Russia's nuclear strategy through the eyes of Western analysts
Madame Oliker begins with the fact that in Washington near government circles are very popular talk about the fact that Russia has "returned." It is necessary to understand - I figured out the main heap of internal problems, became strong and confident again, and returned to the place waiting for us only one of the two superpowers. How dare they — after all, we lost the Cold War, as V. Churkin (now deceased) reproached his colleague in the UN Security Council. And Americans are very worried about the fact that the Russian Federation, which has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world (and strategic, and especially non-strategic / tactical), is actively investing in the production of new types of tactical nuclear weapons, including small and especially small capacities, which are convenient for limited ( regional, in the terminology of the current military doctrine of the Russian Federation) wars, or even for local wars of high intensity.
Considering that regrettable fact (which Olga, Ms. "forgot" to mention) that the USA has an extremely weak potential for tactical nuclear weapons in the form of several hundred bombs, that is, weaponswhich is not confidently delivered to the target, and unable to respond in the same way due to the lack of nuclear weapons production in the medium term, this is especially worrisome for Washington. They are also worried about the ongoing reconstruction, strengthening and expansion of both central and advanced 12 GU MO arsenals, in particular, American sources report extensive work in the Kaliningrad special defense area and in the Crimea, they say, they see it from satellites. And even the capacity of these renewable arsenals was somehow estimated - approximately by 8 thousand units, supposedly only non-strategic nuclear weapons. By and large, I want to advise our counterparts to stop scratching Honduras - and he will stop disturbing them, because this is our territory, what we want on it, then we dig and build. And posting too. We do not bother you to build something, say, in California or Alaska? But back to the second Olga and her material.
The enhanced development of TNW, including low power, convinces analysts in the United States that the Russian government is prone to “push the nuclear button” first in a future war, quickly eliminating the enemy’s main groupings to convince them not to aggravate the situation. triarii ", as the Romans used to say. Triarii in this case - this is Russia's strategic nuclear forces, of course. Such a strategy exists and is called "escalation for de-escalation." It was developed, according to the author, in 90, when the refusal of the Brezhnev promise of “no first use” was declared (in fact, no one ever intended not to apply first, the notion of “strike at the appointed time” was not excluded from the strategy, nor was it excluded now). And then the principle of this very “escalation for de-escalation” was declared, based on the fact that the Russian Armed Forces in the ordinary component were then weak, and NATO had not yet decayed to the extent that it is now. Approximately in 1999, under Primakov, and then under Putin, this thesis was born, according to Oliker. She also believes that the main problem is not in this strategy, but in misunderstanding of Moscow’s intentions in the nuclear sphere, they say, in Washington, they don’t understand us and our intentions, making wrong conclusions and making wrong decisions, and Russia is allegedly “unable” to communicate its vision to Washington.
However, its policy of deliberate ambiguity raises fears in Washington, leading to a dangerous escalation cycle, which inevitably aggravates suspicion and increases the risk of escalation of clashes.
Olga Oliker believes that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation abandoned the strategy of "escalation for the sake of de-escalation", referring to the extreme editions of our military doctrine, they say, it says that Russia will use nuclear weapons only in two circumstances: either in response to an attack with weapons of mass destruction nuclear or other, or in the face of the usual offensive that threatens “the very existence of the state." And now the provision on non-nuclear strategic deterrence forces has been added (and these have already been created and are operational, and have proven their effectiveness in Syria - talking about various carriers of cruise and ballistic missiles in non-nuclear equipment, the number of which has increased by an order of magnitude and will grow even more, and the number of missiles is 30 times). That is, Oliker believes, Moscow does not adhere to aggressive nuclear behavior and is not inclined to cling to a nuclear pistol. They say Russia is not on the path of reducing the threshold of nuclear use, but increasing it. But the active development of non-strategic nuclear forces "confuses Washington with a correct understanding" of our nuclear strategy.
Oliker, however, demonstrates a lack of knowledge on the issues of our tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. For example, she believes that our arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, “by the most conservative estimates,” is of the order of 2000 units. Do readers need to be reminded that these estimates come from the unforgettable analyst Christensen from the Federation of American Scientists, and the assessment method is approximately as reliable as predicted by cracks in the ceiling and divination on the bones of a roasted rabbit? Somehow it was possible to consider his methodology on this resource. She also believes that the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Iskander-M complex and the Kyrgyz Republic and the Kyrgyz Republic are currently used as non-nuclear. This is strange, because the development of both weapons complex assumed nuclear use from the very beginning, and it would not have happened if these systems were purely non-nuclear. Moreover, the appearance of the SBCh of these complexes is even known (more precisely, the appearance of the warheads is in special equipment, because the appearance of the SBCh itself is just a secret, and even the Americans are much more open about this issue). Moreover, in open access it is possible, if desired, obviously, to the analysts of the American centers missing, to detect signs of intensive development and other modern non-strategic SBCh and weapon systems - torpedoes, bombs, warhead RCC, and others.
Then O. Oliker, as they say, suffered a little. I will quote:
This is called “fit to answer”! In fact, active exercises with the use of such weapons cannot be viewed from the perspective of either “or-or”, but only “and”! It may well be as exercises on the use of these tools, both non-nuclear and nuclear, too. Moreover, the development of "actions in the conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction" is now again receiving much attention, as well as in the development of promising technology, in particular, armored vehicles, although not always. As well as the formation of non-nuclear deterrent forces and the generally more "calm" attitude of the Russian Federation to the possibility of conducting large-scale hostilities with non-nuclear means also does not mean a "rejection" of the policy of "escalation for the sake of de-escalation" or return to the promises of non-use first. This only means a change in both internal military realities and external.
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, following the country, may have returned, not yet to the desired level, but to some necessary “tone”, have proved their capabilities in various conflicts over the past several years (yes, such a definition is appropriate). And at the same time, our main opponents greatly lost their combat power, despite the growth in the number of NATO members, the real potential did not grow, but fell many times, if this is not to evaluate the real combat effectiveness of the units. Also, the experience of military operations has clearly shown that, for example, such a "bugbear" of recent decades, as a massive strike of non-nuclear missile defense, is no longer a problem of the highest degree of difficulty for air defense air defense systems of airborne forces, air defense air forces, aviation VKS and means of electronic warfare of Russia. Including therefore, as one of the scenarios (no more and no less), the “protracted" non-nuclear period may well be considered along with the unacceptable damage to the enemy by non-nuclear means. Yes, yes, we have this potential, and it will continue to develop, including with the help of hypersonic missiles. Although the popular idea of delivering non-nuclear strikes to the Avangard anti-tank missile system in its non-nuclear version and its counterparts can hardly be considered very promising - because the British and, possibly, in the future, the Americans, have especially low power warheads on Trident-2 SLBMs cannot be a substitute for nuclear weapons. Because the launch of an ICBM or SLBM, even with a telemetry disc, but not toward the proving ground, is a danger of the highest level, and they will react accordingly.
Oliker also believes that the lines from the new naval doctrine of the Russian Federation on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in escalating the conflict for its de-escalation cannot be taken literally. She believes that if the desire of the Russian Federation to lower the threshold of use was, it would be clearly translated in public documents, and not in a separate passage. And here she is clearly wrong again. The point is quite different. Russia is not just "cannot explain the essence of its nuclear policy in the non-strategic field." We have excellent diplomats, the best in the world, probably, in the field of strategic stability - in particular. The same START-3 Agreement is a fairly clear indicator of this. Separate "muddy" statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on nuclear issues are not an indicator. Especially since they may have a dual purpose. Russia, if it wants, can bring whatever it wants to the "partners." Another thing is that the "partners" lately demonstrate the inability to understand even simple words and phrases that would be more appropriate not for the Foreign Ministry, but for Sergei Shnurov, not that something more complicated. Apparently, the virus of universal dullness. But the question is not in understanding from the other side, but in the fact that in this particular case - the designation of the nuclear threshold, Russia is benefited by some uncertainty.
The development of the tactical nuclear weapons arsenal, moreover, diverse and developed, provides a very flexible and powerful tool for mixing any opponents with the upper soil layers, no matter how many. And a certain ambiguity of intentions and a real threshold for the use of nuclear weapons gives flexibility in decisions without constraining the higher military-political leadership within the framework of the rules established once, which may well not be appropriate in this case. And, most importantly, the lack of clarity with this issue is a very serious deterrent for "partners." Let them suffer and think, whether in response to a large-scale military conflict, the taciturn guys from 12 GU MO will deploy PRTB, deliver nuclear missiles, bombs, torpedoes, SBCh for cruise and ballistic non-strategic missiles, for anti-ship missiles and so on. Whether they are in the outset of the conflict they will get a nuclear bat on the baseball cap (as they say, baseball in the Russian Federation is unpopular, except for one aspect of this boring game), or later. Whether at all in a situation like the one that could, but did not happen, this spring in Syria. At the same time, Washington is well aware (Trump may not understand, judging by his statements and tweets, he has strange knowledge about the nuclear missile field) that going for a non-strategic nuclear escalation is a loss, and for the strategic one - at best. for the US and NATO, the case of mutual destruction.
And just to find out the real intentions of the Russian leadership on the threshold of application - this is very important for our "dear partners." Perhaps this is where a similar analyst comes from, like Ms. Oliker’s article - to get some intelligible explanations from official sources. It is worth noting, however, that she noted that the development of non-strategic systems may have one of the goals of the very policy of “ambiguity of intentions” mentioned above, but since this contradicted its basic ideas that the Russian Federation is necessarily considering such a conflict as the prelude to the exchange of massive nuclear-missile strikes (MRLN) of the SNF of the parties, she did not develop the theme. On the other hand, she focused attention on V. Putin's famous phrase about whether we need a world without Russia, from which she based her speech on the fact that Moscow supposedly adheres to the “old strategy of mutual destruction”. No, everything is much more flexible and thinner.
But on the whole, her material is not bad for an analyst who declared that Russia should not interfere in the situation in Ukraine, and then no one would have taken the latter either in the EU or in NATO, and so, they say, only worse for RF. There are no planned US bases in the Crimea, and the Crimea is now an unsinkable aircraft carrier that controls the entire region — this is, of course, bad, like everything else. Especially since Russia had no other course of action in that situation - any passive options led to a loss. As in the nuclear strategy.
- Ya. Vyatkin, especially for "Military Review"
- depositphotos.com
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