Military Review

The operational and tactical skills of the militia of the South-East of Ukraine. Ending

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Militiamen, faced with a knownly stronger rival, were forced to fight from the very beginning on the principle of “if you want to live, know how to spin”. The Ukrainian troops, on the contrary, tried to fairly straightforwardly cover the entire territory of LDNR with a kind of gigantic stranglehold, in the hope of cutting off the rebels from Russia. After the failure of the plan, it was decided, in the manner of a blitzkrieg, to inflict dissecting blows in several directions, leaning against all available tanks and light armored vehicles. At the same time, of course, they did not forget about the massive use of artillery. At first, it worked and endangered the integrity of the defense and territory of the LPR, but the Ukrainian units eventually got bogged down in exhausting battles on the territory of the Southeast. Serviceable tanks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were methodically knocked out, due to which, for example, they were not enough for Ilovaisk, and "ideological" volunteer battalions at the legendary "Shushpantsers" were sent to battle.




At the same time, the self-defense of Donbass cannot be called absolutely perfect and devoid of flaws. First of all, this is a limited human resource: there are still too few armed people at the front, opposing the enemy army. In addition, their contribution was made by the attacks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the civilian population, as well as refugees who reduced the mobilization resource of the territory. A serious disadvantage of the militia, especially in the initial period of the war, was the shortage of all types of weapons, including conventional small arms. There was a shortage of ammunition and artillery ammunition. This was one of the reasons hindering the growth in the number of LDNR fighters. Frequent attacks by sabotage groups from Ukraine sowed fear in the minds of some civilians in Donbass and increased the confusion in populated areas. After that, some simply refused to take it in their hands. weapon and stand up to defend their land, fearing retribution even deep in the rear. By 2016, these contradictions were eliminated, and now only in one DPR the number of regular armed units exceeds 40 thousand fighters. Small arms and heavy armored vehicles in the near future, qualitatively and quantitatively, may be equal to the armament of the enemy. But everything looks rosy if you do not look at Ukraine, in the armed forces of which there are more than 160 thousand people and another order of 1 million in reserve! Only tanks in varying degrees of combat readiness 2890 copies, 8217 armored combat vehicles, 1302 SAU units of various calibers, 1669 copies of the artillery barrage and around 620 MLRS. Even if no more than 30% goes into battle of all this (due to a lousy technical condition), such an armada will have to be considered at least. And in LDNR there is practically no stock of equipment with spare parts even in a faulty form. A more positive situation was with uniforms due to the fact that many were equipped at their own expense, as well as through the channels of the "Voentorg".

The operational and tactical skills of the militia of the South-East of Ukraine. Ending


The problem of 2014-2015's confrontation with Ukraine was the actual absence of a single command, as well as the rivalry of field commanders for leadership. Bezler, Strelkov, Khodakovsky, Mozgovoy, Bednov, Kozitsyn and others at various times claimed leadership positions in the politics of Novorossia. At the same time, this did not result in large-scale fratricidal bloodshed, and in the face of an external threat, field commanders (atamans) managed to unite efforts. There were even attempts to create a council of field commanders — Mozgovoy and Strelkov took the initiative, but failed to gather it. Later, the strengthening of the power vertical both in the DPR and in the LPR did not pass without bloodshed - the most recalcitrant were physically destroyed.



Now about the strong operational and tactical qualities of the militia of Donbass. First of all, this is an extraordinary flexibility, boldness and decisiveness of commanders, as well as a powerful charisma that attracts at least the minimum number of fighters to the ranks of self-defense. Such examples, of course, were Arseniy “Motorola” Pavlov and Mikhail “Givi” Tolstoy. In some situations, only their determination and courage could turn the tide of combat operations on entire sectors of the front. But the rank and file of the militia was excellently prepared for combat, this was especially expressed in comparison with the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ATU). The superiority of the forces of self-defense was in the moral and psychological aspect, which was expressed in the entry into the battle with a much superior in number enemy. Thus, in the summer of 2014 of the year near Lomovatka, one militia unit was able to hold an entire column of armored vehicles moving in the direction of Bryanka. There were (attention) in the militia six fighters who held back three armored personnel carriers, a tank and several Uralov with a mass of ATO fighters. 13 of August of the same year, the infantry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as volunteers, marauders, richly flavored with the five T-64, several self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles entered Miusinsk. The Motorola unit met them only with 80 fighters, one BTR and three to five mortars. The final was the battered center of the city and the retreating forces of the ATO.

In these examples, the readiness of the militia to contact battle was manifested, which distinguishes them favorably from the APU. Of course, the “ideological” Ukrainian volunteers also eagerly went to combat contact, but, apart from the burning desire to kill, the necessary skills that former people from Maidan were deprived of are vital. And those who had the skills, that is, the rank and file of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, were only ready to go on the scorched earth after the artillery fire shaft. In addition, some militiamen had considerable experience of not just serving in the army, but also participating in military conflicts, for example, in Chechnya. They became a kind of mentor for the young recruiting, and in combat with the APU in many ways copied the techniques and tactics of the Caucasian conflict.



Ivan Konovalov, director of the political conjuncture, said: “I was on both Chechen campaigns, and today I see how experienced militia members use their experience. This can be seen in uniform, equipment, tactics. Some even cut their beards, as in that war. And most importantly, the militia here is complete freedom of action. For them, the statute does not work, they fight as it suits them. This can also explain serious tactical successes, in particular, in the work of the DRG ”. Do not forget that the overwhelming majority of the militias are fighting over the territory, which they know very well, and in the conditions of the semi-partisan conflict this is a serious advantage over the enemy. A typical militiaman is a mature man 30-40 years old, and sometimes even a 50-year-old, which also leaves a definite imprint on the tactics of combat. More experienced militia fighters are more successful than 20-year-old calves from the next call of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of survival and are much more stable psychologically.



The majority managed to serve in the army, many were contract soldiers, which makes them much more professional users of weapons than their opponents on the other side of the front. This is the reason for the victory of the militia specialists in an artillery duel with the "gunners" of Ukraine. Tactics of predominantly smuggling was much more effective than reckless and ruthless shelling of settlements in Donbass by ATO forces. In addition, the general level of technical competence of the population of the industrialized Donbass played into the hands of self-defense forces: equipment, in particular, was recovering much faster and re-engaging. Previously, the Ukrainians militiamen entered into battle homemade drones with installed security cameras. This was one of the reasons for the refusal of self-defense forces from the bloody assaults of the dominant heights. Now, even for reconnaissance in the interests of artillery, a single Chinese or self-made drone is sufficient.

The temporary outcome of the Ukraine-LDNR confrontation was a relative lull, which cannot be interpreted otherwise than the victory of the Donbas self-defense forces. With such a gigantic imbalance of the initial forces, the militias managed to bleed and wear down the enemy, who now has much less motivation for the war.
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The operational and tactical skills of the militia of the South-East of Ukraine. Part of 1
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  1. Fedorov
    Fedorov 19 October 2018 07: 20
    -4
    And the fact that there are a few FSB officers and “Russian vacationers, doesn’t say anything?” They checked me right away - who is, where, where he studied, who is dad and who was the first commander., And the size of my feet, and I have a damn 46, even knew about it.
  2. tasha
    tasha 19 October 2018 07: 27
    +4
    In addition, some militiamen had considerable experience not only in military service, but also in participating in military conflicts, for example, in Chechnya.

    Well, Christmas trees, sticks. How could Ukrainian militia citizens, for example, take part in the Chechen wars, is this not the other side?
    This is the merit of thousands of volunteers from Russia, about which the author is somehow silent.
    1. Fedorov
      Fedorov 19 October 2018 07: 39
      +4
      Then they were not yet militias. Serve-fight with many in the blood for a Just cause for the Country-Fatherland-Homeland, but not for the state, sometimes fails. So there is nothing surprising there. There are examples right next to me across the road (I came to my mother), a colonel of the Russian army, and started as a citizen of Ukraine in Chechnya.
      1. NEOZ
        NEOZ 19 October 2018 09: 37
        0
        Quote: Fedorov
        Country-Fatherland-Homeland, but not for the state

        and what is the difference between a country / fatherland / homeland / state?
        1. bayard
          bayard 19 October 2018 21: 35
          +2
          Donetsk.
          There were past Chechnya and veterans of Afghanistan, remember Shuravi - a participant in the storming of Amin’s palace. Many who passed Chechnya were drafted into the Soviet Army from Ukraine, fought in the officer rank, someone on a contract, then returned home ...
        2. Pax tecum
          Pax tecum 29 November 2018 02: 02
          0

          NEOZ:
          ... and what is the difference between a country / fatherland / homeland / state?

          The difference is between the basis and the superstructure.
          The state is a system of organization of society in a certain territory.
          The homeland-land on which you and your kind (people) live, the Fatherland is what the fathers bequeathed, the covenant of their ancestors, the social and cultural environment.

          What you prefer to fight depends on your personal beliefs.
    2. BAI
      BAI 19 October 2018 09: 12
      +2
      On the side of the militia, a Chechen volunteer battalion fought. The general public became known after the conflict with the Georgian battalion from the Ukrainian side.
      1. Andrey VOV
        Andrey VOV 19 October 2018 11: 35
        -1
        After May 2014, the number of Chechen volunteers became much smaller, the number of battalions in no way
        1. bayard
          bayard 19 October 2018 21: 41
          +1
          Donetsk.
          They were then, and at the beginning of 2015, they were simply not one unit, separate groups. They fought well ... but there was also a tendency to looting.
  3. BAI
    BAI 19 October 2018 09: 10
    0
    The increasing raids of sabotage groups from Ukraine spread fear in the minds of some civilian Donbas and increased the confusion in the settlements ....... By 2016, these contradictions were resolved,

    Something in the light of the events of recent days - it does not seem.
    1. NEOZ
      NEOZ 19 October 2018 09: 37
      0
      Quote: BAI
      the light of recent events

      in the light of what events?
      1. BAI
        BAI 19 October 2018 12: 41
        +1
        For example - Zakharchenko.
    2. Jerk
      Jerk 19 October 2018 11: 22
      +1
      How to say, at least art correctors do not walk around Donetsk in herds, as it used to be
  4. Jerk
    Jerk 19 October 2018 11: 21
    +1
    Well, at first it was with the gunners that the militia was quite tight on the contrary))) It was literate with the artillerymen, it happened - there are mortars, but what to do with them - but who knows?
  5. Dead hand
    Dead hand 19 October 2018 21: 22
    0
    Quote: Fedorov
    And the fact that there are a few FSB officers and “Russian vacationers, doesn’t say anything?” They checked me right away - who is, where, where he studied, who is dad and who was the first commander., And the size of my feet, and I have a damn 46, even knew about it.

    Fedorov, did you work there from the Ministry of Defense?
  6. serge siberian
    serge siberian 4 January 2019 16: 52
    +1
    Learning is never too late, but it is better to learn from the mistakes of others. Yes, and volunteers with experience are still in abundance.