Military Review

Operation "Ultra", or the Story of how the Poles with the British "Enigma" hacked. 5 part

22
The Abwehr and its agents have always been among the priority targets of the British decoders, and December 8 of the year 1941 saw another episode with the revelation of German spies. On this day in Bletchley Park, a cryptogram from a special “intelligence” version of Enigma was deciphered. They took a group of agents, some of them managed to be recruited and started a radio game in the interests of British intelligence.


Also, the Enigma interceptions later allowed us to calculate the spy Simoes, a Portuguese by nationality, who did his dirty work in Britain. He turned out to be not the best spy - during the interrogation he gave out everything he knew, and he motivated his work to the Germans with the opportunity to just get to England and earn. They punished a spy loser by war standards relatively softly. For all its effectiveness, catching Portuguese agents was too frivolous for such a gigantic project as Ultra.

Rђ RІRѕS, история with two saboteurs (Erich Gimpel and William Kolpag), who landed 29 in November 1944 on the US coast from the German submarine U-1230, without information from Bletchley Park could end in tragedy. The aim of the saboteurs was the radio command targeting to New York of an experimental intercontinental ballistic missile, which was built in Germany by Werner von Braun.

Operation "Ultra", or the Story of how the Poles with the British "Enigma" hacked. 5 part

Erich Gimpel

The first signals about suspicious personalities came to the FBI from local residents, but during the war they could become one of thousands of such signals and go unnoticed. But earlier data from overseas colleagues came to counterintelligence of the United States that the U-1230 submarine performs some special task off the coast. As a result, the terrain of the proposed landing was combed, Gimpel and Kolpag missed, but nevertheless after several weeks they were detained in the area of ​​New York. The search for such important saboteurs became the largest US special operation during the war.

Contacts with the Soviet Union on the Ultra program were very limited, but had a considerable influence on the course of hostilities on the eastern front. From the very beginning, the command of British intelligence was categorically opposed to providing data on the deciphering of Enigma to the leadership of the USSR, but, as always, Winston Churchill had the last word. Despite intelligence arguments pointing to the weakness of the Soviet ciphers and their potential interception, the prime minister ordered information to be transmitted about the impending attack on the USSR to the country's leadership. In fairness it should be noted that the British view of the weakness of domestic ciphers was completely unfounded, but this will be another story. Another thing is that Stalin and his entourage could not adequately assess the information from the UK and did not do enough to repel the German attack.



On the impending attack on the Soviet Union in Moscow were warnings including from Bletchley Park. True, the British concealed the true source of information.


Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky

On this account there is a statement by Marshal A. Vasilevsky: “What is the reason for such a large miscalculation of an experienced and far-sighted statesman Joseph Stalin? First of all, that our intelligence agencies, as G. K. Zhukov rightly notes in his memoirs, could not fully objectively evaluate the information received about the military preparations of fascist Germany and honestly, as a party, report it to Stalin. I will not touch on all aspects of this situation, they are mostly known. I will dwell only on the fact that a certain isolation of the intelligence department from the staff of the General Staff apparently played its role in this. The chief of intelligence, being at the same time the deputy people's commissar of defense, preferred to leave with a report on intelligence directly on Stalin, bypassing the chief of the General Staff. If G. K. Zhukov had been aware of all the most important intelligence information ... he probably could have made more accurate conclusions from her and more authoritatively provide these conclusions to Stalin and thus in some way influence the beliefs of the leader of the country that we are able delay the start of the war, that Germany will not dare to fight on two fronts - in the West and in the East ". It should be noted separately that for Stalin there was not a word about the interception of Enigma in the information messages from the UK - Churchill always referred to sources in neutral countries, the testimony of prisoners, etc. Any details that might disclose that the data was obtained from the decryption were excluded. So, 30 of September 1942, Churchill wrote to Stalin: “From the same source that I used to warn you about the impending attack on Russia a year and a half ago, I received the following information. I believe that this source deserves absolute confidence. Please let it be just for your information. ” In this message, Britain warned the USSR about the plans of the Germans in the North Caucasus direction. The leadership of England was very concerned about the possibility of Hitler’s breakthrough to the Baku oil fields. Perhaps, if Churchill informed the Soviet Union from the very beginning about the seriousness of the Ultra program and the possibilities of deciphering the Enigma, were his reports more attentive?



The British shared the results with Russia of the Ultras until the end of 1942, then the stream of information dried up. The next major “discharge” of the data was information about the Battle of Stalingrad and Kursk, but since 1944, the materials from the Ultra have officially ceased to flow into the Soviet Union. And in 1941, there was still a place to be quite an active exchange of intelligence data between the two allies - Britain and the USSR. Then our "brothers in arms»They transmitted the Luftwaffe codes and instructions for opening the hand ciphers of the German police, and in response received the encryption documents captured by the Soviet troops. Later, Stalin tricked himself to the detriment of the British, when he received from them materials on opening the Abwehr hand ciphers, but did not provide anything in return. This, of course, did not please the leadership of Great Britain, and there were no more such gifts.

But even the meager flow of information based on the decrypted messages of the Enigma, unfortunately, was not always properly perceived in Russia. In the spring - summer of 1942, England informed about the impending German offensive near Kharkov, but no one responded adequately, and the Red Army suffered heavy losses. For all the ambiguity of the situation, one should not perceive the Russian leadership as too self-confident and distrustful of the British - the French did the same, and even the British themselves. And they were aware of the true source of the information. For example, in the summer of 1940, the Polish decryption team found that the Luftwaffe was preparing a major raid on Paris. The French were notified of the number of aircraft, their route, flight altitudes and even the exact date and time of the attack. But no one did anything, and on June 3, 1940, the Germans carried out the first bombing of the French capital, with the country's air defense and air force completely inactive. Much later, in 1944, the British Field Marshal Montgomery, knowing about the presence in the landing area near the city of Arnhem (Holland) two tank units, ordered to throw out the regiments of the 1st paratrooper division, where they died. The information naturally came from Bletchley Park.


Shells 7,5 cm Pak 41 in the cut. One of the samples "equipped" with tungsten

But the history of WWII knows examples of the extremely beneficial use of the results of the Enigma decryption. At the beginning of 1942, the British leadership receives information from Bletchley Park that the German high command orders retreating units to prevent the latest anti-tank missiles from falling into the hands of the enemy. We shared this information with the Soviet Union, and it turned out that after the battle for Moscow, those miracle shells were in our hands. The analysis showed that the German industry uses an alloy for the core - tungsten carbide, and then allies in the anti-Hitler coalition began to turn. It turned out that there are no tungsten deposits in Germany itself, and such strategic raw materials were supplied from a number of neutral countries. The British and American intelligence services worked quite effectively, and the Nazis lost such a valuable resource.

The ending should ...
Author:
Photos used:
wikipedia.ru, warspot.ru, russian7.ru
Articles from this series:
Operation "Ultra", or the Story of how the Poles with the British "Enigma" hacked. 1 part
Operation "Ultra", or the Story of how the Poles with the British "Enigma" hacked. 2 part
Operation "Ultra", or the Story of how the Poles with the British "Enigma" hacked. 3 part
Operation "Ultra", or the Story of how the Poles with the British "Enigma" hacked. 4 part
22 comments
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  1. Olgovich
    Olgovich 18 October 2018 07: 58
    +1
    First of all, our intelligence agencies, as G.K. Zhukov rightly notes in his memoirs, were not able to fully objectively evaluate the information received about the military preparations of fascist Germany and report honestly her to Stalin.

    Everyone wanted to live.
    and some isolation of intelligence from the apparatus of the General Staff. The intelligence chief, being both the deputy people's commissar of defense, preferred to go out with a report on intelligence directly to Stalin, bypassing Chief of the General Staff.,

    Those. Stalin carried, and the General Staff did not give? Some kind of nonsense.
    If G.K. Zhukov was aware of all the most important intelligence information ... he

    But why Stalin, to whom they carried everything, did not share information with Zhukov? Nonsense...

    In the spring and summer of 1942, England informed about the impending German offensive near Kharkov, but no one adequately reacted, and the Red Army suffered heavy losses.

    For this it was necessary to BELIEVE an ally. And no one believed him ...
    1. Evgeny Fedorov
      18 October 2018 08: 22
      +1
      Those. Stalin carried, and the General Staff did not give? Some kind of nonsense.

      Well, this is the information from the memoirs of Marshal Vasilevsky. I agree that only his point of view, which may be far from the truth ...
      For this it was necessary to BELIEVE an ally. And no one believed him ...

      Stalin with his pathological suspicion is to blame and no one else.
      1. 3x3zsave
        3x3zsave 18 October 2018 09: 11
        +3
        You must admit that this pathology was justified.
        1. Koshnitsa
          Koshnitsa 18 October 2018 16: 01
          -3
          Genetics, heredity, a number of diseases, dysfunctional family, father's alcoholism, native origin, inability to complete secondary education.
      2. Olgovich
        Olgovich 18 October 2018 12: 16
        +1
        Quote: Evgeny Fedorov
        Stalin with his pathological suspicion is to blame and no one else.

        He didn’t believe anyone, but in the most important thing (attack on the USSR) he was deceived ....
        1. Ekaterina Shtepa
          Ekaterina Shtepa 18 October 2018 12: 36
          0
          Stalin himself had to think, and not listen to the slabs from the intelligence of the army and the NKVD!
          1. Vladimir 5
            Vladimir 5 18 October 2018 18: 03
            +1
            This is the problem of the dictatorial regime, when one decides everything, and if he is mistaken (and dictators are always paranoidly suspicious and only believe in themselves and their conclusions), that is what we have with the beginning of the Second World War, and before the big war, the extermination of a vast layer of high command and other berries dictatorships ...
      3. Tarhan
        Tarhan 23 October 2018 19: 20
        -1
        Vasilevsky is still that careerist. For the sake of a career, he abandoned his parents. His father served at the church before the revolution and seems to be after.
        From the memoirs of Vasilevsky - At some reception-banquet, Stalin, smiling in his mustache, asked Vasilevsky why he was not helping his parents who were in great need. Vasilevsky answered, like, I do not recognize such parents.
  2. Albatroz
    Albatroz 18 October 2018 08: 00
    +5
    In the beautiful old movie "Octopus", a certain Espinoza uttered the following significant phrase: "Information is the key to power."
    And states are ready to spend any money, to make any sacrifices in the name of obtaining iconic information. Apparently - not in vain. If the Enigma info could have prevented the Kharkov catastrophe, it would not be in vain in a cube.
    significant thing.
    I read, interesting
    1. Olgovich
      Olgovich 18 October 2018 12: 19
      +2
      Quote: Albatroz
      If the Enigma info could have prevented the Kharkov catastrophe, it would not be in vain in a cube.

      The fact that the offensive near Kharkov was a doomed adventure was understood by many even without enigma.
  3. Ekaterina Shtepa
    Ekaterina Shtepa 18 October 2018 12: 35
    0
    Thank you, but the article is short and deceitful ... Apparently, the British and Russians still have secrets! How many years have passed since the end of the war, but they never tell the whole truth or give it bit by bit, sometimes contradicting themselves or deceiving! ...
  4. Alexander Greene
    Alexander Greene 18 October 2018 22: 01
    +2
    Again, they continue to blame all the failures of the Red Army in the first months of the war
    I.V. Stalin. But think, is this true? Who is responsible for the defense of the country? - Answer the MILITARY.

    Stalin did everything so that the Red Army had modern weapons, and so that it prepared to repel aggression, on June 18, on his instructions, the troops sent a directive to bring everything fully ready, disperse the aircraft, mask airfields, withdraw troops to summer camps, etc. P. Where it was carried out - the German attack was repelled, in the Special Western Military District this directive was worked out, but the General Staff did not check the implementation. As a result, the troops were taken by surprise.

    I believe that all of Stalin’s accusations are similar to a joke published in classmates:
    "I am Jane Psaki, I am a fool, and Putin is to blame for this"
    1. Olgovich
      Olgovich 19 October 2018 05: 31
      +3
      Quote: Alexander Green
      I.V. Stalin. But think, is this true? Who is responsible for the defense of the country? - Answer the MILITARY.

      Of course, it is true: a leader with such unlimited rights is responsible for everything.
      Moreover, intelligence from all departments flocked only to him.
      He was beaten and deceived.
      Quote: Alexander Green
      and so that she would prepare to repel aggression, on June 18, on his instructions, the troops sent a directive to bring everything fully ready, disperse the aircraft, disguise airfields, withdraw troops to summer camps, etc.

      There is NO such directive in archives anywhere, a liar and an ignoramus.
      Quote: Alexander Green
      Where it was carried out - German attack beat off, in the Special Western Military District this directive was worked out, but the General Staff did not check the implementation. As a result, the troops were taken by surprise.

      Where was it "recaptured"? belay Tell the storyteller fool lol
      1. Alexander Greene
        Alexander Greene 19 October 2018 18: 03
        +1
        Quote: Olgovich
        Tell the storyteller

        Read not your training manual, but modern research by military historians, then you will know that in some parts of the front our troops even occupied a foothold in a foreign territory, the directive of June 18, 1941 was removed by Khrushchev, but not everywhere, according to it there are indirect evidence of many military leaders. Nobody Stalin outplayed the blame for the military leadership for the outbreak of war: gagging or direct betrayal of the command of the Western District, lack of control from the side of the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of General Staff. Then many memoirists edited the memories, for example, Admiral Kuznetsov. I hope that you understand that at his own peril and risk, as written in his memoirs, he could not bring the entire fleet into combat readiness number alone without the directive of Stalin. Zhukov, in general, is deceiving that he did not receive information from foreign intelligence ..
        1. Olgovich
          Olgovich 20 October 2018 05: 20
          -1
          Quote: Alexander Green
          Read not your training manual, but modern research by military historians, then you will know that in some sections of the front our troops even occupied a bridgehead on foreign territory,

          If you could understand, you would know that you have taken where the so-called. "directive" -... was sabotaged and where they fought against .... royal Romanians (still to flee from them). Although they later retreated from the Romanians.
          And where the non-existent directive "was allegedly carried out (VVO), the defeat was quick and terrible. Moreover, it was far from superior to the enemy.
          Quote: Alexander Green
          The directive of June 18, 1941 was removed by Khrushchev, but not everywhere, according to it there are indirect evidence of many military leaders.

          Yes, yes, "deleted: from the archives of the General Staff and from the archives of ALL onrugs and from magazines, etc. fool lol
          The directive of June 18 is on the table, storyteller! No? Bye!
          Quote: Alexander Green
          Nobody beat Stalin

          Everyone outplayed, alas: the army was NOT put in combat readiness and was mobilized. Although the warrior stood against her for two years, in higher the degree of combat readiness, treacherously ALREADY seized Europe, the fully mobilized army of Germany. Hopes for some pieces of paper and their own cunning and "logic" turned out to be a complete failure.
          Giving instructions not to succumb to provocations, the comrade did not understand that world wars do not start spontaneously from any provocation, but are planned and appointed long before a certain day, regardless of them. with
          Quote: Alexander Green
          gagging or direct betrayal of the command of the Western District, lack of control from the side of the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of General Staff.

          Pavlov, etc. -rehabilitated and do not dare to insult them! And other higher ones destroyed them because of their gagging and mistakes
          Quote: Alexander Green
          Then many memoirists edited the memories, for example, Admiral Kuznetsov. I hope that you understand that he, at his own peril and risk, as written in his memoirs, put the entire fleet in combat readiness number one without directives of Stalin could not.

          Everybody lies, cheats, yes, one green knows the truth fool lol Only documents-NOT. What, by the way, is the "directive of .. Stalin", what kind of nonsense is this?
          1. Alexander Greene
            Alexander Greene 20 October 2018 15: 46
            +1
            Quote: Olgovich
            Pavlov, etc. -rehabilitated and do not dare to insult them!

            Quote: Olgovich
            What, by the way, is the "directive ... of Stalin", what is this next nonsense?


            In the materials of the trial of Pavlov and other military leaders of the Western Front, there is a mention of a telegram from the General Staff dated June 18, 1941, containing a demand to bring the troops into full combat readiness.

            In the multivolume "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", Moscow: Military Publishing, 2011. T. 1. - P. 26). there is a mention of this telegram “On June 18 (1941 - A.G.) a telegram was issued by the General Staff on putting the troops of the border districts on alert”

            The existence of this directive was confirmed by many generals, but Khrushchev and his camarilla had to turn everything on Stalin, and therefore the mention of the directive was removed from their memories.

            So Pavlov was informed about the timing of the possible start of the war, but he did not give the necessary orders to the units and formations of the district. For this he paid. The time will come and his rehabilitation will also be sorted out.
            1. Olgovich
              Olgovich 21 October 2018 07: 20
              0
              Quote: Alexander Green
              The existence of this directive was confirmed by many generals, but Khrushchev and his camarilla had to turn everything on Stalin, and therefore the mention of the directive was removed from their memories.

              TABLE DIRECTIVE, liar! As well as its inbound-outbound numbers in magazines, archives, etc.

              No? Bye!
              1. Alexander Greene
                Alexander Greene 21 October 2018 13: 53
                0
                Quote: Olgovich
                TABLE DIRECTIVE, liar! As well as its inbound-outbound numbers in magazines, archives, etc.

                Do not make yourself a pedant. Your anti-Stalinist camarilla tried to turn the blame on I.V. Stalin for the defeat in the initial period of the war, she cleaned the archives, but this directive is mentioned in other sources, in addition, many generals of the pre-war era testify to it.
                1. Olgovich
                  Olgovich 22 October 2018 11: 14
                  0
                  Quote: Alexander Green
                  Do not make yourself a pedant. Your anti-Stalinist camarilla tried to turn the blame on I.V. Stalin for the defeat in the initial period of the war, she cleaned the archives, but this directive is mentioned in other sources, in addition, many generals of the pre-war era testify to it.

                  The directive CANNOT be cleaned: it has a number, number, code. WHERE is all this?
                  There is nothing.

                  Goodbye, liar storyteller!
                  1. Alexander Greene
                    Alexander Greene 22 October 2018 17: 37
                    0
                    Quote: Olgovich
                    The directive CANNOT be cleaned: it has a number, number, code. WHERE is all this?
                    There is nothing.

                    Everyone can do an anti-Soviet, therefore there is only indirect evidence about her, the authorities do not need her, and therefore they are not looking for her.
                    But here is an example of how many whistled that on the first day of the war, Stalin was in prostration, and then there were magazines for receiving visitors. So they will find a directive.
  5. ccsr
    ccsr 19 October 2018 10: 41
    +2
    Author:
    Evgeny Fedorov
    I will dwell only on the fact that a certain isolation of the intelligence department from the apparatus of the General Staff apparently played a role in this. The chief of intelligence, being simultaneously the deputy people's commissar of defense, preferred to go out with a report on intelligence directly to Stalin, bypassing the chief of the General Staff. If G.K. Zhukov was aware of all the most important intelligence information ... he would probably be able to draw more accurate conclusions from it and more authoritatively present these findings to Stalin and thereby somehow influence the convictions of the country's leader that we are able to delay the start of the war that Germany would not dare to fight on two fronts - in the West and in the East. ”

    This is a lie, because by the time Zhukov became an NGS, the intelligence department was subordinate to him:
    In August 1934, the Fourth Directorate of the Headquarters of the Red Army was renamed the Information and Statistics Directorate of the Red Army, which in turn was transferred in November 1934 to the direct subordination of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and was renamed the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army.

    In May 1939, the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army was transformed into the 5th Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.

    In July 1940, the 5th Directorate was again transferred to the General Staff and was called the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army.
  6. Tarhan
    Tarhan 23 October 2018 19: 05
    -3
    On the impending attack on the Soviet Union in Moscow were warnings including from Bletchley Park. True, the British concealed the true source of information.

    So this is one of the first laws of any intelligence to report data, but not to disclose sources. But Stalin did not want to believe the British. He and Hitler signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact on the division of Eastern Europe, that is, Germany and the USSR are allies. And here the enemy of Germany, England reports that Hitler wants to attack and why to believe.

    And in 1944 there was nothing to report