1914 Polish legions

4
Appreciate the unfortunate knowledge, child of Europe,
Bequest Gothic cathedrals ...
the works of Descartes, Spinoza, and the loud word "honor."
Cheslav Milos, "Child of Europe"


Since the beginning of World War, the idea of ​​forming a certain Polish militia was seriously discussed among high-ranking Poles, it was especially popular among the emigrants. However, the Russian command at first did not react at all, and the enthusiasm quickly faded away. Here's how 26 (13 Art. Art.) September 1914 wrote about this already at the rate of Kudashev’s minister of foreign affairs at the headquarters of the diplomatic office: “I haven’t heard about the Poles and their proposals to organize militias lately. Another similar proposal was received from a little-known person, but it was declared unacceptable, since the letter of this person spoke about the organization of a purely Polish army, with banners, etc. As for the Polish question in a broader sense, they don’t even speak about it “It’s too far and too many purely military tasks separate us from the time when it will be subject to resolution” (1).



As you can see, most of the authorities were looking at the Polish problem on the principle of "everything ahead." In fact, at the beginning of the war, only the initiative of Vitold Ostoy-Gorchinsky received approval of the Russian authorities. In a telegram from 18 in October 1914, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, General Nikolai Yanushkevich, agreed to the formation of Polish units. Gorchinsky began to act in Brest and in Chelm and continued in Puławy, where the most famous of the Polish legions, the “Puławski Legion”, originated.

1914 Polish legions

The Pulava Legion was almost no different from other regiments of the Russian army.

It seems, indeed, with the grand-ducal "Appeal" Russia was ahead of everyone. But, obviously, first of all, the desire of the highest bureaucracy and advanced liberals from among the Duma members with the start of the war at least in this direction to do something significant worked. Nevertheless, many local historians today tend to regard the Polish Manifesto primarily as a rather aggressive claim to the accession of all Polish lands, albeit in the form of autonomy.

With all the military anti-German hysteria, which included the Polish provinces as well, with all the chanting of the Slavic brotherhood, those in the Kingdom were also quite a few who were ready to fight against Russia to death. According to Polish sources, which are considered almost official, 3 in August in Warsaw was formed without special conspiracy “Zhond narodovy”, which was announced by the Polish commander-in-chief, Jozef Pilsudski.

Jond made an anti-Russian appeal to the Polish people, which was widespread, however, in the Austrian Krakow. There are many reasons to believe that this appeal and the Zhond itself are the fruit of Pilsudski’s imagination or amateur performances together with his closest associates. To give him more weight, the future head of state did not hesitate to "confess" that the Germans financed Zhond in order to give the uprising in the Kingdom a national Polish character (2).

Pilsudski announced the release of the “Appeal” at the meeting of the “Ad-hoc committee of the association of independent organizations” that actually existed. The commission was created back in 1912 year to unite rifle squads and has already accumulated three hundred cells and organizations with several thousand members (3). Under the pressure of Pilsudski, with the outbreak of world war, the Temporary Commission announced that it was subordinate to the leadership of Zhonda. And only 5 August 1915 of the year, entering Warsaw, the Germans did not find there any “Jonda”.

However, Pilsudski created, in addition to Zhonda, a certain people's committee - Członkowie Komitetu Ludowego, with an eastern branch in Lviv, which existed only 10 days before the capture of the city of 3 by General Ruzsky's army. It is characteristic that the committee based in Krakow, that is, on the territory of Austria-Hungary, contacted directly the German command, bypassing the Austrians.

Returning to the year of 1914, we note that no uprising in the lands of the Kingdom of Pilsudski could not be ignited - the Poles in their mass were completely loyal to the Russian crown. Already on 13 in August, the Austro-German command requires the commander of the legions to include his combat units in the Austrian landscape tour. The leadership of the Polish Kolo in the Vienna parliament sharply protested and demanded to reorganize the shooters into the legions on the model of Napoleon. As a result, 27 of August "legions" were still created, and the 1 th legionary regiment was headed by Jozef Pilsudski himself, who had no military education or officer rank. Is it any wonder that in August 1915 of the year the legionnaires were not even allowed to enter Warsaw.

Head of Professor Grabsky

If the Polish population of Galicia, as well as all its inhabitants, except the Germans and Austrians, was completely loyal to the Russian army, this did not mean that it really entered Galicia in the role of “liberator”. It was 1914, and not 1945, and not even 44. For the time being, it could only be about the correction of borders, and not about redrawing the entire map of Europe. In addition, those who owned, albeit formally, the right to decide the fate of the region, had long been divided into Russophiles and Russophobes. Could this be the reason why Pilsudski’s first failure with his legions was explained to everyone?

To understand the attitudes of the “liberated Galicians”, let us turn to the short correspondence of the leader of the Polish National Committee, Professor Stanislav Grabski, a professor at Lviv University, a convinced Russophile, with the new Russian military governor-general, Count Bobrinsky, and Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander Yanushkevich.





Grabski reminded the Russian generals of Vienna’s efforts to incite anti-Russian sentiments among Poles: “With the onset of tension in Austria’s political relations with Russia (annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Viennese government began to take increased measures to cause a popular movement in the event of war with Russia Galicia, which, thrown into the territory of the Kingdom of Poland, would lead to the uprising of the whole Polish people against Russia. "

Noting that such measures did not bring success before 1911, Grabski admitted that there was then a clear split in Polish society, after which the formation of "legions" and "rifle unions" became possible. The professor has analyzed the short enough in some detail. history internal struggle among the very different kinds of Polish national organizations in Galicia, considering it a positive outcome, is no less than the actual prevention of the Polish uprising in Russia.

From the current standpoint, it must be obviously recognized that Stanislav Grabski tried to present objective reality as a result of the efforts of “the best representatives of Polish society”, and therefore did not receive a clear answer to his proposals either from Yanushkevich or from Bobrinsky. We must not forget the not too well-known fact that with the beginning of the World War in the Polish lands both in Germany and in Austria sympathies for the Russians remained - and considerable ones. Regarding Galicia, this is best illustrated by General A.A. Brusilov, at that time - the commander of the 8-th army of the Russian South-Western Front.

“By the way, I must say that not only in Eastern Galicia, where the majority of the population are Ruthenians, located for us for a long time, but also in Western, where the entire population is purely Polish, not only the peasants, but also the Catholic clergy treated us well and in many cases we were helped by all we could. This was explained by the fact that, earlier, according to my order, the well-known appeal of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich to the Poles was widespread among the population. The Poles hoped that with the help of the Russians, an independent Poland would be resurrected again, to which Western Galicia would be joined. I diligently supported them in this hope. It agitated and annoyed the Poles only that there was no evidence from the central government of Russia that the promises of the Grand Duke would be fulfilled; The Poles were very annoyed that the king did not confirm with a single word the promises of the commander-in-chief. They formed the opinion that Nicholas II never fulfills his promises, and therefore many of them, especially the clergy, were afraid that when the need to attract them to their side passed, the Russian government would fake them without in any way embracing the promises of the Grand Duke.

In any case, I must say that during my stay in Western Galicia, it was easy for me and the Poles to live and they very diligently, without refusal, fulfilled all my requirements. Railways, telegraph and telephone lines have never collapsed, attacks even on single unarmed our soldiers never took place. In my turn, I tried to show courtesy to the Poles with all my might, and I think that they were more pleased with us than the Austrians ”(4).


The princely appeal hardly made a revolution in the minds of most of the Poles. Most of them tended toward Russia, but for the Galician Poles, it was still more difficult to go into direct confrontation with Vienna. It’s no accident that with the declaration of war, all Polish parties in Galicia, without much coercion by the authorities, made loyal statements that they would fulfill their duty towards the monarch, believing that this required nothing less or less “national honor” (5) .

However, the tough demands of the authorities, which, with the start of hostilities, directly prompted the Poles to revolt in the Russian lands, as well as the very course of the war, many things changed in the position of Polish society. Doubters, led by Stanislav Grabsky, clearly tended to take the side of Russia, especially since she proposed to unite the three parts of Poland. Also important is the fact that Polish politicians fairly correctly estimated the prospects for Austrian expansion in the Balkans. If the Habsburgs really create a third throne there for themselves, the Poles will finally lose all the chances of independence and even autonomy in this empire. Some Polish leaders did not exclude such a paradoxical variant as the “exchange” of Galicia and Krakow, which the Romanovs would relegate to the same Serbia and the complete domination of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans.

It is significant that it was Stanislav Grabsky, even among the students who received the nickname “bright head”, initiated the creation of a pro-Russian “Supreme National Committee” in Galicia, which would put an end to the activities of both the “national bucket” and the “preliminary commission”. Grabsky remained in Lviv after the Russians captured him and almost immediately suggested that the Governor-General of Galicia, Count GA Bobrinsky, convene some kind of congress of reputable Polish political figures in January 1915 in Lviv.

More than 100 representatives of the counties and cities of Galicia were to take part in the congress. According to the draft of Professor Grabski, they, together with representatives of Russian Poland, were to discuss the beginnings of the administrative and political structure of the liberated Slavic lands and, in the future, the whole of Poland. Mandatory in such cases, proposals on the right of the Polish population to use the Polish language in administrative activities, in educational institutions and church services, on independent land management were accompanied by a direct requirement of administrative autonomy (6).

Is it worth explaining that such “revolutionary” initiatives have not been understood either by the Governor-General of Galicia, or by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General NN Yanushkevich, to whom Bobrinsky turned for advice. It is characteristic that Yanushkevich reminded Bobrinsky that the entry into office of the Warsaw Governor-General P.N.Engalychev and his speech with explanations on the Polish question are expected. In such conditions, according to the general, “the convocation of the congress seems premature,” and “the need for appeals of the Russian authorities to the Polish population is excluded” (7).

General Yanushkevich reasonably noted that if we are talking about the structure of Poland’s internal control, the Congress of Polish representatives can only be convened in Warsaw. But all this is not within the competence of the military authorities, and in general such important issues can be resolved only after the end of the war. Victorious, of course. However, the closest associate of the supreme commander-in-chief, the author of the appeal, did not object to the convening of a congress, the Galician leaders proper. It was this approach to solving Polish problems, with indecision and a desire to postpone everything to “after the war,” and became characteristic of the Russian leaders, with rare exceptions, until February 1917.

Do not forget Talerhof and Terezin

Recall that since the beginning of the war, the national democrats, continuing to follow the royal policy of reunification, tried to negotiate with the nationalists of Galicia - the endetion still claimed political leadership in all three parts of Poland. But these attempts, even after the entry of Russian troops into Galicia, had little success. And the clumsy measures of the newly appointed “temporary” military administration on the Russification of the region gave, in general, a loyal Polish and Jewish population rather than the opposite effect.

The search for a compromise, which was already mentioned by Nicholas II in the “liberated” Galicia, made it even more difficult. The desire of the Russian clerks to curry favor with the sovereign resulted in a frank farce with a demonstration of the monarchical feelings of new loyalists and the “massive” conversion of Rusyn to Orthodoxy. For many Poles, this only alienated them even more from Russia - and, it seems, forever.

Justice demands to be reminded that in the end those who had the courage to believe that the Russians came forever suffered the most. After the Russian army left Galicia, the repressions against the Rusyns, who in fact considered themselves simply Russians, and returned to Orthodoxy, were simply merciless. Not so long ago, the book on the tragic fate of the “liberated” Galicians (8) saw the light, many may consider it odious, but the abundance of the documents cited in it speaks for itself — with the help of a German ally, the Austrians introduced in their own territory the occupation regime is much tougher than in the same Russian Poland. And the concentration camps of Talerhof and Terezin, where not only prisoners of war were kept, but also thousands of civilians, including women and children, became the prototype of the future Dachau and Treblinka. However, there the Nazis brought the death line to the absolute and it was already working completely industrialized.


The terrible prototype of Buchenwald and Dachau was created in Austria-Hungary during the First World War.

And yet, turning to the Poles, the higher circles of Russia were thinking about expansion in the least. Such a paradoxical assessment confirms at least the point of view of the well-known opponent of the war with the Germans, Count S.Yu. Witte. The retired prime minister, contrary to established opinion, on the eve of World War I had certain chances to regain his influence by leading a key finance committee that regulated military lending.

In his criticism of government policy, he was able to find the most vulnerable places. Learning about the publication of the grand-prince's “Appeal,” Witte, in an interview with the Petersburg correspondent of the Russian Word A. Rumanov, did not hesitate to call the war for the liberation of the Poles “absurd” (9), considering the more complete and complete destruction of Poland. Apparently, not without complicity in that of Austria and Germany. But let us recall that, fortunately for the Poles, it was not Witte and his supporters who then ruled the ball in Russian foreign policy.

From here, by the way, a completely different assessment of the goals of the grand duke’s appeal arises. As if in reply to the liberal circles, the authorities, by their habit, tried to throw a bone at them, and at the same time the Polish leaders, the most organized and stubborn of all the “nationalists” of the immense empire. Who would have thought at the beginning of World War II that a purely propaganda “Appeal” would not remain a one-time document? We must not forget that the manifesto on behalf of the commander-in-chief also allowed the tsar and his entourage once more “beautifully” to present themselves to democratic allies.

Notes
1. International relations in the era of imperialism. Documents from the archives of the royal and provisional governments 1878-1917. M.1935, Series III, Volume VI, Part 1, p.319.
2. K.Skorowski, NKN, p.102-103.
3. Stanislaw Kutrzeba, Polska odrodzona 1914-1918, str.17.
4. A. Brusilov. My Memories, M.1946 G., p.120-121.
5. Report of S.Grabsky to the Governor-General of Galicia gr. Bobrinsky. Case of the Chancellery of the Council of Ministers about the structure of the Polish region, L.NUMX.
6. Russian-Polish relations during the world war. ML, 1926 G., p. 35-36.
7. Ibid., P.37.
8. Russian Galicia and Mazepinstvo, M., Imperial Tradition, 2005, About Thalerhof and Terezin, p. 211-529.
9. Arkady Rumanov. Strokes to the portraits: Witte, Rasputin and others. Time and we. New York, 1987. No.95. Page 219.
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  1. +4
    1 November 2018 07: 23
    Pilsudski, acting on the side of the Austro-Hungarian crown, became, as it were, a digger not only in the formation of Polish legions (early August, while the decision to form Russian Polish legions was released on October 18).
    In fact, this opened a pandorra’s box in the formation of legions (or attempts to form) from citizens or citizens of the enemy state (our legions from Czechs - Austrian citizens from prisoners of war appeared a little later than the Polish legions of Pilsudski, which he initially tried to form from among Russian citizens).
    This turned out to be important for both world wars.
    1. +1
      1 November 2018 15: 12
      I know about Pilsudski's "Polish Legions" and was mentioned often on the site, but I hear about "Pulawski Legion" for the first time.
      Pilsudski man is extraordinary - no doubt. It is a pity that he was our opponent.
  2. +1
    1 November 2018 08: 40
    And I’ll ask you to pay attention to how socialists, democrats, liberals throughout Europe so quickly and willingly turned into Nazi Nazis and other nationalists.
    Socialist Poles pursued an internal policy of genocide * of non-Poles *. After the Nazis came to power in Germany, they quickly entered into a military alliance with them under the division of the SOVIET UNION.
    In Germany itself, the Social Democrats welcomed the APPOINTMENT of Hitler as head of government faster than his own party members.
    And so it was throughout Europe, with the rare exception of the Baltic states and Finland, where the Nazis were in power.
    And after the GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR in Europe, the so-called social democrats and how fiercely they resisted * denazification *.
    Today it turns out that the Nazis hid Nazis from all over Europe and prepared from them and their descendants a future administration for * Europeans *.
    The transformation of the Socialist Democrats-Liberals into frenzied Nationalist Nazis is happening today.
  3. IGU
    +4
    1 November 2018 10: 42
    Thank you for the article. I learned many aspects for the first time. It was interesting to read.

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