The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 26. OdVO
I did not knowwhether the corps headquarters received any instructions or information about the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities in the near future, however, some very non-specific orders were received by 51-I Perekopskaya SD from the 14-C headquarters about a day before the start of the war, such as: exit to the line of deployment, to cover parts in beams, return parts to the areas of their parking and so on.
21.6.41 of the year I was in 265-m cap, where I checked the combat training of the regiment. There were no signs of enemy concentration near our border.. At dawn 22.6.41 fighting began on the fly aviation the enemy at our airfields, located 40-50 km from the state border, by shelling our units located barracks in the city of Reni [S.SH.Cekunov - the parts of 25-th SD: 31-th cn, 99-th gap, 47-th ombsb were deployed in Reni;] and Mr. Ishmael [WITH. Chekunov - the parts of 51 str were stationed in Izmail: 287 st and 165 st]] ... "
RCB 14 ck: "22.6.41. 3-05 An order was received to raise parts of the alarm and withdraw from the districts of winter apartments and camps. Parts located on the border to occupy defensive districts.
3-00 Romanian-German troops opened military operations - they launched an offensive in the directions of Cahul, Renii, Kartal and opened artillery fire on the districts of Ishmael and Kiliya.
4-00 Parts raised for combat alert... »
CDB 25 sd (14 sc): "To enhance the protection of the state border ... a squad was formed as part of 2 / 263 cn and 2 / 69 an [2 th battalion of 263 th joint venture and 2 th battalion of 69 th] ... The squad made 12-00 ... and on the night of 20 on 21 June, occupied the defense sector. On the night of 21 [from 20 to June 21] units of 31-th and 54-th joint venture were occupied by defensive areas according to the state border defense plans. 22.6.41 2-00 31-th cn and 54-th cn fully occupied the defense areas... »
We again faced the initiative of the NSh of the Okrug to withdraw the group of troops to the field fortifications to the border ...
14 ck 20-00 22.6.41 live report: "From the dawn of 22.6.41, German-Romanian troops launched an offensive along the entire front of the corps’s defense. With 4-00, enemy aircraft ... consecutive raids bombarded the airfield of Bulgarian and the city of Bolgrad, without causing significant damage ...
On the front of the case, parts of 12, 26 and 32 are presumably operating. 25 sd with border guards with 3-00 reflects attempts to cross the route in the area of Kagul, Renii, Kartal ... 51 sd ... defends the border in the area... »
Intelligence information is incorrect: there is no front of the 12, 26 and 32 front chassis. There are only Romanian two cavalry brigades, 10-i PD and a detachment of marines. Since there is no exact name of the adversary’s connections, it is likely that the RM is not based on the testimony of prisoners. Perhaps this is pre-war intelligence.
PM Verkholovich (NSh 35 sc): "By the time of the German attack the troops remained in the areas they occupied and in the ranges, with the exception of two backs that for the 2-3 of the day were withdrawn and delivered to the OP to cover the garrison of the city of Chisinau ...
12 and 18 of June corps troops, located on the state border, were waiting for provocative actions by the enemy, who were timely warned about the adoption of measures of combat readiness ...
On 0-30, 22 June received an order from the district commander on raising troops Chisinau garrison and troops located in other garrisons, on alert without warning about the danger of war. This was followed by warnings about the combat readiness of the troops., about possible provocations at the border and that the troops did not give in to provocations.
Approximately in 2-00 22 of June reports were received from the troops about the opening of fire from the enemy and about the shootout at the state border, and at the same time, the district headquarters ordered the troops to be on alert and deployed for the defense of the state border in accordance with the previously developed plan... "The time of the opening of fire in 2-00 is doubtful, since this fact is not reflected in either the RCU of the 9 army or the army headquarters report.
Message: "Parts of the case with 4-00 22.6.41 perform the task of covering the state border, according to the plan. Commander 35 sk kombrig Dashichev NSh corps Colonel Verkholovich»
In accordance with the instructions received from the headquarters of the OdVO were prepared PCS # 283, 284 [1 and 2 Parts]: "Commander 30 and 176 cd 95 cd. Corps commander ordered the receipt of this headquarters and parts of divisions alarm alert is announced. Parts withdraw from locations in the closest areas according to the designation of the division commanders, carefully disguise themselves, taking security measures without noise.
Divisional commanders check readiness and disguise and, for a report to the Military Council, bring 9-00 22.6.41. The progress report in three hours. Hang up on 22-00 22.6.41. When driving, treat crops with care - do not trample crops ... "
Received in SHO 22.6. 1-40, encrypted with 22.6.41 I h. 2-00, II h. 2-30.
This is probably the first indication NSh VM Zakharov commanders of corps. Headquarters and units are not brought to the areas defined by the Cover Plans, but to the nearest areas. Take care of your crops ...
RCB 147 Dep. artillery battalion (30 cd 35 ck): "22-June 1941, in 3-30 separate DC battery ... in full combat strength - 4-x firing platoons: 11 "Komsomolets" tractor, 8 pieces 45 mm guns, 8 vehicles and odnik "BK" was alerted to performing the task... "
CDB 95 sd (35 ck): "In 2-00 22.6.41 with 35 Pins [headquarters 35 ck] An alarm was announced to parts of 95 sd with the task of being ready to repel the enemy when crossing the Prut river. Through 1-45, the parts were ready to execute the order. In 4-00 22.6.41, the enemy began the shelling of border villages... »
According to the time specified in the PC and XB 95-th SD, we see that the command of the 35-C sk raised subordinate divisions and units along open lines of communication, not waiting for PCs to reach the headquarters of the formations and units. Please note that in PCs it says “Release in 22-00 22.6.41". Even in 1-40 22.6.41, the district commanders do not know whether there will be a war or not. According to the author, people at that time thought only about possible provocations.
PC (time to send 7-15 22.6.41): "Commander of the OdVO troops. I ask to give an instruction to the movement of the Kishinev railway troops on the allocation of rolling stock for the evacuation of families of the commanders of the garrison in the amount of two echelons. Are there instructions on shipping from Ackerman to Chisinau ... Kombrig Dashichev».
We see that the commander of 35 sk Ivan Fedorovich Dashichev prepares the dispatch of families of the commanders before sending from Moscow Directive No. XXUMX. Perhaps this is also a manifestation of his private initiative, caused by concerns about the lives of military families. We will see a similar efficiency in the evacuation of families in the 2-kk.
PC (23-00 22.6.41): "Prepare on the likely directions of action of the motor-mechanical parts pr-ka mining sites. Strengthen defense work at the main line of the Prut River. Bridges on the river Prut undermine. Do not allow in any case dangling people in the rear. To provide 100% of the personnel of the combatant units to the combat formations of the units ... To supply the units from peacetime warehouses ... Comp 35 sk kombrig Dashichev»
Unlike PribOVO, the order to mine sites is given by the end of the day on June 22. Do not forget that, according to intelligence, there were up to 900-960 anti-war troops tanks.
P.A. Belov (Commander 2-th QC: 5-I and 9-I cd): "9 cd two regiments on defense alert took the defense of the river Prut to about 3-00 22.6.»
RCB 5 cd: "Task: 5 cd to 21-00 22.6.41 to concentrate in the region ... The division marched with 16-00 22.6... »
RCB 131 CP (5 cd): "The 22.6.41 in the 6-00 regiment received an order from the commander of the 5 cd to be ready to perform a combat mission... »
RCB 160 CP (5 cd): "22.6.41 Fascist Germany violated the treaty ... barbarously attacked the Soviet Union ... In 8-00, the Order was read to the entire commanding staff of the regiment and the regiment began to prepare for the performance... »
N.S. Oslikovsky (Assistant Commander 9-th cd): "Approximately in 2-20 22 June, I was awakened by a phone call, and when I arrived at the division headquarters, I found everyone already assembled, since The encryption of the headquarters of the OdVO on the withdrawal of parts to the border was obtained. By proposing to the division commander and the NS corps to act as we did at the previous night training and received their consent [Who commanded the division at all?], I called the commanders 5, 108 and 136 kp to the phone and personally gave them the conditional password, after which I got into the car and drove from Comrat to Leovo, where I arrived at dawn, meeting cars and carts with evacuating families of commanders on the way...
In Leovo, I found parts of 5 kp already withdrawn and occupied trenches; artillery took firing positions. Minutes through 10 after my arrival, as soon as dawn began, around 4 hours of 22 June 1941, the enemy opened artillery fire ... The tank regiment was fully equipped... "In the tank regiment 9-th cd was about 64 tanks.
YES. Myakushev (5 qn xnumx cd): "On June 19, we went home to Leovo from the range ... The squadron mortar men had another big task - to equip a separate stable for the platoon horses. We had to do this on Sunday, 22 of June, therefore, on Saturday having finished our work, we prepared working uniforms. In the afternoon we went to a bathhouse on the bank of the Prut. We noticed that for some reason the Romanian border guards with fishing rods do not sit on the opposite shore and do not stare at us ... As usual, they fell asleep with the last peaceful sleep.
About 2-30 at night the squadron on duty shouted: “Alarm!”. This is a common thing - our 5-th regiment, the only one of all the regiments of the division, stood directly on the border, and we had two alarms for a week. They quickly got dressed and, having disassembled the rifles and checkers, ran to the stable to saddle the horses. Around the stables lined up and waited for the team. The platoon commanders came running. A command was sent to send to the barracks of the Red Army men: lay down the sheets, blankets, free the mattresses from the hay and immerse it all in the convicts. And we were given combat grenades RGD. It has come to be that this is not an ordinary alarm, something serious is happening.
Then the senior lieutenant, the commander of our platoon ... brought the medallion, and we ... filled out the forms with the addresses of the parents of the Red Army men and platoon sergeants and distributed them ... Only we got ready to go for breakfast, as the whistle of flying projectiles was heard and right there - the roar near gaps ... It was in 4 hours am 22 June 1941 of the year... "
The division of the cavalry regiment 9-th cd, located on the border, did not advance to defensive positions before the shelling began. It turns out and then did not wait for the start of the war at dawn 22 June ...
RCB 9 cd: "22.6.41 1-00 Romanian troops without a declaration of war fired at our border ... and launched an offensive on the entire front ... The enemy’s attack was restrained by our border guards before our division arrived at the border. 136 kp together with the border post bravely restrained the onslaught of the enemy ... 22.6.41 in the 1-30 division declared anxiety. Parts of the division after the march from the areas of location to 7-00 concentrated and occupied the defense... »
An erroneous time of shelling and offensive along the entire border is probably inscribed in the RCB. In accordance with the memories of D.A. Myakushev, the shelling began near 4-00.
Boevoy order №1. 9 headquarters cd. Comrat, 22.6.41 5-30 (entered in 5-st kn 22.6 in 7-00): "1. The enemy is trying to force the Prut River on the Leovo, Gotheshta section of the forces.
2. 9 cd advocates and defense r. Prut in the district of Leovo, Giltos, Kachaliya.
3. 5 kp with a cannon battery 12 Konad [horse-artillery battalion] to defend the river Prut in the area ...
4. 108 kp with battery 12 Konad r.Prut on the site ...
5. 136 kp with battery Konad, defend the plot ...
6. 72 CP, 30 TP, Battery Konad in Maugham Reserve... "[Aut. spelling.]
A.G. Batyunya (NS 48 ck: 74 cd and 150 cd): "8 June 1941, in accordance with the order of the OdVO headquarters, the corps management, leaving two divisions and all corps units on vehicles to be permanently deployed, was redeployed to the Floreşti region... "
[S.L. Chekunov - the management of 48 ck was advanced on the basis of the disposition of the Supreme Command OVBO from 6.6.41.
In the new place in the corps included: 74 and 176 sd, 30 gsd.
A.G. Batyunya: "By 22 June 1941 of the year, the dislocation of the corps units was changed, namely: 176 sd remained in place, reinforcing the border troops in its sector; 30 GDS moved to the state border line east. bank Prut ... 74 sd passed in the Balti region to the west, making up the second echelon of the corps ...
21 June evening, from the district headquarters, or rather from the OdVO task force stationed in Tiraspol, a warning was received that sabotage and armed attempts to violate the state border were possible on the night of 22 in June. The troops were ordered: to be in a state of full combat readiness to repel the enemy in the event of his attempts to violate the line of the state border. At the same time, it was strictly forbidden to transfer them to the territory of Romania in the event of hostilities.... »
In accordance with the data presented in the 25 part, the phrase “21 June evening”Meant the period from 23-00 to 24-00 21 June.
KD Litvinov (Chief of Operations Division of 48 headquarters ck): "Of the three sd, available in the corps, only one - 176 cd without funds the reinforcements were deployed in advance in battle formation along the state border ... The front, covered by its parts, reached approximately 125 km. The frontier that occupied 176 sd was located at a distance of 3-15 km from the border troops directly defending the state border of the USSR and Romania ... 30 GDS and 74 cd and corps were concentrated ... at a distance to 140 km from the state border ... artillery-anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery units and rifle divisions to the beginning of the war were on the county fees and arrived in their units already in the course of the outbreak of hostilities ...
Down to until 8 JuneIn fact, no effective measures were taken to bring the troops on alert and to strengthen the defense of the state border. From 8 June, separate parts and connections of the OdVO began advancing to the borders and partial deployment foreseen by the mobilization plans. But these activities in the corps connections were not completed by the beginning of the war. The corps received the combat task of defending the state border only on the first day of the war. Prior to that, there were no specific orders from the army command, with the exception of a warning about possible provocations and the withdrawal of troops to new areas of concentration.... »
The date of June 8, as you remember, is related to intelligence information from 6 June about the expectation of some events of June 9-12.
KD Litvinov: "By the beginning of the war, the formations and units of the corps had not yet completed their mobilization, a significant part of them was concentrated at a great distance from the border, exceeding two to three or more daily transitions, which made it difficult for them to enter the battle in a timely and organized ...
Early in the morning of 22 on June 1941, the corps headquarters was informed by 9 A headquarters about the attack on the USSR by fascist Germany and its satellites ... The corps units and units warned of 21 June by the district headquarters about the impending attack of the enemy were brought into advance in the first hours of the outbreak of the war. suffered no casualties ...
Equally important... had the fact that the corps troops were concentrated in a direction where the enemy, at the beginning of the war, did not undertake hostilities with strong strike forces of his troops with decisive goals...
It should also be noted that, in spite of the fact that the fascist German troops had already begun a real war with the USSR, in the first days of the corps and corps troops there was an atmosphere of disbelief in the possibility of... »
HER. Maltsev (deputy commander for political affairs 74 cd): "20 June was ordered by the corps commander to give out to the fighters and commanders of the helmet ... At about half past four in the morning on 22 June a Thunderstorm signal was received, which should open the red packet containing the corps action plan to cover the USSR State border. War!.. "
ZhBD 11 td (2 microns): "In 2 hours of 22.6.41, an alarm was declared on parts of 11, etc., with the task of alerting parts ... In 5-55, without warning and declaring war, fascist aircraft in the number of 11 aircraft accompanied by fighters made the first raid on the city of Chisinau. After 10 minutes after the first raid, a second German bombers raid was made, who were met by anti-aircraft artillery fire.
Thereafter hours in 10 22.6.41 commander 11 td colonel Kuzmin was given a military order: "... I order immediately to bring all parts to combat readiness, to leave the parts in the former areas, to organize an enhanced outposts and air surveillance. Air defense systems will be brought to combat readiness and repel enemy aircraft raids ... "By the time of the announcement of the mobilization of the 11 unit, td: 21 tp, 22 tp, gap and 3 / 11 MSP on the range north-east of Chisinau dispersed in battalion order. Part of the combat vehicles and personnel of the 21 tp were located at the Bushora range, where tank gunfire was carried out... »
A.G. Earthy (NSh 16 td): "By the time of the perfidious German attack on the Soviet Union ... parts of the division had been withdrawn from the garrisons in advance to the adjacent forests of Balta and Kotovsk.
[S.L. Chekunov - this is about bringing 16 etc. to summer camps.]
Part of the division was transferred to combat readiness on the basis of the command of the commander of the OdVO from 22 .6.41 0-20 and began to mobilize the units and subunits of the division ... By the beginning of the fighting, the division was not an effective connection, since strike force - tanks - absent... »
Historical form 47 mp (15 md 2 micron): "22.6.41. Raising the regiment in alarm and making a march to occupy the starting line for striking the enemy... "
O. Yu. Kozinkin stated: "I argue that, in KOVO, we started with 16 June to output the 4-th and 19-th microns first of all and started to stir up something with 8-m. You on 4-th and 19-th do not pull me to refute? By 2 on OdVO does not pull to expose..."
What happened in the mechanized corps KOVO and ZAPOVO, we saw in the previous parts. Something to assert without providing data that is contradictory, agree, frivolously. And if a writer claims the historical authenticity of only his version, then this is unacceptable. Data about what is happening in 2-m mk OdVO we just saw. It is also impossible to assert from them that O. Yu. Kozinkin uses the correct statement ...
N.I. Krylov (NS Danube SD): "20 June, I met a family in Bolgrad ... All five ... went to sleep on the floor ... The very Saturday came the next morning ... The next night, at dawn, a Red Army officer from our headquarters woke me up with a sharp knock on the window. Quickly I went out into the courtyard, and the first thing I perceived was the characteristic roar of the motors of the hawks of the I-16. They were in the air, although no flights and exercises (I knew for sure) were not foreseen on Sunday ... When I ran up to the headquarters, from the border I heard the growing roar of airplanes, not ours anymore. Then Bolgrad began to bomb, and over the city began an air battle... »
PM Shafarenko (NSH 6 vdbr, 3 vdk): "Four days before the start of the war, the corps commander ... conducted tactical exercises with the commanders and staffs of 6 and 212 brigades ... At dawn, they threw us "into the rear of the enemy" ... The exercise was useless ...
The call of the operational duty officer early in the morning of 22 June 1941 of the year caught me at breakfast. The officer on duty reported that the brigade had been alerted. Kombrig and Commissioner summoned to corps headquarters. I run to the headquarters, fastening my belts. The soldiers, led by younger commanders, leave the barracks, heading for the assembly areas. Quickly contact the NSh corps ...
“Today at four in the morning,” he said, “the German troops crossed our border.”... "
K.S. Grushevsky (2 secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk regional committee of the CP (b)): “The phone rang aggressively ... "I listen ..."
- You are called General Dobroserdov. The general commanded the 7 sk. What could have happened at Dobroserdov so early on? .. Konstantin Leonidovich apologized for the early call and asked for an urgent visit to the corps headquarters.
- What have you got there? Dobroserdov paused. Then he said softly and gloomily: “War... "
V.M. Shatilov (NSh 196 sd): "Early in the morning, 22 was woken by an insistent knock at the door of a small camp house. “Comrade Major, the division commander urgently summons you to the headquarters,” I heard the voice of a messenger puffing from running. A few minutes later I learned about the beginning of the war.... »
RCB 20 Garden: "22.6.41. During the 22.6.41 air division, fighter regiments [4 & 55 iap] covered the cities of Chisinau, Balti, Tiraspol, fought with the enemy bombers.
Bomber Regiments [45-th sbap and 211-th bbap] bombed railway the bridge of the river Prut in the district of Iasi and the crossing in the district of Dumen, Lipcani... »
V.P. Karpovich (commander of the 55 th iap): "It was a Sunday, which I had to be a participant and a witness. On the eve I tried to go to the family with some kind of opportunity, but it did not turn out to be one, and I stayed in the camp among the squadron friends, intending to spend a weekend with them in nature.
Early in the morning, when the dawn was not yet engaged and the earth was shrouded in darkness, the air camp was, after a hard day’s work, plunged into a deep sleep, only the duty outfit kept the watch without closing its eyes. Suddenly, the pre-dawn silence was cut by the dull sound of strikes into the rail, and the heartbreaking howl of the siren disturbed the rest of the sleepers.
Anxiety! Only extraordinary circumstances in military life require the use of such signals and immediate action. But the rise of personnel in combat alarm can be for training purposes, and such a test of combat readiness was carried out the day before. No one, of course, did not expect the alarm to repeat again the next day, on Sunday.
The flight and technical staff of the fighter air regiment, the services of the airfield maintenance battalion, raised by alert, were triggered according to the combat schedule ... At that time everything was set in motion at the airfield - the material part of the aircraft was spreading, gasoline and oil tankers, auto starters were coming up , transport with ammunition and compressed air. The aircraft were being prepared for departure ... The aircraft mechanics and special equipment specialists made refueling of the aircraft with fuel and lubricants, debugged the aircraft equipment and armaments, checked the work of the control devices and aircraft controls. At different ends of the airfield, motors were launched, machine-gun bursts cracked, fire tracks flashed - gunsmiths fired machine guns.
At this time, the pilots of the 1 Squadron Semyon Ovchinnikov, Alexander Mochalov, Kuzma Seliverstov, Alexei Ovsyankin, Konstantin Mironov, Alexander Surov, Ivan Makarov, Grigory Shiyan, Ivan Skomorokha and Nikolai Kalitenko, led by their team, Fyodor Atrashkevich, a team, and they was a team, and they was a part of the team, and they were a part of the team, and they were a part of the team, and they were a part of the team, and they will be replaced by a team of them, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a team while on combat duty at the Singureny stationary airfield near the city of Balti, they were already in the first air battle to repel a raid on the city and the airfield of German bombers covered by fighters ...
In the last months before the war, the situation in the frontier zone was created rather tense, there were grounds to believe that some important events were brewing on the other side of the state border. German reconnaissance aircraft more and more began to violate the state border and invade Soviet territory. In order to counteract reconnaissance flights, an order was received to organize airfield ambushes at advanced landing sites. The task of duty units included interception of enemy reconnaissance aircraft and forcing them to land at our nearest airfields. It was strictly forbidden to engage in air combat and shoot down violators in order to avoid complications of diplomatic relations with Germany.
Once, when Valentin Figychev, pursuing such an air violator, happened to be on the other side of the border, this led to a lot of noise and a diplomatic scandal, while Valentine himself had to write explanatory words for a long time ...
18 June 1941 of the year. The pilot of our regiment, Junior Lieutenant Ivan Khanin, went up to patrol from the Vali-Mary field site on the I-153 plane. Finding a German intelligence officer over Soviet territory, he blocked his path, opening barrage fire. Approaching the enemy's scout for a short distance, he began to give him signals, forcing him to land. However, the shooter reconnaissance aircraft opened fire on the Soviet fighter. Our plane was shot down, Junior Lieutenant Ivan Yefremovich Khanin was killed. This incident was observed by border troops, heard machine-gun fire and saw the fall of the Khanin aircraft ...
The second squadron was brought to full combat readiness in a matter of minutes ... When setting the task, the commander informed us that a message had been received from the division headquarters: “Today, at about four in the morning, fascist Germany attacked our country. Frontier posts, fortified defenses, troops located in the border zone, communications centers were subjected to powerful artillery shelling.... »
I.I. Dog dog (the commander of the link 211-th bbap): "In April, 1941, the 211-th bap went out to the field airfield near the Dniester River. At the end of the month, and especially in May, anxiety increased in the regiment. Rare days did without them. We ran to the planes, hung bombs, loaded machine guns.
Sometimes a link, less often a squadron was lifted into the air. An hour later, everyone returned, having completed the task: they flew in formation, then to ground bombing. Then, the commanders checked the contents of the suitcases with which they were at the alarm, and followed the hang up ...
The command of the regiment, of course, saw us approaching the war better, took all measures to increase combat readiness, and now, many years later, I can say with complete confidence that the more the time was reduced to the perfidious German attack, those our worries.
22 June, twenty minutes before the start of the war, which turned out, of course, later, 211-th bap was alerted ... At first, everything went in the usual way. I, the navigator, the technician and the mechanic, hung up the bombs, loaded the machine gun belts ... All the crews of the regiment started and tested the motors. Then the motors stopped. We are sitting, waiting for the next team. Relaxed. If no one is lifted up into the air, it means that they will soon hang up. Hour we sit. Located in the grass, near the aircraft. None of the commanders on the field does not appear ...
Half an hour later, the team: "To destroy the planes!" They were standing in line with us. Airplanes were dispersed around the airfield perimeter: the places for this were determined in advance. Soon a new team: “Disguise planes!” The signal is not good. But the trees for camouflage were also watched. Chopped down. Masked. Hitchhiking with the next team ... Here they declare: "Gathering a regiment on the bank of a ravine ..."
On the edge of the ravine a commander appeared with his deputies, and we began to build quickly, but he ordered with a gesture: no. Our commander’s voice is dull, even hoarse. “Comrades!” He said, and there was a tense silence.
- Without a declaration of war, the Germans began fighting. Enemy aviation barbarously bombed our cities ... The official message about the beginning of the war was broadcast on the radio in two hours... »
Commander 20-th garden A.S. Osipenko: "Despite the sufficient amount of time from the moment the alarm was announced to the enemy’s raid, the units still couldn’t get away from the blow with the least losses and damage the enemy ... The dispersal of the material part was unsatisfactory in all the regiments. Airplanes are crowded; together on the same field there are serviceable and faulty planes ... Disguise, it can be considered no... »
HELL. Yakimenko (deputy commander of 67 iap): "22 June. Many commanders, assuming that nothing would happen at the weekend, decided to rest. But not everyone thought so. We dispersed the fighters of our regiment on the airfield in such a way as to take off immediately when the enemy attacked. And just before dawn, there was a roar from Romania, a German reconnaissance aircraft appeared. Our pilots immediately took off and shot him down. Behind him 50 German bombers appeared in the sky. All 30 fighters of our regiment met fascists in the air... »
В 2-50 in 67, the IAP declared the alarm and dispersed the planes. In the 4-10 from the west seemed a scout - a twin-engine bomber. 22.06.41 opponent made two attempts at a raid on the airfield in Bolgrad, but the regiment pilots repelled raids. In just one day, the regiment destroyed 13-16 enemy planes on 117 sorties, losing 1 or 2 to their aircraft.
A.T. Cherevatenko (69 st ip): "At dawn, 22 June siren suddenly began to whine ... Buttoning up jackets on the move, pilots, engineers, technicians ran to the headquarters ... It took no more than six or seven minutes - and the regiment was assembled ... We are still in ignorance. “Leonid Utesov came to Odessa, we will meet,” someone is trying to joke ... In the face of Maryinsky, you can see: upset about something. He walked along the ranks, stopped, shifting from foot to foot: “Comrades pilots, engineers, technicians and mechanics! Today at four in the morning fascist German Germany, treacherously violating the treaty, attacked our country... "
N.V. Isaev (131-iap 45 garden): "Sunday promised to be fair ... We arrived here to undergo combat training and master new cars. They look more impressive than our "donkeys", - so we tenderly called our stupid And-16 ...
My turn came, and I took to the air ... Piloting in the zone, I gladly worked out turns, fighting turns, coups, went into a dive and soared up again ... Suddenly I heard the order: "Go on landing!" Something happened, I thought, and how nice it is that there is a radio on the plane. Previously, we did not know this luxury. When I planted the car, the instructor ran up and said with concern: “At twelve government communication” ... From the very first words of V.Molotov's speech, it became clear: war!.. "
V.M. Sinai (131 st ip): "In peacetime in Zaporozhye, we carried out a combat mission, covered the area of the Dnieper and Krivoy Rog. Duty were daily. Flights were early in the morning, from dawn, from five in the morning, unless the squadron was on duty. And when the squadron was on duty, the flights were not in the morning but in the evening. The duty was carried out in the form №2 and form №1.
Position number XXUMX is a pilot in the cockpit, everything is connected, a signal rocket, and it goes into the air. Form number XXUMX - it's all under the plane, you can relax, at the ready, two hours we have a break. Then again in the form number XXUMX. When we switched to duty on the form number XXUMX, then left to smoke.
15.4.41, an alarm was declared, Yakov Vladimirovich Smushkevich flew in ... By the position in 20 minutes all 60 fighters had to stand on the runway. And here for 2 hours 4 aircraft were delivered to the runway. Each squadron (and all of them were 4) with difficulty on the shoulders dragged along the plane. Because the soil in Ukraine, black soil, so much so that the plane is tied up. Therefore, dragged on the shoulders. The motor could not be started. I remember, the regiment was standing, Yakov Vladimirovich Smushkevich was walking, leaning on a stick ... I heard Smushkevich say to Conrad: “Not today, tomorrow, to fight the Germans, and what are you playing here in the trials?” In short, just removed.
The lieutenant colonel came. Not as distinguished as Conrad, but an experienced, skilled military man, an excellent pilot. He took matters into his own hands. Started to fly twice a day. I don’t know how he arranged all this, because, among other things, we had friction with the bombers who stood at this airfield because the commander of the bomber division commanded the garrison, and we were not always given time to fly. In general, Goncharov entered in April, as early as May we flew to the field airfield in Novaya Poltavka, in the area of Nikolaev.
In Bessarabia, our Dad repeatedly trained the regiment in alert - either to intercept the naval assault, or to intercept the bombers. You see, what a stupid situation! We saw German intelligence officers flying daily through us, and we had no right to oppose them to anything. Not only to shoot down, but it was impossible to take off and ask them to leave ... I don’t remember now that in some regiment the pilot flew out and pursued a scout. So he was arrested and tried ...
22 June was a little rain. It was quiet at night. We slept in tents under the sound of rain. Shortly after dawn, the howling sound of a siren suddenly came. We all grumbled: “What will this Daddy on Sunday not allow to rest ?! Only three days ago, we reflected the Romanian troops. Here is the alarm again! ”I ran to the plane, uncovered it, started the engine, began to try. Other aircraft also started the engines. Squadrons stood along all sides of a rectangular airfield. Our squadron was located closest to the village, so we started first.
Soon squadrons launched, which stood on the sides, the fourth squadron, which stood on the opposite side, launched last. When the fourth squadron was launched, I was already finishing the test of the engine, I warmed it. Suddenly I felt a knob on my legs. I saw that a weapons engineer was jerking an aileron, showing me to remove the gas. I removed the gas. He came up and said that machine guns should be tested. I was outraged to shoot 4 machine guns, then take them off and clean them - it's half a day, all Sunday will be gone. He told me something else, but I did not understand. Then he put his hand on my shoulder, bent down to my ear, said: “War, Sinai, war, what Sunday! ..”
Without waiting for any instructions, we began to dig a gap. Then Tokarev came running - we temporarily threw down the gaps and dragged the planes into the forest belt around the airfield, disguised them. Again began to crack. And by the time when, as scheduled, a German intelligence officer had flown in, there were not only aircraft, but also tankers and no starters at the aerodrome - there were no signs of the presence of an airfield. Apparently, therefore, on the first day of the war the Germans never touched our airfield - measures were taken in a timely manner.... "
A.A. Pavlichenko: "I started [war] in the rank of lieutenant in 210-m bbap ... 22 June ... We were on [field] airfield near Pervomaisk, station Pandurka [about 260 km from the border]. Then they suddenly woke up and immediately building. They built and turned on MNRT's radio on 12 hours, announced that we were suddenly, without declaring war, attacked by the Germans. We saw that some planes were flying at a high altitude, but who we did not know, German bombers were going through our airfield. War alert was announced. Aircraft settled in all places. But the regiment was not ready for combat sortie, there were no bomb holders, the bombs themselves, the planes were not filled with ammunition... »
G.F. Sivkov (pilot ot.korpusnoy air squadron): "22 June 1941 of the year. 7 o'clock in the morning. Woke up. We lie, joker. We hear a knock at the window.
- Whom is it early in the morning? - grumbles Pavel Startsev. - They will not give sleep enough ... Yevgeny Mylnikov slowly dressed and, dancing, went outside. He soon came back and said quietly, calmly: "Anxiety." And he fell on the bed. We are lying too. He shouts: “Anxiety!” “What are you yelling ?!” Ivan Kramorenko tells him.
- Anxiety !!! Damn you! Get up!
- And why did it fall apart?
- I'm already dressed ...
We jump up, dress quickly and run to the headquarters. There is no one. Soon the squadron commander appeared: "Who declared the alarm ?!"
- The duty officer in part ...
Sappers sailed past us. From them we learn about the violation of our state border ... And suddenly, among the howling roar of the motors, someone shouts: “Crosses on the wings! See the crosses!.. "
The author did not manage to find confirmation that the air regiments of the Air Force OdVO, flying up at dawn, dispersed around field airfields by the morning ... The district pilots were lucky that most of their opponents were Romanian pilots who did not have combat experience, could not use the shortcomings of Soviet aviation and were largely outdated the material part. General F. G. Michugin was the only commander of the Air Force of the western border districts, who survived the initial period of the war.
RCB 9 Dep. (Crimea): "On the night from 21 to 22.6.41, the German army, without declaring war, crossed the borders of the USSR and formed a front from the White to the Black Sea. 9 std.korpus, as part of 156 and 106 cd and 32 cd on the orders of the Headquarters One in 2-00 22.6.41 is on alert... »
P.I. Batov (the commander of the land forces of the Crimea - the commander of 9 otd.sk): "With the beginning of the war, the Supreme Command set the task for the land forces of Crimea to defend the coast and prevent the landing of both sea and airborne troops, and before the Black Sea Fleet - to ensure the supremacy of our naval forces on the Black Sea ... The resulting task obliged us to determine the place and role of the 9-s special sk in the defense of the Crimea ...
At the end of June 1941, during negotiations with Moscow, Marshal B.Shaposhnikov told me: “You understand, my dear, that success German troops in the Crimea to the extreme would exacerbate the situation not only at LF. From the Crimea one step to Taman and to the Caucasian oil. Take all measures of antiamphibious defense both on the coast and inside the Crimea ...
From the first days of the war, submarines were sent into active search in positions near the Bosphorus, Varna and Constanta - in anticipation of entering the Black Sea forces. outside...
I have extracts from intelligence and other staff documents of the time. What is there just not!
June 22: a landing is being prepared in Constanta ... 10 enemy transports have been discovered by air reconnaissance ... direction to the Crimea.
June 24: a submarine was found aboard Shocho ... concentration of vessels in the Constanta area indicates preparation of a landing ... on the airfields of Bucharest a cluster of six-engine transport aircraft for paratroop transfer.
27 June: the Italian fleet proceeded through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea for the landing of troops in Odessa and Sevastopol.
June 28: confirmed the presence of landing craft in Constance 150. In the first half of July, the same thing - from the region of Constanta, Tulcea, from the airfields of Romania it is possible to wait for landings, both sea and air, from day to day.
July 7th Danube Headquarters flotilla reported that 37 transports with troops left ports of Bulgaria and Romania in an unknown direction... "
JBD 21 Aviation Regiment DD: "22.6.41. In 6-00, a combat alarm has been declared in the regiment. Fascist robber aviation attacked the land of Allu, without any declaration of war. In 4-00 bombed Sevastopol, Kiev, Zhytomyr and other cities. The regiment was ordered to prepare for the relocation of Dzhankoy, then the relocation was set aside by the th division. The regiment is engaged in under-lnnn.postav and m / h to the flight... "
From the presented materials on OdVO it is clear that it was not possible to find anything extraordinary in comparison with other border districts. No traces of instructions from the top leadership of the spacecraft in preparation for the war at dawn on 22 June. We met, as in other districts, to a greater extent a private initiative of commanders. In OdVO - this is the National Okrug of VM Zakharov, who took the initiative both before the beginning of the war and on the eve of it.
* * *
At this point, the author concludes the consideration of the cycle of an unexpected attack. After reviewing all the districts, the author returns to the conclusions he made at the end of the 17 part. At the same time, I would like to note the following: the author does not see the perpetrators of the catastrophe that occurred. There are huge human casualties, huge losses of military equipment and warehouses, and, according to the author, there are no guilty ...
There was an underestimation of the number of German divisions, sufficient to start a full-scale war. The General Staff and military science incorrectly believed that Germany would advance against the USSR on the western border before 180 ... 200 divisions. This may be objected to me: after all, the games considered participation of German divisions in the 150-160 war. However, there is a wording: without waiting for the end of the concentration of German troops ...
The presence of shock moto-tank groups — tank groups — was not opened by intelligence. Without the presence of such groups, according to the Soviet command, it was impossible to start a war. The Germans did not fight without such groups either in Poland or in France.
Nobody thought that it was possible to manufacture the troops in almost a day to attack such a powerful force as a spacecraft. Nobody thought that the mototank groups that had emerged from the air would rush to the operational space.
The military-political leadership was confident that it would be able, through the gradual build-up of a group of spacecraft troops, to counter or deflect the threat of a war. Without obstructing the reconnaissance flights of German aircraft, the country's leadership and the spacecraft were probably trying to show that the USSR was not preparing for a preemptive strike against the German forces. Rather “detailed” RMs probably inspired confidence that the preparations for the war would be opened in time, and the troops would leave the RPM before the Nazis hit them. German intelligence in this case should be outdated.
The author of the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff do not see - they tried to act according to science, but it turned out as always. Without waiting for the war, they did not accelerate the bringing of the troops of the border districts to combat readiness.
I.V. Stalin carefully studied all the documents submitted by the intelligence services and the military. About the number in 180 of the German divisions he should have known. There was no such number and close to the RM. There were no German motorized corps there (0 of 12-ti available in the Wehrmacht) and there were no tank groups (0 of 3-5 that appeared in the war in Poland or in France). The author does not see Stalin in the incident.
Our intelligence did not face such a large-scale opposition to them. No one at this time encountered such opposition to the actions of intelligence. There was still nothing like this with extensive disinformation at all levels, including the most advanced one. There is no fault of our scouts in what happened.
It seems to me that only the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the lost Soviet people in the war, their relatives who have lost their loved ones are entitled to blame the leaders mentioned above. The blessed memory of the perished Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War!
In conclusion, the author would like to say the following: the sad experience of 1941 will not be repeated in the future. Potential opponents will never succeed again. attack unexpectedly. Too huge price in 1941-45's. paid our motherland and our people for the confidence of the leadership of the country and the army.
- aKtoR
- The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. 13 part
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 14)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 15)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 16)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 17)
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 18. Air defense
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 19. Air defense
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 20. Lvo
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 21. Cova
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 22. Cova
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 23. SOBOVO
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 24. SOBOVO
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 25. OdVO
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