Military Review

The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 26. OdVO

257
N.K. Ryzhi (chief of artillery 14 ck): "Flags of anti-aircraft artillery were carried out on a district scale with the expiry date, as far as I remember, by June 15. By order of the OdVO headquarters, the duration of anti-aircraft artillery gathering was unexpectedly reduced, and by 5 June All anti-aircraft artillery units were returned to their seats.


I did not knowwhether the corps headquarters received any instructions or information about the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities in the near future, however, some very non-specific orders were received by 51-I Perekopskaya SD from the 14-C headquarters about a day before the start of the war, such as: exit to the line of deployment, to cover parts in beams, return parts to the areas of their parking and so on.

21.6.41 of the year I was in 265-m cap, where I checked the combat training of the regiment. There were no signs of enemy concentration near our border.. At dawn 22.6.41 fighting began on the fly aviation the enemy at our airfields, located 40-50 km from the state border, by shelling our units located barracks in the city of Reni
[S.SH.Cekunov - the parts of 25-th SD: 31-th cn, 99-th gap, 47-th ombsb were deployed in Reni;] and Mr. Ishmael [WITH. Chekunov - the parts of 51 str were stationed in Izmail: 287 st and 165 st]] ... "

RCB 14 ck. "22.6.41 3 – 05 An order was received to raise parts of the alarm and withdraw from the districts of winter apartments and camps. Parts located on the border to occupy defensive districts.

3 – 00 Romanian-German troops opened military operations - they launched an offensive in the directions of Cahul, Renii, Kartal and opened artillery fire on the districts of Ishmael and Kiliya.

4 – 00 Parts raised for combat alert
... »

CDB 25 sd (14 ck): "To enhance the protection of the state border ... a squad was formed as part of 2 / 263 cn and 2 / 69 an [2 th battalion of 263 th joint venture and 2 th battalion of 69 th] ... The squad made 12-00 ... and on the night of 20 on 21 June, occupied the defense sector. On the night of 21 [from 20 to June 21] units of 31-th and 54-th joint venture were occupied by defensive areas according to the state border defense plans. 22.6.41 2-00 31-th cn and 54-th cn fully occupied the defense areas... »

We again faced the initiative of the NSh of the Okrug to withdraw the group of troops to the field fortifications to the border ...



14 ck 20-00 22.6.41 live report. "From the dawn of 22.6.41, German-Romanian troops launched an offensive along the entire front of the corps’s defense. With 4-00, enemy aircraft ... consecutive raids bombarded the airfield of Bulgarian and the city of Bolgrad, without causing significant damage ...

On the front of the case, parts of 12, 26 and 32 are presumably operating. 25 sd with border guards with 3-00 reflects attempts to cross the route in the area of ​​Kagul, Renii, Kartal ... 51 sd ... defends the border in the area
... »

The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 26. OdVOIntelligence information is incorrect: there is no front of the 12, 26 and 32 front chassis. There are only Romanian two cavalry brigades, 10-i PD and a detachment of marines. Since there is no exact name of the adversary’s connections, it is likely that the RM is not based on the testimony of prisoners. Perhaps this is pre-war intelligence.

PM Verkholovich (NS 35 ck): "By the time of the German attack the troops remained in the areas they occupied and in the ranges, with the exception of two backs that for the 2-3 of the day were withdrawn and delivered to the OP to cover the garrison of the city of Chisinau ...

12 and 18 of June corps troops, located on the state border, were waiting for provocative actions by the enemy, who were timely warned about the adoption of measures of combat readiness ...

On 0-30, 22 June received an order from the district commander on raising troops Chisinau garrison and troops located in other garrisons, on alert without warning about the danger of war. This was followed by warnings about the combat readiness of the troops., about possible provocations at the border and that the troops did not give in to provocations.

Approximately in 2-00 22 of June reports were received from the troops about the opening of fire from the enemy and about the shootout at the state border, and at the same time, the district headquarters ordered the troops to be on alert and deployed for the defense of the state border in accordance with the previously developed plan
... "The time of the opening of fire in 2-00 is doubtful, since this fact is not reflected in either the RCU of the 9 army or the army headquarters report.

Message. "Parts of the case with 4-00 22.6.41 perform the task of covering the state border, according to the plan. Commander 35 sk kombrig Dashichev NSh corps Colonel Verkholovich»

In accordance with the instructions received from the headquarters of the OdVO were prepared PCS # 283, 284 [1 and 2 Parts]: "Commander 30 and 176 cd 95 cd. Corps commander ordered the receipt of this headquarters and parts of divisions alarm alert is announced. Parts withdraw from locations in the closest areas according to the designation of the division commanders, carefully disguise themselves, taking security measures without noise.

Divisional commanders check readiness and disguise and, for a report to the Military Council, bring 9-00 22.6.41. The progress report in three hours. Hang up on 22-00 22.6.41. When driving, treat crops with care - do not trample crops ... "

Received in SHO 22.6. 1-40, encrypted with 22.6.41 I h. 2-00, II h. 2-30.


This is probably the first indication NSh VM Zakharov commanders of corps. Headquarters and units are not brought to the areas defined by the Cover Plans, but to the nearest areas. Take care of your crops ...

RCB 147 Dep. artillery battalion (30 cd 35 ck): "22-June 1941, in 3-30 separate DC battery ... in full combat strength - 4-x firing platoons: 11 "Komsomolets" tractor, 8 pieces 45 mm guns, 8 vehicles and odnik "BK" was alerted to performing the task... "

CDB 95 sd (35 ck): "In 2-00 22.6.41 with 35 Pins [headquarters 35 ck] An alarm was announced to parts of 95 sd with the task of being ready to repel the enemy when crossing the Prut river. Through 1-45, the parts were ready to execute the order. In 4-00 22.6.41, the enemy began the shelling of border villages... »

According to the time specified in the PC and XB 95-th SD, we see that the command of the 35-C sk raised subordinate divisions and units along open lines of communication, not waiting for PCs to reach the headquarters of the formations and units. Please note that in PCs it says “Release in 22-00 22.6.41". Even in 1-40 22.6.41, the district commanders do not know whether there will be a war or not. According to the author, people at that time thought only about possible provocations.

PC (time to send 7-15 22.6.41): "Commander of the OdVO troops. I ask to give an instruction to the movement of the Kishinev railway troops on the allocation of rolling stock for the evacuation of families of the commanders of the garrison in the amount of two echelons. Are there instructions on shipping from Ackerman to Chisinau ... Kombrig Dashichev».

We see that the commander of 35 sk Ivan Fedorovich Dashichev prepares the dispatch of families of the commanders before sending from Moscow Directive No. XXUMX. Perhaps this is also a manifestation of his private initiative, caused by concerns about the lives of military families. We will see a similar efficiency in the evacuation of families in the 2-kk.

PC (23-00 22.6.41): "Prepare on the likely directions of action of the motor-mechanical parts pr-ka mining sites. Strengthen defense work at the main line of the Prut River. Bridges on the river Prut undermine. Do not allow in any case dangling people in the rear. To provide 100% of the personnel of the combatant units to the combat formations of the units ... To supply the units from peacetime warehouses ... Comp 35 sk kombrig Dashichev»

Unlike PribOVO, the order to mine sites is given by the end of the day on June 22. Do not forget that, according to intelligence, there were up to 900-960 anti-war troops tanks.

P.A. Belov (Commander 2-th QC: 5-I and 9-I cd): "9 cd two regiments on defense alert took the defense of the river Prut to about 3-00 22.6.»

RCB 5 cd. "Task: 5 cd to 21-00 22.6.41 to concentrate in the region ... The division marched with 16-00 22.6... »

RCB 131 CP (5 cd): "The 22.6.41 in the 6-00 regiment received an order from the commander of the 5 cd to be ready to perform a combat mission... »

RCB 160 CP (5 cd): "22.6.41 Fascist Germany violated the treaty ... barbarously attacked the Soviet Union ... In 8-00, the Order was read to the entire commanding staff of the regiment and the regiment began to prepare for the performance... »

N.S. Oslikovsky (Assistant Commander 9-th cd): "Approximately in 2-20 22 June, I was awakened by a phone call, and when I arrived at the division headquarters, I found everyone already assembled, since The encryption of the headquarters of the OdVO on the withdrawal of parts to the border was obtained. By proposing to the division commander and the NS corps to act as we did at the previous night training and received their consent [Who commanded the division at all?], I called the commanders 5, 108 and 136 kp to the phone and personally gave them the conditional password, after which I got into the car and drove from Comrat to Leovo, where I arrived at dawn, meeting cars and carts with evacuating families of commanders on the way...

In Leovo, I found parts of 5 kp already withdrawn and occupied trenches; artillery took firing positions. Minutes through 10 after my arrival, as soon as dawn began, around 4 hours of 22 June 1941, the enemy opened artillery fire ... The tank regiment was fully equipped
... "In the tank regiment 9-th cd was about 64 tanks.

YES. Myakushev (5 qn xnumx cd): "On June 19, we went home to Leovo from the range ... The squadron mortar men had another big task - to equip a separate stable for the platoon horses. We had to do this on Sunday, 22 of June, therefore, on Saturday having finished our work, we prepared working uniforms. In the afternoon we went to a bathhouse on the bank of the Prut. We noticed that for some reason the Romanian border guards with fishing rods do not sit on the opposite shore and do not stare at us ... As usual, they fell asleep with the last peaceful sleep.

About 2 – 30 at night the squadron on duty shouted: “Alarm!”. This is a common thing - our 5-th regiment, the only one of all the regiments of the division, stood directly on the border, and we had two alarms for a week. They quickly got dressed and, having disassembled the rifles and checkers, ran to the stable to saddle the horses. Around the stables lined up and waited for the team. The platoon commanders came running. A command was sent to send to the barracks of the Red Army men: lay down the sheets, blankets, free the mattresses from the hay and immerse it all in the convicts. And we were given combat grenades RGD. It has come to be that this is not an ordinary alarm, something serious is happening.

Then the senior lieutenant, the commander of our platoon ... brought the medallion, and we ... filled out the forms with the addresses of the parents of the Red Army men and platoon sergeants and distributed them ... Only we got ready to go for breakfast, as the whistle of flying projectiles was heard and right there - the roar near gaps ... It was in 4 hours am 22 June 1941 of the year
... "

The division of the cavalry regiment 9-th cd, located on the border, did not advance to defensive positions before the shelling began. It turns out and then did not wait for the start of the war at dawn 22 June ...

RCB 9 cd. "22.6.41 1-00 Romanian troops without a declaration of war fired at our border ... and launched an offensive on the entire front ... The enemy’s attack was restrained by our border guards before our division arrived at the border. 136 kp together with the border post bravely restrained the onslaught of the enemy ... 22.6.41 in the 1-30 division declared anxiety. Parts of the division after the march from the areas of location to 7-00 concentrated and occupied the defense... »

An erroneous time of shelling and offensive along the entire border is probably inscribed in the RCB. In accordance with the memories of D.A. Myakushev, the shelling began near 4-00.

Boevoy order №1. 9 headquarters cd. Comrat, 22.6.41 5-30 (entered in 5-st kn 22.6 in 7-00): "1. The enemy is trying to force the Prut River on the Leovo, Gotheshta section of the forces.

2. 9 cd advocates and defense r. Prut in the district of Leovo, Giltos, Kachaliya.

3. 5 kp with a cannon battery 12 Konad [horse-artillery battalion] to defend the river Prut in the area ...

4. 108 kp with battery 12 Konad r.Prut on the site ...

5. 136 kp with battery Konad, defend the plot ...

6. 72 CP, 30 TP, Battery Konad in Maugham Reserve
... "[Aut. spelling.]

A.G. Batyunya (NS 48 ck: 74 cd and 150 cd): "8 June 1941, in accordance with the order of the OdVO headquarters, the corps management, leaving two divisions and all corps units on vehicles to be permanently deployed, was redeployed to the Floreşti region... "

[S.L. Chekunov - the management of 48 ck was advanced on the basis of the disposition of the Supreme Command OVBO from 6.6.41.

In the new place in the corps included: 74 and 176 sd, 30 gsd.

A.G. Batyunya. "By 22 June 1941 of the year, the dislocation of the corps units was changed, namely: 176 sd remained in place, reinforcing the border troops in its sector; 30 GDS moved to the state border line east. bank Prut ... 74 sd passed in the Balti region to the west, making up the second echelon of the corps ...

21 June evening, from the district headquarters, or rather from the OdVO task force stationed in Tiraspol, a warning was received that sabotage and armed attempts to violate the state border were possible on the night of 22 in June. The troops were ordered: to be in a state of full combat readiness to repel the enemy in the event of his attempts to violate the line of the state border. At the same time, it was strictly forbidden to transfer them to the territory of Romania in the event of hostilities.
... »

In accordance with the data presented in the 25 part, the phrase “21 June evening”Meant the period from 23-00 to 24-00 21 June.

KD Litvinov (Chief of Operations Division of 48 headquarters ck): "Of the three sd, available in the corps, only one - 176 cd without funds the reinforcements were deployed in advance in battle formation along the state border ... The front, covered by its parts, reached approximately 125 km. The frontier that occupied 176 sd was located at a distance of 3-15 km from the border troops directly defending the state border of the USSR and Romania ... 30 GDS and 74 cd and corps were concentrated ... at a distance to 140 km from the state border ... artillery-anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery units and rifle divisions to the beginning of the war were on the county fees and arrived in their units already in the course of the outbreak of hostilities ...

Down to until 8 JuneIn fact, no effective measures were taken to bring the troops on alert and to strengthen the defense of the state border. From 8 June, separate parts and connections of the OdVO began advancing to the borders and partial deployment foreseen by the mobilization plans. But these activities in the corps connections were not completed by the beginning of the war. The corps received the combat task of defending the state border only on the first day of the war. Prior to that, there were no specific orders from the army command, with the exception of a warning about possible provocations and the withdrawal of troops to new areas of concentration.
... »

The date of June 8, as you remember, is related to intelligence information from 6 June about the expectation of some events of June 9-12.

KD Litvinov. "By the beginning of the war, the formations and units of the corps had not yet completed their mobilization, a significant part of them was concentrated at a great distance from the border, exceeding two to three or more daily transitions, which made it difficult for them to enter the battle in a timely and organized ...

Early in the morning of 22 on June 1941, the corps headquarters was informed by 9 A headquarters about the attack on the USSR by fascist Germany and its satellites ... The corps units and units warned of 21 June by the district headquarters about the impending attack of the enemy were brought into advance in the first hours of the outbreak of the war. suffered no casualties ...

Equally important... had the fact that the corps troops were concentrated in a direction where the enemy, at the beginning of the war, did not undertake hostilities with strong strike forces of his troops with decisive goals...

It should also be noted that, in spite of the fact that the fascist German troops had already begun a real war with the USSR, in the first days of the corps and corps troops there was an atmosphere of disbelief in the possibility of
... »

HER. Maltsev (deputy commander for political affairs 74 cd): "20 June was ordered by the corps commander to give out to the fighters and commanders of the helmet ... At about half past four in the morning on 22 June a Thunderstorm signal was received, which should open the red packet containing the corps action plan to cover the USSR State border. War!.. "

RCB 11 td (2 micron): "In 2 hours of 22.6.41, an alarm was declared on parts of 11, etc., with the task of alerting parts ... In 5-55, without warning and declaring war, fascist aircraft in the number of 11 aircraft accompanied by fighters made the first raid on the city of Chisinau. After 10 minutes after the first raid, a second German bombers raid was made, who were met by anti-aircraft artillery fire.

Thereafter hours in 10 22.6.41 commander 11 td colonel Kuzmin was given a military order: "... I order immediately to bring all parts to combat readiness, to leave the parts in the former areas, to organize an enhanced outposts and air surveillance. Air defense systems will be brought to combat readiness and repel enemy aircraft raids ... "By the time of the announcement of the mobilization of the 11 unit, td: 21 tp, 22 tp, gap and 3 / 11 MSP on the range north-east of Chisinau dispersed in battalion order. Part of the combat vehicles and personnel of the 21 tp were located at the Bushora range, where tank gunfire was carried out
... »

A.G. Earthy (NSH 16 TD): "By the time of the perfidious German attack on the Soviet Union ... parts of the division had been withdrawn from the garrisons in advance to the adjacent forests of Balta and Kotovsk.

[S.L. Chekunov - this is about bringing 16 etc. to summer camps.]

Part of the division was transferred to combat readiness on the basis of the command of the commander of the OdVO from 22 .6.41 0-20 and began to mobilize the units and subunits of the division ... By the beginning of the fighting, the division was not an effective connection, since strike force - tanks - absent... »

Historical form 47 mp (15 md 2 micron): "22.6.41. Raising the regiment in alarm and making a march to occupy the starting line for striking the enemy... "

O. Yu. Kozinkin stated: "I argue that, in KOVO, we started with 16 June to output the 4-th and 19-th microns first of all and started to stir up something with 8-m. You on 4-th and 19-th do not pull me to refute? By 2 on OdVO does not pull to expose..."

What happened in the mechanized corps KOVO and ZAPOVO, we saw in the previous parts. Something to assert without providing data that is contradictory, agree, frivolously. And if a writer claims the historical authenticity of only his version, then this is unacceptable. Data about what is happening in 2-m mk OdVO we just saw. It is also impossible to assert from them that O. Yu. Kozinkin uses the correct statement ...

N.I. Krylov (NS Danube SD): "20 June, I met a family in Bolgrad ... All five ... went to sleep on the floor ... The very Saturday came the next morning ... The next night, at dawn, a Red Army officer from our headquarters woke me up with a sharp knock on the window. Quickly I went out into the courtyard, and the first thing I perceived was the characteristic roar of the motors of the hawks of the I-16. They were in the air, although no flights and exercises (I knew for sure) were not foreseen on Sunday ... When I ran up to the headquarters, from the border I heard the growing roar of airplanes, not ours anymore. Then Bolgrad began to bomb, and over the city began an air battle... »

PM Shafarenko (NSH 6 vdbr, 3 vdk): "Four days before the start of the war, the corps commander ... conducted tactical exercises with the commanders and staffs of 6 and 212 brigades ... At dawn, they threw us "into the rear of the enemy" ... The exercise was useless ...

The call of the operational duty officer early in the morning of 22 June 1941 of the year caught me at breakfast. The officer on duty reported that the brigade had been alerted. Kombrig and Commissioner summoned to corps headquarters. I run to the headquarters, fastening my belts. The soldiers, led by younger commanders, leave the barracks, heading for the assembly areas. Quickly contact the NSh corps ...

“Today at four in the morning,” he said, “the German troops crossed our border.”
... "

K.S. Grushevsky (2 secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk regional committee of the CP (b)): “The phone rang aggressively ... "I listen ..."

- You are called General Dobroserdov. The general commanded the 7 sk. What could have happened at Dobroserdov so early on? .. Konstantin Leonidovich apologized for the early call and asked for an urgent visit to the corps headquarters.

- What have you got there? Dobroserdov paused. Then he said softly and gloomily: “War
... "

V.M. Shatilov (NSH 196 sd): "Early in the morning, 22 was woken by an insistent knock at the door of a small camp house. “Comrade Major, the division commander urgently summons you to the headquarters,” I heard the voice of a messenger puffing from running. A few minutes later I learned about the beginning of the war.... »

RCB 20 Garden. "22.6.41. During the 22.6.41 air division, fighter regiments [4 & 55 iap] covered the cities of Chisinau, Balti, Tiraspol, fought with the enemy bombers.

Bomber Regiments
[45-th sbap and 211-th bbap] bombed railway the bridge of the river Prut in the district of Iasi and the crossing in the district of Dumen, Lipcani... »

V.P. Karpovich (commander of the 55 th iap): "It was a Sunday, which I had to be a participant and a witness. On the eve I tried to go to the family with some kind of opportunity, but it did not turn out to be one, and I stayed in the camp among the squadron friends, intending to spend a weekend with them in nature.

Early in the morning, when the dawn was not yet engaged and the earth was shrouded in darkness, the air camp was, after a hard day’s work, plunged into a deep sleep, only the duty outfit kept the watch without closing its eyes. Suddenly, the pre-dawn silence was cut by the dull sound of strikes into the rail, and the heartbreaking howl of the siren disturbed the rest of the sleepers.

Anxiety! Only extraordinary circumstances in military life require the use of such signals and immediate action. But the rise of personnel in combat alarm can be for training purposes, and such a test of combat readiness was carried out the day before. No one, of course, did not expect the alarm to repeat again the next day, on Sunday.

The flight and technical staff of the fighter air regiment, the services of the airfield maintenance battalion, raised by alert, were triggered according to the combat schedule ... At that time everything was set in motion at the airfield - the material part of the aircraft was spreading, gasoline and oil tankers, auto starters were coming up , transport with ammunition and compressed air. The aircraft were being prepared for departure ... The aircraft mechanics and special equipment specialists made refueling of the aircraft with fuel and lubricants, debugged the aircraft equipment and armaments, checked the work of the control devices and aircraft controls. At different ends of the airfield, motors were launched, machine-gun bursts cracked, fire tracks flashed - gunsmiths fired machine guns.

At this time, the pilots of the 1 Squadron Semyon Ovchinnikov, Alexander Mochalov, Kuzma Seliverstov, Alexei Ovsyankin, Konstantin Mironov, Alexander Surov, Ivan Makarov, Grigory Shiyan, Ivan Skomorokha and Nikolai Kalitenko, led by their team, Fyodor Atrashkevich, a team, and they was a team, and they was a part of the team, and they were a part of the team, and they were a part of the team, and they were a part of the team, and they will be replaced by a team of them, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a part of the team, they will be a team while on combat duty at the Singureny stationary airfield near the city of Balti, they were already in the first air battle to repel a raid on the city and the airfield of German bombers covered by fighters ...

In the last months before the war, the situation in the frontier zone was created rather tense, there were grounds to believe that some important events were brewing on the other side of the state border. German reconnaissance aircraft more and more began to violate the state border and invade Soviet territory. In order to counteract reconnaissance flights, an order was received to organize airfield ambushes at advanced landing sites. The task of duty units included interception of enemy reconnaissance aircraft and forcing them to land at our nearest airfields. It was strictly forbidden to engage in air combat and shoot down violators in order to avoid complications of diplomatic relations with Germany.

Once, when Valentin Figychev, pursuing such an air violator, happened to be on the other side of the border, this led to a lot of noise and a diplomatic scandal, while Valentine himself had to write explanatory words for a long time ...

18 June 1941 of the year. The pilot of our regiment, Junior Lieutenant Ivan Khanin, went up to patrol from the Vali-Mary field site on the I-153 plane. Finding a German intelligence officer over Soviet territory, he blocked his path, opening barrage fire. Approaching the enemy's scout for a short distance, he began to give him signals, forcing him to land. However, the shooter reconnaissance aircraft opened fire on the Soviet fighter. Our plane was shot down, Junior Lieutenant Ivan Yefremovich Khanin was killed. This incident was observed by border troops, heard machine-gun fire and saw the fall of the Khanin aircraft ...

The second squadron was brought to full combat readiness in a matter of minutes ... When setting the task, the commander informed us that a message had been received from the division headquarters: “Today, at about four in the morning, fascist Germany attacked our country. Frontier posts, fortified defenses, troops located in the border zone, communications centers were subjected to powerful artillery shelling.
... »

I.I. Dog dog (the commander of the link 211-th bbap): "In April, 1941, the 211-th bap went out to the field airfield near the Dniester River. At the end of the month, and especially in May, anxiety increased in the regiment. Rare days did without them. We ran to the planes, hung bombs, loaded machine guns.

Sometimes a link, less often a squadron was lifted into the air. An hour later, everyone returned, having completed the task: they flew in formation, then to ground bombing. Then, the commanders checked the contents of the suitcases with which they were at the alarm, and followed the hang up ...

The command of the regiment, of course, saw us approaching the war better, took all measures to increase combat readiness, and now, many years later, I can say with complete confidence that the more the time was reduced to the perfidious German attack, those our worries.

22 June, twenty minutes before the start of the war, which turned out, of course, later, 211-th bap was alerted ... At first, everything went in the usual way. I, the navigator, the technician and the mechanic, hung up the bombs, loaded the machine gun belts ... All the crews of the regiment started and tested the motors. Then the motors stopped. We are sitting, waiting for the next team. Relaxed. If no one is lifted up into the air, it means that they will soon hang up. Hour we sit. Located in the grass, near the aircraft. None of the commanders on the field does not appear ...

Half an hour later, the team: "To destroy the planes!" They were standing in line with us. Airplanes were dispersed around the airfield perimeter: the places for this were determined in advance. Soon a new team: “Disguise planes!” The signal is not good. But the trees for camouflage were also watched. Chopped down. Masked. Hitchhiking with the next team ... Here they declare: "Gathering a regiment on the bank of a ravine ..."

On the edge of the ravine a commander appeared with his deputies, and we began to build quickly, but he ordered with a gesture: no. Our commander’s voice is dull, even hoarse. “Comrades!” He said, and there was a tense silence.

- Without a declaration of war, the Germans began fighting. Enemy aviation barbarously bombed our cities ... The official message about the beginning of the war was broadcast on the radio in two hours
... »

Commander 20-th garden A.S. Osipenko. "Despite the sufficient amount of time from the moment the alarm was announced to the enemy’s raid, the units still couldn’t get away from the blow with the least losses and damage the enemy ... The dispersal of the material part was unsatisfactory in all the regiments. Airplanes are crowded; together on the same field there are serviceable and faulty planes ... Disguise, it can be considered no... »

HELL. Yakimenko (deputy commander of 67 iap): "22 June. Many commanders, assuming that nothing would happen at the weekend, decided to rest. But not everyone thought so. We dispersed the fighters of our regiment on the airfield in such a way as to take off immediately when the enemy attacked. And just before dawn, there was a roar from Romania, a German reconnaissance aircraft appeared. Our pilots immediately took off and shot him down. Behind him 50 German bombers appeared in the sky. All 30 fighters of our regiment met fascists in the air... »

В 2 – 50 in 67, the IAP declared the alarm and dispersed the planes. In the 4-10 from the west seemed a scout - a twin-engine bomber. 22.06.41 opponent made two attempts at a raid on the airfield in Bolgrad, but the regiment pilots repelled raids. In just one day, the regiment destroyed 13-16 enemy planes on 117 sorties, losing 1 or 2 to their aircraft.

A.T. Cherevatenko (69 st ip): "At dawn, 22 June siren suddenly began to whine ... Buttoning up jackets on the move, pilots, engineers, technicians ran to the headquarters ... It took no more than six or seven minutes - and the regiment was assembled ... We are still in ignorance. “Leonid Utesov came to Odessa, we will meet,” someone is trying to joke ... In the face of Maryinsky, you can see: upset about something. He walked along the ranks, stopped, shifting from foot to foot: “Comrades pilots, engineers, technicians and mechanics! Today at four in the morning fascist German Germany, treacherously violating the treaty, attacked our country... "

N.V. Isaev (131-iap 45 garden): "Sunday promised to be fair ... We arrived here to undergo combat training and master new cars. They look more impressive than our "donkeys", - so we tenderly called our stupid And-16 ...

My turn came, and I took to the air ... Piloting in the zone, I gladly worked out turns, fighting turns, coups, went into a dive and soared up again ... Suddenly I heard the order: "Go on landing!" Something happened, I thought, and how nice it is that there is a radio on the plane. Previously, we did not know this luxury. When I planted the car, the instructor ran up and said with concern: “At twelve government communication” ... From the very first words of V.Molotov's speech, it became clear: war!
.. "

V.M. Sinai (131 st ip): "In peacetime in Zaporozhye, we carried out a combat mission, covered the area of ​​the Dnieper and Krivoy Rog. Duty were daily. Flights were early in the morning, from dawn, from five in the morning, unless the squadron was on duty. And when the squadron was on duty, the flights were not in the morning but in the evening. The duty was carried out in the form №2 and form №1.

Position number XXUMX is a pilot in the cockpit, everything is connected, a signal rocket, and it goes into the air. Form number XXUMX - it's all under the plane, you can relax, at the ready, two hours we have a break. Then again in the form number XXUMX. When we switched to duty on the form number XXUMX, then left to smoke.

15.4.41, an alarm was declared, Yakov Vladimirovich Smushkevich flew in ... By the position in 20 minutes all 60 fighters had to stand on the runway. And here for 2 hours 4 aircraft were delivered to the runway. Each squadron (and all of them were 4) with difficulty on the shoulders dragged along the plane. Because the soil in Ukraine, black soil, so much so that the plane is tied up. Therefore, dragged on the shoulders. The motor could not be started. I remember, the regiment was standing, Yakov Vladimirovich Smushkevich was walking, leaning on a stick ... I heard Smushkevich say to Conrad: “Not today, tomorrow, to fight the Germans, and what are you playing here in the trials?” In short, just removed.

The lieutenant colonel came. Not as distinguished as Conrad, but an experienced, skilled military man, an excellent pilot. He took matters into his own hands. Started to fly twice a day. I don’t know how he arranged all this, because, among other things, we had friction with the bombers who stood at this airfield because the commander of the bomber division commanded the garrison, and we were not always given time to fly. In general, Goncharov entered in April, as early as May we flew to the field airfield in Novaya Poltavka, in the area of ​​Nikolaev.

In Bessarabia, our Dad repeatedly trained the regiment in alert - either to intercept the naval assault, or to intercept the bombers. You see, what a stupid situation! We saw German intelligence officers flying daily through us, and we had no right to oppose them to anything. Not only to shoot down, but it was impossible to take off and ask them to leave ... I don’t remember now that in some regiment the pilot flew out and pursued a scout. So he was arrested and tried ...

22 June was a little rain. It was quiet at night. We slept in tents under the sound of rain. Shortly after dawn, the howling sound of a siren suddenly came. We all grumbled: “What will this Daddy on Sunday not allow to rest ?! Only three days ago, we reflected the Romanian troops. Here is the alarm again! ”I ran to the plane, uncovered it, started the engine, began to try. Other aircraft also started the engines. Squadrons stood along all sides of a rectangular airfield. Our squadron was located closest to the village, so we started first.

Soon squadrons launched, which stood on the sides, the fourth squadron, which stood on the opposite side, launched last. When the fourth squadron was launched, I was already finishing the test of the engine, I warmed it. Suddenly I felt a knob on my legs. I saw that a weapons engineer was jerking an aileron, showing me to remove the gas. I removed the gas. He came up and said that machine guns should be tested. I was outraged to shoot 4 machine guns, then take them off and clean them - it's half a day, all Sunday will be gone. He told me something else, but I did not understand. Then he put his hand on my shoulder, bent down to my ear, said: “War, Sinai, war, what Sunday! ..”

Without waiting for any instructions, we began to dig a gap. Then Tokarev came running - we temporarily threw down the gaps and dragged the planes into the forest belt around the airfield, disguised them. Again began to crack. And by the time when, as scheduled, a German intelligence officer had flown in, there were not only aircraft, but also tankers and no starters at the aerodrome - there were no signs of the presence of an airfield. Apparently, therefore, on the first day of the war the Germans never touched our airfield - measures were taken in a timely manner.
... "

A.A. Pavlichenko. "I started [war] in the rank of lieutenant in 210-m bbap ... 22 June ... We were on [field] airfield near Pervomaisk, station Pandurka [about 260 km from the border]. Then they suddenly woke up and immediately building. They built and turned on MNRT's radio on 12 hours, announced that we were suddenly, without declaring war, attacked by the Germans. We saw that some planes were flying at a high altitude, but who we did not know, German bombers were going through our airfield. War alert was announced. Aircraft settled in all places. But the regiment was not ready for combat sortie, there were no bomb holders, the bombs themselves, the planes were not filled with ammunition... »

G.F. Sivkov (pilot ot.korpusnoy air squadron): "22 June 1941 of the year. 7 o'clock in the morning. Woke up. We lie, joker. We hear a knock at the window.

- Whom is it early in the morning? - grumbles Pavel Startsev. - They will not give sleep enough ... Yevgeny Mylnikov slowly dressed and, dancing, went outside. He soon came back and said quietly, calmly: "Anxiety." And he fell on the bed. We are lying too. He shouts: “Anxiety!” “What are you yelling ?!” Ivan Kramorenko tells him.

- Anxiety !!! Damn you! Get up!

- And why did it fall apart?

- I'm already dressed ...

We jump up, dress quickly and run to the headquarters. There is no one. Soon the squadron commander appeared: "Who declared the alarm ?!"

- The duty officer in part ...

Sappers sailed past us. From them we learn about the violation of our state border ... And suddenly, among the howling roar of the motors, someone shouts: “Crosses on the wings! See the crosses!
.. "

The author did not manage to find confirmation that the air regiments of the Air Force OdVO, flying up at dawn, dispersed around field airfields by the morning ... The district pilots were lucky that most of their opponents were Romanian pilots who did not have combat experience, could not use the shortcomings of Soviet aviation and were largely outdated the material part. General F. G. Michugin was the only commander of the Air Force of the western border districts, who survived the initial period of the war.

RCB 9 Dep. (Crimea): "On the night from 21 to 22.6.41, the German army, without declaring war, crossed the borders of the USSR and formed a front from the White to the Black Sea. 9 std.korpus, as part of 156 and 106 cd and 32 cd on the orders of the Headquarters One in 2-00 22.6.41 is on alert... »

P.I. Batov (the commander of the land forces of the Crimea - the commander of 9 otd.sk): "With the beginning of the war, the Supreme Command set the task for the land forces of Crimea to defend the coast and prevent the landing of both sea and airborne troops, and before the Black Sea Fleet - to ensure the supremacy of our naval forces on the Black Sea ... The resulting task obliged us to determine the place and role of the 9-s special sk in the defense of the Crimea ...

At the end of June 1941, during negotiations with Moscow, Marshal B.Shaposhnikov told me: “You understand, my dear, that success German troops in the Crimea to the extreme would exacerbate the situation not only at LF. From the Crimea one step to Taman and to the Caucasian oil. Take all measures of antiamphibious defense both on the coast and inside the Crimea ...

From the first days of the war, submarines were sent into active search in positions near the Bosphorus, Varna and Constanta - in anticipation of entering the Black Sea forces. outside...

I have extracts from intelligence and other staff documents of the time. What is there just not!

June 22: a landing is being prepared in Constanta ... 10 enemy transports have been discovered by air reconnaissance ... direction to the Crimea.

June 24: a submarine was found aboard Shocho ... concentration of vessels in the Constanta area indicates preparation of a landing ... on the airfields of Bucharest a cluster of six-engine transport aircraft for paratroop transfer.

27 June: the Italian fleet proceeded through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea for the landing of troops in Odessa and Sevastopol.

June 28: confirmed the presence of landing craft in Constance 150. In the first half of July, the same thing - from the region of Constanta, Tulcea, from the airfields of Romania it is possible to wait for landings, both sea and air, from day to day.

July 7th Danube Headquarters flotilla reported that 37 transports with troops left ports of Bulgaria and Romania in an unknown direction
... "

JBD 21 Aviation Regiment DD. "22.6.41. In 6-00, a combat alarm has been declared in the regiment. Fascist robber aviation attacked the land of Allu, without any declaration of war. In 4-00 bombed Sevastopol, Kiev, Zhytomyr and other cities. The regiment was ordered to prepare for the relocation of Dzhankoy, then the relocation was set aside by the th division. The regiment is engaged in under-lnnn.postav and m / h to the flight... "

From the presented materials on OdVO it is clear that it was not possible to find anything extraordinary in comparison with other border districts. No traces of instructions from the top leadership of the spacecraft in preparation for the war at dawn on 22 June. We met, as in other districts, to a greater extent a private initiative of commanders. In OdVO - this is the National Okrug of VM Zakharov, who took the initiative both before the beginning of the war and on the eve of it.

* * *

At this point, the author concludes the consideration of the cycle of an unexpected attack. After reviewing all the districts, the author returns to the conclusions he made at the end of the 17 part. At the same time, I would like to note the following: the author does not see the perpetrators of the catastrophe that occurred. There are huge human casualties, huge losses of military equipment and warehouses, and, according to the author, there are no guilty ...

There was an underestimation of the number of German divisions, sufficient to start a full-scale war. The General Staff and military science incorrectly believed that Germany would advance against the USSR on the western border before 180 ... 200 divisions. This may be objected to me: after all, the games considered participation of German divisions in the 150-160 war. However, there is a wording: without waiting for the end of the concentration of German troops ...

The presence of shock moto-tank groups — tank groups — was not opened by intelligence. Without the presence of such groups, according to the Soviet command, it was impossible to start a war. The Germans did not fight without such groups either in Poland or in France.

Nobody thought that it was possible to manufacture the troops in almost a day to attack such a powerful force as a spacecraft. Nobody thought that the mototank groups that had emerged from the air would rush to the operational space.

The military-political leadership was confident that it would be able, through the gradual build-up of a group of spacecraft troops, to counter or deflect the threat of a war. Without obstructing the reconnaissance flights of German aircraft, the country's leadership and the spacecraft were probably trying to show that the USSR was not preparing for a preemptive strike against the German forces. Rather “detailed” RMs probably inspired confidence that the preparations for the war would be opened in time, and the troops would leave the RPM before the Nazis hit them. German intelligence in this case should be outdated.

The author of the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff do not see - they tried to act according to science, but it turned out as always. Without waiting for the war, they did not accelerate the bringing of the troops of the border districts to combat readiness.

I.V. Stalin carefully studied all the documents submitted by the intelligence services and the military. About the number in 180 of the German divisions he should have known. There was no such number and close to the RM. There were no German motorized corps there (0 of 12-ti available in the Wehrmacht) and there were no tank groups (0 of 3-5 that appeared in the war in Poland or in France). The author does not see Stalin in the incident.

Our intelligence did not face such a large-scale opposition to them. No one at this time encountered such opposition to the actions of intelligence. There was still nothing like this with extensive disinformation at all levels, including the most advanced one. There is no fault of our scouts in what happened.

It seems to me that only the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the lost Soviet people in the war, their relatives who have lost their loved ones are entitled to blame the leaders mentioned above. The blessed memory of the perished Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War!

In conclusion, the author would like to say the following: the sad experience of 1941 will not be repeated in the future. Potential opponents will never succeed again. attack unexpectedly. Too huge price in 1941-45's. paid our motherland and our people for the confidence of the leadership of the country and the army.
Author:
Articles from this series:
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. 13 part
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 14)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 15)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 16)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 17)
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 18. Air defense
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 19. Air defense
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 20. Lvo
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 21. Cova
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 22. Cova
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 23. SOBOVO
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 24. SOBOVO
The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 25. OdVO
257 comments
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  1. AsmyppoL
    AsmyppoL 3 November 2018 05: 27
    +56
    Many thanks to the author Vick for an interesting selection of materials in the new cycle !!
    1. AsmyppoL
      AsmyppoL 3 November 2018 06: 26
      +7
      At the end of the comments of the 25-th part, I will begin this evening with the gradual placement of materials on my version of the increase of the assigned staff of the headquarters of the Southern Front in the evening of 20 of June 1941 of the year. First there will be a lot of excerpts from memoirs, in one word, blah blah blah, then I will present my version, which coincides with the main vision of the events on the eve of the war of Author Vik.
      1. Vladimir 5
        Vladimir 5 3 November 2018 13: 11
        -2
        The author claims that everyone was innocent in the defeat of the Red Army in 1941-42. Quote from the article: "The intelligence did not reveal the presence of shock mototank groupings - tank groups. Without such groups, in the opinion of the Soviet command, it was impossible to start a war." And now let us recall the rakhgrom and the destruction of all external intelligence of the USSR in the repressions of 1938-9, with the destruction of all worked-out structures and connections. The consequence of the defeat of the foreign intelligence of the USSR is the result of the above quote. And so on in many directions. So the threads of guilt are drawn to the "genius of all times and anrodes" comrade. Stalin and his associates Yaguda, Yezhov, Beria ..
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 3 November 2018 19: 01
          +5
          Jews are to blame.
          - ... and cyclists.
          from the "Black Obelisk"! Remark
        2. RuSFr
          RuSFr 3 November 2018 19: 47
          +1
          You are right, Vladimir. Stalin is guilty and others too. But in the autumn of 1940, the General Staff of the Red Army began to strengthen again. Only the subject matter proposed by the author is very narrow. Waited or did not expect a real war in the morning or afternoon of June 22. I think that within the framework of only this issue and analysis of the available intelligence and data of the most advanced military science in the world, he is not guilty. But this is just my opinion. In your opinion, guilty. I put +
          1. Vladimir 5
            Vladimir 5 3 November 2018 20: 41
            +2
            RusFr. Briefly on the topic: I. Stalin and his created system were expecting a German attack from mid-May 1941. According to the plan, Operation Barbarossa was supposed to start on May 15, but the events in Yugoslavia and the military actions of the Wehrmacht in Serbia and Greece postponed the offensive against the USSR until June 22, 1941. The last days of the Red Army were waiting for the Germans to advance, because everything indicated full preparation for the offensive Germany and its allies. Some partial delays in the deployment of troops, especially of the second echelons, were due to the fear of the command to show the initiative and acted strictly according to orders, which were often late due to the fault of the NGSH. The fear of acting was aggravated especially in the light of the directives "to maintain friendly relations with German" and until the last minute, even in the first hours of the attack, they did not open anti-aircraft fire, etc.
            1. Mikhail Zubkov
              Mikhail Zubkov 17 December 2018 03: 27
              0
              Waited from the beginning of April. Throughout April, UR bullets spent in bunkers (in those where it was possible) in a barracks position, with full ammunition and field NZ, on alert, sleeping with weapons. Then the readiness was canceled, the BK was handed over to the warehouses, the military personnel were returned to the RPD barracks. From June 4 to 11, enlisted personnel began to arrive in the bulbats, work on putting the bunkers on alert began, but the BK was not delivered until 22.6.41., There was only a guard BK. 22.6.41. began to receive ammunition already under bombing and shelling. Not all and not all received, especially equipment and communications.
        3. ccsr
          ccsr 4 November 2018 10: 46
          -12
          Quote: Vladimir 5
          And now let’s recall the rahgrom and the destruction of all the most external intelligence of the USSR in the repressions of 1938–9, with the destruction of all worked out structures and ties.

          As for the destruction of "all foreign intelligence", this is an overkill, because the repressions mainly affected the secret service, among which there were very dubious personalities and even traitors. Read the book of Gurevich-Kent, and then you will understand what some of the agents were doing at that time. Here is what F. Golikov writes about the scale of the purge:
          However, the activities of the NKVD bodies to identify the true and imaginary enemies of the people were reflected in military intelligence. As reported by Lieutenant General Aviation I.I. Proskurov, 1937-1940 employees of internal organs arrested over 200 people from the intelligence network of the Intelligence Agency, 365 people were expelled from central subordination units. More than 326 new employees came to the military intelligence agencies, most of whom did not have the appropriate training (19). “... They were absolutely not prepared to solve the tasks assigned to the intelligence. In the Central Committee of the party, it was believed that in intelligence, as, by the way, everywhere, the most important thing is proletarian origin, everything else can be easily replenished. Such trifles as an understanding of state policy, a level of culture, military training, knowledge of foreign languages, didn’t matter ”,

          Firstly, not all those arrested were convicted, and secondly, those expelled usually returned to the troops to other posts. Thirdly, the technical services of the General Staff of the General Staff, providing strategic intelligence, were not subjected to repression at all.
        4. Astronaut
          Astronaut 4 November 2018 20: 12
          +12
          The main problem of the Red Army of 41-42 years is the lack of communication. The division commander did not know what was going on in the neighboring division adjacent to him on the front!
          1. Mikhail Zubkov
            Mikhail Zubkov 17 December 2018 03: 35
            0
            The Germans took radio communications instantly, and then they brutally bombed, especially the headquarters. Some parts of the Red Army communications in our divisions were prohibited from commanders of formations on radio communications. They performed, because the enemy immediately punished for violations of radio silence.
    2. Mikhail Zubkov
      Mikhail Zubkov 29 November 2018 21: 22
      +1
      Work very good. worthy. It gives a picture of exactly UNREADINESS for the beginning of the war on the night of 22.6.41, both in the Kremlin and in the districts. The highly controversial Directive No. 1 on "being in full BG", "not succumbing to provocations" and "no other actions without an order", the People's Commissar and Marshal Timoshenko began to send only after 23.30. As if he, an experienced campaigner, did not know that only to receive from the warehouses all the equipment, ammunition and food required by the wartime states, even when the troops were at the points of permanent deployment, the troops need a minimum of XNUMX hours, and there is no order for this in the Directive. What is this - "other actions" by special order? Did he not know that bombs and ammunition ships were brought to planes by special order to a strictly defined place? That planes are FULLY refueled and prepared for combat missions also by special order? But he only orders them to "disperse and disguise". Those. simply pull them apart through the bushes - but how is that for heavy bombers? Does he not know that bombs and shells are lying in the district warehouses under lock and key and are issued by orders with three signatures and a seal? That even bowlers, helmets and cape-cloaks are given to soldiers and command personnel in the same order? I think Tymoshenko perfectly understood that he was putting ALL aviation and artillery of the Red Army under a terrible blow and terrible responsibility personally by his delay? This is in fact treason.
  2. parusnik
    parusnik 3 November 2018 08: 04
    +13
    I am slowly "stitching" these topics into one whole .. Interesting material is obtained. Thank you. I look forward to continuing ...
  3. 210ox
    210ox 3 November 2018 08: 27
    +22
    Warriors of the Odessa district and border guards adequately met the enemy, even in that situation. Border guards of the Kagul border detachment, paratroopers on the Danube. Honor and glory to them.
  4. RuSFr
    RuSFr 3 November 2018 08: 58
    +27
    never be able to attack again unexpectedly

    Let's hope so
    Thank you personally from me Vick for the article with which I regularly expected to meet summer and fall
  5. Mcar
    Mcar 3 November 2018 10: 09
    -30
    Unexpected Hitler's war with the USSR

    I apologize if this has already been discussed a hundred rows - the 26th part, after all. But, I think, there are always those who, like me once, were new to.

    There was no invasion of the German hordes on June 22, for Stalin and the General Staff, a surprise. It is a myth.

    From the intelligence service of the NKVD of the USSR, which had already played a strategic role at that time as far back as June 15, 1941, irrefutable documentary evidence was received that the process of the Wehrmacht troops' advance to the initial positions for the attack was resumed from 4.00 on June 18, 1941. On the same day, Stalin last time checked the accuracy of his understanding of the situation and the reliability of the information received.

    Stalin called on the Red Army Air Force Commander Zhigarev and Beria, to whom the border troops were subordinate, and ordered the forces of the Western Special Military District to organize thorough aerial reconnaissance with a view to finalizing and documenting the Wehrmacht’s aggressive preparations for the attack, and the border guards were to assist the pilots. All this is clearly confirmed by entries in the journal of visits to Stalin. On the night of June 17-18, Zhigarev and Beria were in his office.

    On June 18, during the daylight, the U-2 aircraft flew along the entire border line in the ZAPOVO strip from south to northpiloted by the most experienced pilot and navigator. Every 30-50 kilometers they planted a car and wrote another report directly on the wing, which was immediately picked up by noiseless border guards. This fact is confirmed by the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation Georgy Zakharov (before the war, he commanded the rank of Colonel 43th fighter air division of the Western Special Military District). Major Rumyantsev, navigator of the 43rd Air Division, was with him on that flight. From a bird's eye view they discerned everything, put it on the cards and reported in writing. They clearly stated that the avalanche-like movement of the Wehrmacht armada towards the border line began.

    18 June 1941, Stalin ordered the troops of the first strategic echelon on full alert. The General Staff handed the directive to the troops, but it was not actually implemented in those border districts where the enemy’s main attack fell.

    The text of Directive No. 1, which arrived in the military districts on the night of June 22, read: "Быть in full combat readiness. " Let's pay attention: not to “lead”, but to be. Means an order to bring troops on alert was issued in advance.

    More about this here: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/31134

    Rђ RІRѕS, why the General Staff’s directive was not implemented in those border districts for which the enemy’s main blow came — this is a completely different, separate conversation.
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 3 November 2018 12: 19
      +29
      Directive # 1 was not implemented for the reason that it was contradictory, as shown by many of the commanders mentioned in the cycle. And secondly, it did not provide for the exit of formations into the defensive areas. word "be"Or"be"can also mean being in areas of dispersal near places of permanent deployment.

      Look at what the chief of the OdVO headquarters V.M. Zakharov writes: “The commander of the 35th corps, Major General DG Egorov, approached the ST-14 apparatus first, the commander of the 35th corps brigade commander I.F.Dashichev, and then the NS 2 kk Colonel M.D. Gretsov. To the commander of the 48th corps, R.Ya. Malinovsky, the order was transmitted through the Morse apparatus. The following instructions were given to all of them: 1) to raise the headquarters and troops on alert and withdraw from settlements; 2) units of cover to occupy their areas; 3) establish communication with border units ”

      The chief of staff of the OdVO gives logical instructions, and then he writes: “Having received the directive of the People’s Commissar of Defense, I was very excited, because the order I gave about the withdrawal of the district’s troops to the areas of cover on the state border was in conflict with the instructions received from Moscow»In other words, in accordance with Directive No. 1, troops were not envisaged to enter defensive positions according to cover plans! And the units went up in alarm. And the order to bring troops into combat readiness was not given.

      OdVO
      “To the commander of 30 and 176 sd 95 sd. The corps commander ordered the receipt of this headquarters and parts of the divisions declared combat alert. Move parts from locations to nearby areas »
      ZhBD 14 sk: "22.6.41. 3-05 An order has been received to raise units on alarm and withdraw from the districts of winter apartments and camps. Units located on the border occupy defensive districts "
      Units did not run to the border to occupy defensive positions, since there was no order for it. Only the few units that were located there occupied only the positions.

      Cova
      A.Vladimirsky: “The directive of the NPO on putting the troops on alert and engaging firing points at the border was received at the army headquarters and reported to the commander at 2-30 on June 22 ... The army commander, having read the contents of the directive, personally at the beginning of the fourth hours by telephone ordered the corps commanders to raise troops on alert. ”It took the commander forty minutes to make a decision on the conflicting Directive.
      G.I.Sherstyuk (commander of 45 battalions): “To my first question:“ What are the orders from above for actions of 45 battalions, ”received Komkor 15’s response through NSh 45:“ Provocation, parts of battalion be in the garrisons in full readiness [practically your wording]. "

      LenVO
      At 2.00, an order was issued to the commander of the 19th ck about alarming, and the order to withdraw units to the border was received only at 4.15-4.25. And where were they before? In places of concentration on alert and were there in readiness. This is again the word "to be."
      50 sk of the same district. Same. The entry of troops to the border began at 6.30.
      ZhBD 21 TD: “The commander of the 2.00rd Army arrived at the staviv at 22.6.41 a.m. and warned that the division was ready to speak ... At 23-12 the division announced a combat alert with the units leaving for their alarm gathering areas” Warning to the possibility of advancement to 00, when the division was raised on alarm, and the advance according to cover plans was only at 2.00.

      Now look at the text of the Directive itself.
      “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden German attack on the fronts of the LVO, Arr. OVO, Zap. OVO, KOVO, Od. OVO. An attack can begin with provocative actions. ” The directive speaks of a surprise attack on the fronts, including the LenVO front.

      “At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa districts to be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.” From this proposal, does it follow that troops should immediately rush into defensive areas? It was not for nothing that many large military leaders called this directive contradictory. Everything is clear to you, but the military did not quite understand it ..

      “I order:
      a) during the night of June 22, 1941 secretly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border; " We are talking about bunkers separate battalions of URs, and not about taking up positions with the troops.

      “B) before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military, across field airfields, carefully disguise it;
      c) bring all units into combat readiness. Troops to keep dispersed and disguised; "
      This proposal also does not mention the withdrawal of troops to defensive positions. This can also mean raising parts on alert and taking them to a concentration place on alert. The distance can be from 500-800 meters and up to several kilometers.

      It sounds wild, but such a Directive once again speaks about the unexpectedness of the war
      1. Mcar
        Mcar 3 November 2018 12: 43
        -34
        Quote: RuSFr
        Directive # 1 was not implemented for the reason that it was contradictory, as shown by many of the commanders mentioned in the cycle. And secondly, it did not provide for the exit of formations into defensive areas. the word "to be" or "to be" can also mean being in the areas of dispersal near the places of permanent deployment.

        Are you a philologist? Well, don't teach what you don't understand. And if he is a philologist, then they themselves could understand that "to be" and "to lead" are different orders. There are no and there were not in either the SA or the Red Army there were discrepancies in this or that verb. It would be fraught if there were discrepancies.

        This time. Secondly, he articulately explained that THIS IS A SEPARATE conversation WHY the directive of the General Staff was not implemented in those border districts for which the enemy’s main blow came.
        1. strannik1985
          strannik1985 3 November 2018 13: 52
          +15
          It is very interesting how the commanders of the SD 04/120 will fulfill the directive without announcing mobilization? Okay, there are those called up to the BUS, can they be enlisted as ordinary, but sergeants, officers, ~ 400 vehicles and 2 horses?
          1. Mcar
            Mcar 3 November 2018 14: 01
            -14
            Quote: strannik1985

            It is very interesting how the commanders of the SD 04/120 will fulfill the directive without announcing mobilization? Okay, there are those called up to the BUS, can they be enlisted as ordinary, but sergeants, officers, ~ 400 vehicles and 2 horses?

            With a whistle will perform!
            And sergeants and horses will be credited where it should.

            The case has something to say?
            1. strannik1985
              strannik1985 3 November 2018 14: 14
              +18
              Will they get caught on the street?
              1. Mcar
                Mcar 3 November 2018 14: 24
                -8
                But will not be ashamed?
                1. strannik1985
                  strannik1985 3 November 2018 14: 38
                  +16
                  He will not, he is obliged to leave the location of the unit in Ch +, taking with him weapons, property, ammunition and food. Under normal conditions, people, horses, and cars should be provided by the military commissariat.
                  1. Mcar
                    Mcar 3 November 2018 15: 11
                    -10
                    Quote: strannik1985
                    He won’t be obliged

                    And I'm not talking about him. I'm talking about you - will not be ashamed? Then.
                    1. strannik1985
                      strannik1985 3 November 2018 15: 25
                      +13
                      For the question? No.
                      1. Mcar
                        Mcar 3 November 2018 15: 29
                        -14
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        For the question?

                        For the ostrich pose.

                        You, a citizen, are in trend. In the majority. You, and people like you, are not able to separate the grain from the chaff. Therefore, your porridge from one garbage.
                      2. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 3 November 2018 15: 45
                        +13
                        So what is the question? Amaze me with your knowledge of the subject, tell me how 109 state SD 04/120 should have been put in combat readiness?
                      3. Mcar
                        Mcar 3 November 2018 15: 46
                        -24
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        So what is the question? Amaze me with your knowledge of the subject, tell me how 109 state SD 04/120 should have been put in combat readiness?

                        I am amazed.

                        There was no invasion of the German hordes on June 22, for Stalin and the General Staff, a surprise. It is a myth.

                        The NKVD of the Border Guards of the USSR NKVD, which had already played the strategic role of 15 on June 1941, received irrefutable documentary evidence that the process of advancing Wehrmacht troops to the initial positions for the attack resumed from 4.00 on June 18. On the same day, Stalin last checked the accuracy of his understanding of the situation and the reliability of the information received.

                        Stalin called on the Red Army Air Force Commander Zhigarev and Beria, to whom the border troops were subordinate, and ordered the forces of the Western Special Military District to organize thorough aerial reconnaissance with a view to finalizing and documenting the Wehrmacht’s aggressive preparations for the attack, and the border guards were to assist the pilots. All this is clearly confirmed by entries in the journal of visits to Stalin. On the night of June 17-18, Zhigarev and Beria were in his office.

                        On June 18, during the daylight hours, a U-2 aircraft flew from south to north along the entire border line in the ZAPOVO strip, piloted by the most experienced pilot and navigator. Every 30-50 kilometers they planted a car and wrote another report directly on the wing, which was immediately picked up by noiseless border guards. This fact is confirmed by the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation Georgy Zakharov (before the war, he commanded the rank of Colonel 43th fighter air division of the Western Special Military District). Major Rumyantsev, navigator of the 43rd Air Division, was with him on that flight. From a bird's eye view they discerned everything, put it on the cards and reported in writing. They clearly recorded that the avalanche-like movement of the Wehrmacht armada towards the border line began.

                        18 June 1941, Stalin ordered the troops of the first strategic echelon on full alert. The General Staff handed the directive to the troops, but it was not actually implemented in those border districts where the enemy’s main attack fell.

                        The text of directive number 1, which entered the military districts on the night of June 22, read: “Be on full alert”. Let's pay attention: not to “bring”, but “to be”. So, the order to bring the troops on alert was given in advance.

                        More about this here: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/31134

                        But that’s why the General Staff’s directive was not implemented in those border districts for which the enemy’s main blow came, this is a completely different, separate conversation.

                        Any questions?
                      4. RuSFr
                        RuSFr 3 November 2018 16: 32
                        +27
                        Insanity grew stronger and the shiz mowed their ranks)))))
                        The fact of the flight set out in memoirs,
                        This fact is confirmed by the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General Aviation George Zakharov

                        I understand on your resources one source of information is enough.
                        And the presence in the journal of visiting Stalin of any personality can be attributed to any actions)))
                        The circus left, and the clown came alone.
                        In addition to some memoirs, can anything be presented in the form of documents? That's a clown
                      5. RuSFr
                        RuSFr 3 November 2018 16: 52
                        +15
                        Even the source does not know. General Zakharov wrote on June 17-18.
                        Where is the second any source confirming your words?
                        Any memoirs or document confirming Stalin’s participation or order for this flight. Poor Beria, why are his stupid border guards pilots, according to this clown, who do not know how to monitor the territory of the enemy .... And what do they understand, they flew twice a day to each side: to the Baltic states and KOVO. Only the throat of a pan can not know this, and it’s you
                      6. Mcar
                        Mcar 3 November 2018 16: 54
                        -16
                        Quote: RuSFr
                        In addition to some memoirs, can anything be presented in the form of documents?

                        What do you want? Only articulate, clearly and point by point.
                        Quote: RuSFr
                        That's a clown
                      7. RuSFr
                        RuSFr 3 November 2018 18: 58
                        +21
                        I wish for comprehensible facts to corroborate your quotes.
                        Only the facts and do not need someone else's opinions. Here people are smart, they will understand who is cheating
                      8. Mcar
                        Mcar 3 November 2018 19: 12
                        -15
                        Quote: RuSFr
                        I wish for comprehensible facts to corroborate your quotes.

                        So here is "be on alert" and not "put on alert". Do you not understand that it is impossible to give the order "BE" if there was no order "BREAK"?
                      9. RuSFr
                        RuSFr 3 November 2018 19: 30
                        +24
                        Do you have problems with the Russian language? Or do not consider it necessary to delve into the answers? To the questions of General Pokrovsky
                        G.I.Sherstyuk (commander of the 45th regiment) replies: “To my first question:“ What are the orders from above for the actions of the 45th regiment ”, - received the response of Comcor 15 through NSh 45:“ Provocation, units sd to be in the garrisons in full readiness ».
                        The units of the division are in the garrisons, they were not even taken to places of dispersal on alarm!
                        So many divisions were on alert in the RPD.
                        That is why the directive was called contradictory!
                        Instead of driving the units according to cover plans, they tried to figure out the ridiculous word BE
                      10. Mcar
                        Mcar 3 November 2018 20: 04
                        -27
                        Quote: RuSFr
                        Instead of driving the units according to cover plans, they tried to figure out the ridiculous word BE

                        I apologize, but I have no time to look for what I once read. Moreover, even if I find and provide comprehensive evidence, I will never hear such a thing - you were right, I was wrong. This has not happened yet. I, if I was convinced of something, happened and reconsidered their positions, and recognized the correctness of the opponent. But now, so that other people behave this way ... It wasn’t.

                        Nevertheless, if I am not mistaken, I read this in this book:
                        Arsen Martirosyan
                        Stalin and intelligence on the eve of the war
                        https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=239144&p=1

                        IF it’s really interesting for you to find out, but not to assert yourself, I’m sure you will find time to read.
                      11. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 07: 25
                        +14
                        I apologize, but I have no time to look for what I once read. Moreover, even if I find and provide comprehensive evidence, I will never hear such a thing - you were right, I was wrong. This has not happened yet. I, if I was convinced of something, happened and reconsidered their positions, and recognized the correctness of the opponent. But now, so that other people behave this way ... It wasn’t.

                        Nevertheless, if I am not mistaken, I read this in this book:
                        Arsen Martirosyan
                        Stalin and intelligence on the eve of the war

                        Arsen has memory problems. And there is no evidence again!
                      12. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 07: 32
                        +4
                        2: 0. German leads. One of the arguments of the word BE in the books of Arsen Duty. He does not even know that a number of parts beyond the dispersal areas of the FAP have not gone. And they were in these areas in combat readiness before receiving a new order.
                        Not knowing this, and for so many years, claim to historical authenticity in their books. So many times in the cycle it was similar with Kozinkin’s books))))
                      13. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 3 November 2018 16: 46
                        +15
                        Ohohonyushki ...
                        What do you mean by the concept of putting on alert a division / corps / army / front?
                      14. Mcar
                        Mcar 3 November 2018 16: 52
                        -12
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        What do you mean by the concept of putting on alert a division / corps / army / front?

                        By this I understand that the commanders of divisions, corps, fronts have a sealed envelope in their safe. You can print only after the order or the time "H". This is how I understand - having received a signal / order, every commander of a division, corps or front performs what is set out in this package.

                        Repeat your "Ohohonyushki ..."
                      15. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 3 November 2018 17: 13
                        +16
                        Well, he read, then what? In the SD 04/120, 5834 people of staff, some are undergoing a military bus, to deploy to states close to the military, you need to replenish the total staff of up to 12 thousand people, get 2000 horses, 400 vehicles. Estimated (without exercises and combat coordination) 3 days. Upon receipt, the division is ready to step out of the RPD (up to 400 km from the border).
                      16. ccsr
                        ccsr 3 November 2018 19: 12
                        -8
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        Well, he read, then what? In the SD 04/120, 5834 people of staff, some are undergoing a military bus, to deploy to states close to the military, you need to replenish the total staff of up to 12 thousand people, get 2000 horses, 400 vehicles. Estimated (without exercises and combat coordination) 3 days. Upon receipt, the division is ready to step out of the RPD (up to 400 km from the border).

                        And apparently they did not guess that this division is called "cropped" in the common people, that is. is not ready, and has nothing to do with covering the state border. That is why she is given time to bring her to the state of "combat readiness", then to use her according to the cover plan.
                      17. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 3 November 2018 19: 55
                        +10
                        And who gave these divisions time to deploy and concentrate?
                      18. ccsr
                        ccsr 4 November 2018 10: 59
                        -7
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        And who gave these divisions time to deploy and concentrate?

                        Heroically dying cover units that were supposed to engage in protracted battles at the border and not retreat - this was our concept for cross-border battles at that time.
                      19. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 4 November 2018 14: 49
                        +13
                        We didn’t have such a concept, the cover armies were supposed to protect against the same attacks in order to disrupt mobilization, and not from the main enemy forces.
                        Second tier divisions had a concentration period of 4-7 days
                      20. ccsr
                        ccsr 4 November 2018 17: 54
                        -7
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        We didn’t have such a concept, the cover armies were supposed to protect against the same attacks in order to disrupt mobilization, and not from the main enemy forces.

                        Do not smack nonsense - this is precisely why the cover units were created so that, with the peacetime armed forces not mobilized, they would have enough time to equip the framing units of the okrug and transfer troops from internal okrugs to strengthen the fronts.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Second tier divisions had a concentration period of 4-7 days

                        So what? And the district’s mobil reserves were calculated for 15 days according to all standards. So at least two weeks, our parts of the cover should have been kept only on their reserves.
                      21. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 4 November 2018 19: 06
                        +12
                        The source?
                        Are you seriously? Having a defense density of 22 ~ 48 km with a statutory up to 12 km in field defense and up to 25 km, relying on SD, and having a multiple (for example, in the direction of the main attack, to Brest and its surroundings, 2 infantry and 1 were advancing against 5 SD and 3 AP tank divisions) superiority of enemy forces?
                      22. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 07: 36
                        +8
                        The 1985 Wanderer successfully fights off two Colonels Milchakov and Arsen Martirosyan himself, who turns out to be unaware of the interesting details of the 1985 Wanderer below.
                        I did not know either, thanks)))
                      23. ccsr
                        ccsr 5 November 2018 11: 19
                        -4
                        Quote: AsmyppoL
                        and Arsen Martirosyan himself,

                        Did he personally tell you that he was taking part in the discussion?
                      24. ccsr
                        ccsr 5 November 2018 11: 18
                        -6
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        The source?

                        Commander training for many years.

                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Having a defense density of 22 ~ 48 km with a statutory defense of up to 12 km in field defense and up to 25 km based on UR,

                        And why did you create a mechanized corps, and placed them in the second tier? Well, the country could not allow itself in peacetime to have an armed force of 10 million troops - can you at least understand this without any antics about the constitutional requirements?
                      25. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 5 November 2018 13: 56
                        +15
                        It’s funny, but the commander’s training of I.V. Tyulenev, the commander of the MBO, orders him to carry out an army defensive operation (100 km along the front, 100-120 km in depth) at the prepared lines (10-15 days of troops, 10 thousand mobilized population, 4 -5 construction battalions for special operations) by army forces from 4-5 SK (12-15 SD), 1-2 TD, 4-5 regiments of the ARGK, 2-3 ZAP, other forces.

                        The country couldn’t, the country expected to have time (for the formations of the western military units up to 7 days) to concentrate troops.
                      26. ccsr
                        ccsr 5 November 2018 17: 33
                        -6
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Funny, the commander’s training IV Tyulenev, commander of the Moscow Military District prescribes

                        It is not enough that the guiding documents and instructions prescribe, and in life it is often simply impossible to observe them - any military professional understands this, and does not stand up in a pose, but performs the assigned task.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        The country couldn’t, the country expected to have time (for the formations of the western military units up to 7 days) to concentrate troops.

                        Is this apparently a discovery for you? What struck you so, clear.
                      27. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 5 November 2018 19: 06
                        +9
                        That is, such plans were not built, the cover armies were not intended to repel the attack of the main forces of the Wehrmacht. What are we talking about.
                        The spacecraft did not have weeks (estimated, i.e., minimum) for deployment; they did not have time to prepare at the level of armies and fronts before the start of the war. What are you trying to prove? I don’t understand.
                      28. ccsr
                        ccsr 8 November 2018 20: 16
                        -2
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        That is, such plans were not built, the cover armies were not intended to repel the attack of the main forces of the Wehrmacht. What are we talking about.

                        On the contrary, district cover plans were urgently revised in May 1941.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        What are you trying to prove? I don’t understand.

                        Then it is not clear what you are going to dispute if you do not understand what I'm talking about?
                      29. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 8 November 2018 20: 28
                        +4
                        Are you reworked counting on defense at the front many times more than the authorized and with multiple superiority of the enemy?
                      30. ccsr
                        ccsr 8 November 2018 20: 49
                        -1
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Are you reworked counting on defense at the front many times more than the authorized and with multiple superiority of the enemy?

                        They were processed according to the May directive of the people's commissar, taking into account the existing forces in the districts. Cover plans are developed regardless of what further actions the general staff is planning, and based on available funds at the moment. And what the enemy is planning in terms of cover is impossible to foresee.
                      31. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 8 November 2018 20: 51
                        +4
                        What does this have to do with our question? There are more than enough forces in the districts to wage war; the question is in their timely mobilization.
                      32. ccsr
                        ccsr 9 November 2018 10: 00
                        -1
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        There are more than enough forces in the districts to wage war; the question is in their timely mobilization.

                        Who told you this? You would at least think why, before June 22, the strengthening of the districts began due to the arrival of formations from other districts, if we proceed from your logic. And the concentration of our troops on the border left much to be desired, so those who do not know well what these groups were at that time can speak of the "sufficiency" of troops in the border districts. I don't even mention the quality.
                      33. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 9 November 2018 10: 35
                        +5
                        Note by Vatutin. For the first echelon (0-100 km), 186 divisions are needed, there are 170 divisions in the border ones (1 TD 1 MK moved to the Kandalaksha direction, 20 divisions already). They were supposed to put forward-7 from the air defense, 7 hVO, 6 OrVO. From June 12-15, 32 divisions of frontier military units begin to advance to the border. Against 153 divisions of the Wehrmacht and allies.
                        If they were mobilized on time / pushed to the border / would deliver a preemptive strike to the spacecraft, there might be time to deploy reserves of the fronts (22 SD, 7 TD, 3 MD from the internal military armies) and the Headquarters reserve.
                      34. ccsr
                        ccsr 9 November 2018 11: 23
                        -1
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Be mobilized on time

                        There was no money in the country to begin mobilization in advance, which is why they waited until the last.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        would deliver a preemptive strike to the spacecraft could have time to deploy reserves

                        How to strike if troops were not enough for a full-fledged defense?
                      35. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 9 November 2018 12: 03
                        +3
                        There is nothing to do with it, there is little to mobilize the troops, they are at the border, they have to do something-carry out offensive or defensive operations. It’s easier to advance, because the plans and the alignment of the enemy’s forces are not known in advance;
                        The issue price is 15 days-M + 15 (in the course of covert mobilization it may be even more) and there are already forces for defense or offensive.
                      36. ccsr
                        ccsr 9 November 2018 21: 33
                        -2
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        There’s nothing to do with it, there’s little to mobilize troops,

                        Money is the most important argument for the economy. By the way, you probably don’t know that in order to draft ONE soldier in the army, at least 15 people in the national economy must work for its maintenance - this is the ABC of the military economy. So, first of all, think about where we can find so many additional workers in the country if, for example, we take one million men out of the national economy to support them at the expense of others without worsening the lives of citizens.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        It’s easier to advance, because the plans and the alignment of the enemy’s forces are not known in advance;

                        Where you have been taught such a "science" - do not bother to tell in order to understand with whom we are dealing.
                      37. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 9 November 2018 22: 40
                        +5
                        It was Poland and France that saving and passive waiting helped. Two visible examples before the eyes.

                        Where necessary. What were the "northern" and "southern" deployment options?
                      38. ccsr
                        ccsr 10 November 2018 10: 53
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        It was Poland and France that saving and passive waiting helped. Two visible examples before the eyes.

                        In the first place, they did not have a spirit - you cannot understand this either.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Where it is necessary.

                        So nowhere ...
                      39. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 10 November 2018 12: 32
                        +4
                        By the beginning of the war, out of 47 formations, according to Polish plans, 24 had been deployed as part of 6-7 operatively unconnected groups, the Germans had 1 by September 43. Was the spirit not enough to deploy an army? I agree

                        I graduated from the MVKU. Answer the question?
                      40. ccsr
                        ccsr 10 November 2018 15: 41
                        -2
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        I graduated from the MVKU. Answer the question?

                        Did they teach you how to advance without intelligence? Original ...
                      41. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 10 November 2018 15: 54
                        +5
                        Everything, you are no longer interested in questions, all the attention to my humble figure? repeat
                        Has anyone canceled intelligence, radio-technical, aviation intelligence?
                      42. ccsr
                        ccsr 10 November 2018 16: 05
                        -2
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Everything, you are no longer interested in questions, all the attention to my humble figure? repeat
                        Has anyone canceled intelligence, radio-technical, aviation intelligence?


                        Which one - I do not follow all the texts.
                        Your passage about the types of intelligence surprised me - you offered to advance without it.
                      43. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 10 November 2018 16: 10
                        +6
                        1. Not me, but GS.
                        2. Not without reconnaissance, but believed that it would not be possible to find out the exact places of strikes and the outfit of forces, therefore it would be more effective to strike by oneself.
                        3. Have you already figured out the meaning of the "northern" and "southern" options for the deployment of the Red Army?
                      44. ccsr
                        ccsr 10 November 2018 16: 17
                        -1
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Not me, but GS.

                        What exactly did GS do wrong? Can you formulate?
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Not without intelligence, but believed that it would not be possible to find out the exact places of strikes and the outfit of forces, therefore it would be more effective to strike yourself.

                        This is nonsense, because only in 1941 the program of rearmament of spacecrafts and the creation of 30 mechanized corps began, so that "effective strike" could only be in your imagination. It was not possible to strike first at the spacecraft - they would have received an even greater pogrom than after June 22.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Have you already figured out the meaning of the "northern" and "southern" options for the deployment of the Red Army?

                        This issue has long been discussed at the "militer", when Kozinkin's books were discussed, and I see no reason to start a discussion of these options here. If you so want to show your cleverness, then write the text so that it amazes everyone else, and it is not interesting for me to discuss this material within the framework of Madame's articles.
                      45. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 10 November 2018 16: 33
                        +5
                        1. GSh did everything right.
                        2. The ability to defend effectively was even less.
                        3. Why? BMSh and Meretskov wrote in Russian what the fronts should do after concentration. If you "refuted" them, it's your own business.
                      46. ccsr
                        ccsr 11 November 2018 13: 00
                        -4
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        2. The ability to defend effectively was even less.

                        On the basis of what such a bold conclusion is made? Or maybe you don’t know that the advancing party always suffers more losses than the defending side under approximately equal conditions of the parties?
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        in Russian they wrote what the fronts should do after concentration.

                        Specific quotes or links to the studio, so that it is clear what you are hinting at.
                      47. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 11 November 2018 16: 25
                        +3
                        Did I bring you an outfit of forces for defense in the main area during the army defensive operation? Is he even observed somewhere on the border? How are you going to successfully defend without having the strength to do this, not knowing the exact date of the attack and sections of the main strikes?

                        Considerations for the deployment plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union against Germany and its allies. The document was developed by Shaposhnikov in August 1940. Chapter V. Fundamentals of strategic deployment.
                        The main task of our troops is -....
                      48. ccsr
                        ccsr 11 November 2018 17: 23
                        -4
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        How are you going to successfully defend without having the strength to do so,

                        How are you going to advance if you admit that there were not enough forces for defense?
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Considerations for the deployment plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union against Germany and its allies.

                        If you had experience working with official documents from the district and above, then you would know that "Considerations .." is just a PRESENTED material, not DIRECTIVE. When you learn to at least correctly assess the purpose of the spacecraft command documents, then we will discuss with you what role the "Considerations" played in preparing the border districts for war in terms of, for example, providing people, weapons and equipment.
                      49. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 11 November 2018 17: 52
                        +4
                        Secretly, under the guise of a BUS and new OSH, we mobilize and concentrate the army, we assign the date and places of strikes ourselves. This is much simpler than passive waiting.

                        Do you have similar material characterizing the actions of the Red Army after concentration?
                      50. ccsr
                        ccsr 12 November 2018 11: 54
                        -2
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Secretly, under the guise of a BUS and new OSH, we mobilize and concentrate the army,

                        And the Germans will not notice this, and will not start a war earlier - apparently you think so.
                        Once again I want to remind you that if the Germans started the war on May 10-15, it is still unknown how the battle for Moscow and all subsequent events would have developed. But this is just my opinion.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Do you have similar material characterizing the actions of the Red Army after concentration?

                        There are district cover plans - this is the material characterizing the actions of the spacecraft in the initial period of the war. Everything else is out of the realm of guesswork, as well as various interpretations of the "Considerations".
                      51. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 12 November 2018 12: 32
                        +3
                        It doesn’t matter, there is still not enough force on the border for a successful defense or offensive; troops need to be transported anyway.

                        This material characterizes the actions of the KA for the period of concentration. Ie you have nothing serious, but you "proved". Thanks.
                      52. ccsr
                        ccsr 12 November 2018 14: 47
                        -2
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Ie you have nothing serious, but you "proved". Thanks.

                        Do you yourself have this material?
                        Maybe present it for discussion - then we will understand what you mean by "seriousness".
                      53. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 12 November 2018 16: 45
                        +2
                        You have it too. This is "Considerations ..." We do not observe any polemics, opposition of opinions in 1939-1941. Why shouldn't the spacecraft act as Shaposhnikov and later Meretskov painted it?
                      54. ccsr
                        ccsr 12 November 2018 21: 54
                        -2
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        This is "Considerations ..."

                        Yes, this is not a guiding document, but only a memorandum - if you do not understand what is the difference between them, then I do not see any reason to discuss it with you because of your incompetence.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Why should the spacecraft not act as Shaposhnikov painted, and later Meretskov?

                        Since after the report of the "Considerations" and their approval by the country's top leadership, the NPO had to issue an order to develop a PLAN in case of war, and the General Staff had to prepare a bunch of directives and instructions to the troops, coordinate joint actions with other law enforcement agencies, and only after all this, a plan was to be born, which would be approved by the head of government. Such was the order in the country, both then and later. "Considerations" are not such a plan by definition.
                      55. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 13 November 2018 06: 02
                        +3
                        At least the report, for the opposite point of view, even this is not. What did WWI participants do in their first operations? What did France do before Sitzkrieg? What was Poland going to do and what did Germany do with Poland and France? Hit first. But for you this is not an indicator, personal experience, does it dictate something else?

                        Are you sure that all documents of the winter-spring 1941 period are declassified? Are you sure that two weeks to develop a plan for any of the options is not enough?
                      56. ccsr
                        ccsr 13 November 2018 09: 27
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Are you sure that all documents of the winter-spring 1941 period are declassified?

                        Even if they were not classified, the traces of the execution of such documents would certainly be reflected in the documents of the services, combat arms, and headquarters of border districts, associations of different levels. And this is nowhere to be found - here is the whole answer to your "nondisclosure".
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        But for you this is not an indicator, personal experience, does it dictate something else?

                        Only one thing dictates - measure your strength with the enemy in the first place, if you decide to attack someone.
                      57. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 17 November 2018 05: 39
                        +6
                        Why did you decide that these documents are not classified? Why did you decide that two weeks to develop them is not enough? Maybe in the headquarters of the covering armies, military districts there are other documents characterizing the actions of the spacecraft after concentration?

                        Namely, strategic defense is more complex and requires great strength, France and Poland lost acting on defense — but this is not an argument for you.
                      58. ccsr
                        ccsr 17 November 2018 20: 14
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Why did you decide that these documents are not classified?

                        Well, think for yourself - if there is some unclassified plan of attack on Germany, for example, and it includes measures to at least strengthen border armies with formations from other districts, then how will you hide the movement of military echelons and transports that must have passed through applications to the People’s Commissariat of Railways? It is impossible to hide all this at large-scale events, especially when, in addition to NPOs, other people's commissariats and state structures participate in them. Traces in the documents of other departments will certainly remain, and in the memoirs they would certainly be mentioned.
                      59. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 17 November 2018 23: 40
                        +7
                        How do you distinguish an attack plan from a defense plan? In any case, there are transportation of parts and formations to the border.
                      60. ccsr
                        ccsr 18 November 2018 10: 01
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        How do you distinguish an attack plan from a defense plan?

                        The creation of a plan of attack is impossible without the creation of a plan of war, like the directive "Barabarossa", because we must know the ultimate goals and the required forces for this. But the country's defense plan, in principle, can be limited to district cover plans, i.e. have a more local character, due to the fact that it is impossible to plan defense for a long period without mobilization in the country. Moreover, we cannot know in what sector and by what forces the attack on us will take place, and therefore the entire plan of the country's defense, which can be revealed by the enemy on indirect grounds, will be completely inoperative.
                      61. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 18 November 2018 17: 39
                        +6
                        What for? What prevents the development of detailed plans during the concentration of the first front-line offensive operations?
                        Okay, Shaposhnikov and Meretskov are not authorities for you, will Zhukov fit? In his "Considerations ..." of May 15, he wrote: "... I consider it necessary in no case to give initiative to the German command, to preempt the enemy in deployment and to attack the German army at the moment when it is in the stage of deployment and has not yet will manage to organize the front and the interaction of the combat arms. "
                      62. ccsr
                        ccsr 18 November 2018 17: 57
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Okay, Shaposhnikov and Meretskov are not authorities for you, will Zhukov fit? In his "Considerations ..." of May 15, he wrote: "... I think

                        You seem to have not entered that "Considerations" is not only not a plan, but not even DIRECTIVE instructions, but just a PRESENTATION. Do you understand at least something in the hierarchy of military documents, or are you ready to propagandize any nonsense here with an intelligent air?
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        What for? What prevents the development of detailed plans during the concentration of the first front-line offensive operations?

                        Only one thing - the enemy does not dedicate us to his strategic plans, and therefore it is necessary to use the country's resources very carefully, taking into account the fact that they were not enough even to maintain the army in wartime states.
                      63. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 18 November 2018 19: 58
                        +5
                        This "nonsense" was written by several NGSH, this "nonsense" in meaning repeats the first operations of the fronts of the First and Second World Wars. Do you have at least something other than your own self-conceit to even be a subject of dispute?

                        Smearing them on a huge front, by default not knowing the start date of the war and the place of the strikes? Do you even know that before the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts outnumbered the opposing armies of Army Groups Center and South?
                      64. ccsr
                        ccsr 19 November 2018 12: 38
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        This "nonsense" was written by several NGSH, this "nonsense" in meaning repeats the first operations of the fronts of the First and Second World Wars.

                        If they would write less, but more really study and support the troops involved, measuring military means and means of support, then our personnel army in 1941 would cause the Germans more damage.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Do you have at least something other than your own self-conceit so that the subject of the dispute is at all?

                        I have experience of service and I understand why the tragedy occurred in 1941. But you, apart from the declarations, didn’t bring anything clever, speculating on the strength ratios, but without comparing the qualitative characteristics of the troops.
                      65. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 19 November 2018 16: 16
                        +6
                        Seriously? And what kind of preparation should be in order to level the ratio of forces 3,6: 1 in favor of the Germans on June 22 at the border of the KOVO?

                        What does your personal experience have to do with the spring-summer 1941 situation? You are not a direct participant in the events? How did you find out that the AC was going to conduct only defensive operations after concentration?
                      66. ccsr
                        ccsr 19 November 2018 19: 41
                        -2
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        And what kind of preparation should be in order to level the ratio of forces 3,6: 1 in favor of the Germans on June 22 at the border of the KOVO?

                        At least so that the commanders of the regiments of cover could give the command to take positions on the plan of cover before the first bombs and shells fell on our land.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        How did you find out that the AC was going to conduct only defensive operations after concentration?

                        Defensive operations are included in the cover plan, and in order to organize an offensive operation, a completely different number of troops is needed, which were not in the districts at that time. Study the Finnish experience - it clearly showed how we then knew how to carry out an offensive with the forces of the district, even reinforced by other parts.
                      67. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 19 November 2018 21: 11
                        +5
                        What does the right to independent defense lines have to do with preparation? It is either there or it is not. I have already given you the ratio and indicators of the length of the defense lines of border connections, how are you going to defend effectively with this ratio?

                        I’ll tell you a terrible secret (again), the cover plan does not provide for defense against the main forces of the Wehrmacht, maximum from the same cover armies, but from the German side. To successfully defend, you need no less forces than the enemy, and there are more mobile connections.
                        The Finnish company was carried out by a recently mobilized spacecraft of the 1939 model, the ratio of forces in the infantry was approximately equal, the superiority in tanks and artillery was leveled by bunkers, it was according to the experience of the Finnish war that the "Southern option" was recommended, there are fewer defensive structures.
                      68. ccsr
                        ccsr 20 November 2018 10: 00
                        -4
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        What does the right to independent defense lines have to do with preparation? It is either there or it is not.

                        The most direct, and the naval actions on June 22 best showed how it was necessary to prepare for war - they practically had no losses even at the bases.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        I’ll tell you a terrible secret (again), the cover plan does not provide for defense against the main forces of the Wehrmacht, maximum from the same cover armies, but from the German side.

                        The cover plan is actually a universal document that can be corrected over the next years by the directives and orders of the General Staff, and can be changed both in the direction of increasing the district group, and in the direction of decreasing it. And it can be introduced not only when they attack us, but also when we ourselves want to secretly prepare for the attack.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        The Finnish company was carried out by the recently mobilized spacecraft of the 1939 model,

                        You want to prove to me. what in two years our army has radically changed? Oh well...
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        according to the experience of the Finnish war, the "Southern Option" was recommended, there are fewer defensive structures.

                        The southern and northern options were discussed in detail on the milter, and so if you have something to say, you can do it there. And here, where they discuss articles of another author, I see no reason to lead a discussion in this direction.
                      69. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 20 November 2018 18: 47
                        +7
                        The most direct, and the naval actions on June 22 best showed how it was necessary to prepare for war - they practically had no losses even at the bases.

                        Ships and shore infrastructure were simply not the Luftwaffe's priorities. And then they managed to spoil the raids on Kronstadt and Sevastopol. Moreover, in Sevastopol, several magnetic mines fell to land, i.e. they knew about the laying of mines. As a result, they lost the destroyer, floating crane, tugboat. Moreover, the fleet had experience fighting English magnetic mines in 1919 in the North and in 1939 adopted a mine with a magnetic target sensor.
                        You want to prove to me. what in two years our army has radically changed?

                        Yes, plus the enemy is not sitting on the Maginot Line, the Finnish field defense was regularly crushed by artillery.
                        And here, where they discuss articles of another author, I see no reason to lead a discussion in this direction.

                        If you are not able to prove your point of view by referring to sources, then why write?
                      70. ccsr
                        ccsr 20 November 2018 19: 56
                        -4
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Ships and shore infrastructure were simply not the Luftwaffe's priorities.

                        The answer to such "experts" as you were given a long time ago:
                        http://old.nasledie.ru/oboz/N03_99/3_23.HTM
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Yes, plus the enemy is not sitting on the Maginot Line, the Finnish field defense was regularly crushed by artillery.

                        Have you prepared at least one fighter with classiness in the army in two years, or do you know this process purely theoretically?

                        Quote: strannik1985
                        If you are not able to prove your point of view by referring to sources, then why write?

                        Then, so that people like you do not try to move the arrows to another topic. And it’s not interesting to re-discuss here what you don’t know much about.
                      71. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 21 November 2018 06: 57
                        +7
                        Do you even understand that you put an equal sign between repelling an air attack and full-fledged combined arms battles? Did the fleet beat the formation for the formation or did the naval assault reflect in June 1941? Under similar conditions, the oddvo also got off easily.

                        Little, I’m a simple mabutei, I don’t know how to defend successfully under conditions of qualitative and quantitative superiority of the enemy at the front many times higher than normal. Can you tell? And at the same time, where did you get such experience?
                      72. ccsr
                        ccsr 21 November 2018 11: 01
                        -4
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Do you even understand that you put an equal sign between repelling an air attack and full-fledged combined arms battles?

                        In this case, the readiness of the type of armed forces for war and the level of its readiness for an enemy attack are evaluated. And in this, the naval ones were at their best, unlike some district cover formations, when border guards fought without support from the spacecraft units until 11-12 hours on June 22.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        And at the same time, where did you get such experience?

                        The teachers were good - there was no better school than the GSVG in the SA.
                      73. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 21 November 2018 12: 48
                        +7
                        Willingness is to perform certain tasks, right? What tasks, for example, did the KBF face?
                        From June 21 to June 22, the Finns land troops on the Aland Islands (5000 men, 69 guns), Finnish submarines lay minefields off the Estonian coast, the German MZ put large minefields "Corbet" and "Apolda", the Finns put MZ "Kipinola" on 26-27.06 "and" Kuolemanyarve ", the bomber regiment K.Gr.806 places magnetic mines in the fairway of the Gulf of Finland (raids on Kronstadt took place from June 22 to 24, after that there was a lull until September 19). Can you please tell me, did the fleet interfere with any of this?

                        So what is the problem of showing your erudition? And then for a hundred messages, and then links to a certain personal experience, the matter does not go. So you only discredit your t / z.
                      74. ccsr
                        ccsr 21 November 2018 14: 54
                        -5
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Please tell me, did the fleet prevent any of this?

                        Did our fleet enter the war on June 21? Or did Finland attack us before, and the fleet made no attempt to repel the attack? On June 22, the fleet reflected the German air raid on its bases - and this, incidentally, is the large cities, Leningrad, Riga, Sevastopol, for example.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        So what is the problem of showing your erudition?

                        The only problem is with you - you, unlike me, are cowardly afraid to express your point of view on the "militer" or on the forum "For the truth", which is why you use a platform that almost no one reads.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        So you only discredit your t / z.

                        In front of you? You still have not noticed that no one else is reading this topic except you.
                      75. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 21 November 2018 15: 41
                        +7
                        That is, the fleet did not notice the installation of the Ministry of Defense, could not prevent the installation of mines from the air. What is he better than the army? The intensity of the battles in the air is much less; at airfields in the border military operations, the backlashes performed from 4 to 8 raids per day. Do you seriously compare this with 2 raids of 12-14 Yu-88 with magnetic mines on Kronstadt?

                        Why do I need "militerra" if we are discussing the issue here? Why do I need someone, if the polemic is with you, you read my messages?
                        Bggg, he blamed cowardice. Well, really a child.
                      76. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 22 November 2018 07: 30
                        0
                        The fleet is better ... their form is prettier ..
                        And the encryption is short - "Alert No. 1."
                        Damn of course in the details, but we're not talking about them now ?!
                      77. ccsr
                        ccsr 22 November 2018 18: 23
                        -3
                        Quote: Shturman_50
                        And the encryption is short - "Alert No. 1."

                        Even by the way the sailors acted on this cipher, one can judge their combat readiness:
                        June 22, 1941 at 3 hours 06 minutes
                        Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral I.D. Eliseev ordered to open fire on German aircraft.
                        This was the first military order of the Great Patriotic War.

                        https://pikabu.ru/story/sevastopol__gorod__pervyim_vstretivshiy_nachalo_velikoy_otechestvennoy_voynyi__4288614
                      78. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 22 November 2018 07: 27
                        -1
                        The last statement is not entirely true.
                      79. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 19 November 2018 06: 24
                        0
                        This took advantage of gr. Rezun ..
                      80. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 19 November 2018 07: 34
                        +8
                        Suvorov-Rezun wrote for a wide audience, and at a time when information on the topic in the public domain was scarce.
                      81. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 21 November 2018 14: 41
                        +1
                        Well, in terms of commerce!
                  2. ccsr
                    ccsr 3 November 2018 19: 05
                    -26
                    Quote: strannik1985
                    Under normal conditions, people, horses, and cars should be provided by the military commissariat.

                    Are you out of your mind? The military registration and enlistment office is engaged in the call of people, and not in the mobilization of equipment and horses in the troops. These events are held according to the district’s mobplans, agreed upon with enterprises and collective farms, and the military commissariats have no relation to the implementation of this.
                    1. Mcar
                      Mcar 3 November 2018 19: 43
                      -29
                      Quote: ccsr
                      Are you out of your mind? The military registration and enlistment office is engaged in the call of people, and not in the mobilization of equipment and horses in the troops. These events are held according to the district’s mobplans, agreed upon with enterprises and collective farms, and the military commissariats have no relation to the implementation of this.

                      This is not the case - in place there the mind or went for a walk.

                      The point here is that the new information does not agree with the previously received one. And the individual does not have the wisdom to double-check the pledged "reserves". Hence all the troubles. I know what I'm talking about - I myself used to be like that. Then it passed.
                    2. strannik1985
                      strannik1985 3 November 2018 20: 00
                      +19
                      I’m in mine, but you should read the "Manual on the mobilization work of military units, directorates and institutions of the Red Army." Chapter III, clauses 6 and 7.
                      1. ccsr
                        ccsr 4 November 2018 10: 20
                        -13
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        and you should read the "Manual on the mobilization work of military units, directorates and institutions of the Red Army." Chapter III, clauses 6 and 7.

                        No need to advise - you’d better tell which military enlistment office, regional or city, a herd of horses will drive, and what is written about it in the manual.
                      2. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 4 November 2018 14: 46
                        +16
                        According to the Manual, the military commissariat, together with the military unit, organizes delivery points for mobilized horse-drawn personnel and equipment.
                      3. ccsr
                        ccsr 4 November 2018 18: 01
                        -14
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        According to the manual, the military commissariat, together with the military unit

                        And who is subordinate to whom, military enlistment office or what? You generally have an idea of ​​how the functions of district mobsters are divided, and the functions of military registration and enlistment officers. Parts of the district are subject to the instructions of the district headquarters, which means that everything connected with mobilization passes only through the district’s mobsters. And if you don’t know this in practice, then you don’t need to wave instructions that have specific orders and instructions of the district headquarters under them, which guide them in mobilizing enlistees and rolling stock from the national economy.
                      4. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 4 November 2018 18: 37
                        +14
                        Again. The military registration and enlistment office organizes a drop-off point; representatives of the military unit take horses and equipment from it. What is the essence of your claim? smile
                      5. ccsr
                        ccsr 5 November 2018 11: 45
                        -10
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        The military registration and enlistment office organizes a drop-off point; representatives of the military unit take horses and equipment from it. What is the essence of your claim?

                        Do you even have an idea of ​​the number of military registration and enlistment officers, and the amount of equipment and property that the district was supposed to receive from the national economy?
                        If only we would have thought with our head why we should drive the equipment to the military registration and enlistment office, and then to the unit, if it can immediately be assigned to a specific unit, and send it (or issue by orders) upon receipt of a mobilization order.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        What is the essence of your claim?

                        Do not spread your fantasies as obvious truth if you have never encountered this before.
                      6. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 5 November 2018 13: 09
                        +10
                        I have no idea, I did not live in 1941. Can you confirm your words with something?
                      7. ccsr
                        ccsr 5 November 2018 13: 12
                        -6
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        I have no idea, I did not live in 1941. Can you confirm your words with something?

                        If you have no idea, then why are you spreading lies?
                        I can confirm my words only by knowledge of military affairs and understanding of how this is organized in the districts.
                      8. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 5 November 2018 13: 41
                        +13
                        So you, too, did not live at that time, you could not personally observe the situation, how did you find out?
                        We take the memoirs of M.N.Sbitnev, the military commissar of the Dzerzhinsky district of Moscow, 1941. On June 23, VK officers were transferred to the barracks position, hard work began on national teams and drop-off points. The military registration and enlistment office also mobilized vehicles, horses, carts and harnesses.
                        We take the book of Ulanov / Shein. Order in the tank troops. Chapter 6 Unsatisfied appetites. Report on the inspection of vehicles located in the Darnitsky distribution point for repair.
                        By golly, like a child.
                      9. ccsr
                        ccsr 5 November 2018 17: 40
                        -9
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        So you, too, did not live at that time, you could not personally observe the situation, how did you find out?

                        From textbooks and memoirs of participants in those events.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        The military registration and enlistment office also mobilized vehicles, horses, carts and harnesses.

                        Do you have any idea about the staff of the draft board?
                        How can a hundred cars be accepted under an act, for example, an officer of the military registration and enlistment office, even if it’s not a minute event even for the deputy head of the battalion, because then he will be held responsible for the equipment adopted. Who will go to the tribunal if the cars are understaffed and with a worked out resource, and even break down when moving to the unit? Have you ever taken equipment in the army?
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Report on the inspection of vehicles located in the Darnitsky distribution point for repair.

                        And what about the military registration and enlistment office, if the distribution point is organized by an armored vehicle or by a district auto service?
                      10. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 5 November 2018 18: 24
                        +14
                        I brought you memories and documents, can you at least somehow comment on them? Well, besides the allegations of lies? wink
                        Move on. Order on the enforcement of the Manual on the mobilization work of local government bodies of the NPO of the USSR No. 095 of March 5, 1941.
                        Chapter II P.11 Equipping of horsemen, carts, harnesses and mechanized transport is distributed in peacetime among households that, upon mobilization, supply the indicated points to the transfer points of military commissariats.
                        The delivery of motor vehicles directly to military units is allowed only in individual cases, with particularly short periods of readiness (UR, air defense, cavalry in border regions).
                        P.30 Regional and district military registration and enlistment offices bear full responsibility:
                        a) ... as well as for the condition of the supplied horse train, wagon train and mechanical transport.
                        c) for timely and high-quality staffing of military units with horses, wagons and mechanical transport during mobilization.
                        Questions?
                      11. ccsr
                        ccsr 8 November 2018 20: 34
                        -5
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Move on. Order on the enforcement of the Manual on the mobilization work of local government bodies of the NPO of the USSR No. 095 of March 5, 1941.
                        Chapter II P.11 Equipping of horsemen, carts, harnesses and mechanized transport is distributed in peacetime among households that, upon mobilization, supply the indicated points to the transfer points of military commissariats.
                        The delivery of motor vehicles directly to military units is allowed only in individual cases, with particularly short periods of readiness (UR, air defense, cavalry in border regions).

                        I don’t know how you understood what you brought, but given the fact that we are talking about June 22 in the border districts and the order of mobilization with the outbreak of war, you have to chew what the text of the Manual means.
                        We read carefully: distributed in peacetime among farms that, by mobilization, supply the indicated points to the transfer points of the military commissariats.
                        The word "distributed" means the planning of supplies by the military registration and enlistment office, and the words "by mobilization" means that it begins only after the Government announces mobilization. And the mobilization was announced on June 23, i.e. it started when the war was going on for 20 hours. How were the incomplete border units supposed to act, which, according to the cover plan, must be combat-ready 3-9-12-24 hours after the cover plan was entered? Where could they get the missing personnel, horses, equipment? Only in civil organizations, for which, according to the second part of the manual, it was provided:
                        The delivery of motor vehicles directly to military units is allowed only in individual cases, with particularly short periods of readiness (SD, air defense, cavalry in border regions).
                        If you carefully studied the events of those days, then you would have understood that the first part of the Manual in Section 11 is written for the internal districts and some areas of border districts that are far from the border. But the second part is just written for the border areas, where representatives of military units received property and equipment in the national economy directly, bypassing their collection at some sites.
                        It is strange that you could not understand this, since you undertook to cite the document without understanding its essence.
                      12. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 8 November 2018 20: 47
                        +9
                        Dear, I don’t need to chew. You didn’t personally observe this?
                        1.Provide documents or memoirs where it is mentioned that horses and equipment of SD 04/120 with a mobilization period of 1-3 days were received directly, bypassing the delivery points?
                        2. If you already declare that to 16? 18? 22? June was aware of the attack, how many horses and equipment were mobilized before the war?
                      13. ccsr
                        ccsr 9 November 2018 10: 30
                        -6
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        1.Provide documents or memoirs where it is mentioned that horses and equipment of SD 04/120 with a mobilization period of 1-3 days were received directly, bypassing the delivery points?

                        Do not distort - it was about the mobilization of equipment, which began according to the district mobplan after the outbreak of war, when the Government’s decree on the start of mobilization from June 23 did not yet enter. Then, they could not physically create any points.

                        Quote: strannik1985
                        2. If you already declare that to 16? 18? 22? June was aware of the attack, how many horses and equipment were mobilized before the war?

                        Learn:

                        EXTRACT FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE DECISION BY THE POLITICAL Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.)
                        N: 28
                        8 March 1941 city
                        155. On the conduct of training camps for military reserves in 1941 and the attraction of horses and motor vehicles for training from the national economy.
                        2. Allow NPOs to attract 45 horses and 57.500 vehicles for training camps from the national economy for 1.680 days, distributed according to the appendix to the republics, territories and regions.
                      14. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 9 November 2018 10: 57
                        +8
                        How so dear, because according to MP-41, in the course of a hidden mobilization under the guise of a BUS, conscripts are called up, supplies of vehicles and horses assigned to parts are delivered by personal summons, without announcing NGO orders?

                        1. Dear, the number of registered members of the SD (those who can be considered to bring the number to NWS) in the border military units is less than half, for example, in the ZOV, only 2 divisions (10 people) planned to conduct the collection of assigned personnel, then increased to 000 thousand, KOVO 24, LVO 65550, OdVO 20000.
                        2. Mob. Need of the KA 671 770 horses. When the secret mobilization was actually carried out (BUS 1939), 634 thousand horses, 117 vehicles, and 300 tractors were called up.
                      15. ccsr
                        ccsr 9 November 2018 11: 19
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        How so dear, because according to MP-41, in the course of a hidden mobilization under the guise of a BUS, the conscription of military men, the delivery of motor vehicles and horses, assigned to parts, are carried out by personal summons,

                        This is a planned training camp, and not the beginning of the war in the early morning of June 22 - can’t you understand the situation correctly or you weren’t taught to distinguish it?
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        1. Dear, the number of attributed composition of diabetes mellitus (those who can be considered to bring the number to NW) in the border military units is less than half,


                        And you do not take statistics for the entire district, but rather study in more detail how the conscripts were called up in the cover units located in the border strip or nearby - then you will find out how many people were mobilized there by the end of June 22. For example, reserve officers in border cities who were assigned to cover units — were they waiting for the summons on June 22, or were they supposed to immediately arrive at the place of registration?
                      16. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 9 November 2018 12: 05
                        +8
                        And why do you cite BUS 1941 as an example of mobilization?

                        I don’t know about the officers, the mobilization of ascribed to the recently annexed territories did not extend.
                      17. ccsr
                        ccsr 9 November 2018 21: 25
                        -4
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        And why do you cite BUS 1941 as an example of mobilization?

                        This is an example of how, on the eve of the war, equipment and horses from the national economy appeared in the troops.
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        the mobilization of ascribed to the newly annexed territories did not extend.

                        Even those that were joined in 1939?
                      18. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 9 November 2018 22: 19
                        +7
                        On the scale of the districts where the bus took place, this is a minuscule.

                        Yes, so Zemskov wrote.
                      19. ccsr
                        ccsr 10 November 2018 10: 57
                        -4
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        On the scale of the districts where the bus took place, this is a minuscule.

                        Here, not so much the scale is important, but where they were sent, because first of all it was necessary for the cover units where there was a shortage. Indeed, the execution of the entire cover plan primarily depended precisely on those units that were the first to be met by German troops at the border.
                      20. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 10 November 2018 12: 36
                        +6
                        Why did you decide that horses and vehicles were sent to the cover army? They called on a lot of people in the internal districts, they could be used for transportation of enlisted assigned personnel.
                      21. ccsr
                        ccsr 10 November 2018 15: 44
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985

                        Why did you decide that horses and motor vehicles were sent to the cover army?

                        Do you think that then some dumbasses served at district headquarters?
                        Would you personally send horses and equipment arrived from the national economy in order to somehow solve the current problems, if it depended on you?

                        They called on a lot of people in the internal districts, they could be used for transportation of the assigned enlisted staff.

                        On carts or something in parts of the scribes were transported? Oh well...
                      22. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 10 November 2018 16: 01
                        +6
                        I think that building theories from the finger does not respect yourself.
                        These horses could be used to harness guns, field kitchens, carts with property for training.
                      23. ccsr
                        ccsr 10 November 2018 16: 09
                        -3
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        These horses could be used to harness guns, field kitchens, carts with property for training.

                        Have you ever heard anything about the fact that then from each regiment in the battalion (battery) for the construction of URs they were attracted? And where it would first of all be directed that which arrived at the training camp, it is not difficult to guess for those who themselves faced this situation.
                      24. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 10 November 2018 16: 14
                        +7
                        I know that the ascribed to ZAPOVO were sent to the construction of the SD, but I did not see evidence that all the horses and equipment were sent to the border military districts.
                        This is even more nonsense, instead of training and co-ordinating (if this is the assigned composition of the SD) to send for construction.
        2. AsmyppoL
          AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 07: 22
          +8
          Note that Arsen couldn’t answer anything intelligibly)) 1: the German leads 0
          1. The comment was deleted.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 4 November 2018 10: 54
        -14
        Quote: RuSFr
        Now look at the text of the Directive itself.
        “During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden German attack on the fronts of the LVO, Arr. OVO, Zap. OVO, KOVO, Od. OVO. An attack can begin with provocative actions. ” The directive speaks of a surprise attack on the fronts, including the LenVO front.

        After these words, any district commander simply had to raise troops, and withdraw them from the RPD to concentration areas, or else approach the areas provided for by the cover plan, and not wait for any further instructions from Moscow.
        Quote: RuSFr
        It sounds wild, but such a Directive once again speaks about the unexpectedness of the war

        For the illiterate, it’s possible, but for professionals, this means that from 00:22 on June XNUMX, all troops should already be raised, and located either in the areas of concentration or near the positions provided for by the command post.
    2. The comment was deleted.
      1. RuSFr
        RuSFr 3 November 2018 18: 57
        +26
        Come on the facts on the points, you nonsense brand new:
        1) How are the words of Zakharov confirmed. Any one memory or document. Not what to present to you. THERE IS NOTHING !
        2) Any evidence that Stalin and Beria were related to Zakharov’s flight. Any one. The visit log is not evidence. One ram invented and connected two different events. You cannot confirm them. But well, scoundrel, outlined.
        3) Any non-unfounded evidence that, according to your statement, "1On June 5, 1941, irrefutable documentary evidence was received that the process of the Wehrmacht troops' advance to the initial positions for attack was resumed from 4.00 on June 18, 1941. "Some divisions were not even on the territory of former Poland - they were in Germany.
        Damn another lover of agitation! I remember in ancient times I watched the plot from Damansky. Soviet border guards stand in a chain next to each other. Before them is a brutal crowd of Chinese. They fanatically scream for something waving waving little books (Quotations of Mao Zedong). Zealots were what you take. And they believed that their ideology was the most faithful in the world. These quotes and rice cakes were offered to our border guards.
        Everything changed when the field kitchen was brought up. Smells must have been non-resignable. Border guards began to eat, and some Chinese threw cakes and quotes on the snow. Conclusion: a perverted ideology is something against real tangible things or facts))
        1. Mcar
          Mcar 3 November 2018 19: 36
          -16
          Quote: RuSFr
          Come on the facts on the points, you nonsense brand new:

          Can you communicate more politely? You were not raised by cattle, so do not dishonor your parents.

          Quote: RuSFr
          1) How are the words of Zakharov confirmed. Any one memory or document. Not what to present to you. THERE IS NOTHING !

          What do you have as confirmation that the German invasion was a surprise for Stalin and the General Staff, EXCEPT WORDS?

          Quote: RuSFr
          2) Any evidence that Stalin and Beria were related to Zakharov’s flight. Any one.

          Zakharov wrote the book "I am a fighter", in which he describes the above. Testimony, in fact. What else does?

          Quote: RuSFr
          3) Any non-unsubstantiated evidence that, according to your statement, "On June 15, 1941, irrefutable documentary evidence was obtained that the process of moving the Wehrmacht troops to the initial positions for the attack resumes from 4.00:18 on June 1941, XNUMX."

          Citizen, I did not write a dissertation on the topic. And I was not aware that here ALL commentators are prepared as for the defense of a doctoral dissertation. But there are people who did it. For example Arsen Martirosyan, a former intelligence officer, Doctor of Historical Sciences. He studied the archives (not all, but what is open to this day) and wrote quite a few books (some specifically about June 22). If you are so interested in this particular moment, then you will certainly find "not unfounded," but documentary evidence of this in his books.
          1. RuSFr
            RuSFr 3 November 2018 20: 09
            +23
            All clear. You know little about the topic and came here to bend your fingers. You cannot indicate a single fact! No one! Materials not read !! But they came to teach others without knowing the subject. Such people are called couch experts.

            Beria, beg. The Air Force’s Main Directorate was with Stalin many times. Matching dates means nothing. For Stalin, materials were prepared almost daily, taking into account the daily overflights of the border from KOVO to PribOVO (inclusively for both districts). Round trip daily. On R-10 aircraft of border aviation. Pilots were charged with the duty of including monitoring the adjacent territory. Daily, twice a day. According to German documents, the withdrawal of tank and mechanized units began only on June 18 closer to the dark of the day. And in the memoirs it is written that the flight took place on June 17 or 18! Not knowing the exact date, she was artificially tied to the date of June 18th. Unproven, and this is a forgery! An unverifiable event is called a fact confirming something beneficial to Martirosyan. Therefore, they dragged Stalin and Beria. Enter the term online. Rogues, one word.
            I am not saying that there was no flight. He was, only his initiator was not Stalin, nor Beria, nor Moscow, nor Pavlov.
            The plane landed on platforms where border aircraft regularly landed and the standard reporting procedure was in place. They did not transmit reports immediately to Moscow. Deliberate reports are given on command. At first they are drawn up in the border commandant’s office, then generalized and supplemented in border detachments arrive and write. The same thing happens at the headquarters of the border troops and then they go to the headquarters of the border troops. Only then, individual information can be summarized in Beria. How everything is running))))
            We read about this a year ago, and your site is still dense))) But this is not the worst. Debiloids even brought this unverified fact into the Encyclopedia. The level of historical science ((((
            1. Mcar
              Mcar 3 November 2018 20: 21
              -22
              Quote: RuSFr
              All clear. You know little about the topic and came here to bend your fingers.

              Have you read all 26 parts? Well, bend your fingers yourself, what's stopping you?

              Did you see the headline? Well, explain to me on facts, on documents, and not in words, that the war was a surprise to Stalin.
            2. ccsr
              ccsr 4 November 2018 11: 04
              -20
              Quote: RuSFr
              All clear. You know little about the topic and came here to bend your fingers. You cannot indicate a single fact! No one! Materials not read !!

              You are a typical verbiage, and you use this prepared phrase against all your opponents who make fun of your illiteracy. Those who know what kind of "NNA scout" you are, have long noticed one feature - you, like Madame, are slandering our history, presenting our people as some idiots who, having obvious data about the preparation of the Germans for war, did not take any measures and war did not wait. You are just a mean person, and nothing more ...
          2. RuSFr
            RuSFr 3 November 2018 20: 11
            +20
            In the cycle of material for the whole book. Why this stupid question about bringing evidence ???
            1. RuSFr
              RuSFr 3 November 2018 20: 13
              +5
              I will not discuss new couch experts with new ones.
              The level of knowledge of the lads at the level of a read book
              1. Mcar
                Mcar 3 November 2018 20: 25
                -22
                Quote: RuSFr
                I will not discuss new couch experts with new ones.

                Reasonable. You are not the first to say anything.
            2. Mcar
              Mcar 3 November 2018 20: 24
              -20
              Quote: RuSFr
              In the cycle of material for the whole book.

              Cite a document testifying that the war was a surprise.
              1. Barbus
                Barbus 4 November 2018 22: 55
                -17
                Why testify? There is a fact, it is also a proof. Directive No. 1 is called. Or in one of the previous parts this fact has been refuted or questioned? If the attack had not been expected, there would have been no directive.
                1. Mcar
                  Mcar 5 November 2018 03: 35
                  -21
                  Quote: Barbus
                  Why testify? There is a fact, it is also a proof. Directive No. 1 is called.

                  Twenty five again! Is there money for fish?

                  The fact of what?

                  Is it really not clear that the order "BE in combat readiness "could not be given, IF there was no order before it"LEAD on alert "?

                  I’m never a military man. But even to me it is very clear.
                  Depending on the type of troops, deployment, the scale of the unit, and probably something else, it takes from several hours to several days to be put on alert. So what is "to be" if there was no "lead" before?
                  1. AsmyppoL
                    AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 07: 43
                    +8
                    3: 0. German leads. Arsen didn't make sense again! And on such a controversy the word game builds its versions. The author of the fantastic version of General Zakharov and the online broadcast for Stalin. Cheap crazy sensation, but the more absurd, the more believable. The first time lying is not a military man. A typical reception for sympathizing members of the forum))) theater rests
                    1. Mcar
                      Mcar 5 November 2018 08: 10
                      -16
                      Quote: AsmyppoL
                      Arsen didn’t get the point again!

                      And where does Martirosyan?

                      By God, like little children, beating with their palm the threshold that they stumbled upon. You would have criticized the speaker for the text of the speech outgoing from it.

                      With what fright did the commanders of the districts begin to give orders to put their units on alert several days before the Nazis invaded? And this is at a time when, for a reaction to provocations from the Germans, it was possible not only to remove epaulettes, but also his head? Why is there such a massive insanity among district commanders and lower commanders? Yes, for a similar gag in any army in the world and at all times - the tribunal. So, there was an order to put on alert. And not on June 22, but much earlier. And therefore, there could be no surprise.
                  2. Barbus
                    Barbus 5 November 2018 11: 38
                    -2
                    You read my comment inattentively. I wrote that if there was a directive, it means that they were waiting for the war. Here
                    Quote: McAr
                    If the attack had not been expected, there would have been no directive.
                    1. Mcar
                      Mcar 6 November 2018 05: 42
                      0
                      Barbus, indeed, was inattentive. Excuse me.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 3 November 2018 20: 01
        -24
        Quote: McAr
        Do not get dirty just the obvious blackening. And then it will be a shame then. Not everyone, but people will certainly be ashamed.

        They will not be ashamed - they are simply illiterate in military affairs. The author of the articles has too abstract ideas about the armed forces, and therefore her enchanting conclusions reflect the views of the ignorant part of our society. Well, the team of hackers who support it is from the same breed, that’s why getting a competent analysis of the situation before June 22 will not work here, the contingent is not the same ...
        1. Mcar
          Mcar 3 November 2018 20: 13
          -18
          Quote: ccsr
          that’s why a competent analysis of the situation before June 22 will not work here, the contingent is not the same ...

          Yes ... I am already beginning to understand this. I will become "old" here completely.
  6. Olgovich
    Olgovich 3 November 2018 11: 16
    +5
    At this point, the author concludes the consideration of the cycle of an unexpected attack. After reviewing all the districts, the author returns to the conclusions he made at the end of the 17 part. At the same time, I would like to note the following: the author does not see the perpetrators of the catastrophe that occurred. There are huge human casualties, huge losses of military equipment and warehouses, and, according to the author, there are no guilty ...

    thanks a lot for the cycle. but with the fact that there are no perpetrators, I disagree categorically. It doesn’t happen!

    In occupied Poland there was a huge mobilized warring WWII winner (as of June 1941). just GREATLY capturing almost all of Europe. The fact that she stands in Poland with all the tank corps and other aircraft. Was EXACTLY known. Against whom, against England? And how much is Poland so that everything instantly appears on the border?

    There was only one way to keep the situation under control: to keep the army on the other hand and in the same degree of combat readiness and mobilization.
    So ALWAYS acted and acted: as soon as the battalion appears in NATO in Estonia today, something against it simultaneously appears in the Pskov region.
    NEVER yet a demonstration of peace and compliance with treaties did not stop the aggressor.
    And that combat readiness of peacetime, which they tried not to provoke to war, provoked and provoked the war in the greatest way.

    And no one thought of looking at the USSR as an aggressor, for Germany was ALREADY recognized as such a world and ANY measures against it were welcomed by everyone.
    1. strannik1985
      strannik1985 3 November 2018 15: 41
      +12
      So she was. The first echelon (as part of the covering armies) consists of 56 divisions and 2 brigades, the second (50-100 km from the border) 52 divisions, the third (100-400 km) 62 divisions in the HE reserve, I will not say the composition of the forces for months, I do not know. Against them, as of October 1940, 30 divisions (including 3 TDs), as of March 1941 38 divisions (including 8 TDs), May 1941 52 divisions (3 TDs), and June 1941 81 divisions (12 TDs), June 22, 129 divisions (17 TD, 13 MD).
      Thus, until the end of spring, most of the divisions for "Barbarossa" were in the PVD throughout the territory of the Reich, keeping 100 ~ 120 divisions as part of the covering armies is unrealistic, for them there are neither barracks nor a training base.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 4 November 2018 08: 46
        +4
        Quote: strannik1985

        So she was.

        It was sky-ready, unmobilized, not deployed. Those. was completely inadequate to the opposing side.
        We are already silent about the fact that almost ALL strategic bridges
        and the highways were not mined and were captured in the very first hours
        and the invaders from the first hours rolled inland, bypassing resistance points (the same Brest).
        Quote: strannik1985
        Thus, until the end of spring, most of the divisions for "Barbarossa" were in LDPE throughout the territory of the Reich,

        On the territory of the Balkans, from where practically EVERYTHING was transferred to Poland, which was well known to everyone: "to rest and to deceive England."
        Who is deceived, it is known.
        1. strannik1985
          strannik1985 4 November 2018 15: 09
          +6
          How to tell you .... request
          For example, against 60 German detachments at the beginning of June 1941, the KA had 89 state directors 04/100, this is a state close to the military, the mobilization period of the division is 2-4 hours.
          Concentration - let's put the Germans we do not believe, we are waiting for the attack, we don’t know the exact date, the time is conditionally peaceful. Please tell me where and how to place only 120 infantry divisions (consonant May note of Vatutin) near the border? Moreover, the fighters not only live, but must learn.

          Further. We don’t know what to do? The enemy is not, he will create decisive superiority in power in places of impact. How to guess the places of blows or something else to do?
          The conclusion is actually as simple as a lowing.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 5 November 2018 09: 54
            +4
            Quote: strannik1985
            For example, against 60 German detachments at the beginning of June 1941, the KA had 89 state directors 04/100, this is a state close to the military, the mobilization period of the division is 2-4 hours.

            What 2-4 hours to mobilize, complete nonsense.
            Quote: strannik1985
            Concentration - let's put the Germans we do not believe, we are waiting for the attack, we don’t know the exact date, the time is conditionally peaceful. Please tell me where and how to place only 120 infantry divisions (consonant May note of Vatutin) near the border? Moreover, the fighters not only live, but must learn.

            as it was located on the fronts after June 22
            Quote: strannik1985
            Further. We don’t know what to do? The enemy is not, he will create decisive superiority in power in places of impact. How to guess the places of blows or something else to do?

            hit there, roughly where expected. The only thing they assumed was that the strike would be stronger at KOVO, and not at ZAPOVO. And everywhere they drove straight over undestroyed bridges and highways
            Quote: strannik1985
            The conclusion is actually as simple as a lowing.

            it yes - there was a glaring mistake of the leadership - ostentatious peacefulness to delay the beginning.
            1. strannik1985
              strannik1985 5 November 2018 10: 56
              +8
              What is this nonsense? State SD 04 / 100-10 291 people, combat units deployed, before 04/400 you need to get 4,2 thousand people (2,6 of them armed with rifles), 150 vehicles and 1100 horses. In readiness for nomination, they should be 2-4 hours after Ch +. Deployment of the first echelon (covering army, including the Air Force, air defense and SD units) -1-3 days. In fact, until the beginning of June, the spacecraft on the border with the Reich has more strength than the Wehrmacht.

              They can’t, it’s already a war, they study (more precisely, they pass the exam, with blood) right at the front, fighting with the enemy. Do you propose to conduct training firing towards the border with Germany until June 22, 1941?
    2. antivirus
      antivirus 14 November 2018 19: 16
      +2
      + but
      And no one thought of looking at the USSR as an aggressor, for Germany was ALREADY recognized as such a world and ANY measures against it were welcomed by everyone.
      everyone THOUGHTED AND LOOKED AT THE "FUTURE AGGRESSOR" - everything and everyone has their prices and dishonor- BABLO SHARE AND NOW CAN - SEE YUGOSLAVIA, IRAQ AND SYRIA WITH LIBYA - and perfectly justify
      AND WHO WILL THE AGGRESSOR IN THE CASE OF THE WAR WITH IRAN ??? (FOR EXAMPLE IN 19 OR 2022)
  7. bubalik
    bubalik 3 November 2018 15: 56
    -11
    ,, yes, they knew about the approaching war, the author pays little to the information emanating from the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR ,,

    COMMUNICATION OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR IN THE NKGB OF THE USSR ABOUT THE DETENTION OF DIVERSANTS AT THE SITE OF 87 STANDARDS
    20th of June 1941
    20 of June of this year, 87 saboteurs from 6, who were in m. Pruszków, were detained at the site of the 32 border detachment (town of Lomza, BSSR). One of the detainees was our fierce agent “Mayevsky”, who broke away from a group of saboteurs and warned them about border guards on their transfer to Soviet territory.
    During the arrest, three saboteurs put up armed resistance and were wounded in an exchange of fire with border guards. One of them died.
    The detainees seized: two machine guns and four pistols with cartridges for them, three hand grenades and two compasses.
    Two border guards were wounded in a collision with saboteurs. Border security enhanced. Institutions informed
    Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
    Lieutenant General Maslennikov


    ORDER
    CHIEF OF BORDER TROOPS OF THE NKVD BSSR ON ENHANCING THE PROTECTION OF THE BORDER
    20th of June 1941
    In order to enhance border security
    I ORDER:
    1. Until 30 June 1941, the planned classes with personnel do not hold.
    2. Personnel who are at the training camp at the outposts, immediately return to the linear outposts and not to call until further notice.
    3. All personnel of the machine gunners to skip through the three-day training camp at the outposts, causing two machine-gunners from each linear outpost
    4. Weekend days for personnel up to 30 June, 1941 will not be granted.
    5. Border patrols at night (from 23.00 to 5.00) should be expelled, consisting of three people each. All light machine guns used in night outfits in the most important directions.
    6. The tenure at night is 6 hours, the day time is 4 hours.
    7. The calculation of people for service is to be built in such a way that from 23 00 to 5.00 service is carried on the border by all people, with the exception of returning from 23.00 outfits and sentry posts.
    8. On separate, the most vulnerable flank directions, set up posts for ten days under the command of the assistant chief of the outpost.
    9. During the day, check the control strip by cavalrymen consisting of two people each outfit, the service life is 8 — 9 hours of continuous movement to the left and right along the section.
    10. At night, check KP and each point to conduct at least one and a half hours. KP each outpost split into two or three areas.
    11. Border posters should be located no closer than 300 m from the border line.


    hi the last letter from my grandfather's brother, who served in the 92 PO, in June contained the phrase "B" soon, until 22, the relatives could not understand what the letter "B" was, but at the border they saw and knew everything,

    died in German captivity in November 1941 soldier
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 3 November 2018 18: 44
      +30
      How do the two documents presented relate to the outbreak of war, not PROVOCATION at dawn on June 22, 1941?

      Why is the commander of the border detachment at dawn June 22 not aware of the start of the war? I am surprised that when you came here to teach others, you did not even bother to read the material. Are you also a throat? The second part is about ZAPOV. When it comes to April, find the reconnaissance part and how much the intelligence of the NKVD border troops in April overestimated the data of the overly overpriced RU General Staff.

      A.P. Kuznetsov (chief of the 17th Red Banner Border Detachment of the Belarusian Border Guard District of the NKVD troops). "Since April, reports of an alarming situation at the border were sent to the border guard headquarters every day. The detachment timely reported this not only to the headquarters of the border troops of the BSSR, but also informed the command of the 4th Army, 28th cc, the regional committee of the CPSU (b) ... The most important issues related to enemy preparations, the command of the detachment also reported to Moscow, in the GU of the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR ... For border guards, preparing the enemy for an attack was not a secret. But no one expected this to happen so soon, so meanly and so treacherously.

      21.6.41 I returned from the border, where I checked the combat readiness ... In the afternoon, after hearing reports from the NS, deputies, I went home at 16-00. I really wanted to see my 11-month-old daughter, and I had to rest after a long business trip. But neither lay down nor dined. At about 17 pm they reported a fire in the area of ​​the 00th outpost ... I had to go to the scene and take urgent measures to eliminate the fire and strengthen border protection in this area. Just returned to headquarters - a call to a direct wire. Received an order from the deputy chief of the border troops of the district brigade commander A.P. Kurlykin: to send 11 border guards by morning train to one of the border detachments on the Lithuanian border. In order to fulfill the order precisely and on time, he ordered to gather at 100-21 deputies, chief of staff, secretary of the party bureau, head of the 00th department and the head of the unit’s service ...

      After 24-00, my deputy intelligence officer Major V.V. Vidyakin reported that a local resident had crossed the line of the 2nd outpost on the adjacent side and said that military operations would begin against the Soviet Union at 4-00 ... After hearing the report of Vidyakin, I’m here but he reported on the incident to the officer on duty at the district headquarters ... from whom he received an answer: "Wait for instructions."


      After that, I ordered the commandants of the precincts to increase the readiness of the units, and the officers to be in full combat readiness. Then ... informed his neighbors on the right - the head of the 88th border detachment ... and on the left - the head of the 98th border detachment of the Ukrainian border district ... Both confirmed the data on the pulling of enemy troops to the border. The situation was also described in detail by the PMA of the 4th Army ... Beginning from 2-00 - 2-20 from all commandant’s offices, and sometimes directly from outposts, alarming reports began to arrive about the withdrawal of tanks and the accumulation of fascist troops directly at the state border line. Several times we called the district headquarters. The answers are the same: “Reported to Moscow. Wait. ”

      Lacking instructions, on my own initiative, I gave the order to bring all units to combat readiness, and to prepare means for setting fire to or blowing up the bridge over the Bug at the 13th outpost. I took on a lot of responsibility because at that time, any initiative was fettered by special orders and directives from Beria. The time was approaching 4-00 ... The headquarters of the detachment began to transmit the order to bring the units to combat readiness, but it had not yet reached the units by 4-00. "

      I hope I should not explain to you what was reported to Moscow to the headquarters of the NKVD border troops. Then any smart person can make elementary conclusions.
      1. bubalik
        bubalik 3 November 2018 19: 42
        -23
        How are the two documents submitted related to the beginning of the war, not PROVOCATIONS at dawn 22 June 1941?
        hi ,, yes there are many documents on the MF of the NKVD of the USSR, and not just these two ,,,, (I cited an example) ,,
        ,, read the operational reports ,,, belay(if you can) ,, repeat
      2. The comment was deleted.
        1. bubalik
          bubalik 3 November 2018 21: 09
          -5
          Dear author, why do not you count the troops of the NKVD PS request
          1. Barbus
            Barbus 5 November 2018 11: 55
            -8
            And because such a technique is to take into account only what gives the desired result. In the section on ZAPOVO there is not a word about Borzilov’s report, which clearly states that 6 mk (one of the strongest in the entire Red Army) was returned to its original position even before the war.
  8. Tusv
    Tusv 3 November 2018 18: 10
    -29
    So many bukkaf. We have a loss. You are not refillable. Guys, you are not holding the world.
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 3 November 2018 18: 45
      +4
      For gorlopanstvo and not wanting to think minus the answer
      1. Barbus
        Barbus 4 November 2018 23: 05
        -10
        For all the time you yourself have not brought a single fact except memoirs and memoirs, but you demand from others regularly. I wrote earlier, it would be better if the author simply laid out scans or photocopies of declassified documents. This would be much more useful.
        1. AsmyppoL
          AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 07: 49
          +5
          We lie?)) Straight, like Kozinkin with Milchakov. Another circus actor))
          I was not too lazy to count that in part except for memoirs there are twenty documents listed. But the order should work out. and read in this case is not required. The more dirt and absurd charges the better for the order. This we see in the Ukrainian media)))
          1. Barbus
            Barbus 5 November 2018 11: 36
            -2
            Watch your tongue and do not be rude - it does not honor you. The whole cycle I have not read and do not intend to. I was interested in ZAPOVO and that was enough for me. The author is engaged in the old practice: he takes only the information that is beneficial to him and draws the necessary conclusions based on it. Documents in the text are not given, there are only quotes from documents, interspersed with comments by the author. I repeat once again: it is better to publish scans and photocopies of documents, since there are dates and various marginal notes indicated there.
          2. ccsr
            ccsr 5 November 2018 11: 53
            -7
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            . This we see in the media of Ukraine)))

            Since there are no arguments for objection, then they begin to talk about the Ukrainian media, although in what way they relate to this discussion, the author of the thesis is unlikely to lie "smart".
  9. shmelik45
    shmelik45 3 November 2018 18: 23
    +28
    Thanks to the author for the work done and the selection of materials. I read with great interest.
  10. ccsr
    ccsr 3 November 2018 18: 56
    -25
    Author:
    aKtoR
    The General Staff and military science incorrectly believed that Germany would set up against 180 ... 200 divisions against the USSR on the western border. They can object to this: after all, at the games, participation in the war of 150-160 German divisions was considered. However, there is a wording there: without waiting for the concentration of German troops to end ...

    F. Golikov refutes this lie in his memoirs (p. 82):
    Naturally, the desire to compare these data of our Intelligence Agency with what is written in the book of the Hitler Wehrmacht General Kurt Tippelskirch “History of the Second World War”: “By June 22, the day of the offensive, in the strategic deployment areas were concentrated: 81 infantry division, 1 cavalry division, 17 tank, 15 motorized, 9 police and security divisions. As reserves of the main command, another 22 infantry, 2 tank, 2 motorized divisions and 1 police division were on the way ”(174). Total: 150 divisions. On the same issue, I will quote from the book of the collective of military historians, “World War II 1939–1945.”: “The Nazi troops (taking into account the reserve of the main command, not counting the five German divisions in Finland, as well as the Allied forces) were located in the directions whose boundaries are indicated above (175). In the main direction, in the center of the front, there were 62 divisions and two brigades, or about 43%, in the southern sector of the front - 54 divisions, or up to 36%, and in the northern sector of the front - 31 divisions, or 21% ”(176). Total: 152 German divisions (with five located in Finland).
    Finally, the official evidence on this issue is what was said in the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR”: “153 divisions were allocated to attack the Soviet Union, including 33 tank and motorized ones ... ”(177).

    The error is units of percent, i.e. at the statistical level, which suggests that RU GSh was not mistaken in its estimates, and the author of the articles, for the sake of his false version, does not shy from fraud.
    1. AsmyppoL
      AsmyppoL 4 November 2018 07: 01
      +29
      Again Milchakov is deceiving right before our eyes. You refer to the head of the General Staff of the Red Army Golikov.


      Whose signature is the first military intelligence service of the RKKA General Staff? General Golikov. The intelligence data from 20 June was confirmed, which has not yet been published. And what is the conclusion in this intelligence ??


      And now we take a calculator and determine what number of divisions will be reported by the percentage indicated in the report. It was the same in the materials of the author Vic !! Do you have sclerosis or can you behave so rudely = that you lie to people directly in the eyes? And in the summary there is another phrase that divisions from Germany or from France may additionally be let down. The text refers to the approach of divisions from Bulgaria.

      If in the fall of the 1940 of the year, according to the General Staff, the Germans alone could put up divisions against the USSR before 173, on what documents did the GSH specialists carry out an assessment ?? Of course on intelligence materials.
      From the Note by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and V.Molotov on the basics of deploying the 18.09.40 aircraft: “Currently, Germany has deployed 205-226 front doors (including to 8 md) and 15-17 td, and in total - to 243 divisions ... Of the above 243 divisions to 173 divisions, of which up to 140 reg. directed against our borders ... ”According to the GSH against the USSR, up to 15% of German armed forces can be set. According to the memoirs of A.M. Vasilevsky, this document was twice brought into Stalin's office. Consequently, the leader should have read this document.

      From the Plan of the General Staff KA about the strategic deployment of the 11.3.41 aircraft: “Germany currently has 225 radar, 20 td and 15 md deployed, in total up to 260 divisions, 20000 field guns of all calibers, 10000 tanks and up to 15000 airplanes, from them to 9000– Xnumx fighting. Of the specified number of divisions, 9500 divisions, of which up to 76 td and 6 md, are currently focused on our borders and up to 7 divisions in Romania and Bulgaria ... Thus, up to 35 divisions, of which up to 200 pd, 165 td and 20 md, will be directed against our borders ... "

      Around 15 may be called the number of 180 divisions.


      Something similar comes through the NKGB on 25.5.41: "Germany has now concentrated on the Soviet border 160-200 divisions, equipped with a large number of tanks and aircraft."

      The first military intelligence, which also refers to a report from 20 June, which no one has seen, closes all. From the findings of the report, it follows that if 30% of enemy forces is 50-52 divisions, then 100% forces will be from 167 to 173 divisions.

      In the subsequent memoirs, you can write anything. Conclusions about the number of enemy divisions could be made only on reconnaissance materials, which were signed by General Golikov!
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 4 November 2018 09: 53
        -25
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Closes all the first military intelligence, which also refers to the report of June 20, which no one has seen.

        If you didn’t see her, this does not mean that she wasn’t - daily reports were compiled in the General Staff of the General Staff. But the illiterate do not know this.

        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Around 15 may be called the number of 180 divisions.

        If you were smart enough, after reading the text, you would have turned to the words "Supposed", "Germany ... will be able to put up against us before ...", which, firstly, speak only of estimates, not reliable, but secondly, the total strength of all German armed forces on the eve of June 22 exceeded 180 divisions. If you do not know how to understand official documents, then this is your problem. and not those who develop them.
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      5. basal
        basal 4 November 2018 13: 22
        -13

        AsmyppoL (Eugene)! It seems to me, or are you confused?

        In this summary, the key is not "30%" but "about". So it is incorrect to use a calculator to calculate the number of divisions.
        Also, speaking of pre-war information, it is simply impossible to get an exact figure. If only because no one could know for sure whether Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland would enter the war right away and by what forces. And where are the police divisions that do not take direct part in hostilities? And the rear units? What about reserves?
        By the way, there will also be discrepancies in the number of spacecraft divisions. The question was correctly raised here on the cadre divisions. Here where to take them to mobilization? It seems that there is a division, but fighting efficiency at the level of a regiment or brigade. And where to put it?

        Understand, I do not argue. I just think that even though each division has entered a bar, the calculations will still vary.
        1. AsmyppoL
          AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 07: 56
          +17
          You can quote any document with a date before 21.6.41, which states that the 120-130 of the German divisions is sufficient for a war with the USSR. And with a word about, I think you are wrong. Summary tradition went to Stalin. And every word and number in the conclusions is not written from the lantern. Each of them was verified.
          1. basal
            basal 10 November 2018 16: 14
            +5
            AsmyppoL (Eugene)

            Yes, I wrote that I did not argue with you, and my knowledge of the history of the issue is clearly insufficient for conclusions.
            I just wanted to draw attention to the complexity of accurate calculations, especially if they are carried out according to various sources, not necessarily 100% reliable.
            But the very problem of the causes of the defeat of the spacecraft in 1941. extremely painful and topical. Therefore, we must write and discuss and argue.

            By the way, thanks to the author for the work. That would be his work to structure, systematize, analyze and draw conclusions, you look not even a book, a full-fledged candidate will work.
      6. AsmyppoL
        AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 07: 30
        +1
        Interestingly, the Note from 15.05.41. (presumably) initially indicated in total 189 German divisions that Germany can deploy to attack the Soviet Union. When editing, the recalculation of German forces is carried out more carefully and a new edit in the number of divisions is highlighted in red. " 180 "Therefore, it cannot be said that after a month the leadership of the Red Army was convinced that the Germans would risk attacking the USSR having only 128 divisions at the border.
  11. ccsr
    ccsr 4 November 2018 12: 11
    -27
    Author:
    aKtoR
    Something to assert without providing data that is contradictory, agree, frivolously. And if a writer claims historical authenticity only of his version, then this is unacceptable. The data on what is happening in the 2nd mk OdVO we just saw. It is also impossible to assert on them that O.Yu. Kozinkin uses the correct statement ...


    In contrast to the author of the articles, O. Kozinkin described in sufficient detail in his books how the rise of units in different districts came about and who received commands:

    "When Purkaev sat down on the telegraph office and began to raise instead of the fallen, apparently from
    fear in a stupor of Kirpanos, he gave - “an order to bring troops to full
    combat readiness, take up defense according to plan. When crossing the Germans
    to reflect the state borders by all means and means, the borders themselves do not cross.
    “Our planes will not fly over to special instructions.” What does it mean -
    open their “red” packets, in which exactly this position from the PP and
    states: “When crossing the Germans, state borders should be reflected by all means and
    means, the borders themselves do not cross. Our planes have no borders
    fly to a special indication "...

    In the directive b.n. there was nothing about opening the packages and even more so - “take
    defense according to plan ” and Purkayev, who arrived in Ternopol only at 3
    hours, began to give such an order only at the command of Kirpanos. Which personally to
    this time and received an oral order from Tymoshenko - “Proceed to
    the implementation of the 1941 RP ”- at 2.30 approximately ...


    And here is what E.E. showed Maltsev, deputy political commander 74 sd, 9th
    Army Air Defense Forces: “In mid-June, corps divisions were raised by alarm in order to
    conducting regular exercises. However, we all saw something else in this -
    the advance of troops to the borders of the State Border of the USSR.
    two
    divisions of the 48th corps occupied the frontiers on the Prut River, and ours, 74th Tamanskaya
    was in the second tier in the area of ​​the city of Balti.
    June 20 from the corps commander was ordered to issue fighters and commanders
    hard hats.

    Everyone was anxiously awaiting disturbing events. At about half past three
    On the morning of June 22, a thunderstorm signal was received, according to which it was necessary to open
    red packet
    containing an action plan for the corps to cover the State
    borders of the USSR. War! .. ”(Maltsev E. E ..“ During the years of testing. ”M .: Military Publishing House,
    1979., p. 57. These memoirs were also considered in the book "Stalin. Who betrayed
    the leader on the eve of the war "in 2012)

    Divisions of the 48th Corps R.Ya. Malinowski (who became the boss in the 1960s
    Chief of General Staff Zakharov - Minister of Defense of the USSR) starting the nomination on June 15-16, were
    put on high alert, advanced "to the area
    provided for by the cover plan ”and took up defense in this area approximately to
    20 of June.
    On June 20, Malinovsky ordered "to issue helmets", which is done when
    bringing to high and full combat readiness. And it was done in
    connection with the arrival on June 19 in the district of the directive of the General Staff "of June 18" on bringing
    combat readiness of all parts of the western districts. Zakharov about 2.00 already gave
    war alert order to all garrisons of the district, and about “half past three
    in the morning "on June 22, a written order for autopsy came to Malinovsky’s building
    "Red packets", before the German attack on the USSR.

    So. In the same KOVO, the order to open the "red packets" went from Purkayev
    around 3.30 - “take up defense according to plan”, and in OdVO an autopsy order
    they gave their packages to the troops half an hour before the attack, at 3.30 on June 22! And in
    ZAPOVO also began to give their order for packages about 3 hours, having received and
    WRITTEN order from the General Staff on the package by 4 o’clock. And it was done in three different ways.
    constituencies - everywhere around 3.00-3.30 - naturally by order of NGOs and General Staff, i.e.
    Stalin, and not on the "personal initiative" of the command of the districts ...
    "

    (From a new book by O.Yu. Kozinkin ...)
  12. Mcar
    Mcar 4 November 2018 16: 36
    -25
    During the life of Stalin and on his orders in the late 40s - early 50s. Under the leadership of the Chief of the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff, Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky, careful work was carried out to generalize the experience of the concentration and deployment of troops of the western border districts according to the plan for covering the state border in 1941 on the eve of World War II. Under this cover, a thorough investigation of the causes of the incredible tragedy of June 22, which was secretly initiated by Stalin at the beginning of the war, continued. For this purpose, the participants in those events, who occupied various command posts in the troops of the western border districts during the initial period of the war, were asked five questions:
    1. Has the state border defense plan been communicated to the troops with regard to them? when and what was done by the command and staffs to ensure the implementation of this plan?
    2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the cover troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities?
    3. When the order was received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack of fascist Germany in the morning of June 22; what instructions were given and when to implement this order, and what was done by the troops?
    4. Why were most of the artillery in training centers?
    5. How prepared were the staffs for command and control and to what extent did this affect the conduct of operations during the first days of the war?

    In those years, the survey was a secret event. The time has passed, the seemingly time of publicity has come. Honest historians in uniform decided to turn to the materials of this survey. And now the famous and authoritative “Military History Journal”, beginning with No. 3 in 1989, began to print the answers of Soviet generals to the above questions, alternately devoting one article in the issue to the answer to one question. It was possible to publish the answers of the generals only to the first two questions, because as soon as the turn came to answers to the question “When was the order to put the troops on alert?”, without any explanation, the publication was stopped. And the editor-in-chief of the VIZH was given a hat and a hand so hard that God forbid ...

    However, what they managed to publish turned out to be quite enough to drive a good-good aspen stake into Khrushchev’s, Zhukov’s and utterly false tales of liars stating that on the eve of the war, Stalin did not allow the troops to be ready for combat readiness. Because all those whose answers were given in the first publications, operated on dates ranging from 13-14 to 24.00 on June 21. And some of them directly stated that they had received orders to put the troops on alert personally from Zhukov, including both orally and in writing.

    The answers of the military leaders.

    Colonel General of the Tank Forces P.P. Poluboyarov (former chief of the armored forces of PribOVO):
    «June 16 (!) At 23 hours the command of the 12th mechanized corps received directive on bringing combat readiness. Corps commander Major General N. M. Shestopalov was informed about this at 23 hours on June 17 upon his arrival from the 202nd Motorized Division, where he conducted a mobilization readiness check.
    On June 18, the corps commander raised the formations and units on combat alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. On June 19 and 20, this was done.
    On June 16, by order of the district’s headquarters, the 3rd Mechanized Corps (commander of the Major General of the Tank Troops A.V. Kurkin) was also put on alert and concentrated in the indicated area at the same time. ”

    Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th Army):
    «20 June In 1941, I received the following code from the General Staff: “All units and units of your unit located on the border itself should be taken back several kilometers, that is, to the lines of prepared positions. Do not respond to any provocations from the German units until they violate the state border. All parts of the division must be are given on alert. Report execution by 24 o’clock on June 21, 1941. ” Just at the indicated time, I reported by telegraph about the execution of the order. The report was attended by the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko, who was entrusted with a verification of execution. ”

    Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th Army - PribOVO):
    “... The commander of the district troops decided to go to Taurag и lead there on alert The 11th rifle corps of Major General M.S. Shumilov, and I was ordered to retreat to the right flank of the army. The chief of staff of the army, Major General G. A. Larionov, we sent back to Jelgava. He received the task of taking the headquarters to the command post ... Parts of the 12th mechanized corps were brought to the Šiauliai area on the night of June 19, and the army headquarters also arrived at the command post. ”

    Major General I. I. Fadeev (former commander of the 10th Infantry Division of the 8th Army - PribOVO):
    «19 June 1941, an order was received from the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps, Major General I.F. Nikolaev о bringing combat alert divisions. All units were immediately withdrawn to the defense area, occupied by bunkers and artillery firing positions ... In order to conceal the activities carried out at the border, conventional defense operations were carried out, and part of the personnel was masked inside the defenses, being in full combat readiness. "

    Which is curious. Any mention, even hints of the existence of the directive of June 18, 1941 disappeared. Nearly half a century ago they disappeared. Therefore, it is now hardly possible to establish its number, as well as the coordinates of archiving. But it should be remembered that it was Zhukov who became the Minister of Defense and gained access to all archives.

    Traces of this telegram remained, and not only in writing, but primarily where Marshal Zhukov would least have expected them to be. They remained in the records of the investigation and trial in the case of those arrested together with Pavlov D.G. commanders of the Western Special Military District, whose authorization for arrest and prosecution was personally approved by Zhukov. On the 70th sheet of the 4th volume of the investigation, the following words of the head of communications of ZAPOVO General Andrei Terentyevich Grigoryev were recorded on their charge:
    “And after the telegram of the chief of the General Staff of June 18, the district’s troops were not are given on alert ".

    The telegram, therefore, was - in this sense, the former position of Grigoriev is of particular importance. He was the chief of communications of ZAPOVO, that is, a telegram passed through his hands! And at the trial, Grigoriev confirmed this with the following words: “All this is true.”

    Judging by the documents, as well as the words of N.G. Kuznetsov, who arrived at Tymoshenko by call at midnight, Zhukov and Tymoshenko for some reason failed with this directive until night - she left the troops only at 00.30 on June 22! For some reason, the two top military leaders for at least 7 (seven!) Hours could not "give birth" to directive No. 1 with a volume of only half a page! And if we start from the contents of the diary of S. M. Budyonny, then it turns out that from 12.00:21 on June 00.30 to 22:XNUMX on June XNUMX!

    As a result, the only troops that really were are given in full combat readiness - these are the border and internal troops subordinate to Beria. There she was announced already at 21.30 on June 21, that is, 6 hours before the aggression! At the same time, full combat readiness was declared in all bodies of the NKVD and the NKGB.

    Hence the question: for what purpose on topwar, during as many as 26 (!) issues, they are fooling the heads of the gullible about an allegedly “unexpected” war with Nazi Germany?
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 4 November 2018 18: 15
      -19
      Quote: McAr
      This begs the question: for what purpose on topwar, during as many as 26 (!) Issues, they are fooling the heads of the gullible about an allegedly “unexpected” war with fascist Germany?

      I think that the author of the articles was paid for by his "research" and she, realizing that literate people would make fun of her, quietly, hiding behind an abundance of unsystematic quotes from her memoirs, imposes on us the idea that no one expected the war, that fools worked in the Kremlin and in NPOs, and she is so smart and enlightened, she opens our eyes.
      Paradoxically, there was such an abundance of simpletons who bought into the texts of Madame, and sometimes perverted or interpreted completely biased, that she believed that she was doing "educational" work here. Although, in my opinion, another campaign to discredit Comrade Stalin began, and for this they chose the initial period of the war, to which he had much less relation than to the period when our troops began to smash the Wehrmacht.
      1. Mcar
        Mcar 4 November 2018 18: 45
        -24
        Quote: ccsr
        I think that the author of the articles paid for his "research"

        And I'm sure of that. A researcher cannot be "conscientiously mistaken" in what has been known since 1989 - the answers of the generals in the VIZH. And if he did not know, then it means a bad detective. And such a "historian" is worthless.

        It's like with "tens of millions" of victims of "Stalinist repressions". Since 1991, it has been known from Zemsky's "GULAG" that 1921 million Basmachi, Banderaites, green brothers, policemen, traitors, spies, smugglers, pests and other enemies of the people were convicted under political articles in the period from 1954 to 3,8. They knew, and they blatantly lied! Goebbels are shitty.

        Quote: ccsr
        in my opinion, another company began to discredit Comrade Stalin, and for this they chose the initial period of the war,

        The discrediting of Stalin is part of a plan to destroy Russia and the Russian people. And only ignoramuses or zombies do not understand this.

        PS. And nerds want to remind you that

        Categoricality is a sign of limitation.
        Confucius
        1. AsmyppoL
          AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 08: 02
          +16
          Again, we see Arsen Martirosyan lying about the author’s allegedly discrediting the role of Stalin in the events on the eve of the war. Cheap trick to attract the sympathy of users who like JV Stalin.

          Author Wieck wrote unambiguously in the conclusion of the 26th part: "
          The author does not see Stalin's fault in what happened. "
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 5 November 2018 11: 32
            -18
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            Author Wieck wrote unambiguously in the conclusion of the 26th part: "
            The author does not see Stalin's fault in what happened. "

            And in the 25 previous Madam, she proved to everyone that in Moscow they did not know anything about the impending attack, until June 22, and therefore the attack was sudden. I would like to know then, Stalin also did not know about the impending attack and was aloof from what was happening? In my opinion, an obvious distortion of the facts has already begun here, taking into account the fact that intelligence information was reported to Stalin and he, like all military leaders, was well aware of the preparation of the Wehrmacht for the attack. But it seems Madame decided to change her shoes in the air ...
        2. ccsr
          ccsr 5 November 2018 11: 26
          -17
          Quote: McAr
          A researcher cannot be "conscientiously mistaken" in what has been known since 1989 - the answers of the generals in the VIZH.

          By the way, a few years ago, a famous author writing on the topic of pre-war events, O. Kozinkin published his book analyzing the answers to Pokrovsky and compared them with newly discovered materials in recent decades. It examined in detail many questions of what was happening on the eve of the war and at the moments when the units were on alert, as well as the actions of individual military commanders. In my opinion, this is the best book written by O. Kozinkin, and it is on the net for those interested. Those who wish can familiarize themselves with her, and compare with what Madame writes here.
  13. Mcar
    Mcar 4 November 2018 16: 37
    -25
    And further. Commander of the Baltic Special Military District, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, 18 June 1941 issued order No. 00229. Excerpts from the order:

    "With the aim of the fastest casts on alert district military theater ORDER: 1. To the head of the air defense zone by the end of June 19 November 1941, XNUMX lead on full alert all air defense of the district, for which: a) organize round-the-clock duty at all air observation, warning and communication posts and provide them with continuous communication; b) to make all anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight batteries, appointing round-the-clock duty on batteries, organizing uninterrupted communication with posts, carefully preparing them in engineering terms and providing fire extinguishers; c) organize the interaction of fighter aircraft with anti-aircraft units; ... 19.6.41, report on the procedure for covering large railway and unpaved bridges, artillery depots and major facilities from diving bombers.
    Until Mr. 21.6.41 together with local air defense to organize: blackout of the cities: Riga, Kaunas, Vilnius, Dvinsk, Mitava, Libava, Šiauliai, fire fighting in them, medical assistance to the victims and determine the premises that can be used as bomb shelters; ... 2. To bring to the chief of communications of the district in full readiness all communications in the territory of the district, for which: a) no later than the morning of 20.6.41 at the front and army command posts, throw out teams with the necessary property to organize communication centers on them. Have supplies ready for immediate start-up. ...4. By the commander of the 8th and 11th armies: a) determine on the site of each army the points of organization of field depots of anti-tank mines, explosives and anti-personnel barriers with a view to placing them on certain barriers specified in the plan [directions]. The specified property to be concentrated in organized warehouses by 21.6.41; ... e) create in the Telšiai, Šiauliai, Kaunas and Kalwarii directions mobile units of mine anti-tank warfare. For this purpose, have stockpiles of anti-tank mines carried by vehicles. The staff of these units, formed by sapper units and allocated by the head of the Armored Directorate of Motor Vehicles, shall be developed and reported to me on 19.6.41. The readiness of the units on 21.6.41 ” (Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War. M.: Military Publishing, 1953.).

    The question is the same.
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          1. AsmyppoL
            AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 07: 13
            +9
            This global analysis of all documents is not in your books?
        2. strannik1985
          strannik1985 5 November 2018 07: 34
          +6
          Ordinary, mobilization and concentration of cover armies of the first echelon 1-3 days (including the Air Force, air defense troops, UR), the second echelon 4-7 days (other units, combat support units, army rear units), the third 8-15 days front rear and spare parts, repair bases, fourth, on day 16-30 stationary hospitals and spare parts.
      2. The comment was deleted.
        1. Mcar
          Mcar 5 November 2018 07: 47
          -19
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          This clown himself Arsen Martirosyan

          Non-Clowns on business have something to say?

          For tankers. I do not argue that the Great Patriotic War was. I do not dispute that we - our fathers and grandfathers took Berlin. I am outraged by the blatant lie about the unexpectedness of this war.

          So I'm wondering - is there any evidence that the Second World War turned out to be the "Unexpected War of Hitler's Germany with the USSR"?

          If there is, I will readily read it, and if not, then there is no need for empty words.
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 5 November 2018 12: 02
            -19
            Quote: McAr
            So I'm wondering - is there any evidence that the Second World War turned out to be the "Unexpected War of Hitler's Germany with the USSR"?

            They have no evidence, that's why they lie godlessly in the hope that people unfamiliar with this issue will believe in their lies. As soon as they are presented with evidence that there can be no question of any "surprise", they fall into hysterics, and this is clearly seen by the way they were delighted that O. Kozinkin was forbidden to write here. And he owns this issue much better than all his local opponents put together.
            1. Mcar
              Mcar 5 November 2018 13: 57
              -21
              Quote: ccsr
              They have no evidence.

              I know it. They do not exist in nature, not like "them".
              1. AsmyppoL
                AsmyppoL 6 November 2018 04: 59
                +14
                Here are a few people who are familiar with the materials No worse than you. I know two who know more than you. A set of documents and memoirs well-known. There is fragmentary information about the individual fragments of those events. The main thing is how to join them. And this analysis helps the author Vic.
                I am writing this to understand how smart you are, Arsen.
                1. Mcar
                  Mcar 6 November 2018 05: 11
                  -11
                  Quote: AsmyppoL
                  You arsen

                  Thanks, of course, for such a compliment! I am really pleased to be mistaken for a scout and a doctor of science. A sharp career, however, ranged from an S-75 air defense air defense sergeant-sergeant to a KGB colonel. And they also say that social elevators do not work.

                  Tongue tongue is not tired? In the case, citizen, what do you have to say?
    2. AsmyppoL
      AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 08: 07
      +20
      Arsen brings to us the Alphabet Truths that author Vic outlined a year ago)
      Take a nah, without examining the question is his demeanor)))
      Now it is clear what kind of person
      1. AsmyppoL
        AsmyppoL 5 November 2018 08: 12
        +13
        I think users of the site will be interested to form an opinion about the literary figure and fiction writer Arsen Martirosyan.
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        2. AsmyppoL
          AsmyppoL 6 November 2018 04: 51
          -1
          He is unlike you clever. The second day hangs online constantly. The cycle of the author Vic is the golden bottom. Wins the one who first will develop a vein. I think therefore there are no addresses of many documents, so that they are not for free. We must try to find them. And in the article On the Creation of the Southern Front WILL NOT be specified documents outside of the known case. Do not expect a new one for your co-author to get there
          And the fact that it is present here Arsen can be seen from his imperious manner, self-confidence, by nickname, by the manner of presentation. I understand that many truism and not truth in general. I read his reasoning on individual issues and can now distinguish his style. The only thing I do not know what comment he will give next.
      2. RuSFr
        RuSFr 5 November 2018 12: 04
        +15
        I’m watching something familiar, but I don’t understand. How famously he was blown away when the mask was ripped off. Masks are torn off, masks are torn off gentlemen.
        Now at least I can understand what kind of gentleman Mr. Martirosyan is. Not a single fact was brought by the daredevil. And he lies, as he writes. Yes, all three have one berry in the field. You can do anything for the sake of business.
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        2. ccsr
          ccsr 16 November 2018 09: 45
          -15
          Quote: RuSFr
          Not a single fact was brought by the daredevil. And he lies, as he writes. Yes, all three have one berry in the field. You can do anything for the sake of business.

          Here are the facts, verbiage.
          On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Soviet military intelligence, the Rodina magazine published a long article about the GRU.
          There is also material about the "surprise" of the June 22 attack.
          On November 5, 1918, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) N 197/27, the staff of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR was declared, and its staff was the staff of the Registration Directorate (Register), the central apparatus that united all the intelligence agencies of the military that existed at that time in Soviet Of Russia.


          https://rg.ru/2018/10/22/rodina-gru.html
          1. AsmyppoL
            AsmyppoL 16 November 2018 11: 19
            +11
            I understand that you can’t bring anything clever ... you understand age ....
            What did you bring this link to? If there are no facts already slogans should be allowed to do?
            I repeat: where are the facts ??? Facts are evidence, documents. Where are they???
            Bring intelligence that the author Vic would not have considered in his cycle ???
            No need for women’s gossip and nonsense, give facts, comrade))) Or not a comrade at all, but a master?
            1. AsmyppoL
              AsmyppoL 16 November 2018 11: 22
              +11
              So I collected the materials for the first time and tried to explain the arrangements for the organization of the Southern Front. Looked already over 1400 people.
              From you, except for useless materials that you cannot even clearly explain .... You are a former officer, Colonel! Didn’t the speakers clearly articulate your thoughts?

              Well, you have placed the same link on the For Truth website. I'm just wondering: will anyone besides Kozinkin leave something in the comments there ??? Watered the author Vic there in a big way. .. Well, not one user except you and Kozinkin did not leave a single comment when discussing your folly !!! No one! It was also on the site "Military Literature". After the beginning of the release of the new part of the cycle, not a single comment except for two clowns: Milchakov and Kozinkin !!! No one!!

              Dear moderator even Kozinkin between the lines called Clown. There are such cheeky and arrogant people. For profit, everything can be vulgarised. Straight as brazen and Americans! Everybody misinterprets. Now at least it is clear from whom data frames are taken as an example)))
              1. AsmyppoL
                AsmyppoL 16 November 2018 11: 37
                +15
                I will insert a fragment of someone else’s comment so that it is clear about the level of awareness of some literary figures)))
                "14 June 2018 was held a meeting of the Guchkov House discussion club, which was devoted to the events of 22 June 1941. Writer Kozinkin O.Yu. was present at the meeting. Read the transcript at http://zhistory.org.ua/nikifrov.htm
                Writer Kozinkin O. Yu. for many years "pleases" its readers and teaches others who do not belong to them. A question was asked at the club meeting: where did the 16 army go?
                Get the pleasure of how they dodge. For so many years they wrote about the beginning of the war and did not know it. The final conclusion: they allegedly forgot the leaves and simply can’t remember where the army went. And this is the basis of the beginning of the transfer of troops to the western border.
                But now he teaches the author in seven messages, supposedly he knows it.
                Look again there is no evidence as presented by the author. Some words
                A crook, not a writer. What he can natschit, just dodge and lie
                "

              2. ccsr
                ccsr 16 November 2018 17: 37
                -11
                Quote: AsmyppoL

                Here I collected materials for the first time and tried to explain the activities of organizing the Southern Front. Over 1400 people have already watched.

                Do you think that America was discovered? And what's so unusual that all readers gasp - a common event held on the eve of the war in view of the fact that there was information from the intelligence about the attack.
                By the way, and where are the comments from 1400 people - except for a few people, no one paid attention to your "work", so you should not speculate on the numbers.
              3. ccsr
                ccsr 16 November 2018 17: 39
                -10
                Quote: AsmyppoL
                After the start of the release of the new part of the cycle, not a single comment was made except for two clowns: Milchakova and Kozinkina !!! No one!!

                Because what Madame writes is not interesting to anyone - everyone already understood that she was an ordinary amateur in military affairs.
                Quote: AsmyppoL
                For profit, everything can be vulgarized.

                In vain sputter of envy - Kozinkin does not receive profit in the amount that you dream of.
            2. ccsr
              ccsr 16 November 2018 17: 33
              -11
              Quote: AsmyppoL
              No need for womanish gossip and bullshit, come on facts, comrade

              Well, if the information from the professionals of the GRU is for you at the level of "baba's gossip", then how are you different from the attendants?
              Quote: AsmyppoL

              I understand that you can’t bring anything clever

              So far, nothing smart has come from you either, and nevertheless, you write here, although you are afraid to express your fantasies on the "militer".
  14. bubalik
    bubalik 6 November 2018 23: 02
    0
    ... the 26 part came out, if the author has the opportunity to lay out at least scans of documents, on which he bases his articles or links? hi
    1. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 7 November 2018 07: 08
      +2
      If you carefully read the articles and comments, it should be clear to you what value the "scans of documents" are ... Many are still classified. Individuals break into the archives, have relatives, etc. get access ..
      This is money! Gagarin’s magazine was sold at auction ..
      This is a lot of money. Hands can "tear off" or "sources" select, destroy, etc. (Underline whatever applicable). Not so long ago, the library archive storage burned down.
      1. bubalik
        bubalik 8 November 2018 23: 41
        -17

        If you carefully read the articles and comments, you should understand the value of "document scans".
        ,,, gentlemen believe in the word without any conditions! laughing ,, but the VO resource has always been valued by the fact that the opponent provided: either documents or references ,,,
        1. Navigator_50
          Navigator_50 9 November 2018 06: 32
          0
          In what classic novel did a young man enter the city of Stargorod ... with astrolabe ?.
          Homeless began to ask for a million ..
          He was offered the key to the apartment where the money is .. did not take it.
          1. bubalik
            bubalik 15 November 2018 00: 03
            -16
            If you carefully read the articles and comments, it should be clear to you what value the "scans of documents" are ... Many are still classified. Individuals break into the archives, have relatives, etc. get access ..

            ,, The author cites "the type of documents in the article", Believe in the word? ,,, at least one document ,, but this is boltology ,,
  15. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 7 November 2018 07: 14
    +10
    As for the series of articles, I have the opinion (personal) that the leadership of the USSR wanted to prevent war in an original way - to deploy divisions, corps, URs, armies, etc., thus giving a clear signal - "seriously preparing for a fight" ...
    I think that in such a (relatively cheap) way they hoped to avoid war ... Another month would not have been 1941, and then (maybe) 1942 ..

    The other side also understood this, but she had no choice. She was also "sharpened" against the USSR.
    Did you take money? Let's make a calculation, s ...

    No one seriously in the USSR and did not believe in a terrible war. The military too. Hence the battlefield with combat training ..
    and the dislocation of parts and compounds .. and vacations, and fees.
    But as military people, everyone was "ready", only it turned out that they were not very good.
    Well something like that.

    GS and NGOs (without reference to persons) received everything that was possible from industry and the national economy ..
    Dressing and feeding a DISABLED ARMY OF PEOPLE (were in short supply - healthy and strong) is not halda-bastards ..
    Here.
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 9 November 2018 10: 38
      +3
      Quote: Shturman_50
      No one seriously in the USSR and did not believe in a terrible war. The military too.

      Indeed, then it was difficult to predict how the war would go and how long it would last. And not only our leaders were mistaken in this, but also the Germans - their plan began to crumble from the first months of the war. And in the end - the loss of the whole war. But do not forget that in later times, Americans made a mistake with Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc. France was defeated in Algeria and Vietnam.
      So there is nothing surprising in our mistakes - we simply could not imagine the future losses and opportunities of the German army.
  16. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 8 November 2018 07: 43
    +14
    It is clear that neither NGOs nor the General Staff believed that Germany would attack such a force ...
    Therefore, they reported that they were ready to repel .. here are just provocations if, then we are not to blame.
    Well, to add tanks and guns and planes .. and we already know the matter.
    Something like this.
    1. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 19 November 2018 06: 30
      +7
      Well, they showed NOT HIDDING and the Airborne Forces and the number of tanks, aircraft, etc.
      Che Germans are fools to attack such a force? We’ll turn it around and throw it over so that we HAVE MORE! And sergeants let them manage the combat training .. I forgot about the radio, but we didn’t finish the academies. each commander has 3-4 ...
      Something like this
  17. MartirArse
    MartirArse 16 November 2018 07: 14
    +1
    A rather unusual position expressed in the article. I will get acquainted with previous issues later. Generally pre +
  18. VS
    VS 22 November 2018 08: 54
    -9
    Quote: strannik1985
    What were the "northern" and "southern" deployment options?

    Do you want to talk about these options? Blow on "For the Truth" - http://zapravdu.ru/forum/viewforum.php?f=5
    Here, or banyat or the topic is already gone)))

    If hunting - strike me on the box - [email protected] - let's chat about these options - I'm wondering what YOU think about them - after all, I write books about these plans)) But it's better on "For the Truth"))
  19. VS
    VS 22 November 2018 08: 56
    -11
    Quote: MartirArse
    A rather unusual position expressed in the article.

    there’s just nothing unusual in the articles NO))) The modern re-reading of the old story that intelligence did not report something there and the military didn’t do anything because the tyrant didn’t give)) And if someone did something, contrary to the tyrant estessen)))
  20. VS
    VS 22 November 2018 08: 57
    -9
    Quote: Shturman_50
    It is clear that neither NGOs nor the General Staff believed that Germany would attack such a force ...

    and who told you these things - that the General Staff did not believe in the attack and all the more did Stalin not believe?))
    1. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 23 November 2018 07: 13
      +4
      And for what purpose are you interested?
      And then I learned a lot of things for military service ...
      1. VS
        VS 23 November 2018 07: 33
        -5
        I kind of wrote 9 books and almost everything about the pre-war days and June 22))) and I am ALWAYS extremely interested when a new infa appears)))
        Sincerely, Kozinkin O.Yu.)))

        So where did you get the idea that the General Staff did not believe in the attack and the more so Stalin did not believe?))

        And here they read anonymous ladies or - in the memoirs of some marshals who are responsible
        for the tragedy of June 22, the time of Khrushchev Brezhnev read?
        1. Navigator_50
          Navigator_50 23 November 2018 11: 09
          +6
          Wow!
          9 books written and did not understand?
          There were people in NGOs and the General Staff who did not understand what the war would be like!
          That’s why they couldn’t reveal the stages of preparation from reconnaissance signs ..
          And they knew how to report. Small blood powerful blow.
          Hence the failure in preparation, and management, and tasks .... flew to the front as lather right there.
          Red envelopes ... (yeah) I held them in my hands ... That's why they are kept secret from shame and shame.
          You would still recommend a report to the Khrushchev Congress ...
          1. VS
            VS 23 November 2018 12: 26
            -5
            where did you get that I didn’t understand something?)))

            I ask YOU - why did you get that the attack did not wait - the military and Stalin all the more - WHO told you that they did not understand WHAT will be the war?
            You ALL intelligence reports read apparently the pre-war days and the more so reports of the GRU = Golikov on June 19, 20 and 21?
        2. Navigator_50
          Navigator_50 23 November 2018 12: 19
          +4
          NGOs and the General Staff did not believe, because they did not understand how the war would begin ..
          Stalin trusted them and also believed ..
          How they describe the drafting of Directive No. 1 - THIS IS A SINGAPORE!
          1. VS
            VS 23 November 2018 12: 29
            -6
            So WHERE do you know why there who believed or did not believe in the General Staff and the Kremlin?))
            They recognized the crystal ball from the articles of an anonymous lady here - who wrote who "thought" there in the General Staff and the Kremlin?
  21. VS
    VS 23 November 2018 18: 09
    -5
    Quote: Shturman_50
    How they describe the drafting of Directive No. 1 - THIS IS A SINGAPORE!

    I think today I’ve studied this day best of all)))

    And what is there who describes in his memoirs - well, what can you do)))
    1. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 24 November 2018 05: 49
      -1
      1) I'm not interested in your showdown with the author of the articles in the cycle, and absolutely!
      2) Those who write memoirs are (usually) direct participants in events (well, they lie ... it happens). And all the rest usually write "from other people's words ..." and this is not proof of reliability.
      3) During the perestroika period, I had to be on a business trip “to perform a job” in one of the divisions of the General Staff Department of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Then, they pulled out a lot from the archives and began to process it. V. director well remembered ...
      So shta know what I'm saying. And then they came to their senses and closed the access again, (although the guys managed to collect the dissenters). Because "A lot of knowledge - a lot of sadness."

      Your right to write both the tenth and eleventh book. Well, if health allows (in Odessa, I remember, they joked - “if there is enough muzzle.” I also joked ..).
      All the best to you.
      PS
      It is clear that I cannot tell you the names without their consent, and "there are no others, but those are far away" (c) is not mine.
      Something like this
      1. VS
        VS 24 November 2018 09: 02
        -3
        I love the former military and the more staff officers))
        Quote: Shturman_50
        Your right to write both the tenth and eleventh book.

        strike me on the box - [email protected] - let's talk about the case)))
        In my writings, before handing it over to the publishers, I first give them to those who understand military matters and such comments are VERY important to me)))

        my face is just making new books on the topic of June 22))) So I will be glad if you give YOUR comments on the book)))

        Quote: Shturman_50
        then they came to their senses and closed the access again, (although the guys managed to collect the dissenters). Because "A lot of knowledge - a lot of sadness."

        about the same thing to me and someone Slavin told - about how he made a report to Kvashnin at a private meeting in the General Staff on the topic of June 22)))
  22. VS
    VS 2 December 2018 09: 18
    -3
    Quote: Mikhail Zubkov
    This is in fact a betrayal.

    Not this way. For starters, figure out what this so-called deer 1))) SEE HOW it was understood by those who received it)) Because it does NOT matter what you think about it))) IT IS IMPORTANT AS UNDERSTAND IT, whoever received and read it))
    According to this directive, there was no need to bring a bomb)))
  23. VS
    VS 5 December 2018 16: 44
    -7
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    it cannot be said that a month later the leadership of the Red Army was convinced that the Germans would risk attacking the USSR having only 128 divisions at the border

    you are again inventing for those people - what did they "THINK" there)))

    Well, bring the oud at last AT LEAST ONE DOCUMENT wherever the Bugs or Stalin wrote - THERE ARE NO YET 180 more divisions on the other side of the border, then Hitler will not attack !!!)))

    Although I would find something in Zhukov’s memoir - they say that we thought that since the Germans hadn’t caught up with the very estimated 180-200 divisions, they won’t attack us)))

    Zhukov, in what current intelligence and especially Stalin did not wing, but HE IN THIS did not dare to blame her and the tyrant)))
    THINK at your leisure - WHY Zhukov, the main author of the myths about June 22nd, NEVER WRITTEN AND SHOWNED THAT WE - or rather STALIN - thought that since the Germans didn’t catch up with their estimated divisions for 200 divisions, the June 22 attacks that will be??))

    You can search in Golikov’s memoirs - I’m sure you will find this - your mythical 180 divisions - since they were not there and the attack can not be expected on June 22))

    In the meantime, search - look for OPEN sources and you will find - our intelligence has given the date of the attack about 110 times since spring as "mid-June")) "June 22" plus or minus a week on average)) And the closer June came, the "range" this narrowed around June 22 by days and hours)))
    And it was not the tavern gossip but the source of the level of encirclement of the Halders Churchill and others. US State Department)))
    I’m sure - right now you’ll cry out that intelligence gave OTHER dates but they didn’t come and therefore they did NOT BELIEVE intelligence !!!
    Here is the current in such a cry that is righteous and you’re only stupid and expose yourself - as our anonymous madame put herself up in this form - with a series of articles about the June 22 attack not being expected, and if something was done solely on the personal initiative of the good people of the maple unafraid tyrant kravavaga)) After all, Madame brought a bunch of information exactly at the level of gossip and rumors))
    But Golikov from whom Madame sculpts our fool and wrote - go through the woods - our sources were of the highest level first of all !!)) AND ALL THAT WE NEED FOR THE MILITARY - MILITARY! - DALI quite. And the direction of the strikes and the strength of the Germans, and most importantly - the date and time of the German attack, and even more so after June 10 - when Halder signed his order to attack the USSR)))
    1. AsmyppoL
      AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 19: 39
      +8
      Again I see the forger-rezunist Kozinkin. The falsification of our history by a former citizen of the USSR began with Rezun, who was given the material for his "work" by the impudent secret service. At one time you were offended by the label of "forger-rezunist" stuck to you. They cannot obtain evidence from you on any site: Military literature, on the site For the truth. You write all sorts of nonsense to float on the surface.
      Multiple questions that you ignore and put this nonsense in your epics again:
      1 - proofs of Zhukov’s call from Stalin’s office to the responsible duty officer of the General Staff (except for an error in Zakharov’s memoirs)
      2 - proof of Zhukov’s call to districts before 24-00 (except for Tyulenev’s lies)
      3 - evidence of the rise of all mechanized corps, which we talked about
      4 - evidence of the betrayal of generals at all levels
      5 - evidence of the difference in the number of German divisions in various intelligence materials in March-April-May-June from their actual number
      And a lot of other fictional lies. If a person proves that his delusions are the only true one, then he is a liar. The liar who lies for the sake of his books is a fraud.

      Your favorite trait, make your opponent look for evidence of his "genius". you spied on Arsen. He does the same. Sweet couple...

      "Well, bring at least ONE DOCUMENT wherever ZHUKOV or Stalin wrote - IF THERE ARE NO MORE 180 divisions on the other side of the border, then Hitler will not attack !!!)))

      AT LEAST in Zhukov's MEMOIR find something like that - they say we thought that since the Germans had not caught up with those same calculated 180-200 divisions, they would not attack us))) "

      The available amount of materials on the eve of the war in the public domain is limited. Existing materials cannot make the conclusion you are talking about. This is the position of the crook that you are.
      Since you always stick out that you have already released ten opuses now, cite evidence of your "truth" and cite the statements of Stalin or Zhukov (in the materials before June 23, 1941), what they considered sufficient for an attack on the USSR of 120-130 German divisions

      They are not and we know it. And the estimated numbers of divisions being put up by Germany in the number of 180-189-200 exist in draft documents. And the numbers in the 120-130 divisions in the pre-war documents just missing. And above are the documents that were signed by the head of the General Staff of the Red Army Golikov before the outbreak of war. What he wrote after the war is another matter. Exactly the same as the general-marshals wrote after the war.

      And when you write about 110 intelligence reports about the date of the attack, you are cheating again. Because the date of the attack at dawn on June 22 is only in three messages! Even in Directive # 1, the word "at dawn" has been removed. Even at this time, the war was PROBABLY expected only on June 22 and 23, but not exactly
      1. AsmyppoL
        AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 19: 49
        +7
        As you are on the site For the truth, screaming like a hysterical woman:
        "post my answers to this sheep on"
        "On BO banned me forever - so lay out my answer to this fool you"

        And what kind of answers, claiming the truth, can come up with the fiction fiction Kozinkin?
        For example, something like this: "Only they can admit that going to a report to the country's leader on a certain issue, any responsible official will not take with him at least a draft document, a positive decision on which he would like to receive. In general, it is difficult to discuss such questions with amateurs - their level is not the same. Even the zampolit also bears nonsense when you start discussing such issues with him, not to mention those who were not close to the army."
        Allegedly "not" and "not a dilettante" Kozinkin pretend to be authentic, he does not know that shortly before 20-00 on June 21 Zhukov was at a meeting at GAU, and left before 20-00. This is in his memoirs ... Therefore, his words about the taken directive are only words. In light of his lies about all the events of June 20-21, they have no faith. And Kozinkin cannot confirm these words, but demands to refute their opponents. What after that can be the truth, and not fiction in the works of this science fiction writer ??)) Zero point and zero tenths of the truth.
        1. AsmyppoL
          AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 19: 57
          +6
          Rezunist-forger Kozinkin: "In the General Staff there were both the operational duty officer and the service of responsible duty officers))) YOU chewed it to me by the way
          But in general - this woman is restless - as soon as she got to the events of the night on June 22 - immediately her lies began to go off-scale
          "

          Kozinkin cannot provide evidence of these words. someone told him something. maybe just to be nice. Not clear, but he claims it is true. I trust S. Chekunov, who writes that there was no such position on the eve of the war. I myself was not looking for this information - not interesting.
          But in the pre-war documents on the headquarters of the Moscow Military District and the headquarters of the 1080 military unit I found information. There are duty and responsible duty officers there, and the post of operational duty officer appeared only a few days after the start of the war. Only after a few days after the start of the war, and previously the position of operational duty officer is not mentioned. She is often mentioned only in post-war memoirs. and again, Kozinkin will not be able to produce anything documentary, and everything is straining to show his absolute knowledge about pre-war events.
          1. AsmyppoL
            AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 20: 09
            +8
            And how does Kozinkin, a forger-cutter, try to answer the questions raised in the cycle? Those questions that he asked Milchakov to post on our website and which he did not begin to post this nonsense. By the way, not a single user of the site "For Truth" responded with a word to Kozinkin's hysterical cries. NO ONE...

            Dilettante Kozinkin: "1-e - Zhukov lied about the defector, but rather he SO in his Vir-Litnegry prescribed BUT !! There are memoirs of Tyulenev, and he shows - in the evening of 21, Zhukov informs him - he notified the district that there would be an attack and this is known according to the EXPLORATION and not from the defectors)) And this conversation was BEFORE Zhukov went to Stalin - around 18-19.00 it could be quite))) BUT stupid Madame SUCH memoirs ignore))) And Zhukov could refer - just to the Reports of Golikov from 19, 20 and 21 of June - those that Golikov himself mentioned in his once forbidden memoirs"

            What do we see ?! Solid speculation-fantasy, claiming the authenticity of Kozinkin!
            The fact that the Feldwebel was imposed on him by the censors was Kozinkin's conjecture. Zhukov repeatedly placed false information about the events of 21 June and can not believe them. If a science fiction writer publishes them in his writings, then he trusts them and is responsible for their accuracy. Otherwise, he should write that according to unverified information and further ... But in this case Kozinkin’s nonsense comes out ... There could not be Zhukov’s acquaintance with intelligence data, since He was at a meeting at the GAU. Not provable this! Otherwise, it is a fiction issued for authenticity.

            To believe Tyulenev after his lies about air defense and about Stalin's call at noon is also impossible. It is well known that he wrote these words of the Seals after the war, being an ardent supporter of Zhukov. In other words, the statement of Tyulenev is not confirmed by any source. Perhaps this is a lie. But Kozinkin can use this lie in his writings to build a false version ...

            Fantast Kozinkin: "2 - The fact that Zhukov carried with him the text of the work he was wearing and 11 of June, he told Anfilov himself. Madam did not like it - it is not likely that the marshal refuted .. if he could)))
            Like Golikov's words - from the FORBIDDEN once his memoirs - he will try to refute - that ALL that the military should have reconnaissance DALA completely - and by the forces of the Germans and in the directions of strikes, etc. info
            "

            Again, information that is NOT CONFIRMED BY ANYTHING. may or may not. And the science fiction writer again claims to be historical. Not having a single fact, only a swindler can claim "reliability"))))
            1. AsmyppoL
              AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 20: 17
              +7
              Forger Kozinkin: 3 - in those days - starting from 6 June ALL orders were duplicating from GS to districts and in the districts themselves ALSO))) - first, OURSELF commands were given and then WRITTEN orders came)))
              And the same thing happened with the deer. b.n. which Madame stubbornly calls the deer. 1 - they began to load the districts about it from 22.00, and Zhukov himself called Kirpanos at MIDNIGHT and Orally told that he would bring the troops to the city faster, and also OSTNO and Purkaev then gave the command "to act according to the plan" at 3.30 - i.e. e. open packages))) That is confirmed by the same Rokosovsky !!!))
              and it was also with dir. 1 - about opening the package)) About 2.30, Pavlovs received an ORAL order for this and WRITTEN came to the package around 4 hours from the General Staff)))


              Again, solid Babskie emotions and not one documentary evidence. In the materials of the cycle, ALL available memories of opening packages, which are very contradictory, are considered. One memory contradicts to FIVE other memories. But Kozinkin takes and believes only one memory, ignoring the rest. That's right, this is what a station cheater does.

              He can not cite a single fact of the ORAL directive from Moscow about the opening of packages. NO ONE. But in his fantastic books it asserts again. What kind of truth can be talked about in these works, if, apart from certain memorable passages to him, nothing is used and dozens of other memories are openly ignored. Tens!
              Rokossovsky does not confirm the words of Kozinkin. You just need to read carefully!

              So I give Kozinkin's third answer to the author Vick and NO ONE PROOF. One word forger-rezunist-cheater))) And most importantly there is not a drop of shame for their lies. So many minuses received and pluses only from co-author Milchakov.
              1. AsmyppoL
                AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 20: 20
                +3
                Fantast Kozinkin: "5th - it was not Kozinkin who wrote about Vatutin, but - Zhukov, and it was HE who distorted the situation a little - Vatutin WAS NOT in Stalin's office personally, but he could well if he mentioned Zhukov - to wait in the waiting room))) Why was Vatutin needed with Zhukov? SO Vatutin is the deputy of the General Staff for Operations))) he was supposed to be there and he was))) By the way - I never wrote about any room for the "military" in the Kremlin))) - Madame again came up with something for an opponent and rushes with this)))"

                A lot of brackets, as befits a flirtatious Madame Kozinkina. Note: again, not a single fact. And for finding Vatutin is responsible, not Kozinkin, and G.K.Zhukov. That's how interesting. The writer claims historical justice and assumes no responsibility. The fact that before this Beetle piled a bunch of lies - it does not matter! For Kozinkin's falsifier, only one supposedly truthful phrase by Zhukov is important, which converges with the falsified version of this science fiction writer.
                1. AsmyppoL
                  AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 20: 22
                  +4
                  New Kozinkin speculation: 7th - this ..... writes - "" In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, there is practically no information about the events of June 20 and 21, 1941. If there are no events, then probably all of them are not too biased and that is why they did not make it into his memoirs. ""))
                  Actually, THIS IS NO IN THE OFFICIAL Zhukov memoirs only because THAT TIME the bike was composed that the attack did not wait for it were not prepared in the Kremlin first of all))) - as NOW this is trying to repeat)))
                  And what about Zhukov CAM marshal described this watch in CHERNOVIKI - it is not yet known)) they are not fully published yet)))


                  Maybe there is, and maybe not. And if there is, but it may again be a lie, in order to look like a general military leader. But the main thing is to insult the author. And again, not having a single factor. The true behavior of the station cheater!)))
                  1. AsmyppoL
                    AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 20: 26
                    +6
                    Kozinkin: "8 - Budyonny DIDN'T WRITE ANY memoirs about this day at all - OFFICIALLY)) THERE are only some DRAFTS that his daughter was showing in parts or RETRICTED to the Red Star))) And from HIM understand what was there - IMPOSSIBLE - by these retelling in Star and refer to THEM as a refutation of Zhukov's words - the height of stupidity and indecency)))"

                    Again, a lot of Madame coquetry. And now the position is the opposite of his previous answer. Zhukov may have other memoirs (and most likely no, but there is no certainty that they are not false again), but Budyonny’s diary is the height of stupidity.
                    And why? Yes, because in this case, at once all ten works of Kozinkin should be handed over to the trash. And this frame still claims exceptional reliability ....
                    1. AsmyppoL
                      AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 20: 31
                      +6
                      Kozinkin: "9th - Madame writes nonsense)) - "" a well-known fact that the call about the defector could not take place until 21-00 on June 21. "")) Actually, it is a well-known fact that, EXCEPT Liskov, who are we talking about, there were OTHER defectors in the same KOVO - on the 18th)) Ie - COULD REPORT to Stalin about DIFFERENT defectors)) And if Zhukov referred to Purkaev who was not stupid at the HQ in Ternopil yet and at 21 o'clock he was still stupidly on the way - Purkaev could tell Zhukov something about earlier defectors - BEFORE June 21"

                      Again, without female coquetry, there is no place for Kozinkin. Something is very strange for an adult man)))) At this point, Kozinkin is simply lying, since there is a huge piece in a series of articles about many defectors. It's just that not everyone can remember this, but throwing mud at you and becoming like "smart" is the usual behavior of this shot.

                      Purkaev could inform Zhukov or could not. The question is that the military is very sensitive to military subtleties. For example, to military ranks. There was no Feldwebel 21 number. There was some kind of 18. But Purkaev would never allow himself to report on a defector who crossed the border of 18 numbers, only in the evening of 21 Zhukov. But the warehouse does not know the same))))
                      1. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 5 December 2018 20: 36
                        +3
                        And then a similar nonsense. When a person cannot say anything clever, but somehow throw mud at him (slander). Such a person, without slander and lies or live to him. And every day is celebrated on three sites - so to speak, to show one’s genius, which is not at all .... Before you write me something, let’s PROOF. I do not believe your verbatim without a single fact. Come on Kozinkin, falsify further, water our mud on the military - this is very like in the West ....
                      2. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 6 December 2018 07: 57
                        +2
                        I thought and decided to slightly clarify my position, based on the materials already presented by the author Vik. Very wonderful materials in the cycle. precisely because of its volume !! There are no more than one or two dozen memories of veterans who are not included in the cycle. There is such an entertaining science statistic. It is with her that we have a place considering the vast amount of memories and documents in the cycle “The Unexpected War”. That is why this author causes fear and hatred in you, as all your fictional version flies to hell. All ten books were written by a charlatan!

                        What part of your version is based on, regarding the events directly on the eve of the war?

                        1) Supposedly, the withdrawal of connections according to the Directives from Moscow in anticipation of the June 22 war. But there is no general plan for the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff in the withdrawal of formations and associations to the border precisely by June 22-23. Not! Terms much later! You often mention on sites that you need to read the books of Marshal Zakharov. I read it many times, but for some reason you use, as usual, only fragments of text from this book that are convenient for your version. His mention of the fact that he was the initiator of the nomination of parts of the district in early June, 1941, is somehow held back by you. It was he, not the People's Commissar and not Zhukov. He insisted and his initiative was supported by the Commissar of Defense. He also received permission to withdraw the county field office in advance. He offered and insisted. True, he managed to do this because of intelligence materials about certain events on the part of Romania. These materials were also available at the General Staff Directorate of the Red Army, but the leadership of the Red Army did not intend to do anything about them. Very similar to the events on the eve of June 22 ...

                        There are no events in the OdVO that you could conclusively bring under the withdrawal of troops on the idea of ​​Moscow to the border! Present a couple! Yes, not in life. You will bring a bunch of words and do not provide a single fact.
                      3. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 6 December 2018 08: 02
                        +4
                        KOVO. Your version that the 15 divisions were put forward with the goal of preparing for the 22 war of June. But this is a version without facts sucked from your finger. According to Sudoplatov, the author’s version of Vic is the buildup of Soviet troops to counter the German threat of invasion. Keep Hitler from attacking a large number of Soviet troops, which near the border would not exceed the number of German. This is also a version and it, just like yours, cannot be confirmed or refuted by available open materials! Neither yours nor the one expressed by the author Vic. But you are claiming historical authenticity without facts, and the author Vick is slinging mud. So do defending their benefits!

                        Author Vic even analyzed a huge amount of materials and her position in the light of this more reasoned. By the mechanized corps, too, the author of Vic has analyzed a lot of documents that do not confirm your fantastic version. Of all the documents on the mechanized corps, you caught hold of the memoirs of the general, the deputy commander of the 19 mechanized corps, I.S. Kalyadin that prepared for the beginning of the war in the corps. At the same time, you were not at all embarrassed by the contradictions of his memories with the memories of the commander of this corps and the ordinary tankman. You deliberately choose a profitable quotation for your version and in passing throw mud at those that contradict it. Although such facts and documents are much more than individual memories you have torn out. At the same time, there are numerous contradictions in the memoirs of political worker Kalyadin. Many such facts were shown by the respected Zakoretsky at the “Military Literature” forum: from incorrect recollections about the bombing, about the information received from the KOVO headquarters, about the distances and so on. Zakoretsky can look for information and analyze it, and your credo, as a person-quotation, only quote the quotes of memories you need and ignore all others. So do crooks crooks ...

                        Yes, the situation is Pribovo different from all other counties. In the cycle it is shown that there are no materials on bringing the KOVO, ZOVOVO, and OdVO air defense units into operational readiness No. XXUMX! There is no information, and indirect evidence suggests otherwise. And this already contradicts your version of uniform instructions from Moscow. The situation is the same with parts of VNOS. What happened in PribOVO did not happen in all other districts and in the Moscow air defense zone. Similarly, the situation with the Air Force of all five districts. There are no traces of a single indication from Moscow. Hundreds of memories show this. There are only isolated cases of aviation dispersal in separate divisions. Only individual cases! The orders of the People's Commissar of 2 and 19 June did not reach the troops! And they could not get to dawn 20 June! This is again your invented link in the events of your version. A false link that you can not confirm with anything! You can not confirm their words, claiming exceptional historical accuracy. You are just a crook! ...

                        It is impossible to link the withdrawal of troops in early to mid-June with the expectation of a war of June 22-23 with available documents and memoirs. Impossible at the moment! But an indirect analysis of the event shows that this simply could not happen. The troops went to the border at a much later date, with subsequent plans for long-term equipment of anti-tank lines. They dragged with them not necessary educational property and property, without which you can do in war. Your fiction that the battle logs begin to be carried out when withdrawing from the Cover Plans is not confirmed by anything. This is your fiction, which can not be confirmed even by memoirs. In other words - this is a lie, acceptable to your version!
                      4. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 6 December 2018 08: 08
                        +4
                        2) I already wrote about the number of German divisions. There are estimates in numbers from the 173-180-189-200 divisions required to attack the USSR. The numbers of 124-130 divisions sufficient for war with the USSR are absent in any pre-war materials. It can not be confirmed by anything. Post-war memoirs can be, but only with the post-knowledge!

                        The use of 150-160 German divisions in 1941 games of the year is the use of German troops who have not completed their concentration. They could have been more if they had completed their full concentration. You also do not refute anything. The presented version, like yours, has the right to exist due to the lack of information currently available. None of them can not be refuted!

                        3) About dates. Of course, intelligence gave many other dates, which are mentioned in numerous materials of the cycle. But besides dates, real military people of the combatant units understand something else: there must be means to achieve the goals of the initial period of the war and the first operations of the German troops! Are needed Facilities! A person who has served in the warehouse is simply not destined to understand!

                        Imagine that in your warehouse there are many toilet bowls that are like German tank battalions and shelves. I think such a comparison may come to you))) They built a huge high-rise and installed toilet bowls in the toilets and water supply to them. But this does not mean that residents will be able to go to the toilet for a week! They went a couple of times and that's all - to merge that is not where!

                        Tank divisions, which are also too few against our districts. Many tank battalions and regiments in bulk! According to intelligence, Zapovo, only about three tank divisions against them - the rest is regiments of tanks. Let these divisions be connecting communications between the apartments and the basement of this high-rise. Even if there is tap water - you will clog the system again quickly!

                        Tank or motorized corps and groups are already a system that simulates communications to sewage treatment plants. Any plumber understands this, as well as the Soviet senior commanders understood that without these associations it is impossible to advance to a greater operational depth. But before 22 June, these corps and tank groups did not find intelligence !!!! The dumbest military man at that time understood that without these groupings it was impossible to advance far and long! Therefore, there is still time before the concentration of these forces and, therefore, before the start of the war too. I don’t know, sick people who are obsessed with the idea of ​​a fix are unlikely to even get such a simplified explanation ...
                      5. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 6 December 2018 08: 14
                        +3
                        4) Your Milchakov consultant posted a fragment of your new book ... What a nonsense! Again, the fictional teams for training the troops, for opening the red packets ... Everything is designed for readers (mostly schoolchildren) who will not get into the details, but only check certain points.

                        I wrote above that the materials of the author Vik are remarkable for their volume!
                        Numerous materials are arranged in districts, armies, corps. When you refer, for example, to the mention of an order to open a package in any one division, it is immediately apparent that this is another juggling of facts - another case of fraud.

                        For example, 15 Rifle Corps 5 Army KOVO. One mention of the division commander about the opening of the package, allegedly at the command of the corps headquarters. One !!! This is not confirmed either by the Commander, or by his Chief of Staff, or by an officer of the 5 Army Headquarters, or by the commanders of two other corps divisions. One supposedly true memory against five others! Very reminiscent of the memory of another commander of his report directly to the General Staff)) This is like an online report to Stalin about the flight of a reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately, insanity was getting stronger ...

                        You choose one precisely because it is necessary for your version. How else to call it, if not juggling with the facts? Or fraud ?! And so you have everywhere. Separate mentions (mostly quotations) and ignoring the rest of the vast amount of memories and documents.

                        5) You write that the timing of the outbreak of the war already knew in the spring. The fact that the war will be, of course, they knew, but when exactly they did not know. Here is a fragment of the memoirs of the commander of the 21 th Lyukhushenko Mechanized Corps: “... About a month before the beginning of the war, being in the GABTU of the Red Army, I asked the head:
                        - When will tanks arrive to us? After all, we feel the Germans are preparing ...
                        “Do not worry,” said Lt. Gen. Yakov Nikolayevich Fedorenko. “According to the plan, your corps should be fully equipped in nineteen forty-two.”
                        - And if the war?
                        “The Red Army is strong enough without your corps ...”


                        A month before the war, the mechanized corps related to reduced-size corps (according to the GABTU document) is not planned for military operations on the western border. A month before the war, the transfer of the 5 th mechanized corps from Transbaikalia and another division begins. It is still not clear where they were initially transferred: to the western border or to Transcaucasia?

                        And if we waited for the war in 20 in June with deep breakthroughs of German mobile units (according to your version), then why didn't 28-th micron from Transcaucasia (more than 800 tanks) transfer to the western border, 7-th micron from MVO (also significantly more than 800 tanks at the end of May), 1-th mic from LenVO (about 1000 tanks), 23-th and 25-th mic from CVO and RDT (more 700 tanks)?

                        In my opinion, this did not happen for three reasons: at the end of May - the first half of June, they did not know whether the war would happen in June 1941, the Germans did not have large mobile groups and our commanders did not think that the Germans would be able to quickly defeat a huge number of Soviet troops.

                        This once again shows the wrong data coming from intelligence, and not the understanding of the top leadership of the Red Army, as the Germans are planning a war with the Soviet Union.
                      6. AsmyppoL
                        AsmyppoL 6 December 2018 08: 24
                        +4
                        The commander of the aviation division, Belov, wrote that on the night before the war, commander Korobov said that he, as army commander, had the right to raise one division in alarm. Then it turns out that the district commander can pick up and do something with at least the troops of the whole corps. And the rights of the Chief of the General Staff and the People's Commissar of Defense in the districts should be much bigger !!

                        But from the 18 of the first number, they did not undertake anything to pull at least some troops to the border in order to prepare for the start of the war at dawn on June 22. Nothing. In the afternoon of June 21, they tried to remove the OG No. 2 from PribOVO air defense - this is a fact. And the signal from Zapovo about the removal of wire obstacles and the supply of German troops had already arrived at dawn on June 21. And the leadership of the Red Army did nothing, although it could, by its own rights, raise part of the troops in alarm. Although a small part, but they could. However, they did not!

                        Could order by phone to disperse aircraft. Did not become. Even the head of the Red Army GU Air Force on the night of June 22 knows nothing about the beginning of the war. As well as the head of the Red Army. Just as on the eve of the war in the evening, an hour about the meeting was held on the creation of the command of the Southern Front and the directions! But these same events are not directly related to what the leadership of the Red Army, the fleet, districts, the government, the NKVD and the NKGB should be doing while awaiting war through the 8-10 hours !!! And the Chief of General Staff is quietly at a meeting on the production of shells, which is also not related to the army’s unpreparedness for war through the same 8-10 hours. A science fiction writer Kozinkin defends the version that Zhukov rushed from the meeting for the draft Directive from 11 June ... One word, science fiction ... Zhukov was not bothered by this. Here probably memories of Budyonny are more true ...

                        The war began, the army was not ready for it. Communication disgusting with the troops, intelligence information is extremely small. But the General Staff is not thinking about a real war with breakthroughs and huge masses of enemy troops, but about some other incomprehensible war!

                        Small groups of planes are bombing something. Enemy infantry divisions with hundreds of tanks are attacking in separate directions. Not on the whole front, but in separate directions! The Brest sector is completely lost and is not considered by the General Staff! Of course, such operational summaries from districts are simply coming. But in the General Staff these reports do not bother anyone! Probably precisely because everything goes the way they assumed before the war !!!

                        Memoirs of Bagramyan are interesting (I brought them in my comments on the 25 part). Even when it is clear about the catastrophe on the front of the UZF (KOVO), the arrived Chief of the General Staff will not cancel the order on the counterstrike without understanding what is happening across the entire border. If, based on real facts, he does not understand what is happening, how could he have assumed before the war that this could happen? !!

                        6) The fact that intelligence reported everything accurately - you jumped on your fantastic donkey again. I did not report exactly intelligence - this lie has already been refuted in the materials of the cycle. The total number of divisions was close to what counted intelligence by June 22 and only! Only more than a dozen divisions and on the 840-900 tanks, according to the General Staff and District Intelligence Department data, were more against OdVO troops. And this information was maintained until the beginning of July 1941.

                        The number of troops and tanks against KOVO was also overestimated. If against the two specified districts the data were overestimated, then against other districts they should have been underestimated! Or distorted! Why lie again? It seems that for you, if you don’t fool anyone, then the day is lost))) More facts, gentleman, more facts, and not their fantastic inventions ...
  24. VS
    VS 6 December 2018 08: 57
    -1
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    They cannot obtain evidence from you on any site: Military literature, on the site For Truth.

    everything is gone here but if you want to blow here - http://zapravdu.ru/forum/viewforum.php?f=5 Stalin’s war

    we’ll chat there - you’ll tell how smart you are — that NO ONE ATTACK was waiting and Stalin was not preparing for it)))
  25. VS
    VS 6 December 2018 09: 02
    -2
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    cite evidence of your "truth" and cite the statements of Stalin or Zhukov (in the materials before June 23, 1941), what they considered sufficient for an attack on the USSR of 120-130 German divisions

    They are not and we know it.

    and here everything is simple - LEARN WHAT HAS BEEN DONE in the prewar days - what orders went to the districts in those days)))

    In short, you want to be smart - blow to the address and here I am not interested with people like you - where they banyat right there - chatting)) ALL of your questions - I will answer THERE)))
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 8 December 2018 07: 00
      +1
      Our administrators are rightly banned for boorish statements!
  26. VS
    VS 6 December 2018 09: 03
    -2
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    S. Chekunov, who writes that there was no such post on the eve of the war. WITH

    DO NOT LIE - NEVER WRITTEN SO CHEKUNOV)))
  27. VS
    VS 6 December 2018 09: 07
    -2
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    The fact that sergeants imposed the censors on him is Kozinkin’s speculation. Zhukov repeatedly posted false information about the events of June 21 and you can’t believe them

    that is, you did not know that Liskov was interrogated ONLY about midnight in the 5th Army ??)))
    AND - NOT Could Purkaev with whom Zhukov allegedly talked in the evening of the 21st and who allegedly spoke about sergeant Zhukov - chatting about Corporal Liskov with Zhukov in the EVENING on June 21 since Purkaev left Kiev at 10.00 and arrived in Ternopol at 3 o’clock in the morning)) )
  28. VS
    VS 6 December 2018 09: 09
    -2
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    oh, that before this Beetle heaped a bunch of lies - it doesn’t matter! Only one allegedly true phrase of Zhukov is important for the forger Kozinkin,

    but you believe Zhukov about talking with Purkayev in the evening of the 21st))) (I’m so laughing at you like that)))
  29. VS
    VS 6 December 2018 09: 13
    -2
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    Zhukov may have other memoirs (and most likely not.

    SO YOU DIDN'T KNOW about DRAFT Zhukov’s memoirs that were PARTLY completely published ??) Yes, uzhzhzhzh))))

    in short - if you want a serious conversation, then blow it on http://zapravdu.ru/forum/viewforum.php?f=5 - Stalin’s war))

    By the way, I send my new book to everyone to read)) Unless of course a person is an anonymous eccentric illiterate but screaming out of business))) ANONYMES - I do not give books)))
  30. VS
    VS 6 December 2018 13: 56
    -2
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    More facts, gentleman, more facts, not your own fantastic inventions ...

    I understand that you don’t understand the difference between facts and references to sources)) FACTS I give constantly and also - I give the sources of my knowledge)) These are documents and memoirs, etc.))) ALL "facts" I cite have their own "sources" - do not worry))
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 8 December 2018 06: 56
      +2
      As I understand it, the use in their fictions, set forth in their books, not supported by facts from documents is permissible, if one uses references to very dubious extracts from memoirs? Thus, the distorted events in the memoirs in your science fiction novels turn into real historical events. Without a single fact, you slip false fabrications to us and do not indicate that this is your hypothesis. And who does not believe in this hypothesis, which is not confirmed by facts and is sewn with white thread, then that falsifier, deceiving unsuspecting readers.
      At the same time, you do not own the material, are engaged in fraud, you do not know how to logically connect events from a single chain. A typical sofa expert who falsifies our story!
  31. VS
    VS 6 December 2018 13: 59
    -2
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    from the 18th, nothing was undertaken by them to pull at least some troops to the border in order to prepare for the outbreak of war at dawn on June 22. Nothing.

    I have no time to tell you — from June 11th — after TWO meetings of Stalin with the military took place in the Kremlin on June 9th and a decision was made to deploy troops at the border crossing point for their 41 border divisions.
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 8 December 2018 06: 17
      +2
      I understand that to confirm my words again there is not a single document and not a single recollection of eyewitnesses ?! And again, fictional events are presented as real?
      How do we know what the decision was made in these discussions? A typical example of distortion of real events due to their notions
  32. VS
    VS 8 December 2018 06: 51
    -2
    Quote: RuSFr
    I understand that to confirm my words again there is not a single document and not a single recollection of eyewitnesses ?! And again, fictional events are presented as real?
    How do we know what the decision was made in these discussions? A typical example of distortion of real events due to their notions


    Want to read how I know that?
    These are just facts))
    After TWO meetings of Stalin with the military took place in the Kremlin on June 9 and a decision was made to deploy troops from the 41 border border divisions, they EXACTLY sent 22 divisions to the BASIC defense zone !!))
    According to the directives of the General Staff from June 11-12 ..

    In PribOVO - ALL of their 9 frontier villages were withdrawn. At the same time, two went from Riga and Dvinsk and reached the border by June 22. The rest - since June 18, were withdrawn by software. The order on PribOVO at the same time (from June 19) forbade them to occupy the trenches themselves at the border - the so-called. the foothills until the Germans attack .. By order of the okrug, on June 16-17 they were brought to the regiments - an attack is possible on June 20
    At least 10 border rifle divisions were brought to KOVO - out of 17. Those who were too far from the border - in the places of their PPD. T.N. "deep" .. At the same time, the order for the "deep" and these are primarily the second echelons of reserves went to Kiev after June 12, but the border ones began to withdraw - by their railway - from June 11 already.

    On June 8, the movement of troops began in the OdVO pose .. On June 15, the Malinovsky SK divisions began to be withdrawn to the border at the checkpoint ..

    These are just facts))) If you want to know the "details" and "sources" - well, start reading something other than anonymous ladies))

    Come to For Truth - there hardworking admins do not ban me for every word)))
  33. VS
    VS 9 December 2018 11: 05
    -1
    Quote: RuSFr
    Our administrators are rightly banned for boorish statements!

    he said - you want to know ANOTHER opinion and FACTS about the pre-war days and all the more about the plans of the General Staff of the Red Army, for which Madame Anonymous has never mentioned - come to For Truth)))
  34. VS
    VS 9 December 2018 11: 08
    -1
    Quote: RuSFr
    As I understand it, the use in their fictions, set forth in their books, not supported by facts from documents is permissible, if one uses references to very dubious extracts from memoirs? Thus, the distorted events in the memoirs in your science fiction novels turn into real historical events. Without a single fact, you slip false fabrications to us and do not indicate that this is your hypothesis. And who does not believe in this hypothesis, which is not confirmed by facts and is sewn with white thread, then that falsifier, deceiving unsuspecting readers.
    At the same time, you do not own the material, are engaged in fraud, you do not know how to logically connect events from a single chain. A typical sofa expert who falsifies our story!



    AND YOU PERSONALLY - AT LEAST ONE have read my book ??)))
    There, in general, apart from the memoirs, that I criticize if they do not correspond to facts and documents - it is documents that are given in droves - and all the more so about which you have not heard at all yet)))

    he said - you want to know ANOTHER opinion and FACTS about the pre-war days and all the more about the plans of the General Staff of the Red Army, for which Madame Anonymous has never mentioned - come to For Truth)))
  35. VS
    VS 9 December 2018 11: 08
    0
    Quote: RuSFr
    How do we know what the decision was made in these discussions?

    he said - you want to know ANOTHER opinion and FACTS about the pre-war days and all the more about the plans of the General Staff of the Red Army, for which Madame Anonymous has never mentioned - come to For Truth)))