Nationalization in Novorossia. Expropriation failed
In 2017, the leadership of LDNR, "catching hold," launched a large-scale nationalization of industrial and commercial facilities. First of all, utilities, markets and all kinds of services and facilities, including the Akhmetov Donbass Arena, were “nationalized”. That which should have become the property of the republics long ago. In 2017, it suddenly became clear that a significant number of social infrastructure facilities and even strategically important enterprises still belong to Ukraine.
After the tragic death of the head of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko, changes took place in the ruling circles of the republic, during which the head of the Ministry of Revenue and Duties, Alexander Timofeev, the call sign "Tashkent", suddenly found himself out of business. Denis Pushilin, who became and. about. heads of the DPR, hastened to declare the return of illegally nationalized markets to their previous owners, but today it is not clear whether the property will be returned, which one and by what procedures.
Nationalization, even in a reduced form, has become one of the few positive achievements of Novorossia. A shift that is of paramount importance not only in the economic but also in the ideological plane. There is no doubt that during the nationalization many mistakes were made (and maybe even the most real "wring"). However, the return of markets, supermarket chains and other property to former owners, many of whom are physically located in Ukraine, will cause frustration among the population.
As for the city-forming enterprises and the largest mines, they are still not the property of the LC and the DPR. External control was introduced at all large and potentially profitable facilities under the control of Vneshtorgservis CJSC registered in South Ossetia. The issue of ownership has become rhetorical, and the incomes of enterprises, after deducting taxes, have begun to go "for the flags." A certain percentage of the profits also goes to the legal owners of the enterprises.
On the one hand, given the indistinct status of the LC and the DPR, “BTC” is extremely important for Novorossia as an intermediary in the purchase of raw materials and spare parts (most of them were produced in Ukraine), fixing timber and other resources necessary for the operation of plants and mines. On the other hand, legitimate concerns arise regarding the distribution of potential profits.
The editor of the Sonar-2050 portal, Ivan Lizan, is sure that there was no alternative to such a solution for Lugansk and Donetsk:
The situation was really close to critical: after the introduction of the blockade in March 2017, many specialists and managers were forced to leave for Ukraine. After switching to external control, the outflow of personnel has become even more intense. Against the background of an acute personnel crisis, this was a painful blow for the Donbass. Not a smaller problem was the shutdown of a number of enterprises in connection with the termination of the supply of raw materials; sales of finished products. Even today, one and a half years after the beginning of nationalization, these problems could not be completely solved.
Metallurgy needs metal ore concentrate. The coal-mining industry needs a fastening forest, which Ukraine has ceased to supply. Russia can satisfy these needs, but deliveries are still carried out in minimal quantities. Sometimes raw materials are simply unprofitable to supply: the only source of manganese ore for the Stakhanov Ferroalloy Plant is the Urals. Enterprises need mechanisms and spare parts, the nomenclature of which differs from the Russian one, i.e. they can be made only by special order, which will affect the cost.
Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant, or, as it is now called, branch No. XXUMX AMK CJSC Vneshtorgservis, was hardly launched in January-February 12. The company finally stopped 2018 in February 13 of the year due to the LDNR blockade: supplies of iron ore from Krivorozhsky were interrupted the pool. On November 2017 of the same year, the plant came under the control of VTS, and already on December 29, one of the two operational furnaces was launched.
Delivery of raw materials from Russia was arranged; stretched energy bridge. Alas, despite the announced restoration of the full production cycle, the volumes for June 2018 amounted to only 152 thousand tons. For comparison: for 2016, the plant produced more than a million tons of steel, iron and rolled products. Average productivity was approximately 4-4,5 th. Tons per day. The difference is obvious.
The work of the enterprise, which fed the whole of Alchevsk and a good part of the district, is an important factor for the image of the republics. Since the transition of the plant under external management, more than 900 residents of Alchevsk have found work at AMK. The average salary is about 15 thousand rubles. - not bad by local standards. The finished products of AMT are delivered to Russia. Also announced deliveries to the Khartsyzsk Tube Works, which formally earned 9 on July 2018.
Yet today's figures are critically different from prewar. For example, in 2010, 14,5, thousand employees worked at the plant, more than 3,6 million tons of pig iron and 3,3 million tons of steel were produced.
Russian volunteer, participant of the “Russian spring” and fighting in the Donbas in 2014, publicist Svyatoslav Golikov believes that large Russian business may consider the metallurgical enterprises of Donbass as direct competitors, therefore objective difficulties may arise with sales markets and, accordingly, with production growth . Golikov considers:
The salary is really low, although many residents of Novorossia are happy with the very fact of a stable, albeit small, income. They are not embarrassed by downtime, lack of special equipment and violation of safety precautions - but there is work!
The former people's mayor of Kramatorsk, Pavel Tsveloy, believes that Vneshtorgservice CJSC is not too eager to invest in controlled enterprises:
In general, "VTS" is not too committed to long-term investments. Ready-to-operate facilities are launched (Krasnodonsky and Lutuginsky wind parks), large coal-mining enterprises, and sometimes the surviving separate workshops resume work, as happened at the Khartsyzsk Tube or Lutuginsky Rolling Plant. However, to fully restore the industrial giants of JSC "Vneshtorgservis", apparently, not too keen.
Sometimes it is simply impossible: a part of the equipment failed during forced downtime, a part of the equipment was destroyed or stolen. Concern "Stirol" is able to provide with medicines and fertilizers not only LDNR, but also the south of the Russian Federation. However, in 2014, the concern’s property was severely damaged by marauders. At the moment, work is underway to restore the production of ammonium nitrate (before the war, Stirol produced about 4% of the global volume of this fertilizer), but the DPR government does not name the exact launch dates of the line yet.
Almost completely stopped engineering. The Donetsk Machine-Building Plant feels best of all - a screwdriver assembly of Russian passenger buses takes place there; production of some mine equipment survived. Luganskteplovoz works several days a week and is engaged in repair and maintenance of rolling stock. Stakhanov Carriage Works stopped.
The highest activity of VTS is observed in the mines - the new leadership is increasing coal production. New lavas are being commissioned, coal mining is steadily increasing, although mining is still an order of magnitude lower than the 2010-2013 volumes. The enthusiasm is clear - the demand for coal remains: despite loud statements, Kiev still buys up to 70% of coal from Russia. It is likely that a significant share in the supply belongs to CJSC Vneshnetorgservis.
Unfortunately, the fighting, anarchy and looting caused enormous damage to the richest (even if outdated) industry of Donbass. Not less damage was caused by vague policy, “agreements” with the Ukrainian oligarchs and maximum delay in the beginning of nationalization.
The equipment of many enterprises, for example, the Donetsk Coke Chemical Plant, was systematically destroyed from the 2014 year. In fact, the staff of the “coke oven” went to work just for dismantling. A significant amount of equipment was criminally exported to the territory controlled by Ukraine. Much can not be restored due to long downtime.
After the late nationalization, it became obvious that in order to restore the industrial complex of Novorossia, colossal investments, integration into the Russian economy and the political will of the Kremlin aimed at legitimizing the unrecognized republics are necessary. Otherwise, the current half measures will be sufficient only to create the illusion of restoration and minimal compensation for financial assistance to the republics.
After the tragic death of the head of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko, changes took place in the ruling circles of the republic, during which the head of the Ministry of Revenue and Duties, Alexander Timofeev, the call sign "Tashkent", suddenly found himself out of business. Denis Pushilin, who became and. about. heads of the DPR, hastened to declare the return of illegally nationalized markets to their previous owners, but today it is not clear whether the property will be returned, which one and by what procedures.
Nationalization, even in a reduced form, has become one of the few positive achievements of Novorossia. A shift that is of paramount importance not only in the economic but also in the ideological plane. There is no doubt that during the nationalization many mistakes were made (and maybe even the most real "wring"). However, the return of markets, supermarket chains and other property to former owners, many of whom are physically located in Ukraine, will cause frustration among the population.
As for the city-forming enterprises and the largest mines, they are still not the property of the LC and the DPR. External control was introduced at all large and potentially profitable facilities under the control of Vneshtorgservis CJSC registered in South Ossetia. The issue of ownership has become rhetorical, and the incomes of enterprises, after deducting taxes, have begun to go "for the flags." A certain percentage of the profits also goes to the legal owners of the enterprises.
On the one hand, given the indistinct status of the LC and the DPR, “BTC” is extremely important for Novorossia as an intermediary in the purchase of raw materials and spare parts (most of them were produced in Ukraine), fixing timber and other resources necessary for the operation of plants and mines. On the other hand, legitimate concerns arise regarding the distribution of potential profits.
The editor of the Sonar-2050 portal, Ivan Lizan, is sure that there was no alternative to such a solution for Lugansk and Donetsk:
“Has nationalization allowed the republics to ensure state security?” Yes, definitely, especially in terms of resource-supplying enterprises and monopolies (gas, water, electricity). In addition, it is worth remembering the background against which nationalization took place in the spring of 2017, when Ukraine broke its production chains. Nationalization allowed at least partially compensate for this gap.
Partly it was possible to save labor collectives, workplaces and guarantee the budget's fullness. Partly because a lot of specialists left, and part of the money (perhaps even a lot) is lost due to the unrecognized republics, weak managers and officials, as well as the presence of a “lining” in the form of “Vneshtorgservice”, which “eats” part of the profits from the sale of products.
That is, to make the perfect nationalization did not work. However, without it, everything would be much worse, both politically (total dependence on Kiev and the enormous costs of growing social tensions), and economically. ”
Partly it was possible to save labor collectives, workplaces and guarantee the budget's fullness. Partly because a lot of specialists left, and part of the money (perhaps even a lot) is lost due to the unrecognized republics, weak managers and officials, as well as the presence of a “lining” in the form of “Vneshtorgservice”, which “eats” part of the profits from the sale of products.
That is, to make the perfect nationalization did not work. However, without it, everything would be much worse, both politically (total dependence on Kiev and the enormous costs of growing social tensions), and economically. ”
The situation was really close to critical: after the introduction of the blockade in March 2017, many specialists and managers were forced to leave for Ukraine. After switching to external control, the outflow of personnel has become even more intense. Against the background of an acute personnel crisis, this was a painful blow for the Donbass. Not a smaller problem was the shutdown of a number of enterprises in connection with the termination of the supply of raw materials; sales of finished products. Even today, one and a half years after the beginning of nationalization, these problems could not be completely solved.
Metallurgy needs metal ore concentrate. The coal-mining industry needs a fastening forest, which Ukraine has ceased to supply. Russia can satisfy these needs, but deliveries are still carried out in minimal quantities. Sometimes raw materials are simply unprofitable to supply: the only source of manganese ore for the Stakhanov Ferroalloy Plant is the Urals. Enterprises need mechanisms and spare parts, the nomenclature of which differs from the Russian one, i.e. they can be made only by special order, which will affect the cost.
Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant, or, as it is now called, branch No. XXUMX AMK CJSC Vneshtorgservis, was hardly launched in January-February 12. The company finally stopped 2018 in February 13 of the year due to the LDNR blockade: supplies of iron ore from Krivorozhsky were interrupted the pool. On November 2017 of the same year, the plant came under the control of VTS, and already on December 29, one of the two operational furnaces was launched.
Delivery of raw materials from Russia was arranged; stretched energy bridge. Alas, despite the announced restoration of the full production cycle, the volumes for June 2018 amounted to only 152 thousand tons. For comparison: for 2016, the plant produced more than a million tons of steel, iron and rolled products. Average productivity was approximately 4-4,5 th. Tons per day. The difference is obvious.
The work of the enterprise, which fed the whole of Alchevsk and a good part of the district, is an important factor for the image of the republics. Since the transition of the plant under external management, more than 900 residents of Alchevsk have found work at AMK. The average salary is about 15 thousand rubles. - not bad by local standards. The finished products of AMT are delivered to Russia. Also announced deliveries to the Khartsyzsk Tube Works, which formally earned 9 on July 2018.
Yet today's figures are critically different from prewar. For example, in 2010, 14,5, thousand employees worked at the plant, more than 3,6 million tons of pig iron and 3,3 million tons of steel were produced.
Russian volunteer, participant of the “Russian spring” and fighting in the Donbas in 2014, publicist Svyatoslav Golikov believes that large Russian business may consider the metallurgical enterprises of Donbass as direct competitors, therefore objective difficulties may arise with sales markets and, accordingly, with production growth . Golikov considers:
“The industry of Donbass is directly connected with enterprises in the rest of Ukraine into a single industrial complex, and the destruction of these ties hits not only the economic fundamentals of the Kiev regime, but also the Donbas itself. In particular, a radical increase in the supply of raw materials inevitably leads to higher prices for final products and, consequently, to a decrease in competitiveness. Full integration into the industrial complex of Russia is under a big question, since the very metallurgical enterprises of Donbass actually compete with similar Russian enterprises, i.e. politics stumbles on a profit-oriented economy ...
There is no stable positive dynamics in terms of increasing the number of jobs, increasing wages or improving working conditions in the one and a half years that have passed since the introduction of external management. ”
There is no stable positive dynamics in terms of increasing the number of jobs, increasing wages or improving working conditions in the one and a half years that have passed since the introduction of external management. ”
The salary is really low, although many residents of Novorossia are happy with the very fact of a stable, albeit small, income. They are not embarrassed by downtime, lack of special equipment and violation of safety precautions - but there is work!
The former people's mayor of Kramatorsk, Pavel Tsveloy, believes that Vneshtorgservice CJSC is not too eager to invest in controlled enterprises:
“In fact, today the issue of nationalization has mostly affected only small segments of the economy: small enterprises of light industry, markets of the republics, chain stores, etc. Basically, they are registered as an LLC, with their new founders, under the auspices of the GP uniting them, and the issue of filling the State Budget with the help of the listed forms of activity for residents of the republics is unknown.
With regard to enterprises taken under external control, this is precisely that large industrial backbone that is not considered and legally is not nationalized. On the one hand, these enterprises are given the opportunity to "exist" through external investment in a "blockade", on the other hand, given their "controversial status" on the part of the world community, all financial investments are critically limited and exclude modernization, compliance with environmental standards, safety of workers and, in general, prospects for dynamic development ”.
With regard to enterprises taken under external control, this is precisely that large industrial backbone that is not considered and legally is not nationalized. On the one hand, these enterprises are given the opportunity to "exist" through external investment in a "blockade", on the other hand, given their "controversial status" on the part of the world community, all financial investments are critically limited and exclude modernization, compliance with environmental standards, safety of workers and, in general, prospects for dynamic development ”.
In general, "VTS" is not too committed to long-term investments. Ready-to-operate facilities are launched (Krasnodonsky and Lutuginsky wind parks), large coal-mining enterprises, and sometimes the surviving separate workshops resume work, as happened at the Khartsyzsk Tube or Lutuginsky Rolling Plant. However, to fully restore the industrial giants of JSC "Vneshtorgservis", apparently, not too keen.
Sometimes it is simply impossible: a part of the equipment failed during forced downtime, a part of the equipment was destroyed or stolen. Concern "Stirol" is able to provide with medicines and fertilizers not only LDNR, but also the south of the Russian Federation. However, in 2014, the concern’s property was severely damaged by marauders. At the moment, work is underway to restore the production of ammonium nitrate (before the war, Stirol produced about 4% of the global volume of this fertilizer), but the DPR government does not name the exact launch dates of the line yet.
Almost completely stopped engineering. The Donetsk Machine-Building Plant feels best of all - a screwdriver assembly of Russian passenger buses takes place there; production of some mine equipment survived. Luganskteplovoz works several days a week and is engaged in repair and maintenance of rolling stock. Stakhanov Carriage Works stopped.
The highest activity of VTS is observed in the mines - the new leadership is increasing coal production. New lavas are being commissioned, coal mining is steadily increasing, although mining is still an order of magnitude lower than the 2010-2013 volumes. The enthusiasm is clear - the demand for coal remains: despite loud statements, Kiev still buys up to 70% of coal from Russia. It is likely that a significant share in the supply belongs to CJSC Vneshnetorgservis.
Unfortunately, the fighting, anarchy and looting caused enormous damage to the richest (even if outdated) industry of Donbass. Not less damage was caused by vague policy, “agreements” with the Ukrainian oligarchs and maximum delay in the beginning of nationalization.
The equipment of many enterprises, for example, the Donetsk Coke Chemical Plant, was systematically destroyed from the 2014 year. In fact, the staff of the “coke oven” went to work just for dismantling. A significant amount of equipment was criminally exported to the territory controlled by Ukraine. Much can not be restored due to long downtime.
After the late nationalization, it became obvious that in order to restore the industrial complex of Novorossia, colossal investments, integration into the Russian economy and the political will of the Kremlin aimed at legitimizing the unrecognized republics are necessary. Otherwise, the current half measures will be sufficient only to create the illusion of restoration and minimal compensation for financial assistance to the republics.
- Yegor Makhov
- psp.kharkov.ua
Information