The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 24. SOBOVO

I.V. Kislov (aircraft factory engineer): "May 1941 of the year. Headquarters 123 iap. I introduce myself to the military engineer of the 2 rank N.I. Tolmanov: "The head of the crew of the Yak-1 aircraft assembly" ...

19 June arrived District Air Force inspector. By this time, the entire personnel of the unit had already completed theoretical training and was well versed in the new machine. All twenty Yak-1 lined up at the alternate aerodrome and were ready to fly ...

“When will we put new cars into operation,” Surin asked. [commander of the regiment] at the inspector - after all the war on the nose? BUT there is no fuel and projectiles"... 21.6.41 I reported to Major Surin on the completion of the work and that I received an order to urgently go to the place of servicess ... "I.V. Kislov 22 June took the fight to the railway station.

V.S. Popov (commander 28 ck): "Orders from the commander of the 4-th army, the commander of 28-th sk, about the withdrawal of the corps to the state border did not receive. Corps units before the attack of the fascist German troops on the Soviet Union were located at the place of deployment... »

G.S. Lukin (NSh 28 sc): "Until the enemy attacked, there were no instructions or orders to lift troops and withdraw them to occupy defensive lines either from the 4 A headquarters, which included the 28 cc, or from the district headquarters, although the telephone connection was up to this point in operation. properly... »

A.M. Ignatov (NSh 6 sd): "Prior to the beginning of the attack of the German fascist troops about any orders of the corps or army headquarters to bring the parts of the division to combat readiness, I had not heard, and in parts of the division nothing was done in that sense... »

P.A. Sherbinin (42 cd): "The division is located in the city of Brest, and 459 cn was located in the town of Kartuz-Berezka, and after about three months they relocated to the city of Zhabinka ...

19 June 1941 was announced at a meeting of the commanding staff that 22 June at 5 would be an exercise in the morning, ostentatious, with live firing. I lived in a private apartment ... 22 June, about 4 hours, from the explosions of the shells the glass in the apartment rang... "

A.S. Kislitsyn (NSh 22 td): "On June 22, 1941, at about 3-30 am, the division commander, Major General V.P. Puganov, called me. and told me to quickly arrive at the division headquarters. In the office of the division commander, I saw the NSh of the 14th military commander Lieutenant Colonel I.V. Tutarinova ... Puganov told me that it was ordered to bring the division to combat readiness by dawn, but without announcing an alarm. I turned to Tutarinov and told him: Ivan Vasilievich! How can you raise a division without alarm, because this is not a battalion, but half an hour before dawn? Tutarinov confirmed to me that the commander of the army does not allow the division to be raised on alarm so as not to disturb the neighbors. Then, right there in the divisional commander's office, I began to call the regiment commanders' apartments and ordered them to run to the divisional headquarters to receive instructions from the divisional commander. I managed to call the commanders tank and motorized rifle regiments... »

V.A. Rozhnyakovsky (Chief of Operations Division of 22 Headquarters, etc.): "He reported to the division commander the content of the reports. And once I tried to express my thoughts. It would be advisable with a preventive purpose, without disrupting the course of combat training, to withdraw a division and camp at a distance, in conditions where you can quickly prepare for battle. The general made me understand that I can keep my thoughts with me. Then, during the period of the cult of personality, it was not customary to express an opinion on such issues.

Everything remains as before. Moreover, one of the regiments to 21 June returned from the camps. Thus, on June 22 all divisions of the division were in place. None of us knew when the war would begin ... On Sunday, June 22, a new technology was scheduled to be shown. On the eve, on Saturday, out of any plan, the corps commander conducted a drill inspection division. Then a concert took place at the club ... I got up very early - at about three in the morning. It was necessary to gather commanders to travel to the landfill, to control the departure of the parts. Wearing a tunic ... just managed to pull it up, as the roar of tears shook the town... "

G.K. Tesla: "16 days before the beginning of World War II, in the military rank of lieutenant, was sent to serve in the military unit 5473 [22 gap 22 td], which was located in 4 km near the Brest Fortress, in the forest ...

22.6.41 ... Finished my duty rolling patrol in the village, that in 3 km north-west of the city of Brest ... We went to rest up, it was 2 in the morning, there was a strong soldier's dream. And suddenly, waking up, we heard explosions of shells and bombs, flew glass in the windows... »

N.N. Bolotov (NSh 30 td): "Even T-26 tanks were incomplete ... The Artpolk had guns, but there were no tractors, anti-aircraft weapons were completely absent. Although the ammunition was in accordance with the norms, the warehouses were located at a great distance from the RPM of the division ...

June 22 at 4-00 in the morning the enemy aviation bombed Pruzhany airfield. It is a few kilometers from the location of our division. And we understood - war! Division commander Colonel S.I. Bogdanov in 4-15 raised the division on alert. By 6-00, the units reached the concentration area in the forest southeast of Poddubno. Only TP of Major Ivanyuk, who conducted night firing, arrived an hour later... »

The covering forces of the 4 district included the 62 th (Brest) SD consisting of three separate battalion battalions (OPB): 16, 17 and 18. On the night of 21 on 22 June, the wired connection between the battalion headquarters and company, as well as the 62 SD headquarters, was broken by the saboteurs.

18 OPB. In the first minutes of the war, units and subunits of the UR on the orders of its commander entered the battle. During 6 hours, the 1 squadron of the 18 company, an op-out of the pillboxes, fired at the Nazi machine guns, preventing them from crossing the Bug. By the end of the day, the garrisons used up their ammunition ...

Steadfastly repelled the attacks of the 3 company under the command of Lieutenant S.I. Veselov. Initially, the enemy fired pillboxes with guns, then used flamethrowers. For two days the garrison of an artillery brigade commanded by Junior Lieutenant A.K. Shankov. After two days of continuous combat in DotA Junior Lieutenant I.T. Clay run out of ammunition. Of the 258 fighters and commanders of the company, miraculously survived lieutenant lieutenant Shankov and machine gunner FA. Siskin.

A.K. Shankov (platoon commander): "In our company there were 6 firing points built and relatively ready for battle ... In addition, another unfinished pillbox participated in the battle. Our positions were located near the village of Orla. I remember my pill well. He had two caponiers, each with one 76-mm gun, paired with a Maxim machine gun. At both entrance doors - in the loophole for the light machine gun. But unfortunately we didn’t have any machine guns. The platoon that made up the DotA garrison had three squads, one for each gun and a machine gun, the third squad was to serve light machine guns.

For almost the whole of April, 1941, the personnel were in inseparable dots. Weapon cleared of winter grease, ammunition and food were brought into the facilities. But in early May, a new order was received, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the pillboxes. The fighters were again settled in the barracks about a kilometer from the facilities, the officers returned to their families. Food, ammunition and shells returned to the mouth of the warehouse. At the same time, shells were abundantly smeared with cannon fats for long-term storage. Thus, by the beginning of the war, there was no food or ammunition in the firing points, except for a few boxes of ammunition in the DotA sentry platoon.

With the attack of the Nazis to occupy Doty had to be under fire. This caused great losses. From 18 the soldiers and sergeants of my platoon only 5 snuck into the pillbox, then three more border guards came running. I was the ninth. For shells, cartridges and products, the soldiers were crawling to the company warehouse already during the battle. At such moments, only the sentry and I remained in DotA. From the very beginning of the war, the company’s positions were surrounded... »

The most intense and lengthy battles with the enemy were the 17 warriors opb. Early in the morning of June 22, the first order to repel an enemy attack was given by the battalion commander Captain A.I. Postovalov. The three-amber pillbox Eagle fought 12 days. On 13, when the ammunition ran out, the Nazis surrounded him. The offer to surrender was refused. The Nazis used gases and flamethrowers.

June 29 fascists blew up the pillbox "Quick". The survivor of the machine gunner PP Plaksy carried on his shoulders a seriously wounded commander I.N. Shibakova. As the ammunition ran out in the pillboxes, the fighters broke into the still operational firing points. According to local residents and the wives of the commanders, the last three dota of the 3 th company fought until 29 June 1941.

I.N. Shibakov (platoon commander): "The defensive installations of our 3-th company of the 17-th opb were located ... near the village of Slohi-Annopolsky ... From the 8 firing points in this area, the company occupied 7. One pillbox, artillery, was empty, because the guns in it had not yet been installed ... All these points, with the exception of the Dot "Gorki", were machine guns. Each of them had two embrasures with “Maxim” machine guns installed in them. The Gorki had one Maxim machine gun and a 45-mm gun, paired with a machine gun. All pillboxes were not yet completed. Structures were bare, not covered with earth, not disguised. Water supply, lighting, underground communications were not equipped, there were no radios, there were not enough periscopes. Sector of fire is not cleared. In the walls of the pillboxes, there were gaping holes for the communication cable and the sleeves. The material part, although it was installed, was not put on alert, was preserved... »

Less is known about the fighting 16 opb. I.I.Zmeikin (company commander): "The defensive position of the 16-th opb was located along the Bug's coast between the villages of Krupitsa and Putkovitsy ... The 2-I company of this battalion, which I commanded, occupied a plot in the area of ​​the village of Minchevo. Commanders lived in private apartments in the village. The personnel was located in the dugouts near the firing points.

As soon as the shelling and bombing began, I rushed to the command post. It was difficult to get to it: shells were torn at almost every step. On the way, I was contused and wounded ... I could crawl to gearbox. The commanders were already here, and I gave them the order to take up pillboxes and to detain the enemy at any cost. After 20 minutes, our four dota and three dug in the ground tank were ready to open fire. All of them took an active part in the battle. The technician-lieutenant Fedorov, who brought up ammunition, managed to make only one trip. During the second flight was killed... »

V.F. Osaulenko: "In the summer of 40, we left ... Brest, Fort Red ... There, in 18 opb 62 of Brest UR, I started the war ... The very first pillbox was in 50 meters from the Western Bug (border), and the rest in 75 -Xnumx from her. Tightened powerful camouflage, metal with wood. there was such a disguise that her week should be removed. But they fixed it all. What would happen if we had time to come there, I don’t know ... But when the war began, we started on these dots as well didn't hit. By June 41, I was a sergeant ... a platoon commander and a commander of a two-gun brigade ... In two months I was hoping to pass exams for a junior stock lieutenant ...

All our commanders were absent. Part was in the fortress, they lived there. And the part lived between the garrison and the fortress, there was a town there. In the evening of June 21, they all left, of course, without weapons. All their weapons were under my lock, like the duty officer ... On the night of 22, I became the duty officer on the battery ... After some time, half an hour - an hour, the commander of our first battery appears. "How are you there?" Guys prepare as it should. Warn everyone to return home. And on Monday, 23 Jun, we will start loading dota ammunition and food... »

At about 1am on the night of 2, a cook ran up to me: “Volodya, there is no water in the kitchen! I can't cook breakfast. ” After 10-15 minutes, he jumps out again, “the electricity was cut off! ..” Somewhere in the fourth and fourth, there was already a mighty hum of hundreds of aircraft that fly from west to east, to our territory ... garrison duty officer. There is not anyone. I grabbed the phone to call NS. Th ephone is not working... »

I.N. Shveykin (head of artillery supply 18 –th opb): "In the autumn of 1940, our units arrived at the border from Mozyr ... Our 18-th opb had a site of more than 30 kilometers ... The quality and combat equipment [facilities] compared to the pillboxes on the old border was much higher. There were only four guns on the battalion, and the rest of the weapons were machine guns. Here, many pillboxes had one or more guns, paired with a steel ball mount machine guns. The guns operated semi-automatically ... By June 1941, there were few built and equipped points. Ammunition was stored in the forts surrounding Brest, as well as in pillboxes and warehouses at the red barracks ...

Did we then feel the approach of war? Yes and no. Yes - because on the eve of the war there were many cases when German planes flew over the border and, with impunity, circled over the city, went back. Yes - because we constantly heard the noise of moving troops and equipment and guessed about their concentration on the other side of the Bug. No - because they did not receive any warning orders and orders. The normal railway connection with Germany also worked soothingly ...

In the evening of June 21, 1941, the “Wind from the East” motion picture was shown in our club. The fighters of all companies, as well as families of commanders, came to watch the movie ... That evening everything was calm with us, nobody suspected that the war would begin soon ...

The rise of June 22 was unusual. We were awakened by a strong cannonade. Glancing out the window, I saw tracer shells flying from the border to the fortress and the territory adjacent to it. The shelling was very intense ... The attack of the nazis caught off guard. Therefore, even ready pillboxes were engaged in a hurry, under fire. The garrisons could not get into some buildings... "

In contrast to the Grodno Regional Administration, the Brest Regional Administration did not raise the late evening of June 21. No ammo loaded. You remember that there was a similar situation in some of the KOVO URs.

A.P. Kuznetsov (Head of the 17 of the Red Banner Border Detachment of the Belarusian Border District of the NKVD Troops):Since April, reports of an alarming situation on the border have been sent to the headquarters of the border guard unit every day. The detachment promptly reported this not only to the headquarters of the border troops of the BSSR, but also informed the command of the 4 Army, 28 SK, the regional committee of the CPSU (b) ... The most important issues related to the preparations of the enemy, in the State Border Guard of the NKVD USSR ... For the border guards, preparing the enemy for an attack was not a secret. But no one expected this to happen so soon, so vile and so treacherous.

21.6.41 I returned from the border, where I checked combat readiness ... In the second half of the day, having heard the reports of the National Assembly, the deputies, I went home to 16-00. I really wanted to see the 11-month-old daughter, and I had to rest after a long trip. But neither lie down nor dine failed. Around 17-00 reported a fire in the area of ​​the 11 th outpost ... I had to go to the scene of the accident and take urgent measures to eliminate the fire and strengthen border security in this area. Just returned to headquarters to call direct wire. Received an order from the deputy chief of the border troops of the district brigade commander, APKurlykin: send morning train to one of the border guards at the Lithuanian border 100 border guards. In order to execute the order precisely and on time, I ordered the 21-00 to gather deputies, the chief of staff, the secretary of the party bureau, the chief of the 4 branch and the squadron of the detachment ...

After 24-00, my deputy for intelligence, Major V.Vidyakin, reported that a local resident had crossed from the adjacent side to the site of the 2 gate and said that 4-00 would begin military operations against the Soviet Union ... After listening to the Vidyakin report, I was here same reported on the incident to the duty officer on the staff of the district... from which he received the answer: "Wait for instructions."

After that, I ordered the commandants of the sites to increase the readiness of the units, and the officers to be in full combat readiness. Then ... he informed his neighbors on the right - the head of the 88 border detachment ... and on the left - the head of the 98 border detachment of the Ukrainian border district ... Both confirmed the information about pulling the enemy troops to the border. The situation was also detailed by the headquarters of the 4 Army ... Starting with 2-00 - 2-20, from all commandant's offices, and sometimes directly from the outposts, alarming reports about the withdrawal of tanks and the accumulation of fascist troops directly on the state border line began. Still several times we called the district headquarters. The answers are the same: “Reported to Moscow. Wait. "

Not having instructions on my own initiative, I ordered to bring all units to combat readiness, and on the site 13-th outpost prepare the means for arson or explosion of the bridge over the Bug. I took a great responsibility because at that time, any initiative was shackled by special orders and directives Beria. The time was approaching 4-00 ... The headquarters of the detachment proceeded to the transfer of the order to bring the units to combat readiness, but it had not yet reached the units for 4-00.

During the period of aviation and artillery preparation ... the fascist troops took initial positions for forcing the r. Western Bug. They removed our sentries and captured the railway bridge north of the fortress and the motor transport bridge at the Stradich. The capture of serviceable bridges greatly facilitated the enemy’s crossing to the right bank, especially in the Brest region.... »

We see that along the line of the border guards of the NKVD 21 of June also did not come instructions about the preparation for war and the frontier guards themselves do not expect much of a war. Yes, there was an indication of caution and the location of outfits no closer than 300 meters from the border. But this indication could mean the expectation of provocations, not war ... 100 border guards are taken from the frontier detachment, who will be on the road in the morning of June 22. Alarming, and whether the war will be unknown. The memoirs mention the personal initiative of the head of the frontier detachment.

V.N. Hunchback (Head of the 2-th outpost of the 17-th Red Banner Border Detachment): “Last day before the war. Tomorrow is Sunday ... At about 22 hours, the attire noticed that a man ran up to the Bug, rushed into the water and swam to our shore ... He told the miller confusedly. It was evident that he was very worried, his voice trembled, there were tears in his eyes: “... They, apparently, will lead the crossing to the old highway, where there was a ferry. Another crossing may be prepared at a large stone and, perhaps, a third one - at a ford ... ”

- When do they think to ship?

- It seems in 4 in the morning of your time.

- And you're not lying? Perhaps they sent you?

Miller looked at me bitterly, then with some inner pride straightened up and said: “I am an old soldier of the Russian army, I fought back in 1914, I want to help you, Russians. They will go to war with you tomorrow - all of Germany, believe me. My family, my grandchildren remained there ... ”

I reported the incident to the commandant, senior lieutenant M. S. Velichko. The captain FLS soldiers from the headquarters also arrived from the commandant's office. Again poll. And we believe and do not believe. Facts say: tomorrow is war. And the mind - no, this is absurd ...

I called the head of 1-th outpost Art. Lieutenant K.T. Kichiginu. I conveyed to him according to the code table: “Guests are expected from the other side today, take action. I sent a frontier post (our joint) to the 114 area to meet guests with cars (guests are the enemy, machines are machine guns). ”The telephone rang. From the 1-th outpost, the senior political propaganda instructor of the political department of the detachment, senior political officer N. A. Suhovey, called: "Gorbunov, report in detail on the situation."

Then I heard the voice of the chief of the outpost and conveyed to him already openly: “Listen, Kuzma! Once again I tell you. Our outposts in the Nemirów and 114 border posts in 4-00 will be attacked by a German. There I additionally send an outfit with a light machine gun. Now decide for yourself, act as your conscience dictates. ”

After 1-00, junior commanders gathered in the office. I told them about the upcoming attack on the outpost. Put in front of them the combat mission. Each individually indicated the area of ​​defense, fighters and weapons. Warned that no one raised panic, and acted coolly. He paid special attention to the fact that the fascist surpasses us in manpower ...

In 2-00, in the 114 area, a frontier post sent an additional outfit as a part of Corporal Ivan Sergeev and Vladimir Chugreev with a light machine gun and a dog: “Hold the outfit at the mill. Bear service together until further notice. In the case of crossing the Germans, open fire yourself. On the number of the enemy at the outpost to report to the dog. Do not wait for our help. Act on the situation ... "

In 3-00, Gorbachev and I raised an outpost into a gun: “In 5 minutes, line up everyone here with a weapon. From the knapsacks lay out too much. "People stood, looking puzzled:" What will it be? " We had to announce clearly and directly: “Germany is attacking us. Our task is to defend the land entrusted to us by the Motherland.... "On the other side is silence. The Germans were silenced ... And after an hour, artillery and mortar fire... »

We also see the adoption of the initiative by the commander of the outpost and his clear understanding that Germany is attacking us. The commander beat the decision of the General Staff for many hours ...

10-th Army. P.I. Lyapin (NS 10 A): "The defense plan of the state border of 1941, we did and reworked from January until the war, and so didn't finish. Changes to the first directive on drawing up a plan during this time were received three times, and all three times had to be redone. The last change to the operational directive was received by me personally in Minsk on May 14, in which it was ordered to complete the plan by May 20 and submit it to the district commander for approval ...

“Bagpipe” with the approval of the state border defense plan developed by us - on the one hand, the Germans had clearly prepared for decisive actions, of which we were thoroughly informed through the RO - on the other, completely disoriented us and made us not give serious importance to the situation, which ripened the military attack of the Germans ...

From 16 to 20, June, the district headquarters carried out a reporting, army field trip of the army headquarters and 10 army headquarters, to which corps directorates from the eastern districts of the district were also involved ... In the evening of 20 June, after analyzing the results of the field trip conducted by General of the Army Pavlov, DIA in Bialystok, army commander 10, Major-General Golubev, under the strictest secret, announced to the generals and senior officers in charge that the BOVO military commander had allowed: “Large heads to send their families and property in depth l country, but without fanfare... »

Since the departure of families was banned from June 20, and families were removed from trains and returned to military camps, in PribOVO, on instructions from the People's Commissar of Defense, the permission of the Commander of Zapov is at least some act. Although this concerned only the families of the big bosses, but contrary to the instructions of the People's Commissar of Defense ...

Much later 23 hours 21 Jun General Golubev summoned to headquarters for negotiations with Pavlov. Minutes later, 40 was called to the headquarters and PI Lyapina: “I came to the office of the commander, who was already filled with generals and senior officers ... I realized that nobody knows the true purpose of our presence at headquarters at such a late hour. It was about two in the morning. In a half-whisper, Lieutenant-Colonel Markushevich reported to me the following: some particularly important piece of equipment is being sent by telegraph, and the commander is awaiting orders from the direct telephone for the commander of the BOVO troops. All corps and division commanders are already in their headquarters near the telephones and are waiting for instructions from the commander, only there is no connection with the 113 division. Just a few minutes after my arrival, the person on duty reported that the direct telegraph communication with Minsk had been interrupted, the attempt to receive PCs through Grodno also failed, they took half of one part through the telegraph of border communications, but it also stopped; Communication from Bialystok to Bielsk does not work either.

Apparently, Major General Golubev also realized that something was wrong, and immediately began to call Minsk by direct telephone. HF phone on Minsk still worked. The situation with the communication was reported to the army commander, General of the Army Pavlov, and in response to this in 2-30 22 June 1941, Major General Golubev received an order: “Open the red packets and act as indicated there” and that's it!

We had nothing to open, because the documents of the army headquarters, which are to be sealed in the “red bag”, were kept in the safe of the operational department by unapproved commanders of the BOVO, and therefore not sealed. In the units and formations of the army, as has already been said, documents were kept in “red packets” only for alarm and material support. Combat orders for all units were expressed on schematic maps issued to division commanders at the army headquarters a month ago. All this very quickly allowed us to transfer the order personally to the commanders of the formations, not only by a signal on the phone, but also by short PCs, since the link still worked with all the connections except the 113 Division... »

Report Chief of the 3 Division of the 10 Army of the Regimental Commissioner Elk 15.7.41: "21 June 1941 in 24-00 I received a call from the FWS and asked me to come to headquarters ... The commander of the 10 army Golubev said that the situation is extremely tense and there is an order from the district to wait for orders from the administration. In turn, by this time all the corps and division commanders were called to the wire and waited for orders.

At around 1:00 in the morning on 1, the former ZOVOVO Commander Pavlov phoned HF, ordered the troops to be put on alert, and said that he would give the details in a cipher. In accordance with this, instructions were given to all commanders of the units. At around 22 hours, all communications were torn. I believe that the enemy parachutists were dropped before the start of the bombing and they removed all means of communication... »

M.M. Barsukov (chief of artillery 10 A):The artillery of the army was assembled in only one camp, the proving ground Chervon Bor, the Zambrovo area. By 22.6.41, the camps were: 124 gap and 310 dads RGC [S.S.Chekunov - 311 dads - cannon ap]cap [case an] and tkap [S.S.Chekunov - heavy corps an] 1 sk ... The collection of artillery units in the camp was carried out according to the camp schedule, announced in the order of the commander of the troops Zapov.

Artillery of six sd, kk and molded 13 tk, 301 gap [S.S.Chekunov - probably 375 gap RGC] and the formed anti-tank artillery brigade was located in areas of permanent deployment and had to go into the camps for the period of artillery firing at Chervonny Bor and Obuz-Lesna test sites. By order of the commander of the army, the artillery and its artillery were sent to areas of concentration in their directions, if memory serves, 20.6.41. The artillery units located in the Chervonny Bor camp are alerted by the alert that I personally announced during the time period between 5-00 - 7.00 22.6.41... ".

Mv Bobkov (NSh 5 sc): "At the end of the 20.6.41 exercise, tov.Golubev at a meeting of the army leadership, commanders, commissioners, corps NS and other officials said: “We cannot say for sure when there will be war. It may be tomorrow, and in a month, and in a year ... I order 6-00 21.6 corps headquarters to take their gearboxes. ”

The command post 5 was located in Zambrov, in the military camp 13, where the headquarters of the corps moved exactly to 6-00 21.6, as indicated by the army commander. Wherein no order was given for the withdrawal of corps units to the state border and occupying defensive lines with them. Corps divisions began to enter the state border in 3 - 4-00 22.6when already the German fascists had treacherously attacked our homeland. The order for entering the state border and occupying defensive lines was given by the army commander 10 via Morse telegraph in 2-00 - 3-00 22 June 1941 year... »

M.A. Zashibalov (commander of the 86th division): "21 June 1941 of the year on the territory of the regimental defense sectors were defensive works: the 1 and 2 rifle battalions of the Red Banner 169 regiment with one regimental artillery battery ... The 1 rifle battalion 330 cn with one regimental battery ...

The remaining parts of the division and divisions of the rifle and artillery regiments of the division were located in camps at the place of permanent deployment ...

The 169 th Regiment of the Red Banner ... away from its defense sector from 25 to 40 km. 330-th sp ... away from its defense area from 20 to 40 km. 248-th sp ... away from its defense area from 30 to 40 km. The 248 and 383 ap to the 21.6.41 were at the district assemblies of the artillery units of the district ... at a distance from the defense sectors of the rifle regiments and the prepared firing positions from 30 to 40 km. Ozadn was on the district assemblies of anti-aircraft units in the area of ​​Belostok, at a distance of 130-150 km from the area of ​​combat positions ...

At one o'clock in the morning on 22 on June 1941, the corps commander was called to the telephone and received the following instructions - the division headquarters, the regiment headquarters to alert and collect them at the location. The rifle regiments were not raised in combat alarm, why wait for his order ... In 1-10 22.6.41, the division headquarters was alarmed ... In 1-25, the commanders of the division reported that the headquarters of the regiments and the battalion headquarters were assembled and are waiting for further orders. In addition, the regimental commanders sent staff officers to the infantry battalions located on the USSR State Border on vehicles in order to raise them in alarm and occupy the prepared defense areas ...

In the 2-00 22.6.41 NSh division reported on the information received from the head of the Nur frontier post that the Nazi troops approach the Western Bug River and bring transport means. After the report NSH in 2-10 22.6.41 ordered to send a signal "Storm" and raise the alarm center and perform a forced march to occupy the sites and defense areas in the divisional defense zone prepared on 50%. The division's artillery commander, Colonel Boykov, was ordered with the necessary vehicles to transfer artillery to the OP, to go to the district collection of artillery units, to raise the alert and 6 to the OP areas of the regimental and divisional artillery groups. NSH divisions headquarters divisions, headquarters regiments and battalions with communications on vehicles for 22.6.41 hours with 4 June 22, the output of the prepared command and NP, where the arrival of SP to arrange communication to control defensive combat. The entire division reconnaissance battalion in 1941-2 30 on June 22 will move from the quartering area to the Dombrova region, where it will concentrate on 1941-4 30... »

Yu.D. Kuznetsov (117 gap, 8 cd): "By the beginning of the war, our unit was located in the summer camps of “Cherveny Boer” ... Our regiment was preparing for sporting events that were scheduled for Sunday 22 June ... At dawn 22 June I woke up from the noise of flying planes and voices near the tent ... Going beyond the front line to the edge of the forest, we saw planes circling above the airfield, or rather above the flight platform, located not far from us. Then came the shooting. The duty officer approached the camp. For a long time we looked at how these planes were spinning the wheel, and could not understand what was happening... "

On 22.06.41, 6-i cd was part of 6-kk. 21 June in Lomzhinsky DCA was held a festive evening on the occasion of the release of ml. Lt. June 22 expected divisional and corps equestrian competitions. Two squadrons of 3-kp, reinforced by two platoons of tanks, 19 June aimed at strengthening the 87 detachment of the border troops of the NKVD.

After midnight, the commander of the 6-th cd, Major General Konstantinov, who spent the night at the headquarters location, was called to the telephone by the head of the frontier detachment, Major I.M. possible soon. In the second hour of the night, the commander of 6 KK, Major General I.S. Nikitin, called General Konstantinov to his office; they worked out an algorithm for action in case the Wehrmacht crossed the border. Around 3-00 from the headquarters of ZAPOV over the phone, an order was received to open the “red packet”. The division's cavalry regiments near 4-00 in the morning marched from military camps. 35 th TP was somewhat delayed, preparing for the march of armored vehicles.

In 4 hours of 22 June, the 36-I cd was alerted and soon came up with the task of connecting with the 6-th cd.

CDB ZF: “[Were at 22.6.41] 6 MK - Bialystok Headquarters ... 4 TD - Bialystok ... 7 TD - Khoroshch ... 29 MSD - on the eve of the transition from Slonim to the Bialystok region... "

Report of the commander 7 td 6 MK: "6 MK during the war with the Germans from 22 to 30.6.41 was not used as a whole as a mechanized compound, it was transferred from one direction to another, being under the blows of enemy aviation ...

20.6.41 The corps commander held a meeting with the division commanders, which was tasked with improving combat readiness, i.e. it was ordered to finally equip shells and shops, to invest in tanks, to strengthen the protection of parks and warehouses, to check once again the assembly areas for combat alert, to establish radio communication with the corps headquarters, and the corps commander warned that these events should be carried out without any fuss. talk, continue to study according to plan. All these instructions were met on time ...

22.6.41 on 2-00 a password was received through the alarm delegate of the communications with the opening of the Red Packet. After 10 minutes, division units were alerted, and in 4-30, units of the division focused on the combat point assembly point. In 4-00, enemy aviation bombed Bialystok, m.Horosh and Novosilka, but parts of the division were not bombarded except for the remnants of 13 mn. Losses: 26 people injured and 4 killed, ma.chast not suffered.

Fighting 7 td. 22.6.41 by order of the corps commander, the division performed the reconnaissance service with the reconnaissance battalion along the Warsaw highway to the west. Intelligence worked well, information about the actions of the enemy was enough, but intelligence had the task to reconnect with parts of 1 sk. The first day of the war division had no more tasks before 22-00 22.6.41... »

Protocol interrogation in the German captivity of commander 4 nd td (6 nd mk) Potaturcheva 30.8.41: "22 June in 24-00 he was summoned to the commander of 6 MC General Major Khatskilevich. At about 2 hours of the night, Major General Golubev, commander of the corps, who returned from the commander of 10 th Army, [he learned] that there was a war between Germany and Russia. After 2 hours of waiting, he received the first order - to raise parts of the alarm and take the provided positions... »

After the announcement of the June 22 alarm, the air defense divisions of the 6-k MK were in 120 km east of Minsk.

The covering forces of the 2 area included 64 and 66.

64 (Zambrowski) Ur. A.G.Nizov (deputy politician 12 opb): "In December 1940, our unit moved ... to 64 Zambrowski UR, which was just being built. In some places there were pillboxes full of caponiers and polukaponiry, but somewhere there was still an empty space - "dead space". Dots are good, but not everything was there. There was no filter ventilation system, transformers, etc. The location of our battalion was the village of Konchany, which was located in 11 km from the town of Chizhev and in 100 km from Bialystok. Our pillbox was located not far from the Moscow-Warsaw highway ...

From the first hours of the war I had to take the fight myself, because the connection was immediately interrupted, and there was no connection between the pillboxes either. The advanced parts of the Germans, of course, immediately went ahead ... At the PD periscope, it was obvious that the Germans literally marched deeper and deeper into our territory, and it was not possible to fire at them - they marched outside the bombardment of our bunker. The shells of the German cannons almost did not harm our pillboxes. Several border guards from the 88 border guard detachment headed by the commandant’s station lieutenant Shepelenko escaped in our pillboxes ... The command decided to split into groups and move east... »

66 (Osovetsky) Ur. The garrison of UR at the beginning of the war was eight opb and four artillery batteries. The UR also included two tank companies armed with T-18 tanks. With 22.6.41, the garrison joined the battle with the troops of 1 sk, some of which managed to take up positions in the RA.

A.M.Loginov: "The headquarters of our 87 border detachment was not far from Grodno, 25 km is probably the city of Lomza. At first I served on the 24 th outpost, and then I was transferred to the 3 outpost. Day after 3 before the war, the chief of the technical supply of the detachment arrived at our outpost, and I have ribbons loaded for two 24 machine guns. So he arrived, examined the ribbons and ordered: “Discharge and dry”. But this was all to be done with my hands ... I took one box, I start discharging, then he left. I again put this tape. Three days later the war. If all discharged...

In 3-45, another outfit was taking over the border guard. I gave him a combat mission, and then the sky was covered with a glow, the planes passed, and then the shelling began. The head of the outpost then rested, the political leader was on vacation, well, we ourselves knew what to do, only the border guards asked me: “Well, what is a foreman, war or provocation?” I say: “War.” What kind of provocation here, when the Belovsky plot is shelled, Sorokinsky, Malinovsky is shelling. Across the border shooting... "

13-I army. S.P.Ivanov (Deputy NSH 13 Army): "Sigh of relief involuntarily escaped from me [this is a TASS statement on June 14]. I thought at that moment that our government apparently probed the ground from the German side and received appropriate assurances ... Colonel Lyapin handed me an order for an urgent departure to Mogilyov and said that ... I was appointed head of the operations department - deputy 13 Army X. K .D.Golubev immediately accepted me and, at my request, replied sadly: “I myself already asked the NSh district to leave you with us, but he refused outright refused ...”

Late in the evening of June 21, we finished the work ... Early in the morning I was awakened by the duty radio operator, who said that the tankers had received an order to raise the personnel on alert. The clock showed 5-30 ... It was not possible to establish a connection with Minsk or Mogilev on that tragic day.... »

I.N.Russiyanov (commander of the 100th division): "On Saturday, June 21 ... we were preparing for the solemn opening of the self-built stadium ... In the evening ... everyone went home. Woke up a sharp phone call. “Russiyanov is listening,” I said into the phone and heard the familiar, but strangely disturbing voice of the deputy commander of the army Zapov, Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin: “Do you recognize me?”

- I will find out. I am listening to you, comrade general.

- Germany without a declaration of war attacked us. "Option number 1." Clear what to do?

- Yes sir!

- Act!.. "

S.I. Gurov (NSh 49 sd): "Ordinance on combat readiness of units from anyone not received. 21.6.41 in 21 hour, after the operational game, I left Kobryn. On the way I stopped by a divisional commander in the town of Vysoko-Litovsk. I learned from him that the headquarters of the division today, i.e. 21.6., Moved to a new location at 31lap headquarters [easy an], and that the commanders of the units, the NSH, have to arrive at 6-00 22.6's exercises at the Brest artillery range ...

Being in Kobryn, 21.6 received a telegram about what should come with the mob plan to the headquarters of the BVO 22 June to 10-00. At 23-00, I arrived at the division headquarters at a new location ... At 4-00, the commanders of the units and the NSH gathered at the old headquarters, and at 4-05, German aviation bombed 212, 222 cn, 31 paws, autobat, medical battalion, division warehouses... »

N.I. Kovalenko (commander 212 cn 49 sd): "Before the beginning of the war, the regiment was deployed in the forest in the newly built barracks battalion-battalion at the Nurets railway station ... 3 Infantry Battalion, ... sapper company ... at that time were located in the area of ​​the frontier commandant's office ... who were engaged in fragmenting PT ditches, making wire barriers and PT nolb. 22.6.41 in the attack of the German fascists, according to the report of the chief of the engineering service of the regiment and 4-x fighters, who ran from there in underwear and reported that the battalion was destroyed by the enemy... »

RCB 44 ck: "15.6.41 44 ck received an order - go to a mobile camp ... All parts of the corps were not fully provided with the necessary weapons and ammunition. As a result, the events that unfolded 22.6 found parts of the corps not prepared for entry into battle... »

CDB 108 sd: "June 22 The 108-th SD with the attached Red Banner 49 cap as part of the 44 sk 13-th Army from the Drogobuzh camps went to the front... »

CDB 55 sd: "In 7-30 22.6.41 telegraphic com-troop Zapovo ordered: bring the troops on alert, give out ammunition, artillery shells. In 8-00, this order was confirmed by Zapov’s headquarters... »

YES. Morozov: "In May, the headquarters of artillery and all the artillery units of the 1941 division left 55 for the Urechensk camps, located 15 kilometers east of Slutsk. Once in the new location, the units immediately began their studies ... At dawn on 22 June, Colonel Semenov, Jr. Lt. Makarov and I went fishing. As soon as we reached the river, we heard the increasing roar of airplanes. “Weekend, and our aviators work. Probably some kind of teaching, ”said Sasha Makarov.

“They are not enough days now. Master new cars. And today the weather is good, and they are catching the moment, ”explained Semenov. "Ten ... twenty ... thirty," I counted black dots moving toward the rising sun. “More regiment!” Sasha was surprised. "This is not ours, German!" - I exclaimed in alarm when I saw crosses on the wings of cars with binoculars... »

CDB 121 sd: "11 June on the orders of the commander of the BVO 121 troops from the Bobruisk region moved to a new place Obuk ​​(station) - Lesnaya, where it concentrated. On the night of 22 on 23 June 1941, the division took up defensive positions in the Slonim area... »

On the night of 22.6.41, the 13 MK was alarmed. At two o'clock in the morning, the corps headquarters moved to a field command post in the forest, in 15 km south-west of Belsk.

31 Backsight (31 td 13 mk): "23.6.41 6-00. Division from the camp has not yet arrived... »

N.G. Ilyin, V.P. Rulin (129 ip 9 garden): "A team arrived to prepare for the relocation to the summer camp ... The airfield resembled a rectangle stretched from west to east ... "Everything would be fine, but the border is close", sighed ... commander ... It seemed that the Germans were plotting something. While making patrol flights along the border, our pilots observed how the Nazi troops, tanks, and cars were moving along the roads of Poland. However, I did not want to believe that war was on the threshold.

Suddenly 21 June in Bialystok called the entire leadership of the regiment. In connection with the beginning of the exercise in the border VOs, it was proposed to disperse all the material in the regiment before dark, to ensure its disguise. When at the end of the day the regiment commander returned to the camp, the work began to boil. All the airplanes at the airfield were dispersed and camouflaged ... We were awakened by the thunder of artillery cannonade, which came from the border ... The siren burst out sharply, howled... "

«Captain J. Berkal, commander of 129-iap ... in 4-05 managed to raise two squadrons of the MiG-3 to cover the city of Ostrow-Mazowiecka and one squadron of I-153 in the Lomza region. Fourth Squadron I-153 patrols near the airfield... "

P.I. Tsupko (13 sbap 9 garden): "22 Jun ... announced a day off. All were delighted: three months did not rest! The last two days were especially tense when, on orders from an air division, the regiment was engaged in 200-hour maintenance work ... Pilots and technicians dismantled airplanes into their component parts, cleaned them, adjusted them, lubricated them and reassembled them. Worked from dawn to dusk. On Saturday evening, leaving the senior chief of the operator, Captain Vlasov, the command of the air regiment, many pilots and technicians left for the families in Ross, while those left in the camp at nightfall went to the improvised club site to watch the new sound feature film “Musical”. story". The entire air garrison remained in the custody of the internal service, which was headed by the duty officer for the camp collection ml. Lieutenant Usenko ...

Suddenly, he heard the faint hum of aircraft engines ... The sound was rapidly growing. He came from the west ... "Sat, what?" - the pilot tried to determine the type of aircraft from a distance and wanted to continue on his way, but he kept some subconscious anxiety in place. The planes flew up to the border of the airfield, entered from the right side, and suddenly bright red flashes of fire often flashed from the lead.... »

N.S.Titov (13 sbap): "Question: And the air defense of the airfield?

We did not have this in the regiment. Maybe the anti-aircraft guns stood aside, but they were not directly on the airfield ...

Question: Was the 22 Jun regiment virtually annihilated completely?

Completely.

Question: How many planes did you manage to save?

No one. One is almost ...

Question: And the airfield was disguised? Or stood as a ruler?

The line was set, and the staff lived in tents on the other side of the airfield ... The parking was like a line, and who had a motor shot and a chassis. Disabled two or three squadrons. And the fourth was at the edge of the forest, and it survived - the Germans probably didn’t see it - four hours were still dark, they came in from the forest ... The squadron, about which I said that it remained after the first raid intact, took off , the resource of gasoline has developed, and just before that, the second raid came back and sat down. But now only one plane managed to take off. Flew away, made landing in Orel, but crashed... "

IN AND. Olympiav (9 garden): "The headquarters of 9 Garden was located on the main street of the city in a mansion surrounded by a spacious courtyard with a turret. In the basement of the house is the barracks of the communications company. After returning from duty to the barracks late in the evening on 21 June 1941, with a pay leave in my pocket on Sunday, I was already dozing off when, through sleep, I heard a loud command of the day-to-day “shotgun”. I looked at the clock - about two nights. The company quickly built in the courtyard of the headquarters. War alarm did not surprise us, because expected next military exercises.

Extraordinary teams - to put air observation on the headquarters of the headquarters building, to receive live ammunition and grenades, to load the emergency supply of cable onto the car as perceived by us as part of the then-current training exercises in an environment as close as possible to the actual combat conditions. Thoughts of the worst in youth were discarded. Leaving the end of the cable in the headquarters, my office began the usual work in the dark of a moonless night - laying a field telephone line to a spare command post located on a farm a few kilometers outside the city. It was almost dawn when our special truck, designed for unwinding and cable winding, reached a military airfield on the outskirts of the city. Everything was quiet. The 37-mm guns disguised in caponiers along the airfield, whose calculations were armed with carbines in helmets, caught the eye. Such anti-aircraft semi-automatic were then a novelty and just started to enter the air defense units.

Our car drove away from the airfield no more than a kilometer away, when explosions and cannon-machine-gun fire were heard. Turning around, we saw planes diving on the airfield, luminous routes of shells and bullets, explosions of bombs. However, the terrible reality reached us only when black crosses were clearly visible on the bomber coming out of the peak of a bomber.... "

The fate of the 129-iap and 13-th sbap of the same air division was different. Not enough data to talk about the initiative of one of the commanders and the lack thereof in others ...

S.F. Dolgushin (122 iap, 11 garden): "Question: Has the airfield actually been at the border?

On the border. To the north is 5,5 km. In the process of preparation, we flew all border airfields in Belarus. At all aerodromes, 4-5 fighters were deployed several kilometers from the border. We circled all the airfields. The squadron sits down, if everything has sat down and there is enough fuel to return, we turn around, take off and leave ...

On Friday, June 20, we flew, explored ... On Friday, Pavlov flew in, Kopets flew in, and the division commander, Colonel Ganichev, on his plane. They collected us at the headquarters, I report that I saw a group of planes at forty. It was us at dawn, in the morning we flew from Seryozha ... We took pictures from two thousand, we examined all this, and now we reported that there were so many planes of this type. An increase of so much, the entire airfield of Suwalki is completely packed.

And later we see a passenger car, which is heading for us to the parking ... Goes Kopec, a lieutenant-general, asks, “What is your name? Will you give me a plane to fly? Do not worry, Sergey, I will not break ... "

We flew then: the commander, the regimental commander, and our colonel Nikolaev ... We flew, taxied. I come, and Kopec goes. “The plane is really good. Everything you reported was accurate. We could not count the planes with accuracy, and I didn’t want to hang out there a lot. ”

Then a commission from the Air Force arrived at the airfield. He was headed by the deputy head of the operational management, the colonel. I knew him well, after the war he became a general. With them was the deputy Koptsa drill, Major General ...

On Saturday, 21 June, we flew off, by the evening the flights ended, and we were told: "Remove the weapons and ammunition boxes, and store them separately." But what is it! We were all excited.

Question: Before this order was not?

Not. We flew to intercept! Guns and machine guns for one reload, press and hit. And then - take off! We have no armourers, we have no motorists ...

On Saturday, we drank a little before dinner, but vodka and sprats were still on Sunday. In 2-30 a signal is heard - an alarm! .. They rushed to the aircraft, uncovered. Technicians began to try engines, warm up. And it's time for us to carry guns, machine guns. But what did I do? I said on Saturday: “Let's not remove the boxes!” - “Well, how?” - “Comrade Commander, everything will be fine.”

And in 2-30 - anxiety! Our 2 squadron and 4 squadron need to run through the airfield, and 1-I and 3-I were standing right next to the tents. We ran, and those boxes had already been removed, began to carry guns. Technicians also connected, you need to quickly. And we have boxes in the planes, and my link was prepared first, all three planes. I went and reported to the squadron commander that the link was ready. He did not ask how we were able to get ready for this before everyone ... Just the dawn began ... And suddenly, from the south side, two planes approached the airfield. In the tail of this aircraft, a queue is heard, a long queue - and to the aircraft parking ...

We dispersed the cars, and again carry guns and ammunition. We were the first to prepare, then the 1 squadron, which was standing near the tents. They ran out of the tents, - and already through 5-10 meters their planes. We look: there are six planes, - three are coming, and behind are three more. What it is? Teaching what? Again we will not understand anything. We decided that this is the MiG-3 from Bialystok, - there was a regiment on the MiG-3. And then they turned around and began to beat us. Moreover, first from machine guns, and when they pass at low altitude "shells" are thrown ... Here is such a ball, when they threw it stuck into the ground, and then it breaks into four petals, like a rose. These petals scatter plastic shards... "

It should be noted that this is the only mention of the removal of aircraft armament and ammunition boxes in the air units. This is an indication of why it is associated with the indication of the Commander General Pavlov himself. In parts about Zapovo, quite a lot of memories of Air Force veterans about the beginning of the war are given and nowhere is there a similar situation. This is the only memory of such a case. If this is the only one, not a single one for all border aviation regiments, then this is either a case of distortion of facts or an initiative of the Air Force commission that arrived to the regiment.

G.N.Zakharov (commander 43 iad): "We before the memorable June 22 took a number of measures. All the vacationers were recalled and returned to the unit, I canceled the layoffs on Saturday and Sunday, the number of duty units, squadrons was increased. Actually, in those days I flew to the divisional courses of the link commanders ... At first, the directive came [Directive No. 1] signed by S.K.Timoshenko and G.K.Zhukov. It began with the words: “During the 22-23.6.41, the Germans might attack suddenly ...”

Need I say that in those few hoursthat remained until the start of the war, spread out dozens of aviation regiments, hundreds of cars accumulated at border airfields, and even, say, machines like the MiGs, on which no one, except for individual regimental commanders and squadrons, flew turned out to be impossible. Therefore, after the first massive air strikes on the frontier aerobatic hubs, only those individual aviation regiments and squadrons, which, according to the plans of the pre-war summer exercises, were already on field airfields and airfields, survived and remained operational.... "

The commander of the air division says unequivocally that prior to Directive No. XXUMX there was no indication of the dispersal of the Air Force. However, he does not say that 1 June units of the ZOVOVO Air Force were brought to combat readiness, and in the afternoon this instruction was canceled. In the 21 garden, some of the planes remained dispersed ...

N.A. Kozlov (162-iap 43-iad): "[21.6.41] This evening I spent with my little family in the park. And none of us imagined that only a few hours remained until the fateful minute, which predetermined not only our personal life for years, but also the life of our whole Motherland ... In 17 hours I took up duty on the airfield. It was, as always, calm, but calls from the headquarters of the division were frequent. Two hours later, an order was received to prepare everything for receiving aircraft at night. I asked:

- Who will be?

- This is not your concern. Prepare and report, answered me.

After preparing for the reception, I reported on the readiness. At my request, when the landing was tentatively, the division’s duty officer answered: you will receive additional data.

By 23 hours communication with the headquarters of the division ceased. The operator informed that the line was damaged. At about 24 hours I was replaced by the deputy commander of a neighboring regiment, Captain Koryagin.

- How is the duty, Nikolai?

I expressed surprise that not a single aircraft arrived.

Koryagin thoughtfully said: “Yes, something is being done, and what is not clear” ...

Sharp sirens of siren lifted us to our feet. It was about five o'clock ... Saying goodbye to my wife and sleeping daughter, taking flight uniforms, I ran to the airfield... »

The fact of waiting for the arrival of some aircraft around the 19 watch 21.6.41 interesting. However, due to the large distance from the border to the airfield, located near the city of Mogilev (300 km), it is difficult to associate this fact with the expectation or not of waiting for war at dawn 22 June.

I.Geibo (deputy commander 46 iap 14 garden): "My chest went cold. In front of me are four twin-engine bomber with black crosses on the wings. I even bit my lip. Why, this is the "Junkers"! Germanic bombers Yu-88! What to do? .. Another thought arose: "Today is Sunday, and on Sundays the Germans do not have training flights." So war?.. "

F.Ya.Falaleev (1-th Deputy Head of the State Air Force KA): "On Sunday night 22 June 1941, I decided to go to the city of Lutsk, where the headquarters was [14 garden]. The division commissar, MM Moskalev, went to bed for hours on 12 nights ... At about 4 in the morning, a phone call rang. We were alarmed at the division headquarters ... At this time there were explosions of bombs dropped by German bombers on the airfield and the city of Lutsk.... »

The representative of the Civil Aviation Directorate on the night of June 22 is not aware of the expected start of the war at dawn. We saw a similar case in the LVO when the head of the department of the Main Command of the Air Force KA called up the Air Force commander. This fact confirms that on the night of 22 June, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Space Forces did not expect the beginning of the war at dawn ...

M.A. Ilchenko (128 bap, 12 bad): "21 Jun, platoon commander Grebennikov brought the layoffs to all twenty soldiers on 22 Jun from 6-00 to 20-00 ...

In the evening, we met familiar lads from an airfield company, who told us that they raised an alarm and sentry company and service company. They ordered all the planes from the parking lots to be removed and disguised at the edge of the forest. [Probably events were held as part of PT Taranenko from 21.6.41]

The whole day they rolled the planes by wedges and by hand. “The commanders probably have nothing to do and they force us to roll planes from place to place so that we don’t get bored,” they said. Others added with the meaning: "The command says there will be exercises." “Doctrines are like teachings, something that doesn’t concern us, the command freed us from the exercises and gave us leave” - we thought ...

In 5 hours, 22 June 1941, as agreed, the daily woke everyone who should go to Vitebsk ... In 5-25, the speakers clicked and a formidable voice announced: “Attention, attention, attention! Alarms, alarms, alarms! "The whole town immediately began to move... "

F.P.Polynin (commander 13 bad): "I paid special attention to night flights. Some commanders ... in a joking manner, began to complain: “Wives are asking for a divorce. We don’t look at the house for weeks ... ”21.6.41 came to us ... a team of artists arrived from Minsk ... It was past midnight when ... they were sent back to Minsk. Just came home and went to bed, as a long telephone call rang. "Battle alarm!" - I hear the agitated voice of the duty officer on headquarters.

- Where did they report?

- From Minsk...

“Immediately send the alarm to all the garrisons,” I ordered the duty officer. He quickly got dressed and ran to the headquarters ... I pick up the phone, contacting the regimental commanders. Those are ready, waiting for the battle order. The conversation cipher extremely brief. The goals are such, meeting with the fighters there. I called the district air force headquarters to report on readiness. His commander, Colonel S.A. Khudyakov, is absent, and the air force commander I. Kopets too. To our inquiry: “Are the fighters ready for combat, as foreseen by the plan?” - answered: “They will not be. To fly to the mission unaccompanied ... "Just in case, we make another request. We are answered: “Perform the task yourself. Cover will not be... »

V.V. Tolstikov (shooter-radio operator 24 sbap 13 bad): "The war for me came in 2 in the morning of June 22. The regiment was alarmed, and in 3-30 we were in the air for the entire regiment, taking a combat course to the West, to the Bug river, to bomb the Nazi tankers. We sighted bombs on the enemy, but on the way back we were overtaken by German fighters "Messerschmidt", and we went without any cover for our fighters, and "Messerschmidts" managed to shoot down half of our regiment's planes. My plane was among the planes shot down. True, I and the navigator managed to get out of the burning plane... »

E.V.Koyander (staff officer at 59 iad, Minsk): "Rise! Combat alarm! ”- the alarm officer of the division on duty burst into the room. Commanders, residents of the hostel, where the same temporary bachelors lived, like me, as if blown away from the beds. On the move, buttoning waist belts and waist belts, straightening the folds in tunics, we hurry to the training class to get a personal weapon. Someone resembled yesterday's sheet from the calendar. At the next, he was overwhelmed: "June 22." I looked at my watch — four in the morning.

In class, the attendant checked on the list of participants. What to do next - no one knew. Our division was in the process of formation. In case of anxiety, even the schedule of actions of the headquarters staff has not yet been compiled However, you still need to check the connection with the airfields. I call Puhovichi. Answer immediately. The alarm there has already been announced. Actually, this is how it should be: the duty officer of the division, upon receiving an alarm, is obliged to immediately notify staff commanders and pass this signal to subordinate air units.

"Probably, the Air Force headquarters is checking our vigilance on a day off," I suggested.... "

I.G. Starchak (head of the parachute service Zapovo): "On the morning of June 21, 1941, testing a new parachute, I injured my leg ... It was getting dark when my chief of service at the headquarters of the Air Force ZAPOV, Colonel S.A. Khudyakov entered the ward [NSHV ZOVOVO]. He was also among the patients: he was diagnosed with acute pleurisy ...

I did not notice the arrival of midnight. This was announced by the chiming of the Kremlin chimes. Sunday came 22 June. Khudyakov left ... I was awakened by some kind of push ... From the side of our airfield four strong explosions rang out ... I jumped on my good foot into the chamber of Colonel Khudyakov. He spoke on the phone. I understood: with the duty officer at the district headquarters. Finally, Sergei Alexandrovich hung up. I was silent, expecting him to speak himself. I saw it in his face: something very serious happened, something that even the spirit didn’t have to ask ...

Khudyakov answered my unspoken question: "Wait, captain, now I will call the commander ..." It came from the pipe: "He is at a meeting of the Military Council." Khudyakov sighed heavily, mechanically adjusting the rubber tubes out of the abdominal cavity: “This is what the parachutist is: it seems the war has begun. Not at the time we were here with you... "

A.A.Gorobets: "Since May, 1941 personnel [39 bap] housed in camp tents in a wooded area in the airfield area. 22.6.41 in 4 o'clock in the morning was declared a combat alarm in connection with the beginning of the war with Germany ... Of the five air squadrons ... three planes took off. The fourth and fifth air squadrons ... were attacked by German aircraft... "

I.I.Konovalov: "I was offered to go to study at the bomber flight school, which was organized in the city of Slonim ... In the spring we were taken to camps located near the village of Mihalishki [26 km from the border], where we continued flight training. Training continued until 22.6.41. On Saturday, the officers went to the garrison to the families. Only cadets and a few officers on duty remained at the airport. In the morning there was a rumor that the war had begun. Announced the alarm.

We took overcoats in skates and gas masks, lowered the canopy of tents, threw two branches on them, sort of disguised. And it didn’t occur to anyone to disperse the planes! They stood in the center of the airfield wing to wing. As I remember seventeen handsome SB and opposite them the same P-5-s. In the afternoon we went to the dining room, had lunch. The point is in the evening. Suddenly, the He-111 bombers were flying, I counted twenty-four of them ... The Germans finished the bombing, they began a U-turn, and at this time the tail arrows began firing at us with machine guns ... The whole parking lot was on fire. Of the seventeen SB aircraft, only one aircraft remained intact. From P-5's - none... »

N.S. Skripko (commander of 3 long-range bomber corps): "Long after midnight, I went to bed ... At dawn 22 June 1941, I was picked up by a phone call. The operational officer on duty of the air corps reported that they were summoning me to the HF unit from Minsk ... I ordered the duty officer to hand over the air corps to the NS, so that he would not waste time on the phone and start dressing quickly. Instantly followed by a second call. This time he was reporting to the NS: "It’s you who are calling the HF unit." I run to headquarters ...

About 4-40 minutes, the commander of the Air Force ZAPOV, Major General I.I. Kopets, approached the phone. He immediately asked the question: “Do you have any instructions from Moscow?” I reported that I had not received any instructions, and in turn asked: “What happened?” Kopec was excitedly saying in a patter: “German aviation bombed Lida airfields Bialystok, Grodno, Pruzhany, Baranovichi and others. Our planes are burning on the airfields. Immediately bring all parts of the air corps and the Smolensk air garrison on alert. If you don’t get a combat mission from Moscow, you’ll be assigned to it... »

A.A. Avetikyan: "About the beginning of the war ... we were informed in the barracks at dawn 22.6.41 from the commanders of the 7 airborne brigade of the 4 VDK, in which I served. The corps, having completed the formation of 1941 in May, was stationed in a military town near the settlement of Maryina Gorka south of Minsk ... The beginning of hostilities can be considered 22.6.41, when by order of the acting corps commander of Kazankin the outpost was sent westward along the highway for contact with the advanced troops of the advancing enemy... »

Z.I.Kondratyev (VOSO representative in ZOVOVO): “Seeing me, Matishev approached and reported that construction was in full swing. And when we were alone, he said: “The talkers are coming: the war with the Germans is not today or tomorrow. The peasants say that the Germans make cannons at us. ” “How do fighters and commanders react to this?” I asked.

- They say: let them try to stick their heads up ... "Perhaps the fascists are plotting a major provocation? - I thought. “After all, they often now violate our border.” I arrived in Moscow at dawn 22 June. The day foreshadowed to be warm, sunny, and Muscovites rushed out of the city. After leaving the square in front of Belorussky railway station, I began to look for a taxi. Suddenly I heard: “Comrade General!” I turned around.

- Are you Zakhar Ivanovich Kondratyev?

In front of me stood a breathless senior lieutenant technician. Raising his hand to the field cap, he introduced himself and handed over the order to the head of the VOSO, Lieutenant General NI Trubetskoy: directly from the station to arrive at headquarters.

- Something happened?

The senior lieutenant technician looked at me strangely, but said nothing. Opening the door, he offered to get in the car. A minute later we were already running along the Moscow streets in the direction of the Arbat. Only now my companion said: “Where you come from is restless.” I got it. During the time I had to spend on the road, the irreparable happened. Thought was transported to the forest, under the city of Belsk. How is Akhlustin, the railway brigade, Matishev, who is keeping up now? "Or maybe this is just a major incident?"- flashed in my head... »

I.G. Starinov: "In the twenties of June 1941, the General Staff of the Spacecraft Forces planned to conduct Zapov’s military exercises. From the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army, two people were seconded to the exercises: deputy head of the military engineering training department, Lieutenant Colonel Z. Kolesnikov, and me, who at that time was the head of the barrage and mining department ... In the evening of June 19 we left Moscow to introduce yourself in Minsk to the command, and then continue on to Brest, to headquarters for future exercises.

The senior lieutenant who met us said that General Vasilyev, the head of the district’s engineering department, was asking to be at headquarters. "And that he can not sleep?" - Kolesnikov was surprised. General Vasiliev, smooth-shaven, fit, was a model of excellent health and good mood. He said that everything is ready at the training ground for the upcoming teachings, he offered to go to the NSh district. “Is it because of the teachings that all the bosses are already at headquarters?” I asked. "The authorities always have reason to sleep enough!" - Vasilyev joked.

The NS Klimovsky District, in contrast to General Vasiliev, looked gloomy, closed. He greeted him with a nod, but did not come off the handset. A minute or two later he apologized, said he was extremely busy: “See you at the site!»District Commander Pavlov also spoke on the phone. Irritably demanded from the interlocutor to show more exposure. Showed the commander of the test program. He looked at it, noticed with displeasure that the engineers again took up their position: they paid too much attention to the device of PT barriers and too little to ways to overcome them.

At this time Klimovskiy entered: “Comrade Army General, an important thing ...” Pavlov looked at us: “Think of the program. Goodbye. See you at the exercises". Until we closed the door behind us, General Klimovsky didn’t say a word.

Puzzled and alarmed by what he saw and heard, I decided to see General Klich, commander of the artillery of the district. Maybe he will explain something? “Wolf!” Klich exclaimed, remembering my Spanish pseudonym, “to the teachings? Glad you, glad! Only I am afraid, now it’s not up to the teachings. ” He said that the Nazis are constantly pulling up troops to the border, bringing artillery and tanks, carrying out reconnaissance flights over our territory, and many of the commanders on leave, most of the vehicles and tractors, artillery regiments taken on the construction of ur. “If something happens — guns without traction!” Klich was indignant. “Pavlov reports to Moscow every day about the seriousness of the situation, and we are told not to let panic and that Stalin knows everything. "

"But after all, German troops are assigned to the eastern borders of Germany for a holiday? ”I said carefully “In any case, the TASS message from the 14 number says so.”

“I am not an employee of TASS, but a soldier!” Klich snapped, “and I used to keep my powder dry. Especially in dealing with the fascist bastard! Who should I believe? To Hitler? What are you, Wolf? ”We could not continue the conversation: The cry was urgently summoned to Pavlov.»

[We met with confirmation that the commander of the troops Zapovo regularly reported to Moscow on the seriousness of the situation on the border: “Pavlov reports to Moscow every day about the seriousness of the situation, and we are told not to let panic". The representative of the engineering control of the spacecraft responds with words that are officially voiced: "But after all, German troops allotted to the eastern borders of Germany for recreation?"This is further confirmation that the Central Office of the Spacecraft (and in particular in engineering management) did not expect the start of the 22 war in June. We have seen a lot of evidence of this in the 11 part.]

«The day was spent in preparation for the exercises: we refined and changed the points of the test program in accordance with the wishes of the district commander. At the end of the day I tried to see Klich again, but to no avail. “Go to rest!” Said General Vasilyev - “the morning is wiser than the evening. If something serious happened, the exercises would have been canceled long ago, and, as you see, everything is going according to plan.“In the words of the head of the engineering department there was a reason. We went to the hotel, slept well and early on the morning of June 21, on Saturday, went by train to Kobrin, where the headquarters of the 4 army was located, covering the Brest area; it was necessary to see the head of the army engineering troops, Colonel A.I. Proshlyakov, to discuss with him the change of the training program.

We got to Kobrin in the evening. Proshlyakov confirmed that the fascists were tightening military equipment to the Western Bug, built many observation towers, installed masking boards in open places. “We were warned that the German military could go on provocations and that it was impossible to resist the provocations,” Proshlyakov calmly said, “Nothing. There are no nervous in the army headquarters". The head of the engineering department arranged for us to spend the night in his own office. We agreed that we would go to Brest together in the morning ... About twenty two hours returned to headquarters. The duty officer reported: we called from the district, the exercises were canceled, we should return to Minsk. Involuntarily remembered the arguments of General Vasiliev ...

«Surely the German generals will decide on a provocation?"- sitting on the edge of the staff couch and tightening his boots, Kolesnikov asked ..." Sleep well, Zakhar Iosifovich! In the morning we’ll find out! ”I replied. We woke up suddenly. Whether blasting, or a bomb fell off an airplane ... Gaps, following one after another, merged into a monstrous roar... »

In the morning, at 4-30, at the apartment of 1, the secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee (B), P.K.Ponomarenko, a telephone call rang - the district commander DG Pavlov reported on the events at the border. In 4-45, a meeting of the command and commander of the district has begun.

Disposal: "Bobruisk Commander 47 sk. Control and send parts by train by train ... Start of transportation 23.6.41. Ensure loading on time according to plan. Keep the move secret. Shipping documents do not indicate the destination station. The question of departure, contact personally with the "Z" of Belarus. Deliver each sent echelon in cipher. Klimovskiy. Xnumx. "

On the document mark: "Similar instructions 21.6.41 given commanders 17-th SD 21-th sk, 50-th SD, 44 th sk, 121-th and 161-th SD. “Carriage start was set for 50 cd - 22.6.41, for 161 cd - 23.6.41, for 21 cc 17 and 121 cd - 24.6.41. ”Perhaps there was an increase in the number of units near the border in order to counter the increase in the number of German troops ...

M.Yu.Zapol (foreman of the airfield construction department of the NKVD): "Early in the morning 22.6.41 locals began to say that the war had begun. At 12 hours, a civilian builders gathered for a rally at the construction site (soldiers and prisoners rested on Sunday in the barracks) and listened to the radio by VM Molotov ... Approximately in 13-00 because of the forest adjacent to the construction site, a squadron of aircraft with black crosses on the fuselages appeared at low altitude ... Airplanes ... turned around and opened fire on the assembled... "

In the presented materials there are no even hints of traces of the mythical directive (s) of the General Staff. Also, there is no confirmation that within these directives the district mechanized corps were raised. But there are cases of lifting connections on a personal initiative ...

In the parts devoted to KOVO, there are only a few references to the opening of red packets. One of them is the NSH of the 62-th cd of the 15 of the sk of PANovichkova: “In 3-00, by order of the 15 shtaker, the headquarters were alarmed and a letter on the opening of the package and maps was indicated... "

This information is not confirmed by the commander of 15-th sk, and the NS of 15-th sk provides completely different information: “At about 3-20 22.6.41, the commander of the 5 army ... conveyed something like: “The Germans started fighting with our frontier guards in some places. This is another provocation. Do not go to the provocation. Troops raise the alarm, but the cartridges on his hands do not give out... "Raising troops in an alarm - it does not take them to areas of concentration according to the" Cover Plans "...

GI Sherstyuk (the commander of 45-th SDN 15-s) basically confirms the information of the NSH of the 15-th SC and indicates that he gave the order to open the packages: “In 8-00 - 8-30 NSH sd, Colonel Chumakov restored the connection ... and called me to the phone. To my first question: “What are orders from above on the actions of 45 sd?” - received a reply from the 15 commander via NSN 45: “Provocation, parts of the detachment to be in garrisons in full readiness, strictly prohibit firing at the frontier corps, wait for additional orders” Informing the division headquarters NS about the situation on the border, about opening the mobplan packages... "

KK Rokossovsky (commander 9 MK): "About four o'clock in the morning on June 22, upon receiving a telephone message from headquarters, was forced to open a special secret operational package... ”KK Rokossovsky writes that he had to open the package. Consequently, he did not see such an order in the telephone message. Only in 9-27 does he receive the STS order that he should proceed with the execution of the cover plan.

N.P. Ivanov (NSH of the 6 Army): “The commander of KOVO prohibited the deployment of cover units, bring the troops into combat readiness, and even more to strengthen them even after shelling the state border and air raids at night from 21 to 22 June 1941 of the year. Only on the afternoon of June 22 was this allowed... ”From this statement, the NSN of the 6 Army can only conclude that at the dawn of the order to open the red packets in the headquarters did not receive.

B.I. Arushunyan (NN 12 Army): “Take the paper, pencil and write down, - demanded the commander. Fascist German aviation bombed Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol and other cities in 3-00 today. With 3-30, artillery is carrying out heavy fire on our border posts and the UR. I order ... "

An hour after the conversation with the commander of the NSH district of the 12 Army, General M.A.Purkaev called to the telephone and, using the Bodo apparatus, transmitted a conditional signal for the implementation of the State Border Plan - KOVO-41 "It turns out that the order to introduce the" Cover Plans "and open the red packages in KOVO occurred after 4-30 22.6.41.

Looking ahead to the events in the OdVO, one can say that there, too, the opening of the packages occurred later than such a team went through in ZOVO.

E.E.Maltsev (Deputy Commander 74 sd): "At about half past four in the morning of June 22, a Thunderstorm signal was received, according to which a red packet should be opened containing the action plan of the corps to cover the USSR State border... "

In the memoirs of M.V. Zakharov, there is not a word about giving them an order to open packages up to 3-45 ... 4-00 22.6.41

At the same time, the memories of war veterans were presented to you, who stated that personally the commander of the ZAPOV troops on the phone after 2-00 22.6.41 began to give orders to open packages. At the indicated time, there were no such instructions either in KOVO or in the ODVO.

We do not know why DGPavlov during the interrogation indicated that he arrived at the district headquarters at one in the morning on June 22. Probably did not want to substitute a possible defender - Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko. At the same time, there are memories according to which Pavlov was in the headquarters until that time.

K.N. Galitsky (56 cd 4 ck): "Late at night on June 21, returning from Augustow, General Kuznetsov drove into the army headquarters, got acquainted with the latest reports and was about to go home. But then the HF phone rang. Kuznetsov received an order from General of the Army DGPavlov to be with the staff, awaiting a particularly important order. The commander immediately summoned to the headquarters all the officers of the field administration and the political department of the army ... ”

“Much later 23 21 of June General Golubev was summoned to headquarters for talks with Pavlov. Minutes through 40, Pyotr Lyapin was called to headquarters... "

I would like to complete the part devoted to ZOVOVO with the words of Sergey Leonidovich Chekunov: “By studying the set of documents, it is clearly visible that Pavlov clearly carried out all the orders of the General Staff. No gag, only the execution of orders. " The author cites some comments from S.L. Chekunov to questions related to the events on the eve of wars, in the comments to the 23 part.

Comments

[AsmyppoL]

Thanks to the author for an interesting material! I am waiting for the continuation

[8Schlaf]

The study of a set of documents clearly shows that Pavlov clearly followed all the orders of the General Staff. No gag, just follow orders

Consequently, the General Staff did not expect war and did not raise troops

Nothing. There are no nervous in the army headquarters

Thanks to the author for an interesting dramatic work

[ccsr]

Quote: 8Schlaf

Consequently, the General Staff did not expect war and did not raise troops

This conclusion best shows what kind of "professional" you are in military affairs. But General Golikov slaps such know-it-alls like you on the cheeks with his memoirs:

“On June 19, 1941, a special message was prepared at the Center“ On the Signs of a Probable German Attack on the USSR in the near future ”146. (146 The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: In 12 t. M., 2013. T. 6. S. 108.)
On June 20, 1941, the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration sent a report to the USSR leadership “On the Signs of the Inevitability of a German Attack on the USSR in the Coming Days” 147. (147 Ibid., P. 108.)
On the morning of June 21, 1941, G. Kegel called the Soviet intelligence officer to a meeting and said that the German ambassador "received a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin [that the] German war against the USSR would begin in the next 48 hours." The second meeting took place on the same day at 19:00. The source said that in the morning the German ambassador F.V. von der Schulenburg was instructed to “destroy all secret documents” and ordered “all embassy staff to pack all their belongings and hand them over to the embassy, ​​who live outside the embassy, ​​should move to the mission territory” until the morning of June 22. At the end of the conversation, the German anti-fascist said: “Everyone believes that war will begin on the coming night” 148 (148 Ibid., P. 108).
After this meeting, an urgent report was prepared “On the Signs of a German Attack on the USSR on the Night of June 21.06 to June 22.06”. At the direction of Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova, special communications officer at 20:00 on June 21, 1941 urgently delivered an envelope with the inscription "Only to the addressee. Do not open the staff of the apparatus ”I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and S.K. Tymoshenko 149. (149 Ibid. S. 108) ... "

As a result, we have that the General Staff of the General Staff under the leadership of General Golikov on 20, 21 and by 20.00:22 on June XNUMX submitted to Stalin and the military leadership THREE reports: about the "probable" 20th, "inevitable" 21st — the German attack, and about the German attack on the night of June 22 — in the evening of June 22!
And after that you have the audacity to lie with Madame that Moscow did not expect war?

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

And after that you have the audacity to lie with Madame that Moscow did not expect war?

You are the author's articles - READ!

Expectation symbol attacks and "readiness" she was brought to him: a pilot who arrived in TRUSA and MIKE at a neighboring airfield (Western District), the only survivor of its bombed part. That's how they met the war

A lot of examples of "readiness" for an attack are given here too: disarmed pillboxes, ammunition removed from there, garrisons outside the pillboxes. Then everything had to be done under fire and, naturally, it was done as it should, in principle it could no longer be
as a result, terrible and quick losses of people, inefficiency, mediocre losses of equipment built by such labor ..

For how long did the comrade "delay" the beginning of the war, who sacrificed in the name of this - the timely mobilization of the army, the timely bringing it to combat readiness, constantly warning about the intractability of provocations?

Yes not for a second he didn’t delay: when the Nazis planned to attack, they attacked at that hour, regardless of the presence / absence of provocation and the answer to it.

But the soldiers paid for it

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

You are the author's articles - READ!

I read these articles and I can say for sure that the author on the topic has too amateurish ideas, and this can be seen despite the abundance of the material he cited from well-known sources.
How did you and the author want to impress me?

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Answer, "non-flyer", why were there no light machine guns in the bunkers and pulbats, which were assigned to the garrisons of the UR by states? Who, when and why seized this all-round defense weapon from them? Moscow or its districts? At the same time, hand grenades were left for them - they are mentioned in the memoirs of self-detonation of heroes who did not surrender. Why is there no mention in the ZAPOVO - not a single one - of the mine weapons of the URs, while in the PribOVO mines appear in written orders and reports? Read the texts and between the lines, like a wise author och. valuable and interesting work. Respect the work of a respected author.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Answer, "non-flyer", why were there no light machine guns in the bunkers and pulbats, which were assigned to the garrisons of the UR by states?

At that time, there was a lot of things in the country, and one should not forget that staffing shortages even in later Soviet times existed in deployed units.

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Read the texts and between the lines, as the wise author of Pts. valuable and interesting work.

I don’t need to read the inventions of the author - I myself know what a regular lack of staff is, and how long it takes to fix it, because I constantly came across this. And only in the GSVG were there more or less manned compounds, unlike those deployed in the Union.
We did not have the opportunity in 1941 to fulfill all your wishes - can you at least understand this?

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Pulbats as separate units were formed and recruited even on the "Stalin line", until 1939, and there were enough Degtyarev light machine guns in the Red Army. There were enough battalion 45-mm guns in the Okrug warehouses as of 22.06.41, and 37-mm guns were also enough, but for some reason they were not delivered to the "Molotov line". 23 .6. Lelyushenko in Idritsa (!) Received from LOCAL warehouses approx. 100 "magpies" for its 21st MK, and BT tanks approx. 30 pieces ON THE BODY "under their own power" were driven from Moscow, from the BTV Academy, and the task was set to march to Dvinsk, go from the Moscow Military District to the PribOVO, which became the NWF. And Idritsa has already been bombed, and the roads too. Someone knew how to create in the districts a shortage of standard weapons and ammunition, when in 1941 approx. 60% of the total pre-war reserves of the country. The question is - who and why created these "shortages" of weapons and ammo, the mediocre location of the DISTRICT warehouses and their failed work? The author of this Pts. of valuable work you need to delve into the readiness of the rear services of the districts for war, be sure! And also in the horse question, since then each state division was supposed to have approx. 3000 horses. Nobody has written about the sleds yet, but they provided 90% of the supply of troops and the entire battalion artillery, approx. 15000 "forty-five", 90% of which were abandoned by the troops during retreat and encirclement.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Someone knew how to create shortages of full-time weapons and ammunition in the okrugs, when approx. 1941% of the country's pre-war stock.

I am amazed at the ease with which you juggle with numbers, but you will have to be lowered to the ground so that you finally understand why a shortage of weapons was formed.
So the strength of the Red Army:
24.02.1939 - 1 931 962
October 1, 1940 - 3 446 309
June 21, 1941 - 4 826 907 people
Do you seriously believe that with a more than twofold growth of the army in two years, our industry was able to catch everyone and provide everyone?
Maybe we need to more objectively assess the capabilities of those years?

[Mikhail Zubkov]

The trophies of the Polish campaign - more than 10 thousand 7,92 mm machine guns and 1,5 million rounds of ammunition for them, where did they go? 900 captured guns and shells for them? They were kept in ZAPOVO and KOVO - why were they not given out to the pulbats of new URs anywhere? 6000 anti-tank rifles Rukavishnikov, caliber 12,7 mm, withdrawn from the troops "for weak performance characteristics", with ammunition for them, why were not allocated to the URs? Because two ukromarshals in Moscow were preparing the defeat of the Red Army in the border battle and the defeat of the USSR. They have been preparing specifically since 1939, starting in Kiev.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Trophies of the Polish campaign - more than 10 thousand machine guns of 7,92 mm caliber and 1,5 million rounds of ammunition

Most likely they were stored in warehouses, and then they were transferred to the Anders army.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

What are you loading in the morning? Polish trophies from the warehouses of the occupied BSSR and the Ukrainian SSR in 1941? And send them across the Volga for the armies being formed there? It would be nice for you to find out where these 10000 Polish machine guns, 900 guns and 300 thousand rifles were stored from September 1939 to June 1941. What did you manage to take out of the warehouses near the western border of the USSR, from the territories of "special military districts "at a rate of average daily retreat of approx. 1941 km and the average daily irrecoverable losses of the Red Army from 50 people, with a retreat to a depth of at least 5000 km? With the loss of more than 400 of its tanks and 14000 of its guns and mortars? million of their rifles just abandoned on the battlefield?

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

What are you loading in the morning? Polish trophies from the warehouses of the occupied BSSR and USSR in 1941?

In my opinion, you do not know how everything was then:

On June 4, 1941, a decision was made by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the creation by July 1, 1941 of the 238th Infantry Division of the Central Asian Military District Red Army consisting of 10 people from Poles and people who know the Polish language. The formation of the division was entrusted to the Burling group, but before the German attack on the USSR they did not manage to form the Polish division.
.... July 3, 1941 the government of the USSR decided to allow the formation on the territory of the USSR of national committees and national military units from Czechs, Slovaks, Yugoslavs and Poles, and so on, and also to provide assistance in the arming and uniforms of these national units [3 ].

By July 3, not the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR was occupied. Moreover, once a decision was made on June 4, even then Polish weapons could be shipped to SAVO. By the way, since you give exact numbers, though without citing sources, you might have guessed that such an account can only be established in warehouses.

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

It’s good for you to get to the bottom of where these 10000 were stored

Why don't you get to the bottom of this yourself? Or do you want others to work for you? It's not gonna go...

[Mikhail Zubkov]

SW comrade professional! What number of red army do you give? Nominal approved by the government of the USSR or actual list? Specify the source. According to the directory of the Ministry of Defense (see the website), the average monthly payroll of the Red Army in the 2nd quarter of 1941 was slightly higher than 3 million 300 thousand, and in the 3rd quarter - slightly higher than 2 million 800 thousand. This is with irretrievable losses The current Army until the end of 1941 approx. 2 million. This means that 0,5 million irretrievable losses of l / s due to the fault of the conspiracy of the Ukromarshals-traitors in June 1941, the USSR Armed Forces could not be restored before the end of the year.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

SW comrade professional! What number of red army do you give? Nominal approved by the government of the USSR or actual list? Specify the source. According to the directory of the Ministry of Defense (see the website), the average monthly payroll of the Red Army in the 2nd quarter of 1941 was slightly higher than 3 million 300 thousand, and in the 3rd quarter - slightly higher than 2 million 800 thousand. This is with irretrievable losses The current Army until the end of 1941 approx. 2 million. This means that 0,5 million irretrievable losses of l / s due to the fault of the conspiracy of the Ukromarshals-traitors in June 1941, the USSR Armed Forces could not be restored before the end of the year.

The one that Meltiukhov in his book cited:

From 15 on May 1941, a call began for the assigned composition of the reserve for the VAC, which was to last until 1 on July 1941. In total, on 22 on June 1941, 805 264 people were called up, which amounted to 24% of the contingent called up for mobilization, and the Red Army counted 5 080 977 people {1164}.

http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/09.html
Do you want to argue with Meltiukhov?

[Mikhail Zubkov]

I wish. In this case, Meltyukhov believes that the May decision of the Central Committee, the government and Stalin was personally automatically carried out by the NGO headed by the Ukromarshal Timoshenko and the General Staff headed by the State Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan. No matter how it is! This decision was repeated on May 25, when it was decided to form new divisions and armies in the border districts, for example, 27 A PribOVO. But the order of the NCO on the assigned composition was issued and began to be executed in real life only at the beginning of JUNE. In real life, the assigned personnel began to be sent to the troops after 11.6.41., And until 22.6. many are not yet in uniform. Many burned in tanks in civilian clothes, and were captured in this form. There was a decision of the Central Committee as early as July 1939 on divisions with a staff of 17000 - they did not form until the Finnish war anywhere and reduced the staff to 14000, then to 12000, then to 12550 (along with the states of 3000, 6000, 8000 ... As a result, the average the number of SD on 22.6. in the border districts was about 8000 with a huge shortage of command and technical personnel. Divisions of more than 10000 could be counted on the fingers, no more than one per army of the first line. With mechanized corps it was the same story, one 6 microns was close to state, with a shortage of company commanders and junior commanders.Read Lelushenko about the real process of the formation and introduction of his 21 microns into battle in Idritsa, when he received the first BT tanks and 45 tanks after 23.6.41., already under bombing, simultaneously with by order to run to occupy Dvinsk, which the Germans had already passed by their motorcyclists, he defeated and captured these insolent SS-ts on the way to Dvinsk, fought for Dvinsk on 28.6. left on the move with a dozen BTs and a dozen 30.6 litters entrenchment against the SS Panzer Division. And in the General Staff there were 3 MK 21 tanks, when he had 175-70 pieces of them before the assault on Dvinsk, including amphibious machine-gun ones.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

In real life, the assigned composition began to be sent to the troops after 11.6.41., And to 22.6. many have not yet changed into uniform.

In real life, our troops were replenished not only in the border districts, but also in the internal, but you do not want to take this into account in the total number of troops.

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Many burned in tanks in civilian clothes, and were captured in this form.

Or maybe they were captured after they were defeated, and they changed into civilian clothes, trying to get out of the environment? How do you imagine a military unit in civilian clothes?

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Comparative table of the growth rate of the Red Army and the Reichswehr, and then the Wehrmacht for the period from 1923 to June 22, 1941. (person)
Red Army

1923-550 000

1927-586 000

1928-617 000

1932-562 000

1933-880 000

1935-930 000

1937 - 1 200 000

1938 - 1 513 400

19.08.39 - 2 000 000

09.05.40 - 3 200 000

01.01.41 - 4 207 000

21.06.41 - 5 500 000

Until 16.03.35 - Reichswehr, after - the Wehrmacht

until 30.01.33 - 100 000

31.12.33 - 300 000

1935-500 000

1936-600 000

01.10.38 - 2 200 000

19.08.39 - 4 233 000

23.11.39 - 5 000 000

21.06.41 - 7 240 000


“As of June 21, 1941, the payroll of the Red Army was 4 people, to which it is necessary to add 826 reservists, of whose call Stalin did not make any secret, on the contrary, he did it demonstratively. 907 servicemen who, although they were assigned to the People's Commissariat of Defense, served in other departments.Total is 767 people (including the number of the Navy) as of June 750, 74. That is, for 945 years where did Stalin's aggressive preparation for unleashing World War II come from, if I may say so, the "aggressor" increased its armed forces by only 5 times! And even then in the face of the threat of an armed attack on the USSR! "Peacemaker" is Adolf, whom together "pacified" the entire West, in eight years - 669 times! By modern standards, preschool education is enough to understand the colossal difference that clearly arises when comparing these numbers - 602 and 21, 1941! By the way, the difference is more than crazy in terms of the average annual growth rate of the armed forces: for the Red Army - 18 times, for the Wehrmacht - 10,31! I hope you will agree that it is time to put an end to the tales of the out-of-nowhere aggression of Stalin and his USSR!

By the way, while listening to all these figures, please do not forget that 5 669 602 people. (including the size of the Navy) - this is based on the defense of the entire territory of the USSR, and it then amounted to 22,4 million square meters. km! Moreover, do not forget that the Soviet Union had to keep about 30–35% of this number in the Far East and Siberia. "(From blogs) Mr. thinker, I don’t guess, I knew witnesses. Who saw you and suggested how 10000 Polish captured machine guns were transported in echelons from west to east to Central Asia to Berling on June 4, 1941, and to meet them from the Far East they were transported in echelons of 3000 Soviet machine guns to the western military districts (by decision of the GVS at the end of May), where machine guns, as you indicated, were not enough.Eh, at this time you should be put at the head of the rear and transport of the USSR - for the transfer of the entire payroll of the Red Army under the command of exiled Poles in Central Asia and Siberia ... materiel.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

If no jokes - study the materiel.

No kidding - what are you trying to convince me of? What did you remember earlier, or did you decide to demonstrate your knowledge in this way?

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Who saw, as you suggested, 10000 Polish trophy machine guns

We did not have a well-functioning production of cartridges for Polish machine guns, and they were not part of the staff of the Red Army either — can you at least understand this? Why keep these machine guns if each of them has only 150 rounds? Head, think how to equip the Red Army with such weapons, so that their benefits would be. During the war, a huge amount of German small arms was captured, but they were not armed with parts of the spacecraft, and at best they were transferred to partisans and saboteurs.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Our debate began on the issue of the absence of light machine guns from the URB bullets, which they were assigned by the state and archaeological for the CALCULAR circular defense. I considered it and I consider it evidence of CHANGE. You began to prove to me that the country had a shortage of DP machine guns. I pointed out to you a trophy of 10000 machine guns, 900 guns and 300 rifles, which could have been installed in advance in the URs, but they did not do this, citing a shortage of weapons. You justify this treason, it turns out. Therefore, please stop trolling me. I am wonderful at your posts ALL.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Our debate began on the issue of the absence of light machine guns from the URB bullets, which they were assigned by the state and archaeological for the CALCULAR circular defense. I considered it and I consider it evidence of CHANGE.

And I believe that the country could not satisfy all the requests of the military purely physically, given the fact that the needs of the army increased sharply due to an increase in the number of the Red Army since 1939.

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

I am wonderful at your posts ALL.

You yourself are wonderful in your narcissism.

[AsmyppoL]

Again we are confronted with the fact that Milchakov gives the text, without any analysis and draws conclusions that cannot be made on the basis of the text he cites. I repeat, fraudsters do this on the Internet, at the train station and in other places.

I have already encountered his apparent fraud in the comments of the 19 part. The first part about air defense (part of 18) was published on 8.9.18, and the second - on 9.9.18. From September 8, Milchakov began to criticize the author of the cycle.
Only 16 September 2018 on 13: 38 Milchakov puts the following text in his comment: “Since the author likes to cast in favor of his version that the air defense system of the Moscow Military District did not itch until the beginning of the war, and only after it began to act sluggishly, I quote a text that the author intentionally does not show:
From ZhBD MKR air defense 0.10 Corps commander, Major General of Artillery [Zhuravlev]... »

Paradoxically, the 19 part begins with a specified extract from the combat log and contains information that is even slightly larger than Milchakov copied from some site. after seven days after the release of the 19 part. In other words, Kozinkin’s military consultant criticized the author, emphasizing his past as a military professional, without even knowing about the combat magazine of the 1 Air Defense Corps. The main thing for him is to support his employer. A week later, copy the text of the author and pass for his research. So do the scammers. In the comment above, Milchakov again uses the same trick. Bring the materials presented by the author, pass him off and denigrate the author by attributing to him any dictation invented by Milchakov himself.

See for yourself what Milchakov writes: “19 June 1941 The Center prepared a special report “On the signs of a probable German attack on the USSR in the near future” 146. 20 June 1941. RU GSH KA sent to the leadership of the USSR a report “On the signs of the inevitability of the German attack on the USSR in the coming days»

In the title of the document from 19.6.41, the term “probable attack” is used. It will probably or will not and it is not known when this will happen. In the title of the document from 20.6.41, the term “inevitability of attack” is used. I think no one in the leadership of the Red Army, the WKB (b) and the government had no doubt that war with Germany was inevitable. The question is when will it begin!

Citing only what kind of text Milchakov flounders again. Many forum users are grounded in the issues under consideration and should write something in his support. The question is what was contained in these documents. And in this matter Milchakov does not give any comments.

Let me remind you that in the 1 and 2 parts (released in July 2017 of the year), materials were provided on the intelligence data of the NKGB and the General Staff Directorate of the Red Army. There was cited the document "Calendar ...", which was prepared with all the available intelligence in the line of the intelligence of the NKGB about a possible German attack. The document has the date 19 June 1941 of the year. For whom the document could be prepared? For Stalin, for the government of the USSR and for the military. See if there is evidence in this document that the war will start at dawn of 22 June!

If the assignment was given to the NKGB RU, then maybe the assignment was received in the Red Army Directorate of the General Staff. The dates for June 19 are the same. The military intelligence document could later be reissued into the “List of Documents ...”, which is also available in the 1 and 2 parts. Also see how it shows the inevitability of the start of the war at dawn of 22 June. Only the military document has a date 28 of June. Perhaps, they were simply insured by adding more recent data to it? This is not difficult to see, since the first and last pages of this document are listed on the MO website. The last document is the document of Kegel's scout about the beginning of the war at dawn of 22 June. Quite a lot of documents from the “List ...” are publicly available and there are no clear messages about the beginning of the war at dawn on June 22. This can be easily concluded, since the document publishes data from January 1941. If the beginning of the war at dawn 22 June was known on the eve of the war, then why bring numerous verbal debris that is outdated over the past months?

Let us return again to Milchakov’s commentary: “On the morning of 21 on June 1941, Mr. G. Kegel called a Soviet intelligence officer to a meeting and reported that the German ambassador "received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry in Berlin [that] Germany’s war against the USSR would start in the next 48 hours»

Look at the text in the 2 part: "19.06.41 - The embassy is convinced that 20 June should be considered daily with the possibility of military action between Germany and the USSR. The embassy was instructed to immediately send all the children and women. I received an instruction to leave the German naval attache with the staff from Moscow. Hilger stated that it is now absolutely clear that war is inevitable.

20.06.41 - Regular diplomas were instructed not to leave Berlin. Representatives of industrial firms in Moscow were instructed to immediately leave for Berlin. The attack is possible 23.06.41 g.

21.06.41 in the morning - the Embassy received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry. With 4 hours of the morning there is a meeting with Tippelskirch. The source is convinced that the war will begin in the next 48 hours.»

The author has even more complete text than Milchakov leads. What does it lead him in cropped? To cheat. We see that 20.06.41, the source says about the possible attack 23 June 1941 of the year. On the morning of 21.06.41, the source almost confirms the previous message by pushing the timeline to 48 hours. It may be noon 21 June, midnight 21 June, noon 22 June, midnight 22 June, 23 day of June. Choose any term that is convenient. Only the message went to the same recipients as the last message source. Including in NGOs. Interestingly, what does Zhukov say in his memoirs about the bottom of June 20? Nothing. The NGO management did nothing. And the day of June 21? There is nothing in the memoirs. Did nothing. Tried to reduce the combat readiness of air defense in PribOVO. It could not be without a submission from Moscow to be canceled combat readiness Aviation ZOVO day 21 June. Nothing done!

Let us return again to Milchakov’s commentary: “The second meeting took place on the same day at 19: 00. The source said that in the morning the German ambassador F.V. von der Schulenburg was instructed to "destroy all secret documents" and ordered "all embassy staff to pack all their belongings before the morning of 22 June and hand them over to the embassy living outside the embassy to move to the mission area." At the end of the conversation, the German anti-fascist said: “Everyone thinks that the coming night will start a war.” After this meeting, an urgent report was prepared on "Signs of a German attack on the USSR on the night of 21.06 on 22.06". At the direction of Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova special communications officer on 20: 00 21 June 1941 urgently delivered an envelope with the inscription “Only to the addressee. Employees of the apparatus do not open ”I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and S.K. Tymoshenko. "

Look at the text in the 2 part: “21.06.41 in 19-00 - The embassy in the morning was instructed to destroy all the secret papers. It is ordered to all employees of the embassy to pack their belongings and hand them over to the embassy until the morning of June 22. Living outside the embassy - move to the embassy. It is believed that the coming night will be a decision. This decision is a war. "

After the meeting of Colonel Leontyev with Kegel to 20-00, the head of the Directorate ordered the special communications officer to urgently deliver a report to Stalin, Molotov and Timoshenko. The envelopes indicated: “Only to the addressee. Staff members do not open. "

So what's new Milchakov? Nothing but an attempt to blacken the author. That is what fraudsters do!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Again we are faced with the fact that Milchakov cites the text without any analysis and draws conclusions that cannot be drawn on the basis of the text he cited.

The text I quoted from Golikov’s memoirs completely refuted the nonsense of the author of the articles that no one was preparing for the war in Moscow and did not know that it would begin in the near future.

Quote: AsmyppoL

So what's new Milchakov? Nothing but an attempt to blacken the author. That is what fraudsters do!

Golikov’s memoirs denied all the nonsense that people like you believed in after reading the author’s articles and believing in her conclusions. As they say, there is nothing more to add.

The author has an even more complete text than Milchakov cites. What does he bring him to the circumcised form? To cheat. We see that on June 20.06.41, 23, the source speaks of a possible attack on June 1941, XNUMX.

If you were more literate, then you would have realized that I was citing information from ANOTHER source, and not from Golikov’s memoirs, which, incidentally, confirmed what I quoted earlier. So it’s not me who is cheating, but you are absolutely illiterate, and you can’t even understand where I got the information from.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

See for yourself what Milchakov writes: “On June 19, 1941, a special message was prepared at the Center“ On Signs of a Probable German Attack on the USSR in the near future ”

Do not lie so primitively - this is written by Golikov in his memoirs, which can be trusted much more than all amateurs who write about intelligence on this resource. I just brought to people like you that there is a source of information that amateurs did not even hear about, that’s why they pierced so cheaply with their conclusions about the allegedly absent preparation for war, and that supposedly intelligence had overslept everything.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

It is ironic that part 19 begins with the indicated excerpt from the military journal and contains information even a little more than Milchakov copied from some site seven days after the release of part 19.

And what is paradoxical here, if I repeatedly caught the author of the articles on outright lies and fraud, and therefore sometimes check from other sources of information that she pours out here?
Well, with what joy should I follow her flight of thought into distant galaxies, and instantly refute any of her nonsense? This is too much an honor for her, but she has not deserved it yet.
So what about Golikov’s memoirs, and how about the statement of Madame and yours that they didn’t wait in Moscow and in the districts of the war and the intelligence overslept everything?
Are you ready to refute Golikov with reason? Go ahead.
The audience is waiting for your new revelations along with Madame - you can play a little bit so that you don’t look completely foolish ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The term “probable attack” is used in the title of the document dated 19.6.41. Probably there will be or will not be and it is not known when this will happen.

For the illiterate, the term "probable attack" is still used in military intelligence documents. The opponent is so primitive that he does not understand that the planned attack can be postponed and will not take place due to various reasons.

Quote: AsmyppoL

On the morning of June 21.06.41, 48, the source practically confirms the previous message, pushing the deadlines up to 21 hours. It can be noon on June 21, midnight on June 22, noon on June 22, midnight on June 23, day on June XNUMX.

Then the signal "Dortmund" had not yet been transmitted, which is why it was impossible to accurately predict the beginning of the war. But illiterate people do not understand this.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Interestingly, in Zhukov’s memoirs it is written about the day of June 20? Nothing. The leadership of the NPO did nothing. And on the afternoon of June 21st? There is nothing in the memoirs.

And Zhukov did not write memoirs about the activities of the RU General Staff, that's why it's better to read Golikov. And then, why did you decide that it was beneficial for Zhukov to describe all the details of the days when he wrote his memoirs in the sixties? He had to justify himself before history, so he "forgot" some details. However, you are so illiterate in understanding the differences between documents and memoirs that I see no reason to seriously argue with you - show off in front of madam, not in front of me, because to me you are ridiculous in your attempts.

Quote: AsmyppoL

This is what scammers do!

For scoundrels, all people look like scammers - did you study Gogol at school?

[kig]

Quote: ccsr

Do you have the audacity to lie with Madame that Moscow did not expect war?

In my opinion, the author claims almost nothing. He only cites documents, and we have to draw conclusions ourselves. You read that, according to the recollections of the surviving fighters, there were no weapons and ammunition in the pillboxes, and you concluded that the author was lying. Well then, it's up to you.

[ccsr]

Quote: kig

In my opinion, the author claims almost nothing.

It artificially brings you to the idea of ​​a tendentious selection of materials that the leadership of the USSR and NPOs did not prepare for war, intelligence did not report anything, and almost everyone slept in bed on the night of June 22.
This is a typical paid propaganda chatter, when allegedly under the guise of objectivity you are selectively presented with defamatory material, and an inexperienced person buys it. That is why I showed in detail how Madame lies, or interprets events as beneficial to her - for example, I refuted her text about Rokossovsky with the text from his book. And I found dozens of such examples in her articles - from outright lies, to fraud, for which I received a minus from her team of hackers who hide their name under nicknames.

Quote: kig

You read that, according to the recollections of the surviving fighters, there were no weapons and ammunition in the pillboxes, and you concluded that the author was lying.

If you carefully read the memoirs, the bunker was approximately a kilometer from the location of the unit where weapons and ammunition were stored, i.e. he was. Why I removed them from the bunkers, I can’t say for sure, but the fact that delivering them back from the warehouse within one or two hours will not be much work, I know for sure - everyone knows how to make six-kilometer-long march in the army. Therefore, the question arises, why, from the moment of decision making by Stalin on June 21, not everyone managed to take positions on the cover plan - who will answer this?
Our madame is unlikely - she has a base below the baseboard ...

[kig]

Quote: ccsr

She artificially brings you to thought

Maybe. However, absolutely all researchers are engaged in this. Having access to documents, it is very easy to pull out the right place from them, and omit the unnecessary. And if we are dealing with memories, it’s even easier.

[ccsr]

Quote: kig

Maybe. However, absolutely all researchers are engaged in this.

No, not all. For example, the historian E. Spitsyn very competently and sensibly presents the history of our country, without any bias.

Quote: kig

Having access to documents, it is very easy to pull out the right place from them, and omit the unnecessary.

That is why it is necessary to expose those who do this.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Stop insulting the author. Golikov knew the value of time, both for Stalin and the Kremlin as a whole (where there was not even a single bomb shelter), and for the troops in the border districts and on the borders. He knew for sure that he was “probably” late already on 20.6.41, and that he was “inevitably” late on 21 and by 20.00 on 22.6.41. already late for sure. He was still waiting for reports about the beginning of the enemy's preparation for war in winter, for which he, the enemy, would certainly have to buy a sheepskin - and Golikov miscalculated, the enemy rushed into an unexpected summer blitz-krieg. The Wehrmacht really did not prepare for the winter campaign. He deceived Golikov, but he miscalculated. And not only this is his, the enemy's, failure, his vaunted Abwehr. But in the summer of 1941, the Abwehr won over Golikov by 90%. The defeat of our troops in Belarus and the Baltic states, in the Ukraine and in Karelia, in the Crimea and Donbass, and even in Rostov-on-Don, won a mighty victory. Military intelligence and STRATEGIC MILITARY INTELLIGENCE were late everywhere in 1941.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Stop offending the author. Golikov knew the value of time, both for Stalin and the Kremlin as a whole (where there were not even any bomb shelters), and for troops in the border districts and at the borders.

The author insults the memory of people of the past, i.e. those who do not have the opportunity to answer her and refute her lie.
Why should I stand on ceremony with her if she has the audacity to lie in her texts?

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

He kept waiting for reports of the beginning of the preparation of the enemy for war in the winter, for which he, the enemy, would certainly need to buy a sheepskin - and Golikov miscalculated, the enemy rushed into an unexpected summer blitz krieg.

Well, do not beat the crap - this is just ONE of the intelligence signs that everyone began to point out as the main one, when the idea arose to blame all the failures of the outbreak of the war on intelligence.
Well, open the June district intelligence reports - even there, in addition to intelligence reports, there is a link to a radio interception. If you do not understand this, then at least do not duplicate other people's nonsense.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

The Minsk fortified area along the old border turned out to be unfit for action, in a half-disassembled state, although there was a political decision to preserve the combat readiness of the "Stalin's line". There were no restrictions on the restoration of the combat capability of the URs along the old border in Belarus and the deployment of permanent garrisons from artillery battalions with standard weapons and ammunition there since May 25, 1945. Breakthrough 26-27.6.41. Minsk UR and the surrender of Minsk brought down the entire ZF already on June 28.06, with the doom to the death of the most powerful group of the front. Pavlov and the entire headquarters are 95% guilty of this.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

Pavlov and the entire headquarters are 95% guilty of this.

Pavlov and some commanders were punished for their misconduct - I do not dispute that this was undeserved. Who are you arguing with?

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

This SD was of the same strategic importance,

Well, one SD cannot be of strategic importance, if only because the DISTRICT can be of strategic importance, and even then not every, and not a separate defense element in the entire strip of the okrug. If you are clever, at least do not write obvious nonsense.

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

There were no restrictions on the restoration of the combat readiness of the URs along the old border in Belarus and the deployment of permanent garrisons from artillery battles in them with regular weapons and ammunition since May 25, 1945.

In 1945, the war ended, and Pavlov was shot in 1941 - we know that ...

[Mikhail Zubkov]

A typo crept in, I called. 1941, of course.

Quote: ccsr

In 1945, the war ended

I am personally convinced about the strategic importance of the Minsk UR. The loss of him and Minsk was of strategic importance. And the Polotsk UR of the same "Stalin line", in a much worse condition of bunkers and bunkers, kept the SS and 10 Wehrmacht divisions for 3 weeks! Not 3 days, like Minsky, but 3 weeks in July 1941! With an estimated durability of SD 15 days.

[antivirus]

because German troops were withdrawn to the eastern borders of Germany for rest? ” This is another confirmation that the Central Administration of the spacecraft (and in particular in the engineering department) did not expect the outbreak of war on June 22. We examined many of the evidence in Part 11.]

only the first blow saves forces and "cocks" the army until the first losses, and this is several days (see reports "the Germans are pulling troops to the border")

The Politburo consciously made a sacrifice and the Red Army - part of that sacrifice. a lot of attention to a highly specialized issue
PREPAREDNESS OF THE USSR TO WAR - NOT PAVLOV WITH RED PACKAGE OR JUKIOV WITH PENCIL OVER DIRECTIVE No. 1


Milkmaids and mechanisms for harvesting manure from cowsheds - MAIN AND NOW
all parts and this 24 - about a narrow layer of professional military indiscriminately the readiness of the Urals and Donbass !!!
the army only protects the people and "assets", the territory and history of the people from capture

[gunnerminer]

Interesting stuff.

[parusnik]

I continue to form the book. Thank you.

[gunnerminer]

I wish you further success in hard work.

[parusnik]

Such material needs to be read in full .. The whole picture will be formed ..

[chenia]

If the Germans declared war and attacked two weeks after, the result would be that he was in real life.
And not the readiness of the covering forces, this is far from the main cause of the disaster.

The main and decisive factor is the scarcity of the prepared reserve and the almost complete absence of BP (due to constant reorganizations) of the tank (mechanized) component of the formations and aviation.
And the creation of 30 MK (spring 1941), when the remaining tank brigades were pulled out in the SK, which extremely weakened the capabilities of (more or less) combat-ready associations.

And this is already the second row - the erroneous operational formation of the troops of the first strategic echelon, and the desire to strike with tank formations (by the way, if the BP was at the level, it could work out), and, last but not least, this is the action of the covering forces.

In short, our military screwed up, well, they pushed the idea of ​​unexpectedness (after Stalin's death) blaming everything on the political leadership.

In short, when the NKVD pressed Meretsky, Tymoshenko should be in the company with Zhukov (then it would be better to fight).

[Olgovich]

Quote: chenia

If the Germans declared war and attacked through two weeks after, the result would be that he was in real life.

Write nonsense: both the troops would be withdrawn and buried, and the artillery would be returned to units, and the planes saved, and the tanks equipped.

Yes, they would retreat, but there would not be catastrophic losses of the first day and the following, and it would be TIME for organization repulse, evacuation and concentration.

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

Write nonsense: and the troops would withdraw

Yes, you didn’t understand what I wrote.
This kind of surprise is for Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland.

It was the second day of the war, the third. tenth and twentieth, well? In the first days, 1-2% of forces and means were lost. And then, thousands and thousands of people and equipment were lost, just for the reason indicated by me, and, as a rule, not even in battle. We had second and third strategic echelons (and even the first could stand) stuffed with equipment, but there was no trained reserve. And I had to throw, like logs, under the feet of the Germans, formations without proper preparation in order to gain time. Therefore, we fought so inefficiently. And this is not the fault of Stalin, but of the generals of the Red Army (I’m telling you, as a military man with two higher ones).
And only when troops with three to four months of training (the so-called Siberian divisions) went offensive did an offensive near Moscow.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

On the morning of 23.6.41. Losses of 3 TD 3 MK and 12 MK (two TD and one MD), in total more than 900 tanks, including 78 KV and 50 T-34s, made ONE tank accidentally hit by a German bomb. The NWF tank fist, concentrated in the forest on 20.06.41/3/XNUMX, was launched by FORESTS into a pre-prepared counter-attack on Taurag. Two days later, he was scattered through the forests, crushing a couple of Germans anti-tank barriers, missed the main tank fist of the Germans to Dvinsk and Riga along the main highway, panicked due to the exhaustion of fuel and shells, cut off the rear supply in general (gangs of saboteurs on the roads), then he allowed the deaths of the headquarters, torn off without communication from the troops, including the motorcycle regiment - and was forced to leave the encircled remnants from the encirclement, blowing up his equipment along the way. Who planned this? Further, in the bands of the Western Front and South Federal Front, the Germans went through URs for XNUMX days, allegedly in the absence of weapons on the bullets.
The trophies of the Polish campaign - more than 10 thousand 7,92 mm machine guns and 1,5 million rounds of ammunition for them, where did they go? 900 captured guns and shells for them? They were kept in ZAPOVO and KOVO - why were they not given out to the pulbats of new URs anywhere? 6000 anti-tank rifles Rukavishnikov, caliber 12,7 mm, withdrawn from the troops "for weak performance characteristics", with ammunition for them, why were not allocated to the URs? Because two ukromarshals in Moscow were preparing the defeat of the Red Army in the border battle and the defeat of the USSR. They have been preparing specifically since 1939, starting in Kiev.

[strannik1985]

Everything is much more complicated, in the summer of 1940 the French army was mobilized, plus British English. Did it help?
You need to know (guess) the approximate places of strikes (to conduct defensive army operations) or to thwart the enemy's plans with a front-line offensive operation. For the first "Stirlitz" is needed, for the second combat-ready MK (and they were in the stage of reorganization).

[Mikhail Zubkov]

For the entire number of combat-ready tanks of all types in the border districts - approx. 11000 - there was, according to the estimates of historians of the Academy of BTV, only approx. 6000 drivers, 80% of the initial course of driving and operating tanks, even old types. Rembats were manned by 25-30%, which, taking into account a very small average motor resource - about 100-120 hours, caused tanks to fail even without enemy action for 5 days with long marches and 10 with short marches. Which is what happened.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

In short, our military screwed up, well, they pushed the idea of ​​unexpectedness (after Stalin's death) blaming everything on the political leadership.

The German military screwed up even more - having a mobilized army with combat experience, they planned the "Barbarossa" in such a way that from the first weeks of the war everything did not go according to plan, and in the end they lost the war. So don't dust your head with too much ash from this angle. Although I do not justify the mistakes of those military commanders, through whose fault we lost a cadre army in the first months of the war. And even more so it is dishonorable to hang your personal blame on the leader of the peoples - here I completely agree with you.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

German military screwed up even more

I agree. So they really were not ready for war with the USSR.
On this, and our "ABOS (namely military) PROSKOCHIM" and was built at 41 a major provocation is possible, not war.... So, "maybe" with certain reasons, and not a conspiracy, is the cause of the catastrophe 41.
All measures to increase the BP and the preparation of the reserve is planned for the fall of 1941 and through Winter. They drove MK through the teachings in full, would have settled the OSH. And during the exercises, the equipment would show up, identifying the reasons (representatives of design bureaus, plant engineers, NKVD naturally support the tone) improvement at the request of the crews, more accurate recommendations for operation.
And the Germans opposed the troops of the sample (figuratively) of the end of the forty-first (still weak, but not helpless). And this is without losses (also figuratively) in 1941. Then they could crush nemchuru and mass.

Did not happen.

True 30 MK is a bagpipe until 1945 (peacetime, which means for any PSU fails). Here, for Zhukov’s sabotage (who later wondered in his memoirs - there were so many MKs), you can shoot a little (it’s only a reason that Hitler was ahead of our attack for a couple of weeks, referring to this event).

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

All measures to increase the BP and the preparation of the reserve is planned for the fall of 1941 and through Winter. They drove MK through the teachings in full, would have settled the OSH.

It really was a tragedy that the rearmament program began in early 1941 and, naturally, the actions of the mechanized corps, even at full-scale exercises, were not worked out, i.e. the coherence of the connections was at a zero level, which, taking into account the poor organization of communication, resulted in enormous losses.

Quote: chenia

True 30 MK is a bagpipe until 1945 (peacetime, which means for any PSU fails).

I remember that in 1946 the formation of all mechanized corps should have ended, i.e. we could not create and train them in 1941-1942. Even if the war had not started on June 22, we would still lag behind the Germans, because a two-year cycle is mandatory for all military personnel in peacetime.
When you begin to delve into the details of that preparation for war, you immediately lose the desire to label, as unscrupulous authors of articles posted on various forums do, which they don’t understand at all about the essence of the processes taking place then.
As a local madam, trying to convince that on June 22, the Moscow air defense had to stand on its ears, due to the fact that the Germans could allegedly bomb Moscow. Although if she understood at least something about bombing, she knew that the Germans, for example, used in raids on England from several hundred to a thousand aircraft at the same time. These are the "theorists" who present us with the "new" history of the war ...

[antivirus]

"ABOS (military) IS MISSING" and was built in 41, perhaps a major provocation, not a war .. So "maybe" with certain reasons, and not a conspiracy, is the cause of the disaster 41
decisions were taken by the Politburo - the military did not rule the country and did not dispose of "milkmaids" and "water utilities" with "electricians"

[chenia]

Quote: antivirus

decisions were taken by the Politburo - the military did not rule the country and did not dispose of "milkmaids" and "water utilities" with "electricians"

Of course (political bureau) layout plans for the development of the armed forces, BP programs and staffs were imposed, while the General Staff and the People's Commissariat were only present and took note. And controlled milkmaids and electricians.

So we won. (or you have other information about this).

There was no political bureau among the French and the British, and in three weeks they were blown away.

So, the glory of the CPSU (or VKPb) is the inspirer and organizer of all our victories.

I must say, after three decades (and experience), this is a slogan as a postulate.

[antivirus]

Quote: antivirus
decisions were taken by the Politburo - the military did not rule the country and did not dispose of "milkmaids" and "water utilities" with "electricians"

-conditional MIKalinin (awarded milkmaids and shepherds) had weight in the affairs of the deployment of the Red Army

-if you -military- continue to think about yours that the GDP_ of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, alone runs the country and the Armed Forces (without DAM, Kozak, Khloponin, Vasiliev (Dagestan) and Kolokoltsev with Naryshkin,
Belozerov + Sobyanin, Sechin + Chemezov - are they superfluous on this list? then it is clear about whom - "the flag is in your hands" they say

[chenia]

Quote: antivirus

then it is clear about whom - "the flag is in your hands" they say

Do not be so straightforward, sarcasm is not caught.
"... and a drum on your neck"

[antivirus]

and the CPSU (b) was led by both the Red Army and the GKZH with Tymoshenko along with the milkmaids

[chenia]

Quote: antivirus

led both the Red Army and the GKZH with Tymoshenko on a par with milkmaids

Clear business hands drove. Cow pulled the tit, or just a milkmaid?

[antivirus]

... and the camels were milked, which Lawrence of Arabia drove.

everywhere the arm of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks reached out — a force that bent into the ram’s horn of the NKVD and Mandelstam ..
Party !!! all !!!! I was familiar with Nagans and spurs, plank and bast shoes, hunger and birch logs.
All this helped to be above the battle and juggle the whole country and the world (where they reached)

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR

KK Rokossovsky (commander of 9 mk): “At about four in the morning of June 22, upon receipt of the telephone message from the headquarters, I was forced to open a special secret operational package ...” KK Rokossovsky writes that he was forced to open the package. Consequently, he did not see such an order in the telephone message. Only at 9-27, he receives the order that they should proceed with the implementation of the cover plan.

Another juggling of the author of the article, because Rokossovsky in a completely different context describes the situation in his memoirs:

About four o'clock in the morning of June 22, the officer on duty brought me a telephone message from the headquarters of the 5th Army: to open a special secret operational package.
We had the right to do this only by order of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR or the People’s Commissar of Defense. And in the telephone message there was a signature of the deputy chief of the operations department of the storm. Ordering the duty officer to clarify the reliability of the dispatches in the district, in the army, in the people's commissariat, I called the chief of staff, my deputy for political affairs and the head of a special department, to advise what to do in this case.
Soon the duty officer reported that the connection was broken. Neither Moscow, nor Kiev, nor Lutsk answer.
I had to take responsibility and open the package.
The directive indicated: immediately put the corps on alert and speak in the direction of Rivne, Lutsk, Kovel. At four o'clock, he ordered the announcement of a combat alert, division commanders N. A. Novikov, N. V. Kalinin and V. M. Chernyaev to arrive at my command post.

There is a distortion of the author, because Rokossovsky acted strictly according to instructions, and directives to the corps were just in the package, and should not have been transmitted by telephone. In the telephone message there was an instruction to open the package, and not how to act in the corps - Madame and could not figure it out.

[ccsr]

A huge pig to the author of a series of articles was planted by Golikov, whose memoirs had recently been published as a separate book and which for various reasons were not published in Soviet times.
Here is what General Golikov himself writes about intelligence, refuting the unthinkable fantasies of the author of the articles:

“In historical literature one can find conflicting and often distorted opinions about the role of our military intelligence before the Great Patriotic War. Sometimes, even intentionally or unintentionally, military intelligence leaders are credited with actions that actually did not and could not be. In particular, that our military intelligence allegedly gave I.V. To Stalin, incorrect information about the impending attack of Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union, which did not report all the data to the General Staff, as it was personally subordinate to Stalin. All this is fiction. In reality, this was the case.
Firstly, military intelligence was able to timely reveal and report to the political and military leadership of the country the true plans and plans of the enemy, to establish its specific intentions. In a complex, dramatically changing environment, military intelligence, despite once making a serious mistake in the conclusion181 (181Obviously, this refers to the conclusion made in the report of F.I. Golikov in the NPO of the USSR dated March 20, 1941. See document No. 34. ( Note. Comp.)), Did not allow the enemy to get confused in the intricate network of misinformation, but consistently, step by step, and always timely reported to the leadership about the true plans of the enemy, his main efforts. In this regard, the timely disclosure of the contents of the Barbarossa plan and its main elements should be considered the crown of our military intelligence activities.
Secondly, our military intelligence managed to establish and disclose not only the plans of the enemy and his intentions, but also the timing of their implementation, despite their repeated transfers. The culmination of intelligence in this regard is the timely establishment of the possible timing of an attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the timing of the implementation of the same Barbarossa plan.
Thirdly, the Soviet military intelligence, with amazing accuracy for intelligence, promptly and fully revealed the general composition and grouping of the armed forces of Nazi Germany before the attack, its deployment and numbering of the main formations.
Fourth, with the outbreak of war, despite enormous organizational and technical difficulties and losses, our military intelligence was able to quickly switch to a military footing, sharply strengthen its operational link, correctly target all other links to solve the main tasks, and successfully provide political and military leadership in the new conditions.
These are the facts that are irrefutably and convincingly proved by numerous archival documents and eyewitness accounts. ... "(p. 86-87)

Philip Golikov. Notes of the head of the Intelligence. July 1940 - June 1941
https://book24.ru/product/zapiski-nachalnika-razvedupra-iyul-1940-goda-iyun-1941-goda-3757556/

[gunnerminer]

Golikov is a unique person. He served in the GRU, was a combatant chief, a major political worker. He exceeded Stalin and Khrushchev.

[ccsr]

Quote: gunnerminer

0
Golikov is a unique person.

I share your point of view. But the most important thing was that his guilt that the beginning of the war was that way was not. That is why neither after the start of the war, nor after its end, he was not subjected to repression or punishment. Well, the fact that Zhukov personally did not like him, most likely speaks of their difficult personal relationships, and Golikov knew well how it really was.

[ccsr]

Quote: gunnerminer

Golikov is a unique person ..

Here is how Golikov explains his difficult relationship with Zhukov:

Zhukov, of course, was appointed commander of the corps, but he did not forget this story. In 1964, he wrote N.S. Khrushchev and A.I. Mikoyan: “In the years 1937-1938. They tried to defame and label me as an enemy of the people. And, as I knew, especially in this regard, the former member of the military council of the Belarusian military district F.I. Golikov (now Marshal) and the head of the PU of the Red Army, Mehlis, who carried out the purge of the command and political staff of the Belarusian HE ” It doesn’t matter now whether Zhukov stood up for repressed military leaders or not, it is important that if Golikov tried to “defame” Zhukov, he could easily use his words in defense of “enemies of the people”. However, this did not happen. F.I. Golikov did not agree with Zhukov’s accusations against him. As early as 12, he wrote to I.V. To Stalin about one of the conversations with the future Marshal of Victory: “Zhukov considered and still considers me the culprit of an attempt to subject him to party and official repressions. I immediately refuted this opinion, indicating that, on the contrary, I took the opposite position and that thanks to my prohibition, his great party affair was not raised. ”1944 In our opinion, these words can be trusted, and here's why: not so much time has passed since the conflict that allegedly occurred in 13, so its materials should have been preserved and the commission could easily get them and establish the truth with any verification .

But also F.I. Golikov in the late 1930s. was under threat of arrest. According to his daughter, Nina Filippovna Golikova, he “suffered the fate of many of our outstanding commanders — in 1938 he was dismissed from the Red Army” 14, but was soon restored to the Red Army.

So it becomes clear why Golikov’s memoirs weren’t published in Soviet times - apparently he did not share Zhukov’s views expressed in his memoirs, and he did not try to defame Stalin either.

[458vik]

Let's look at the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff through the eyes of the employer, Mr. Milchakov, in the comments to the 16th part: "Oh the fact that it was RU GSh that distorted INTENTED information under [i] chasing her under the idea that the main blow will be south of woodland - I’ve been writing for more than a year already and in the new book it will also be about this ... "

- alas - this is a fact. Study Zakharov's books yes "lessons and conclusions" yes Sudoplatov what have you brought here .. If you understand the essence of GSh-Zhukov's plans, you may understand what Golikov was doing [/ i]

Do you think that Mr. Milchakov, with a sense of noble anger, rushed to defend General Golikov? No, I didn’t rush. Then the scammers did not need him. And today, when the words of Golikov (without evidence in the form of documents) suit them, they immediately began to use the words of the former chief of the General Staff of the General Staff. Milchakov here and on the site For Truth, and Kozinkin only on the site For Truth. He was banned from everywhere. Now there he seeks support and cries that the girl offended))) on the site of Militeri no one except Milchakov supported him either .....

[ccsr]

Quote: 458vik

Do you think that Mr. Milchakov, with a sense of noble anger, rushed to defend General Golikov? No, I didn’t rush.

I personally write to Kozinkin everything that I think about various events and his assessments, so it is you who rush off the chain when you are presented with the truth, but not the one you would like to hear. By the way, and no one forbids you to make denunciations of Kozinkin on the sites you specify. What was the matter?

Quote: 458vik

no one supported Milchakov on the Militeri site either .....

And then under what nickname on the site miletra hiding, to judge who supports whom?

[ccsr]

Quote: 458vik

Let's look at the head of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate through the eyes of the employer Mr. Milchakov

I have no employers - I have been providing myself with work for a long time.

Quote: 458vik

No, I didn’t rush.

I was expecting this throw from you. But you, because of your ignorance, could not do it, and you decided to blame me for that too. You are just a scammer.
Why should I do your work for you?

[gunnerminer]

Gradually, ten years after ten, the curtain rises over the secret of events of June 21-22, 1941. By the labor of historians, archival workers.

[Ivan Tartugai]

Quote from the article:

"... the commander of the 10th army, Major General Golubev under the strictest secretly announced to the generals and senior officers in charge that the commander of the BOVO troops had permitted: "Big bosses send their families and property inland, but without too much noise ... "

The conspiracy of generals against the Soviet government is more and more manifest.
Earlier, generals wrote in their memoirs something like this, for example, Sandalov, who was at that time the chief of staff (large chief) of the 4th army:

“At half past five (June 22), before leaving for Bukhovichi, I decided to take a look at the housewhere he lived. "

It is noteworthy that Sandalov decided not to check, to find out how his family is there, whether his wife, his 2-year-old daughter and mother-in-law are alive, healthy, but not just that “... look at the house ...”. So I was sure that his family was no longer in the house. I came to see, to look, maybe something valuable from the property remained. Still, they left "... without too much noise ..." at night, so here you can forget and leave something.
Sandalov further writes:

“Neither in our, nor in the neighboring house. I met my neighbors only outside the gates of the town, in the bushes between the highway and the river. Mukhavets. So gathered a lot of families nachsostav (but which are not belonged to the big bosses) Women have haggard faces, tears in their eyes. Talk in an undertone. Most are dressed up somehow. Almost everything with knots in hands. I didn’t notice any suitcases.
-Did anyone see my wife? I asked.
“Elizabeth Pavlovna with her daughter and grandmother managed to get on some kind of lorry,” said one of the women.
- With them together and family Colonel Belov (also big boss, commander of the 10th mixed air division), another spoke up. - The car was going, it seems in Baranovichi.
- We left what we were. Only managed to capture a package with food, - the third added.
-And what shall we do? - they asked everyone. ”

A similar thing happened with the family of the commander of the 4th Army, General Korobkov (also big boss).
So in his memoirs, Sandalov recalls that on the same morning, June 22, Korobkov told him:

“- So you told me that you couldn’t get into your apartment, as it fell as a result of a bomb entering the house. And I went into my apartment ...Wife and daughter evacuatedbut all things remained in place. ”

The main thing in the evening at 20-00, June 21, 1941, and Korobkov with his wife, and Sandalov with his wife were on the operetta "Gypsy Baron", which was on the stage of the army DO. And on the night of June 21-22, their families, as the families of other big bosses, were evacuated, completely without "too much noise", i.e. On the evening of June 21, everyone saw them at the play, and in the morning of June 22, 1941 they were no longer in the city, they had already been evacuated.
And Korobkov, and Sandalov, and other "big bosses" knew the exact time of the outbreak of hostilities.

[ccsr]

Quote: Ivan Tartugay

those. On the evening of June 21, everyone saw them at the play, and in the morning of June 22, 1941 they were no longer in the city, they had already been evacuated.

In fact, the NKVD was responsible for the evacuation of families of party workers and high-ranking military commanders, and this was primarily due to the fact that they should in no case remain in the territory that could get to the enemy. This ruled out the possibility of their capture, and therefore the ability to somehow influence the actions of their husbands (fathers). And the presence of families in our rear precluded the transition to the enemy of military leaders - this is obvious, because they understood what threatened their families.
This issue was resolved long before the war at the highest level, so you can believe that the NKVD officers simply fulfilled their duties, as the instructions on the evacuation of families of senior party workers and senior military personnel demanded from them.
I do not see any "horror films" in this - on the contrary, it is a sane calculation based on the fact that the fate of the family for a person can prevail even over the sense of self-preservation.
Our ancestors were much smarter and knew psychology well than it might seem to someone ...

[Ivan Tartugai]

Quote: ccsr

I do not see any "horror films" in this - on the contrary, it is a sane calculation based on the fact that the fate of the family for a person can be transformed even over a sense of self-preservation.

For a traitor, a family will never be an obstacle to betrayal.
Is the traitor easy, difficult, but he abandons and betrays his homeland, his parents, in the hope of finding a new homeland more favorable, more comfortable for himself.
He also abandons his family, children, again in the hope of acquiring a new wife in a new place, and creating a new family, but more convenient and comfortable for himself.
The same General Vlasov, the same our pilots who flew over and ran away, the same packs of GRU and KGB colonels who ran across, so family values ​​did not hold them back. They abandoned their families and ran for new "happiness".
If a person is concerned about the fate of the family, he will no longer become a traitor to the children, regardless of whether the NKVD will evacuate his family or help relatives or friends, or take him out.
If a person decides to become a traitor, then that's it - there is no morality, no worries about the fate of the family, only personal benefit, only about oneself beloved, to get the maximum profit and no sentimentality, and no "horror films".

Quote: ccsr

In fact, for the evacuation of families of party workers and high-ranking military commanders answered by the NKVD, and this was primarily due to the fact that they in no case remained in the territory that could get to the enemy.

But the Molodechensky regional committee of the BKP (b) asked Filatov, commander 13, whether they should begin the evacuation of party workers or wait, i.e. did not look at the NKVD, but looked at the army.
If organized, i.e. according to the plan, the families of military commanders themselves evacuated themselves, but of course they did not refuse help from the NKVD.

[ccsr]

Quote: Ivan Tartugay

But the Molodechensky regional committee of the BKP (b) asked Filatov, commander 13, whether they should begin the evacuation of party workers or wait, i.e. did not look at the NKVD, but looked at the army.

In fact, the regional committee does not obey the commander in its actions, and a request was made to assess the situation, and not to obtain permission to evacuate. And they did not look at the army, but their actions were carried out taking into account the requirements of the NKVD in the first place - that was the order at that time.

Quote: Ivan Tartugay

For a traitor, a family will never be an obstacle to betrayal.

You poorly know all the motives of the traitors - for example, Polyakov did not receive money from the Americans for his betrayal, but acted for reasons related to other motives.

[Ivan Tartugai]

Quote: ccsr

You poorly know all the motives of the traitors - for example, Polyakov did not receive money from the Americans for his betrayal, but acted for reasons related to other motives.

You poorly know all the motives of the traitors. The overwhelming majority of traitors from the USSR are not materially satisfied. All of them believed that they deserved much more, much more material compensation for their work, for their service, for their knowledge, for their talents.
Of course, there were other reasons, such as, for example, compulsory attendance and imprisonment at party meetings, and the vast majority of traitors were members of the CPSU (b) -KPSS, the same Vlasov, the same Belenko, the same Litvinenko and many others, all members of the CPSU (b) -KPSS. However, these are not the main motives, the main thing is the insufficient, in their opinion, material support of loved ones. And the rest, a prison term at party meetings, subbotniks and other things could be endured.

[ccsr]

Quote: Ivan Tartugay

The overwhelming majority of traitors from the USSR are not materially satisfied.

If a person is caught on a woman, or after a rigged accident in a foreign country they promise him a long time, or drugs will be planted on his child, then believe me it is not material gain that will push him to betrayal, but something else, more like animal fear. Or are we all as "fearless" as you?
So trim the sturgeon ...
And less demagogy about the members of the CPSU - now many howled from their current lives, and would like to return to the just life that the members of the CPSU tried to build.

[Ivan Tartugai]

Quote: ccsr

And less demagogy about the members of the CPSU - now many howled from today's life, and would like to return to a fair life, which the CPSU members tried to build.

You know and see for yourself that present life from which many howled arranged-built members of the CPSU. These are General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, CPSU member Michal Sergeyevich, member of the Civil Bureau, secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, Yeltsin member of the Politburo, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, foreman of the perestroika Yakovlev, numerous members of the CPSU Gavriil Popov, Gaidar, Sobchak, Chubais, Khakamada, Shokhin, Grachev , Shahrai and others, and others, and others.
It is only in the center. No less huge crowd of the same members of the CPSU in every republic, in every region, in every region, region, party committee of enterprises. Everywhere there were and are members of the CPSU their Yeltsin, Gaidar, Chubais, Khakamada, dogs and other millions of members of the CPSU.
And the current life, i.e. today, from which, as you write, many howled commanded, led, organized again by members of the CPSU, namely GDP, DAM, Shoigu, Kudrin and many others.
None of them tried, as you write, to build a "just life", they all only pretended that they were trying to build a "just life", and yet they were and are in power, they had and have all the means, all the mechanisms in their hands for construction of "fair life", but only all lied, chattered from the highest stands.
So trim the sturgeon ...
And less demagoguery about members of the CPSU who tried to build a fair life.

[ccsr]

Quote: Ivan Tartugay

And the current life, i.e. today, from which, as you write, many howled commanded, led, organized again by members of the CPSU, namely GDP, DAM, Shoigu, Kudrin and many others.

They were small pawns during the time of the CPSU, and would never have achieved the current level of power. And since our fellow citizens saw all their troubles in the CPSU itself, it had to leave the political arena, under the hooting of most of the country's population. I don’t know if you personally participated in this, but as they say for their stupidity, citizens should pay. So what to expect from those who built mercy in the capitalism in Russia to the exploited, the naivety is the top - even our ancestors understood this in 1917. It is strange that you do not want to see this, and look for those responsible for the former rank-and-file members of the CPSU.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

The quintessence of betrayal of the chief executives: "AK Shankov (platoon commander):" Our company had 6 built and relatively ready for battle firing points ... In addition, another unfinished pillbox took part in the battle. Our positions were located near the village of Orlya. I remember well He had two caponiers, each with one 76-mm cannon, paired with a Maxim machine gun. Both entrance doors had loopholes for a light machine gun. But, unfortunately, we did not have light machine guns. the pillbox garrison had three sections - one for a gun and a machine gun, the third section was supposed to serve light machine guns.

For almost the entire April of 1941, the personnel were inseparably in pillboxes. The weapon was cleaned of winter grease, ammunition and food were delivered to the facilities. But in early May, a new order came in, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the pillboxes. The fighters again settled in the barracks about a kilometer from the structures, the officers returned to their families. Food, cartridges and shells returned to the company warehouse. At the same time, shells were abundantly greased with cannon fat for long-term storage. Thus, by the beginning of the war, there were no food or ammunition at the firing points, except for a few boxes of cartridges in the guardhouse platoon bunker.

With the attack of the Nazis, the pillboxes had to be occupied under fire. This caused heavy losses. Out of 18 soldiers and sergeants of my platoon, only 5 made their way to the pillbox, then three more border guards came running. I was ninth. For shells, cartridges and food, the soldiers crawled to the company warehouse already during the battle. At such moments, only the sentry and me remained in the pillbox. From the very beginning of the war, the positions of the company were surrounded ... ""

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

NKVD employees simply fulfilled their duties as required by their evacuation instructions families senior party workers and senior military

I hope for this statement you can bring confirmation from the sources? Because as far as I know this was not the case. maybe i'm just wrong

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

maybe I'm just wrong

No, you are simply lying, because you know perfectly well that this was exactly so.
By the way, here’s Stalin’s famous resolution on encryption from Khabarovsk regarding the evacuation of military families:

Cipher telegram G.A. Borkova I.V. Stalin on the evacuation of senior management families
24.07.1941

No. 1477 w
.... I understand that it is necessary to prepare for the evacuation of some families, and especially children and the elderly, from the frontline zone. *It is now necessary to have evacuation plans thought out in a narrow circle of people. They offer us right now from plans to move to action, offer to start the evacuation. Is it premature? Are we getting ahead too much here?

I ask, comrade Stalin, your instructions on this matter *.

Secretary of the Khabarovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) BORKOV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 59. L. 17 — 18. Script. Typescript.

* - * Outlined in the margins in two lines.

On the first sheet there is a resolution of Stalin: “Khabarovsk. Secretary of the Regional Committee Borkov. Families of border guards and command personnel must be evacuated from the front line. The absence of such an event led to the destruction of family members of the command structure in a sudden German attack. The same thing can happen with a sudden attack by the Japanese. ”

[AsmyppoL]

[quote = ccsr] [quote = AsmyppoL] maybe I’m just wrong [/ quote]
No, you're just lying, because you know very well that this was exactly the case ...
By the way, here’s Stalin’s famous resolution on encryption from Khabarovsk regarding the evacuation of military families:
24.07.1941
On the first sheet there is a resolution of Stalin: “Khabarovsk. Secretary of the Regional Committee Borkov. Families of border guards and officers should be evacuated from the front line. The absence of such an event led to the destruction of members of the family commanders in the sudden attack of the Germans. The same can happen with a sudden attack by the Japanese.". [/ Quote] [/ quote]

Ah, you rascal! One day can not live without juggling data??
What period is considered in the articles? On the eve of the war! When did the war begin ?! In the month of July or what ??? Where are the facts about the duty of the NKVD to evacuate the families of major party workers or military leaders before the war or immediately after it began ?? Cheater! Unwise con man. Read what you posted: "absence of such an event"! The absence of such an event led to the destruction of family members of the people during a sudden attacked by the Germans. There was no such indication to the NKVD organs - again you bring your inventions to the couch expert, thoughtfully inflating sponges and cheeks: this is how clever I am and knowing many, many things, and judging by copying information from the network ..... fraudster, one word

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Read what you posted: "no such event"!

This means that the NKVD authorities did not comply with what was prescribed to them in full.

Quote: AsmyppoL

There was no such instruction to the NKVD bodies - again you bring your inventions of a sofa expert,

There was such an indication - they were the ones who provided the evacuation of party, state and banking structures, and not the Red Army soldiers.

On August 3, 1923, the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR adopted the provision “On the export of valuable property, institutions, and enterprises from areas threatened by the enemy and human contingent».
Three years later, the first plan appeared, which was subsequently repeatedly adjusted.

Quote: AsmyppoL

that’s how clever I am and how much I know a lot, but judging by copying information from the network ..... a scammer, one word

But then, judging by the answers, an obvious layman in the topic under discussion, no matter how hard you try to prove your wisdom.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

And then under what nickname on the site miletra hiding, to judge who supports whom?

I'm a guest. I am also a guest on the site "For the truth". Also, I was a guest of the site "Military Review" until I decided to answer you and Kozinkin. It's good that on these sites, guests can themselves make a picture of different authors

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I'm a guest. I am also a guest on the site "For the truth".

A characteristic feature of all anonymous authors is that they are afraid to express their views openly, because they understand that they can easily be identified and it will immediately become clear who is hu.
By the way, a certain swindler Zakoretsky, for a long time pretended to be an artillery officer, and then slipped an alleged scan of his ascribed, and was instantly exposed by the VUS, which belongs to intelligence officers. So it will work out with you, and you are afraid of this, which is why you are hiding under nicknames in different forums.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

A huge pig to the author of a series of articles was planted by Golikov, whose memoirs had recently been published as a separate book and which for various reasons were not published in Soviet times.

Only a person who does not know how to carry out an analysis and who wears rose-colored glasses or an ordinary swindler can reason like this using anything to protect his point of view.

I agree that the memoirs of the former head of the General Staff of the Red Army, a unique edition at the level of 60-70 = s of the last century. Over the past period, an enormous amount of intelligence materials has been opened that can be viewed in the public domain. At the time I indicated, many documents were not accessible to many people, little was written about them in the literature. There was an official point of view on the events on the eve of the war.

From my point of view, the memoirs of General Golikov can be unique only when the missing intelligence materials appear in them, and this will not happen for sure. When he writes that intelligence provided everything that was needed - this is not a completely correct statement. As the party slogans of that era.

If you write a story on the statements of respected military leaders, not supported by specific facts and documents, then it is easier to burn all documents of the times of war and study the history according to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov.

All unsubstantiated statements or allegations should be clarified in terms of specific facts. In the memoirs under consideration - from the point of view of intelligence materials. The units presented a sufficiently large number of such materials with little analysis, which cannot be refuted with exaggerated statements like "the military knew everything about the opponents and this was confirmed in the first days of the war".

Anyone who does not agree with my statement, present a similar statement by war veterans (regiments, divisions, corps) who were in the direction of strikes by German tank groups, ostensibly knowing about the enemy tank units that were opposite to them. There are too many memories in the materials and there you will not find information contrary to my statement.

In addition, knowledge of the German units located at a depth of 400 kilometers, it is not yet providing intelligence materials revealing the exit of these parts to their original positions before the attack! And this was one of the primary tasks of intelligence! After all, about 65-75% of German divisions were in PPD near the border since the autumn of 1940, so. This is according to intelligence information, and in fact there were three times less. Then this difference began to shrink.

A rather detailed account of the events of Vladimirsky (5 army) that only two of the five panzer divisions were known at the army headquarters. This general Kozinkin calls unfounded liar, so it is convenient for him. In the same way as many generals-cadres are called traitors ........

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

All allegations or allegations must be clarified in terms of specific facts. In the memoirs under consideration, from the point of view of intelligence materials.

You are a complete amateur in this matter - so far not all intelligence materials even of the pre-war period have been declassified, and you will never see intelligence affairs at all, like many intelligence reports.

Quote: AsmyppoL

I agree that the memoirs of the former head of the RU General Staff of the Red Army are a unique publication at the level of 60-70 = x of the last century. Over the past period, a huge number of reconnaissance materials have been opened that can be viewed in the public domain.

And what prevents you from comparing them in order to understand at least a chronology of events, or to evaluate the reliability of different sources?
If you do not have enough knowledge for this, then do not blame Golikov for this, whose memoirs were banned for publication in the USSR.

Quote: AsmyppoL

In addition, knowledge of the German units located at a depth of up to 400 kilometers is not the provision of reconnaissance materials revealing the release of these units to their original positions before the attack!

Apparently, the concept of forecasting the actions of the enemy based on the current situation does not exist for you, due to the lack of an appropriate military education, which is why you speculate that intelligence did not manage to get everything.
This is the reasoning of all amateurs who have a poor idea of ​​how all this is happening in the army, for example, during the FKSHU, when the "operators", knowing only the situation, and not the enemy's plans, present the options for our actions to the command of the district (group). They have not yet learned otherwise, unless they recruit top officials in the enemy's military leadership.

Quote: AsmyppoL

And this was one of the primary tasks of intelligence!

Instead of wringing your hands, you would at least familiarize yourself with the possibilities of our reconnaissance and the Germans' activities in disinforming the enemy, so as not to look like an amateur when refusing Golikov’s memoirs.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

A fairly detailed account of the events of Vladimirsky (5th Army) that only two out of five concentrated divisions were known at the army headquarters.

And what does this have to do with the fact that his army should have taken positions on the cover plan before the Germans attacked, and even died completely, but give time to unfold to other units of the district?
And if the Germans had changed the size of their tank group before the start of the war, would this have somehow changed the actions of the army according to the cover plan? Enlighten everyone that prevented the fulfillment of the cover plan for the army commander on the eve of the war in order to at least take up positions before the attack.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

If you write a story on the statements of respected military leaders, not supported by specific facts and documents, then it is easier to burn all documents of the times of war and study the history according to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov.

Your radicalism is caused by your inability to understand official documents, in which you are simply confused, like the local "experts". Here is a document taken from the militia, which shows that already on June 21 there was a document on the formation of the Southern Front:

And after that, you and Madame will argue that you did not prepare for the war in Moscow in advance?

[AsmyppoL]

you are not tired of different nonsense in public to write? And what's so special about the topic under consideration ?? Do you really try to explain your position? As a two-page document presented is related to the topic of the article under consideration and, in general, it is interesting, the opinion of the sofa experts about this document)))

I put a minus, because you did not write a clear link between the topic and the submitted page. In my opinion, do not know the answer

I’ve seen this document back in March, and you see, I saw it for the first time, and right away went the female yelling and snot))) Well, you are a former military man. clearer, clearer express your thoughts))) Here people are adults

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

and die even if completely

references to the document, according to which such an opinion existed literally, you will not submit again))) How these home-grown experts got it! Well, that you do not lie on the sofa and want undeserved fame ................................

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

links to the document according to which such an opinion existed verbatim you will not submit again

This is not an opinion - this is a combat mission to the units of the cover, which they are ordered by the district command. You were just too far from all this, that’s why you don’t even know elementalism, but with a smart look you demand what any platoon commander who serves in the cover regiment knows.

Quote: AsmyppoL

How got these homegrown experts! Well, you don’t lie on the couch and want undeserved fame ..

Come to the forum "For Truth" with your ideas, and there we'll see what kind of pretzel you are. I think you will drift like madam ...

[AsmyppoL]

So that they wouldn’t say later that it took me a while to prepare for the answer, I’ll say that if you carefully read the presented parts, then there are TWO similar cases with the event presented in the document. It’s just that you and your friend are completely lacking any analytical skills. This is already full ..............................

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I was leafing through this document back in March, and I see it for the first time and immediately went female cries and snot)))

What is the use of flipping through if you do not understand its essence? If you understood, then you would have guessed that he refutes the fantasies of Madame and people like you that they did not prepare for the war and when it would begin, they had no idea.

Quote: AsmyppoL

more clearly, more clearly express your thoughts))) Here people are adults

Well, if you are so wise and own the topic, then try to show your mind on the forum "For the truth" - there will be a stronger contingent, that's where we'll see which of us will smear snot.

Quote: AsmyppoL

you are not tired of writing nonsense in public?

I have not heard anything clever from you here, so I can’t judge how much you can evaluate what I write. When you sparkle with knowledge, then we'll see ...

[AsmyppoL]

I'm not that stupid! Why should I butt with two scammers, if not a single person criticized the author on the Militi website, where the author was called, except for two scammers. No one... After the posting of your and your friend's hysterical cries of women on the site "For Truth" for three days, not a single user has spoken in your support. No one.
There are practically no users supporting you on the Voennoye Obozreniye website. There are less than five of them.
There are quite a lot of smart and savvy users. It is enough to see how one of the users planted Kozinkin in a puddle about heavy German tanks. Kozinkin has been involved in events on the eve of the war for nine years and does not know basic things. True, the author did not see this report, judging by her comment ............
Why do I need a smart person to butt with people who manipulate the facts, give the readers unverified facts for events that are supposedly real, get a lie to be presented as the absolute truth. crooks like cat Basilio and fox Alice. Only a complete idiot can butt with such rogues. And I write this only for users of the site and for guests.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

0
I'm not that stupid! Why should I butt with two scammers, if not a single person criticized the author on the Militi website, where the author was called, except for two scammers. No one.

You're lying. She knows how Chekunov appreciated her - you can find out from her.

Quote: AsmyppoL

There are quite a few smart and topic-savvy users.

But you definitely do not belong to them, and I understand that.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why do I need a smart person

You certainly will not die of modesty ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

And I write this only for users of the site and for guests.

I immediately said that you are afraid to refute something there, because you will simply be ridiculed.

[AsmyppoL]

I posted the answer in several parts of the comments to the 25 part. They completely refute the nonsense of Milchakov and Kozinkin. The first time he saw the document. They did not find him. and immediately came up with a place for him in his version. one word, scammers)))

[AsmyppoL]

I will assume the functions of the lawyer of the author. The specified subscription was raised on the 20 June 1941 Summons as part of a scheduled field study tour, which was scheduled to take place on Monday 23 June 1941. For how long could not find. Since, as the author wrote, his main goal is to consider whether the war for the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of Staff was unexpected, this document has nothing to do with the expectation of war at dawn on June 22. After the announcement of the gathering of 23 on June, the raised staff was dismissed to their homes until June 23.

After the start of the war, the personnel from the Moscow Military District were separated by train on the evening of June 22. The conscripted staff of the operative department, headed by the personnel military lieutenant colonel Petukhov, civilian and trainee cadets, departed on the June 23 train, as had been planned in advance.

The document presented by the sofa expert Milchakov at the time of its compilation did not have any relation to the draft document drawn up on the evening of June 21, which referred to the creation of the LF headquarters. I would like to warn people cautiously here comments are amateurish amateurs who cheat

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I will assume the functions of the author’s lawyer. The specified enlistment was raised by agendas on June 20, 1941 as part of a planned field study trip, which was to be held on Monday June 23, 1941.

And why did they then leave earlier, can you intelligibly explain?
By the way, if they were not preparing for war, then why the hell to take the Southern Front ADMINISTRATION to another district for 1,5 thousand km for study, if planned exercises can be carried out on the territory of the Moscow Military District? I can still understand when the chief of staff and the beginning. operas, and then why drag everyone there, especially the attorneys? Well, you "expert" can explain, at least from the point of view of common sense?

Quote: AsmyppoL

then this document has nothing to do with the expectation of war at dawn on June 22.

This is a lie - military unit 1080 is the department of the southern front, which was created on the eve of the war, and therefore there was no question of any PLANNED TRAINING trip, because in terms of combat training for 1941 it simply could not be included. On the contrary, the haste with which this department was created, and its immediate dispatch from Moscow, just proves that they were preparing for war.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The document presented by couch expert Milchakov at the time of its compilation had nothing to do with the draft document drawn up on the evening of June 21, which spoke about the creation of the headquarters of the Law Firm.

On June 21, a secret document was already created, in which they indicated who did not appear on call, which once again confirms that this was not a training event:
https://postimg.cc/w7B2YNqd
So you're lying, not blushing - this is not a training document that was prepared for the planned event, but organizational and mobilization for the formation of a new structure.
But you do not cut it because the ordinary ignoramus in military affairs.

Quote: AsmyppoL

I would like to warn people carefully here leave comments foolish amateurs who cheat

You are an amateur in military affairs who does not know how to understand official documents.

[AsmyppoL]

The complete inability to search for documents and wishful thinking. In other words, fraud.
Planned study - there is a document with the schedule and the date of the trip, released before the war. There is a mention in the memoirs of the head of the engineering service of the MWA.

Raising the composition of 20, not 21 June - there is a document when these people were called up from stock.

Departure of the staff of 22 June - there is a document. Departure time is indicated in two memoirs.

Departure of the raised junior 23 June is a document. The fact that they were at home follows from another document.

A moronic explanation of the front headquarters and its location is the level of the kindergarten's explanation

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Planned study - there is a document with the schedule and the date of the trip, released before the war. There is a mention in the memoirs of the head of the engineering service of the MWA.

Well, what kind of planned studies can be planned for a non-existent structure? You would think with your head, not something else.
And in memoirs, your boss confused the legend of cover when creating and moving the law firm from Moscow, with the true essence of the event. Or maybe I just forgot ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

Raising the composition of 20, not 21 June - there is a document when these people were called up from stock.

I gave a detailed answer on the milter - read:

For the illiterate, I inform you that the decision to create a law firm was made before June 20 and a consent permit from the Politburo was received before June 21 due to the fact that everyone understood the inevitability of war. That is why the People’s Commissar of Defense not only instantly prepared a draft decision of the Politburo, but also immediately carried out mobilization measures to create a management of the Law Firm, without waiting for an official decision of the Politburo.

But the decision itself was made on June 21, as Tymoshenko and Zhukov could not influence the frequency of meetings of the Politburo.
That is why, on June 20, after the conscripts were called up and the officers were allocated from the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, work began on the creation of a law office, which once again confirms my conclusion that Moscow knew that the war would begin in the near future.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

Instead of wringing your hands, you would at least familiarize yourself with the possibilities of our reconnaissance and the Germans' activities in disinforming the enemy, so as not to look like an amateur when refusing Golikov’s memoirs.

So you look like a complete ignoramus in the matter at hand. Constantly some kind of semi-literate attacks. and now you write: "got acquainted with the capabilities of our intelligence and the activities of the Germans on the enemy's disinformation". Once again I am convinced that all sofa experts carefully read only their comments. And the text of those whom these experts criticize is not necessary to read.

What you just read is now represented in the 1 and 2 parts, in the 7 and 8 parts, and in three parts after the 14 in sufficient detail! You criticize everything without reading the text. So it was in the 19 part about air defense, in the comments in this part (it was higher about the documents of the General Staff of the Red Army). and now you have found a new revelation on the Internet. Such experts are always advised to teach materiel. Read carefully the criticized material, sofa expert Milchakov!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Constantly some kind of semi-literate attacks. and now you are writing: "you have familiarized yourself with the capabilities of our intelligence and the measures taken by the Germans to misinform the enemy."

Do you even understand what is hidden under the words "capabilities of our intelligence"?
Can you describe how they understand these words? Maybe you do not understand what is at stake?

Quote: AsmyppoL

What you subtracted just now is presented in parts 1 and 2, in parts 7 and 8, and in three parts after 14 in sufficient detail!

When Madame publishes her work in the form of a monograph, and not a set of scattered texts, moreover with illiterate comments, then you will try to prove to me how wrong I was with the link to the pages and my comments on them. In the meantime, from you only one blah blah blah, and no more ...

[Navigator_50]

So from you blah blah blah - Madame is wrong ...
And the monograph is hardly likely .. (envy is bad, in any way)

[ccsr]

Quote: Shturman_50

0
So from you blah blah blah - Madame is wrong ...

I poked Madame into Rokossovsky’s memoirs with my nose and showed that she does not understand how the control signals are being transmitted. And why didn’t you pay attention to it, are you our shy?
And yet, since you are a navigator, tell us in more detail how you imagine the bombing of Moscow by the Germans on June 22, based on the capabilities of German aviation at that time and their location of airfields. Madame assured us that this could be planned. Do you think so too?

[AsmyppoL]

We do not know what source of information the author used. with a raid on Moscow you big flopped in a puddle

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

0
We do not know what source the author used.

And why didn’t you specify with her?

Quote: AsmyppoL

with a raid on Moscow you flopped heavily into a puddle

Those. Do you have evidence that he was in the plans of the German Air Force?
Well, lie, something believable, proving that the Germans planned such a raid on June 22.

[Grim Reaper]

Thanks to the author.
I hardly read the comments, because literally "showdowns" begin right there, seemingly personal.
About a month ago, the main opponent of the author wrote that he could send his book to anyone who wishes. (Electronic version)
Unfortunately I could not find. Well, when you read, you write only from the phone. There, a search can take half a day ..
Why am I? It would be extremely interesting to read a different point of view.
I guarantee the payment of the book.
My email. [email protected]

[Navigator_50]

Interesting ...
Only some comrades flood.
Tell me honestly, ccsr (ccsr), could G.K. Zhukov, completely subordinate to the chief of the General Staff? Head of RU - to provide information to the country's leadership?
He provided them through Zhukov and Tymoshenko (!!!)
And knowing the character of Zhukov G.K., we can consider the fact of the intelligence filter from RU to the country's leadership established as an established fact .. I believe that Zhukov gave his own comments. And "squeezed" material resources from the leadership. And the main task - the preparation of the Red Army for the war, lost it .. And flew out of the General Staff, like soapy, straight to the fronts, to put everything in order ... Then he found both extreme, and guilty, and uninitiated, and
etc.
Three editions of memoirs only 20 years after the Victory, when the fear of responsibility for the failed period of the beginning passed. Tymoshenko honestly didn’t write his memoirs, he couldn’t lie, but this one "smeared" everyone, and he himself is in white! Fucking Buonaparte, Khrushchev saved ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Shturman_50

Tell me honestly, ccsr (ccsr), could G.K. Zhukov, completely subordinate to the chief of the General Staff? Head of RU - to provide information to the country's leadership?
He provided them through Zhukov and Tymoshenko (!!!)

This is not entirely true - this is what Golikov’s first meeting with Stalin looked like:

October 11, 1940 Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov was first adopted by I.V. Stalin for the report. The meeting took place face to face and lasted 40 minutes - from 21:45 to 22: 2539. Unfortunately, it is now impossible to say what exactly F.I. Golikov could report why this meeting took place, what extraordinary he told the Soviet leader. One can only assume that this was a report prepared on the basis of the intelligence report mentioned above, or a report based on information from a source at the German embassy in Moscow on the economic relations of Germany and the Soviet Union40. As it has now become known, this source was Gerhard Kegel ("HVC"). After Golikov left, at the same time, at 22:30, they came to Stalin: Zhdanov, Andreev, Malenkov, Molotov. With a little delay - Mikoyan, Bulganin, Ascension. Later, at 23:05, Beria arrived. All of those listed came from Stalin at 00:50.

But the fact that Golikov always reported to NGOs and the NHS everything that he reported to the country's leadership is absolutely certain, it could not be otherwise.

Quote: Shturman_50

And knowing the nature of Zhukov GK, we can consider the fact of a filter of intelligence information from the Republic of Uzbekistan to the leadership of the country to be established ..

This is a moot point, because Golikov was not so stupid as not to understand that intelligence materials were also being sent along the NKVD and NKID lines, and he did not want to be extreme afterwards, after other people's edits.

Quote: Shturman_50

Tymoshenko honestly didn’t write his memoirs, he couldn’t lie, but this one "smeared" everyone, and he himself is in white!

Firstly, Tymoshenko himself was the culprit in the tragedy of 1941, and secondly, Zhukov led the General Staff too little to hang all the dogs on him, although it is clear that he was out of place on June 22, 1941.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

and secondly, Zhukov led the General Staff too little to hang all the dogs on him,

Of course, but he finished off the TBR SK. And the SK were perhaps the most combat-ready associations in the Red Army.
The Germans doubled the TD (after France), halved the TBR. and new tank divisions were built around tank regiments. The number of divisions has increased, but there are no regiments (however, these are more likely shock divisions than armored divisions, but it still took place before the age of 43).
And we made two on the basis of one brigade (regiments for combat units and equipment repeated the brigade). And this is blurring of personnel, the inability to fully use tankodromes and training fields (although they were most likely involved in tracing the fleet of equipment and pulled barbed wire, they haven't had time to do it since March).

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

Of course, but he finished off the TBR SK.

Rather, he complied with the decision made before him to create 30 mechanized corps, and apparently proceeded from the fact that he would have to report, that's why he went along the path that seemed to him the simplest. He was already a hostage to the decision - this is a fact.

Quote: chenia

And this is blur frames,

The erosion of personnel before Zhukov began - I cited data that in two pre-war years the army had more than doubled in number. Where to find personnel commanders in such a situation?

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

Rather, he complied with the decision made before him to create 30 mechanized corps,

Actually, I heard that Zhukov was pushing it (naturally, it was not only his initiative, but a certain group of generals), but Meretskov objected, and Stalin doubted.

Quote: ccsr

Blur frames to Zhukov began

At that time (Meretskov NACH.GSh) 9 MK it is very optimal. It was necessary to drive the MK in the exercises.
For this, one TD and management headquarters of the remaining formations and their units with minimal (mainly officers) involvement of l / s (department, calculation depicting a company, battery), and 3-4 intermediaries (in the formation corresponding to their positions) from neighboring MK and teachers of academies and higher education institutions.
And drive changing the command structure.
TD would immediately show its slowness (during the war they saw it, but it cost blood) and could settle the OSH (well, they revealed a bunch of other shortcomings, I wrote earlier).
And there it was necessary to fix in two links
- make a tank regiment a three-battalion
- and a three-tank platoon. (Much better controllability, but for the TBR SK 4-5 tanks each, this is normal, they break through the defense, and do not rush into a breakthrough)

And we get TP 94-95 tanks (how it will be)
then 5 TP (two in TD and one in MSD)
470-475 main tanks in the MK, taking into account about 150 (mostly light) tanks in the combat and rear support units, it turns out -620-630 tanks in MK. Already somewhat easier for the rear and the armed forces.

But that’s not all, instead of 20 TB there will be only 15, which means that command frames are not so blurry.

This is what I chased after the quantity and scared to fly.
.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

Actually, I heard that Zhukov was pushing it (naturally, it was not only his initiative, but a certain group of generals), but Meretskov objected, and Stalin doubted.

This, in principle, could not be, firstly because Zhukov had just come to the General Staff and had not even really entered the course of affairs, which means he would hardly have become clever right away. And secondly, this issue affected the production of armored vehicles in the country, which means that at least in the autumn of 1940 reports were presented to plan financing and their production in connection with a sharp increase in the demand for tanks.

Quote: chenia

This is what I chased after the quantity and scared to fly.

I would not see a big mistake not so much in large numbers, although this is really so, but also in the fact that the supporting infrastructure lagged very much behind the increased number - I mean the lack of tankers, communications, etc., and most importantly - the lack trained personnel for such a quantity of equipment.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

and most importantly, the lack of trained personnel for such a quantity of equipment.

Here is the salt of the problem. We are in much worse conditions, with almost no superiority
in late 1941, the Germans were crushed by forces and means, primarily with the advent of less trained formations (Siberian divisions) and having gained combat experience, even if battered, but not defeated.

There was also no significantly prepared reserve, this was even for infantry (but I am silent about armored forces in general). Well, in the war they were able to establish training (I understand that the military conditions are somewhat different).
The concentration of efforts on reorganization to the detriment of BP is the main cause of the forty-first disaster.
And whose fault is this? Certainly not a political leadership.

The increase in formations, so there is one subtlety, what kind of career growth has begun and who will refuse?

[antivirus]

READ S. R. A. CH. MANY
the growth of the army was not only against Germany - and Yapi + Romanians + Hungarians + Italians and the Iranian problem (what would Afghanistan require?), Turkey-H sea and the Caucasus - the entire perimeter of the borders.
Poles --- for us or against?
French people?
Americans how much could the "volunteer fascists" give?
if you take into account the experience of the WWI then Iraq had to be laid, and the whole Brit empire

and real enemies ("bloodshed") with combat experience -Franco Spain?

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

Your radicalism is caused by your inability to understand official documents, in which you are simply confused, like the local "experts". Here is a document taken from the militia, which shows that already on June 21 there was a document on the formation of the Southern Front:


And after that, you and Madame will argue that you did not prepare for the war in Moscow in advance?

Again, after my comment, not a single word, and again Babish cries. A military man would answer logically and in essence.

For example. The main version of the author, outlined in part ...., is .... When considering the document submitted by me (Milchakov), it is clear that ..... ..... ..... ...... And further in the text. You can not even correctly express your thoughts.

How did you find this document? Found it yourself? Yes, not at all. It was posted on the Militi website by a user. You have posted it as a revelation from above. Did you find other pages of the document? of course not. I liked the phrase about you: they puffed their lips and cheeks out of importance and wrote something there, allegedly knowing the cherished secret !! This is exactly what the real dummy sofa experts do. who supposedly know everything and even know inaccessible to sufficiently advanced users of sites.

Judging by the fact that you did not correct me regarding two documents, then you did not find them and did not even look for them. You haven't even found the very first stamped document. The next one was the document presented on the Militi website by the respected user Andrey K. The third is another sheet with crossed out text.

By the way, there are a lot of documents in documents at dawn of 22 June, when the date of June 22 is just a slip of it when describing the shelling of our territory and the actions of our troops 21 of June. How can you check whether there is an error in the date of inflating a sponge and cheeks in a thoughtful way that it will find an important document. I know the truthful answer, and you, with the true obstinacy of the sofa expert, are trying to show your significant value, which is actually at the level of the plinth. Not a smart crook - quite comical creature))))

Since in your statements the ideas of the author of this material began to slip, you also study on the materials, giving out other people's ideas as your own. With such frames, even discussing what is = funny

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

How did you find this document? Found it yourself? Yes, not at all. It was posted on the Militi website by a user.

You might think that you got it at TsAMO, but no one saw him before you. Lie that it was just that ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

Judging by the fact that you have not corrected me regarding two documents,

Do you seriously think that I simply must carefully study the nonsense that you write here? I selectively respond to the author of the articles, and you have not yet grown to his level to answer your every sneeze.

Quote: AsmyppoL

By the way, in the documents at dawn on June 22 there are a lot of documents when, when describing the shelling of our territory and the actions of our troops on June 22, the date is June 21 — just a typo.

I didn’t see you discussing this here. What claims to me?

Quote: AsmyppoL

Since the ideas of the author of this material began to slip in your statements, you also learn from the materials, passing off other people's ideas as your own.

You lied as always - the author of the articles is not interesting for me. And if some of his views coincide with my opinion, then I only note that this is only a coincidence. By the way, when Madame began to write on the forums on this topic, do not remember?
Maybe compare with what I wrote eight to ten years ago to understand who and what wrote on this topic long before it.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Quote: ccsr

So the strength of the Red Army:
24.02.1939 - 1 931 962
October 1, 1940 - 3 446 309
June 21, 1941 - 4 826 907 people

You, Milchakov, want to say that in the SPECIAL border districts, where 60% of the country's weapons and ammunition were delivered, there were not enough light machine guns for the all-round defense of fortified areas on the "Stalin line" and "Molotov line"? By the number of bunkers and bunkers (less than 10000)? Are you seriously deceiving yourself so or are you deceiving us? Read Zhukov's report to the Politburo on 25.05.41/95000/60. - he reported there that only guns and mortars, including tank guns, there were approx. XNUMX. Do not be lazy, find the figure for light machine guns - I have not succeeded yet. There was XNUMX% of the mobilization reserve of weapons!

[ccsr]

Quote: Mikhail Zubkov

You, Milchakov, want to say that in the SPECIAL border districts, where 60% of the country's weapons and ammunition were delivered, there were not enough light machine guns for the all-round defense of fortified areas on the "Stalin line" and "Molotov line"?

I want to tell you that you sucks imagine how everything was then. Here is an example of where the two company machine guns went - to the radio intelligence unit, which did not have machine guns in the state. And they were given them because they understood that they would have to repulse the attack alone, and so they strengthened them at the expense of others.

[kig]

Suddenly, it dawned on me that gentlemen who were especially ardently commenting, were arguing only about whose vision of events was the most correct and correct. And they have only two versions: a) the leadership knew about the imminent start of the war; b) the leadership did not know. It knew whether or not, but in the end it turned out to be 1941!

[AsmyppoL]

That's right. The author of the topic Vic wrote that the purpose of the cycle is to consider whether the start of the June 22 war was unexpected for the defense junkie and the Chief of the General Staff. Only one this question))))))
The question of whether some rather large events in the districts with the aim of increasing combat readiness were conducted on the legal initiative of the harmful councils of the districts or simply on their initiative, is sidelined.
Other issues are not relevant to the main consideration.
I express my opinion if the author can correct me.

[kig]

Quote: AsmyppoL

bad councils districts

This Google damn intervenes ... not for nothing they want to replace it with Yandex

[Navigator_50]

I join the request.
Probably, the NPO and the NGSh had their own "vision" of the war .. and the mriya - "with little blood, a mighty blow .. on its land we will crush .."

[strannik1985]

The vision of war is a note by Vatutin, according to which in the first echelon there should have been 120 only rifle divisions. NCOs and NGSs do not announce mobilization; they cannot move the compounds of their own free will.

[Barbus]

But is the answer to this question not a telegram sent to the okrugs on the night of 21 to 22 about putting the troops on alert?
Either the question is posed incorrectly, or it needs to be expanded. What does it mean unexpected? They knew about the possibility of an attack - they knew. So there’s no longer any surprise whatsoever. For the troops in the border districts, to which the information from the telegram did not reach, the attack on June 22 was unexpected. But they were waiting for the war. From my point of view, all the quotes given by the author can only serve as the basis for building some chronologies of the events of those days. Again, most of these recollections are recorded from the words of the participant, but are not confirmed in this article by any statistical documents. Moreover, if we take the memories of several participants in the same events, there will be many inconsistencies. How, then, to understand who is telling the truth? I tried to recover, according to publicly available information, the short combat path of 6mk Khatskilevich. So, if you look at the reports of the commanders who left the encirclement, then there is a large number of contradictions in them. And it looks even more interesting that while the generals who were closer to the border retreating fought, the generals who were much east were captured (or surrendered). Even more interesting things in Boldin's memoirs. But this is a hotel story. By the way, in accordance with Borzilov’s report, 6mk was taken to the places of concentration even before the start of hostilities, due to which he did not incur losses in places of permanent deployment.

[Navigator_50]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Shturman_50

0
So from you blah blah blah - Madame is wrong ...

I poked Madame into Rokossovsky’s memoirs with my nose and showed that she does not understand how the control signals are being transmitted. And why didn’t you pay attention to it, are you our shy?
And yet, since you are a navigator, tell us in more detail how you imagine the bombing of Moscow by the Germans on June 22, based on the capabilities of German aviation at that time and their location of airfields. Madame assured us that this could be planned. Do you think so too?

First - (ironically): Are you sure that Madame, not Mademoiselle? ..
Or speculation? (no, but could be presented, so to speak?)

Second - (seriously): you have a strange mindset about navigators ..
The navigator ensures the fulfillment of the task (by combat order) in accordance with the route, weather conditions, range .. load and much more .. (on a specific ship, ship, submarine, bomber, etc.)
But completely different people of different qualifications plan and set tasks.
They determine the purpose of the operation, calculate the forces and means to complete the task, deadlines, etc. etc.
And if they did not set such a task, then this does not mean that it could not be ..
Did not find this important! And the leadership did not set - ...
I think that it was possible through the Finns, only a little bunting ... to get fuel, ammunition, relocate aviation units with security, place ...
Well, develop routes taking into account meteo, etc. with a possible return through the front line ..
There was no point in this for OKV ... The result seemed already achieved ..
Well, why exactly June 22 ?, and June 27 wouldn’t fit?
The preparation of such an operation could not be hidden or carried out in 2 days .. (in Finland) ..
A navigator is considered on a specific route and goal only after receiving the task and are responsible for its execution in kind .. (head and other parts of the body, together with the crews ..)

[AsmyppoL]

interesting comment.
since there still appear users, I will clarify one thing. In the 19 part, the author Wick spoke about an analytic note for NGOs. True, it is not called ANALYTICAL - I found this document. in my opinion, the author deliberately distorted the name so that the fraudsters Kozinkin and Milchakov did not find it. The document dates back to May 1941. One of the two conclusions says that German bombers converted into a long-range bomber and long-range bomber regiments from airfields in Finland and in the territory of the Polzi (the locations of the airfield hubs are indicated) can cause a bombing attack on the capital city of Moscow. There is a link to the document with the number of February. it was not found yet.

Also in the comments it was said about the flight of the German reconnaissance aircraft in the morning of 22 on June 1941 of the year which took place near the city of Tula to Moscow. It was possible to find a copy of the investigation document of this incident by the 3 department. The document refers to the non-deployed observation points of VNOS, sound absorbing installations, and a non-working location station near Tula.

The second document by the author Vik did not see. Let it be a gift to him (sent by mail). Not one Sergey Chekunov can give her gifts))))))

[Navigator_50]

So mademoiselle, (pure white envy) ...