The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 25. OdVO

Before considering the events in the ODVO, let's see how some writers create their own version of events on the eve of the war and present it as our real history. Unfortunately, it is impossible to manage without consideration of this issue, although this is annoying for many readers. (I apologize to them in advance.) Consideration of this issue is associated with confusion in the memoirs of war veterans and in documents relating to the ODVO. Without understanding the events far from this district, it is impossible to understand the events taking place in it.

How to create a writer of your version? To do this, it is not always necessary to go to the archives and dig there, you do not need to search for material on the Internet, explaining inconsistencies. It is enough to take two different events and connect them with your version. After that, categorically declare that all military professionals think so! Who thinks differently - that rezunist-forger! And it passes! Next, the next event is taken and connected to the resulting link. Such links are overgrown with "details" that do not explain anything, more and more confusing and dragging away from inconsistencies. So arises a fictional story, which is given out for the truth and is sold to us for our money. When creating such a “story”, it is possible for those commanders whose actions or memories contradict the writer's version to be called traitors, liars, stupid unters — when it is profitable.

For example, a literary figure O. Yu. Kozinkin. Consider two events from its version that fundamentally affect the sequence of events in the ODVO. From the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov concerning the events on the eve of the war, the plot is chosen about when 21 June Tymoshenko and Zhukov come with a draft of their directive to Stalin. O.Yu. Kozinkin immediately complements the memories of G.K. Zhukov, who probably forgot those distant events, by his clarification: “[Zhukov] brought the directive to Stalin that he brought more 11 June to the input PP [Cover Plans]. ”

Then the phrase is taken from the memories of the former NS OdVO M.V. Zakharova: “At about 22 hours I was called to the Bodo office for talks with the commander of the district... "Further, in the memoirs of M.V. Zakharov describes the conversation about the possibility of adopting a particularly important Directive from Moscow. Is this event in the writer's version? So good it goes. Therefore, there is no need to check. Kozinkin accepts that this event is an axiom for him.

To a logical question: how could the NS OdVO call to 22-00 and talk about the transfer of the Directive if Tymoshenko and Zhukov left Stalin’s office only in 22-20 ?! The answer should be, and Zhukov called operational duty officer from the office of Stalin or from the room for the military at the reception. The operational duty officer, in turn, at the direction of the head of the General Staff, called all the districts. Beautiful version, only evidence of its existence no single.

When asked why Vatutin is missing from the list of people who were Stalin, the answer is that Vatutin was waiting at the reception. And when Zhukov in his memoirs writes the word "we"then I mean the transition of Zhukov and Vatutin from the reception room to the room where the military usually worked. Again there is no evidence, and the link of the true" history "is already confirmed by the" facts. " into the falsifiers and falsifiers, and already require evidence from him that refutes O. Kozinkin's fiction ... In response to an indication of inconsistencies, Stalin’s office and the details associated with it are described as evidence. be confirmed HAND presence in its General Vatutin 21 of June? ..

Let's try to understand these two events and understand when the call of the people's commissar could follow or from the General Staff to the border districts. S.L. Chekunov wrote that the posts "operational duty officer on GSH"At that time did not exist. There was a duty officer on the General Staff and his assistant. On the night of June 22 Colonel Vasilchenko was on duty. Even in the details of O. Yu. Kozinkina already has inaccuracies, but perhaps such inaccuracies are simply characteristic of military professionals? .. This is what Kozinkin and his military consultant Milchakov constantly call themselves.

In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov virtually no information about the events of 20 and 21 June 1941 year. If there are no events, then all of them are probably not very biased and that is why they did not fall into his memoirs. Everything about 21 June begins with the following text: "In the evening of June 21, the headquarters of the KOVO headquarters, Lieutenant-General MA. Purkayev reported that a turncoat arrived at the border guards - a German sergeant-major who claimed that the German troops were leaving the initial areas for an offensive that would begin on the morning of June 22.

I immediately reported to the People's Commissar and I.V. Stalin what MA gave Purkaev.

“Come with the People's Commissar for minutes in 45 to the Kremlin,” said I.V. Stalin.

Taking with them the draft directive to the troops, along with the people's commissar and lieutenant-general N.F. Vatutin we went to the Kremlin ... I.V. Stalin met us alone. He was clearly concerned: “But did the German generals throw up this defector in order to provoke a conflict?”

— No, - answered S. K. Timoshenko. - We believe that the defector speaks the truth...

“We must immediately issue a directive to the troops about bringing all the troops of the border districts to full alert,” the Commissar said.

- Read! Said I. V. Stalin.

I read the draft directive. JV Stalin remarked: “Now this directive is to be given prematurely, perhaps the issue will be settled by peaceful means. It is necessary to give a short directive in which to indicate that an attack can begin with provocative actions of German units. The troops of the border districts should not succumb to any provocations so as not to cause complications. ”

Wasting no time we with N.F. Vatutin out to another room and quickly amounted to draft directive Commissar. Back in the office, asked permission report ... With this directive N.F. Vatutin immediately went to the General Staff to immediately transfer it to the districts ... »

What in the specified fragment of memories is not correctly stated?

First, the well-known fact that the call about the defector could not take place before 21-00 21 June. Why in the memoirs there is a reference to the former NS KOVO? Probably because the army general MA Purkaev passed away in January 1953, and could not refute his memoirs ...

The second. In the office, Stalin was not alone. In addition to the leader, there were: Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and, possibly, Beria.

Third. Zhukov does not mention Budyonny, since Budyonny could refute this fragment of memoirs. In an unpublished diary S.M. Budyonny described the events that took place in Stalin's office, quite differently than the head of the General Staff. Therefore, it is possible that the names of all people who knew exactly what was happening in the office of I.V. were also deliberately removed from the memoirs of the former head of the General Staff. Stalin late in the evening 21 June.

Fourth. Why is the defense commissar sure that the defector is telling the truth? The testimony of this defector contradicted the data of all the intelligence services and reports of the district authorities. In addition, P.A. Sudoplatov wrote that on the eve of the war it was established that the Abwehr, under the guise of deserters, sent his agents to us. Neither Tymoshenko, Zhukov, nor Stalin could know about this. How then completely trust some defector ??

The fifth. G.K. Zhukov writes: “Wasting no time, we N.F. Vatutin went to another room "and" returning to the office, asked permission to report". According to the author General Vatutin, was not at the specified time in the Kremlin. The data on the presence of Vatutin has not been confirmed by any of Stalin’s visiting journals or in any other source of information. The writer has a version that Vatutin was waiting at the reception desk and there is not a single proof for this statement. In a similar situation, when the fall of 1940 of the year, Stalin’s project “Cover Plans” was worn twice by the Commissar of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and Vatutin. They entered the chief's office. Marshal A.M. wrote about this in his memoirs. Vasilevsky, who remained at the reception. And then, according to the writer, General Vatutin was told to sit on the chair ... It turns out that it is simply impossible to believe in the given fragment of memoirs, because there is unverified information, and the information that can be checked is distorted.

During the previous meeting in Stalin’s office, the head of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov was at a minor (from the point of view of an impending war) meeting at the State Agrarian University, where he delivered a speech. Therefore, the version of S.M. Budyonny, that the military came to Stalin without any directive at all ... It turns out that the first control point of Kozinkin’s version, to put it mildly, may turn out to be false. How, then, it can be argued that his version of the most truthful and historically correct? In addition, the writer offendedly declares that he has no version: he simply describes the real events that took place at that time ...

The lack of truthful information in the memoirs of the Chief of the General Staff about the events of the day and evening of 21 June can only indicate that before the meeting with the Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff Stalin did not do anything to prepare the troops for the war at dawn of 22 June. Nothing but reassuring the commanders of the border districts, for which there is evidence.

And then the writer came up with his own version: Zhukov goes to another room where Vatutin is waiting for him. Put together a new text of Directive No. XXUMX. Zhukov calls the operational duty officer on the General Staff, with instructions to call all the districts to wait for the arrival of a particularly important Directive. In this case, in any district there is not a single confirmation of this version. Even G.K. Zhukov, probably out of modesty, kept silent about this in his memoirs. Only O.Yu. knows this. Kozinkin ... After that, the writer had a new "ingenious" idea of ​​sending the second Directive to the districts to begin entering "Cover Plans". Nobody has seen this Directive either, as well as the mythical directive (directive) from 1. Dear readers, you can find out what researcher S.L. Chekunov, some of whose comments are given in the comments for the 18.6.41 part. Unfortunately, you will have to look for them there in the comments of the author ... It should be noted that the author used the statements of S.L. Chekunov without his consent and asks for forgiveness for his wrong deed. Link.

The second control point of the "real story" O. Yu. Kozinkina - these are the memories of M.V. Zakharov about calling him the commander of the troops of the OdVO in 22-00. We will return to this time mark after reviewing the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharova (from 04.1960 to 03.1963 and from 11.1964 to 1967 a year - head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR). We proceed to consider the events on the eve of the war in the southernmost district.

In May, the 1941 of the year relocated to the Crimea from the North Caucasian Military District the control of the 9 sk with body parts and from the 106 st. At the same time, 32-i cd, which is part of 9-sk, is relocated from KOVO to Crimea. The body after the redeployment was named "9 special sk." At the same time in separate documents and memoirs it is called separate.

The 22.6.41 ck (14 and 25 cd), 51 ck (35 and 95 cd), 176 ck (48 gsd and 30 cd), 74 special ck (9, 106 cd and 156 cd) , 32 kk (2 and 5 cd) and being in the formation stage 9 mk (18 and 44 td, 47 md). On the territory of the district, the reserve of the High Command was stationed in Dnepropetrovsk 218 st (7, 116 and 196 sd) and in the Tiraspol-Kishenev-Balta area 206-th m (2 and 11 etc., 16 md).

Earlier it was said that at 17.6.41, according to intelligence estimates at the border, in three echelons against troops, OdVO were concentrated to 16 German divisions (including two TD, one of them required verification) and 18 Romanian. In the Republic of Uzbekistan Republican Highway Command, the German grouping in Romania (including stationed in the central regions of the country and moving units from Bulgaria to our border) is estimated at 35-36 divisions. Intelligence delivered the same information in the first days of the war.

A large number of formations deployed off the coast in Romania aroused the thoughts of the SC command about the possible landing of an enemy landing on the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent strike to the rear of the OdVO troops. The idea of ​​our landing on the Romanian coast in the event of a retaliatory strike by the German-Romanian troops creeps in some books. According to the author, this is a lie beneficial to the European "civilization". Why? Compare the number of our divisions in Crimea and up to 15-18 German-Romanian in Northern Dobrudja. Whose fleet is stronger than the Black Sea Fleet or Romanian and the part of Italian that may enter the Black Sea? .. Do not rush to laugh at the mention of Italian fleet in the Black Sea. This will be information in the RM ...

K.A. Meretskov: "From Kiev I went to Odessa, where I met with the NSh of the district, Major General M.V. Zakharov. After listening to his detailed report, from which it was clear that here, at the border, there was an alarming picture ... M.V. Zakharov did a great job of preparing the troops for military operations. He often made alarms. When I raised the alarm district Aviation, and then the planes taking off from ordinary airfields, ordered to sit in the field, as provided for in the plan in case of war. It turned out well, except for the fact that six aircraft could not then take off from the viscous soil, soaked after rain...

[About carrying out such mass exercises of the Air Force in other districts you will not find any mention. We are again confronted with a private initiative in the district in question. It is rather strange that in describing this event, Meretskov does not mention the district commander.]

Mn Kirponos, dealt with the matter very seriously, ordered the occupation of field positions in the border UR KOVO and began to pull up the troops of the 2-echelon. In Moscow received a message about this. Moving connections from the 2 echelon was allowed, but at the direction of the General Staff, the KOVO troops had to leave the assumption and move back. Prior consideration of a similar initiative OdVO matter did not come. As a result, in practice, the troops of this district were on the eve of the war, it can be considered in combat readiness, which cannot be said about the KOVO troops, as well as about ZOVOVO... »

According to Marshal K.A. Meretskov in KOVO, the occupation of the predvolya and long-term facilities, as well as the supply of the 2-th echelon of the covering troops was carried out on the initiative of M.P. Kirponos In consequence, this initiative was legitimized by the General Staff; at the same time, at the direction of the General Staff, the troops left the predpole. Marshal Meretskov also writes that the General Staff didn’t "get the job" to a similar direction to the OdVO command. Again, we are confronted with the reference not to centralized instructions from NGOs and the General Staff, but to the legalization of the initiative of the Military Council of KOVO.

On the personal initiative of the district commanders (the author believes that the OdVO NS is relevant to this), mass aviation flights from the main aerodromes to field sites at night are practiced. No other frontier district decided to do this anymore ... And the case of the aviators is developing in the country. It is necessary to have the courage at this time to carry out a massive relocation of aviation of the district. A little later, we will see some more interesting points related to the initiative of the command of the district or personally of the secondary school of the district of MV Zakharov.

I.T. Cherevichenko (Commander of the OdVO 22.6.41 on the basis of the control and the troops of the OdVO formed 9 otd.armiya): "21.6.41. Late evening. “Comrade General!” - the voice of the operative duty officer sounds excitedly in the receiver “You are called by the People's Commissar”. And here I am in the building where the district headquarters was located before the redeployment. "Moscow is on the wire," the duty officer immediately reported, handing me the receiver of the HF unit.

“People’s Commissar of Defense Marshal Tymoshenko will be talking to you now,” I heard a voice muffled by distance. For a moment, it was quiet. Then came the voice of the People's Commissar: "Hello, Comrade Cherevichenko!"

- Hello, Comrade Commissar! Listen to you.

- Are you in Odessa?

- Yes. But tomorrow, by the end of the day, I am leaving for Tiraspol.

- Where is your headquarters?

- The headquarters is focused on the eastern outskirts of the city of Tiraspol to guide the upcoming exercises.

— Leave immediately to the headquarters. Keep in mind that provocation by Germany and Romania is possible..

- What, war? - involuntarily burst from me.

— War may not be, but the troops must be ready, - answered Tymoshenko and added: - With all I have already said, I started from the Baltic.

There was silence in the office. It did not last long. She broke the loud battle of hours. They tapped 11 once. 23-00.»

Strange conversation: a war is probably expected, and the commander is sent on the road immediately. Until the morning he does not have time to arrive at his headquarters and will be outside the "access zone", as they say now. Just like the commander of the LVO ... Such events are possible only in one case, if Commissar of Defense late in the evening don't know yet whether war will be at dawn on june jun. Recall that in the draft text of Directive No. XXUMX, the word “at dawn».

The call of the People's Commissar about 23-00 is confirmed by the fact that in the memoirs of Ya.T. Cherevichenko says: "With all I have said, I started from the Baltic". Probably, the People's Commissar called round the county from north to south. A copy of Directive No. XXUMX was also sent to the NK Navy, and Admiral Kuznetsova, the People's Commissar of Defense called about 23-00. It probably happened after the call to the OdVO. In this case, the call to ZOVOVO was before the call to KOVO.

The echo of the call of the People's Commissar to the headquarters of Zapovo around 23 hours we find in the memoirs of the 4 Army NL L.M. Sandalov: “About 23 o'clock, we were called to the NSh telephone. but special orders we have not received. About the same, that you need to be ready, we ourselves knew... "Probably NS Zapovo says close to what he heard from the People's Commissar of Defense and then passed on similar instructions to all subordinate border armies. The words of NS Zapovo are close to the words of the People's Commissar in the memoirs of Ya.T. Cherevichienko: “Troops must be ready. ”Calls to districts before 23-00 with warnings about something in the memories of the commander OdVO do not have a word. Such information, as we have seen, is also missing in the memoirs of war veterans from other districts. Probably, the Commissar of Defense did not expect that Directive No. XXUMX would go very far to the districts ...

According to the recollections of K.N. Galitsky, late at night on June 21, General Pavlov calls the commander of the 3 Army with orders to wait at the apparatus for a particularly important order. It is possible that this is an echo of the subsequent negotiations with an indication of bringing the headquarters to readiness. This is partly confirmed by the memories of N. G. Belov (commander of 10 garden): “The commander asks to come to him now. ”As the habit developed, he glanced at his watch - 24-00... General Korobkov was one: "Received an order to bring the staffs on alert... "Who decided to go through the links, he should have seen the comment S.L.Cekunova that Pavlov clearly carried out all the orders of the General Staff.

P.I. Lyapin: «Much later 23 hours 21 June, General Golubev [Commander of the 10th Army] summoned to headquarters for talks with Pavlov... "This is also confirmed by the report of the chief of the 3 section of the 10 army of the regimental commissioner Elk:"21 June 1941 in 24-00 I received a call from the FWS and asked me to come to headquarters ... The commander of the 10 army Golubev said that the situation is extremely tense and there is an order from the district to wait for orders from the administration. In turn, by this time all the corps and division commanders were called to the wire and waited for orders.... "

Probably for the first time after preparing the draft text of Directive No. 1, the People's Commissar of Defense called the district headquarters from about half past ten (or a little later) to 23-00 (or a little later). In the previous parts, we did not encounter any references to calls to the districts from the capital near 22-00. The indication of this time in the memoirs of MV Zakharov is connected with some kind of mistake ... In the comments S.L.Cekunova It also states that there was no call from Moscow to OdVO leadership before 23-00.

Back again to the memories Ya.T.Cherevichenko: "Tie me to the NSh district, - I ordered the duty officer. The link worked well and already In a minute I talked to NSH Major General MV Zakharov. Briefly explaining the situation and conveying the contents of the conversation with the People's Commissar, I ordered Zakharov to raise all the border troops for alarm, and the district troops to take up defensive lines, according to the plan, and be ready to meet the enemy with fire.

MVZakharov showed exceptional efficiency and initiative. Even before my order, having learned from the command of the Black Sea Fleet about imminent danger, he simultaneously ordered that the commander of the air force of the district, Major General FG Michigin, increase the combat readiness of the corps commanders to withdraw the troops for alert from the settlements. Parts of the cover were ordered to occupy their areas and establish contact with border detachments....

We are confronted with the fact of distortion of information. Discrepancy again. The Black Sea Fleet learned about a possible attack only after the call of the Navy Commissar of the Navy Admiral Oktyabrsky after 23-37 21.6.41. In the memoirs of veterans and in documents OdVO many time stamps, but, it is strange that they sometimes do not fit together. What is this verbosity for? In order to show what memories MV Zakharov in the text: "At about 22 hours I was called to the Bodo office for talks with the commander of the district. He asked if I could decipher the telegram if I receive it from Moscow... "are not correct. In preparing the materials for the cycle, the author voiced his criterion for seeing the plausibility of the information: plausible information must be documented or other memories. About the timestamp "22-00" confirmation is not in any source. Therefore, for the author, this mark is incorrect.

In the memoirs of Zakharov it is indicated (after the call to the operational duty officer of the General Staff after 22-00): “Assessing the situation, I decided to call the commanders 23, 14 and 35 ck and NSh 48 kk about 2 watches... "The mark given in the specified words"23-00The author would have agreed with the time of the call to the commander of the OdVO.

What else is not correct in the memoirs of Ya.T. Cherevichenko? This is what the District NSh begins to give orders without informing their commander about them, whom you can contact within a few minutes ...

About the call of the People's Commissar of Defense in the districts around 1-00 22 June a little more information that we reviewed in the 24-th part.

Continue to consider the description of the events on the eve of the war, given in the memoirs of Marshal Mv Zakharova: "German forces continued to concentrate near the Soviet borders on an increasing scale. From various sources, through reconnaissance channels and otherwise, more and more information began to arrive indicating the specific dates of the German attack and that the fascist army had almost completed preparations for the invasion, that at any moment it should be expected to be attacked. In response to the dire need, the General Staff, at the direction of the government, in early May 1941 of the year instructed the border VO to redeploy a number of units closer to the state border, and with a directive from 13.5.41 ordered the troops to move to the west from internal military ...

By the decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 21.6.41 and the directive of NGOs of 25.6.41, signed by S.K.Timoshenko and N.F. The commander of this group was appointed Marshal S.M. Budenny, a member of the Military Council - G.M.Malenkov and temporarily performing the position of the NSH group - General A.P. Pokrovsky. The headquarters of the group was to be located in Bryansk. Group formation ended at the end of 19. Fulfilling the directives of NGOs from 20, border districts began to pull up a number of divisions and corps located in depth, closer to the state border.

At the urgent request of the Military Council OdVO by personal order Chief of General Staff G.K. Zhukov from 14 June OdVO, according to the mobplan, was allowed to “allocate army control and 21.6.41 to bring him to Tiraspol”, i.e. transfer the control of the 9 Army to the field manual. At the same time, the district administration headed by the deputy commander of the district, General N.Ye. Chibisov leave in Odessa to guide the troops located in the Crimea. On the same day, the commander of KOVO received such an order: he was ordered to direct the department of the South-Western Front to Vinnitsa to 25 Jun. The management of the ZF (ZAPOVO) and the NWF (PribOVO) by order of the General Staff of 18 June was allowed to take to the field KP to 23.6.41... »

Pay attention to the dates. Front-line controls are not displayed at the same time on field controls to be ready for war at dawn on 22 June. To move to the field KP does not mean to be ready to control the district troops. This is the situation we saw in KOVO and in PribOVO, when there was confusion when driving to field control points. Why did it happen so? It turns out because the deadline of readiness of front headquarters at field points for command and control was later than the allegedly expected attack by the command of spacecraft at dawn 22 June.

A.M. Vasilevsky: "On May 10, 27 of the General Staff gave western border districts instructions on the construction of urgently field frontline command posts, and 19 of June gave them the front-line controls PribOVO, ZOVOVO and KOVO. OdVO Directorate, at the request of the district command, obtained such a permit earlier. 12-15 June these districts were ordered to withdraw divisions located in the depth of the district, closer to the state border... »

Again we face with private initiative Command District, which agreed to Tymoshenko and Zhukov. Front-line directorates of other districts are nominated for field controls in other terms that cannot be associated with the expected start of the 22.6.41 war by the General Staff. It should be noted that the said orders on the withdrawal of front-line directorates are a violation of the deadlines previously agreed with the General Staff and given in the projects of the “Cover Plans ...”

A note According to the defense plan for the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment of KOVO troops on 1941: “More to the right - ZOVOVO County headquarters from 3 th mobilization day - Baranovichi ... To the left - OdVO. Headquarters from 3 th mobilization day - Tiraspol... »

A note according to the action plan of the troops in the cover on the territory of ZOVOVO: “To the right - PribOVO. Headquarters with M-3 - Panevezh ... To the left - KOVO. Headquarters with M-3 - Tarnopol ... "

The projects of the “Cover Plans ...” in the above interpretation are being taken to Moscow for approval. One would like to say: "war is war, and approval of Plans is on schedule ..."

M.V.Zakharov: "The 21.6.41 Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) Decided to create a law firm consisting of the 9 and 18 armies. The management of the latter was distinguished from the Kharkov VO.

Since April, 1941, in the border areas, there are quite definite signs of a complication of the situation. From the reports of the RU GSH, the district command was aware of the continuous increase in the number of German troops in Poland due to their transfer from France and the appearance of formations of German fascist troops on the territory of Romania ...

With increasing tensions, the command and headquarters of the OdVO took the necessary measures to increase vigilance, strengthen the border security, and increase intelligence. An inspection of the combat readiness of the troops was carried out. Many aviation units and formations rose in alarm with the onset of darkness. During the night, the aircrew trained in the relocation of aircraft from permanent airfields to operational. The take-off of the aircraft was planned in such a way that the pilots, having made the flight, had time at dawn to get on operational airfields, where fuel and ammunition reserves were being created ...

In April (or May), when considering the plan of mobilization transportation of the district, I noticed that the plan does not include payments for the removal of families of commanders from the border zone. To my question, what caused this, the head of VOSO district, Colonel P.I. Rumyantsev, referred to the fact that there was no section on evacuation of families from the border zone in the Manual on mobilization work published in 1941 (there was such section in the previous Manual). This gap in the plan was urgently closed. The heads of the border garrisons were immediately given orders on the procedure for exporting families in the event of a declaration of mobilization or the beginning of hostilities. They indicated the railway stations to which the garrisons were attributed, the order of arrival of the families of the servicemen to the landing site, which garrisons should be evacuated... [Again, this is an initiative of the NS OdVO]

6.6.41 data were obtained from Romania in which a telephone conversation was recorded: the mayor of Husi asked his colleague in Iasi whether he had completed the evacuation of valuables, since 9-12 June "need to wait for events." What events were discussed, it was not established. At this time, the commander of the district colonel-general I.T. Cherevichenko was in Crimeawhere 9-th sk, cd and cd took control arriving there.

Having received this report, the district headquarters immediately informed the headquarters of KOVO and the General Staff. On the same day, about 14 hours on the RF about the received report was reported personally to the head of the General Staff Army General G.K. Zhukov and at the same time requested: the management of 48 sk from Kirovograd and its 74-th SD from Pervomaisk to transfer to the Balti region, because in this direction ... there was only one 176 sd, whose forces were clearly not enough to cover the front in 120 km; in addition, to move from the Rybnitsa region to the Belsk direction and 30 gds. By extending these connections, in the Belsk direction, it was possible to create a grouping consisting of three divisions - 176, 74 and 30, united by the management of 48 sk.

G.K. Zhukov interrupted My report says: “What are you panicking?” Hearing in response: “I expect a positive solution to this issue.”, G.K. Zhukov, after a short pause, said that he would report to the Commissar and call me no earlier than 16 hours. Indeed, around 16 hours the head of the General Staff transmitted on HF that People's Commissar of Defense agrees with the proposal, but draws attention to the fact that the movement of troops was carried out secretly, at night.»

Again we see the personal initiative of NSh VM Zakharov, who is not afraid to insist on his decision. We saw the same position in the memoirs of NS KOVO Purkaev. The softer NS ZAPOVO Klimovskiy did not come up with similar requests - he was “crushed by himself” by the commander Zapov. We do not know about the position that PS Klenov (NS PribOVO) held, which left no memories. During this period, the phrase appeared: "the movement of troops was carried out secretly, at night."

M.V.Zakharov: "Instructions were accepted for execution. An hour later, an aircraft was sent to Kirovograd for the corps commander ... R.Ya. Malinovsky, who conducted an exercise in the area. By the end of the day he arrived in Odessa. By this time, the headquarters had prepared a map of the routes and areas of the exercise, including the exercise for crossing the Dniester River. After examining the necessary documents, the corps commander flew to Kirovograd at dawn on June 7. On the night of June 8, the headquarters, corps units, and 74 sd on alert sent to the Balti region. 147 cd 48 ck remained in place, because intended for transfer to the 7 ck.

During the night march, troops conducted exercises to repel a tank strike. For this purpose, the 16 TD, deployed in the Kotovsk area, was involved. An exercise was also conducted on forcing the Dniester. In this case, the enemy acted 30 gsd. By June 15, 48 sk and its 74 and 30 divisions were concentrated in the forests east of Balti. On the same day, the HE headquarters issued an order: do not send the second line of the artillery regiments to the district artillery ground, where they were to conduct combat shooting; delay also sending anti-aircraft artillery to the landfill ...

At the end of June in District outlined army field trip with communications, which involved all the corps, aircraft and army apparatus allocated for mobilization from the district administration. On June 18, in the morning, the commander of the district troops returning to Odessa was informed that a field trip with communications equipment should cancelbecause the situation requires constant combat readiness of the troops. Conducting this exercise would cause the need to concentrate the corps headquarters and the headquarters of the aviation divisions with their communications equipment in the Tiraspol region, leading to troops of the whole district in the event of hostilities may be left without control. In such an alarming time, it is more expedient to carry out reconnaissance with the solution of problems-volatikhek on the ground without means of communication, so that the commanders of units and formations could, if necessary, quickly return to their troops. Army management, allocated from the district, need to raise the alarm according to the mobilization plan and send it to Tiraspol, where it was planned to deploy the army headquarters both in terms of the game and the cover plan (especially as a communications center was prepared in advance in Tiraspol for wartime).

With this proposal, the commander of the troops initially did not agree, referring to the fact that the General Staff accused of disrupting the planned army field trip. As a result my persistent suggestions General Ya.T. Cherevichenko called Moscow and asked permission to conduct exercises. People's Commissar of Defense responded that we must agree with the proposal of the NSH district.

[The commander of the district's waxes, following the very insistent demands of the school, appealed to the higher authorities, who again met the command of the district.]

After this conversation, it was decided, in the order of verification of the mobilization plan, to raise the personnel of the deployed army command and to send it to Tiraspol in combat alarm. There, depending on the situation, in the coming days to spend with the commanders of the reconnaissance corps and the loss of bats on the ground. On the morning of June 20, the control of the 9 Army began to move. The next day, with the permission of the district commander, I also left Odessa by train to Tiraspol and arrived at the army headquarters in the evening ...

At about 22 hours I was called to the Bodo office for talks with the commander of the district. He asked if I could decipher the telegram if I received it from Moscow. The commander was answered: that any encryption from Moscow will be read. The question again followed: “They ask again, confirm your answer, can you decipher PCs from Moscow?” I was extremely surprised. I replied: “I report for the second time that I can decipher any PC from Moscow.” An instruction followed: “Expect receipt of special importance from Moscow. The Military Council authorizes you to decipher it immediately and issue the appropriate orders. Me and the FWS will be in Tiraspol on the 9-00 22 train in June. Cherevichenko.

Immediately thereafter, the head of the department was instructed to select an experienced worker who was able to quickly decipher the telegram. Then I called the operational duty officer on the GSH to the Bodo apparatus and asked when it would be possible to expect the transfer of STS of special importance. The duty officer replied that he did not know yet. Assessing the situation, I decided to call the commanders 23, 14 and 35 ck and 48 kk for 2 watches.

The commander of the 35 corps, Major General DG, was the first to approach ST-14. Egorov, the second - commander of the 35 corps, commander I.F. Dashichev, and then - NSH 2 kk colonel MDDretsov. The commander of 48 Corps R.Ya. Malinovsky's order was transmitted by the Morse machine. All of them were given the following instructions: 1) to raise headquarters and troops on alert and withdraw from settlements; 2) cover units occupy their areas; 3) establish communication with border parts.

By this time, the headquarters for the urgent call gathered the heads of departments and types of troops, the commander of the District Air Force. The commander of 2 MK was also present ... I informed them that a telegram of special importance was expected and that I had given the appropriate orders to the commanders of the formations. The commander 2 MK was also instructed to bring parts of the corps on alert and bring them to the designated waiting areas.

Thus, directly in the border zone (OdVO on combat alert 7 rifle, 2 cavalry, 2 tank and mechanized divisions and 2 SD.

[At the border there were Upper Prut and Nizhnprut URs, in which there were only 7 structures under construction. They were in the process of formation, and therefore they were not given orders.]

In the second echelon, the districts remained 150-th SD and divisions 7-th sk (on the third day of the war, this corps was transferred to the South-West).
When it was proposed to the commander of the District Air Force to disperse aviation by operational airfields by dawn, he objected, motivating them by the fact that when landing on operational airfields many airplanes will be damaged. Only after giving a written order, the commander of the Air Force began its execution..

[Commanders in the case of "aviators" are arrested. If 22 numbers do not happen, but many planes are broken or damaged during landing at night, then the NS (who gave the order) and the commander of the aviation (who served the provocative order) will suffer just like the aviation generals ... Zakharov takes responsibility for himself, not Knowing what instructions are in the text of the not yet received PC.]

At about two o'clock in the morning of June 22, the duty officer at the headquarters communications center reported that the operational duty officer of the General Staff called me. The following conversation took place: “The staff has a responsible duty officer of the General Staff. Accept the telegram of special importance and immediately report it to the Military Council. "I replied:" At the apparatus, General Zakharov. I got the warning. Please transmit. ”In a telegram signed by the People’s Commissar of Defense SKTimoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff G.K.Zhukov, the Military Councils of Border Districts and the Narkom Navy reported that during the 22 – 23.6.41, Germans might attack in the LVO, PribOVO, ZOVOVO , KOVO and OdVO.

The telegram emphasized that the German attack could begin with provocative actions. Therefore, the troops were given the task not to succumb to any provocations that could cause major complications. At the same time it was ordered: to bring all the troops into combat readiness; on the night of June 22, secretly occupy the firing points of the UR on the state border; before dawn 22 June, disperse into field airfields and carefully disguise all aircraft; put in full combat readiness of the air defense; prepare to darken cities and objects. The districts were warned not to take any other measures ...

Having received the directive of the National Commissioner of Defense, I was very excitedBecause my order for the withdrawal of district troops to cover areas on the state border conflicted with instructions from Moscow. Then, on behalf of the district commander, I decided to transfer the content of the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense to the corps commanders for steady execution and leadership, which was immediately done. but previous order not only about bringing the district troops into combat readiness, but also about bringing them to the waiting areas not canceled. Moreover, combat alarm was declared in all garrisons of the district... »

An interesting opinion of the former High School District, which went through the whole war and later became the head of the General Staff: the requirements of Directive No. XXUMX were in conflict with the instructions given to them earlier. Let me remind you that Marshal Meretskov wrote similar lines after arriving in Leningrad: “Before I arrived in Leningrad from the NKO to the district headquarters, the directive on bringing the troops on alert in connection with the possible start of the war was judged. During the elapsed time, the formations, units and subdivisions of the district began to pull themselves closer to the state border and take up SD, but they did it slowly, because the directive required the troops to remain dispersed and move covertly ... In general, the district failed to fulfill all that was required. Even the bringing of troops into combat readiness was carried out rather timidly: it did not allow the last paragraph of the directive, which was forbidden to carry out any other measures without special order.... »

Mv Zakharov: "At dawn, the commander of the Air Force ... reported that the main part of his subordinate aviation was redeployed to operational airfields and removed from the strikes of enemy aviation, which were inflicted on stationary airfields from 3-30 to 4-30 22 June ...

Worry about how the troops entering the cover areas did not succumb to possible provocation did not leave me. In 3-45 22 June, the person on duty telegraphed in a room where we were, and he passed the reception from Colonel A.M. Kashkina reported that, according to the data of the commander of the Odessa naval base, Rear Admiral A. Zhukov, unknown aircraft in 3-15 bombed Ochakov and Sevastopol... »

RCB 9 Army: "В 24-00 The 21.6 units of the army covering the state border with a telegraph order are placed on alert for alarm. An order is given to occupy areas according to a cover plan.

В 4-00 22.6, when parts of the army, in cooperation with the frontier units, covered their sites, the Romanian army, supported by German units, opened artillery and machine-gun fire at our border points ... At the same time, Romanian-German aircraft made raids on a number of cities... »

The information given in the CIR shows that units of the 9 Army were alerted on June 24-00. This information fits in with the above analysis of events and with the introduction of the army headquarters.

Operation No.01 to the 9-00 22.6.41. Starm Tiraspol: "1. Army units covering the state border with 24-00 21.6.41, by telegraph order, are on alert for a combat alert. It is ordered to occupy areas under the cover plan.

2. Since 4-00 22.6 Romanian army opened artillery and machine-gun fire on our border posts at the front Badrazhi-Nouy, ​​Ungheni, Leova, Reni, Izmail and Beletsky direction aircraft bombed Balti, Chisinau, Dubossary, Grossulovo and south of Ackerman, Bolgrad.

3. To 9-00 known:

a) K 5-10 in points Vinshoara, Ungeni, Leovo, Cahul, Reni mutual artillery and machine-gun fire;

b) K 5-30 - enemy avivtion bombed the Grossulovo airfield. loss - 5 aircraft on the ground. Air battle over Balti, Bolgrad and Chisinau. In the area of ​​Kagul - aiming crossing crossing pr-ka.

c) To 6-00 - from Galati in the direction of Reni along the Romanian coast ten monitors. In the area of ​​Izmail - Reni firefight. Over Bolgrad air battle. Trophies - shot down four Romanian aircraft.

d) K 7-00 over Balti air combat involving German aircraft. Trophies - two aircraft pr-ka shot down. In the area of ​​the airfield Akkerman with an aircraft of the type "Blenheim" dropped five bombs. there are no damages and losses. Aerial combat over Chisinau... "

From the information given in the first opsvodka headquarters 9 th army, it is impossible to make a definite conclusion about the beginning of a full-scale war.

K.I. Derevianko (Deputy NSh of the Odessa naval base): "NS OdVO, Major General M.V. Zakharov invited the commander of the base Zhukov and me and acquainted us with the content of the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense, which was forbidden in the frontier zone to hold such events that Germany could interpret as our preparation for war. It was about military exercises, aircraft flights, pulling troops to the border. It was not allowed to open fire on German aircraft ... I asked General Zakharov to orientate in the environment.

- There are already more than 75 German and Romanian divisions at our borders, there is a build-up of forces. The German government explains the transfer of its troops from west to east by the need to withdraw them from the strikes of British aircraft for rest, re-formation and training for landing on the British Isles. Sounds unconvincing. It is unclear whose attention the Germans want to divert: the British - from the Channel or ours from our border? The situation is extremely complicated, and we should not exclude camouflage actions of the German command. Our business is to prepare to repel the blow....

Restless April and May gave way to an alarming June. The district headquarters receives information from the cordon about how the concentration of enemy troops is proceeding near our border. In May, the Romanian divisions doubled, and the appearance of German units and a large military headquarters was noted in the northern regions of Romania. It was the headquarters of the 11 of the German army. In readiness 3 and 4 Romanian armies. The OdVO headquarters exchanged intelligence reports with KOVO ... The June report of the GS GSH came ... General Zakharov invited me and the district intelligence chief to get acquainted with the theses of our lectures, maps and diagrams. And here I saw a reconnaissance map with data on 1.6.41. From the circles of the German and Romanian divisions, located in a wide strip along our border from the Baltic to the Danube, rippled in the eyes - 133 divisions... [Pay attention to the words in the broad band, and not near the border.]

The doctrine of the fleet, together with the troops of the OdVO, ended ... Suddenly the bell of Ivanov's Military School: "Let's go to the commander." Zhukov was excited and anxious: "Read." It was the telegram of the Military Council of the fleet: “Out of turn. According to the fleet. Operational readiness №2". Filed on 17-15 19 June. Without the mark "Training" ... But the headquarters of the OdVO has not yet received instructions on improving the readiness of the troops. It seems that the Commissar of the Navy acts independently, according to the situation prevailing by this day ...

The conditional signal was transferred to the connections and parts of the Odessa base, which meant the transition to FG-2. Repeatedly lost at the exercises, he was clearly executed at the appointed hours and minutes ... Only I lay down to rest after a night check of the ships and parts, Zhukov’s bell: “Come in.” He has Ivanov.

- Read. “And Zhukov handed me a telegram from the NS of the fleet of Yeliseyev:“ In two days, complete the border guard plan drawn up with the district headquarters and submit it to the Military Council of the fleet; Directions to the General Staff District. ”

“You made it up - you’ll finish it,” Zhukov ordered me. - Waiting for you in the district headquarters, Zakharov called.

Vetoshnikova I found in the camp.

- In Tiraspol? - I asked.

- Not. An operative unit headed by my deputy major Filippov went there, and I went to Moscow. Call in the General Staff with the Border Cover Plan. Our joint plan for the defense of the coast has been ordered to send to the Military Council of the fleet for approval, and, apparently, you will have to accompany our representative ...

21 June 1941 of the year. Fleet already two days in high alert... In hard thoughts, I left Odessa ... The command of the district in the movement of the CP, the fleet in readiness ... And the troops no instructions... »

S.N. Kuznetsov (chief of artillery OdVO): "Heads of departments and divisions of the district were informed by NS Zakharov M.V. that in June a large exercise will be held by the staff of the district ...

[S.SH.Cekunov - 13.6.41 NSH OdVO, Major General M.V. Zakharov, on the basis of a telephone conversation, sent ST to the Head of the General Staff, General G.K. Zhukov, on agreeing on the conclusion of the OdVO control exercises. In his reply, G.K. Zhukov ordered the separation of the 9 administration of the army and its withdrawal to Tiraspol to 17-18.06.41, leaving the district administration in Odessa.]

In the first half of June, by order of the district commander, some units (30 and 74 sd) began to be brought to the territory of Bessarabia.

[S.Chekunov - the withdrawal of compounds was carried out on the basis of the decision of the Military Council of the OWD from 06.06.41, agreed with the General Staff].

14.6.41 STS was given an order to the commanders of 522 and 430 gap BM, the commander of 307 oad OM to prepare the units for loading to be sent to the area of ​​the village Separate to continue combat training in the new terrain. Parts were asked to take with them. combat and training equipment and fully ammunition. It was strictly forbidden to take the families of the commanders with them. No reason was given for such a restriction.. By transmitting this order to the commander of the troops, I, like other heads of departments and divisions of the district, did not suspect the real purpose of transporting troops...

[The head of the artillery of the army does not know why they are sent to the border, subordinate units ?! This is only possible if the NSH of the district acted at its own peril and risk, without devoting it to its plans. Of course, you can think that it was such a secret indication of the General Staff, which could not be spoken to the commanders. But why then there are no similar “secret instructions” in the actions in PribOVO 14 June? ..]

About 22-00 [20.6.41 headquarters of the 9 th armies] disembarked in Tiraspol ... By the end of 21.6.41, the head of the RO of the district headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Gayev, in a private conversation with me, said that the Romanian troops, located west of the Prut river, had visited Antonescu the other day and that there was preparation for some serious events ...

At about 3 in the morning 22.6.41 I arrived at the district headquarters, where I learned about the attack on Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union ... It should be noted that OdVO troops were apparently informed about the events that could happen 22.6.41; otherwise it is impossible to explain the following facts known to me:

- gap 25 sd stationed near the town of Renee and camped on the very bank of the Danube river, with the onset of darkness 21.6.41 left the camp and, taking up the battle formation, prepared to repel the enemy’s possible landing with fire. On the morning of 22.6.41, after a short artillery training in the 25 gap camp of the division, a Romanian battalion landed on our shore. Massive gap fire was so effective that the remnants of the battalion were easily destroyed by an infantry unit;

- by the morning of the 22.6.41 aviation units, all of their combat vehicles were concentrated on the landing sites, as a result of which the enemy’s bombing raids on our airfields almost did not give any losses;

- 35 units SC ... around 22.6.41 received an order from the corps commander to bring the units to full combat readiness and come forward to the State border according to the schedule, leaving a small number of personnel in the winter quarters to carry out possible mobilization... »

We see that NS OdVO M.V. Zakharov, showing personal initiative, is taking measures to prepare the troops of his district for possible hostilities, without notifying some of the leading employees of his staff ...

The ending should ...

Comments

[AsmyppoL]

Thanks to the author for an interesting material. Especially liked the passage through the story-fossifier history))
If in the next part there is no information on the creation of the Southern Front, then I will prepare my vision for these events.

[vladimirZ]

Nobody has seen this Directive either, as well as the mythical directive (directives) dated 18.6.41 - from the article

Before inventing different versions about the "ignorance" of the USSR leadership of the upcoming date of the war on June 22, 1941, and the "initiative" of the military in the districts, the author should have studied the historical works published at least in recent years. For example, the fundamental 12-volume work "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" of the Ministry of Defense under the editorial commission headed by Shoigu in 2015, volume two "The Origin and Beginning of War".
Section "Activities of foreign intelligence in the interwar period":
On June 18, 1941, a directive was sent to the troops to put them on alert. (p. 87)
Section "Strategic plans and deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR:
calculations and miscalculations ", pp. 494 - 496:
The formation of the second strategic echelon at the Western Theater of War began on May 13, 1941, when, with the permission of JV Stalin, a directive was issued on the nomination of four armies formed in the internal military districts: the 22nd from the Urals; 21st - from the Volga Military District; The 19th - from the North Caucasus District and the 16th - from Transbaikalia, as well as the 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov District, subordinated to the 19th Army.
...
On June 12, the People’s Commissar of Defense issued directives on the nomination of rifle divisions to the border, located in the interior of the border military districts. It was recommended to move mainly at night under the guise of going to summer camps. Most of the compounds had to move on their own (on foot) to a distance of 150 km or more, some were transported by rail.

... measures were taken to increase the combat readiness of the Navy. On June 19, the fleets and flotillas received orders to go into operational readiness No. 2. On June 20, 1941, the commanders of the Leningrad, Baltic Special and Odessa Military Districts were instructed to work out issues of interaction with the fleets in two days in accordance with the cover plan.
...
On June 19, the Chief of the General Staff, on behalf of the People's Commissar, ordered the districts to set up front-line departments and bring them to command posts by June 22–23. On June 19, People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov ordered the fleets and flotillas to be put on operational alert No. 2. The order issued by the People’s Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko, issued on the same day, ordered masking airfields, military units, and other military facilities.

Section "The last days before the war":
On June 14, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov turned to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars I.V. Stalin with a proposal to bring the troops into full combat readiness. Stalin refused, not wanting to take responsibility for starting a war. Another proposal was approved. From June 14-19, the command of the border districts received instructions to withdraw front-line (army)
management of field points with a deadline of June 22-23. (p. 513)
...
Since June 15, in the intelligence reports reported to Stalin, the repeating date of the possible start of the war, June 22, has increasingly been heard. The start of mobilization in Romania was also reported. On June 15, more than half of the divisions that made up the second echelon and reserve of the western military districts were set in motion. (p. 514)
...
On June 18, Colonel G.N. Zakharov, navigator of the 43rd fighter air division, Major Rumyantsev, made a reconnaissance flight of the Belarusian state border stretch 2 km south of Bialystok every 400 km on a U-50 plane to transmit reports of drug addiction seen through border guards Internal Affairs L.P. Beria and I.V. Stalin. Zakharov’s reports testified to the mass transfer of German troops to the Soviet border.
On the same day, by order of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the General Staff ordered the commander of the western military districts to take measures to increase the combat readiness of the troops. The commanders of the Baltic, Leningrad, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts, as well as the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern Fleets received a corresponding order signed by the head of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General G.K. Zhukov.
This cipher telegram was not found in the archives of the Russian Federation, but it is mentioned on the 70th sheet of the 4th volume of the investigative case on charges of the ZAPOV command, where the testimony of the ZAPOV communications chief, Major General A. T. Grigoriev, was recorded: “And after the telegram of the chief of the General the headquarters of June 18, the troops of the district were not put on alert ... "
Similar evidence is also contained in the answers of the generals interviewed after the war who commanded the Western districts before the war (materials of the commission led by Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky), as well as in separate documents of the command of the Baltic Special Military District, reports of the fleet commanders on bringing the entrusted to them fleets in combat readiness No. 2 dated June 18, in particular, in the "Order of the Commander of the Baltic Special Military District No. 00229 of June 18, 1941 to the district administration and troops on the conduct of events with the aim of quickly putting the theater of military operations of the district into combat readiness." In accordance with it, the district troops were to occupy the original areas (concentration areas) by June 21. (p. 515)

... Stalin ordered to expedite the implementation of defensive measures. In the cipher telegram of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov dated June 19, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, Commander of the Kiev Special Military District, was ordered: “By June 22.06.1941, 516, the administration should leave for Ternopol, leaving the district administration subordinate to you ... Allocation and to keep the transfer of front control in the strictest confidence, which is what the district staff should be warned about. ” The command of the district was warned of the possibility of an attack by Germany in the coming days without declaring war. (p. XNUMX)
http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/books/vov/tom2.htm

[AsmyppoL]

The reading you specify on the fan. I personally did not like it. Fumigated agitation)))

There is no word about the transfer of the Northern Fleet to FG No. 2 18 June. They crossed out this objectionable event from life. Although it is confirmed with TWO memoirs, and not alone about the reconnaissance flight of Zakharov. By the way, in the memoirs there is no reference to the instruction on the flight of Stalin or Beria. Frank lies))))

There is not a word about the fact that reconnaissance did not find a single mechanized corps and not a single tank group. It is better to remain silent and not spoil the official version of the group of authors.

The fact that a month before the war, the General Staff, in a note, estimated the number of German divisions being deployed for the war with the Soviet Union by the number 180 - not a word. Sorry, the documents can not be destroyed, is not it?

On the evening of June 2, the command of the Western Special Military District reported to Moscow that the Germans had removed the barbed wire, and the noise of engines was heard about the encryption from the ZAPOVO sent at 21 am. I understand Timoshenko and Zhukov for the founding of the meeting with Stalin)))) Previously, there was a defector at 21-00 and Purkaev, who could not refute these words. Now this text and the presence of General Vatutin at the meeting were bashfully removed. We have inserted again a convenient fragment of G.K. Zhukov's memoirs.

On the reconnaissance flight reference to memoirs. What a wretchedness. On the directive from 18 Jun - a link to the words of the interrogated, beaten by investigators. If Shoigu signed - where are the originals and the facts?

Having run through some more sheets, I noted for myself the top three blunders ...

It’s good that we have the right to choose to read))) For a link to a document with frank inaccuracies, I put a minus

[vladimirZ]

The fiction specified by you on the fan. I personally did not like it. Falsified agitation))) - AsmyppoL (Eugene)

Ha ha ha. Well, yes, the multivolume work of a team of professional historians with links to hundreds of sources, editorially selected and described over the years - do you have a "reading matter" that you put below the illiterate, contradicting the facts stated right there, unknown author, hiding under the nickname aKtoR, raw material? !
This only speaks of your ignorance and ignorance of the actual historical material of the theme "June 22, 1941"!

And the indicated 12 - volume about the Great Patriotic War, 2015 release, differs significantly from the previous editions of similar publications not only in the presentation of material on WWII thematic issues, but also in the analysis of historical events of that era, discussion of acute issues not previously published in similar publications - especially the reasons for the defeat the beginning of the war.

The old editions of the multivolume books about the Second World War differed mainly only in the general descriptive nature of the events of the war, in hiding sensitive issues, especially the causes of the defeat in 1941, without presenting material on the thematic problems of the war.

There are also shortcomings in the new 12-volume book about the Great Patriotic War related to the time of its writing - the ardent rejection of the entire Soviet, communist, which were inalienable objective circumstances of that time, but these are the costs of the current liberal capitalism, which inevitably leaves its mark on that time.

[AsmyppoL]

Piarite agitation? Collection of torn messages and documents. as it was convenient for the authors, so they prepared. Please note that you have not contested a single item from my message. Like to read on health. Though the raw materials are from the author Vik, but I have been watching materials on the electronic site for six months already. Thank her for that!

And the facts set forth by Vic can be checked by anyone and the links in her materials are also hundreds. why should I believe the 12 materials of a tomnik if, in 10 minutes, I found up to a dozen crude frauds and lies, browsing pages devoted to events on the eve of the war.

If we talk about my illiteracy, then it turns out that you cannot distinguish the grain from the chaff at all. I am already an adult and sane person, to be conducted on agitation of the times of illiterate political workers

[AsmyppoL]

Posted by vik, xnumx views and just two dissatisfied users)))
This is the success and vague words of your opponents))))

[icant007]

Well, yes, House-2 is also watching people fig)

[vladimirZ]

Please note that you have not disputed a single item from my message. - AsmyppoL (Eugene)

And I'm not going to be engaged in nonsense, challenging those "falsifications and lies" about which you write.
I have been interested in the topic "June 22, 1941" for several decades, I have re-read more than a hundred books on this topic, including the "lies" that you are writing about in other books.
The fundamental 12-volume book of the Moscow Region about the Second World War, 2015, accumulates the latest events of war that have been proved and verified by historians and archives. It is not without flaws, but the Ministry of Defense, unlike authors like aKtoR, has archives and sources, as they say at hand, thanks to which they are easily checked and false screened out. It’s impossible to lie in such academic publications, it’s a seal for centuries, it’s easier not to write something than to look like falsifiers of history.
The fact that you are an "adult and sane person" does not mean that you can distinguish "agitation" from fundamental academic books on the history of war.
The transition to "you-kanye" is a sign of poor upbringing and lack of culture, which is akin to illiteracy, so I will stop discussing with you.

[AsmyppoL]

I am extremely surprised that the historian, the deputy chairman ..... protects the low-grade book product. Right, money doesn't smell ......
Was at the exhibition Russia at the Exhibition of Economic Achievements ..... There are quite a few primitive fabrications ......

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The fact that a month before the war, the General Staff, in a note, estimated the number of German divisions being deployed for the war with the Soviet Union by the number 180 - not a word. Sorry, the documents can not be destroyed, is not it?

F. Golikov easily refutes this lie in his memoirs based on documents:
page 82

Naturally, the desire to compare these data of our Intelligence Agency with what is written in the book of Hitler Wehrmacht General Kurt Tippelskirch “History of the Second World War”: “By June 22, the day of the offensive, in the strategic deployment areas were concentrated: 81 infantry division, 1 cavalry division, 17 tank, 15 motorized, 9 police and security divisions. As reserves of the high command, 22 more infantry, 2 tank, 2 motorized divisions, and 1 police division were on their way ”(174). Total: 150 divisions. On the same issue, I will quote from the book of the collective of military historians, “World War II 1939–1945.”: “The Nazi troops (taking into account the reserve of the main command, not counting the five German divisions in Finland, as well as the Allied forces) were located in the directions whose boundaries are indicated above (175). In the main direction, in the center of the front, there were 62 divisions and two brigades, or about 43%, in the southern sector of the front - 54 divisions, or up to 36%, and in the northern sector of the front - 31 divisions, or 21% ”(176). Total: 152 German divisions (with five located in Finland).
Finally, the official evidence on this issue is what was said in the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR”: “153 divisions were allocated to attack the Soviet Union, including 33 tank and motorized ones ... ”(177).

[icant007]

But the passage through the "rezunist-falsifier" does not paint the author at all. Moreover, the hanging of labels. An article is not a place to sort things out. This is at least not professional. A bit like a woman's tantrum. Argue in the comments.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

A bit like a female hysteria.

This is her natural reaction to all the stupidity that those who understand military affairs noticed in her texts.

Quote: icant007

Especially labeling.

Not one madam suffers from this here - she has several more hackers who help her in this matter, instead of specifically challenging the conclusions of others.

[antivirus]

about shortcuts
then, according to the data of the Odessa Naval Forces commander Rear Admiral A. Zhukov, an unknown aircraft bombed Ochakov and Sevastopol in 3-15 ... "

at the end of construction of SP2 - will bomb Ochakov "unknown planes with signs" green man "on the fuselages" ????

[icant007]

Comrade Colonel Antivirus, I did not understand the meaning of your statement. For those who can chew in a tank? )

[antivirus]

again "unidentified belonging" "green airplanes" are moved to the banner and the amers will not be given another, Ochakov base

[ivamoss]

Thanks to the author. I will wait to continue

[Olgovich]

By the morning of 22.6.41, the aviation units of the district concentrated all of their combat vehicles on landing sites, as a result of which the attack by enemy bomber aircraft at our airfields almost did not give any losses;

This is evidenced by many pilots, for example, the famous Pokryshkin (he started the war near Balti, MSSR): OdVO pilots on the first day of the war suffered much smaller losses and fought more successfully than in ZapVO.
Of course, the blow to the ZapVO was stronger, but the OdVO prepared for a surprise attack better.

[chenia]

There is so much information about the unavailability of cover troops (there was a small number of troops in the support zone), although this is a third-rate cause of the 1941 disaster. I already wrote on this subject that the Germans had declared war with a delay of hostilities for two weeks, the result would have been the same.

[icant007]

I agree. Losses would certainly be less. But in general, the rake would be the same.

[chenia]

Quote: icant007

But in general, the rake would be the same.

Well, obviously, where the Germans were opposed by the NKVD troops, separate units (rifle), then the cadets could not cope with any. And only the failure of the neighbors set them up. And as the divisions went with 3-4 months of training, so we advance (relatively successfully started).
The failure of the armored forces in the armored forces and aviation (there is also the unavailability of equipment and the OSh as a consequence, only practice polishes this) is the main cause of the disaster.

And this is not political fault (Stalin strained industry, where, at the request of the military, they were bombarded with weapons), but of a military (general) structure.

Well, and then (in memoirs, not everything is true), with the submission of Khrushchev, they craftyly found the reason for the failures.
And the author of the article wants to push this idea.

And I say this as a military man (already completely retired).

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

Well, and then (in memoirs, not everything is true), with the submission of Khrushchev, they craftyly found the reason for the failures.
And the author of the article wants to push this idea.

This is striking from her first articles, which once again confirms the custom-made nature of these works. And hiding her data most of all says that while fulfilling the order, she does not want to light up, because people remember who wrote what and when.

Quote: chenia

And I say this as a military man (already completely retired).

I think that not only the military will support you, although there are such "military" ones here that one wonders what they were taught in the army.

[antivirus]

about all the spitting on each other

read the version of the setup on the border for a clear designation of the aggressor-victim of the attack.
in ZOVO not escaped after that. in Moscow they did not know about the heads of the strike and did not stock up on the "3rd layer of straw" to Smolensk - so Kiev surrendered

[ccsr]

Quote: antivirus

read the version of the setup on the border for a clear designation of the aggressor-victim of the attack.

This version is not worth a damn, and was created, most likely to the peak version of Rezun.

[antivirus]

a strange war - not only in 40 g. The French --- and the USSR delayed the "point of no return" for every conceivable reasonable time -
-NOT GAME PLAYING FOR 500 THOUSAND H, THE SOLDIER LAYING UNDER THE EQUIPMENT - MACHINES IN THE MORNING 22.06.
A WITHOUT A SINGLE SHOT FROM YOURSIDE
(PER 1000 KM OF THE BORDER) TO WAIT THE FIRST 1-2 MILLION SHOTS FROM THE VERMACHT - FOR UNIQUE DEFINITION OF "VICTIM-AGGRESSOR" FOR THE WHOLE WORLD,
FOR THE ABSENCE OF DOUBT ON THE PART OF THE IMPERIALISTS "-FULFILL" THE ORDER NOT TO BE SUSPENDED TO PROVOCATIONS "AT ANY PRICE.
THE PRICE HAS BEEN UNDERSTANDED ONLY AFTER 1-2 MILLION SHOTS AND AFTER 2-3 WEEKS OF WAR.
a narrow cap shaped certain thinking
SM MY PRO "THE RKKA LEADED THE POLITBURO", GKZH AND TIMOSHENKO-PESHKI

[steelmaker]

Cognize everything in comparison, compare yourself with others. Stalin understood that there would be war, but he wanted to delay it as far as possible, and therefore ordered not to succumb to provocations. He had no nuclear weapons, "Calibrov" so I understand him now. But I do not understand the current rulers who allow humiliating Russia, taking our citizens hostage, killing our military with impunity, taking away embassies, which makes it difficult to answer. We are a great country, we won wars! And those who are trying to throw mud at Stalin are "sent Cossacks".

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR

Pay attention to the dates. Front-line controls are not displayed at the same time on field controls to be ready for war at dawn on 22 June. To move to the field KP does not mean to be ready to control the district troops. This is the situation we saw in KOVO and in PribOVO, when there was confusion when driving to field control points. Why did it happen so? It turns out because the deadline of readiness of front headquarters at field points for command and control was later than the allegedly expected attack by the command of spacecraft at dawn 22 June.

Madame's next fantasies are easily refuted by F.Golikov's memoirs (p. 84):

Given the further increase in the threat of war, on the instructions of the Soviet government, the General Staff in May - June 1941 began to redeploy a number of divisions and corps of border districts closer to the border; command of border districts is instructed to immediately begin construction of front-line command posts and boost the construction of fortified areas. In the second half of May - early June, the advance of troops from the internal military districts to the west begins. On June 14–19, the command of the border districts receives instructions to withdraw front-line (army) departments to field posts, and on June 19 - an order to disguise airfields, military units and military facilities. The fleets and flotillas were instructed to increase combat readiness and strengthen naval patrols.

From a few hours to a day, and no more is enough to be relocated to the district headquarters on a field control station. By the way, Madame is lying about the confusion - while the district headquarters is being promoted to a field command post, one of the deputies of the commander with a group of officers who manage the troops remains until the main command center is deployed and takes control of the troops.

[AsmyppoL]

The words of Golikov, whom co-author Mr Milchakov considered the forger of intelligence reports for the leadership. It is interesting. One does not know what the other is dudit)))) Just to write something

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Interesting. One does not know that the other is blowing)))) Just to write something

You personally can argue the words of Golikov to refute?
If you can’t, then do not blah blah blah.
I suggested that you come to the forum "For the Truth" and there to irritate Kozinkin for his books, but you just got scared, that's the reason for your verbal outpourings.

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR

To the logical question: how could they call the NSh OdVO at 22-00 and talk about the transfer of the Directive if Tymoshenko and Zhukov left Stalin’s office only at 22-20 ?! The answer follows, and Zhukov called the operational duty officer on the General Staff from Stalin’s office or from the military room at the reception. The operational duty officer, in turn, at the direction of the chief of the General Staff called all the districts. Beautiful version, only evidence of its existence is not one.

Because Madame has wild ideas about the army, it doesn’t fit in her head, which is exactly what all commanders do when they want to quickly bring an important order. Having not yet arrived from the senior management at the duty station, they, by order, set the task of the operational duty officer to immediately call all those concerned with the order and demand that officials who are concerned with these instructions be in the place. There can be no evidence of this - marks on incoming telephone orders are made in the workbook (or in a special telephone message), which is usually destroyed after filling out, or at the end of the year. That's why Madame will not be able to find marks on calls - only in her memoirs can such information be found.

[AsmyppoL]

A lot of text, Milchakov! At least one fact of this call! At least one fact that you and Kozinkin are not deceiving users !!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

A lot of text, Milchakov! At least one fact of this call! At least one fact that you and Kozinkin are not deceiving users !!

I tried to explain to the illiterate how all this is organized in large headquarters, but not in horse feed. If you do not understand my explanations, then why are you even bothering to discuss military issues?

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR

Let's try to understand these two events and understand when the call of the People’s Commissar or from the General Staff to the border districts could follow. S.L. Chekunov wrote that the post of "operational duty on the General Staff" at that time did not exist. There was a duty officer on the General Staff and his assistant. On the night of June 22, Colonel Vasilchenko was on duty. Even in the details of O.Yu. Kozinkin already has inaccuracies, but perhaps such inaccuracies are simply characteristic of military professionals? ..

Because Chekunov and Madame did not serve in the army and do not have an idea of ​​how the operational command and control of troops is organized at headquarters, for a start I give a text that Madame uses:

I.T. Cherevichenko (commander of the OdVO on 22.6.41 on the basis of the command and troops of the OdVO formed the 9th Separate Army): "21.6.41. Late evening. "Comrade General!" - the voice of the operational attendant sounds excitedly in the handset "You are the People's Commissar." And here I am in the building where the district headquarters was located before the redeployment. “Moscow is on the wire,” the duty officer immediately reported, passing me the receiver of the HF apparatus.

It can be seen that in the districts there is an operational duty officer at the district headquarters, who, according to his duties, reported to the General Operations Officer on duty - this was the order both then and much later. Zakharov also indicates the presence of calls from the operational duty officer on the General Staff in his memoirs, and everyone who knows this structure will confirm this.
Moreover, in large headquarters, in addition to the operational duty officer, a regular duty officer (or an assistant to the OD) can be appointed, who is engaged in current affairs, and is responsible for the order, regime, protection of buildings, calling officials, etc. That is why the simple thought that there were two officers on duty in the General Staff could not even enter their heads.
But Chekunov and Madame do not cut in such matters, which is why they build their false theories where they cannot have a place. And any military professional will confirm this.

[AsmyppoL]

There is a big difference. Sergey Chekunov saw documents where the position and the name of the person on duty at the General Staff are indicated, and Marshal Zakharov, who served for a long time after the war, uses, like you, the name of the position he is used to after the post-war service. Do you want to refute my words? Let's get the facts, not your thoughts!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

There is a big difference. Sergei Chekunov saw documents showing the position and surname of the duty officer on the General Staff,

This is a lie - Chekunov did not see a single document confirming this.

Quote: AsmyppoL

and Marshal Zakharov, who served for a long time after the war, uses, like you, the name of the post familiar to him after the war.

This is another lie - operational duty officers are appointed even in smaller structures on combat duty. For example, operational divisions were on duty at divisions of osnaz and in the intelligence department of the district at that time. The operational duty officer on the RU, respectively, was locked in the operational duty district.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Want to refute my words?

Your fantasies are refuted by the memoirs of veterans, and documents of that time repeatedly mention the reports of operational duty officers.
By the way, how do you personally imagine the actions of the non-operational duty officer at the headquarters of the border army, for example, if an attack occurs, and he does not even know the operational situation? Have you ever been on duty at least once on duty?

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR

On the personal initiative of the district command (the author believes that the NS OdVO has a greater relation to this), mass flights of aviation from main airfields to field sites are practiced in the dark. They didn’t dare to do this in any other border region ... And in the country, the business of aviators is being developed. It is necessary to have the courage at this time to carry out a massive relocation of aviation district.

Another cheap distortion of the author of the article, which tries to tie the operational measures of the district level for the redeployment of aircraft with flight training at night with the case of the so-called "aviators", about which she heard the ringing.
In fact, the so-called case of aviators arose from the materials of the accident investigation in the Air Force units, and had a long history, which began with the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Government in 1932. Then in 1936 they put the Red Army in front of the whole volume question of dealing with accidents.

Over the past two years, the accident rate has not only not decreased, but has increased significantly, especially in January, February and the first half of March 1938.

Then there were other orders:

No. 070 from 4 June 1939

May 16-17, p. The main military council of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, with the participation of military councils and commanders of the air forces of the LVO, BOVO, KOVO, KhVO, military councils of the GA, specially called commanders and commissars of air brigades, air regiments and squadrons, heard and discussed the report of the head of the Air Force of the Red Army on measures to combat disasters and flight accidents and on improving the organization of flight training in the Air Force.

Details about the history of this "case" can be studied in detail on this site:
http://statehistory.ru/books/Artyem-Drabkin_YA-dralsya-na-istrebitele--Prinyavshie-pervyy-udar--1941-1942/14
So Zakharov can be attracted to this business only by being guided by the proverb "for the sake of a catchphrase I will not regret my father," and in which Madame has greatly succeeded ...

[AsmyppoL]

We are cheating again. Give evidence that if, during the redeployment of aircraft, for example, the 15-20 planes didn’t break, then this would have gone from the NSh of the Odessa district.
I studied the case of aviators, I looked through the positions and track record of the arrested aviation commanders. I have my own version for this question. You didn't want to do all this? Just to write. Do not write a lot, maybe newbies for smart will)))

[kunstkammer]

Stalin was right when, after the Victory, he began checking all the high leaders of the Red Army for the implementation of Directive No. 1 in the 1941 forces. The result of this check was not comforting! And the implementation of Directive No. 2 was also not implemented.
Unfortunately, we must admit that it was practically impossible to do ... in time for the start of the war.
Most of the top military commanders acted on the principle of crowing, and there, though do not dawn. Received a higher order ... passed them down on the instance (not always on time).
And now - voila - the troops are ready for battle! You can report .. if not for the war.
Is it not true that the situation corresponds to ordinary KShU? When the headquarters after the order receive a virtual operational leap in time to execute. For example, an order was received: Bring troops to the battlefield .. immediately followed by an operational leap in time of 2-4-8-12 days and followed by a new order.
But getting the cipher program from the General Staff to the okrug is one thing ... transferring its contents to the Army subordinates is another ... and bringing divisions and regiments to the Battlefield is the third. Whoever brought at least a regiment to full battlefield knows what this means.
But everything is fine if these are exercises - over the past leap in time, the troops are in the battlefield and are ready to fulfill another order. But what does the enemy do for the same 4-8-12 days?
And the enemy has already taken Minsk ...

[Vladimir 5]

Kunstkammer. It’s better to keep silent about the correctness of I. Stalin, because one of the main reasons for the unpreparedness of the Red Army for the war was an unnatural attitude in the media and on hearing about Germany as a friendly country. For the soldiers talking about the war with Germany PUNISHED ... Only the senior commanders understood the essence, and the lower comrades and rank and file were not known and did not see the mortal enemy in the Germans. On the example from the tanker's memoirs, when in the first days, in the first skirmish with the Germans, he didn’t even shoot at once, it seemed unusual, he didn’t see the mortal enemy in the Germans ... This moral side and the consequences that were forcibly brought to peace with the Germans are forgotten. This is the main responsible I. Stalin. Later, in order to lead to an understanding of a decisive and deadly confrontation with the Germans, the rank and file were instigated by the execution of a regiment or another part of the faint-hearted and deserters by shooting before the ranks .. Another question is about the actions of the junior and middle com. composition in the early days of the war, when there were none of the commanders in the crowds of the retreating Red Army (at least to order the stupefaction) From the sergeant’s memoirs, when hundreds of soldiers were stuck and fled in the first week of the war, he didn’t see a single officer who regretted because there was no one to streamline the running crowd that looked like a herd of frightened sheep without a shepherd .... Once upon a time I overheard a conversation of drunk soldiers, as one told how on June 24 being a cavalry lieutenant, and five more of the same comrades on the M-1 from the broken front, they came to their senses near Vitebsk, turned around and returned, but didn’t find their units (they probably fled in the spirit of those officers) .- so many of the Red Army soldiers were ready for war ....... It’s time to describe moral status and mutual relations of all in the Red Army, which would greatly simplify the understanding of the surrender of hundreds of thousands of soldiers of the Red Army in the first months of the war ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Vladimir 5

. It is time to describe the moral state and mutual relations of all in the Red Army,

You can write a lot about the morale of the troops, but when there is no combat experience, and the supply of weapons and equipment is unsatisfactory, no matter what heroes our fighters perform, this is not enough to defeat a well-armed enemy. Only when our troops learned to fight and commanders with combat experience appeared, the economy switched to military tracks, and then a turning point in the war began. And this took about a year and a half, although if the first months had not been a failure, the end of the war would have happened earlier.

[Vladimir 5]

ccc A year ago, the Finnish War did not mean a lesson, although useful conclusions on the mat. parts on the face - winter uniforms began to flow, PPSh, sniper business and so on ... But the whole Red Army remained the same, pulled up a little and only ... I will repeat about the commanders, sat trembling with herd of hares and were afraid of arrests. because no initiative, and so on ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Vladimir 5

A year ago, the Finnish War didn’t mean a lesson

There, only one district fought, and by and large our commanders did not get serious experience there - the enemy is not the same. But a good lesson was presented to us, it is a pity that there was not enough time left for its assimilation and study.

[Barbus]

You are wrong here. The experience was after the Finnish. Only the conflict was to a certain extent local. And the actions were mostly offensive, not defensive. as a result of the Finnish - the adoption of new types of equipment (the same HF). But in a tactical sense, no conclusions were reached: there was no interaction between the arms of the armed forces, the fighters both flew in triples and continued. Therefore ... Some lessons have been learned. And after the Finnish, and after Spain, and after Khalkhin-Gola and Hassan. But there was no serious experience of defensive battles.

[ccsr]

Quote: Barbus

You are wrong here. The experience was after the Finnish.

Just for comparison, take the number of Wehrmacht to capture Poland (more than 1,5 million troops) and compare with the forces that participated in the Finnish on our part. Questions themselves will disappear.

Quote: Barbus

and after Khalkhin Gol and Hassan. But there was no serious experience of defensive battles.

The number of our group on Khalkin-Gol is slightly more than 50 thousand military personnel, i.e. even a full-fledged army was not. Well, and what experience in command and control could our military leaders get?
It’s better not to talk about Spain - there were just a little more than 2 thousand of our advisers (according to some sources, 3 thousand) for the whole war. Although the personal courage of these people is not in doubt, but what military experience they could get there, can be judged by Pavlov and some other heroes of that war.

[Barbus]

Quote: ccsr

but what military experience they could get there can be judged by Pavlov and some other heroes of that war.

As far as I remember, it was precisely based on the results of the fighting in Spain that conclusions were drawn about the urgent need for tanks with anti-ballistic armor. True, erroneous conclusions were also made that the simple massing of troops by artillery would save from tanks.
I do not argue about the number of troops, but I was not talking about strategy, but about tactics of application and interaction. And on the basis of these conflicts, certain adjustments to the tactics of using troops could be made. In principle, even the study of the tactics of a likely adversary who had been conducting major hostilities since the fall of 39 could have been enough.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

In Hitler's deceitful Declaration of 22.6.41. it was argued that the USSR had concentrated about 160 divisions on the borders and had continually carried out provocations at the borders for many weeks. This fact proves that the TOTAL absence of border conflicts and any hostile actions on the part of the USSR did not have, in principle, ANY value, did not affect either the timing or the massiveness of the COALITION attack on the USSR by the Hitlerite bloc. Likewise, the false statements of the Germans did not affect the anti-German positions of the Anglo-Saxons, who were interested in the German invasion of the USSR and the full-scale German-Soviet war. But it was precisely this POSSIBLE change in the positions of the Americans and the British that was the main factor in those fears of Stalin, which were used by Timoshenko, Mehlis and others to disorganize the bringing of the troops of the border districts to alert no. 1 starting from 11.6.41. - it was on this day that the last orders of the covert call of approx. 700 thousand enrolled personnel, which started in NPOs by the decision of the country's top POLITICAL leadership from 25.5.41. only 01.6.41. For this WEEK delay, the NCO and the General Staff of the Red Army are directly responsible. At the same time, the commanders 'vacations continued in the districts, including the highest, with the simultaneous FORCED retention of commanders' families in the border garrisons, which demoralized the troops. The troops continued political propaganda like "there will be no war, we will expose alarmists and provocateurs" and "the German working class will not allow the military to unleash a war", "only individual provocations by the Prussian generals are possible," which in no case should you succumb to. As a result, it was the political staff of the Red Army that actively prevented the bringing of troops to combat readiness, both No. 2 and No. 1, up to 10.00 on 22.6.41, using their influence in the NKVD and special departments, in the military prosecutor's office. These actions of the highest hierarchs of the political department have not yet received any prosecutorial assessment, and are not even investigated by historians. STILL!

[ccsr]

Quote: kunstkammer

But getting the cipher program from the General Staff to the okrug is one thing ... transferring its contents to the Army subordinates is another ... and bringing divisions and regiments to the Battlefield is the third. Whoever brought at least a regiment to full battlefield knows what this means.

I completely agree with you, which is why it still amazes me how Zhukov, having become an NGS after the okrug, did not dare to check the passage of the combat control signal from the General Staff and to all border formations at least once in anticipation of the war. I have not heard of any such training with intermediaries, but the NHS is directly responsible for this. Much can be attributed to the fact that industry did not satisfy all the applications, but only the military leaders are responsible for what the military themselves organize, and it will not work to write off someone.

[Vladimir 5]

You look at the documentary footage with G.K. Zhukov and Timoshenko, so you can see the behavior of G. Zhukov as an errand boy under Tymoshenko, as a boy who got into the palace from a barn without a clue, only a performer. Rokossovsky wrote the attestation correctly about G. Zhukov - "he is not suitable for staff work, he does not tolerate such work," and so on ... To that, the disastrous results of the work of the NGSH by G.K. Zhukov ...

[Mikhail Zubkov]

In Hitler's deceitful Declaration of 22.6.41. it was argued that the USSR had concentrated about 160 divisions on the borders and had continually carried out provocations at the borders for many weeks. This fact proves that the TOTAL absence of border conflicts and any hostile actions on the part of the USSR did not have, in principle, ANY value, did not affect either the timing or the massiveness of the COALITION attack on the USSR by the Hitlerite bloc. Likewise, the false statements of the Germans did not affect the anti-German positions of the Anglo-Saxons, who were interested in the German invasion of the USSR and the full-scale German-Soviet war. But it was precisely this POSSIBLE change in the positions of the Americans and the British that was the main factor in those fears of Stalin, which were used by Timoshenko, Mehlis and others to disorganize the bringing of the troops of the border districts to alert no. 1 starting from 11.6.41. - it was on this day that the last orders of the covert call of approx. 700 thousand enrolled personnel, which started in NPOs by the decision of the country's top POLITICAL leadership from 25.5.41. only 01.6.41. For this WEEK delay, the NCO and the General Staff of the Red Army are directly responsible. At the same time, the commanders 'vacations continued in the districts, including the highest, with the simultaneous FORCED retention of commanders' families in the border garrisons, which demoralized the troops. The troops continued political propaganda like "there will be no war, we will expose alarmists and provocateurs" and "the German working class will not allow the military to unleash a war", "only individual provocations by the Prussian generals are possible," which in no case should you succumb to. As a result, it was the political staff of the Red Army that actively prevented the bringing of troops to combat readiness, both No. 2 and No. 1, up to 10.00 on 22.6.41, using their influence in the NKVD and special departments, in the military prosecutor's office. These actions of the highest hierarchs of the political department have not yet received any prosecutorial assessment, and are not even investigated by historians. STILL!

[antivirus]

On the territory of the okrug, in the reserve of the High Command, the 7th ck (116, 196 and 206 cd) and in the Tiraspol-Kishenev-Balt region were deployed in Dnepropetrovsk 2nd mk (11 and 16 TD, 15 md).

grandfather served as a 32-36 tank leader in Rybnitsa, his father was born in 34 in Balta
was going to stay on emergency

[kunstkammer]

Quote: Vladimir 5

Only senior commanders understood

Oh ho ... ho! Yes, everything seems to be correct you wrote ... But!
Now you understand a lot in Putin’s actions? All of him are partners ... today they shot down our plane, sort of frowned: Yes, we ... there they are ... for the very tomatoes. And before even the fortieth time to celebrate the dead - again Erdogan is his partner ... and tomatoes in the ass.
And what do his faithful colleagues in the Kremlin explain? But nothing!
So imagine, what did Stalin have before the war? Where to Erdogan tomatoes or even Nitanyahu. America with its 40% of the entire world war industry could start a war against us. Together with Hitler. That would be the end of the whole USSR for sure.
Therefore, I believe that the main thing in Stalin's activity was to prevent this at all costs. Of course, not forgetting the rearmament of the army, etc.
In fact, starting the war Hitler had already lost it. This is the strategic success of Stalin.
However, how to achieve unconditional obedience in the Red Army and to prevent answers to the provocations of the Nazis? Read how the People’s Commissar Voroshilov fought accident rate in the Air Force - it’s breathtaking: the Makhnovists were probably even more disciplined. Orders are not executed in the Air Force from top to bottom.
And how many orders of the General Staff before the war were strictly followed? On the dispersal of aircraft, it was necessary to issue two Orders. What is this no matter how mess in the Red Army? You yourself write how the lieutenants abandoned their units and fled.
And what should Stalin do? Transplant-shoot for failure to comply with orders, rampant drunkenness and tyranny?
So what would you do?
I would focus on preventing war with the United States and Hitler against us.
And the slogan of friendship with Germany is even a feeble attempt to fulfill this goal.
Even now, when everyone seems literate and smart ... there are people who justify Bandera and even ISIS ... but what about the people of the 30s? Completely uneducated and illiterate. And the Stalinist Peskov would explain to them why and why? In the 70s and 80s there were many soldiers who ... to put it mildly, did not know a damn and did not want to know. And it’s all with ten years ...
Sometimes I think the "brilliant" idea was to disarm all the border troops! Of course this is complete nonsense, but how is it guaranteed not to provoke the troops? ... planes separate from fuel and bombs, artillery without shells and sights,
And with all this, now we know the fact that ours crossed the border on the very first day of the war and fought in a foreign city! Really on someone else's territory! What did it cost Hitler to show the whole world the photographs of "Russian aggression"? And this is not a staged Polish provocation, but real hostilities.
All this is complicated. The disaster in 41 was terrible ... but not fatal for the country.

[Vladimir 5]

Kunstkammer. On Stalin's political strategy, I agree with you, I was playing to delay the war with Germany. But we must not forget about the Molotov-Ribentropp Pact from 1939, which placed the USSR on a par with Germany in the occupation of countries. After this pact, the USSR in the eyes of the world was an ally of Germany. And only the war between England and Germany and with the beginning of the Second World War made it possible for the USSR to move to the anti-German camp. Stalin's task is how to delay the war with Germany more, not to give the slightest pretext, but this is a completely empty idea and an empty hope, when it is known about the decision made and the beginning of the deployment of troops to attack the USSR. Hitler completely managed to deceive I. Stalin about the attack on the USSR and created favorable circumstances for the beginning of the Second World War. This is the fault of the dictator I. Stalin, who alone decided, and made mistakes at the main moment ... This is a strategic level, but the mass tactical level and state of the troops are no less important. There is no need to talk about the disorder in the Red Army because of laxity, the disorder was due to NON-COMPETENCE and from the repression of the senior command staff. The entire senior command staff was in a "suspended" state, because at any time he was waiting for arrests, and the result is clear - fear for personal decisions and lack of initiative prevailed, which gave such devastating results for the Red Army. Here is also Stalin's complete fault in created in such a state and regime in the Red Army ... we do not delve into the essence, but analyze special cases, not seeing systemic problems, and they are the main ones in everything ...

[kunstkammer]

Quote: Vladimir 5

It’s better to keep silent about the correctness of I. Stalin, because one of the main reasons for the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war

I do not remember where, but there was such information that Stalin was offered to keep the main troops on the defensive line of "Stalin" ... until a new line of "Molotov" was prepared.
Great idea!
In the new territories, only certain infantry units remain.
Stalin said that this could show the whole world that we are there temporarily and that our decision can be challenged.
Was Stalin right? He knew more about that policy than we do now. I think he was right.

[Vladimir 5]

Kunstkammer. The loss of most of the best heavy weapons of the Red Army (tanks, aircraft, artillery, ammunition, etc.) is considered a strategy, they went far in protecting the dictatorial system ... Here, near Moscow, the defenders were already given Austrian PMV rifles, and the three-inch RIA cannons, is also the result of strategy. With the flight of the entire Red Army, the concept went - "to the old border" (more self-nominated), to stop at the fortifications of the old border (as a pointer to the fleeing parts of the Red Army, perhaps invented). But the fortifications on the old border were disarmed, the garrisons were abolished, according to the orders of the victorious Voroshilov and Budyonny (after the executions of the high command staff, they became solely the main ones in the command of the Red Army ...). So Yakir and Putna and others created in advance in the western regions of the USSR partisan structures with secret bases of weapons and other things. So these structures were defeated, the weapons were seized ... With the expulsion, it was on these weak remnants that the partisan movement was created - so who is the enemy of the country and the state ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Please provide evidence that if, for example, 15-20 aircraft had not crashed during the relocation of aircraft, this would have fallen from the hands of the NSh Odessa District.

The district’s NS is not responsible for the Air Force’s trouble-free nature - another official is involved. But he is responsible for the secrecy of the redeployment of troops. So do not lie that the NSh of the district would be guilty for the fact that the pilots are not trained in night flights, which, incidentally, are included in the annual combat training plan.

I studied the case of aviators, I looked through the positions and track record of the arrested aviation commanders. I have my own version of this question. You didn’t want to do all this? Just to write something.

Well, where is the punishment of generals from the ground forces? Support Madame, and give at least one example when the NSh of the district suffered for accident in the Air Force.

Do not write a lot, maybe beginners will accept for the smart)))

You will definitely not be considered, judging by your illiterate comments.

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR

The third. Zhukov does not mention Budyonny, because Budyonny could refute this fragment of his memoirs. In an unpublished diary CM. Budyonny described the events taking place in Stalin’s office, in a completely different way than the chief of the General Staff.

If the diary was not published, how did it end up in Madame's hands? Madame did not read IT personally, but only in the retelling of either Dobryukha or in "Krasnaya Zvezda".
Maybe she will talk more about this?

the writer came up with his version: Zhukov goes to another room where Vatutin is waiting for him. They compose together the new text of Directive No. 1.

Actually, Zhukov himself wrote about this, that he left the office and wrote something with Vatutin - read carefully Zhukov’s memoirs.
Kozinkin did not write about this, so do not ascribe to him what belongs to Zhukov’s pen.

[kunstkammer]

Quote: Vladimir 5

We do not delve into the essence, but take apart special cases, not seeing systemic problems, and they are the main ones in everything

You, too, analyze "special cases" and draw your conclusion from them - Stalin is to blame.
I don’t like Putin’s modern politics ... but I don’t accept conclusions like: the cat left the kittens - Putin is to blame. And you have everything going to this ... Lieutenants escaped from the army - Stalin did not overlook.
In assessments you follow from particular to general. Being likened to the blind by feeling the elephant and giving its characteristics.
I did not live in those days, I have no right to stigmatize everything and everything. Therefore, considering the general, I find confirmation in the particular.
You write about system problems. Write to me in which of the world states and social systems there are no problems?
We will never agree on the final grades, because Socialism is horror-horror for you ... But for me it is the highest form of development of social relations. With all the minuses in the initial period of development.
Stalin is a historical block in the fate of Russia! Not unambiguous, but fateful for a great country. And he left her descendants at the highest point of development.
This is Peter the Great of the twentieth century ... although it is Georgian.
But isn’t Saakashvili right? And thank God!

[Vladimir 5]

Kunstkammer. Your sayings are retellings of the "popular prints" created for the common people of the times of one party in power, political consumer goods. Although I do not accept the current state of the state and other things, I am glad about one thing, more open information and the possibility of evaluations in comparisons, and without this there can be no objectivity. (Everything is learned in comparison). Perhaps this is only the result of time - the 21st century .... About socialism, there was no such thing in the USSR, there were different periods, from a tough dictatorship to indulgences, but the top-clique ruled with coercion, and there was no "smell" of popular socialism. The first socialism strangled by the dictatorship of I.V. Dzhugashvili (Reference: Dzhugashvili is translated from Georgian, -son of a Jew, Dzhuga is a Jew, Shvili, -son. Therefore, I.V. Dzhugashvili's father is not found.). Further, the dictatorship continued until a handful of persons in power (the Politburo) with indulgences. So what kind of socialism we are talking about, perhaps for the nomenklatura, and only ... Today's chaos of those in power is even worse than the last period of the USSR, and therefore nostalgia for the old, when the present in the state hurts the eyes ... Therefore, the dictator was remembered with affection how a remedy against the comprador handful in power who are robbing the state. and a poor people ... Forgetting what Dzhugashvili did to the country. Lastly, like you, I will propose an idea for a seed, about Kobe-Dzhugashvili, as a tool of the British, in the dark bleeding Russia. Having traced the history of Dzhugashvili's becoming a dictator, and then his veiled support in power by the British, a lot indicates the shadow forces helping to break through to dictatorship and retain power ... I will expound in more detail in the next suitable topics ...

[Barbus]

The author is no different from his opponents, whom he criticizes. He writes that they themselves think up the details and present everything in the form of real facts, but they act in exactly the same way. The article itself (this part of it) does not carry any useful information at all. Any memories are presented by their owners, taking into account what they remember many years after the events and who is the editor of their memories. Not a single document is given. But how many thoughts !!!
What are we trying to prove? That a few months before the start of the war, the top management did not know the exact date and time? Of course I didn't. The Germans themselves did not know. At school we were told all the time that Sorge was giving the exact date of the start of the war. Now, when the archives were opened, it turned out that he never gave a specific date "June 22". The author's thoughts about local initiative are presented as independent actions in spite of the higher command. Frank delirium. Since further the author writes about the coordination of these initiatives. Elementary logic immediately leads to the idea that on the spot they always know better about the state of affairs in the subordinate troops, and therefore on the spot it is better to know when to withdraw units to their initial positions.
Further. In my opinion, it incorrectly says that the country's leadership tried to delay the start of the war - this was impossible, since the war would begin when the Germans wanted it. The leadership of our country tried not to provoke the outbreak of war. Hence all the actions for the gradual withdrawal of troops to the border. Here is what the author writes about this
"Front-line offices are not simultaneously displayed on field CPs in order to be ready for war at dawn on June 22. Moving to field CPs does not mean being ready for command and control of district troops. This is exactly the situation we saw in KOVO and in PribOVO, when there was a mess when leaving for field control points. Why did it happen so? It turns out because the time period for the readiness of the front headquarters at field points for command and control was later than the allegedly expected attack by the leadership of the spacecraft at dawn on June 22."
The fact that the front control units were withdrawn to the field CPs just indicates that they were preparing for war. But ignorance of the exact moment of the attack, together with the desire not to provoke the enemy, played a role.
Plus, answer one question: what would all sorts of slogans say now if the USSR concentrated its troops on their initial positions immediately before the start of the war? Is this not the best reason to accuse the USSR of intending to attack Germany?
It would be better if the author simply published declassified documents. That would be much more productive. Especially without their own speculation.

[ccsr]

Quote: Barbus

It would be better if the author simply published declassified documents. That would be much more productive. Especially without their own speculation.

I fully agree with this conclusion, especially since the author's own views indicate that he knows firsthand about military affairs, and even makes dubious conclusions.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

ODVO 22.6.41. held the border without being in the direction of the main attack. PribOVO, being in the direction of the main attack, by the evening of 22.6.41. was pressed, but still held URy. But in the evening on 26.6.41. I sent the following panicky report to the General Staff: "To further document the situation in the North-West Fleet on 26.06.41/11/360. I am reprinting here - also from Wikipedia, the following document, in which three signatures of the chief officers of the North-West Fleet went to a crap lie and vile slander against the 26.6.41 Army headquarters, in which my father served and left the encirclement, who for the salvation of the headquarters (they saved the banner, all secret and other documents, took out the wounded, ammunition and even partly property from the warehouses) received a medal "For military merit." The description of the feat is as follows: 20.35 carts, removed the warehouses.Read carefully below: People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Top Secret XNUMX XNUMX
I report the position of the troops of the North-Western Front. 1. The enemy continues to encircle Libau.
2. The 8th Army - the 12th mechanized corps and the 5th Panzer Division behind enemy lines without fuel. The commander of the 3rd mechanized corps reported openly on 25.6.41/27/XNUMX: "Help, surrounded." Rifle formations at the front Plateliai, Krazhai, Kelme, Shiaulenay, Seduva. On the night of June XNUMX will begin the departure of the river. Lielupe and further to the north coast of Zap. Dvina to Jekabpils. Army formations suffered losses and need to be replenished immediately, which began to be mobilized, but cannot be worn, since uniforms of two rifle divisions remained at the former deployment points.
The compounds have lost part of the weapon, which is being specified.
The 11th Army - the headquarters and the Military Council of the Army, according to some reports, was captured or died. The Germans captured the cipher document. The 5th, 33th, 188th, 128th infantry divisions do not know in what condition and where they are. Many laggards and runaways, detained in the direction of Dvinsk. A lot of weapons are thrown. The 11th Army is not an organized combat formation.
In Vilnius, the deployment of a new army group is imperative. Due to the replenishment of apparently dead divisions, I ask you to allow the formation of new four rifle divisions.
I ask you to strengthen the front with ten artillery regiments account of the dead. The 11th Infantry Division is fresh, but its howitzer artillery regiment is defeated by aviation.
The air forces of the front suffered heavy losses of a small number of airfields. At this time, they are not able to effectively support, cover ground troops and attack the enemy.
Crews saved 75%. Losses of the material part of 80%.
I ask you to strengthen the front with three mixed aviation divisions. To replenish parts of the air forces of the front with material parts, first of all, with flight personnel.
I ask for the release of 200 thousand sets of uniforms and equipment for providing mobilized and for the new four rifle divisions of weapons. The 22nd, 24th rifle corps are mobilized in winter apartments. The 29th Rifle Corps moved east of Vilnius. I’ll clarify the situation. Dvinsk direction. Dvinsk was occupied by enemy tanks. He demanded to restore the situation. In view of the enemy bombing of communications centers and the destruction of their hostile elements, communications are poor.
I ask you on 26.6.41 to transfer at my disposal three bomber and two fighter divisions to strengthen the air forces.
I ask you to include six new rifle divisions in the front instead of the former territorial divisions redeployed for retraining.
F. Kuznetsov Dibrova P. Klenov
- Report of the commander of the North-Western Front of June 26, 1941 to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR about the situation at the front by 20 hours 35 minutes on June 26, 1941, F. 221, op. 2467ss, house 39, ll. 346-348. "This cannot be called anything other than panic. The author must take into account the reports of the fronts on 26.6.41. And continue his important research.

[AsmyppoL]

Everyone knows about the draft Resolution on the organization of the Southern Front (LF), a draft of which was written in Stalin's office from 19.05 to 20.15 21 in June 1941 of the year. So it is accepted that this document is associated with the expectation of war at dawn 22.06.41 due to the time and date.

Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the organization of the Southern Front and the appointment of commanders

I 1. To organize a law firm consisting of two armies with the seat of the Military Council in Vinnitsa
2. Commander of the Law Faculty should appoint Comrade Tyulenev, leaving him the post of Commander of the Moscow Military District.
3. To appoint Zaporozhets as a member of the Military Council of the Law Faculty.
II In view of the detachment of Comrade Zaporozhets as a member of the Military Council of the Law Faculty, appoint Comrade Mehlis as head of the Main Political Propaganda Department of the SC, while retaining the post of People's Commissar for State Control.
III 1. To appoint the commander of the armies of the second line t. Budyonny.
2. To appoint the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) T. Malenkov as a member of the Military Council of the Second Line Armies.
3. To entrust the people's commissar of defense, comrade Tymoshenko, and the commander of the armies of the second line, t. Budyonny, to organize a headquarters, with a headquarters in Bryansk.
IV Charge nach. General Staff T. Zhukov, the general management of the South-Western Front and the Law Faculty, on-site.
V To entrust Meretskov with the general leadership of the Northern Front, on-site.
VI Appoint as a member of the Military Council of the Northern Front the Secretary of the Leningrad City Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Kuznetsov.

If this document is related to the expectation of war at dawn on 22 June, then why did not T. Meretskov have time to arrive in Leningrad by the beginning of the war, and so Zhukov was not even going to leave for the place? The wording is quite interesting: “To appoint T.Tyulenev as commander of the law firm, leaving him the post of commander of the Moscow military district.” If you know that in the morning he will leave for Vinnitsa and fight there, then how will Comrade Tyulenov lead the Moscow district?

Not once did I carefully read the articles cited in the cycle “Unexpected War ...” by the author Vic, I decided for myself to check whether there is anything unusual in the sequence of events presented. After all, if we accept the version of the author Vik, then during the specified time period they knew that there would be a war with Germany, but it was not known when exactly it would happen. And about its beginning at dawn 22 June did not even suspect. And here, like a bolt from the blue this draft. First, I will present many documents that are known, and then I will express my version of events. I use the design style adopted by Vic

[AsmyppoL]

Let's start with what we consider draft Notes of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)which dates back to october xnumx

I did not manage to find the documents confirming the creation of the military unit on the basis of the Moscow Military District, which, with the beginning of the mobilization period, should be deployed to the front headquarters. It was possible to find a reference to the separation of the army department from the Moscow Military District (February 1941 of the year, the military unit number is not indicated in the document) and the schedule of the army field trip from the Moscow Military District (Spring 1941 of the year). Specified the date of the trip 23.06.41g. It also says about the exercise of the 7-th Mechanized Corps (MVO) on the same date. It is not clear from the document whether these exercises are conducted jointly or these are different events that could have been held within the framework of different exercises.

The following document submitted for your consideration is Draft Views on the strategic deployment plan of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies (May 1941 of the year). The document does not contain a word about the formation of front-line management in the Moscow Military District and the ArVO. OdVO troops as part of the same army must be subordinated to the South-Western Front (SWF).

At the end of April 1941, the scenario of 5 XUS and 6 KSHU of KOVO armies during the period 12-18 of May 1940 was worked out. Known telegram of General Vatutin to the headquarters of KOVO 4.05.41: “In the task and the plan of front-line operational game to amend.
1) “Orange” should not be considered neutral, but should be counted from the first stage of the game on the side of “Western” ones.
2) The organization and forces of the "Orange" take real and strengthen one army corps and a tank division "Western".
3) At the last stage, LF will not create, leaving the 16 army under the subordination of the LUFThe game took place somewhere after 20 on May. We see that there is such a part as the headquarters of the Law Faculty, but it was decided not to create this headquarters during the final command and attack on the Soviet Union with an attack on the USSR. The SWF itself can probably cope with the leadership of all its armies, including the army deployed from the OdVO troops. In the twentieth of May in the General Staff there is no exact understanding that in the war with Germany, the LF headquarters already concentrated and deployed near the border on mobile plans.

Everyone knows the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Forces Commander OdVO (on the development of deployment plans at the end of May 1941), in which again there is not a word about the possible entry of district troops into the SF.

There is Certificate of deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West (June 1941 of the year), in which there is also no word about the formation of front-line control on the basis of the Moscow Military District. The document states: "...The structure of the South-Western Fleet includes: KOVO - 58 divisions, of which: sd - 32, td - 16, md - 8, cd - 2; ADVO (without connections located in Crimea) - 19 divisions, of which: sd - 11, td - 4, md - 2, cd - 2; PRO - sd - 7; HVO - sd - 7; OrVO - sd - 6... »

From the documents submitted it is impossible to conclude that before the outbreak of war LEF Headquarters (w / h 1080) must necessarily be deployed at the border. It is also not entirely clear whether the 1080 military unit before 21 in June 1941 was front-line, not army control.

[AsmyppoL]

The foregoing does not contradict the memories of Marshal MV Zakharov: “[At the end of February 1941 of the year] Some considerations on the composition of the troops, and in particular the proposal on the possibility of deploying front-line directorates from the districts' directorates, expressed in a report to the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, later formed the basis of the note on the cover plan.
In the event of war, the General Staff envisaged to deploy only one 9 th army, designed to cover our border with Romania. The management of the district remained, but was transferred to reduced staff. When I tried to clarify whether our district would receive operational instructions on the plan of war, G.K. Zhukov made it clear that the development of these issues will be engaged in the headquarters of KOVO. From this I concluded that the 9 Army would be part of the South-Western Front, which, as I knew from my previous work in the General Staff, was deployed from KOVO ...

... The covering plan developed by the district headquarters and some thoughts on the initial period of the war in the Romanian direction 20 June were submitted to the General Staff. With a report on the submitted cover plan to the General Staff, the deputy for operational issues of the chief of staff of the OdVO Colonel L.V. Vetoshnikov. The memorandum on the cover plan and the initial period of the war set forth the following considerations. In the Romanian sector, which had independent strategic importance, it was necessary to expand the front and only as a last resort a separate army. It is not expedient to include the Romanian direction in the operational plan of military actions of the South-Western Front, which was created on the basis of KOVO. This front could not carry out the successful leadership of the troops operating in this direction. Thus, it is expedient to deploy two armies for the time of the war on the territory of the OdVO, and in peacetime, to maintain the district so that out of it it was possible to deploy not army, but frontline management ...

... The course of subsequent events showed that some proposals of the Military Council of the District, sent in a memo to the General Staff, were probably taken into account. 21 June 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decided to create a law firm as part of the 9 and 18 armies. Management of the latter stood out from the HVO. The same decision G.K. Zhukov was entrusted with the leadership of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts, and K.A. Meretskov - North-Western Front.
The formation of the LF field office was not entrusted to the Odessa district, as we suggested, but to the Moscow Military District. This decision did not fit the situation and was clearly unfortunate. The personnel of the Moscow Military District did not know the given theater of military operations and its features, the state of the troops, their capabilities and tasks. There was no time to study all this. Moreover, in the conditions of war, the leadership of the newly created front had to relocate to a new place, re-organize and establish command and control of troops, receive formations and units arriving from internal districts, provide them with material and technical means, etc ...»

In my opinion, the commander of the UZF and LF G.K. Zhukov did not need a clever, stubborn and enterprising MV Zakharov as NSH LF. More convenient for management was the leadership of the Moscow Military District.
At the end of June, at the OdVO, as well as at the Moscow Military District, an army field trip was planned. Maybe similar trips were planned in advance in the districts?

[AsmyppoL]

Is there anything in the memoirs of military leaders about the deployment of the headquarters of 21 Law Firm on June 1941?
The commander of the Moscow Military District (the future commander of the law firm), General I.V. Tyulenev wrote: “... It was already getting dark when I left the headquarters of the Moscow Military District ... I got out of the car in a quiet Rzhevsky Lane, where I lived with my family — my wife and two children. At 3 o'clock in the morning 22 June a phone call woke me up. Urgently summoned to the Kremlin ... Then Voroshilov announced that I was appointed commander of the law firm. It was proposed to leave for the destination today ... ”If you believe the memoirs of General I.V. Tyulenev, it turns out that he did not know about the creation of the Law Faculty before leaving home and only found out about this at dawn on June 22.
Head of the Engineering Forces of the Moscow Military District, A.F. Khrenov writes: “... On Monday [23 June 1941 of the Year], the headquarters planned a trip to work out the organization and interaction as part of the front field management ... Home returned long past midnight [June 22]. I collected everything I needed in the field and quickly went to bed. Early in the morning I was going to go to the country, to Zhukovka, - there, in the country house with relatives, the family lived. He barely fell asleep, his phone rang.
“Comrade general,” came the excited voice of the operational duty staff of the district, “the commander calls you.” It is ordered not to linger. The car is leaving now ...
In the reception of the commander, I found the chief of staff, Major-General GD. Shishenin, head of the political department of divisional commissar F.N. Voronin, head of logistics Major General A.I. Shebunina and several other comrades. The generals stood in small groups, talking quietly. In a furious humming of voices, I caught separate words: “It seems to have begun ...”, “Yes, all along the border ...” “So, war ...”
Soon the commander appeared and invited us to the meeting room of the Military Council ... Entering the hall and accepting the report of the chief of staff, he did not sit as usual, but remained standing: “Comrades, at four o'clock with minutes I was called to the Kremlin. K.E. Voroshilov and S.K. Tymoshenko told me that fascist Germany had treacherously attacked our homeland ...
Ivan Vladimirovich said that he was appointed commander of the LF troops, a member of the military council — Army Commissar 1, rank A.I. Zaporozhets, chief of staff - Major General GD Shishenin. The heads of the arms and services of the front are appointed by the appropriate heads of the district. Field control departs to the front in two echelons. Destination - Vinnitsa. The composition of the first echelon should be ready for shipment today, the composition of the second - tomorrow. Then he announced who was leaving for the first echelon, determined the time of gathering at the Kiev station to 15 watches and ordered me to take up the duties of the head of the first special train ... ”
Since General AF Khrenov was going to leave for his summer cottage on Sunday, as he writes, he does not know the expected date for the start of the war at dawn on June 22 and confirms the words of the commander of the Moscow Military District. Or in their memoirs, the events of the evening of June 22 are highly distorted. It should be noted that the presented memoirs do not confirm the version that the leadership of the Moscow Military District until the dawn of 22 on June 1941 knew about the rise of the front management of the Law Faculty and sending it on June 22 to Vinnitsa.

[AsmyppoL]

There is a recollection of General V.F. Vorobyov (head of the law department of the Law Faculty): “On June 21 of the year I was appointed quite unexpectedly for me by the head of the operational department of the law department headquarters, which was formed from the Moscow Military District headquarters ...” From the presented phrase it is not clear when General V.F. Vorobyov: either late in the evening of June 1941, or at dawn of June 21 that the LF department was established. And the word “unexpectedly” confuses me.
How did the headquarters of the Moscow Military District work on the eve of the war? Here's what AI Shishenin writes (in the future intendant of the Law Faculty): “... With the onset of summer heat, families of the administrative staff of the district usually moved from Moscow to their summer cottage in Serebryanny Bor, then considered a suburb.
On Saturday, 21 June, many of my employees, as always, gathered at the dacha. The work at the district headquarters on Saturdays ended at five o'clock, then only the operational duty officers remained there. So it was on that Sabbath day.
The divisional commander Zakharkin was at the General Staff of the space station that day, from where he arrived at the dacha. According to him, I realized that the atmosphere in the General Staff seemed restless to him. After exchanging opinions, Ivan Grigorievich and I agreed that there are very real reasons for alarm. I was anxious in my heart when he left the hospitable division of the divisional commander late at night. And yet I was far from the thought that only a few hours separated us from the beginning of the terrible events that were destined to shake the world.
At six in the morning of 22 on June 1941, the commanding personnel of the Moscow Military District, who lived at the dachas in Serebryany Bor, were alerted to the district headquarters. Here we were officially informed about the beginning of the war with Germany.
Chief of Staff Major General GD Shishenin announced the order of the People's Commissar of Defense to the assembled, according to which the Moscow Military District had to urgently allocate a part of the higher commanding staff to form the administration of the Law Faculty in Vinnitsa. ”
Another commander said that he planned to spend the weekend at the dacha and the staff of the Moscow Military Military District staff left on Friday at about five in the evening. It turns out a peaceful atmosphere reigned in the district headquarters despite the terrible events on the western border. This is the third memoir, that the staff of the Moscow Military District learned about the war and departure to Vinnitsa at dawn - on the morning of June 22.
The draft resolution on the organization of the Law Department says that the 18 Army, formed from the HVO, will be part of the front. Let's see what happened in this army on the eve of the war.
RC 18 Army: "June 22 1941 g ... In the morning 22.6.41 g. Commander of the Kharkov VO in pursuance of the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the Union of the USSR № ___ ordered the allocation of a full Army Directorate.
The Army Field Office 4-echelons 29 June 1941 was fully concentrated in the district Kamenetz-Podolsk. 26 June 1941. The Starma Operational Group (1-th Echelon) arrived in Kamenets-Podolsk in 2-30 ... "
The commander of the HVO troops issues an order for the separation of army control only in the morning of June 22. Also, as the war veterans write about the events in the Moscow Military District with the emphasis on front-line management of the Law Faculty. Note that a draft of the Resolution has been drawn up. There is no order from the People's Commissar of Defense to create a law firm. The military unit cannot be guided not by the instructions of the People's Commissar of Defense, but it is not clear by whom and when signed by the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). And when did the Commissar of Defense order issue about the organization of the LF? Only 24 June 1941 of the year!

[AsmyppoL]

And now let's see what the commanders of the 7 Mechanized Corps were doing, who were also to participate in the June 23 exercises.
The chief of artillery of the 7 Mechanized Corps V.I. Kazakov writes: “[The war] caught me in Moscow. I then held the position of chief of artillery 7 mechanized corps. Parts and formations of the corps were quartered in the Moscow region ... From 13 to 20 in June 1941, the headquarters of the corps, according to the previously developed plan, conducted reconnaissance in the Kaluga and Tula regions ...
In the evening of June 20 we received orders to return to Moscow, and in the morning of June 21 was followed by a new order that alerted us. The corps commander was ordered to urgently withdraw parts from the camps, and artillery to stop combat training firing at the Alabino training ground and return to the points of their permanent deployment.
In addition, the corps commander received orders to allocate a motorcycle company, providing it with ammunition, to staff the headquarters of one of the fronts. [Clearly of what - the new headquarters of the Law Firm.]
Orders were given hastily, nervousness was felt in everything ...
The evening was Saturday. Most of the officers, giving the necessary orders to the junior commanders, went home or left the city, intending to spend the day in the open air. The fact that the war began, they learned only at noon on June 22 from a government report on the radio ... "
General V.I. Kazakov somewhat mistaken that in the morning of June 21 was followed by an order to immediately withdraw parts from the camps, and artillery to stop training firing. This is confirmed by the combat logs (VBD). Maybe the order to allocate a motorcycle company from the 9 th motorcycle regiment was not followed by June 21, but June 22?
RCB 1 of the Moscow Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division: “22.6.41g. 16.00. The order of the division commander to concentrate the division in Moscow. In 21.00 22.6.41. parts of the division acted as separate columns along the Moscow-Minsk, Moscow-Kiev motorways, and by morning 23.6.41 concentrated on winter apartments. Immediately, in all parts of the division, mobilization and recruitment was launched ... "
RCB 14 td: “22.6.41. after the speech of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, comrade Molotova and the received telegram of mobilization, the division commander, Colonel Vasilyev, gave the order to concentrate parts of the division in the district of winter apartments (Naro-Fominsk).
With 16.00, units began to move from the camps to winter apartments in the districts according to the mobilization plan ... "
RCB 28 tp (14 td): “The regiment and tank battalions performed combat missions on the march, on the attack, on the way out of battle and on defense.
The presence of combat and transport vehicles by make as of 22.6 and 1.8.41, see appendix №1.
22.6 Regiment being in the camps of Barkhatovo, which is from 8km of the Naro-Fominsk mountains, received the task: To move from the camp for winter apartments to the area of ​​concentration of the 800 forest, m.
23.6 Regiment with all the material moved to the area of ​​concentration ... "
RCB 14 th gap 14 td: “22.6.41 regiment in full force in Alabino on the ground in readiness for live firing. 23.6. in the 11.00 regiment focused on the winter apartments of the city of Naro-Fominsk, where he began to mobilize according to the plan ... "
Management 7 th mechanized corps to the beginning of the war stationed in the city of Moscow. The 1-I motorized rifle division, 14-I and 18-I tank divisions from 5.05.41 were in camps for summer study with the admission to the part of the registration of the composition.
“Krasnaya Zvezda” newspaper (12.11.2005): “20 June 1941 of the Year The 1-I Moscow Motorized Rifle Division conducted another tactical exercise in the Alabinsky camps. Summing up its results was scheduled for Tuesday. But on Monday evening the regiments had to hastily return to the capital: the war began. At the reception of the replenishment, additional vehicles of the division took a day ... "
The commander of the 1 th mechanic, General J. Kreiser: “... Sunday 22 June began, as usual. Competitions flared up on the sports grounds, and amateur art groups gathered in the regiment clubs. As always in the days of rest, relatives came to see many soldiers. The time was approaching twelve. And suddenly from the loudspeaker came the alarming words: War! This word was carried, as the alarm bell ... 22 and 23 June The 1-I Moscow Motorized Rifle Division, having replenished to wartime with personnel and military equipment, received the first military order ... "
In principle, reconnaissance from 13 to 20 in June by the headquarters of the 7 mechanized corps in the region of Kaluga and Tula can be the threshold of large-scale exercises with the involvement of the 1080 military unit. Conducting tactical one-day exercises in the corps also corresponds to the usual practice of the troops.
Was there some kind of revival in the Moscow military registration and enlistment offices on the eve of the war?
Memories M.N. Sbitnev, the former military commissar of the Dzerzhinsky district of Moscow in 1941: “... We learned about the perfidious attack of fascist Germany on our homeland early on the morning of June 22 in the city military commissariat, where all the district military committees gathered. Military Commissar of Moscow G.K. Black, having informed about the beginning of the war, ordered to immediately begin the deployment of prefabricated and acceptance points. By the evening of the same day, we were ready for mobilization.
On that slightly overcast, but warm morning on June 22, many Muscovites set off for the city. Moscow still lived a peaceful life. In 12 hours, a government message about the attack of the Nazis was transmitted. Everywhere, the Soviet people expressed their readiness, in arms, to come out in defense of the Motherland. 22 June Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree on mobilization. It was published in print the other day. 14 ages of military service 1905 - 1918 years of birth were subject to mobilization ... "

If anyone is interested, look for a version of tomorrow about the rise of the 1080 military unit on the 20 training alert June 1941

[AsmyppoL]

I'm sorry I missed one drawing.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

On Saturday, June 21, many of my employees, as always, gathered at the cottage. The work at the district headquarters on Saturdays ended at five, then only operational attendants remained there.

Tell Madame about the operational duty at the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, otherwise she did not believe that the duty officer could be located in the General Staff, referring to Chekunov.

[AsmyppoL]

Again you are wrong twice.
1) I saw the list of duties and the position is simply "Duty". The term "duty officer" is possibly the result of post-war post-war knowledge. As it was customary for a person to write a memoir after retirement.
2) I do not have the opportunity to correspond with the author Vik. Yes, I forwarded three documents to him, received polite response messages and that's it.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

1) I saw the list of duties and the position is simply "Duty". The term "duty officer" is possibly the result of post-war post-war knowledge.

You don’t know a fig how the service of operational duty officers in NGOs and General Staff is organized, that’s why you’re lying that this is the result of afterthought. Although, for example, there were even full-time positions of "operational duty officer" in the RC General Staff. And I pointed out to one "German" here.

Quote: AsmyppoL

I do not have the opportunity to correspond with the author Vick.

And don’t - you write right here that judging by many memoirs, Madame lied, because operational duty officers are mentioned by participants in those events.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Everyone knows about the draft Resolution on the organization of the Southern Front (LF), a draft of which was written in Stalin's office from 19.05 to 20.15 21 in June 1941 of the year. So it is accepted that this document is associated with the expectation of war at dawn 22.06.41 due to the time and date.

You don't know the history of the issue, that's why, as usual, without going into the essence, you make stupid conclusions. The history of this issue lies much deeper, and breaks the mold for some "theorists" that the war was not expected:

Note by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army in the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) - I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov
[not earlier than 05.10.1940/XNUMX/XNUMX]
No. 103313 / SS / s
Especially important
Top secret
Only personally
In one copy
...
3. In order to further strengthen the forces in the West, the people's commissar of defense:

a) develop and report on the formation of due to the existing staffing K.A. - 18 tank brigades, 20 machine gun and artillery brigades using the latter to cover the borders and especially during the concentration of troops and one mechanized corps. To complete the formation by May 1, 1941, fully provide the material part by October 1, 1941. To provide for the deployment scheme to form 2 front-line departments on the basis of the headquarters of the Moscow and Arkhangelsk districts and 2 army administrations on the basis of the headquarters of the Western and Kiev special military districts, with the deployment of these administrations during the mobilization period; at the same time, submit considerations for the reorganization of the existing rifle division, reducing its strength to 16;

http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1010888

[AsmyppoL]

Why this verbosity, if I have seen scans of this whole document and not on the Yakovlev Fund website?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why this verbosity, if I have seen scans of this whole document and not on the Yakovlev Fund website?

So I think, why are you lying here that until June 22, the leadership of the country and NGOs did not wait for a war, once they are familiar with the documents of those years. Especially if you said that you saw scans of documents, you just forgot to indicate where and when.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

In a number of stories, the author does not accentuate the difference in expectation and understanding in the border districts of Directive No. 1. The ZAPOVO and KOVO understood it (with explanations by phone from Moscow, Minsk and Kiev) as an order to alert No. 1 of HEADQUARTERS, but not troops. The last phrase in Directive No. 1 about "no other measures should be taken without an order" allowed a very broad interpretation with a possible "political" assessment of the actions of the command staff in the districts. The key issue is the issuance of weapons, uniforms, ammunition, equipment, food and fodder to the troops, as well as fuel from the warehouses of the district, armies, corps, divisions and regiments according to wartime states - and in battle order at any request of subdivisions, and not only by those signed and outfits decorated with all sorts of seals, as in a peaceful "instructive" time. Timoshenko and Zhukov knew very well that the transition from peaceful to combat food and supply of troops would take at least 3 - 5 days. Only for the withdrawal of the headquarters of the districts to the field points of deployment, they (according to the APPROVED BY THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COUNTRY mobplan) laid THREE DAYS. They knew for sure that any ambiguity in the Directive could lead to trouble. And there is not a single evidence that in telephone or other explanations to districts and troops, they prevented this misfortune. THEY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND ALL THE CONSEQUENCES.

[AsmyppoL]

In the previously submitted documents and memoirs there is not a single word about waiting for the war in Moscow on June 22. The exception is the unfortunate draft of the Resolution, which is drawn up in the evening in the study of Joseph Stalin.
In my version from 20 to the late evening of 21 in June, 1941 took place on two different lines of events. One of them is a study trip planned in May by an army or front-line government, separated from the Moscow Military District. The second, the result of which was the draft Resolution. And these events are NOT CONNECTED!

Further, I will offer for consideration my version of events related to the rise of the headquarters of the Law Firm, which is similar to the similar version of the author Vik. Author Vic wrote that the withdrawal of front-line headquarters (border districts) to field control posts was not necessarily associated with the expectation of a full-scale war at dawn on June 22.

In the memoirs of Marshal V.M. Zakharov, who you saw in the 25 part, said: "At the urgent request of the Military Council OdVO by personal order of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov from 14, June OdVO, according to the mobplan, was allowed to “allocate army control and 21.6.41 to take him to Tiraspol, i.e. to transfer the control of the 9 Army to the field command post ... On the same day, the commander of the KOVO received such an order: he was ordered to take the command of the South-Western Front to Vinnitsa by June 25. The management of the ZF (ZAPOVO) and the NWF (PribOVO) by order of the General Staff from 18 June was allowed to be brought to the field control to 23.6.41.»

Later, these dates were clarified. I would like to clarify that the withdrawal of district headquarters to field control points was connected with the general preparation of the spacecraft for war. As well as the supply of deep armies to the territory of border districts. As well as the supply of the second echelon of the covering armies closer to the border. There was a build-up of armed forces to deter the enemy. If this is the case, then an 1080 upgrade may also be the same planned preparation. Only to redeploy it to the border will take from 4 to 5 days. Remember that we have many divisions, corps and armies so focus by July 1-10.

In accordance with the planned study on Friday 20 June 1941 year The operational department of the 1080 military unit is being upgraded. The document with the date I give a little later. The rise of all other services of the 1080 military unit was also to take place. Check the collection of personnel for training alert. Sometimes it was done in the headquarters during the Soviet era. There was an alarm only in the headquarters, and then people were released before the start of the raising of the combatant units. After all, the exercises are planned by higher staff officers)))

After the arrival of the personnel and assignment of the 1080 military unit, they are sent to Moscow for a field trip. Monday 23 June 1941 of the year. After that, the staff is dispersed home for the weekend. After the dissolution of personnel, three documents are being prepared simultaneously. For convenience, I will talk about the documents in the wrong order in which they are filed in the case.

[AsmyppoL]

I’ll be the first to review the list of the commanding officers of the non-call 1080 military unit opt. Those. there was a call that Xnumx Jun personnel assembled on. One assigned commander did not appear - captain Kolokoltsev D.К. The document has a resolution, which was applied the next morning, indicating the date 21.6.41g. I do not cite the document in full, since additional inscriptions on it were made later.

Major-General I.M.Karavaev, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District for the rear. He should know how many people should be provided with contentment during a field trip.
The second document is the List of Commanders of the 1080 military unit, which appeared on call.

In the list there are both the personnel structure and the raised subscription composition. This indicates that the alarm raised them all. In other words, the staff was probably sent home and after that (but before the end of 20 June) they were alerted. Note that all 18 commanders are raised (plus one has not arrived). With the staff of the operting department, even the army headquarters is not comparable with few personnel. At the same time there are no civilian employees (typists) and there are no draftsmen for a beautiful design of maps. The document also has a resolution with the date 21.6.41.
This is understandable if people left for a 2-3 day of study visit, when a lot of fluid work is not expected. On Thursday, 26 June or Friday could be scheduled summing up of a field trip. Thus, before June 26-27 no one was going to send the headquarters of the Law Faculty to Vinnitsa as of the morning of June 20.
The third prepared document in the late evening of June 20 was the List of persons departing by train No. 1080 in the 17564 military unit (those who will participate in the field trip). Scheduled for June 23 Echelon, which should take the headquarters of the 1080 military unit to the area of ​​the planned field trip.

[AsmyppoL]

The document was prepared in machine-printed form, as was customary in peacetime. Remember that the author Vick wrote the same for the design of encryption in two parts. Under the machine-printed text, the erased text “St. Chief of the 1 division of the Operations Division, Lieutenant Colonel U. Petuhov, who was also typed on a typewriter. It is not shown on the scan since we will review this document again in my next comment tomorrow.

Because I feel that users are boiling with indignation: why speaks about 20 in June, if the resolution has a date on 21 in June, I am answering this question. The figure shows a later document asserting that commanders from 20 June 1941 have been drafted into the AC, i.e. 20-th June raised subscription composition were handed the agenda for training fees. Nobody expected that this call for fees will end with a long war.

In addition, I managed to find a financial document for calculating the monetary allowance for commanders called up from the reserve from June 23. Please do not confuse this document with the financial document from the case of extradition of per diems. Money allowance is the salary of the military. The document is dated from the very beginning of July 1941, i.e. when it became clear that the war had begun and the subscription was paid only to 23 June.

Why not paid before? I could not find or clarify how it was paid to find people at the camp before the war. Honored employees of military registration and enlistment offices could only say that at the end of 40-s, when a person was at training camps, he was paid a civil organization in which he worked. Payment was made after returning from fees. The same order existed before the collapse of the USSR. Maybe in the case in question, the money allowance was not paid from 20 to 22 June due to the fact that on Saturday 21 June people worked in their organization, and 22 June had to rest.

For interested users: come back tomorrow and look for the sequel below)))

[AsmyppoL]

Today will not continue. I apologize.
Our guest is another entertaining writer himself.
Martirosyan Arsen Benikovich. His comments under the name MsAr can be seen in the comments of the 26 part.
Self-confident and not confirming comments.
Annealed large. Now you can make an opinion about another science fiction writer who comes up with unsubstantiated versions, just like Kozinkin))

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Today will not continue. I apologize.
Our guest is another entertaining writer himself.
Martirosyan Arsen Benikovich.

As always, you're lying - Martirosyan is not writing here, and the other author, who objected to Madame, is simply the one who understands the military better than you all.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Note that only 18 commanders rise (plus one did not arrive). With the staff of the operations department, even the army headquarters, this is incomparably small in personnel. At the same time, there are no civilian employees (typists) and no draftsmen for the beautiful design of maps. The document also has a resolution with the date 21.6.41g.

What a blatant illiteracy - this "expert" does not know that the staffing of any structure of the district (front) is determined primarily by the number of troops included in it, which is why at the stage of formation the number may be minimal. By the way, the entire operational management of the General Staff in 1941 included 68 servicemen, according to the vacation plan.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

According to my version, two different lines of events occurred from the 20th to the late evening of June 21st, 1941. One of them is planned in May, a study tour of the army or front control, allocated from the MBO.

So where is the annual plan that spelled out these exercises? Do not shy away from the answer, I already asked you this question.

Quote: AsmyppoL

I will cite a date document a little later.

How much to wait? With your version, you do not wait, spread the lie without hesitation.

Quote: AsmyppoL

After the arrival of personnel and enlisted personnel of military unit 1080, they are notified of the deadline for sending them in the Moscow Region for a field study trip on Monday, June 23, 1941.

But this is a new turn - it turns out you have already set up a training in the Moscow Region, but before you convinced everyone that they should have gone 1,5 km from Moscow to study. Why's that?

[Mikhail Zubkov]

In Hitler's deceitful Declaration of 22.6.41. it was argued that the USSR had concentrated about 160 divisions on the borders and had continually carried out provocations at the borders for many weeks. This fact proves that the TOTAL absence of border conflicts and any hostile actions on the part of the USSR did not have, in principle, ANY value, did not affect either the timing or the massiveness of the COALITION attack on the USSR by the Hitlerite bloc. Likewise, the false statements of the Germans did not affect the anti-German positions of the Anglo-Saxons, who were interested in the German invasion of the USSR and the full-scale German-Soviet war. But it was precisely this POSSIBLE change in the positions of the Americans and the British that was the main factor in those fears of Stalin, which were used by Timoshenko, Mehlis and others to disorganize the bringing of the troops of the border districts to alert no. 1 starting from 11.6.41. - it was on this day that the last orders of the covert call of approx. 700 thousand enrolled personnel, which started in NPOs by the decision of the country's top POLITICAL leadership from 25.5.41. only 01.6.41. For this WEEK delay, the NCO and the General Staff of the Red Army are directly responsible. At the same time, the commanders 'vacations continued in the districts, including the highest, with the simultaneous FORCED retention of commanders' families in the border garrisons, which demoralized the troops. The troops continued political propaganda like "there will be no war, we will expose alarmists and provocateurs" and "the German working class will not allow the military to unleash a war", "only individual provocations by the Prussian generals are possible," which in no case should you succumb to. As a result, it was the political staff of the Red Army that actively prevented the bringing of troops to combat readiness, both No. 2 and No. 1, up to 10.00 on 22.6.41, using their influence in the NKVD and special departments, in the military prosecutor's office. These actions of the highest hierarchs of the political department have not yet received any prosecutorial assessment, and are not even investigated by historians. STILL!

[AsmyppoL]

As mentioned above, the 1080 military unit was alerted (on call) on Friday 20.06.41. An alarm was raised as a personnel and subscription composition. In the 1080 military unit, a rather small number of personnel was planned for the trip - a total of 19 people (one of whom did not arrive). After the call, the personnel were dismissed to their homes until June 23.

For the field trip, civilians were not called at all, as they are not in the list of those who did not arrive. The lack of typists and draftsmen testifies to the small amount of work expected during a field study trip. This practice was also in post-war time in the headquarters and in the organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense, when the civilian staff did not always participate in the exercises, which was connected with payment. If the commanding staff working day was not normalized, then for civilian workers it was normalized.

It should be noted that only the commanding staff of the 1 and 4 offices, as well as the secret part of the operative department (in a reduced form) should have been present on the planned trip. The participation of specialists 3-th branch was not provided.

According to the memoirs of A.I. Shishenin: “On Saturday, 21 June, many of my employees, as always, gathered at the dacha. The work at the district headquarters on Saturdays ended at five o'clock, then only the operational duty officers remained there. So it was on that Sabbath day. ” Those. there is no concern in the departments and services of the Moscow Military District after raising the 1080 military unit. It cannot be otherwise, because it is a planned trip. The commander of the district and the head of the engineering service (as described in their memoirs) learned about going to a new place and at a new time only after the start of the war at dawn on June 22. We have reached the end of an independent line of events on the rise of the 1050 military unit to participate in a planned study tour.

[AsmyppoL]

From 21 June 1941 of the year begins a parallel line of developments in terms of the headquarters of the Law Firm.
There is a bike on the Internet: “Early in the morning of June 21, 1941, a warden from the Kremlin, brought Mehlis a new appointment. In anticipation of a "surprise" attack, Stalin returns his assistant to the post of Chief of the Red Army Political Administration". I could not find anything to confirm this statement.

And somehow strange: no one expects the 22 war of June, and here a great insight and the appointment of Lev Mehlis as the main political worker of the SC! A very strange event that is right for the supporters of the expected war with Germany at dawn 22 June 1941.

Let's start in order. Stalin did not like to start work in the early morning. This is known.

On June 20, according to the journal Stalin’s visit to Stalin’s office, Commissar of Defense T. Tymoshenko and Chief of General Staff T. Zhukov were absent all day. Probably, they didn’t have important issues on this day that should have been reported to the leader or discussed with him on the eve of the war. Somehow it is not decent without the military to appoint a new chief of the Main Political Propaganda Department of the SC.

21 June, the time of the arrival of the first visitor (Molotov) in Stalin's office is fixed by "18.27". It turns out that Mekhlis could not be appointed head of the State Administration of the PP KA before the evening of June 21. In addition, there is an order under the Directorate for Main Procurement of Spacecraft #20 of 21 June 1941, signed by the Chief of the Main Political Political Department Propaganda Department of the Army Commissioner 1 of rank A. Zaporozhts. In other words, Mehlis took office not on the morning of June 21, but somewhat later.

And how could it be otherwise, if the draft of the Resolution has not yet been compiled ?! There is no basis for his appointment to the specified position. In the memoirs of the deputy of Mekhlis for the State Control Commission, it is indicated that they did not see him on June 22 and for two more days. It turns out that 21 June he was present at work, but how many was present I do not know.

Only after the drafting of the Resolution was drafted, Mehlis was invited to the next meeting, who arrived late or maybe he was called later.

With 19.05 21.06.41. The first discussions begin on the question of increasing the threat on the Soviet-German border. Already after noon, Stalin was supposed to familiarize himself with the intelligence message that the war with Germany was expected during 48 hours. maybe he didn't believe it.

At this meeting from the military is only the Commissar of Defense. In the same place, a draft of the Decree on the organization of the Law Faculty, on the Chief of the Main Prospecting Department of the Spacecraft, on the direction control and on the leadership of the second-line armies was prepared.

None of the issues under consideration could have any significant impact on the development of events on the border of 22-23 June. All the issues addressed were relatively long-term. Extremely necessary military issues, allegedly awaiting war at dawn on 22 June - the afternoon of 22 June were not considered at this meeting. Notice that the date “during 1-22 of June” also appears in Directive No. 23.

The first meeting begins at 19.05, at which Tymoshenko is present. Zhukov at this time is, as has already been repeatedly stated, at a minor meeting in the GAU. Mehlis appears for the first time in Stalin's office only in 21.55.

[AsmyppoL]

Why began to consider these questions? I did not even look for answers to these questions. It is not interesting. Maybe Marshal V.M. Zakharov was right: “The course of subsequent events showed that some proposals of the Military Council of the District, sent in a memo to the General Staff, were probably taken into account. 21.06.41 The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided to create the LF ... The formation of the LF field administration was not entrusted to the OdVO, as we proposed, but to the Moscow Military District". Since the South-West Federal University and the Law Faculty were to be headed by T. Zhukov, the idea could have come from him. And the same Marshal Zakharov could push this idea.

The planned activities in the 1080 military unit (as in the entire headquarters of the Law Faculty) were violated by the news of the beginning of the war. Consider again the list of persons departing in a military unit 1080 train No. 17564.

We see what changes have occurred in it (we have already reviewed the signature transfer above):
1) two captains were deleted from the list, who departed by special echelon on the evening of June 22.
2) three commanders have been added who were previously absent from the list of persons who appeared on a call - these are new people whom it was decided to take to Vinnitsa.
3) Added 11 military school cadets to be used as trainees, draftsmen, etc. More candidates for command positions and personnel are required to complete a huge number of maps and other documents.
4) Three civilian typists appeared, because the amount of typewritten work will be colossal.

Thus, instead of 19 people who were supposed to participate in the planned trip from the operations department in the updated list of them are already 37 people. The departed 22 June echelon was still 8 commander of the operative department. Total in the operative department of the LF headquarters, as of 23 June, 45 people were registered instead of 19 20 planned for June departure. The departing 22 of June and 23 of June are entitled to an additional allowance - a daily allowance, as when traveling on a business trip.

Later, several more cadets of the frontier school joined the operology department. In July, the 1941 of the year, the personnel of the operative department already composed 52 of a person, incl. 19 people are ministand and privates. By July 20, the number of junior squadrons and privates reached 26 people. In July, there is already an 3 branch in the operative department.

[AsmyppoL]

There is information that on 28.06.41g. The 1080 military unit consisted of about 260 people (of which 160 had mln. and ordinary soldiers), including the headquarters security unit.

I would also like to give a small clarification on the payment of per diems - it turns out that this was the standard practice of that time when sending servicemen (civilian) to the active army. Below is the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. XXUMX “On issuing a lump sum and field money to servicemen of the active army.”

The headquarters of the Law Facility moved to Vinnitsa in two echelons. The first to leave is 22 Jun (after 16.00). It is often called the "special train". The second echelon went 23 Jun. The prefix "special" is not mentioned in its name. Maybe because the first one was unplanned or lettered?

The fact that the headquarters’s departure occurred unexpectedly and does not follow as planned from the memoirs of the commander of the LF, General Tyulenev: “... In the evening of June 22, the train with the field headquarters Yuf left the darkened, stiffened Moscow ... In the evening of June 24 a special train I arrived in Vinnitsa. My amazement and sorrow knew no bounds: The KP front turned out to be completely unprepared - not a single telephone and telegraph apparatus, not a single radio station. I had to mobilize local funds and with their help establish contact with the troops ... "

Examples of mobilizing local funds:
1) M.V. Zakharov: “... I was informed about the arrival of the LF headquarters in Vinnitsa by telephone by Army General I. V. Tyulenev. First of all, he asked me to send him a map with the situation and several telegraph devices, since the echelon with the front communications regiment somewhere on the way was attacked by enemy aircraft and had not arrived at its destination. I had to urgently send an officer of the operations department of the 9 Army headquarters with a map of the situation and several telegraphic devices to Vinnitsa ... ”
2) V.D. Tarasova: "... 22.6.41g. I came to work at the 9 watch, on duty. In the control room at all stations, the lights were on, which meant that there was no connection. There were military men in the telegraph, and the brigadier Nadya Yaskova said that the war had begun. We moved to the barracks position. 30.6.41 at 20 hours, a truck arrived from the LF communications center, and our youth shift was sent to the communications center at the LF headquarters. We were assigned to the telegraph battalion of the 40-th separate communications regiment, which served the headquarters of the Law Faculty. I started a war in the rank of private soldier, at the post of signalist-bodist ... "

Certain moments can only be associated with an unexpected dispatch of the headquarters of the Law Faculty to the theater of military operations that they have poorly studied.
The front commander, while in Moscow, does not know that the means of communication are completely absent at the place of arrival.
The chief of staff of the 9 Army does not know that their army is subordinate to the LF, and not to the LUZF.
Heading to Vinnitsa, the front headquarters does not even know where their checkpoint is located.

[AsmyppoL]

More details about this are written by the head of the engineering department of the Law Department A.F. Khrenov: “... In Kiev, we arrived in the evening of June 23 ... I went to the headquarters departments and offices to obtain references, topographic maps and other documents related to EAs, as well as the road and airfield network in the LF strip. The situation in the headquarters somewhat puzzled me. The offices were deserted - their owners, which was quite natural, ended up in Ternopil. But those who remained were not vested with sufficient authority and did not have access to the documents of interest to me. In the Moscow Military District, the transition to martial law was worked out more clearly.

I was rescued by workers of the Engineering Department who were on the spot. From memory, they described the state of URs, roads and airfields to me. Sketched an approximate layout of the concrete KP in Vinnitsa, on the shores of the Southern Bug, this was exactly where our front-line management should have been located. They also warned that the CP may not have the necessary means of communication and the full calculation of the serving team ...

In Vinnitsa, we arrived at dawn 24 June. Quickly unloaded on the railway branch, wedged into a suburban grove. The scheme obtained in Kiev made it easy to find the command post. We went there by car ... In the evening of the next day, the second echelon of the field control of the front arrived safely ... There was no means of communication in the underground control post. Fortunately, we had our own, which we deployed immediately ... "

The question of the availability of their means of communication is puzzling. Perhaps these are inaccuracies in the memories. For example, in the statement of the combat strength of the units and units of the LF on 1.07.41. It is indicated that the front liaison force includes the 40 th communications regiment, consisting of the 377, 378, 379 line communications battalions, 3, 240, 252 cable pole, 255- telegraphic company and military post station №1.
In the note against all divisions of the 40 communication regiment there is a note “Comes, staffing is specified (front)”. In other words in the evening 1.7.41g. all units of the front line communications regiment only arrive at the location of the front headquarters. There was almost no communication, as evidenced by the recollections of generals Tyulenev and Zakharov.

I was unable to find any information on the 40-th communications regiment (the 40-th separate communications regiment) except that it existed. The arrival of its units only by July 2, 1941, at the disposal of the LF headquarters may indicate that this regiment was deployed only after the start of the war. In other words, the 20 of June 1941 of the school alert raises the 1080 military unit. A frontline regiment of communications, without divisions of which the headquarters of the front (army) cannot exist, does not rise to the same number. Otherwise, the first echelon of the regiment had to leave the capital of 22 or 23 of June. The arrival of the regiment of communication takes place in the period in which the completion of the redeployment of the connections of the 2-th echelon of the covering armies is expected. Do not forget that after the arrival the battalions were still to lay lines of communication to the main recipients associated with the headquarters of the Law Faculty.

There is a memory of the formation of a similar communications regiment. The regiment was also formed in the Moscow Military District. I.Ye.Milkin: “… On the morning of Sunday, June 22, I woke up, but I had not yet got up, and lying in bed, I heard women in the courtyard talking loudly and repeating the word“ war, war ”. "What kind of war are they talking about?" - I thought. I got up, got dressed and went out onto the veranda of the country house ... [Later] I went to the Sverdlovsk District Military Commissariat for appointment to the army. There I introduced myself to the commission as the commander of the radio rotation Immediately, I was appointed commander of the radio battalion of the 67 th separate communications regiment. Two days I was given to receive the material part and the formation of a radio battalion. Recruitment took place on the territory of the military communications unit in the area of ​​Matrosskaya Silence. On the third day of [25.6.41], we left for the North-West Front ... "

It is definitely clear to me now that alarming and the preparation of a draft Ordinance on the Deployment of LF are in no way connected with the expectation of the 22-23 June 1941 war.

[AsmyppoL]

With a new group of comments, I am finishing my consideration of materials on the organization of law firm. The statistical compilation states that on 22.6.41g. there were only eight field front controls. One in each of the districts: LenVO, PribOVO, ZOVOVO, KOVO, Moscow Military District, ZakVO, ZabVO and DVF. It is worth noting that there is no front control in the Arkhangelsk military district. Therefore, it is not a fact that immediately after consideration Notes of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (October 1940g.) began the formation of two front-line controls. One of them (in ArVO) was not even deployed.

Also in the statistical compendium indicated that on 22.6.41g. there were staffs of field control of the front and the army, which are listed in the table. States did not depend on the number of armies in the front (the number of divisions in the army).

There is a note that the management of the fronts and armies included political administrations and divisions, directorates and divisions of the Air Force command, special divisions that were maintained by state. It is clear that the servicemen of the said directorates (departments) are not included in the total number of servicemen listed in the table. Previously, information was provided that by the beginning of July 1941, the number of personnel in the 1080 military unit was about 100 commanders. With the guard unit (they also included military personnel serving the headquarters departments: chauffeurs, typists, draftsmen, etc.), the number of military personnel at the LF headquarters was about 260 people (including staff of the political department, the air force and special departments). Thus, the strength of the field management of the LF could only correspond to the regular strength of the army field control.

Perhaps at the end of 1940 - at the beginning of 1941, an army field control was formed - an 1080 military unit based on an MBO, which could fulfill the role of front-line control in a limited composition. In April, the 1941 of the year when preparing the KShU there was a mention of the consideration of the issue of the organization of LF, but in the end it was decided not to organize it. The existing front-line field administration as part of the Moscow Military District was in principle not prepared for use in any theaters of military operations. There was a tick and all.

[AsmyppoL]

There is a mention of the organization of law firms in the memoirs of General A.F. Khrenov. Major-General A.F. Khrenov was the head of the GU of the military engineering troops of the Red Army in 1940-41. Before the beginning of the war he was appointed to the post of chief of the engineering troops of the Moscow Military District. From 22.6.41 - Head of the Engineering Forces of the Law Faculty. A.F. Khrenova at the Moscow Military District headquarters was warmly welcomed by the commander of the district troops (to Tyulenev) SM.Budenny. Perhaps the formed headquarters should have been used as the headquarters leading the second-line armies. As a result, at the beginning of the war, Marshal Budyonny found himself without a headquarters.

A.F.Hrenov: "...At the beginning of June the commander ... reported that we were ordered to prepare for the functions of field front control. Which one This question has escaped from many.
“I can’t add anything to what I said,” answered Tyulenev.
However, when he began to give orders regarding the nature and content of the training, it was not difficult to guess that " in the event of war, we are to act in the south... »

To put it mildly, the staff of the law firm was not quite ready to fulfill their duties. Below is an excerpt from the book of S.Chekunov “I am writing exclusively from memory ...” by General V.F. Vorobiev, who headed the operational department of the headquarters of the Law Faculty. Major General VF Vorobiev with 25.10.41g. He was chief of staff of 61-st sk (Moscow Military District, Tula).

V.F. Vorobiev: “... On the eve of the war, after graduating from the Academy of the General Staff, I served as chief of staff of 1940 ck (Tula) from 61, preparing for a number of war games in the district and on maneuvers to work in the west direction. 21.6.41 I was appointed totally unexpected for me the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the law firm, which was formed from the staff of the Moscow Military District. I did not study the southern direction and did not know this theater.

The staff of the LF headquarters on 50% was staffed from reserve officers who were drafted into the army for two or three days on the eve of the war. In the operations department, of which I was the head, no one of the called-up officers of the reserve could independently keep a log of military operations, compile a combat report, an operational summary, systematically keep a work card. This is explained by the fact that at the training camp the officers assigned to the district headquarters were not engaged and not used according to the posts they were intended for during the war ...»

In the journal "October" was recorded the conversation K. Simonov talk with General A.Pokrovsky: “... Before the war ... I was the deputy chief of staff of the Moscow Military District. At the same time, Lieutenant-General Zlobin came to work at the NGO. An educated, cleverest person who went to the People’s Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko for the same role that I went to Budyonny ... He became the adjutant general for the people's commissar, and I am the adjutant general for the first deputy, for Budyonny ...

The events of the beginning of the war showed that we were not prepared to organize field management. The provision on the field control of the army in war conditions was not worked out before the war. There were notes, drafts, but there was no such Provision on army field management, Headquarters and, in general, on the transition of the army to martial law ...

That is, there were cadres, but even the presence of the best cadres, knowledgeable, experienced people - this does not in itself create an efficient headquarters. The headquarters is in the work: it must be prepared. And what did we get?

For example, in order to create the headquarters of the law firm, an MBO management was sent there. But MBO management was not in the know. It knew neither this theater, nor these troops, nor all that is connected with the preparatory work that preceded the war in the headquarters of those formations that should be deployed in this particular theater of operations. The headquarters of the Moscow Military District, who arrived there, to the south, and became the headquarters of the law firm, for a long time understood the situation and mastered it. Of course, it was wrong.

We could have, in anticipation of hostilities, we could have, in the south, a pre-formed headquarters of the LF headquarters. And it would have cost not so expensive in peacetime and could have been created not openly, but closed, under a different name ... "

About the rise of the headquarters of the military unit 1080 20.6.41. already mentioned. I will not repeat. Just note that according to the memories of the quartermaster A.I. Shebunin after 17.00 21 June, he went on a day off to the cottage. He is not aware of his participation in the June 21 field trip. After arriving at the Moscow Military District headquarters in 6.00 22 June, he unexpectedly finds himself in the lineup of those departing. This once again confirms that the departure to Vinnitsa of the full staff of law offices 20 and 21 in June 1941 was not envisaged. The departure of an unplanned special train 22 June was so hastily (and unexpected) that nobody knew the situation in the area of ​​their future location at the headquarters of the Law Faculty.

A.F.Hrenov: “... In Kiev, we arrived in the evening of June 23. At the station we waited for the car from the district headquarters. I was among those who went to the headquarters ... I went to the headquarters departments and offices to obtain references, topographic maps and other documents related to fortified areas, as well as the road and airfield network in the southern front. The situation in the headquarters somewhat puzzled me. The offices were deserted - their owners, which was quite natural, ended up in Ternopil. But those who remained were not vested with sufficient authority and did not have access to documents of interest to me ...

I was rescued by workers of the Engineering Department who were on the spot. From memory, they described the state of URs, roads and airfields to me. Sketched an approximate layout of the concrete KP in Vinnitsa, on the shores of the Southern Bug, this was exactly where our front-line management should have been located. They also warned that the KP may not be necessary means of communication and the full calculation of the serving team...

We arrived in Vinnitsa at dawn on 24 June ... Scheme obtained in Kiev allowed it was easy to find the command post ... In the evening of the next day, the second echelon of the field control of the front arrived safely ... As was expected, there was no point in the underground command post. Fortunately, we had our own, which we deployed immediately ... "

About "their means of communication»The information is not entirely correct, since there are memoirs of General MV Zakharov, that the telegraph devices were taken by plane to the LF headquarters after his arrival. There is also a mention in the memoirs of General Tyulenev about the mobilization (withdrawal) of communications on the ground. Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov told the commander of the LF that "... the war is fought not according to plan, but according to the situation that is created as a result of battles ...".

[AsmyppoL]

The statistical compendium states that in order to give all district and front headquarters in time of war there were separate regiments of communication (OPS). As part of the troops of the Moscow Military District, there was only one 1 ops. 40 ops probably began to unfold after the start of the war, as did the 67 ops, which was mentioned earlier (67 ops began the deployment of 22.6 and had to finish it with 25.6). Since the deployment of the front line communications regiment of the LF (40 of the OPS) was not launched on June 20 (when the LF headquarters was raised), the rise of the LF headquarters could not be connected with its advancement in anticipation of the war in Vinnitsa. Without proper communications, the front headquarters is not a headquarters, but only a large group of commanders ...

In peacetime, with each army headquarters there was a separate communications battalion, which, upon completion of the mobilization, was supposed to be increased to a full regiment. Each military district (in wartime — the front) was serviced by its own communications regiment, while other individual regiments of communications were subordinate to the RGC. The pre-war RGC communications troops consisted of 19 separate communications regiments (14 district and 5 army), 25 separate communication battalions, 16 separate special purpose radio battalions (for conducting radio interception) and 17 communication centers (one for NGOs and one for each military district). According to the plans of the General Staff, during the war they had to form the structure of the communications troops from 37 separate communications regiments, 98 separate battalions of wire communications and 298 separate communications mouths. In reality, only 17 regiments (lack of 48,6 percent), 25 battalions (lack of 74,4 percent) and 4 company (lack of 98 percent) were created ...

Also in the statistical compilation it is indicated that on 22 June 1941, the head of the Main Directorate for Political Propaganda was Army Commissar of 1 rank Zaporozhec A.I. This confirms the conclusion I made earlier (when the order of the beginning of the PG of the AI ​​KA AI Zaporozhts on 21.6.41 was shown) that Mehlis was not appointed head of the PG of the PP KA during the day and early evening.

Reading about the Chief of Staff of the OdVO, M.V. Zakharov, in various sources, we should have paid attention to his initiative to bring the district troops in readiness on the eve of the war. The district is fortunate that this remarkable commander was not recalled to Moscow yet 20 June 1941. In his memoirs, MV Zakharov wrote: “... I was in the position of the NSH of the 9 Army until 30 June. On this day, an extract was received from the order of NGOs from 19 June on the release of me from the post of NS OdVO, I acted at the disposal of NGOs. Instead of me, the army army NN was appointed by General PI Bodin ... "

The clever, far-sighted, enterprising commander, who had bothered with his appeals to the leadership of the spacecraft in Moscow, was withdrawn to the NPO without specifying the position that he would later have to occupy. Without prior conversation with him on the subject by phone. The article by the author Vik, devoted to the Leningrad Military District, dealt with the transfer of the district air force commander to KOVO to a similar position to replace General Ptukhin. 23 Jun. General Novikov was supposed to be the Commissar of Defense. There was a preliminary conversation on the phone with the personnel officer NKO. And in the case of General M.V. Zakharov, simply a statement of the recall to the NPO.
Since the troops of the 9 Army compared with the troops of other border districts successfully fought, upon arrival in Moscow, MV Zakharov was offered a fairly high position: “... Arriving in Moscow, I introduced myself to the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army GK Zhukov. He invited me to work as his deputy in the operational rear ... "

As of 21.6.41g. did not have such a position in the staffing of the General Staff. The staffing of the General Staff was changed somewhat later. Something else could have been offered to General Zakharov. In my opinion, he could have been assigned a position in which he could not have shown himself later. Two days after the conversation with G.K. Zhukov, General M.V. Zakharov is appointed to the position of NSH of the Main Command of the North-Western Direction. Since August 1941, he has been transferred down to the post of deputy chief of the Main Directorate of Tyla KA. Probably, this post was intended for him three days before the war. There is a saying in the army: “Initiative is punishable ...”

Although the chiefs of staff on the night of June 22 got a lot of trouble and they made mainly decisions about the rise of troops, and he later got most of the slaps. They, not the top management of the SC ...

Chief of Staff PribOVO (SZF) - shot and later acquitted.

The chief of staff of Zapovo (ZF), together with the commander of the troops (who punctually executed all instructions from Moscow) were shot.

In a month, the chief of staff of KOVO (YuZF) was removed from his post. His successor, General VI Tupikov, signaled an extremely dangerous position at the front twice to the Chief of the General Staff and once to Stalin. The commander of the troops of the South-Western Front and chief of the General Staff is called alarmist ...

The chief of staff of the OdVO (9 Army) was removed from the post on June 19. Only the beginning of the war did not allow it to be recalled to Moscow "for debriefing".

The Chief of Staff of the Law Faculty General Shishenin was removed from July 1 and transferred to a subordinate position. The commander of the law forces of Tulav Law Firm and a member of the Military Council Zaporozhets "signaled" to Moscow that the front headquarters headed by Sishenin "are absolutely helpless in both organizational and operational work", while remaining outside observers.

The only one who did not suffer was the chief of the staff of the Leningrad Military District, General D.N. Nikishov, which was due to a greater extent because of the later start of the war on the northern front and the less skilled and worse equipped (compared to the western borders) enemy.

[AsmyppoL]

I came across a few fragments of interest to me from the memories of Marshal Baghramyan. For most of the members of the forum, this may not be a revelation ... Perhaps, some of the readers may also be interested in this, like me. My thoughts here will practically not be. Only the memories of the marshal ... Relying on reconnaissance materials, which were assessed by the author Vick in the “Unexpected War ...” cycle, you can see that Marshal Bagramyan writes about the lack of intelligence information both on the first day of the war and before it began. In my opinion, the catastrophe is associated with the lack of information about the presence of large moto-tank formations against the KOVO troops. That is what the author, Vic, claimed ...

"...[June 22 morning.] But what was going on in the 5 and 6 armies, in the action bands of which, apparently, the enemy dealt the main blow, we could not figure out for a long time. Telephone and telegraph lines were continually violated. The efforts of the radio operators were also often unsuccessful. It is quite natural that in these conditions neither the head of intelligence, nor I could provide the commander with such information that could satisfy him ...
... There has not yet been any information about the number and composition of the enemy troops that invaded our land, about the direction of their main attack. Therefore, it was impossible to draw detailed conclusions about the intentions of the enemy ...
... On the basis of rare, fragmentary, and sometimes contradictory information received from subordinate headquarters, it was still difficult to draw certain conclusions about the enemy grouping that had invaded Soviet Ukraine and the operational plan of the fascist command ...

... In the strip of our 5 army on the 75-kilometer stretch from Ustyluh to Krystynopol, where the main enemy strike was inflicted and the fate of the entire border battle was actually decided, on the first day of the war only 87-I and 124-I were found, and all the other forces were at a considerable distance. The onslaught before the 8 infantry and 3-4 etc. of the enemy fell upon these two compounds ... One should not forget also the fact that if the main forces of 15 and 22 were able to enter the battle not earlier than the second day of the warthen the 9-th and 19-th micron compounds are at best had time to go to the border in four days...

[Suddenly it turned out that there is not enough transport for the advancement of the mechanized corps.]
... We knew that the 15-th MK is poorly equipped with equipment, but only now we are fully aware of the consequences of this. It was difficult for the corps to have time to intercept the enemy tank column, which was heading southwest from Sokal ...
... Before handing over the order to the corps commander to immediately address the enemy, I sought out General Morgunov, the head of the Front Armored Directorate. I show him the report of Karpezo, please: “Give him at least one car battalion.” Morgunov spreads his hands. Almost the entire front-line vehicles are engaged in the transportation of equipment, weapons and inventories of rifle corps moving from the depths of the territory of the district to the border. There is a small reserve, but it is located in Shepetovka. To transfer it from there, a lot of time is required. So, there is nothing to help the body. And General Carpezo flies a short answer: "Follow the order ..."
... A new alarming request, now from Zhytomyr, from Major-General N.V. Feklenko, commander of 19-th micron. Like the 9 of the MK General KK Rokossovsky, he must hurry to the aid of the 5 of the army. But his motorized infantry is forced to move on foot, and there is nothing to carry artillery, ammunition and food: there are no tractors and cars. The general asks at least 40 vehicles from the district reserve. Alarmed, Kirponos summoned General Morgunov: “Immediately transfer Feklenko to forty vehicles from Shepetovka. All that you have in reserve, send him and Rokossovsky. In Kiev, ask to speed up the provision of mechanized corps with machines and tractors at the expense of mobilization supplies ... "

[Even after the start of the war in the headquarters of the South-Western Front, they are not yet sure of the beginning of the war.]
Every hour it became clear that we are not dealing with a border incident, but with the beginning of a carefully prepared war.... Given to the troops state border cover order - destroy the invading enemy and discard his remnants outside the country - turned out to be unreal. And not only because in the border area we had less power than the aggressor, but also because the attack, in spite of the serious measures taken on the eve of the war to strengthen the fighting strength of our district’s forces, was nevertheless unexpected for us...

[AsmyppoL]

[The lack of reliable intelligence information (before the war and the first day of the war, including the absence of large motor-tank associations in these areas) led to an incorrect assessment of information in the General Staff and the adoption of a disastrous decision. They probably used their pre-war billet from KSHU ...]
By the evening of June 22, none of the command and staff of our front had any thoughts about the possibility of an immediate counteroffensive. Just to survive! Everyone was confident that directives from Moscow would target us to defensive actions. At about eleven o'clock in the evening, the head of the special communications service, Klochkov, informed me that a new operational directive had been passed to the People’s Commissar of Defense. Without waiting for the entire document to be delivered, I began to read its passages as it was received.

The telegram began with an assessment of the situation. It was correctly stated that the enemy strikes the main blow on Vladimir-Volynsky and Radzekhuv, in the center and on the left flank of our 5 army. However, the results of the first day of the war were over-optimistic. It was pointed out that the enemy only at these directions, at the cost of great losses, achieved insignificant success, and throughout the rest of the border with Germany and Romania, the attacks were repulsed with great losses for the attacker. With heavy feeling, I reread these phrases. It was involuntarily thought that the optimism of the estimates in the document from the center was in many ways inspired by our rather vigorous reports.

We in 15 hours, without having exhaustive information, got off, essentially, with general phrases and did not report anything about the breakthrough of two powerful tank groupings - we received accurate information about them only at the end of the day ...

... Looking now at our first reconnaissance and operational reports, I am bitterly convinced: they did not reflect all the great danger that threatened the troops of the northern flank of our front. What, for example, information about the enemy, attacking our 5-th army, could tell our front razvodchiki? They noted that in the Lyuboml area one infantry division is comingin the direction of Vladimir-Volyn - one infantry and one tank, and the southern, to the very border with the 6 th army, - two more German infantry divisions.

It turned out that in the whole band of the army comes just five enemy divisions. Given that we had four rifle divisions not far from the border, the situation, of course, did not seem so threatening. From this and proceeded our directive. After all, neither the Commissar, nor the Chief of the General Staff was still aware that from Sokal rushed to Radzehuv on a free area from our troops German motorized body and that the same corps seeks to break from Ustyluga to Lutsk. When we more realistically assessed the threat to the right flank of our front, our reports, which did not reflect the full gravity of the threat, were already in Moscow. Probably, the same errors in the assessment of the forces of the enemy that invaded the country were made by other fronts.

Based on these, the High Command now set tasks for 23 and 24 June. The troops of our front were instructed: “Holding the state border with Hungary firmly, concentric strikes in the general direction on Lublin by the forces of the 5 and 6 armies, at least five mechanized corps, and the entire front aviation, surround and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the front Vladimir -Volynsky, Krystynopol, by the end of 24.6 to seize the area of ​​Lublin ... "I caught my breath. After all, this is an impossible task! .. But there was no time to think. Grabbing the document, I run to the chief of staff of the front. On the way I estimate in my mind what suggestions I can make to him.

When I read the telegram to Purkaev, he looked at me with obvious disbelief, grabbed the form and re-read it several times. Quickly exchange views. They agree: to advance prematurely. Taking the map of the situation from me and taking the directive, Purkaev silently signaled me to follow him. We go to the commander of the front.
- What are we going to do, Mikhail Petrovich? - began Purkaev from the threshold. - We would, thank God, stop the enemy at the border and disarray him in defensive battles, and they demand from us the day after tomorrow to capture Lublin!

General Kirponos, as usual, did not rush to conclusions. Silently stretched his hand over the document, carefully read it. Pick up the phone:
- Nikolai Nikolayevich, come, please, to me.
The member of the Military Council was, as always, vigorous and energetic. The Commander handed him a directive. Quickly running through his eyes, Vashugin leaned back in his chair and owned those present.
- So what, comrades, the order is received - you need to perform.
“That's the way it is, Nikolai Nikolayevich,” Purkaev said, “but we are not ready for it now.” We still have to think about defense, not about the offensive.

Vashugin even got up. The chief of staff resolutely continued:
- Let's take a sober look at the situation. Only in the Lutsk direction, in the lane between Lyuboml and Sokal, ten enemy infantry and tank divisions are advancing. What can we oppose to them? We know that only two regiments of our forty-fifth, sixty-second, eighty-seventh and one hundred twenty-fourth infantry divisions were deployed here. Their third regiments are still on the march. Tomorrow, in this area, at best, we will have 135-th SD and two 22-m divisions. [41-th TD will not have time to come.]

(With her [41-Id]) there was a clear discrepancy; having opened the package with an extract from the army plan to cover the border, the division commander literally from under the Germans’s nose led off his unit from the Vladimir-Volynsky area and headed for the northeast, apparently Kovel, where the plan was to focus the entire 22 unit. There was no connection with the division by either the commander or the corps commander by the end of the day. Potapov sent the headquarters commanders to search, but it is not known where she is or what's wrong with her.

“Thus,” Purkayev summed up, “tomorrow we will be able, in the best case, to gather less than seven of our divisions against a dozen enemy divisions. What kind of immediate offensive can we talk about?
Not allowing himself to try and kill Vashugin, Purkaev continued:
“Besides, it should be expected that the enemy today brought only the first echelon of his forces into battle, and in the following days, of course, there will be - and much faster than we - build up strength. You look, - the chief of staff jabbed a pencil into the map, - only here, to the north-west of Ustyluh, at sixteen o'clock our intelligence noted a concentration of over two hundred enemy tanks. And this is not the only area where enemy tank reserves are found.
Taking advantage of the fact that Purkaev was silent for a moment while examining the map, a member of the Military Council impatiently asked: "Is everything you, Maxim Alekseevich?"
- No, not all.

Without taking his eyes off the map, the chief of staff continued to develop his thought. All of our second-tier troops, which are being advanced from the depths of the 5 Army, are located at different distances from the border: 31-m and 36-ck need to go 150-200 kilometers. This will take at least five to six days, considering that the infantry follows on foot. 9-th and 19-th micron will be able to concentrate and go on the offensive against the enemy main attack group no sooner than in three or four days. And only 4, 8 and 15-th MK have the opportunity to regroup into the battle area in one or two days ...

... It turns out that our main forces cannot approach the battlefield at the same time. The corps will apparently get involved in the battle in parts, as they will have to face the German forces rushing eastwards. There will be a counter battle, and under the most unfavorable conditions for us. Than this threatens us, it is difficult to fully imagine now, but our situation will certainly be difficult. With every word, Purkaeva Kirponos and Vashugin grew gloomy. NN Vashugin no longer tried to kill the chief of staff.

Purkaev put his hand on the map: “We, comrade commander, can only report to Moscow on the current situation and urge to change the task. Now we can only stubbornly restrain the advancement of the enemy, and in the meantime organize, by rifle and mechanized corps, our second echelon, a solid defense in the depth of the front line of action on the line of the former Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky, Shepetovsky, Starokonstantinovsky and Proskurovsky URs ...

... For a moment there was silence. General Kirponos, in deep thought, twisted a pencil in his hands. The corps commissioner spoke first: “Everything that you say, Maxim Alekseevich, - he approached the map, - from a military point of view, perhaps correctly, but politically, in my opinion, completely wrong! You think like a special military expert: the alignment of forces, their relationship and so on. Do you take into account the moral factor? No, do not count! And you thought what moral damage would be caused by the fact that we, who brought up the Red Army in a high offensive spirit, will pass to passive defense from the first days of the war, leaving the initiative in the hands of the aggressor without resistance! And you also propose to allow the fascists into the depths of the Soviet land! .. ”

[AsmyppoL]

[Even possessing more complete intelligence, the Chief of the General Staff, confident of the correctness of his actions, does not cancel the counterattacks of the Soviet troops ...]
At this time, the chief of the General Staff, Army General GK Zhukov, arrived to us ...

... There were many reasons for the success of the Nazis in these areas. One of them was that, in peacetime, we were developing a plan to cover the state border, considered the most important Krakow-Lviv direction. We thought that it was here, where the powerful railway line leading from the depths of Poland to Lviv took place, and there was a well-developed network of highways and dirt roads, the fascists would first of all concentrate their forces. The area pushed to the west with such a large city as Lviv, and we considered it as a favorable springboard in the event of our transition to broad offensive actions. It was not by chance that two of our most well-equipped and most combat-ready MKs, the 4 and 8, were aimed at this direction.

And here is another important operational direction - Lublin-Lutsky - we have not given due importance. Although here the bordering territory of Nazi-occupied Poland pretty deeply went to the east, hanging from the north over Lvov, but there were no good approaches to this from the west. AND It was hard to imagine that it was this region that the Fascist command uses to concentrate its large offensive group. Therefore, in our plan to cover the border, there was provided for less tactical density of the first echelon troops than on the Lvov direction. Moreover, at the junction of the 5 and 6 armies, which were located in this zone, for a considerable distance the border area was covered only by border guard units.

This does not mean at all that we did not care about covering the Lublin-Lutsk direction. In addition to 22 of the MK 5 of the army, which was located near the border, the command expected, if necessary, to transfer here the 15 of the MK of front line command, the formations of which in 100 — 150 kilometers ... In addition, it would be possible within three to four days to tighten two more mechanized corps from the second echelon of the district: from the Novograd-Volynsky area - the 9 corps of General Rokossovsky and from the Zhytomyr region - the 19 corps of General Feklenko. But the reader already knows that events did not evolve as we expected. The attack of the Nazis was so sudden and swift that not only the second echelon corps, but even the rifle divisions that were part of the 5 Army, did not have time to reach the border in advance and turn around to repel the aggressor... »

[AsmyppoL]

Greetings to those who still get to these lines in my research. Over the past period, we managed to collect some clarifying material. I cite a part of it (a part, probably, will appear in the article by 22 in June - if it will be possible to publish it). In particular, according to the list below.

I wrote above that this list was updated after the start of the war. The list contains specialists of the USS (cryptographic staff service, which by the beginning of the war was part of the operations department or management).

From the specialists of the ShShS represented on the list, it was established that Nikolay L. Lyubimov (called Moskvoretsky RVK, Moscow), lt Platonov Mikhail Ilyich (Moskvoretsky RVK), Lt Yumatov Anton Sergeevich (Sovetsky RVK, Moscow ), ml. l-t Kochko Joseph Lazarevich (Kirovsky RVK Moscow), ml.l-t Belousov Viktor Pavlovich (Krasnopresnensky RVK Moscow) were called up from the reserve 22 June 1941 of the year. Only after the start of the war. When the headquarters of the 1080 20 Jun military unit was raised, the WSS specialists did not rise. Therefore, their participation in the expected field headquarters on June 23 was not required. Why do you need to have a lot of cryptographic specialists at the exercises? Probably, during the exercise, no significant exchange of encryption between connections was assumed. Everything changed after the start of the war.

[AsmyppoL]

The same is true of typists and draftsmen from the operational department of the Moscow Military District. Of all the draftsmen and operative typists, only the draftsman of the Red Army Silaev and the typist Ushakov were included in the list at the last moment (they are written in pencil at the end of the list).

The typists Savchuk, Berezhkovskaya and Ushakov (later the surname of the typist Zakharova appears in the documents of the operative department of the Southern Front headquarters) were not planned for the field trip before the start of the war and did not go through the lists.

The documents of Savchuk Antonina Petrovna, Berezhkovskaya Zinaida Alekseevna and Zakharova Antonina Nikolaevna indicate the date of entering the service - 22 June 1941 of the year. All of them went through a war without military ranks: there is a b / c mark (without a title).

Of the draftsmen who found themselves in the operational department of the headquarters of the Southern Front, only Ryabinov Mikhail Aleksandrovich was able to be restored. Called Kiev RVK Moscow 22 June 1941 of the year.


Regarding the cadets included in the staff of the 1080 military unit headquarters. It was possible to establish only two cadets of the Higher Border School (Moscow), who entered the school in 1940 year. This is Gazenklever Yuri Evgenievich and Nagarnikov Vladimir Demyanovich. In connection with the beginning of the war, cadets who entered the school in the 1940 year, starting from the 22 number, began to be sent to military units sent to the front or stationed in defensive positions. 21 of June, no one was going to send these cadets to another department - the Red Army.

[AsmyppoL]

The cadets of the frontier schools did not stay long at the headquarters of the Law Faculty and did not make a big career. In July, 1941 Nagarnikov V.D. gets into the troops of the NKVD, and in March 1945, he fights with the rank of foreman. Gazenklever Yu.E. in September 1943 of the year serves as a junior lieutenant.

Together with the commanders of the 1080 22 military unit of the June 1941, the following commanders are called up for the 22.6.41 RVC of Moscow: Titov T.I. (road department of the home front of law firm), Osipov I.Ya. (supply department of the sanitary management of the LF), Simakov PI (Department of Fuel Supply of the Law Faculty) and other commanders of the headquarters of the Law Faculty. If you recall the memories of the quartermaster Major-General Shebunin A. I .: “...On Saturday, 21 June, many of my employees, as always, gathered at the dacha. The work at the district headquarters on Saturdays ended at five o'clock, then only the operational duty officers remained there. So it was on that Sabbath day... "Probably the commanders of the rear control for alarm 20.6.41g. They did not raise that once again testifies to the surprise of the dispatch of the headquarters of the Law Faculty to the south before the start of the war.

Although, as General Khrenov wrote, in early June of 1941, the year: "...In early June, the commander assembled the district command staff and informed us that we were ordered to prepare for the functions of the field front control. Which one This question has escaped from many.
“I can’t add anything to what I said,” answered Tyulenev.
However, when he began to give orders regarding the nature and content of the training, it was not difficult to guess "that in the event of war we will have to act in the south... »

[AsmyppoL]

There is encryption from 24.6.41: "To the Chief of Staff of ArVO ... To change the directive of the General Staff ... from 19.06.1941, the field front control provided for in the deployment scheme do not shape. It is necessary to form the army field administration with service agencies, security guards, the editorial office and the printing office of the army newspaper ... The formation of the field front management, the editorial staff and the printing office of the front newspaper is completely removed. V.Sokolovsky»

It is possible that the headquarters of the Moscow Military District could receive encryption of similar content. If we assume that this is so, then the time is not known when it was necessary to complete the formation of both field front-line controls. This term could not have been 22 June, because the front office in ArVO 24.6.41 was not formed yet, and the personnel of various services of the 1080 military headquarters (LF headquarters) in Moscow was called only on 22 June due to the start of the war.

In my opinion, the field trip of the operative department (of incomplete composition) 23.6.41 was the training of the commanders of the department, called up from the reserve, to work in their specialty. As the head of the operational department of the Law Department pointed out in his memoirs, the person called up from the reserve was completely unprepared to carry out his duties. And the departure to the Vinnitsa of the LF headquarters itself was probably planned in a week.

It may also be noted that the platoon of the 9 motorcycle regiment of the 7 mechanized corps departed from the camps before Molotov’s speech, receiving ammunition and food. It is likely that most motorcyclists have departed south. In the composition of the column were and cars (mobilized or in the staff of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District). Need more search documents.
For example, Y.P. Finogenov. 22.6.41 called was sent on the M-1 south to the location of the headquarters of the law firm.