Military Review

Russia's nuclear strategy through the eyes of Western analysts

28
Curious material caught the eye in a new issue of Foreign Affairs, devoted to the subject of Russian nuclear policy in the sense that the author has. The material is called “Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma: What is Russia's Arsenal Really For?” (“Moscow’s Nuclear Secret: Why Does Russia Need a Nuclear Arsenal?”). The author is Olga Oliker, senior adviser and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program of the American Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In general, the next "expert about everything." Oliker quite often speaks for our publications from among the "handshake" (like "Kommersant"). But the article is curious, though controversial.




Madame Oliker begins with the fact that in Washington near government circles are very popular talk about the fact that Russia has "returned." It is necessary to understand - I figured out the main heap of internal problems, became strong and confident again, and returned to the place waiting for us only one of the two superpowers. How dare they — after all, we lost the Cold War, as V. Churkin (now deceased) reproached his colleague in the UN Security Council. And Americans are very worried about the fact that the Russian Federation, which has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world (and strategic, and especially non-strategic / tactical), is actively investing in the production of new types of tactical nuclear weapons, including small and especially small capacities, which are convenient for limited ( regional, in the terminology of the current military doctrine of the Russian Federation) wars, or even for local wars of high intensity.

Considering that regrettable fact (which Olga, Ms. "forgot" to mention) that the USA has an extremely weak potential for tactical nuclear weapons in the form of several hundred bombs, that is, weaponswhich is not confidently delivered to the target, and unable to respond in the same way due to the lack of nuclear weapons production in the medium term, this is especially worrisome for Washington. They are also worried about the ongoing reconstruction, strengthening and expansion of both central and advanced 12 GU MO arsenals, in particular, American sources report extensive work in the Kaliningrad special defense area and in the Crimea, they say, they see it from satellites. And even the capacity of these renewable arsenals was somehow estimated - approximately by 8 thousand units, supposedly only non-strategic nuclear weapons. By and large, I want to advise our counterparts to stop scratching Honduras - and he will stop disturbing them, because this is our territory, what we want on it, then we dig and build. And posting too. We do not bother you to build something, say, in California or Alaska? But back to the second Olga and her material.

The enhanced development of TNW, including low power, convinces analysts in the United States that the Russian government is prone to “push the nuclear button” first in a future war, quickly eliminating the enemy’s main groupings to convince them not to aggravate the situation. triarii ", as the Romans used to say. Triarii in this case - this is Russia's strategic nuclear forces, of course. Such a strategy exists and is called "escalation for de-escalation." It was developed, according to the author, in 90, when the refusal of the Brezhnev promise of “no first use” was declared (in fact, no one ever intended not to apply first, the notion of “strike at the appointed time” was not excluded from the strategy, nor was it excluded now). And then the principle of this very “escalation for de-escalation” was declared, based on the fact that the Russian Armed Forces in the ordinary component were then weak, and NATO had not yet decayed to the extent that it is now. Approximately in 1999, under Primakov, and then under Putin, this thesis was born, according to Oliker. She also believes that the main problem is not in this strategy, but in misunderstanding of Moscow’s intentions in the nuclear sphere, they say, in Washington, they don’t understand us and our intentions, making wrong conclusions and making wrong decisions, and Russia is allegedly “unable” to communicate its vision to Washington.

The real danger lies not in the new and more aggressive Russian nuclear strategy, but in the inability of the Kremlin to effectively communicate its goals to leaders in Washington and other places. Russia's actual strategy is not very different from the usual old-fashioned deterrence: Russia believes that any major war with the United States can lead to a massive US nuclear attack, and therefore it has its own nuclear arsenal to prevent such an attack.
However, its policy of deliberate ambiguity raises fears in Washington, leading to a dangerous escalation cycle, which inevitably aggravates suspicion and increases the risk of escalation of clashes.


Olga Oliker believes that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation abandoned the strategy of "escalation for the sake of de-escalation", referring to the extreme editions of our military doctrine, they say, it says that Russia will use nuclear weapons only in two circumstances: either in response to an attack with weapons of mass destruction nuclear or other, or in the face of the usual offensive that threatens “the very existence of the state." And now the provision on non-nuclear strategic deterrence forces has been added (and these have already been created and are operational, and have proven their effectiveness in Syria - talking about various carriers of cruise and ballistic missiles in non-nuclear equipment, the number of which has increased by an order of magnitude and will grow even more, and the number of missiles is 30 times). That is, Oliker believes, Moscow does not adhere to aggressive nuclear behavior and is not inclined to cling to a nuclear pistol. They say Russia is not on the path of reducing the threshold of nuclear use, but increasing it. But the active development of non-strategic nuclear forces "confuses Washington with a correct understanding" of our nuclear strategy.

Oliker, however, demonstrates a lack of knowledge on the issues of our tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. For example, she believes that our arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, “by the most conservative estimates,” is of the order of 2000 units. Do readers need to be reminded that these estimates come from the unforgettable analyst Christensen from the Federation of American Scientists, and the assessment method is approximately as reliable as predicted by cracks in the ceiling and divination on the bones of a roasted rabbit? Somehow it was possible to consider his methodology on this resource. She also believes that the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Iskander-M complex and the Kyrgyz Republic and the Kyrgyz Republic are currently used as non-nuclear. This is strange, because the development of both weapons complex assumed nuclear use from the very beginning, and it would not have happened if these systems were purely non-nuclear. Moreover, the appearance of the SBCh of these complexes is even known (more precisely, the appearance of the warheads is in special equipment, because the appearance of the SBCh itself is just a secret, and even the Americans are much more open about this issue). Moreover, in open access it is possible, if desired, obviously, to the analysts of the American centers missing, to detect signs of intensive development and other modern non-strategic SBCh and weapon systems - torpedoes, bombs, warhead RCC, and others.

Then O. Oliker, as they say, suffered a little. I will quote:

The development of these weapons systems may seem counter to the declared strategy of Russia. In the 1950s and 1960s, tactical nuclear weapons were designed for active warfare; his goal was not so much to contain the conflict as to assist in defeating or intimidating the enemy when the shooting had already begun. Many analysts believe that the same is true today, arguing that there are no compelling reasons for a country to be saved, let alone modernize a large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons, if it does not plan to use it on the battlefield. These analysts also note that Russian military exercises often include the Iskander and Caliber weapons systems, thus suggesting that Russia will aggravate the conflict by launching low-power nuclear weapons against its enemy. But the assumption that Russian weapons systems are being built for this purpose does not hold water. Since these new weapon systems can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads, it can be just as easy to say that the exercises with their participation are just rehearsals for conventional war.


This is called “fit to answer”! In fact, active exercises with the use of such weapons cannot be viewed from the perspective of either “or-or”, but only “and”! It may well be as exercises on the use of these tools, both non-nuclear and nuclear, too. Moreover, the development of "actions in the conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction" is now again receiving much attention, as well as in the development of promising technology, in particular, armored vehicles, although not always. As well as the formation of non-nuclear deterrent forces and the generally more "calm" attitude of the Russian Federation to the possibility of conducting large-scale hostilities with non-nuclear means also does not mean a "rejection" of the policy of "escalation for the sake of de-escalation" or return to the promises of non-use first. This only means a change in both internal military realities and external.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, following the country, may have returned, not yet to the desired level, but to some necessary “tone”, have proved their capabilities in various conflicts over the past several years (yes, such a definition is appropriate). And at the same time, our main opponents greatly lost their combat power, despite the growth in the number of NATO members, the real potential did not grow, but fell many times, if this is not to evaluate the real combat effectiveness of the units. Also, the experience of military operations has clearly shown that, for example, such a "bugbear" of recent decades, as a massive strike of non-nuclear missile defense, is no longer a problem of the highest degree of difficulty for air defense air defense systems of airborne forces, air defense air forces, aviation VKS and means of electronic warfare of Russia. Including therefore, as one of the scenarios (no more and no less), the “protracted" non-nuclear period may well be considered along with the unacceptable damage to the enemy by non-nuclear means. Yes, yes, we have this potential, and it will continue to develop, including with the help of hypersonic missiles. Although the popular idea of ​​delivering non-nuclear strikes to the Avangard anti-tank missile system in its non-nuclear version and its counterparts can hardly be considered very promising - because the British and, possibly, in the future, the Americans, have especially low power warheads on Trident-2 SLBMs cannot be a substitute for nuclear weapons. Because the launch of an ICBM or SLBM, even with a telemetry disc, but not toward the proving ground, is a danger of the highest level, and they will react accordingly.

Oliker also believes that the lines from the new naval doctrine of the Russian Federation on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in escalating the conflict for its de-escalation cannot be taken literally. She believes that if the desire of the Russian Federation to lower the threshold of use was, it would be clearly translated in public documents, and not in a separate passage. And here she is clearly wrong again. The point is quite different. Russia is not just "cannot explain the essence of its nuclear policy in the non-strategic field." We have excellent diplomats, the best in the world, probably, in the field of strategic stability - in particular. The same START-3 Agreement is a fairly clear indicator of this. Separate "muddy" statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on nuclear issues are not an indicator. Especially since they may have a dual purpose. Russia, if it wants, can bring whatever it wants to the "partners." Another thing is that the "partners" lately demonstrate the inability to understand even simple words and phrases that would be more appropriate not for the Foreign Ministry, but for Sergei Shnurov, not that something more complicated. Apparently, the virus of universal dullness. But the question is not in understanding from the other side, but in the fact that in this particular case - the designation of the nuclear threshold, Russia is benefited by some uncertainty.

The development of the tactical nuclear weapons arsenal, moreover, diverse and developed, provides a very flexible and powerful tool for mixing any opponents with the upper soil layers, no matter how many. And a certain ambiguity of intentions and a real threshold for the use of nuclear weapons gives flexibility in decisions without constraining the higher military-political leadership within the framework of the rules established once, which may well not be appropriate in this case. And, most importantly, the lack of clarity with this issue is a very serious deterrent for "partners." Let them suffer and think, whether in response to a large-scale military conflict, the taciturn guys from 12 GU MO will deploy PRTB, deliver nuclear missiles, bombs, torpedoes, SBCh for cruise and ballistic non-strategic missiles, for anti-ship missiles and so on. Whether they are in the outset of the conflict they will get a nuclear bat on the baseball cap (as they say, baseball in the Russian Federation is unpopular, except for one aspect of this boring game), or later. Whether at all in a situation like the one that could, but did not happen, this spring in Syria. At the same time, Washington is well aware (Trump may not understand, judging by his statements and tweets, he has strange knowledge about the nuclear missile field) that going for a non-strategic nuclear escalation is a loss, and for the strategic one - at best. for the US and NATO, the case of mutual destruction.

And just to find out the real intentions of the Russian leadership on the threshold of application - this is very important for our "dear partners." Perhaps this is where a similar analyst comes from, like Ms. Oliker’s article - to get some intelligible explanations from official sources. It is worth noting, however, that she noted that the development of non-strategic systems may have one of the goals of the very policy of “ambiguity of intentions” mentioned above, but since this contradicted its basic ideas that the Russian Federation is necessarily considering such a conflict as the prelude to the exchange of massive nuclear-missile strikes (MRLN) of the SNF of the parties, she did not develop the theme. On the other hand, she focused attention on V. Putin's famous phrase about whether we need a world without Russia, from which she based her speech on the fact that Moscow supposedly adheres to the “old strategy of mutual destruction”. No, everything is much more flexible and thinner.

But on the whole, her material is not bad for an analyst who declared that Russia should not interfere in the situation in Ukraine, and then no one would have taken the latter either in the EU or in NATO, and so, they say, only worse for RF. There are no planned US bases in the Crimea, and the Crimea is now an unsinkable aircraft carrier that controls the entire region — this is, of course, bad, like everything else. Especially since Russia had no other course of action in that situation - any passive options led to a loss. As in the nuclear strategy.
Author:
Photos used:
Depositphotos.com
28 comments
Ad

Subscribe to our Telegram channel, regularly additional information about the special operation in Ukraine, a large amount of information, videos, something that does not fall on the site: https://t.me/topwar_official

Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. rocket757
    rocket757 19 October 2018 14: 20
    +4
    Far-fetched, I think a lot and think a lot, but in fact the fortuneteller is still the same.
    They remembered that you shouldn’t climb to us, that’s all!
    1. lucul
      lucul 19 October 2018 19: 35
      +3
      As I understand it, the logic of the amers (Zionists) is simple - Russia is afraid to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances (even when attacking Russia with atomic weapons), and therefore it can be pressed on as it pleases.
      And then they said that the answer would be 100% atomic - the reaction of the amers is a stupor, now that under Khrushchev (mother Kuzkin).
      I agree with Zadornov ...
      1. rocket757
        rocket757 19 October 2018 20: 01
        -4
        Quote: lucul
        Russia is afraid to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances

        I am old, verb-truth-oo !!! ... a joke of course, but seriously - ANSWER would go anyway, only the scale could be limited!
        You will recall, the Pentagon said, when asked about President Trump and the big red button! The same thing happens, only on the contrary, when everything flies to tar tarara, but there is no order! PEOPLE are sitting at the consoles, and when they have LOST EVERYTHING, they don’t care about the same orders even from where. And in the case of the Pentagon, they have something to lose and they do not want to lose it!
        Such is life, such is our reality, and those who should know this, this is what they know / understand.
        In short, "tomorrow was won" and all sorts of bangs, jerk, shy, canceled, WHILE!
        1. igorka357
          igorka357 21 October 2018 06: 05
          +2
          You wrote some nonsense about "people at the consoles who lost everything", there is a psychological selection, these people do not control the situation outside! When they went down to the command center, then for them there is only control of the situation and an order, and there is no other world on the surface !
          1. rocket757
            rocket757 21 October 2018 19: 25
            -3
            And we do not care, we magically mow the grass with tryns!
  2. Serge Gorely
    Serge Gorely 19 October 2018 14: 21
    +13
    Another divorce of the Yusovsky "partners". Tagged agreed to ban tactical nuclear weapons with the United States, the treaty does not apply to Britain and France. As a result, there are no restrictions in NATO. Gorbachev is eating pizza hut, celebrating the Nobel Peace Prize, the curtain ...
    1. Granddad
      Granddad 19 October 2018 18: 24
      +1
      The real danger lies not in the new and more aggressive Russian nuclear strategy, but in the Kremlin’s inability to effectively communicate its goals to leaders in Washington and elsewhere.

      I think this is the essence of the article .. Russia is caught on trifles and begins to poison and spread rot. in the west and we are being fought, the most annoying thing!
      Putin finally recently said bluntly (absolutely right) to everyone who wants the "body of Russia."
      "We do not care about anyone and we have the means to prove it!"
      And I also liked his statement that our people are fighting and for their homeland, ready to tear everyone up if they turn up .. Here and gentlemen think what to keep their capital in (condensed milk, canned meat can be sold, it’s cheap and long stored)))) )
  3. Sergey39
    Sergey39 19 October 2018 14: 25
    +1
    Are they not enough for Georgia, Crimea, Syria? Is it necessary to use TNW? So we can, "the whole world is in dust."
    1. Mih1974
      Mih1974 21 October 2018 06: 31
      0
      So maybe according to Zhrik - in the Atlantic there is an unnecessary island, let's take it to hell, the Americans will change their minds repeat lol I’ll even tell you the name Ostrovaka - naglia. good
  4. Jerk
    Jerk 19 October 2018 14: 53
    +3
    We don’t interfere with building something in, say, California or Alaska?

    There is a fun example - military bases in Hawaii. Now tadam! Hawaii president then incumbent bill clinton recognized occupied territory laughing And before the occupation, they also got into a genocide there - these are crimes without statute of limitations
  5. sleeve
    sleeve 19 October 2018 17: 45
    +3
    But seriously. What worries them most after the failure of the idea of ​​gaining dominance in the "nuclear" sphere? Porgo we use our "club". Well, that is, is it possible to mess out further around the world and still try to plug a bear with this needle? Technical and analytical calculations are zero. Even a minus. About the Apocalypse they even printed on a piece of paper - "hit first and go to hell." Officially explained in Valdai and the layout of the souls after the reciprocal (victims in paradise, the rest in the archive). However, interestingly, the issue of the use of tactical weapons is really not particularly covered. And why? In the current conditions, when the assessment criteria have lowered Russia to the level of a breathing country (I, to put it mildly, crossing out a couple of paragraphs of foul language, I do not agree) there is an axiom that the use of a global club from our side is possible in response to "tactical pampering". is it different with them? yes no sooner. Moreover, this situation is not "combed" in any way. After all, it is impossible to draw up a treaty or a convention that supposedly if less than 10000 citizens die, it’s like not to naughty each other. Or if the nuclear submarines are drowned, it’s nothing ... it happens. As a result, a huge layer of "reflections" on the topic "but the Russians are superior to us in TNW" do not have a final prospect for a conclusion. This is the same Doomsday weapon and nothing else. It is impossible now "limited nuclear war" in its essence, since not a single sane leader, the ruling elite, or else what happens there will not voice the "price" in their own subjects at the beginning of the Apocalypse. So such articles are akin to Kolmism, which is so popular abroad, and even here, where there is a witty argument on topics that are absolutely not related to the concept of "real rules". Well, if to practice? Well, let's talk about the bad. In the European theater of operations, excluding the potential of the USA, we have before us the only danger in the form of "unattainable" for the immediate elimination of sea-based nuclear weapons of all grades (SLBM, KR ... yes even RSL). Here is pure arithmetic. Maybe we will one day "cover" this topic with missile potential, but no ... Definitely not, and never. Maybe unfortunately (but I adhere to the theory that the presence of absolute superiority in something other than love for the Motherland is evil). So TNWs are weapons of the Post-Apocalypse. Naturally, this defense segment, which is stimulating for peace, is not worth losing. It is better to be able to cover a decent space crammed with military infrastructure with poorly intercepted carriers such as the Iskanders than not. But not that ... Not that the guys are thinking. There is no "threshold of application" today. We cannot be "erased" by conventional weapons in the course of a protracted war. We doubt the "trifle" along the borders, but we will not crumple (it is paid later, and we are not particularly rich people), but no one will harness for them due to the absence of this "porg". So the conclusions. Hopes for the collapse and collapse of the Russian Federation after the Cold War-pshyk. The process of a new unification in the expanses of the former RI-USSR is a given. The theory of superiority in conventional weapons is a myth that is expensive and pointless because of nuclear weapons.
    1. g1washntwn
      g1washntwn 22 October 2018 07: 33
      0
      Not quite past. A new round of the arms race is not even to ruin the enemy on it, but to feed the losing weight of the dollar mass of its military-industrial complex.
      If the EU says harshly - no tactical nuclear weapons on our territory, with the harsh coercion of Washington singing along, the withdrawal of the Americans from the INF Treaty loses its meaning. But this option is unlikely, here on the contrary, the growing disunity of Europeans plays on the Americans. The age-old principle of "divide and rule", IMHO, is why the Brexits are muddying up, encouraging nationalism among the ceuropeitsiv and so on.
      1. sleeve
        sleeve 22 October 2018 18: 22
        0
        The withdrawal from the RIAC is based on the position of the "Young Europeans" in the territorial sense. These are the most controlled governments with the ability to suppress the electorate. So with a "ground" base and without the old Europe will do. The question is in purely technical aspects. Whether we can neutralize it or not, or build the system so that they have to "substitute" for a global blow. The Valdai Upland has not yet been torn down from us, and no one has canceled the aerospace component. It remains possible to withstand a massive attack from the front-forming direction. However, there is a tricky point here. The same thing has been on marine media for a long, long time. In the end, there are all the same aspects of providing a massive strike, and in an accelerated (56 CR on Berks) form of concentration. Why then the ground option? Few installations, for the deployment of something impactable years and years of fussing well, and we look at all this. Can we still talk about the MRBM? Something is already there. Suppose the number of launchers in East Europe is enough to blind the radar and defeat communication centers to provide a massive "lower" attack by a naval component, let's say from the North Sea.
  6. 1536
    1536 19 October 2018 19: 52
    +1
    In Europe, another Napoleon or Hitler is not visible and was not born, I hope. Therefore, all this Euro-Anglo-American "humanity" can sleep peacefully.
  7. Stils
    Stils 19 October 2018 23: 05
    0
    Any significant military escalation using conventional weapons between the Russian Federation and the West leads to the use of nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation first, first TNW, then the threshold of fear of the use of strategic nuclear forces will be very quickly overcome. You don't have to be a fool to understand this. The question is different, at what stage of the RF the nuclear weapons will be applied, and whether this escalation can be stopped and at what cost for the existence of the RF. The rest of the options are clear to everyone ... the whole world is in ruin.
  8. Operator
    Operator 20 October 2018 08: 53
    -1
    We need to state our thoughts more clearly - the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation explicitly states the use of the Russian Armed Forces in the event of an attack on us using non-nuclear weapons.

    With a view to the possibility of further escalation of the conflict in such a case, tactical thermonuclear weapons will be used - Iskander, Caliber, Smerchi and front-line aviation equipped with small-sized ammunition with 100-kt thermonuclear charges weighing 100 kg each.

    With the detonation of the 100 ct of a thermonuclear charge at an altitude of 1,5 km above the ground, radioactive fallout and induced radiation are completely absent. Only light radiation and shock wave act. Clean, profitable, comfortable.

    The number of such ammunition at the end of the 1980 of the USSR reached 40-50 thousand, the amount of plutonium used in the first stage of the division of the indicated charges was 240-300 tons. It is at this level that the stock of plutonium in the Russian Federation is estimated.
    1. Zaurbek
      Zaurbek 21 October 2018 07: 12
      -1
      There are no pure explosions .... the purest are thermonuclear .... But you are right that under such conditions there is a minimum of infection.
  9. Stils
    Stils 20 October 2018 09: 19
    -2
    Quote: Operator
    We need to state our thoughts more clearly - the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation explicitly states the use of the Russian Armed Forces in the event of an attack on us using non-nuclear weapons.

    With a view to the possibility of further escalation of the conflict in such a case, tactical thermonuclear weapons will be used - Iskander, Caliber, Smerchi and front-line aviation equipped with small-sized ammunition with 100-kt thermonuclear charges weighing 100 kg each.
    In simple terms, when conventional divisions of the Russian Federation end during escalation in a conventional war, and if the Russian Federation brings down the full power of nuclear weapons to the enemy, there is no doubt that a strategic nuclear strike will hit our territory. So the question is, who first applied, who will go to hell?))
    1. Zaurbek
      Zaurbek 21 October 2018 07: 13
      -1
      Without the exchange of nuclear weapons ... for example, we are attacked by a non-nuclear state with a powerful army and begin to win.
  10. Operator
    Operator 20 October 2018 10: 25
    +1
    Quote: Stils
    when the usual divisions of the Russian Federation will end

    The Russian TNW will be hit before - in response to the launch of cruise missiles and the use of tactical / carrier-based enemy aircraft with conventional warheads.

    As for the escalation of the nuclear conflict, the grandmother said in two: the Russian TNW will cover exclusively Europe, Israel, the Persian Gulf countries, Japan, South Korea and the places of deployment of NATO ASGs, but in the case of the use of the American strategic nuclear forces, the Russian strategic nuclear forces will have to hit the United States and Canada - and it do they need?
  11. Stils
    Stils 20 October 2018 11: 11
    -1
    Quote: Operator
    Quote: Stils
    when the usual divisions of the Russian Federation will end

    The Russian TNW will be hit before - in response to the launch of cruise missiles and the use of tactical / carrier-based enemy aircraft with conventional warheads.

    As for the escalation of the nuclear conflict, the grandmother said in two: the Russian TNW will cover exclusively Europe, Israel, the Persian Gulf countries, Japan, South Korea and the places of deployment of NATO ASGs, but in the case of the use of the American strategic nuclear forces, the Russian strategic nuclear forces will have to hit the United States and Canada - and it do they need?

    I dare to suggest that if you use nuclear weapons in Europe on a serious scale, which you are considering, further escalation before the use of nuclear weapons will be practically uncontrollable on both sides, i.e. whoever applies the first one has more chances - a) to do more unacceptable damage. b) minimize own damage.
    1. Operator
      Operator 21 October 2018 13: 31
      -1
      You do not take into account one "trifle" - in the case of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the national territory of the owner of the strategic nuclear weapons - the United States will not be affected. Why, then, would the Americans ask for trouble, use their strategic nuclear weapons and expose themselves to retaliation - in order to join in solidarity with the burned out Europeans, Israelis, Japanese and South Koreans?
  12. high
    high 20 October 2018 15: 09
    +3
    The leader of the group, Leningrad, wrote a poem yesterday about the statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Valdai Discussion Club about the possibility of a nuclear attack on Russia:

    Here, there are continuous torments,

    Even die today.

    Let these die

    Well, and we, of course, to paradise,

    We’ll hit it like a ticket

    So our main promised.

    Lash citizens, ropes,

    Quiet and not squealing!

    All-in-one, popularly!

    What do we have heavenly binding?

    We will go anywhere

    If the motherland sends.

    Though to Allah, even to the chopping block,

    At least to the beginning of all beginnings.

    We were sent a long time *****,

    If someone did not notice.
    1. Operator
      Operator 21 October 2018 13: 33
      -1
      I sent this lover of Bavarian ("the leader of the Leningrad group") a long time ago along the route known to him.
    2. Machito
      Machito 26 October 2018 00: 51
      0
      The cord has recently been annealing well, pulled on politics.
  13. Old26
    Old26 20 October 2018 19: 25
    -1
    Quote: Serge Gorely
    Another divorce of the Yusovsky "partners". Tagged agreed to ban tactical nuclear weapons with the United States, the treaty does not apply to Britain and France. As a result, there are no restrictions in NATO. Gorbachev is eating pizza hut, celebrating the Nobel Peace Prize, the curtain ...

    No need to invent. "Tagged" did not agree to ban tactical nuclear weapons. It was about medium and shorter range missiles. The first - medium-range are actually strategic. But the so-called carriers of shorter range were operational-tactical. But this only concerned carriers. Nobody forbade tactical nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the Americans have repeatedly tried to persuade us to conclude a treaty on tactical nuclear weapons. Fortunately - unsuccessfully
    As for Britain and France, their main nuclear weapon is strategic. Tactical - very few. These are mainly air-based cruise missiles and bombs .....
  14. Stils
    Stils 21 October 2018 22: 12
    0
    Quote: Operator
    You do not take into account one "trifle" - in the case of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the national territory of the owner of the strategic nuclear weapons - the United States will not be affected. Why, then, would the Americans ask for trouble, use their strategic nuclear weapons and expose themselves to retaliation - in order to join in solidarity with the burned out Europeans, Israelis, Japanese and South Koreans?
    Yes, I understand what was discussed. But there is Article 5 of the NATO charter, according to which the United States will already be at war with us.
    It is difficult to predict how the escalation might develop. There is a point of view that after the use of nuclear weapons, even if tactical on a serious scale, entails an uncontrolled escalation with the use of strategic nuclear weapons by either side. The United States has aerial bombs located in Europe and Turkey, there, by the way, about 20 megatons, can be fired by CD with SBS from destroyers in the Mediterranean, North Seas, from submarines. It will not seem enough to us. This is without the NSW. After such an exchange, we will already face the issue of the use of strategic nuclear weapons. If we assume that we can arrange a "small" nuclear war in Europe with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and the states will calmly watch from overseas, then this is not particularly beneficial for us, since France and Britain also have a good nuclear arsenal, incl. and strategic, capable of causing unacceptable damage. As a result, Europe was destroyed, incl. The European part of the Russian Federation, the territory of the United States has not been touched and they are winning the war. So we cannot do without hitting the states in any case.
    1. g1washntwn
      g1washntwn 22 October 2018 07: 53
      +1
      An escalation of a nuclear conflict with any NATO country implies a retaliatory strike against the entire infrastructure of NATO, and not just against the "enraged" country. Collective "security" also carries risks of collective responsibility. As everyone understands, the United States plays a major role in this combination of four letters, so they cannot hope for the absence of a nuclear retaliatory strike.
      According to the tradition of the Anglo-Saxons, in the future there is a possibility of a deliberate collapse of NATO, a subsequent provocation with our own hands and the delivery of a nuclear-sized European limotrophe to Russia that "suddenly" received the status of a "nuclear power." Of course, she will not have enough strength to completely destroy the Russian Federation, she just won't have enough caps, but they can try to throw back and cause critical damage to the European part of the Russian Federation with the help of the RIAC, but then, using the old technology, the anaconda squeezes the weakened victim even more, etc. ... etc.