Military Review

The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 16. Climax

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So, after the whole 15 articles, not counting off-cycle, we finally came close to the moment, which, according to the author, is able to explain to us the overwhelming majority of the ambiguities of the battle of “Varyag” and “Korean” 27 January 1904. It is about events occurred in less than a quarter of an hour, in the period 12.03-12.15 in Russian time, or 12.40-12.50 in Japanese.


We left Varyag and Korean in 12.38 (Japanese time, which is ahead of Russian timekeeping in Chemulpo by 35 minutes). At this point, the Varyag fought 18 minutes, of which the first 15 fought only against Asama, because the cruiser’s low speed and Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) prevented the firing of the rest of the Japanese cruisers. "Varyag" has already received some damage, but, of course, it still retained its combat capability, and the gunboat did not suffer any damage at all. But the gunners of the “Assam” slowly got shot, in the 12.35 the fire opens up the “Chiyoda”, followed by other cruisers, and then the damage to the “Varyag” begins to grow like an avalanche.

12.37 Fire on the "Varyag" resumes the "Naniwa", starting the shooting at the left side.

12.39 “Niitaka” enters the battle - according to the “Combat Report” of its commander, the nose and side 152-mm guns opened fire, the distance to “Varyag” was »6 500 m (approximately 35 cables). And, at the same time, at the same time, the Takachiho, the 152-mm guns of the left side from the 5 600 distance m (30 cables), starts firing at the Varyag.



Here I would like to insert a few words about the accuracy of determining the distance by Japanese cruisers. As we said earlier, in contrast to the Varyag and Koreans, who were forced to use Lyuzhol-Myakishev micrometers, all Japanese cruisers were equipped with Barr and Stroud optical rangefinders, which, of course, gave them great advantages. In theory, because in practice it was still necessary to be able to use them. We can watch absolutely any kind of battle plan - at least very common V. Kataev, even the Japanese from the official "Meiji", even AV Half-hearted, at least any other - everywhere in 12.39 "Takachiho" was located from "Varyag" further than "Niitaka". But at the same time, “Takachiho” shoots at “Varyag” with 5 600 m, and the closest “Niitaka” to it is 6 500 m. We criticize only midshipman AM. Niroda ...

12.40 The Japanese record the third hit in the cruiser - presumably, it was an 152-mm projectile from the Naniwa, which, according to the commander of the Japanese flagship, was in the middle of the Varyag hull. And it was at this very time, apparently, "Varyag" was traversed about Phalmido (Yodolmi). Recall that the entry in the Varyag logbook begins: "12.05 (12.40 in Japanese)" After passing through the island "Yo-dol-mi" ... ". But before we continue this phrase, we will try to assess the damage to Varyag by this time, especially since an error has crept into their description in one of the previous articles.

As we have said before, the first hit in the Varyag, recorded by the Japanese (and confirmed during the repair of the cruiser, after its rise), was achieved by an 203-mm projectile into the stern of the ship. At “Asam” he was observed as “getting into the area of ​​the stern bridge, where there was a strong fire immediately”, and we assumed that it was a strong fire on the shchanzah described in the logbook, during which the smokeless powder cartridges caught fire. But the “Varyag” is not a sailing frigate of gray times, but an armored deck cruiser, and for ships of these times “on the shchants” meant “in the middle part of the ship’s deck, to the stern mast” (many thanks to Alexander under the nickname “Ishchite”, indicated this error). Thus, the distance from the point of impact of the 203-mm projectile to the fire area is too large to claim that the fire occurred as a result of this hit, although there is, of course, anything.

However, the Varyag logbook contains a description of other injuries - in addition to the fire and the right wing of the bridge, which caused the death of A.M. Niroda, during this period of time (before the passage of the traverse of Phalmido-Yodolmi), the mast was also hit: “Other shells almost destroyed the battle grotto-mars, the rangefinder station No. 2 was destroyed, the tools 31 and 32 were hit,” the fire broke out in the residential deck's lockers, soon extinguished, ”and besides, 6 was“ hit ”by gun No. 3, and all the servants of the gun and feed were killed or wounded, while plutong commander Michman Gubonin was seriously injured did not fall.

So, it is quite possible that the first hit of the 203-mm projectile in the stern of the cruiser by the logbook was not described at all, or it was caused by the fire in the residential deck. As for the fire on shkanzah, it is quite possible that it was the result of falling into the grotto-mars, which the Japanese did not fix during the battle. This is normal, since the total number of hits in the ship is 11, or even 14 (all this is according to Japanese data), but only six of them are described in the “Battle Reports”.

Later, during the ascent of the Varyag, the Japanese found 12 holes in the upper deck of the cruiser, just in the area of ​​the mainmast, including on the shchants, and could easily have been left by a large-caliber projectile that fell into the mainland mars. Accordingly, it is possible that one of these fragments (hot metal) and caused a fire on the shkantsi, which put out the auditor Chernilovsky-Falcon. However, it is possible that the fire (and the holes in the deck) were caused by the rupture of another projectile, whose fuse worked on the cruiser, say, upon contact with the Varyag spar. In general, the stern of the ship was showered with debris, it is possible that some of them were wedged with six-inch implements No. XXUMX and No. XXUMX, and also damaged another 8-mm and two 9-mm guns. True, the Varyag logbook reports that the enemy shell hit the deck was the cause of the fire on the shchants and the failure of the mentioned guns, but (considering that smokeless powder could have exploded), it could easily have been mistaken.

A hit to the main-mars caused casualties (four sailors died), both 47-mm guns installed on it (No. 32 and 32), as well as the second long-range post failed. It is precisely known that the shell that hit the right wing of the bridge caused the death of four more people. On the stern of the cruiser, the 10 man was killed for the whole battle, but here, unfortunately, it is impossible to say exactly when this happened - but it is very likely that some of them fell during the events described above.

But getting into “Naniwa” is in some way a mystery. The Japanese saw it, but it is impossible to accurately pin it to specific damage - in principle, this could be either getting into the cruiser’s third chimney or a hole in the false side of the starboard (size 0,75 on 0,6 m)



In the logbook "Varyag" there is no suitable description, but there is information about the lined gun No. XXUMX. The exact time of its damage is not indicated, theoretically, it may coincide with the hit of the “Naniva”, but does not coincide in place, and most likely it was caused by fragments of another projectile, perhaps not even a direct hit, but a rupture at the side. It should be noted that another person was killed at tool # XXUMX.

Thus, at the time of passage traverse about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) cruiser, apparently, got hit by 4 shells, and it is possible that another projectile exploded directly above the deck in the stern. Apparently, at least 10-15 people died, and maybe more. Is it a lot or a little? Note that on the Aurora armored cruiser for all the time of the Tsushima battle only 10 people died, not counting those who died later wounds. On "Oleg" (also for the whole battle) 12 people died.

Varyag lost at least as much, or rather even more, in just 20 minutes.

But here, approximately in 12.38, the “Varyag” passes to O. Phalmido (Yodolmi), now in front there is a relatively wide reach. Having stepped on it, Russian ships can maneuver more or less freely, but how can you use it?

Unfortunately, it is not so easy to indicate the location of the Japanese ships at this moment of the battle. As we said earlier, the combat maneuvering schemes of ships are very rough and contain many errors. Take, for example, the well-known scheme of V. Kataev.



Running a little ahead, we note that in the Varyag watch logbook it is clearly stated that the cruiser’s rudder damage occurred in 12.05, Russian time (and in Japanese, 12.40) after the passage of the traverse, Fr. Yodolmi, but for V. Kataev this moment was fixed for some reason not in 12.05, but ten minutes later, in 12.15 (12.50). Then V. Kataev tried to mark the location of the enemy ships at the same time - alas, his assumptions are completely refuted by the “Military Reports” of the Japanese commanders. So, for example, according to V. Kataev’s scheme, “Asama” to 12.15 (12.50) could fight only with the left side, while its commander, Yashiro Rokuro, clearly indicates that starting from 12.00 (i.e., 12.35 in Japanese) "Asama" fired starboard. Yes, discrepancies in a minute or two, of course, are possible, but ... more than a quarter of an hour ?! "Chiyoda", following the "Asama", in 12.05 fired at the Russian ships with the starboard, according to the scheme of V. Kataev, this is impossible.

Now let's take a diagram from the official Japanese historiography “Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji (in 1904-1905). ” The analysis of the Japanese military reports suggests that in 12.38, when the Varyag was traversed by Phalmido (Yodolmi), the position of the Japanese ships was approximately as follows



And then we take the lot of the water area of ​​Chemulpo, which we have already cited earlier, and cut out from it the section we need. We note on it the blue borders of the shallows, where the "Varyag" could not enter, and compare the previously given scheme. It should be noted that when comparing the Japanese scheme (as, by the way, the scheme of V. Kataev), it is necessary to unfold diagonally, since with the usual location of the sheet the direction to the north does not match them. The position of the Varyag to 12.38 is shown by a solid black arrow, the approximate location of the Japanese ships and the direction of their movement are shown by red arrows.



We put ourselves in the place of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev. What did he see? Cruisers Sotokichi Uriu rushed to block the road to the East Channel, and now it is, of course, securely blocked. But on the other hand, a passage to the Western Canal opened: two of the two Japanese cruisers are still going south, and only Asama and Chiyoda turned back, it seems that the Russians should not be given a passage. And if you now turn to the right, that is, towards the Western Channel (in the diagram there is a black dotted arrow) ...

Of course, the Japanese would never allow them to break through, but the fact is that now, in order to intercept Varyag and Koreets, they will have to turn around and "run" to the north. At the same time, managing the maneuvering of three “two” cruisers in a relatively small reach is a very difficult task. The slightest mistake - and the troops will shut down, making it difficult to fire each other. As a matter of fact, already and now “Naniwa” and “Niitaka” are close to being on the line between “Varyag” and the two “Takachiho” - “Akashi”. Following to the west, the Varyag and the Koreyets will be able to fire at the enemy with full onboard salvoes, but it’s far from a fact that all Japanese cruisers will succeed. In addition, the Japanese have already “missed” a little, having gone farther south than they should, so who knows, maybe at least one of their units will not immediately react to the movement of “Varyag” to the right, to the west, continuing to move south?

In other words, a turn to the right did not promise any kind of victory or breakthrough, the result was, in any case, a rapprochement with the Japanese - but a rapprochement, so to speak, on its own terms. Do not run forward, under the enemy's onboard volleys, responding only with the fire of nose guns, but try to force him to do so.

Alternatives? They were not there. The road to the left (to the east) is a road to nowhere, there are shoals and the Gulf of the Empress, from which there was no way out for the cruiser. The road in the direction of the Eastern Channel is a “heroic” attack in the forehead of six Japanese cruisers, despite the fact that, following this course, the Varyag could only use nose guns. That is the same rapprochement, as when moving to the Western Canal, but under the most unfavorable conditions for themselves.

Thus, turning to the right was the only reasonable choice, but on one condition - if the cruiser commander was still going to fight, and not to imitate him. And here we come to one of the cornerstones of the theory of “revisionists”: in their opinion, V.F. By this time, Rudnev was no longer going to fight - having decided that the cruiser had already “suffered enough” of the enemy fire, he wanted “to return to Chemulpo with a sense of accomplishment”.

However, just one look at the lot completely refutes this hypothesis. The fact is that if Vsevolod Fedorovich was going to return to the raid, then he was absolutely impossible to turn to the right.

As we remember, the cruiser was slow to move - its own speed did not exceed 7-9 knots, some more (before 9-11) Varyag was given by the flow. At the same time on the right of the cruiser was about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), but the current in that area was angled to the left side of the cruiser.

The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 16. Climax


If we accept as a hypothesis that the “Varyag” was not going to turn around, but had to go west along the island, then we will see that the direction of the flow almost coincides with the direction of its movement - that is, the cruiser received an additional 3 course nodes due to , which would at the same time a little more to demolish it from about. Phalmido (Yodolmi). But if he was going to turn around ...

I must say that a ship with a somehow sharp circulation always loses speed - this is a natural physical process. In addition, when turning to Chemulpo, the current that had previously pushed the ship forward and added speed to it, now, on the contrary, would have prevented its movement towards the raid. In general, turn right on 180 degrees at about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) would only lead to the fact that the cruiser almost lost speed, moving barely on 1-2 nodes, while a strong three-node current would blow it to the stones of the island. That is, turning to the right, simply speaking, did not lead to an early return to the raid, but to the creation of a full-fledged emergency situation, it would be quite difficult to get out of it. And this is not to mention the fact that the ship, which almost lost speed, became an excellent target for the Japanese artillerymen.

True, there is another option - to the west of about. Yodolmi train seems to show the presence of a narrow passage, theoretically allowing you to bypass the island from the north and return to the raid. But in fact, this is a completely unrealistic opportunity, because the passage is too narrow, and to stick at it with a strong sidestream, and even almost losing speed, this is a form of suicide. Moreover, everyone knew about the presence of pitfalls in Fr. Phalmido, and there was no guarantee that they on this narrow strip will not. The accident of the Japanese ship (marked on the diagram) perfectly illustrates where such optimism could lead. And, strictly speaking, Varyag made no attempt to circumvent the island in this way (shown on the diagram as turquoise).

Thus, if VF Rudnev was going to interrupt the battle and return to the raid, the cruiser Varyag, of course, turned, but not to the right, but to the left, just where the Koreets would turn a little later (marked with a green arrow in the diagram). Such a turn did not create any navigational problems, because in this case the current would take down the cruiser from the shallows restricting the fairway from the east, but to Fr. Yodolmi at the same time would be enough space. And in general, if we are going to get out of the battle, it would be more logical to turn away from the enemy (turn left), but not at all to the enemy (turn right) right?

But the turn to the right practically deprived Varyag of the possibility of a normal return to Chemulpo’s raid. Turning in this direction, the cruiser could only follow the direction of the Western Canal (the black arrow in the diagram) and approach the Japanese cruisers, who, of course, would intercept it (and the Asama was already on). Attempting to turn "over the right shoulder" so as to return to the fairway leading to the raid automatically led to an emergency, which VF Rudnev, naturally, by all means should have avoided.

As a matter of fact, it is the turn of “Varyag” to the right that the author of this article considers the main evidence that “Varyag” was actually going to fight, and not to imitate a fight.

But what happened next? We read the logbook "Variaga":

"12 h. 5 m. (Japanese time - 12.40, approx. Ed.) After traversing the island" Yo-dol-mi "was interrupted by the cruisers in which the pipe was held steering gear, at the same time fragments of another projectile exploded at the foremast and those who flew into the armored room through the aisle were: the cruiser commander wounded in the head, headquarters horn and drummer who were standing on either side were killed, and the commander-in-chief, squad leader Chibisov, was wounded heavily in the back.


There are no doubts that at least two Japanese shells hit the Varyag at that time. Recall that the Japanese recorded an 152-mm projectile hit from the Naniwa into the central part of the cruiser, but in addition, an 12.41-mm projectile between the front bridge and the first chimney was observed on the Asam on 203. After the Varyag was raised in the deck, a large 3,96 hole of the 1,21 meter and ten small holes near it were found near this bridge. At the same time, the 152-mm projectile near the gun in front of the nasal bridge was observed on Takachiho, and on the Asam 3 or 4, projectiles of the same caliber hit the middle of the body (this is doubtful, since no corresponding damage was detected, but on the other hand, there could be a hit in the mast).

And so ... as we said in the last article, there is a suspicion (but not confidence!) That the steering, in fact, did not fail, and this fact is only VF’s fantasy. Rudneva. Consider both versions: №1 "Conspiracy", according to which the steering remained intact, and №2 "Official" - that the steering column was still damaged.

"Conspiracy" - everything is very simple here. Around 12.38, Vsevolod Fedorovich decided to turn right to go to the Western Channel. At Varyag, they raised the signal “P” (turn to the right) and, turning the steering wheel to the appropriate position, proceeded to turn. However, after the start of the turn, the cruiser commander was wounded by fragments of a projectile around 12.40 and the helmsman was seriously wounded. As a result, the control of the cruiser was briefly lost, and the ship, instead of turning around 90 degrees, to go along about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) turns almost to 180 degrees, that is, directly to the island.

The commander comes to himself, but what can he do here now? The situation is exactly as we described it before: “Varyag” goes to the island, having the slightest turn, and the current pulls it down to the stones. Obviously, Vsevolod Fedorovich begins to take vigorous measures to save the ship. What was done exactly, we, alas, is unlikely to ever know.

The commanders of "Niitaki" and "Nanivy" in their "Battle Reports" noted that "Varyag" had taken refuge in Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) in 12.54-12.55. This does not contradict Russian sources, and taking into account the fact that the hit, which caused a temporary paralysis of control of the cruiser, happened in 12.40-12.41, from the moment of entry to the care of Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) took less than 15 minutes. Most likely, the cruiser during this time really had to back up, and then, moving a long distance from the island, move forward again.


The scheme of the battle of the log of the journal "Varyag"


It is possible that when approaching the island, Varyag touched the stones, but perhaps this did not happen. In fact, only one thing is reliably known - somewhere in the interval from 12.40 to 12.55, the cruiser received a fatal hole in the port side, at the waterline level, with an area of ​​about 2 square. m and its lower edge was at 80 cm below the waterline. It cannot be ruled out that this hit was seen on the Naniwa as an 152-mm projectile hit the middle part of the hull on the 12.40, or several hits there, seen on the 12.41 Asam, but most likely it happened later when the cruiser at the very least, he tried somehow to maneuver in Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi).

Having studied the Varyag and Korey logbooks, as well as other documents, the author suggests the most likely such reconstruction:

12.38-1240 - somewhere in this gap "Varyag" starts turning right, to the west;

12.40-12.41 - hitting an 203-mm projectile causes the ship to lose control of the ship;

12.42-12.44 - somewhere around this time VF Rudnev comes to his senses, control of the cruiser has been restored, but he is being dragged onto the rocks by Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi ”) and Vsevolod Fedorovich order“ Full back ”. Naturally, it is impossible to execute his command at once — the cruiser steam engines, this is not the engine of a modern car;

12.45 - "Varyag" gets another serious hit 203-mm projectile in the stern, directly behind the fodder 152-mm guns, while a strong fire begins. From the “Combat Report” of the commander of “Asama”: “12.45 8-dm shell hit the deck behind the stern bridge. There was a strong fire, the foregast mast hanging over the starboard. ” At about the same time (plus or minus five minutes) the Varyag gets a hole in the side at the waterline level, and its stoker starts to fill with water;

The 12.45-12.50 Cruiser moves away from the island a sufficient distance in order to give progress. V.F. Rudnev decides to leave the battlefield to assess the damage;

12.50-12.55 - "Varyag" starts moving forward and hides behind Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) than for some time prevents the firing at him.

After that, the cruiser retreats to the anchorage (but we'll return to this).

It would seem, so what in all this is so reprehensible? Yes, a tragic accident, with the loss of control, but the cruiser still managed to get out, and that received severe damage, precluding a breakthrough - well, so the ship was in battle, not for a walk. However ... let's look at all this from a different angle. After all, someone could describe the actions of Russian sailors, for example, like this:

"The commander of the cruiser" Varyag "V.F. Rudnev led the forces entrusted to him to break through against the superior enemy forces. However, as soon as he overcame the fairway, as a result of an incorrectly executed maneuver, he created an emergency situation due to the enemy, as a result of which the latter was able to cause damage to the cruiser, precluding the possibility of further breakthrough. ”


And in fact, in a sense, it was true, because the turn of the "Varyag" to Fr. Phalmido really created an emergency situation, as a result of which the cruiser either touched stones or not, but, most certainly, lost speed and had to back up directly in front of the approaching enemy. And it was precisely at this time that the Varyag received a hole in the board of two square meters, which caused the flooding of the stoker and roll in 10 degrees to the port side. To continue the fight in this condition, the ship, of course, could not.



Of course, Vsevolod Fyodorovich was wounded, so it was quite excusable for him to lose control of the situation for a while - and there was not much time to turn to Father Phalmido. The helmsman was also wounded, and if not, it would not be his business to independently change the ship’s course. But, first, all the same, the wound of V.F. Rudneva was not serious, and secondly, the senior navigator officer of the “Varyag” E.M. Berens - and now he should not have allowed the ship to turn on the stones.

Strictly judge Evgeny Mikhailovich is quite difficult. He had just been busy laying a course on the Chemulpo fairway, which was very difficult in terms of navigation, and suddenly there was a shell hit, a commander’s injury, the death of sailors, etc. Who knows what he was doing at that moment, perhaps he rushed to the aid of VF Rudnev, but what he had to do was to make sure that the cruiser did not turn on the stones, he did not. And Vsevolod Fedorovich, nevertheless, “the first after God,” and he was responsible for everything that happens on the ship.

The author of this article does not claim at all that V.F. Rudnev really lied in the report regarding the damaged steering. But, arguing in the framework of "conspiracy" theory, he had a reason for this, because damage to the rudder as a result of the enemy projectile that hit the ship obviously removed the responsibility for creating an emergency situation (turning the Varyag to Phalmido).

That's the whole "conspiracy" version: what about the "official" version, it’s all the same ... except for the fact that the Varyag steering column was really damaged and that the turnaround to Fr. Phalmido could not have been prevented by either the commander or the senior navigator officer of the cruiser.

Thus, we arrive at the following conclusions:

1. Having traversed about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) and turning to the right, “Varyag” did not have the opportunity to turn around to go to the Chemulpo raid - given its low speed and current, the attempt of such a turn automatically led to an emergency situation in which the cruiser almost completely lost speed and with a high proportion Probably sat on the rocks at Yodolmi. It is obvious that Vsevolod Fedorovich could not understand this.

2. A turn to the right (without a turn) led the Varyag and the next Koreets to the course towards the Western Canal and to approach the ships of the Japanese squadron.

3. Had vf Rudnev would like to get out of the fight, he had to turn left - moving in this way, he could return to the fairway without creating an emergency.

4. In view of the above, it can be argued that the very fact of the Varyag turning to the west (right) after leaving the Chemulpo channel leads to the wish of V.F. Rudnev to conduct a decisive battle with the enemy squadron.

5. Also, taking into account the above, with the highest probability of a turn to o. Phalmido was not a result of a deliberate decision, but occurred either as a result of damage to the steering column, or as a result of a short-term loss of control of the ship due to injury of its commander and non-fulfillment of his duties as a senior navigator officer EM. Berens (perhaps both are true at the same time).

6. As a result, turn to o. Phalmido (Yodolmi) and the related loss of speed "Varyag" received critical damage.

7. Reasoning in the framework of "conspiracy" theory, admitting a conscious lie of V.F. Rudnev in the reports he wrote, we conclude that if Vsevolod Fyodorovich lied, then the meaning of his lie was not to hide his unwillingness to fight, but to “retouch” the unfortunate turn in about. Phalmido and the Varyag critical damage associated with it.

Apparently, Vsevolod Fedorovich was just unlucky (or, conversely, lucky, here's how to look). With the highest probability, if it were not for the Japanese projectile, which hit the cruiser on 12.41 and temporarily unsettled VF Rudnev (and also, possibly, damaged the steering column of the ship), then we would read in the sources about the cruiser and the gunboat, who took their last battle in the reach behind the channel of Chemulpo and heroically died in an unequal battle on the way to the Western Channel. However, the short-term "failure" V.F. Rudneva in combination with the erroneous actions of EM. Behrens or damage to the steering column led to the fact that the cruiser almost sat on the stones and received damage, making the continuation of the breakthrough completely inappropriate.

In the discussions of this series of articles, much has been said about the “agreement” between V.F. Rudnev and officers of the cruiser and the gunboat. They say that the logbooks were filled up after the battle, so that the gentlemen could agree among themselves on what exactly to write there. In the next article we will try to assess the likelihood of such a development based on the battle descriptions given in the logbooks of both Russian ships.

Продолжение следует ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 3. Boilers niklossa
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 4. Steam engines
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 6. Across the oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 7. Port arthur
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 8. Korean neutrality
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 9. Out "Korean"
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 10. Night
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 11. Before fight
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 12. About shooting accuracy
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 13. First shots
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 14. First damage
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 15. Reports V.F. Rudneva
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  1. Jura 27
    Jura 27 18 October 2018 06: 53
    -5
    Cheerfully invented to justify the incompetent Rudnev. Only now the signal to turn to the right, without indicating the number of points, meant turning to the opposite course. This is exactly how it was understood on the Koreyets, turning to the port, but to the left (so as not to disappear with the cruiser).
    In addition, the diameter of the cruiser’s circulation made it possible to turn into a port with a right turn.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      18 October 2018 08: 36
      +10
      Quote: Jura 27
      Only now, the signal of a turn to the right, without indicating the number of points, meant a turn in the opposite direction

      You're lying, Yura. According to the 1901 vault, the signal "P" means "Keep to the right", and "Turn" meant another signal, "Rtsy"
      Quote: Jura 27
      This is exactly how it was understood on the Koreyets, turning to the port, but to the left (so as not to blend in with the cruiser).

      The Belyaev report does not confirm this. Since he directly writes that he turned on the raid AFTER Varyag did, and he went to the port, naturally, later than turning to the island.
      Quote: Jura 27
      In addition, the diameter of the cruiser’s circulation made it possible to turn into a port with a right turn.

      Yeah. In fact, though, they almost sat down on stones, but Yura, of course, knows better. Yura, however, took a time machine and his beloved protractor, flew into the past, measured the distance from Yodolmi’s stones to Varg, made a complicated calculation of the circulation, taking into account the flow at o Yodolmi ...
      1. Jura 27
        Jura 27 19 October 2018 09: 54
        -1
        [/ quote] You are lying, Jura. [quote]

        Then there are three options:
        1. On the "Koreyets" they sorted out the signal as "turn left, to the opposite course" - which they did.
        2. Belyaev, the "vile coward", instead of going to the right for the "Varyag" into battle with the Japanese, turned left, almost on the opposite course. "About 12 hours 15 minutes of the day, when the Varyag, having a noticeable roll, raised (P.) and began to turn to the right with reduced speed, I changed course to the left and, avoiding to make up, in relation to the enemy, with the Varyag, reduced stroke and described a circulation of 270 degrees to the left. " - Fleet actions, Documents. 1st issue. Belyaev.
        3. He lies like he breathes, pan Andriy.
        "Yeah. In fact, however, they almost sat on the stones".
        Typical incompetence, when making a turn on a cross flow, it is necessary to increase the speed, then the turn time and, accordingly, the circulation diameter will be minimal and the rudder will work. At a speed of 7 knots, the cruiser is almost uncontrollable (the drive pipe is supposedly broken), the circulation diameter is huge due to drift by the current of 3 knots. The result of all this illiterate activity: hello, the island of Iodolmi, right on the course of the "Varyag"; reverse, shooting, the enemy's barely moving cruiser, huge losses, without the slightest damage to the Japanese.
        In general, the "conspiracy theory" of the TS is illogical. If Rudnev wanted to turn to the right and start a battle with his left side, then he would have written about it (especially since he knew how to write fairy tales): he wanted to, they say, turn right and fight, but the rudder drive stopped working and the cruiser buried in the island , then I had to go to the port because of the damage received near the island.
        But Rudnev does not write anything like that, but writes that he decided to go to the port due to damage to the rudder (and others) and that is why he turns to the opposite course. Quote: "At 12 hours 15 minutes, Desiring to temporarily get out of the sphere of fire in order to possibly fix the steering gear and put out fires, began to turn around by cars, ".
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          19 October 2018 11: 11
          0
          Quote: Jura 27
          On the Koreyets, they sorted out the signal as "turn left, to the opposite course," which they did.

          We will analyze logbooks further, including
          Quote: Jura 27
          Belyaev, the "dastardly coward", instead of going to the right after the "Varyag" into battle with the Japanese, turned left, almost on the opposite course.

          In the meantime, so to speak, in advance, I can only note (and for the umpteenth time!) Your complete inability to work with historical documents.
          Quote: Jura 27
          Typical incompetence, making a turn in the transverse flow, it is necessary to increase the speed, then the turn time

          In-in. Generally speaking, common sense suggests that V.F. Rudnev was still familiar with at least the basics of navigating. Those who have it (common sense) have, of course.
          You can argue for a long time about the tactical and other combat skills of the Russian naval officers, but the fact is that they themselves understood shipbuilding quite well. And with the rarest exception, no gross mistakes were made. Therefore, the absurdity itself and without two minutes the suicidal turn to the stones Yodolmi suggests that this happened contrary to the desire of the commander Varyag.
          He tells everyone except those who a priori believe that Russian officers could not calculate how much 2 + 2 would be without outside help. But this is no longer cured
          1. Jura 27
            Jura 27 19 October 2018 16: 39
            +2
            "We will analyze the logbooks further, including"

            This is not from VZh if you are not in the know.

            "In the meantime, so to speak, in advance, I can only note (and for the umpteenth time!) Your complete inability to work with historical documents."

            So work with them correctly - turn the left turn of the "Korean" into the right one. tongue

            "Generally speaking, common sense suggests that VF Rudnev was still familiar with at least the basics of navigation."

            Maybe he was familiar once, but just could not use them in battle. The cruiser's speed alone is less than 10 knots, speaks of Rudnev's ignorance of the fact that at such speeds, the cruiser is poorly controlled. And as soon as the current (previously associated) changed direction after passing the traverse of Iodolmi Island, the speed of the CD fell below the critical mark and Rudnev's complaints about the loss of control immediately fell down (in his version, - the drive pipe was broken; yeah, a three-inch steel pipe, - by an explosion of 6 "- th shell, and distant).


            “One can argue for a long time about the tactical and other combat skills of Russian naval officers, but the fact is that they understood navigation itself well enough. And with rare exceptions, they did not make gross mistakes. Therefore, the absurdity itself and without two minutes is suicidal of turning on stones Yodolmi suggests that this happened against the wishes of the Varyag commander. "

            Of course, against his will, he stuck the cruiser into the island, he simply "forgot" to order, to move the engine telegraph forward. To restore control of the ship and reduce the circulation diameter.
    2. Comrade
      Comrade 19 October 2018 04: 29
      0
      Quote: Jura 27
      In addition, the diameter of the cruiser’s circulation made it possible to turn into a port with a right turn.

      In those conditions, it is risky, one of the Japanese cruisers ran aground in the battle at Chemulpo. Probably, he also hoped for the diameter of the circulation :-) How long the Japanese sat aground, I do not know, sources write that "many hours".
      1. Jura 27
        Jura 27 19 October 2018 10: 11
        0
        [/ Quote]
        In those conditions, it is risky, one of the Japanese cruisers ran aground in the battle at Chemulpo. Probably, he also hoped for the diameter of the circulation :-) How long the Japanese sat aground, I do not know, sources write that "many hours". [Quote]

        To fight is generally a risky business.
        And which KR stranded for a long time?
  2. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 18 October 2018 06: 56
    +3
    Article undoubtedly plus yes good
    Andrei hi , so Rudnev "broke through" or "fought" (part 12)? These are said to be two big differences wink Because for a "breakthrough" some actions can be interpreted as inconsistent with intentions, but for a "fight" these same actions are quite suitable. request I don’t have time to express my thoughts in more detail request Regarding the lie. In my opinion, no one claimed that the entire Rudnev report was a lie. The question concerned only some nuances in the assessment of the battle. winked, which became the basis of the myth of the "Varyag". hi
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      18 October 2018 09: 33
      +12
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Andrey hi, so Rudnev “broke through” or “fought” (part 12)?

      He fought, dear Rurikovich :). That is, he went to sea, intending to fight, acting according to circumstances, and, in case of unheard-of luck (Godzilla emerged, chewed "Asama"), to break through. As we know, unheard-of luck did not happen.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 18 October 2018 22: 30
        +3
        "Returning to the cruiser, I gathered the officers and announced the beginning of hostilities, and it was decided to break through, and in case of failure to blow up the cruiser; for which they subsequently prepared an ignition cartridge with a Bickford cord in a mine cellar."
        Words by V.F. Rudnev from a memorable report repeat
        1. Nehist
          Nehist 19 October 2018 00: 32
          +4
          Nda !!! And again Rudnev contradicts himself !!! Either they decided to break through, pulling the slow-moving Korean behind them, then give battle and, when retracting in the opposite direction, develop more speed than when trying to "breakthrough" As it does not all agree with common sense! Maybe it is still worth dwelling on the version of Rudnev's weak competence, as his contemporaries wrote about. Although Rudnev is not something out of the ordinary. This was the general tendency of the RIF officers, which was shown by the entire RYA
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            19 October 2018 07: 00
            0
            Quote: Nehist
            Then they decided to break through, dragging a slow-moving Korean

            Which was definitely needed for a breakthrough if the Japanese still decided to block the exit of the Chemulpo fairway
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 19 October 2018 23: 16
              +1
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Which was definitely needed for a breakthrough if the Japanese still decided to block the exit of the Chemulpo fairway

              We have already said that the location of the Japanese was visible directly from the Varyag parking lot. The word "if" is not entirely clear here. There were no Japanese in the main fairway, they were all in the second aisle.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                20 October 2018 09: 24
                0
                Quote: Saxahorse
                The word "if" is not entirely clear here.

                Ships, saxors, sometimes have the ability to move :)))) By the way, from the parking lot they were not visible.
    2. 27091965
      27091965 19 October 2018 20: 54
      +1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Regarding the lie. In my opinion, no one claimed that the WHOLE report of Rudnev was a lie. The question concerned only some of the nuances in the assessment of the battle, which became the basis of the myth about the "Varyag".


      Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR was calm about the battle of the Varyag cruiser and did not try to make heroes of it. Below is a scan from an encyclopedic edition published in 1939.


      It was published under the editorship of respected academicians of that time.
  3. Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 18 October 2018 10: 52
    +5
    today we would read in the sources about the cruiser and the gunboat, who took their last battle on the stretch beyond the Chemulpo fairway and died heroically in an unequal battle on the way to the Western Channel.

    Something tells me that in this case, critics would have found something to accuse Rudnev of ...
    Although, such an outcome, of course, is more unambiguous.
  4. Conductor
    Conductor 18 October 2018 11: 10
    0
    in this situation it was possible to break through and not give a fight?
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor 18 October 2018 12: 04
      +5
      In a narrow fairway, against a squadron of several ships, with unreliable machinery? No, well, purely theoretically, there was an opportunity (hardly distinguishable from zero) - for example, the Japanese crews of all ships were attacked by diarrhea, and they were very much not up to loading guns and accurate shooting, or all the ships broke down machinery at once ... Then yes, then it was possible. Otherwise, it's almost impossible. The Japanese had enough ships and geographic conditions, favorable specifically for them, in any case to impose a battle on the Varyag at the exit, and a secretive night exit was akin to suicide.
      1. Conductor
        Conductor 18 October 2018 13: 13
        +1
        whole squadron and with diarrhea. Yes, the Japanese themselves would drown from such a shame fellow
        1. Taoist
          Taoist 18 October 2018 23: 23
          +1
          A good idea for "alternatives" ... Popadanets puts castor oil into boilers in Japanese galleys and thus Varyag successfully breaks through ... Fresh (even smelly) view of things ... ;-)
          wassat
  5. Conductor
    Conductor 18 October 2018 13: 16
    +3
    Andrew. for a large Rakhmet cycle. especially for the hit pattern. I haven’t seen anything like this anywhere else.
  6. Catfish
    Catfish 18 October 2018 17: 57
    +2
    Good day, Andrey and thank you!

    I think that your assumptions about the events on the Varyag are very close to probability. But who will know now ... I am also inclined to believe that Rudnev really led the cruiser into battle, but this shell and the injury of the commander decided everything for him. Although, there would have been no such shell - there would have been another, the enemy had too many guns. Here the probability of large numbers rules. As one character said in one book, "Talent is talent, but guns are guns."
    Special thanks for the hit pattern! I always thought that the Varyag BVL was literally "bombarded" with shells. Well, of course, one against the "solid Japanese fleet", and there weren't so many of them. Although just ONE of them was the very "golden bullet" that put an end to Rudnev's plans and at the end of the battle too.
    Now about the alleged "lie" of the commander: if everything was as you expect, then this is generally not a lie, but, again, there is nothing to confirm this and nothing to refute.

    Thanks again. All the best! hi
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      19 October 2018 07: 01
      +2
      Quote: Sea Cat
      Special thanks for the hit pattern! I always thought that the Varyag BVL was literally "bombarded" with shells.

      But you pay attention - this hits only until the moment when the cruiser passed the Yodolmi traverse, and not for the whole battle :))) hi drinks
  7. anzar
    anzar 18 October 2018 19: 25
    +4
    Very good version, to the author +++. Fly in the ointment - speed Varyag. Why talk about how many nodes there are to add flow (at low tide!), Since you keep 7 knots yourself (the condition of the machines has nothing to do with it) If there used to be a version (also not bad, but very mnogohodovka)) that Rudnev wanted to go under the tail, then before turning increase rev time. However...
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 18 October 2018 20: 00
      +2
      Good question.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      19 October 2018 07: 03
      0
      Quote: anzar
      Why argue how many nodes are there to add current (at low tide!), Once you keep 7 nodes

      The fact of the matter is that we do not know how much the Varangian gave upon leaving the fairway. He started a turn, and could well add speed or do it after he lay down on a new course - but not too much, taking the Korean on 17 nodes, of course, he couldn’t go
  8. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 19 October 2018 00: 42
    +2
    A pretty good description, although there are some obscure points. And of course you can argue with the conclusions.

    note that in the logbook Varyaga it is clearly stated that the cruiser’s rudder damage occurred at 12.05 Russian time (and at 12.40 Japanese time) after traversing about. Iodolmi, but for V. Kataev this moment was recorded for some reason not at 12.05, but ten minutes later, at 12.15 (12.50)

    Over time, there really are misunderstandings (Kataev also mentioned these 10 minutes). Yasiro reports that the Varyag immediately turned after the hit at 12:41 (12:06), but others saw that the flag "P" was raised either at 12:08 or at 12:12, and Belyaev reports that he started the turn after seeing at 12 1/4 (12:15) turn of the Varyag, and Rudnev reports that he has already begun to turn when Yasira's shell hit. Here they hang out for 10 minutes.

    The fact is that if Vsevolod Fedorovich was going to return to the raid, then he was absolutely impossible to turn right.

    And in this episode there is a question for the scheme probably. Note that both on the Kataev scheme and on the scheme from the Varyag logbook, the cruiser rolled out of the island of Phalmido much further than on your scheme with dotted lines. There may be objective reasons, the island does not have a pronounced traverse (i.e., a perpendicular) in the case when the channel passes around the island along an arc, it is not possible to tell the exact time of passage of this traverse. And in a situation like that of Kataev, for example, turning back and right behind the island is already quite safe.

    In view of the foregoing, it can be argued that the very fact of the Varyag turning west (to the right) after leaving Chemulpo's fairway indicates the desire of V.F. Rudnev lead a decisive battle with the enemy squadron.

    But this is a very controversial conclusion. Let me remind you that when approaching the island, Rudnev further slowed down and took to the left, towards the shallows. It rather speaks of preparing a reversal. Well, the most important question is of course 7 nodes Varyag. This has been paid attention to more than once. It is impossible to break through at 7 nodes, but we do not even see an attempt to accelerate on approach to the island.

    that if Vsevolod Fedorovich lied, the meaning of his lie was not to hide his unwillingness to fight, but to “retouch” the unsuccessful U-turn at Fr. Phalmido and the critical damage of the Varyag associated with it.

    And here I probably partially agree with the author. The likelihood of contusions, loss of orientation or simply confusion after being hit by several shells at once could well lead to loss of control for some time. When "the ribs and entrails of Count Nimrod" lie on the 2nd cannon right in front of the nose, it's hard not to get nervous. Three hits in a row in 3-5 minutes and all literally in a few meters, behind the huge embrasures of the armored cabin. This is understandable.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 19 October 2018 06: 37
      +2
      Quote: Saxahorse
      But this is a very controversial conclusion.

      yes Even logically, if the signal "Accept to the right" was raised, the Korean would follow the Varyag to the right (to the west) and turn back, making sure that the cruiser is not controllable. according to the raised signal type to the right, and in the opposite direction what Even if the rudder was damaged by a shell hit at the moment the signal was raised, the "Koreets" WAS OBLIGED TO turn right behind the "Varyag", because Belyaev did not know about the damage to the "Varyag" ...
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      19 October 2018 07: 08
      0
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Yasiro reports that the Varyag immediately turned after the hit at 12:41 (12:06), but others saw that the flag "P" was raised either at 12:08 or at 12:12, and Belyaev reports that he started the turn after seeing at 12 1/4 (12:15) turn of the Varyag, and Rudnev reports that he has already begun to turn when Yasira's shell hit. Here they hang out for 10 minutes.

      Yes, I was going to figure it out in the next article, taking reports and Varyag and Korean logbooks
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Note that both on the Kataev scheme and on the scheme from the Varyag logbook, the cruiser rolled out of the island of Phalmido much further than on your scheme with dotted lines.

      All schemes are very arbitrary. But we have a fact that the Varangian, with the steering wheel on a U-turn, eventually ran into Yodolmi :)))) This is worth the schemes :)))
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Let me remind you that when approaching the island, Rudnev further slowed down and took to the left, towards the shallows.

      He just didn’t reduce the speed when approaching the island, but he took it to the left - yes, this allowed him to bring into battle all the guns of the starboard side (which, incidentally, is noted by the Japanese)
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 19 October 2018 23: 28
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        All schemes are very arbitrary. But we have a fact that the Varangian, with the steering wheel on a U-turn, eventually ran into Yodolmi :)))) This is worth the schemes :)))

        There is even a version that Asama’s shell at 12:41 hit Varyag, in the foremast, after a U-turn. Which supposedly explains the unusually large number of fragments that fell into the cabin. Shards usually fly forward for the most part. But the Japanese do not confirm this version. Everything is complicated and incomprehensible in these 10 minutes.
  9. Comrade
    Comrade 19 October 2018 04: 12
    +4
    Dear Andrew,
    sensible, solid work, with great interest read +!
    I have never thought about some things before, but here they are, on a silver platter :-)
    But the Asama artillerymen slowly shot

    According to the Vicksburg commander's report, ten minutes elapsed between the first and second Asama shots, so in fact the zeroing was short, they hit pretty quickly. The Americans did not know the caliber of the first shot, but the second was exactly 8 '' (judged by the column of water after the fall of the shell).
    Arguing in the framework of the “conspiracy” theory that admits a deliberate lie V.F. Rudnev in his written reports

    Do you mind if one day I post a small opus dedicated to Rudnev's reports (when exactly, I find it difficult to say, the material was collected, but corny there is no time to formalize the work, in addition, the topic on battleships is still hanging)? You are "digging" the topic ..
    Over the past week, something has been revealed to me, and now I believe that it is not entirely correct to blame Rudnev (in any case, on a number of issues of interest to me) for a deliberate lie. In any case, for a number of episodes. If you make a complaint to Vsevolod Fedorovich, then on a different occasion.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 19 October 2018 06: 25
      +3
      Quote: Comrade
      You don’t mind if one day I post a small opus on Rudnev’s reports

      I don’t know, as an author, but I definitely will not mind fellow good hi
      Quote: Comrade
      in addition, another topic on battleships is "hanging"

      Is this not promised? what
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 20 October 2018 04: 55
        +1
        Quote: Rurikovich
        Is this not promised?

        She is the most. All I need is to be on a desert island for a couple of days, in peace and quiet. But in modern times it is an unspeakable luxury.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      19 October 2018 07: 12
      +1
      Quote: Comrade
      sensible, solid work, with great interest read +!

      Thank you, dear Comrade!
      Quote: Comrade
      According to the Vicksburg commander's report, ten minutes elapsed between Asama's first and second shots.

      I DO NOT BELIEVE!. That is, I believe that from Vicksburg "they saw it like that" but I absolutely do not believe that this could have happened in reality, since it completely refutes everything I know about artillery combat. In addition, Rokuro, in his report, would probably have noted such a significant break in shooting, as he noted another (when the Varyag grabbed Yodolmi on the retreat)
      Quote: Comrade
      Do you mind if one day I post a small opus dedicated to Rudnev's reports (when exactly, I find it difficult to say, the material was collected, but corny there is no time to formalize the work, in addition, the topic on battleships is still hanging)? You are "digging" the topic ..

      I am for it. As you understand, I am "FOR" with two hands, regardless of whether my conclusions coincide with yours or not. hi
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 20 October 2018 04: 45
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        As you understand, I am "FOR" with two hands, regardless of whether my conclusions coincide with yours or not.

        I looked at the reports of Belyaev and Rudnev from a different angle, and I have a different documentary base, so it won’t be that you come to certain conclusions, and then I come out and begin to challenge your conclusions. Both mine and your reasoning are two different pieces of the same puzzle.
  10. Ivan
    Ivan 19 October 2018 04: 54
    +1
    Andrei, with interest read all the series about the fight in Chemulpo and the events preceding this, I look forward to continuing.
    There is one question. Recently, the recollections of an officer of the “Korean” de Frank caught his eye, where he writes that during the battle the “Varangian” ran aground, and then took off from it, just before turning to the port. Is it so?
    Here is the text of the memoirs, they were published in the Marine Notes in 1944. It also describes an interesting episode with the idea of ​​capturing the Japanese destroyer in the port on January 26. Of course, you need to divide this all into ten, especially the assertion that the Asama’s aft tower was hit by the Korean’s guns, etc.
    Link: https://dropmefiles.com/8LuPx
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      19 October 2018 07: 16
      +1
      Quote: Iwan
      Link: https://dropmefiles.com/8LuPx

      Thank you so much!
      Quote: Iwan
      There is one question. Recently, the recollections of an officer of the “Korean” de Frank caught his eye, where he writes that during the battle the “Varangian” ran aground, and then took off from it, just before turning to the port. Is it so?

      Very hard to say. Personally, my opinion is that there was no grounding, but it is possible that the cruiser still touched stones off the island
      1. Ivan
        Ivan 21 October 2018 12: 50
        0
        And what is the bottom of the island of Iodolmi - rocky, sandy or muddy?

        And by the way, what would have happened to the Varyag after losing control while turning to the right, if its speed had been 20 knots, as Rudnev's critics on the Internet demand from Rudnev?

        In the "Marine Collection" there are also memories of Port Arthur. Is it necessary?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          21 October 2018 19: 40
          0
          Quote: Iwan
          And what is the bottom of the island of Iodolmi - rocky, sandy or muddy?

          I don’t know the bottom, but there are stones. That is, rocks above the bottom, but below the surface of the sea
          Quote: Iwan
          And by the way, what would have happened to the Varyag after losing control while turning to the right, if its speed had been 20 knots

          Well, what about it? :) The island would ram in the spirit of a true kamikaze :))
          Quote: Iwan
          In the "Marine Collection" there are also memories of Port Arthur. Is it necessary?

          With pleasure!
  11. Syak
    Syak 19 October 2018 10: 06
    +2
    Many blame Rudnev for the fact that the Varangian was not blown up, but simply sunk.
    In my opinion, such a fact is missed:
    It is the first day of the war between the Republic of Ingushetia and Japan. All compare - "Elephant and pug." Those. None of the Russian officers even thought that the war would be long and not victorious.
    Then, a sunken cruiser can be raised and put into operation by the winner (and who will be the winner - see above).
    Conclusion: A non-exploded cruiser is a plus to Rudnev's "prudence".
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 19 October 2018 23: 39
      +3
      Quote: Syak
      Conclusion: A non-exploded cruiser is a plus to Rudnev's "prudence".

      Uriu officially announced that he was about to enter the port at 16 o’clock. Rudnev so rushed the team that they didn’t bury either their personal belongings or their dead. Everyone hurriedly left the ship until about 15 hours. And the ship sank slowly, sinking right up to 18:01. If at least one Japanese destroyer had really entered, they would have taken the ship almost intact.

      This is about Rudnev's "prudence".
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 20 October 2018 04: 34
        -1
        Quote: Saxahorse
        Everyone hurriedly left the ship until about 15 hours.

        There did not have no rush, this is a myth.
        The commander of the cruiser "Talbot" Bailey (Captain Lewis Bayly) in his report separately noted with what calmness and how disciplined the Varangians took their places in the boats. One can feel that the Englishman admired such behavior of Russian sailors, "who had just looked death in the eye."
        Quote: Saxahorse
        Uriu officially announced that he was about to enter the port in 16 hours. If at least one Japanese destroyer had really entered, they would have taken the ship almost intact.

        Not so simple, all three European cruisers prepared to open fire in case of excesses. The guns were loaded, the servant was on the alert.
        Apparently, Sotokichi-san took note of this and refrained from fulfilling his promise to enter the Chemulpo raid.
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 23 October 2018 23: 08
          0
          Quote: Comrade
          There was no rush, this is a myth.

          And what about abandoned personal belongings, including officers? And the abandoned bodies of the dead? Something in general is not comme il faut .. At 13:50 Rudnev returned from Talbot and announced to the officers his decision, by 15:50 the transportation of the team was completed. Belyaev did announce his joint decision with Rudnev at 15:30, at 15:51 the last boat fell off, at 16:05 they blew up. Have you noticed that everywhere you tried to keep up to 16 hours?

          I do not believe in Rudnev’s conspiracy with the British and Japanese, this is too much even with my critical attitude towards him. But the fact that the Varangian did not get to the Japanese that evening was not the merit of Rudnev but the school of Uriu. Rudnev did not move a finger so that at least the flooding of the cruiser would be accelerated.

          Quote: Comrade
          Not so simple, all three European cruisers prepared to open fire in case of excesses.

          I do not believe at all. The neutrals have no reason to stand up for the cruiser abandoned by the Russians. Let me remind you that in Chifu, for example, the Japanese easily captured the Russian ships.
    2. Avior
      Avior 20 October 2018 01: 19
      0
      Rudnev lived a long time after the battle to explain what and how.
      His explanations are known.
      Why do you think that he lied in this matter?
      IMHO, any assumption that contradicts Rudnev, you need to start with the reasons why he lied in a particular issue.
      1. The comment was deleted.
    3. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 20 October 2018 08: 47
      0
      This is the case here, for you and me such an argument is obvious (dear colleague Andrei, he brought him to AI several years ago), but Vsevolod Fedorovich himself never mentioned anything like that.
      Although ... the water is dark in the oblast!
  12. Catfish
    Catfish 19 October 2018 18: 26
    0
    Quote: Syak
    Many blame Rudnev for the fact that the Varangian was not blown up, but simply sunk.
    In my opinion, such a fact is missed:
    It is the first day of the war between the Republic of Ingushetia and Japan. All compare - "Elephant and pug." Those. None of the Russian officers even thought that the war would be long and not victorious.
    Then, a sunken cruiser can be raised and put into operation by the winner (and who will be the winner - see above).
    Conclusion: A non-exploded cruiser is a plus to Rudnev's "prudence".


    Listen, Sasha, and this is Thought! It's a shame that it didn’t even occur to myself ... good
  13. Catfish
    Catfish 19 October 2018 18: 29
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Sea Cat
    Special thanks for the hit pattern! I always thought that the Varyag BVL was literally "bombarded" with shells.

    But you pay attention - this hits only until the moment when the cruiser passed the Yodolmi traverse, and not for the whole battle :))) hi drinks


    Clear. Will we talk about the rest later? hi drinks
  14. Avior
    Avior 20 October 2018 00: 44
    +2
    The topic, of course, is complex and polemical, and respect to the author that he covers it in detail, but in some articles there is a feeling that pets and unlovers were appointed initially smile
    and now for a pet Rudnev pull a bird on a model of the globe.
    That in the case of the steering drive, the pipe of which was not clearly broken, Rudnev lied unambiguously (and not just foggy, the drive stopped working, as he knows in the case of the Japanese losses, Rudnev does not say that they were, but elegantly refers on gossip on this topic).
    So in this case, with the turn of Rudnev.
    Rudnev writes in black and white that the turn was carried out to exit the battle. Why do you have to invent fictional maneuvers?
    And Rudnev didn’t die in this battle, and Behrens did so in the Soviet Navy and only died in 1928, they all had many opportunities to write what and how.
    Why compose for them, multiply entities?
    Turning the Varyag to the right fully confirms Rudenko’s desire to leave the battle, so he would quickly hide behind an island and go back to Chemulpo. But if he turned left, this would not have happened. not to mention that there are no reference points for depths on the left, it’s not a lot to measure the depth constantly, but the line of depths there is uneven. But on the right there is a clear landmark island.
    But no luck, picked up shells.
    Why invent fantastic explanations for what has a simple explanation?
    Rudenko's concussion is also a big question, it is an exaggeration; the memories of the doctor Varyag came across.
    Behrens would have escaped to help Rudnev, by the way, he was not on the bridge and did not see who was shell-shocked there.
    Even if the steering gears were damaged, the debatable question was why it was impossible to be controlled manually - they were not yelling at the stern with a voice, there were telephone pipes from the central post.
    A separate question, Rudenko writes that they went precisely for a breakthrough. Although he himself claims that the speed of the cruiser was limited, and even more so the Korean. Was it possible to break through? No way. Perhaps Rudenko is a complete idiot, unable to assess the chances? unlikely, Avon deftly wrote about the Japanese losses in the report, so there’s nothing to blame him for, he just conveyed rumors, although he saw this battle better than anyone else.
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 20 October 2018 08: 43
      +1
      Excuse me, but what should Rudnev write? What did he have cunning plan (tm) but it didn't work?
      1. Jura 27
        Jura 27 21 October 2018 03: 46
        -1
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Excuse me, but what should Rudnev write? What did he have cunning plan (tm) but it didn't work?

        And here is a tricky plan. The commander of the Kyrgyz Republic makes a turn to continue the battle with an intact side and why should he hide it? And why, instead of the truth indicated above, does he write another truth: I leave the battle to repair the damage? What is the profit for him? Nobody would reproach him with the fact that he wanted to continue the battle, but as a result of an enemy hit, the steering wheel ceased to operate and the KR circulated in the opposite direction, instead of turning a few points. All of the above, completely disavows the main, essentially antilogical, idea of ​​the author of the post.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      20 October 2018 11: 26
      0
      Quote: Avior
      Rudnev writes in black and white that the turn was carried out to exit the battle

      Rudnev does not write this. Why compose? :))))
      Quote: Avior
      Turn of the Varyag to the right fully confirms Rudenko’s desire to get out of the battle

      It does not confirm, since in this course it is absurd, even if there were no Yodolmi
      Quote: Avior
      Why invent fantastic explanations for what has a simple explanation?

      Who's stopping you? Be content with the simple. You write
      Quote: Avior
      there is a feeling that pets and non-favorites were assigned initially

      Well, let's think :)))) The Varangian performs a completely achievable maneuver - a U-turn to the island of Yodolmi.
      I say - "since it is doubtful that the RIF caperang does not know the basic rules of navigation, the U-turn occurred against his will"
      You say - "Rudnev is a complete burdock, that's why he decided to turn around."
      Who has appointed pets here? :)))) I just do not render Vsevolod Fedorovich in the common sense. And you have such a personal dislike for him that you even distort his last name.
      Quote: Avior
      Rudenko's concussion is also a big question, it is an exaggeration; the memories of the doctor Varyag came across.

      She is not exaggerated, she simply did not give the right to retire
      Quote: Avior
      Even if the steering gears were damaged, the debatable question was why it was impossible to be controlled manually - they were not yelling at the stern with a voice, there were telephone pipes from the central post.

      But Rudnev answers this question with vey clarity - because of the roar of the battle in the tiller did not hear orders
      Quote: Avior
      A separate question, Rudenko writes that they went precisely for a breakthrough. Although he himself claims that the speed of the cruiser was limited, and even more so the Korean. Was it possible to break through? No way.

      Can. On this occasion, I wrote a lot and did not see constructive counterargument
  15. Avior
    Avior 20 October 2018 01: 15
    +1
    Add.
    Frankly speaking, the explanation of the turn to the right by Andrey looks as far-fetched as the alleged desire of Rudenko to let the Japanese go forward, for the same reason - Rudenko himself did not write anything like that.
    If everything was so, as the author suggests, there was not the slightest problem writing it in a report.
    The fairway is narrow, the conditions of the battle with the squadron - no problem is that the ship hooked something there, no one would have blamed Rudenko for it, he was not on peaceful maneuvers. and claims, if there were, rather to Berens, he did the laying, not Rudnev.
    Anyway, no one would have expected him to break past the Japanese squadron under such conditions. and Rudenko understood this perfectly.
    And he didn’t have to compose in the report about the loss of the steering pipe, getting into Asama or giving gossip about the sinking of the Japanese.

    There would be no rain of orders, but they did not begin to punish.
    IMHO, it’s just that the author is trying to complete the presentation and, realizing that the official version is clearly incorrect, and he is not enthusiastic about the unofficial version, he is forced to admit explanations that do not look very weighty, including because they contradict what was written by Rudnev himself.
    If you accept these explanations, you will have to agree that Rudnev was such a pathological liar that he lied to the love of art, even where there was no need for it. But this is clearly not like Rudnev.
    But the fact that life circumstances put him in an extremely difficult situation, from which the exits were only bad or even worse, and he twisted out as best he could, including by tacking along the way, it was more logical to believe the garado.
    Threat.
    read that the author would like to consider logbooks.
    Written in one even, neat handwriting with different signatures and coinciding in non-existent events, such as getting into Asama and a fire on it.
    It will be interesting to read wink
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 20 October 2018 08: 41
      +1
      Anyway, no one would have expected him to break past the Japanese squadron under such conditions. and Rudenko I understood that perfectly.

      Uh ... from a typo or ernish?
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      20 October 2018 11: 30
      0
      Quote: Avior
      Frankly speaking, the explanation of the turn to the right by Andrey looks as far-fetched as the alleged desire of Rudenko to let the Japanese go forward, for the same reason - Rudenko himself did not write anything like that.

      Naturally, not a single commander will describe the reasons for each of his maneuvers.
      Quote: Avior
      If everything was so, as the author suggests, there was not the slightest problem writing it in a report.

      What for? In fact, there are some actions of Rudnev, and there are different interpretations of these actions. And it is obvious that even if Rudnev wrote this in his report, you would still not have believed him, just as you would not believe his other words
      Quote: Avior
      And he didn’t have to compose in the report about the loss of the steering pipe, getting into Asama or giving gossip about the sinking of the Japanese.

      And he did not compose. He suggested the reason for the failure of the helmsman's work, or maybe he was informed about it (as in the case of 1 shells). Asama was "seen", this is natural in battle.
      1. Jura 27
        Jura 27 20 October 2018 16: 30
        +1
        [/ quote] Naturally, not a single commander will describe the reasons for each of his maneuvers. [quote]

        One nevertheless was found, contrary to the statement of Andrey, - Rudnev, his surname. And he clearly and unequivocally described the reason for his main maneuver in the battle: the desire to get out of the battle to fix the damage. Full quote, I have already cited.
      2. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 22 October 2018 12: 15
        0
        There is one significant circumstance that complicates the assessment of events.
        Lack of a navigation map with maneuvering pad .. Duty of navigators.
        The card is a legal document and is confirmed by the records of the ship's journal.
        That is, an important part (half) of the evidence is missing.
        Next - the ship's journal is filled after the events .. what to write to the journal is determined by the commander, he also signs the pages (each).
        The officer in charge (or another appointed person) keeps records of commands and orders on the bridge (in the wheelhouse) in a draft journal.
        Marks the time of events by ship hours, etc. You can write everything in draft ..
        But what to write in the finishing magazine - the commander or the elder will say.
        Without these documents - you can not discuss the topic and draw conclusions - well, nothing.

        Second - does anyone imagine HOW THE STEERING DEVICE (s) WORK (s) on the Varyag and how the cruiser turn procedure is carried out?
        1. Jura 27
          Jura 27 23 October 2018 08: 28
          0
          [/ quote] There is one significant circumstance that complicates the assessment of events.
          Lack of a navigation map with maneuvering pad ..

          Rudnev did not make sense to lie in this episode, because it didn’t harm his reputation.

          Second - does anyone imagine HOW THE STEERING DEVICE (s) WORK (s) on the Varyag and how the cruiser turn procedure occurs? [Quote]

          What exactly are you interested in ? Work on shifting the steering wheel, the Davis system, or controlling the spool of a steam engine and an electric motor?
          1. Navigator_50
            Navigator_50 25 October 2018 07: 19
            0
            I am well aware of the engineering device of these mechanisms ...
            Only in battle did they become meaningless devices, which was shown by the battle of the Varangian, and indeed all the squadron battles of the REV. (steering from the tiller could save from a collision, aground, etc., but in battle ..).
            The first is the drive from the bridge, as well as from the wheelhouse to the tiller compartment, is itself a vulnerable part of the ship’s control system during artillery combat. be it duplicated three times. I admit that the steering gear on the bridge, after a shell exploded, could affect steering from the wheelhouse .. - drive to the steering ONE and the general) well, the roller was disconnected, but the mechanism remained .. Through the whole ship it stretched ..
            The second - the cruiser Varyag was not combat ready and was not prepared for sailing on a narrow fairway, near shallow water with control from the conning tower and under fire.
            Third - (I BELIEVE) there was an error of Art. navigator Behrens and commander Rudnev (responsible for everything). The meaning of the error is a premature right turn. We had to wait another 1 minute on the course ...
            I believe that Behrens said that the cruiser arrived at the turning point based on the passage of the beam beam ... Traverse is tightly connected with the ship and its course ...
            But based on the direction of the current and its strength, the cruiser had to take the drift correction .. 10-15 degrees, well, and after turning it turned out to be in shallow water, immediately lost control and turned it 180 degrees around with its nose. The happiness that he walked in the course of 7-8 knots was able to work out with machines (!) And did not jump out to the sandbank.
            There was no chance for Varyag to break out of the word at all, well, only if Asama would ram Chioda (you can vice versa) or there a meteorite would hit him ..
            Something like this..
            1. Jura 27
              Jura 27 25 October 2018 17: 29
              0
              [/ quote] control from the tiller [quote]

              In the tiller room, there was no control, it reached only the steering compartment, Rudnev was still that commander, - did not know the device of his cruiser.
              On the bridge (where the shell exploded) there was no steering control.
              Triple redundancy was sufficient, along with the protection of this triple redundancy.
              The fairway was not narrow, given the height of the tide and the draft of the Varyag; with good visibility, it was quite simple to rule in those conditions, along the islands (coastal landmarks), but of course, the currents had to be taken into account.
              It was unlikely that there was a mistake with the turning point, after the passage of the traverse of the island 10 minutes had passed (but to the left, it was already dangerous to turn right). There was a mistake, with no increase in speed when turning, as a result, the cruiser was demolished by the current and he buried in the island. And the loss of control is associated with a change in the direction of the flow (after passing the Iodolmi traverse) and again, at a low speed. While the current was passing and added up to 3 knots to the speed, there were no problems with the control. As soon as the current began to beat on board and the speed dropped, somewhere below 9 knots, it seemed to Rudnev that the shell had interrupted the drive pipe (which is extremely unlikely in itself and is not confirmed by the Japanese).
              With such a commander as Rudnev, of course, the Varyag had no chance of a breakthrough, it is good that the Japanese fragment helped Rudnev's thoughts move in the direction of leaving the battle, otherwise the losses could have been much greater.