The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 23. SOBOVO

Introduction. In the previous part, we encountered a very unusual point of view of the command and control group of a spacecraft, the division — SD: “Germany formally recognizes existing war conventions. Therefore, our command proceeds from the assumption that the attack will occur, if it happens, only after the termination of the non-aggression pact. In this case, our troops will be withdrawn from the places of permanent deployment to their positions ... "

It is unlikely that these commanders voiced their point of view. In an era when people could easily lose their positions, ranks, and their relatives could suffer for the wrong opinions, commanders hardly dared to express their personal opinions about politics ... According to the author, these words reflected the vision of political bodies for the international situation. The said commanders' statement could not be voiced without official approval (perhaps the nomination of such an interpretation) by the Space Administration. Perhaps it was a strategic misinformation. Such statements should be later eradicated, so as not to leave traces of miscalculations by party leaders among descendants ...

This part will be devoted to ZOVOVO and will begin with its commander. Perhaps many readers will be annoyed by the mention of General Pavlov. General Pavlov did not know how to fight, but he was not a traitor.

Consideration of the material will begin with memories of the legendary general of the GRU. Hadji Umare Dzhiorovich Mamsurov: “[Colonel] Mamsurov began to talk about his work at the front [this is a Soviet-Finnish war of the 1939-40 years], sharply criticizing Mehlis and some other high-ranking political workers for imposing orders on the army linking creativity and initiative of commanders. However, the commanders themselves, especially the lower level, also inherited from Mamsurov.

“They gave me lieutenants from the Tambov Infantry School,” the colonel gave an example. - These people were not commanders, they could not even be fighters. They turned out to be well-trained, knew how to walk on the parade ground, famously commanded the authorities, but did not know weapons, no maps, no movement on the compass. Many of them were frankly afraid to go to the rear of the Finns. The first hostilities showed that the platoon commander, the group in the raid was actually becoming not a lieutenant, but a Red Army soldier, who had at least two weeks of combat experience».

During a break in the meeting, army commissar of 1 rank Mehlis, passing by Mamsurov, unkindly measured the colonel with a glance. And the head of the GABTU commander of 1 rank, Pavlov, Mamsurov’s associate in Spain, right shaking Haji-Umar’s hand, twisted his left hand several times at the temple and quietly asked: “Xanthi, are you bad or immortal?” After the meeting, many expected, if not arrest, then at least the transfer of Mamsurov with a drop somewhere to the periphery. And he became the head of the X-NUMX-th department of the Republican Space Agency and was sent to refresher courses for commanders at the Military Academy. Mv Frunze ...

22 June Hadji Umar Dzhiorovich Mamsurov lay at home with a high temperature. 24 June almost all subordinates Mamsurova led by him were in Zapovo. Now, no one argued with Hadji Umar about the need to deploy a guerrilla war and sabotage work in the rear of the aggressor... "( link).

The words of Hadji Umar Dzhiorovich Mamsurov are interesting: "The platoon commander, the group in the raid actually became not a lieutenant, but a Red Armyman, a fighter who has at least two weeks of combat experience." A lot was in the spacecraft at senior and senior command positions of art. lieutenants, captains, colonels, who went high to the top and did not have a “two-week experience” of command of regiments-formations-unions in combat conditions. And the higher upward through the career ladder this commander advanced before the start of the war, the more bloody “harvest” was required for him to gain invaluable combat experience.

The author says this to the fact that practically no one in the first days of the war could competently fight if he did not manage to cling to a fortified position while he had enough ammunition, he had communications and reserves. Pavlov is not the only commander who did not know how to fight in the new conditions of a maneuverable war, although theoretically he had an understanding of how to conduct a war of maneuver. Many other commanders in high positions had similar knowledge, but they also did not always successfully fight ...

For a long time on the forums it was mentioned about the memories of one of the veteran political workers that the commander of the Zapov troops in the evening 21.6.41 was summoned to the HF apparatus while watching the performance.

«How do I know this? Yes, from the memoirs given to me by that very lieutenant general Fominykh, who was then ChVS ZF. I learned the same thing from Kolesov, an officer in the cultural department of the political department of ZOVOVO. It was this officer who was on duty at Pavlovsky HF and invited the general from the lodge to the office... "

Such statements were taken on faith, they were not engaged in verification. Without asking a question: what relation can a culture officer have to HF communications equipment? Can the district commander order the installation of a new HF communication point in an unequipped location, for example, in the DCA? But why ask questions, if it is so clear that Pavlov was negligent in his duties, and in his business? ..

In May, 1941, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, HF communication was defined as “Government HF communication” and the corresponding “Regulations” on service were approved. The installation and maintenance of high-frequency communications equipment was carried out by employees of the Government Communications Department who were part of the NKVD. Specific locations of the equipment (the so-called points), agreed by the NKVD and NKO, were established.

Consider the memories of a veteran of the government communications colonel N.S. Karpov: "The complication of the situation at the beginning of 1941 was felt by the increasing number of tasks for the organization of HF communications for large unions and spacecraft connections in the border area. The night from 21 to 22 June caught me following one of these tasks. At about 2 pm in the morning a technician on duty from Brest called and said that the Germans had started shelling the city ...

Without knowing the specifics of the work, front command [SWF] believed that we should follow all their instructions on the inclusion of subscribers, and obey the head of communications of the front. Front commander Kirponos was very surprised when I did not fulfill his order - turn on the switch "HF" station artillery commander, rear and some other subscribers.

He was very indignant that some junior lieutenant of state security was not fulfilling the order of the commander, and he very much scolded the head of communications of the front for this. That's why when during a personal conversation, I had to explain our rights, obligations and requirements to the “HF” subscribers - the communications imposed by the NKVD, he, getting an explanation about this with GSH, started to treat us very well. These were the first steps in the organization of government "HF" -communications on the South-West... "

If Pavlov had ordered a “petty tyrant” to install a HF communications device in the DCA corridor, government communications would not have executed this order. They did not obey the command of ZOVO when there were obvious violations of the “Regulations” on service. The location was not suitable for the location of the point. They would not have put the device even in a separate room, because The call from the Commissar of Defense took place quite late. To make an application for the installation of the apparatus it was necessary to issue an application explaining the need for such an installation in the NKVD. Pavlov would never set himself up - he was not a fool. The number of points was limited, and they were individually distributed among the border associations. And finally, after the application, in any case, an inspection of the HF communication installation site took place and only then the act was prepared ...

And who would benefit from the post-war clause of the former commander of the district? .. The rumors went with reference to the political officer and the district headquarters. There was no refutation of this bike by the Political Administration of the SA: they were all arranged. Why suited? Let's try to sort out this issue.

In the middle of the day on June 22, Commander of the Polar Division, General Pavlov reported to the General Staff, that of the three radio stations he had, two were completely broken, and the third was damaged and was not working. With constant breaks of wired communication lines, the absence of data on the location of their units and enemy units - this was a complete loss of communication with subordinate troops. GSH was obliged to urgently correct this situation. Pavlov promised to send three new radio stations, but they did not send ...

By June 23, a group of NGO leaders arrived at the ZF: Deputy Commissar of Defense, Marshals Kulik and Shaposhnikov. Kulik 23 June flew to Bialystok to assist in the management of the actions of the 3 and 10 armies and to organize a counterattack by the forces of the horse-mechanized group of Lieutenant-General I.V. Boldin and Shaposhnikov remained at the front headquarters. With the incorrect work of intelligence agencies and the unstable work of communication, the arrivals could not assist the command of the Polar Division ...

Khadzhi-Umar Dzhiorovich Mamsurov told about the arrest of General Pavlov: “The first approached Pavlov himself. He took off his belt with a pistol and, giving them to me, shook his hand firmly, said: “Don't remember it dashingly, Xanthi will probably meet again in Mogilev ...” He was almost calm and courageous at that moment. Pavlov first sat in a passenger car. The second handed weapons NS Klimovsky. We had never met before. He was also calm, said nothing and got into the same car. The third was approached by a wonderful comrade, a magnificent artilleryman - the commander of artillery of the Klych district. We knew each other perfectly in Spain and always communicated as good comrades. He held out his weapon, hugged me with a smile. A few minutes later a small column moved on to Moscow.... "Agree that they do not say that about traitors. The veteran intelligence officer spoke his memories much later than the end of the war, when many of the circumstances of the initial period were already known ...

In his book, a veteran military counterintelligence B. Syromyatnikov cites some of the circumstances of the arrest of General Pavlov: "Today there is every reason to believe that the fault of D.G. Pavlova in the disaster that occurred at the Polar Division, is minimal, and that the investigation into this disaster, which resulted in the shooting of Pavlov and his generals, was falsified. ” The fateful role in his fate was played by Mehlis, who once again headed the army political agencies with the beginning of the war. It was he who insisted on the arrest of Pavlov, calling him "the Germans who opened the front."

From the surviving eyewitness accounts of the events it follows that the representatives of the military command: Commissar S.К. Timoshenko, his deputy B.M. Shaposhnikov, deputy chairman of the SNK K.E. Voroshilov objected to the arrest of Pavlov. Colonel Haji Umar Mamsurov wrote in his memoirs that he witnessed the 26.6.41 conversation between Shaposhnikov and Voroshilov, when the fate of Pavlov was decided.

“Voroshilov told Shaposhnikov that he had instructions to remove Pavlov from command and send him under guard to Moscow. Boris Mikhailovich agreed: Pavlov - the commander useless. However, he immediately suggested that in this situation arrest would be a mistake that would bring nothing but harm. “This is not the hour now,” he justified his point. “This will cause alarm and turmoil in the ranks of commanders.”

Voroshilov pondered for a long time, then began to sketch the bar in the name of Stalin. I read ShT Shaposhnikova. It contained a report on the situation in the PF, conclusions and proposals. Concerning Pavlov, Voroshilov asked Stalin not to arrest the commander, but suggested that he be removed from command of the district and appointed commander tank a group formed of outgoing units in the Gomel-Rogachev area: according to the district headquarters, there were about two thousand. Shaposhnikov approved, and CT left.

After some time, it became known that Stalin made a different decision regarding Pavlov. Probably, the order was required to be executed immediately, and the Commissar had no people at hand. Marshal ordered the arrest of Colonel Mamsurov. Tymoshenko also tried to save General Pavlov. By his authority as the People's Commissar of Defense, he appointed him to Ukraine as the commander of the UM, and Pavlov was about to leave there.

4.7.41, Chief of the General Staff, agreed to the arrest of Pavlov. According to the memoirs of the head of the NKVD Mogilev Directorate, on July 6, in the morning, he received by telephone the order of Mehlis, sent “on behalf of the government”, to leave for the city of Gdov and arrest the former commander of the Polar Division. When the Mogilev security officers arrived in Gdov, there were already military counterintelligence agents from the 3 NKO administration there. On the same day, July 6, a meeting of the Military Council of the Polar Division was held, at which the fate of Pavlov was discussed. Tymoshenko and Voroshilov reiterated their doubts about the validity of the accusation of the former front commander in the betrayal. "

The protocols brought to us the names and positions of those who interrogated Pavlov. This is the deputy. Head of the Investigation Unit of the 3 Directorate of NGOs; Senior Battalion Commissar Pavlovsky and Investigator of the 3 Directorate, Jr. State Security Lieutenant Komarov.

Komarov - a man of high growth and great physical strength. Registration protocols did not give him. Because of this, even in 1942, Abakumov told him: “You are an oak”. From the beginning of 1942, Komarov became the secretary of Abakumov. In the spring of 1946, Komarov again had a desire to return to his duties as an investigator, to whom he “had a vocation” ... Komarov was shot 19.12.54 g, unrehabilitated.

First interrogation dg Pavlova was launched on 7.6.41 on 1-30 and ended on 16-10. Investigators periodically changed. The protocol text is small enough to record readings of more than 14 hours. What could Komarov talk about with Pavlov for many hours, remaining one on one, being a tongue-tied and narrow-minded person? One can only guess about this ...

The end of the first interrogation: "Question. In vain you are trying to reduce defeat to reasons beyond your control. The investigation has established that you were a participant in the conspiracy back in 1935, and then still had the intention to change the homeland in a future war ...

Reply. Never in any conspiracies, I was not and with any conspirators did not rotate. This accusation is extremely heavy and wrong for me from beginning to end.... »

Absolutely implausible charge. A person under such suspicion would never have become the head of the GABTU and the commander of the district. Two days later, the second interrogation begins, which begins with the question: "The investigation once again offers you to tell about the crimes you committed against the party and the Soviet government.. "

Pavlov's answer: "Analyzing all your past and present activities I found it necessary to tell the investigators about my treacherous actions in relation to the party and the Soviet government... "For one and a half days the former General Pavlov" broke "Komarov. That is why he was needed.

For one and a half days, Pavlov “realized” and decided to “repent”. Further in the protocol it is wildly unbelievable that he talks about his treacherous actions. But no one is interested in the plausibility, and only the confession of guilt and reservation of other generals to the future is of interest. In the same way, the testimony of Pavlov himself was given by the ex-commanders of the Red Army who had already been shot, who had been lying for several years, until the next testimony had come.

Knowing about these testimonies and not paying attention to commander Pavlov’s “traitorous essence”, the CPC quietly promoted him through the ranks, claiming next appointments in the Government. This once again testifies to the falsity of the embossed testimony. A similar situation was with the former NS Pribovo PS Maple. Two days after the new portions of exposure from Komarov, new “confessions” follow: “Question. During the interrogation 9 July this year. you pleaded guilty to the defeat at the Polar Division, but you hid your conspiratorial connections and the real causes of the heavy losses suffered by parts of the spacecraft in the first days of the war with Germany. We offer to give exhaustive testimony about their enemy ties and renegade affairs.

Reply. Indeed, the main cause of damage on the Western Front is my treacherous work as a member of a conspiratorial organization, although this was largely facilitated by other objective conditions, which I showed about during the July interrogation of 9 this year.

Question. At the previous interrogation, you denied your affiliation to an anti-Soviet organization, and now you declare your connection with the conspirators. What indications should be considered correct?

Reply. Today I give the right testimony and I don’t want to hide anything from the investigation... »

In the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" an article was published about the case of General Pavlov: "When it came to the case of General of the Army Pavlov and other arrested generals, Mehlis said that he suspects the former front commander in collusion with the Germans, to whom Pavlov opened the front.

“What is your evidence of Pavlov’s treason?” Asked Mehlis to Tymoshenko.

“I hope that Pavlov he will not lock himself", Answered Mehlis pointedly. Those present were silent. Everyone knew that Stalin had sent Mehlis to the front. What if this is the task of Stalin? Then it is clear why the investigation demands confessions of treason from Pavlov.

Unexpectedly, Tymoshenko supported Voroshilov: “On what basis do you suspect Pavlov of complicity with the fascists? What, in your opinion, Pavlov will not be locked? "

«Pavlov often falls into insanity"- said the silent man with the insignia of the brigade commissar -" at such moments he can sign any accusation. "

[In countering this insanity, Pavlov is actively assisted by counterintelligence officers in carrying out his task.]

They all turned to the brigade commissioner, who was sitting on the side chair next to the head of the Special Department of the Front. It was the head of the special departments of the NKO Mikheev who had flown in from Moscow. Anxious silence violated Tymoshenko, who asked what testimony given by the arrested. "Pavlov admitted guilt," answered the brigadier commissioner, "the rest deny."

- What is the fault?

- In the unpreparedness of the troops of the district, in losses aviation at border airfields, in a loss by the district headquarters of communications with the armies, the brigade commissar listed. “But he continues to persist in denying betrayal.”

- Do you have a reason to bring such charges to Pavlov?

“We are obliged to raise questions comprehensively,” the brigadier commissioner answered.

Mehlis turned the discussion to the political plane: “Comrades, we have to think about how to explain to the parties, the people, the whole world, why the spacecraft is retreating... ".

And here is the reason why Mehlis brought Pavlov under investigation and further under execution. And why from political workers after the war, gossip about high-frequency communication in DCA. A man was needed who could be charged with defeating a spacecraft ...

Despite the available compromising data on commanders of high rank allegedly participating in conspirator groups, all the persons mentioned in the documents on investigating the defeat of the spacecraft, in July-August 1941, the Central Committee decided to approve them by the army commanders and formations of the spacecraft. No luck only a group of leaders of the former headquarters Zapovo. This once again testifies that the data for the commanding staff “knocked out” as a result of interrogations was “fake”, and the people themselves were not traitors and the country's leadership knew about it ... The following dialogue took place at the court meeting.

Defendant D.G. Pavlov: "I plead guilty to the fact that I understood the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army in my own way and did not put it into action in advance, i.e. before the onset of the enemy. [Pavlov’s interrogators didn’t care what directive they were talking about. If only he had testified that he had not done something, showing his treacherous essence.]

I knew that the enemy was about to come, but they assured me from Moscow that everything was in order, and I was ordered to be calm and not to panic. The name of who told me this, I can not name.

Ulrich. His testimony given at the preliminary investigation a few hours ago, i.e. 21 July 1941 of the year, do you confirm?

Pavlov. I ask this testimony do not believe. I gave them being in a bad state. I ask to believe my testimony given at the preliminary investigation July 7 1941 of the year ... [All testimony after the first interrogation is the result of a hard physical impact on Pavlov.]

Ulrich. A few hours ago you said something completely different, and, in particular, about your enemy activity.

Pavlov. I never engaged in anti-Soviet activities. I gave testimony about my participation in the anti-Soviet military conspiracy, being in an insane state ...

Ulrich. At the preliminary investigation of 21 July 1941, you said something completely different about this. And, in particular ... you gave such testimony: “Upon returning from Spain in a conversation with Meretskov on conspiracy issues, we decided, in order to save ourselves from failure, to temporarily not carry out anti-Soviet activities, to go deep underground, showing ourselves through the service line only the positive side.

Pavlov. At the preliminary investigation, I said that to the court. The investigator on the basis of this recorded otherwise... "The investigator wrote another way ... Pavlov did not know that nobody really needed the truth and he was convicted in advance ...

A.P. Sudoplatov: "Pavlov, being the front commander, was not up to par, he suffered a complete defeat. But it never occurred to him to surrender to the enemy, as Vlasov did ... Eitingon, who knew well [Pavlova] in Spain, on the very first day of the war, he said that Pavlov proved himself "at the level of a tank battalion commander, although he was [in Spain] commander of a tank brigade... »

The first who officially raised the question of the innocence of the executed generals of the ZAPOVO in the post-war period was Colonel General L.M. Sandalwood

Memo of Colonel General L.M. Sandalov, Chief of the Military Scientific Department of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General V.V. Kurasov 1.9.56: "Zapovo troops, including 4 A, were almost completely defeated during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. At that time I was the NSH of the 4 Army. Is the command of Zapovo (renamed from the first days of the war to command of the troops of the ZF) and the command of 4 guilty for defeating the troops during the initial period of the war?

In order to answer this important and difficult question, it is necessary, in my opinion, to preliminarily answer another question: could any other command of the district and army troops be able to prevent this defeat? Hardly anyone will undertake to prove the possibility of preventing the defeat of the district’s troops even with another more talented staff of the district’s command. After all, the troops of the neighboring ZPOVO Pribovo and KOVO were also defeated in the initial period of the war, although the main attack of the enemy did not target the troops of these districts.

Consequently, the defeat of the troops of our western border VO depended, ultimately, not on the quality of command and control, but what happened:

- firstly, due to weaker technical equipment and weaker training of the troops and headquarters of the spacecraft compared to the army of Nazi Germany

- secondly, due to the suddenness of the attack, the fascist army, fully mobilized and concentrated on our borders, against our troops that have not been brought to combat readiness.

In these main reasons for the defeat of the troops of the border VO, the share of the guilt of the command of the troops of the districts and armies is small, which, in my opinion, does not require special evidence.

The main attack was directed against Zapovo troops and, in particular, of the four tank groups that played the main role in the German offensive operation, two tank groups attacked the ZOVO troops. On the other hand, the speed of defeating the troops of the Western District undoubtedly depended in some way on the weak command and control of the ZapovO troops and armies.

The reason for the weak command and control of ZAPOV is to a large extent the more than the unsuccessful composition of the command of ZapOVO troops and, above all, the incompatibility of their position with the district commander himself.

Army General Pavlov, having no experience in command of military units (excluding command for a short period of time), after participating in the war in Spain, was appointed head of the ABTU KA, and a year before the war commander of the forces Zapov. Having neither experience in troop control, nor sufficient military education and a broad operational horizon, Army General Pavlov was taken aback in the difficult situation of the initial period of the war and let go of troop control. The same random and irrelevant to their positions were the commander of the Air Force Zapovo Kopec and the commander of the artillery of Klich county.

Both he and the other, like Pavlov himself, were participants in the war in Spain and had no experience in managing troop formations: Klich had been a teacher and head of the artillery department at the academy for a long time before traveling to Spain, and Kopets before Spain commanded the squadron (in the early days of the war Kopec shot himself).

Was it possible to appoint Pavlova, Kopets and Klich with their light military-scientific baggage and experience to such high positions in the most important VOK? The answer is obvious. I summarize the following:

1. The main fault in the defeat of troops Zapov in the initial period of the war should be removed from the command of troops Zapov.

2. The heavier share of the fault of the command of the Zapov troops in defeating the district’s troops as compared with the command of the neighboring IN is due to the unsuccessful composition of the command of the Zapov of the pre-war period, and part of this fault therefore falls on those who approved such a composition of the command of the district.

3. There was no intentional intention to destroy the district troops or to facilitate the rout of the troops by the entire district command and its individuals.

4. Conviction from the representatives of the command of the troops Zapovo should be removed... »

Author add anything. For him, everything is clear.

From the Military Council, the Zapovo was not executed only by the Fomin FWN. If indeed it was about the failure to comply with a certain Directive of the General Staff, addressed to the Military Council of the Supreme Command Organization, then no one would have survived for failing to comply with this order. Mehlis brought his subordinate out of the blow, who personified the party in the District Military Council. Fomin arrives decently and tries to help his district commander with something.

19.7.41 he writes a memo Mehlis: "I consider it my duty to report on some issues on the defense of the western border of the USSR in the territory of ZOVOVO.

1) For approximately 8 months, reports and operational studies reported on:

a) that at these geographical boundaries of the district, when the flanks of the boundaries of the district extend from the enemy to us, i.e. towards the east, and the middle part of the border goes far to the west, that such an outline of the border is very advantageous to the enemy and is extremely disadvantageous to us;

b) the negative side of such a geographical outline of the border is that it creates conditions for the coverage of our parts of the okrug and information of ticks in the Volkovysk-Baranovichi area;

c) as a result of even small successes by the Germans, the rear units of the 3 and 4 armies would immediately be cut, and with great success, the entire 10 army would be cut off. These provisions required strengthening the flanks of the district, which demanded the District Military Council from the General Staff...

All these provisions in more detailed form were reported and worked out in the General StaffThey agreed with all this, but no real measures were taken.

2) In addition, tasks were always given to work out options for an offensive operation with a clear discrepancy between real forces. But from somewhere, additional forces appeared, and, in my opinion, an artificial advantage was created in favor of us ...

3) Now, when analyzing the events that took place, it became clear that individual workers of the General Staff, knowing that in the first period of the war superiority in real forces would be on the side of Germany, for some reason they carried out and developed mainly offensive operations and only recently (at the end of May 1941 g.) Held a game to cover the border, while it was necessary for the first period of the war, taking into account the surprise of the attack, to develop defensive operations ...

4) District Military Council proposed:

a) strengthen the flank of the district: from the north - the Grodno direction and from the south - the Brest direction. During this period, 6-7 did not agree with this, and only recently it was allowed to bring 56 and 85-SD to the Grodno direction and 75-SD, and later 113-SD to Brest. These divisions were in their places in late May - early June;

b) presented and reported on the need to strengthen the flank of the district with long-term structures, building additionally on the right and left flanks a number of defense units. These proposals were rejected, and it was only on 10's June that it was allowed to additionally build two defense units ...

5) When the situation became more intense, it was ordered that all units in Eastern Belarus move to the border. It is right. But, despite our requests to speed up the concentration of divisions from Smolensk, Mogilev, Gomel and Vyazma, to transfer them by rail, this was denied. The divisions were marching in order, and only a small part of them was supplied by rail. This again delayed the concentration of troops ...

Here are briefly the questions that I considered necessary to report. I repeat: there are documents in the General Staff on all these issues ...»

The former ZWOV ZOVOVO refers to documents that should be available in the General Staff, but the person to whom this note is addressed has already decided that the authority of the party and the government is higher than the price of a group of generals: “We have to think about how to explain to the parties, the people, the whole world, why the spacecraft is retreating... »

ШТ To chief of GSH KA 2-40 21.6.41: "Sov.sekretno. Hand in immediately. The first. The 20 June direction Augustow suffered a violation of the state border by German planes: 17-41 6 aircraft went deeper 2 km, 17-43 9 aircraft 1 1 2 17 45 10 3 planes had snapshots of 2 / XNUMX km, XNUMX-XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX / XNUMX km, XNUMX-XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX / XNUMX km, XNUMX-XNUMX XNUMX had NFXX / XNUMX km, XNUMX-XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX / XNUMX km, and XNUMX-XNUMX XNUMX Aircraft deepened our territory on XNUMX km. According to the border detachment aircraft had bombs suspended.

The second. To the report of the commander of the 3 Army, wire barriers along the border along the Augustow, Sejny road, which were still daytime, by the evening shot. In this area of ​​the forest as if heard the noise of ground motors. Border guards reinforced outfit. The 345 Infantry Regiment (Augustus) was ordered to be ready. Klimovsky»

V.G. Pavlov (former commander of ZOVOVO): "At one in the morning on July 22 of this year, on the orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense, I was summoned to the front headquarters. Together with me there appeared the ChVS Corps Commissar Fominykh and NSH front, Major General Klimovskiy.

The first question on the phone, the people's commissioner asked: “Well, how are you, calmly?” I replied that a very large movement of German troops was observed on the right flank, according to the report of Kuznetsov, the commander of the 3 Army, for one and a half days went to Suvalkovsky projection German fur columns. According to his own report, barbed wire was removed in many places by the Germans in the Augustow-Sapotskin section. On other sectors of the front, I reported that the group in Bialopodlias was especially worried about me.

The people's commissioner replied to my report: “You should be calmer and do not panic, but collect headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but look, don't go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations - call. ” This conversation is over.

According to the instructions of the People's Commissar, I immediately summoned all the army commanders to the HF apparatus, ordering them to appear at the army headquarters along with the NS and operational departments. I also suggested that the commanders bring the troops into a state of combat and take up all the structures of a combat type and even unfinished reinforced concrete ...

In 3-30, the People’s Commissar of Defense called me on the phone again and asked what was new? I answered him that now there is nothing new, I have established contact with the armies and the commanders have given appropriate instructions. At the same time, I reported to the Commissar that contrary to the prohibition Head of the Air Force Zhigarev to refuel the planes with gasoline NZ and replace the engines at the expense of the NZ engines, I gave such an order to Kopts and Tayursky. People's Commissar approved my order. I promised the People's Commissar to report on the situation on my site after the second negotiations with the army commanders.... »

Not a single interrogation protocol contains a word about Pavlov’s “lies” about the “fictional words” of the Commissar of Defense. Perhaps, the investigators tried to work out the version of the “betrayal” in the top management of the spacecraft, but did not receive permission for such a development. Therefore, no one was interested in the name of an unknown person in Moscow. This topic was no longer discussed later ...

Neither in the memoirs of people serving far from borders, nor in the documents and memoirs of air defense veterans, LVO and KOVO, we found even a hint of instructions from Moscow to raise troops before Directive No. XXUMX arrived. Even Directive No. XXUMX contains the text: “The troops with all the forces and means to attack the enemy forces and destroy them in those areas where they violated the Soviet border ... Until the special order of the ground forces do not cross the border... "That is, even in Directive No. XXUMX there is no unequivocal understanding that a war has begun. Perhaps this is still a provocation, and therefore the enemy should be destroyed only where they crossed the border ...

D.G.Pavlov is the only commander of the border district who personally gave orders to raise the connections via the HF communication and conventional communication lines, and to open the “red packets”. Actions on the “red” packages contradicted the very essence of Directive No. XXUMX: not to apply for provocations, not to fly over the border, and so on. The fact that Pavlov - this commander was not in his place - is clear, but the fact that he took responsibility, which neither the People's Commissar of Defense, nor the Chief of the General Staff took on himself, is a fact. These comrades simply sent Directive No. XXUMX and were in a hurry to send them to the troops, but how exactly to bring those troops into combat readiness did not interest them ...

K.A. Meretskov: "Together with S.K.Timoshenko, I visited I.V. Stalin in Moscow and told about everything I saw. Both of them treated the report very carefully. In particular, I was ordered to additionally check the state of aviation, and if it succeeds, to conduct a combat alarm. I immediately flew to ZOVOVO. It was the last prewar Sunday. After listening to the reports of my subordinates in the morning, in the afternoon I declared the alarm of the aircraft ... Having become acquainted with the situation on the western border and after listening to Pavlov, I became convinced that here Germany is concentrating its forces... »

I.V. Boldin (deputy commander of the troops Zapovo): "That Saturday night the comedy “Wedding in Malinovka” was on the stage of the Minsk House of Officers. We sincerely laughed ... Suddenly, the head of the RO of the headquarters Zapovo, Colonel S.V. Blokhin, appeared in our box. Leaning towards Army General D.G.Pavlov, he whispered something quietly.

“It can't be,” was heard in response. The chief of the RO has retired. “Some kind of nonsense,” Pavlov told me in a low voice, “intelligence reports that it’s very disturbing at the border. The German troops were allegedly brought to full alert, and even began shelling some parts of our border ... "

The army commander 3, Lieutenant-General V.I. Kuznetsov, reported from Grodno: along the border, along the Augustow-Seini road, there were wire obstacles during the day. By the evening the Germans took them off.. In the forest in this area, the noise of numerous engines is clearly audible.

[I.V. Boldin somewhat distorts the facts. General Pavlov Boldin could not say: “By the evening the Germans had removed them,” since it happened a day before the conversation. PC in the General Staff about this went to 2-40 21 June. And this question should have been discussed by the district leadership.]

Further, intelligence established: by June 21, the German forces had focused on East Prussia, Mlava, Warsaw and Demblin directions. The main part of the German troops is in the 30-kilometer border strip. In the area of ​​Olypanka (south of Suwalki) heavy and anti-aircraft artillery was installed. There are also concentrated heavy and medium tanks. Many aircraft found. It is noted that the Germans are conducting trenching works on the shores of the Western Bug. Forty echelons with transfer means - pontoon parks and collapsible bridges, with a huge amount of ammunition, arrived in Biala Podlaska. Perhaps we can assume that the bulk of the German troops against Zapovo took the initial position for the invasion...

[What can I say. Intelligence Zapovo opened the way to the initial positions of the German troops before the start of the war. Only a day before, there was no hint of a quick war in the RM for 20.6.41. Our commanders did not know that it was so easy to prepare for war ...]

After the performance I came home ... Out of heavy thoughtfulness I got a phone call. The duty officer transmitted the order of the commander to immediately appear at headquarters ... Fifteen minutes later he entered the commander’s office. Caught there were Air Force Corps of Corps Commissar A.Ya.Fominykh and NSH Major General VE Klimovskikh.

“What happened?” - I ask General Pavlov.

- I myself can not figure it out. You know, some kind of devilry. A few minutes ago I called from the army of blacksmiths 3. He says that the Germans violated the border in the area from Sopotskin to Augustovo, bombed Grodno, the army headquarters. Communication with parts by wire is broken, switched to radio. Two radio stations have stopped working - maybe destroyed. Before you came, Golubev called from the 10 army, and Colonel Sandalov from the 4 NS. Messages are unpleasant. The Germans are bombing everywhere ... Our conversation was interrupted by a phone call from Moscow. Pavlova called ... S.K.Timoshenko. Commander reported on the situation... »

General Boldin arrived at headquarters only after the start of the war ... How could this be if the entire commanding staff of the district headquarters was raised after one in the morning? The Germans are bombing everywhere ... And which General Pavlov, after 2- = hours, has already taken part in raising troops ...

I.I.Semenov (Deputy NSh ZOVOVO - Head of Operations Department): “In the month of November 1940, I was appointed to the position of deputy to the headquarters for operational work. At the district headquarters, I, in fact, did not work, because From November 1940 to the second half of April, 1941 worked in the General Staff to draw up a district deployment plan, and in May-June 1941 conducted operational games to work out a plan in the 3 and 10 armies, in the region of Grodno-Belostok. 20 June I was urgently summoned from Bialystok to the district headquarters, and 22 June the war began... »

B.A.Fomin (Head of the 1 Division of the Operations Division of the District Staff):Based on instructions from the district, defense plans for the state border were developed by each army located in the first operational echelon of the district troops (3, 10 and 4 armies) and were approved in April 1941. Extracts from these plans, in their part concerning, were stored in the headquarters of corps and divisions in sealed “red” packages ...
An order to open the red packets from the district headquarters followed in the outcome of June 21.

[At the end of 21 June, there could be no order, but at the beginning of 22, it could have. There is not a single confirmation of the order to open the "red packets" from the headquarters Zapovo 21 June. There are no such orders from the headquarters of other western districts.]

The strike of the enemy aviation (3-50 22.6) caught the troops at the time of their advancement ...

By June 21, on the basis of separate orders (PC), thirteen pr units were fully concentrated, 14-I (113-I Major-General Alaverdov) was on the way ... At a depth of 250-300 km - six sd (50, 121, 155, 143 , 100, 55) of them in motion are four (50, 122, 155, 143) and four divisions (2 and 44 ck) at a depth of 300 and more than km.

The defense of the border before the outbreak of hostilities did not engage in divisions. By the beginning of the strike of aviation (in 3-50 22.6) and the artillery preparation (4-00 22.6) of the enemy, they managed to turn around and take up the defense of the state border: in 3 A - control 4 ck, 27 and 56 cd; in 10 A - control of 1 and 5 cc, 2, 8, 13 and 86 cd, in 4 A - 6 and 75 cd; hit found in the process of nomination for the occupation of the state border defense in 3 A - 85 sd; in 4 A - 42 sd ...

With a group of 21.6 6-00 officers in the district, I went with a train to Obuz-Lesna in Minsk in the morning to deploy the command post of the front headquarters there. He reported on the readiness of KP NS Klimovsky in 1-30 22.6. Last did not tell me anything about the received orders to bring the district troops on alert, only by the morning did 22.6 promise to arrive with headquarters in Obuz-Lesna. I found out about the war at about four in the morning... »

Since NS ZOVOVO in 1-30 22 June promised to arrive at KP together with the district headquarters, he did not yet know that war would begin at dawn. As was shown in other parts: the deployment of KP districts was carried out according to plan, long before receiving at least some truthful information about the beginning of the 22.6.41 war.

D.I. Kochetkov (employee of the Political Propaganda Department ZOVOVO): “At 6, one o'clock in the morning came ... a knock at the door ... A Red Armyman, breathless from a quick walk, stood outside the door: "Comrade battalion commissar, you are ordered to immediately go to headquarters." Several "hawks" circled over Minsk in the bright morning sky. Radio reported air raid. A thought flashed: "Apparently, the teachings of the air defense system began." Almost all the workers of the Department of Political Propaganda have already gathered: “What happened, comrades, why did they call us?” “Nothing is known yet,” Vasya Rudakov, senior instructor of the party organization department, shrugged. Senior Political Commander Mokhnachev came out of the office of the divisional commissioner Lestev ... He said quietly: “A message was received that the Germans bombed Lida, Kobrin, Brest, Baranovichi... ""

CDB ZF: "22.6.41. At about one in the morning, ShT was instructed from Moscow with an order to immediately bring the troops into combat readiness in case of a German attack expected in the morning.

Approximately in 2-00 - 2-30, a similar order was made by the cipher to the armies, parts of the UR were ordered to immediately take the UR. On the signal "Thunderstorm" was introduced with the action "Red Pack", which contains a plan to cover the state border. The staffing of the district headquarters by the headquarters of the armies was received, as it turned out, too late, the 3-I and 4-I armies managed to decipher orders and make some orders, and the 10-I army decoded the warning after the start of hostilities ...

Troops pulled up to the border in accordance with the instructions of the General Staff of the spacecraft. Written orders and orders to the corps and divisions were not given. The divisional commanders received instructions orally from the High School District Major General Klimovsky. It was explained to the staff that they were going to big teachings. The troops took with them all educational property ... "

In 4-00 22.6, district headquarters began to continuously receive reports, mainly on the air defense system, about bombardments ... According to the report of the air defense control in 4-00 - 4-30, the company post of air defense Belsk is broken... »

In accordance with the OBD: 100-I SD was in Minsk. 64-I am from Smolensk and 108-I am from Vyazma by rail were transported to the Minsk region. 161-I sd marched from march from Mogilev to Minsk in marching order. 47 st sk (55, 121, 143 cd) managed to send part of the headquarters and corps from Bobruisk to Baranavichy district. 121-I sd from Bobruisk moved to the Obuz-Lesna area. 143-I SD was transported by rail from Gomel to the area Byten. 21 st sk (24 and 37 sd) from Vitebsk was transported to the city of Lida. 24-I sd 22.6.41 was located in the area of ​​Molodechno, 37-I sd ended concentration in the area of ​​Benyakone-Voronovo. 17-I sd finished the transition marching order from Polotsk in the area of ​​Lida. 50-I SD was on the march in the area Dunilovichi.

3-I army. Kondratiev A.K. (NS 3 A): "No orders about bringing the army troops on alert, as I recall, have been received... »

K.N. Galitsky (56 cd 4 ck): "At the end of May 1941, part of the division forces was pushed to the border in the Avgustov forest, through which the channel of the same name passed ... Along the eastern bank of the channel and west to Augustovo, in the immediate vicinity of the state border, parts of the division equipped the line of defense ... county headquarters. At the reception, I met the commander of the 12 commander, sk Major-General VB Borisov, and the commander of the 21 SD Major-General VP Evdokimov who were leaving the office. Their faces were concerned. But they did not have time to talk - I was immediately invited to the commander. Major General V.Ye. Klimovskikh was in his office as well. Greeting, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov said: “From June 50-13 it is necessary to hold monthly training sessions for the retraining of infantrymen to specialists of other branches of the military ...

In the second half of June, apparently, large military exercises of the district troops will take place, during which 24-I will be transferred by cars of two car brigades to the Grodno region. Now we need to start preparing the exercise ... Keep in mind, according to the plan of the exercise in 20 in June, the region ... will be released 50 sd. Give her your military camps and prepare camp sites in the forests of this area. All parts of this division will be supplied from your warehouses. Details on the placement of parts of General Yevdokimov work with the NSh district.
In conclusion, he warned: “There will be no written instructions from me and the district headquarters. Do everything according to my personal instructions. Report them to the army commander, General Kuznetsov. Unclear questions check with NSH district ... "

When, returning to my room, I told Major General 3 divisions NSH. D. Pododoranov about the instructions of the district commander, Zakhar Demidovich asked bluntly: “Do not you think Kuzma Nikitovich that all this upcoming troop advance closer to the border means preparing more important events , what is the exercise? ”“ Judging by the nomination of 50 sd to the region of Smorgon, Krevo, and possibly the entire 21 ck west of the city of Lida, ”I replied,“ a second operational echelon of front troops is being created in the Grodno direction. Our division, scheduled to be deployed to the Grodno area, obviously, will have to reinforce the first operational echelon of the 3 army. But these are just assumptions ... ”16-17 June we, with the regimental commanders and staff officers, conducted a reconnaissance of the routes of the upcoming exercise in the direction of Lida - Grodno.

Late night 21 Junreturning from Avgustov, General Kuznetsov drove into the army headquarters, got acquainted with the latest reports and was about to go home. But then the HF phone rang. Kuznetsov received an order from General of the Army DGPavlov to be with the staff, awaiting a particularly important order. The commander immediately summoned to the headquarters of all the officers of the field administration and the political department of the army. On his instructions, in the second hour of the night, the headquarters contacted the commanders of 11 MK and 4 SC, Major General of the Tank Forces DK Mostovenko and Major General E.A.Egorov. They were warned that they, as well as divisional commanders, should be at the telephone.

It was already about 2 hours 22 June, when V.I. Kuznetsov received a short order from the front commander from the front commander: to raise all troops on alert, parts of the UR immediately take up the bunkers and bring them to full alert, on signal "Thunderstorm" to activate the "red packet" containing a plan to cover the state border. At the same time, DGPavlov warned that the full text of the order was being transmitted to the army headquarters. He also said that perhaps the Germans are preparing a provocation ...

Even before receiving the directive, immediately after the conversation of V.I. Kuznetsov with DG Pavlov, the army headquarters transmitted the alarm signal to the corps and division commanders. But with some divisions, including our 24, there was no longer a wired connection: it was damaged by saboteurs. Artillery regiments and anti-aircraft artillery divisions were sent an order to immediately return from the artillery training camp to the location of their divisions.

Almost an hour later, a directive from the Supreme Soviet of the district began to arrive from Minsk by communication: “During 22-23 on June 1941, the Germans might have a sudden attack ...” This directive was brought to the Military Council in parts, N later told me I. Biryukov - but we did not have time to get it completely. The connection was lost. Tried to get in touch with the neighbors. But from the commander of 10 the army of General KD Golubev, a neighbor on the left, learned that he had not been in contact with the district headquarters for several hours. With the neighbor on the right has not been contacted.

This conflicting directive I could not, of course, mobilize and direct the army command to carry out the hostilities provided for by the operational plan in the event of an invasion. Subsequently, the former head of the operational department of ZAPOV, General I.I. Semenov ... to my question, what can explain such a vague Directive, answered: "Pavlov received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense at night 22.6 ... and, having his personal instructions on HF, ordered him to be handed over to the Military Councils of the armies literally, as it was received from Moscow, without any additions, but already signed by the District Military Council. This directive was sent to the armies in 2-25 22 June... »

The call of Commissar of Defense to 23-00 is echoed in the following lines of memory: “Late at night 21 June, returning from Augustovo, General Kuznetsov drove into the army headquarters, got acquainted with the latest reports and was going to go home. But then the HF phone rang. Kuznetsov received an order from General of the Army DGPavlov to be with the staff, awaiting a particularly important order. ”

An echo of the received Directive No. 1 in the headquarters of Zapovo poured into the following lines: “It was already around 2 hours 22 June, when V. I. Kuznetsov received on HF a short order from the front commander: to raise all troops on alert, parts of the UR immediately take up the bunkers and bring them to full alert, on the signal "Thunderstorm" put into effect the "red packet" containing the plan to cover the state border ".

The controversial and indistinct Directive No. XXUMX, which could not mobilize and direct the command to conduct the hostilities provided for by the operational plan in the event of an invasion - these are the words of the combat commander. Before coming to the districts of this directive, the high command of the SC also did not decide to transmit anything intelligible over the telephone, except, for example: “Keep in mind that provocation by Germany is possible. Do not give in to provocations ... War, perhaps, will not happen, but the troops should be ready ... All the details in a particularly important directive, which is transmitted to the districts. "

Moscow sideltsy disclaimed responsibility for making decisions or did not believe in the beginning of the 22 war of June. A third option is also possible - due to the lack of real combat experience of the modern war, the Moscow “sofa” strategists were not afraid of an imminent war with the Germans: we are beating seven with one blow ...

K.N. Galitsky (56 cd 4 ck): "The division commanders received an order of combat alarm at different times. One of the first about 2 hours Nights received an order from the commander 85 sd .., who was with his headquarters in Grodno. He immediately called his deputy ... and, reporting a possible provocation of the German fascist troops on the state border, ordered to raise part of the division for alert, simultaneously dissolve the divisional training camp for machine-gunners, snipers, reconnaissance men and others, to return everyone to SP.

By half past three in the morning the order was executed. Part of the division, raised in alarm, were stationed in the camp near the Soly metro station on the southern bank of the Neman River in 5-6 km southeast of Grodno in readiness to go to the area of ​​concentration according to the border guard plan. But the signal "Thunderstorm" did not act, because By this time, the camp was disconnected from the headquarters of the division and the army. Colonel Skorobogatkin decided to push the units to the line of the Loson river and take him for defense. It is light. It was about 4 in the morning when the shelves began to move. At this time, airplanes with a swastika on the wings and fuselage have already appeared over Grodno... "

G.V. Revunenkov (NSh 37 sd): "17 June 1941 of the year I, the division commander Colonel Chekharin and the corps commander General Borisov were summoned to Minsk to the district headquarters for a briefing, where we were told that 37 cd was moving to the camp under the town of Lida, to the town of Voronovo ... 22 June was the headquarters of the division at 12 -00 was at the station Bogdanuv, near Lida, where Molotov spoke about the war with Germany on the radio... »

Ya.Ya.Kovalenko (pompot of tank company 33 td, 11 mk): "In one of the city parks sat on a bench, ate, drank a little and headed for the part. In the city, here and there, war machines and motorcycles scurried about. In the conversation, we discussed this and came to the conclusion that such an active movement of technology and the presence in Bialystok of the commander of BOVO, General Pavlov, who was meeting with the higher command personnel these days.

Returning to the unit saw that the soldiers of the neighboring battalion actively preparing cars, remove the tarpaulin, fill the tanks with fuel and shells. What was the matter? It turned out that uhthen the initiative of their commanders, who ordered to prepare everything for combat. From above, no orders have been received. At 20-00, we left for supper on command, after which some of the employees returned to the barracks, and some went to watch a movie that was shown on a summer open area ...

But we could not watch the film to the end. AT 23-00 a combat alarm was declared, but not to the whole regiment, but by battalion with an interval of 20-30 minutes. Everyone left the movie site and in ten minutes all the crews were built near the combat vehicles. We already spent the night of 22 in June of 1941 of the year without sleep, because at one o'clock, on military orders, we left for a given area of ​​concentration. At two o'clock in the morning the convoy of tanks stopped and the route of movement of TP was corrected, because during the movement of heavy tanks of the neighboring regiment a wooden bridge collapsed over a small but swampy river ... They arrived at the center of concentration at three in the morning, settled in the forest and each of us considered that tactical exercises are going on that were probably ordered by the district commander, General Pavlov.

Once again this was not the case. At 4 in the morning, sitting by the tanks, we heard a continuous rumble of aircraft, and after 5 minutes the strongest explosions of aerial bombs. In the gaps of the clouds were visible huge squadrons of German bomber, which ... bombed ... at the airport of the city of Bialystok. From the burning airfield only three fighters climbed into the sky, entered into an unequal battle and managed to shoot down one German bomber. They collapsed not far from us. Then apparently they ran out of ammunition and they all flew off to the east... »

An alarm was declared in 23-00, but not to the entire regiment, but in battalion ... Whose initiative is this, but not from the top command of the SC ...

N.F.Tokuyev (soldier artillery regiment): "On the day before the start of World War II, I was in dress with a platoon, patrolling the city of Lida. The situation was very calm, no signs of preparation for military action were observed. In the evening, they played, sang, told jokes in the barracks ... At four o'clock, without declaring war on the city, several dozen German bombers flew into the city ...

There was a lull. Taking advantage of this, we ran to the artillery park to shelter the materiel and vehicles. The guns and cars in the park were installed, as required by the conditions of peacetime, on stands, the cars were not filled with fuel. The equipment was not prepared for transportation, and we began to move and shelter on our own. The forest was located in 200 m from the park - behind a clean field ... In a very short time, all the equipment was hidden in the forest. During this time, the tank trucks refueled with gasoline at the city gas station, which remained intact after the bombing... »

The Grodno UR consisted of the Office of the Commandant, the 232-nd Division of Communications, the 9-th and 10-nd detachment of the machine-gun artillery battalions (opub). After the construction of a number of structures was completed, the formation of another 6 opab was envisaged in the future. Most of the pillboxes of the Grodno 68 th UR (in the 3 th army band) at the beginning of the war were not prepared for battle. Many did not have time to arm and disguise, as provided. There was no ventilation and lighting.

At about two o'clock on 22 June, the commander of the 3 Army, V. Kuznetsov, was ordered to raise all troops on alert, and units of UR immediately take up the bunkers and bring them to full alert. 213-th joint-stock company 56-th SD, 1-th battalion of the 23-second detachment regiment were alarmed in 3-35. The 1-th and 3-th battalions of the 213-th joint venture, using the available facilities, took up defensive positions along the southern bank of the Augustów Canal, and the 2-th battalion - along the northern ones.

Four hours before the rise of troops, subordinate to the commander of the troops of the 3-th army, the units of the 68-UR are on alert. We didn’t meet the lifting of the units of the URs in 23-30 21 of June in KOVO and we will not meet them again in ZOVOVO. The author has no assumptions: who took such an initiative. one can only say that it was not an echo of the order from Moscow ... link

ZhDB Grodno UR: "21.6.41 23-30. Order issued by telephone by Colonel Zheleznyak [Commander Colonel Ananii Mironovich Zheleznyak] 9 and 10 pulbates raise b-us on alarm, take and load bunkers.

22.6.41 00-30 - 3-45. Machine gun battalions loaded pillboxes. The enemy began a strong artillery preparation along the leading edge of the SD and the aerial bombardment of the mountains of Grodno.

4-10 - 4-20. Departure for KP UR. Order NS.

4-30. The staff of the headquarters arrived at KP UR. Communicating with 9 and 10 PB... »

F.I. Starichenkov (NSH 68 UR): "21 June around 19 - 20 hours of the evening I was urgently summoned with a combat card in Grodno, to the headquarters of the UR-68, to a meeting of the NSH (jointly UR-68 and the UNS-71).

The meeting was held by Colonels Ivanov and Kashirin, intelligence chief Captain Seliunin and chiefs of other services at UR-68. The meeting dragged on until one in the morning. Each of those present NS (artillery bullets, sapper and construction battalions) on their combat maps put data on the concentration of German troops, the armament of those parts of the Wehrmacht, who were against our battalions. Set the password "Alarm and hang up" and we went our separate parts.

When the driver and 6-7 officers and I… crossed the Sovetskaya square in Grodno, it was difficult for us to drive in in the column of troops 3-th army. They were raised in alert and moved towards the border on Augustow. In the direction of Sopotskin passage was free. I arrived in Sopotskin, in my headquarters, in 2-00 the nights of June already 22. From the report of the duty officer on headquarters I learned that our 9-th opab had gone to the border, to their own bunkers. I also hurried to the CP, in the DOT between Sopotskin and Tartak. The first thing I did was to personally ring up all the combat garrisons, who reported on full combat readiness and loyalty to our Homeland. I familiarized the company commanders with the situation and the location of enemy units, their numbers. In the morning, 4-00, fascist German troops attacked us with a barrage of fire from all types of weapons.... "

He did not know about the rise of the UR of the Starchenkov NS before arrival to the unit, therefore, they did not know about this information at the meeting either. There is mention of raising some troops of the 3 Army in alarm.

V.I. Vetokhin (lieutenant, 68-th UR): "I got into the command bunker 1 of the 9 company, opab, was appointed commander of the machine gun. The alarm in the bunkers turned out to be not only regular fighters, but also many other servicemen. Among them were the builders ... The bunker was a three-brick, in the middle compartment there was a 45-mm cannon and a machine gun, and on the sides were two machine-gun compartments with Maxim machine guns. In the other three-diamond pillboxes there were 76-mm guns. Ammunition was not enough.

The offensive of the Germans went left flank ... 23 June after shelling by German artillery (direct fire) DOT lost its combat capability. First, the periscope of the commander was destroyed, then the gun and machine gun. Only the machine gun, behind which I was, kept its combat readiness. By the evening of 23, the team arrived to leave DOT... »

M.S. Rybas: "At the district headquarters in Minsk, he was assigned to Grodno. From there in the evening of June 21 we, several people, were taken by car to the location of 68 UR. On June 22, when it was still dark, we were alarmed and sent to DOTs, I don’t remember my DOT numbers. There were no doors in the pillbox, there was no telephone connection. Armament - 2 76-mm cannon and machine gun. The shelling sector is approximately 80-85 ° to the left. The right side of the bunker was to be protected by the fire of the neighboring bunker, which was located behind, in the rear, and the right of our bunker. We managed to hold from this pillbox to our telephone connection. And there was also a telephone connection with another DOT, which was from us on the left flank.... »

«At 2 one o'clock in the morning we were alerted and half an hour later we were already in our bunkers, where ammunition carts soon arrived. The bunker immediately put on alert as soon as it began to dawn, as the rumble of numerous airplanes sounded in the sky. At first, distant bombings were heard, and then closer and closer to us: in Sopotskino, in UR. And suddenly, as if a firestorm swooped in - heavy cannons struck from behind the canal... »

«The commanders lived in apartments with local residents, fighters in temporary dugouts ... In early June, they often began to carry out combat alarms for the purpose of training. On the night of 20 on 21 June, the battalion was raised by such an alarm and was on the defensive until 10-00. On Saturday, people rested. And at one in the morning, an order came from the headquarters of the UR: on alarm, with raising the entire NZ, to occupy firing points. An hour later, the battalion was ready to repel the enemy. At first, they thought that this anxiety, like the previous one, was a learning one. But soon bombers flying to our rear appeared in the sky. Half an hour later, the Nazis opened heavy fire at the location of the battalion and neighboring outposts.... »

4-I army. L.M.Sandalov (NSh of the 4th Army): "I ... retold what I heard from the new district commander, General Pavlov. According to the data he received in Moscow, so far we have not had any changes in relations with Germany. But, since Hitler freed his hands in the West, complications in the East are not excluded. Therefore, it is necessary to speed up the construction of defensive structures on the border and to maintain constant combat readiness in the troops ...

Then we talked about the command of the district. I frankly said that the new commander, I think, a broad operational and strategic outlook does not possess. But this is a sensible, energetic general, albeit a bit unnecessarily arrogant, not inclined to listen to the opinion of subordinates. It is, of course, difficult for him to lead the district, and even such as ZVO is special.

New NSH District General Klimovsky I knew much better He was a highly educated and experienced staff leader, but due to his gentle nature, he could hardly save the commander from wrong decisions. Klimovsky did not belong to those people who, being convinced of the correctness of their point of view, are able to defend it in front of anyone.

“Well, how did you like the new district headquarters?” Asked Shlykov. “Divisional Commissar Fominykh also hardly be able to play a prominent role under Pavlov", - I answered bluntly and expressed sincere regret that in this position I had been very much loved by Commissar I.I. Golikov for so long ...

“Yes,” Chuikov supported me, “in the present difficult international situation, the new command of Zapov is not such a big acquisition. But let's better talk about matters relating directly to the 4 army ... "

As soon as Chuikov disappeared from our horizon, the 4 th army began to infringe in every possible way. The improvements we had made with such difficulty in deploying troops at the border were very soon nullified. And it began with the formation of the 14-th micron. The General Staff proposed that: one TD be formed in Bereza on the basis of the Brest TPR ..., there you can also create a corps control, deploy a second TD from a brigade located in Pruzhany; MD form in Pinsk. The operational advantage of such an order of formation and dislocation of microns was obvious. Somewhat drawn from the frontier, he would have time in the event of war to get ready for battle and strike in any direction.
However, the district commander had his own opinion on this. Inspecting the points planned for the deployment of the corps, Pavlov told us: “Do not imagine that I will allow army units and headquarters to be located better than u, which you expect to keep in a black body. I recommend to remember that just a few months ago I was the head of the armored troops troops.

Together with the FVS of the 4 Army Shlykov, we tried to remind that the MK dislocation was not determined by us, but by the General Staff ... Pavlov, probably, managed to convince the Chief of the General Staff. A few days later we received an official written order confirming everything that Pavlov expressed orally. The only “concession” to us was the permission to leave the 42 division alone outside the Brest Fortress and place it in the Zhabinka area.

In the spring of 1941, the Brest garrison was replenished with a new sd ... At this time, the new 4 commander of the army, Major General A.A. Korobkov, arrived. I knew him for a long time. He was a very active commander, quickly moving up the career ladder and leaving behind many of his fellow soldiers. In 1938, he commanded the SD, from the division he went to the corps, and by the spring of 1941, he was already at the head of the 4 army. The new commander meticulously executed the will of the district commander for the deployment of troops. He either didn’t have his point of view on this subject or carefully concealed it..

On the night of June 14, I raised the 6 sd. A day earlier, the same alarm was held in 42 SD by the commander of 28 sk, Major General V.S. Popov. Summing up the results of these two alarms, we unanimously expressed the wish to withdraw 42 sd to the Zhabinka region and about the organization of emergency exits in the walls of the 2-3 fortress. Later, when our proposal was rejected by the commander of the district, General Popov spoke in favor of bringing the 42 division to the camp to the territory of the Brest artillery range, but the district leadership also prevented this ...

In the morning [21.6.41] ...The commander handed me a telegram: “The NSh of the Okrug reports that representatives from the okrug and from NPOs will arrive in Brest today to participate in the army experimental exercise. We must meet them and arrange. And we are going to the training ground with the chief of combat training now and we will rehearse everything there once again. Warn commanders of units and units so that by eight o'clock tomorrow there will be all on the range ...

During our conversation with Tutarinov [NS 14-th mk] I looked into my office for some reason Shlykov. The mechanic corps' NS, turning to him rather than to me, continued: “Among the people, and even among the troops, rumors of the impending invasion of the Germans do not stop. What data do you have from this district or from Moscow? ”
“Apart from the TASS Statement known to you, there is nothing,” answered Shlykov. "Kohl soon the district and Moscow appointed a doctrine for the Brest training ground for tomorrow, presumably, nothing threatening is foreseen."- I tried to encourage Tutarinov ...

To my question, when I left the airfield of the assault regiment, Akulin replied: “By order of the okrug, the hat flew in full force this morning to the field airfield in the Vysokoe district. They also have a novelty - they got a couple of IL-2 planes ... ”- commander iap major N.V. Akulin reported. Under Kobrin I looked at our old airfield. Major Surin commanded the regiment there ...

From the old I went to the new Kobrin airfield and found there the commander of the garden, as well as the commander of the air defense district. “As you can see, the runway is almost ready,” commended Colonel Belov, “in the coming days it will be possible to relocate the Surin regiment here” ...

"You are well known," - spoke [commander of the air defense area] with undisguised annoyance in the voice, - "that I, like the troops of the 4 army, have anti-aircraft units in the camp near Minsk. Neither army headquarters, nor MK headquarters, nor aviation, nor even me to cover myself from the air in the region of Kobrin. “But the district promised to return your anti-aircraft divisions!” - I was indignant ...

Soon he returned from Brest and the army commander. I reported to him about the results of visiting KP, as well as tank and air divisions. However, my report did not impress him..

In a minute he is enthusiastically began to talk about his trip ... About 23 hours We were called to the NSh telephone. However, we received no special orders. About the same thing that needs to be prepared, we ourselves knew.

The commander limited himself to summoning responsible officers of the army administration to the headquarters ... Every hour they called the Brest frontier detachment and divisions. From everywhere there was information about German troops who had been prepared on the western bank of the Bug. They reported this to the district headquarters, but no orders followed from there. Korobkov grumbled: "As commander of the army, I have the right to raise one division on alert. I wanted to raise 42, but I consulted with Pavlov, but he did not allow ...

At two o'clock, Hitler's agents began to operate. They reported from Brest by phone that in some areas of the city and at the railway station the lights went out and the water supply system failed. A few minutes later an accident occurred at the power station in Kobrin. Half an hour later, an agitated head of the army’s communications, Colonel A.N. Litvinenko, came to me and reported in an intermittent voice: “The wire communication with the district headquarters and with all troops ceased. Only one line to Pinsk remained intact. He sent people in all directions to repair the damage. " To get acquainted with the situation on the spot, the commander sent to Brest my deputy colonel Krivosheev, and to Vysokoy and Malorita — other commanders of the headquarters,

About an hour later, contact with the district headquarters, with Brest and with High, in which the commandant of the UR was dispersed, was restored. It turned out that tens of meters of wire were cut on the lines in several places.
В 3-30 Korobkova was summoned to the telegraph office by the district commander and reported that a provocative raid by fascist gangs on our territory was expected on that night. But he categorically warned that we should not give in to the provocation. Our task is only to capture the gangs. The state border is prohibited.

When asked by the army commander what specific measures are allowed to be held, Pavlov replied: “Bring all parts of the army into combat readiness. Immediately begin to deploy a division from the 42 fortress to take up trained positions. Occupy parts of the Brest UR and hide the pillboxes. Relocate the regiments of the air division to field airfields ”. Before the 4 watch, the commander managed to personally hand over the telephone the order of the 42 NSh division and the commandant of the UR. And in the morning hours of 4 the Germans had already opened artillery fire on Brest and the fortress... »

N.G. Belov (commander 10 garden): "In May, the 123-iap received the 20 of the YAK-1 aircraft, the 39-th bap - the 5 of the Pe-2 machines. And by mid-June, two brand new Il-74s appeared in the 2 cap. The neighboring division transferred two MiG-33 to the 1 ip.
However, the training flights on the incoming machines were not made, because no high-octane fuel was released for them. But the main thing was not the case. Retraining flight personnel on new aircraft planned to conduct a centralized order. In parts do it categorically forbidden... The regiments of the division ... were withdrawn to the camps at their airfields. 74 cap - on the field airfield, in 4 – 5 kilometers from the border.

On June 20 I received the ShT of the NSh of the Air Force of the District of Colonel S.A. Khudyakov with the order of the Commander of the Air Force of the District: “Bring the units to combat readiness. Leave commanders ban. Those on leave to withdraw.
Immediately the order of the commander was transferred to the unit. The commanders of the regiments also received my order: “To disperse the airplanes outside the airfield, and to dig gaps there to shelter personnel. The personnel from the location of the camp will not let go. ” I reported on the order of the district air force commander to the commander of the 4 Army, General Korobkov, who answered me: “I have no such order"...

21 June hours in 10 I flew to 74 the hat of Major Vasilyev, who, together with 33-iap, was based at the airfield in Pruzhany ... In 16 hours I flew over to the airfield in 123-ip Major Boris Nikolaevich Surin. There he planned to hold a meeting with the commanders of the regiments. At the airfield, Colonel Fedulev, NSh of the division, was already waiting for me: “A new ST. The order to bring parts into combat readiness and to ban vacations is canceled. Parts to be engaged under the plan of combat training. "

- How so? - was surprised. - I do not get it.

- Well, no blessing in disguise. On Sunday we will hold sports competitions. And then we had canceled them. In the 33 ip, everything is prepared.

- No, Semyon Ivanovich! Let's not bring this PC yet. Let everything remain as before, and I don’t want to call athletes out of parts. In addition, I promised to be in Pinsk in 39-m bap ...

“Nikolai Georgievich,” I heard the voice of Colonel Sandalov. “The commander asks to come to him now.” In the habit that had developed, he glanced at his watch - 24-00. “Strange, to this day the commander didn’t call me to himself at night. Apparently, something special happened "...

General Korobkov was one: "An order was received to bring the headquarters to combat readiness."

“In that case, I will raise the division in alarm.”

“Don't panic,” the commander stopped me. - I already wanted to raise one division, but the district commander forbade it.

- I am in command of the Air Division, and even the border, and I am not going to ask anyone for permission. I have the right at any time part of the division to raise the alarm ... about 2 hours 22.6.41 nights. I give the signal "Combat Alarm" ... In the fourth hour, reports began arriving from the VNOS posts about the border's flight by single German aircraft ... From 3-50 to 4-20, all airfields of the division were subjected to a massive air raid... »

In the presented fragment of memoirs there is a discrepancy with the documents. The memoir says: "Received a new PC. The order to bring parts into combat readiness and to ban vacations is canceled. Part of the engage in combat training plan ... No, Semen Ivanovich! Let's not bring this PC yet. Let everything stay the same... »

However, in accordance with the RCB 10-th garden: "21.6.41 15-00. [Received] verbal order ...: "PC to bring parts on alert to cancel. The units continued their flight and command training with increased readiness ... "17-00 Oral Order of the Commander of the Air Force Zapovo was communicated to the units of the division... »

The initiative of the commander of the airdivision NG Belov was that he at his disposal on the compound somewhat changed the wording of the instructions received from the district: “Parts of the division to be in a state of camp service with increased readiness, part of the aircraft, which do not interfere with the production of scheduled flights, remain dispersed. Disguise measures for study purposes do not remove».

Raising the 10 garden for combat alert after a conversation with the commander of the 4 Army (after 24-00) is doubtful, because, in accordance with the RCB, anxiety in the division was announced only in 2-30. At this time, other connections to the district begin to rise. However, the 4 Army formations began to rise only after 3-30. Probably, in the actions of General NG Belov, in this case, his personal initiative can be traced somewhat delayed in time. Lost time can be associated with the adoption of a difficult decision at the headquarters of the division and the preparation of instructions for subordinate aviation regiments.

RCB 10 Garden: "21.6.41 2-00. The division headquarters received an order from the Air Force Commander ZOVOVO SHT, signed by Colonel Tarasenko, with the following content: “Make 10 garden parts alert # 2 and call personnel off the holidays.”

On the basis of the orders of the commander of the Air Force Zapovo, in 4-00 21.6 the command of the division was called to the Named airfield: commander 123 iap, 33 iap, 74 cap, 39 sbap and commanders of airdrome maintenance unit battalions. The division commander ordered the units: “To disperse the materiel of the aircraft on their airfields, to put the units in readiness No. XXUMX and to call the personnel from the holidays”.

21.6.41 15-00. In the operational division of the division, Captain Ostrovsky, on the telephone “HF” (Kobrin-Minsk), received an oral order from Colonel Tarasenko to read: “They declare the military command of combat units to be canceled. The units continue flight and command training with increased readiness. ”This verbal order was confirmed by the SC, signed by Colonel Tarasenko.

21.6.41 17-00. The verbal order of the ZOVOVO Air Force Commander was communicated to the units of the division and in 17-00 SHT NSH of the division to the ZOVOVO Air Force Headquarters reported: “Parts of the division are in a state of camp service with increased readiness, some of the aircraft that do not interfere with the production of planned flights are left dispersed. Measures of disguise for study is not removed. Fedulev

22.6.41 2-30. The division commander declared combat alarm units of the division. Simultaneously with the announcement of the alarm on the radio, the planes sent the units to the units:

74 hat ... Colonel Bondarenko with the task of immediately announcing a combat alarm, to bring part in readiness №2 and transfer the regiment to the airfield Strigovo.

33 iap Kuplin Colonel Fedulev with a written order immediately regiment alert the number XXUMX and be ready for action. Departure by additional order.

With the same order was sent to 39 sbap - ... Captain Dobrynin.

These same commanders were charged with monitoring and checking the bringing of parts into readiness No. XXUMX. The control and management of the 2 iap division commander left behind.

a) 123 iap in 2-30. After 40 minutes after the alarm was announced, the regiment dispersed the aircraft and was ready to perform a combat mission.

b) The 33 IAP in the 3-10 regiment as part of the 31 aircraft (of which I-16 = 25 and I-153 = 6 units) was prepared for hostilities and dispersed across the squadron at the airfield.

d) 39 sbap in 4-30, 5-15 regiment as part of 25 aircraft was ready for departure. The aircraft materiel was dispersed throughout the airfield.

e) 74 cap combat alarm regiment announced by Colonel Bondarenko in 4-10.

During the period of 3-45 - 4-10, a simultaneous sudden and predatory raid by the Air Force of fascist Germany bombed the airfields of the division ...

At the time of the attack of the air force of the enemy on the city of Kobrin from the Air Force, the ZOVOVO signed by Colonel Tarasenko received the following code: “1) For 9-00 22.6.41 to arrive on the plane the Air Force headquarters having full information about the combat strength of the Air Force units and the state of the materiel and the decision on use of parts.

2) With 5 22.6.41 hours, all parts are on alert # 2 for immediate departure, do not stop retraining flights.

3) Fill all airplanes with fuel, if there is no current allowance to refuel from NZ.

4) Mobile containers fill with fuel.

5) Combat cartridge kits fill - fighter units - 3, bomber - 3 ... bombs. With PC to acquaint the head of air bases. Tarasenko»

At the headquarters of the Air Force, the districts also tried to somehow take the initiative in preparing aviation for a possible attack. If it were a centralized policy of the center, then the end of the alarm on June 21 would not have happened ...

To be continued ...

Comments

[ivamoss]

There is a lot of interesting material again - thanks to the author for this. It was not worth it to devote so much space to the scoundrel Pavlov. could do with three paragraphs. All the same, I note the article

[Waddimm]

Quote: ivamoss

It was not worth it to devote so much space to the scoundrel Pavlov.

It was worth it. History is not studied for fun, but in order not to make similar mistakes. The author convincingly showed that the scoundrel of the general was made by those who could not foresee the current development of events, who did not listen to reports of an imminent attack by Germany, who gave criminal orders "not to succumb to provocations." And for that matter - those who appointed an incompetent military leader to a position that he did not correspond to. Well, then these people, for their excuse, easily made the general a scoundrel and shot him.
So who is the scoundrel? The one who could not cope with his work due to objective and subjective reasons, or those who can easily "substitute" a subordinate?
Are our officers insured against such leaders now?

[Olgovich]

Quote: Waddimm

The author convincingly showed that the scoundrel of the general was made by those who could not foresee the current development of events, who did not listen to reports of an imminent attack by Germany, who gave criminal orders "not to succumb to provocations." And for that matter - those who appointed an incompetent military leader to a position that he did not correspond to. Well, then these people, for their excuse, easily made the general a scoundrel and shot him

This had to be thought out: to appoint the commander of the tank brigade as the commander of the .... front (district), the commander of the squadron, beginning. Air Force front, and the teacher, the start of the front.
And then shoot them, but not yourself.

The conclusion is the same as in other districts: no one was ready for hostilities.

[antivirus]

If the intelligence agencies didn’t work properly and communications were unstable, the arrivals could not help the command of the ZF ...

maybe on a monument to Zhukov near Kr Square tie a black ribbon on his neck - for such a hand-in of the Red Army?

[ccsr]

Quote: antivirus

maybe on a monument to Zhukov near Kr Square tie a black ribbon on his neck - for such a hand-in of the Red Army?

Actually, the Red Army was commanded by Tymoshenko, and Zhukov was appointed the NSS less than six months before the war, so your irony is not entirely appropriate, although I believe that he bears great responsibility as a deputy. Commissar, but no more than the rest of the deputies. Let me remind you that in peacetime it is not customary for the army to punish at least the newly appointed in the first months or six months - they are given time to eliminate those shortcomings that were not corrected by previous commanders.
At least you took this into account ...

[antivirus]

in the early 80s - Minister of Defense - farm, and the army commands and prepares for the war the Chief and General Staff, + develops plans and orders the General Staff also in the General Staff
then dr structure?

[ccsr]

Quote: antivirus

in the early 80s - Minister of Defense - farm, and the army commands and prepares for the war the Chief and General Staff, + develops plans and orders the General Staff also in the General Staff
then dr structure?

First, one-man management in the Soviet Army has not been canceled.
Secondly, the ordering structures in the NHS are just a minimum - they exist mainly in the types and types of troops for ordering equipment and weapons. The General Staff only agrees on such things.
And thirdly, the NHS does not have the authority to command all the other deputies. MO, that's why he is just one of the deputies, although he is called the first.

[AsmyppoL]

I personally liked the article. Thanks to the author for his work and a rather detailed description of his vision of events related to the district commander

[ViKLeV]

I join your answer

[antivirus]

It is unlikely that these commanders would voice their point of view. In an era when, for wrong opinions, one could easily lose one’s position, rank, and loved ones could suffer, it is unlikely that the commanders dared to express a personal opinion on politics ... According to the author, these words reflected the vision of political bodies on the international situation. The said statement of the commanders could not be voiced without the official approval (possibly, advancement of such an interpretation) by the Political Administration of the KA. Perhaps it was strategic misinformation.

I got + for "other mentality" - then everyone had to chew everything - EDUCATION WAS LITTLE AND EDUCATED - even with the upper classes kicked out to 20 g and repressive in 37 g - see yourself - up to 3-5% of 200 million and ONLY HAVE RECEIVED A HIGHER EDUCATION OF HUNDRED THOUSAND - "RED COMMANDERS-PROFESSOR-ENGINEER-TEACHER (Bandera and other" brothers "killed for that)

THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO DELIVER INFORMATION TO THE MASS - TO SPREAD UP TO A SPECIAL UNDERSTANDING, on the "sloth" of peasants - Political Information

[BAI]

About the so-called conspiracy Pavlova could not speak. There is nothing to waste time on the linden. We need to consider more real facts, documents, events.

[Operator]

"The General Staff proposed: to form one TD in Bereza on the basis of the Brest Tbr ..., to create a corps management in the same place, to deploy the second TD from a brigade stationed in Pruzhany; MD to form in Pinsk. The operational advantage of this order of formation and deployment of the MK was obvious. from the border, he would have had time in the event of war to prepare for battle and strike in any direction.
However, the commander of the district troops had his own opinion on this matter. Examining the points designated for the deployment of the corps, Pavlov told us: “Do not imagine that I will allow the units and headquarters of the army to be located better than the MK, which you expect, apparently, to keep in a black body. I recommend remembering that just a few months ago I was the head of the armored forces "- dumb and dumber (C).

[Mikhail Zubkov]

The author is very good. (next) gratitude for the collected RARE evidence of participants in the events of 1941. For example, that in a number of freshly constructed bunkers of the UR there were already 76-mm guns, but there were still no doors, lighting and ventilation, there was a torn wire connection with headquarters and neighbors, and the ammunition had just begun to drive up 22.6., and that a day later they began to give orders for withdrawal. These orders were certainly not from Moscow. For which almost all the chief officers of the ZF were soon arrested, interrogated with prejudice, tried and shot, quite for the cause. For a week they put millions of people under the German boot, almost all of Belarus! Irreversible losses of the Red Army only in the Bialystok boiler amounted to more than 300 thousand!

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR writes

The words of Khadzhi-Umar Dzhiorovich Mamsurov are interesting: "The platoon and group commander in the raid was not actually a lieutenant, but a Red Army soldier, who has at least two weeks of combat experience." There were many in the CA in senior and senior command posts of Art. lieutenants, captains, colonels, soaring high up and not having a “two-week experience” command regiments, formations, associations in combat conditions.

Here, another crashed Madame, who does not understand what Mamsurov writes about. And he writes that in RAID, i.e. to go behind enemy lines of a reconnaissance and sabotage group (platoon), you need to appoint the commander is not a graduate of the school, but someone who already has experience in such actions, at least for two weeks. Moreover, even in the late Soviet times, everyone who was prepared to be sent behind enemy lines was prepared according to a different program than graduates of other military schools, so that not all of them could get into reconnaissance.
The rest of the passage, like about the takeoffs of the "colonels", has nothing to do with the one described by the Mamsurovs - it is talking about purely spetsnaz training. But Madame likes to lie in order to "gain authority".

[8Schlaf]

The ingenious conclusion of the sofa expert! Please note that you are the only one who stupidly connects the words of the GRU saboteur general with the words of the author. All the others connected these words with the figurative spread of such a situation to the commanders of the formations, unions who came out of the midst of infantrymen-tankers-artillerymen-conics. Maybe it's time to not only write something, but also strain your brain a little?))

[ccsr]

Quote: 8Schlaf

Please note that you are the only one who stupidly connects the words of the GRU saboteur general with the words of the author.

It’s not my fault that, unlike you, when reading articles about the Second World War, I don’t see them as a former epic, but approach it from the point of view of a professional, and immediately see the stupid things that are written in it. Well, if you and your like like reading fairy tales about the war, then the flag is in your hands.

Quote: 8Schlaf

All the others associated these words with the figurative spread of such a situation.

Figurative spread - this is just what amateurs suffer from, and I’m used to evaluate the facts and consider the situation not in a fantasy perspective, but in real light.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Maybe it’s time to not only write something, but also strain your brain a little?

I’m trying, he, unlike you, can still think sensibly. Well, you continue to applaud while standing - since you are so permeated by fairy tales.

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR writes:

Not knowing the specifics of the work, the command of the front [SWF] believed that we should follow all their instructions for turning on the subscribers and obey the chief of communications of the front. Front commander Kirponos was very surprised when I did not follow his order to include artillery commander, rear and some other subscribers on the commutator of the “VCh” station.

He was very indignant that some junior lieutenant of state security was not following the order of the commander, and he very much scolded the chief of communications of the front for this. Therefore, when I had to explain our rights, obligations and requirements to subscribers of the “HF” communication shown by the NKVD during a personal conversation, he, having received an explanation on this matter from the General Staff, began to treat us very well. These were the first steps in organizing the government "HF" communications in the Southwest Federal District ... "

The author of the article has a primitive idea of ​​what RF communication is, and therefore makes completely stupid conclusions.
Here is what it is:

To understand the principle of RF telephone communication, we recall that a normal human voice produces air vibrations in the frequency range 300-3200 Hz, and therefore, for the transmission of sound through a regular telephone channel, a dedicated band is required in the range from 0 to 4 kHz, where sound vibrations will be converted into electromagnetic ones. You can listen to a telephone conversation over a simple telephone line by simply connecting a telephone, handset or speaker to a wire. But you can put a higher frequency band through the wire, significantly exceeding the frequency of the voice - from 10 kHz and higher.
.... The first lines of government RF communications were stretched from Moscow to Kharkov and Leningrad in 1930, and soon the technology spread throughout the country. By mid-1941, the government high-frequency communications network included 116 stations, 20 objects, 40 broadcast points and served about 600 subscribers. The work of engineers of that time also allowed the launch of the first automatic station in Moscow in 1930, which subsequently worked for 68 years.

RIA Novosti https://ria.ru/science/20170511/1494074711.html
If Madame understood the essence of the matter, then she would have guessed that Pavlov was among those subscribers to whom such a connection was made. And where the telephone connected to the HF switch will be installed for Pavlov, the subscriber decides if it is possible to ensure the controllability of the territory and communication lines. As for the fact that Kirpanos was refused to install the RF apparatus for his subordinates, this is not surprising - they did not come out with a rank to put such devices. But this does not mean that they could use the RF apparatus of another official with his personal permission and under his responsibility.

If Pavlov ordered “tyrant” to install an RF communications apparatus in the DKA corridor, then government communications officers would not have complied with this order.

This is a lie, because if measures were taken to protect the territory and control the communication line between the HF switchboard and Pavlov’s office in the DCA, the phone could stand there and turn ON when Pavlov arrived there.

They did not obey the command of the ZAPOVO in obvious violations of the "Regulations" on the service. The place was not adapted for the location of the point.

Again, a lie - how can Madame know that it is impossible to organize a protected room in the DKA, without violating the rules of the Regulation?

They would not put the device even in a separate room, because the call from the people's commissar of defense took place quite late.

This is madam's divination, not a fact of history. Moreover, the word "late" does not indicate a temporary admission, given the fact that they could have called even before the Directive was sent.

To fill out an application for the installation of the apparatus, it was necessary to fill out an application explaining the need for such an installation in the NKVD. Pavlov would never have substituted himself like that - he was not. The number of points was limited, and they were individually distributed among border associations. And the last, after the application, in any case, the site of installation of the RF communication was examined and only then the act was prepared ...

But he didn’t have to substitute - he had the HF apparatus put down, that’s why, if he had demanded that the apparatus with access to the switch be placed there, he would have done it by equipping the premises according to the requirements of the Regulation. In any case, when moving to a DKA, his desk phone could disconnect from the switch, and therefore he did not violate the number of working sockets allocated to the district headquarters by the NKVD. Although, in my opinion, Pavlov had a regular telephone that was included in the switchboard of the district headquarters and was intended for communication with his deputies and the operational duty officer of the district headquarters. Well, the story about the HF connection by the author of the article is bloated to show significance in his own words, although experts immediately understand that the question is not worth a damn.

[8Schlaf]

You also have a primitive idea of ​​how to connect HF communications in the pre-war period. Yes, you served in the special communications of the GRU in the 70-90s. You have an idea of ​​the ZAS period from the mid-70s, but you know little about the pre-war state of affairs. Bringing quotes that are not related to the topic under discussion does not make you an expert in this matter. We are faced with this position of yours when discussing issues of encryption. Having knowledge at the level of the performer of ciphers, you showed ridiculous attempts to prove that you are an expert in cipher communication with lengthy long quotes and scans. As A. Pugacheva sang: "It's funny, isn't it funny."

Now again you are trying to pass off your amateurish views and Wikipedia information as an expert opinion.
Let's start in order. The commander of the district, General Pavlova, is uniquely placed on the HF communications apparatus. No one is going to dispute the obvious thing. Only you are one of the 5000 who have read this part. But this unit cannot be taken by the commander of the district where he thinks. Can not.
At that time, an APPLICATION was submitted to the installation points of the apparatus. Even if the device is put to the subscriber, an application is first filed. It’s like in the Soviet box office: the letter changes to a railway ticket.
Next, the staff of HF communications (at least 2) should come and inspect the installation site of the device. Based on the results of the inspection, an ACT is compiled. This is done in order to document that the location is safe from the point of view of conducting secret negotiations and that in case of unauthorized transfer of the device to another place, identify the culprit that led to the leakage of information. For example, the subscriber really wants to speak in the summer, not at the table, but at the open window: he rearranged the device on the window-sill.
Further, an order was issued for the installation of the apparatus. This is the standard procedure as of June 1941.
In the memoirs of a veteran of government communications, there are interesting words: “Therefore, when I had to explain in a personal conversation our rights, obligations and requirements for subscribers of VCh-communications, presented by the NKVD, he, having received an explanation on this matter from the General Staff, began very well to to treat us. "
Itself faced such a situation. The corps commander gives an instruction that contradicts the Manual on the Encryption Service, approved by order of the Minister of Defense N0082. You show the Manual and the item forbidding to carry out the instruction. He said that I have the right to immediately send the encryption to a higher authority and the question was withdrawn. So in the quoted quote it is clear that Kirpanos called the General Staff for corrections and was told that the junior lieutenant of state security acts strictly according to the Instructions (in accordance with regulatory documents). And the question was also removed.
Before leaving Stalin’s office, Tymoshenko and Zhukov no one knew that at dawn on June 22, a war would begin. And Pavlov as well. In peacetime, the commander should not always be at the RF communications apparatus. And in the military too. Such persons, if necessary, are invited to the apparatus. Since nothing alarming was expected (Pavlov was reassured from Moscow), he went to the theater. For the short time it would take to organize a conversation on HF communications, the commander with Moscow would not have time to transfer the device due to the standard procedure for installing the device and the different departmental affiliation of the government communications service. I understand that this is what the author said. You, as usual, got attached. I understand why and not just me. Kozinkin’s friend leaves a new book, and he is banned. So you need to write something

[8Schlaf]

Something casting a shadow. You yourself could not find anything. And the above two comments show your complete unsuitability as an expert consultant Kozinkin, or rather expose you as a typical sofa expert in the understanding of users of the Military Review site. A person whose idea of ​​a question is taken only from the depths of the Internet. Moreover, the opinion is too superficial. Who caught in his ignorance begins to study this issue more thoroughly.
In the same way as in the previous part I expressed my expert opinion on sapper companies and looked at that there are one platoon less in the sappers of rifle regiments.
In my opinion, a former employee of special communications, the mention by a political worker of HF communications in the theater is Pavlov’s conscious reservation. This is not confirmed by Boldin, who was next to the commander in his memoirs, since this is very implausible for people who know this issue.
When General Pavlov was called to the HF communications apparatus by the People's Commissar, he would immediately leave the theater and head to his office.

[aKtoR]

I did not have time to answer, but your answer is more detailed. I would only add that the transfer of the apparatus from the office of the commander of the district DG Pavlov's district to the FAD with the execution of several documents, and then a couple of hours back, would again draw these documents again, would look very stupid and extremely unwise. This would follow the message of Beria, and as a result, his subsequent report to Stalin and the paper to the Commissar of Defense. General Pavlov would never have gone to such a pedestal. You correctly noted that this was not required, since prior to the performance no one suspected an imminent war. About provocations - yes, probably. And about the war - no ...

[Mordvin 3]

Do you know about the 100 of thousands of greenhouses that the Ministry of Defense ordered for the 40 year?

[ccsr]

Quote: 8Schlaf

In the same way as in the previous part I expressed my expert opinion on sapper companies and looked at that there are one platoon less in the sappers of rifle regiments.

You lie as usual - the author made calculations in the sapper companies, excluding regimental companies, and this is a mistake, and only a complete amateur, he does not understand this. And I don’t even mention about the fact that infantry units can be involved in sapper work, but the fact itself says that Madame’s calculations on the timing of engineering work are taken from the ceiling and do not reflect the realities of military service.

Quote: 8Schlaf

In my opinion, a former employee of special communications, the mention by a political worker of HF communications in the theater is Pavlov’s conscious reservation.

I don’t know what special communication you were involved in, and at what level, but apparently you didn’t take into account that Pavlov was in the HOUSE of the Red Army (the author of the article designated it as DKA), which could be nearby or even in the territory of the district headquarters. And this is an object of non-profit organizations, and by the way, in the late Soviet times, at such facilities even a duty sergeant on duty was appointed. Well, the fact that Pavlov was not slandered, but punished with complete haste, I have no doubt - usually the illiterate in the military do not understand that this was fair.

Quote: 8Schlaf

When General Pavlov was called to the HF communications apparatus by the People's Commissar, he would immediately leave the theater and head to his office.

Who told you that he did not? I specifically pointed out to the ignorant that most likely in the DKA there was an ordinary telephone included in the switchboard of the district headquarters, by which Pavlov was informed that he was being called. And then everything was overgrown with legends that Madame willingly replicates here, for people like you.

[ccsr]

Quote: 8Schlaf

You also have a primitive idea of ​​how to connect RF communications in the pre-war period.

You have no idea about this at all, but you are trying to teach others.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Having knowledge at the level of the performer of ciphers, you showed ridiculous attempts to prove that you are an expert in cipher communication with lengthy long quotes and scans. As A. Pugacheva sang: "It's funny, isn't it funny."

I also find it funny to read your texts, from which it is immediately clear that your level of work on a particular technique did not go further, and you take up arguing about what you have no idea about. By the way, the telephone technology of the ZAS of the sixties and seventies, except for "Bulava", used the same method of mosaic secrecy as the technique of government communications that appeared in the 40s, so you will be pushing about your "exclusiveness" to someone else.

Quote: 8Schlaf

But this unit cannot be taken by the commander of the district where he thinks. Can not.

Why drag him to Pavlov if the telephone can stand in a controlled room and be disconnected until Pavlov appears there? You did not seem to encounter such a usage pattern, but this is a common situation.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Next, the staff of HF communications (at least 2) should come and inspect the installation site of the device. Based on the results of the inspection, an ACT is compiled.

Who told you that this was impossible to do back in 1940, for example?

Quote: 8Schlaf

Further, an order was issued for the installation of the apparatus. This is the standard procedure as of June 1941.

Where is your evidence that this was not done at the direction of Pavlov long before June 22? All your verbiage around technology is designed for amateurs, because stretching a line into a controlled room does not require heroic efforts, and even switching to another apparatus can be carried out by Pavlov's oral order. By the way, in the following time, next to the telephone set, a switch was put on two positions - even for "Kremlin houses", not to mention the ZAS phones.
Having become obsessed with Pavlov, you somehow forgot to "remember" that HF ​​devices were also used by the party and economic leaders, where the control regime was significantly weaker than in the DKA - this is a fact.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Before leaving Stalin’s office, Tymoshenko and Zhukov no one knew that at dawn on June 22, a war would begin.

This is nonsense because that the war would begin in the coming hours, even in the intelligence departments of the districts received information. It’s just that not everyone after the war was profitable to admit, because would have to bear full responsibility and therefore the myth of surprise was inflated. A simple question - why didn’t they upset Golikov, apparently not for your mind.

Quote: 8Schlaf

For the short time it would take to organize a conversation on HF communications, the commander with Moscow would not have time to transfer the device due to the standard procedure for installing the device and the different departmental affiliation of the government communications service.

The simple thought that this was done earlier did not occur to you, but it is a pity.
Although I do not presume to say that it was the RF communications apparatus that stood in the DFA, but technically this is possible without violating the installation rules.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Yes, you served in the GRU special communications in the 70-90s. You have an idea of ​​the ZAS from the mid-70s, but you know very little about the pre-war state of affairs.

Strange, until recently you claimed that I was sitting on a couch, and now you have sung differently. But this is not even the point, but the fact that you do not know where I served and what I did, but you are already undertaking to judge my knowledge. It's funny ...

[belly]

In vain you threw minuses, of course. Although you are in some ways wrong. On the issue of special communications: in DKA in Minsk there never was an RF apparatus, because it simply is not needed there. By the way, nowhere in the memoirs does it say that he was there. Pavlov was really called to the HF at the district headquarters. The fact is that the district headquarters (now the district air defense headquarters) from the DKA (now the Officers' House), actually, across the road. These are two buildings on the current Skoryna Avenue in Minsk. Distance - 80-100 meters.

[ccsr]

Quote: Barkun

On the issue of special communications: in DKA in Minsk there never was an RF apparatus, because it simply is not needed there.

I didn’t say this if you read my previous texts. But the technical possibility itself existed, and if Pavlov ordered it, then an RF communications apparatus would be installed in the DKA in a controlled room. HF communication itself was not yet encrypted, only the development of such equipment was carried out.

Quote: Barkun

Pavlov was really called to the HF at the district headquarters.

I wrote about this and that through a regular telephone he was called to the HF telephone installed at the district headquarters.

Quote: Barkun

The fact is that the district headquarters (now the district air defense headquarters) from the DKA (now the Officers' House), actually, across the road.

The local "researchers" do not know such details, that is why it is easier for them to lie than to figure out how much time it took Pavlov to contact the People's Commissar or the National General Staff, having arrived from the DKA at the district headquarters. It took 3-5 minutes at most, because when the People's Commissar calls, the commanders will run away.

Quote: Barkun

In vain you threw minuses, of course.

So amateurs take revenge on those who more than they understand the specific issues of military affairs.

[vladcub]

Thanks to the author for the work done, but his conclusions are controversial. The fact that Pavlov was not a spy is clear. The author rests on the directive21, but let me ask: the Baltic Military District took up positions in a week and the commander was not arrested for arbitrariness. So there was an indication of Moscow, but forgot to call Minsk? At least his statements contradict Martirosyan’s conclusions, and if so, the question arises: who is the liar? Martirosyan also cites many interesting facts ..

[8Schlaf]

Who is a liar is up to each person to decide.
For example, see the article by the author "Review of the past" and the supplement on the issue of flying in one of the parts (starting with the 11th). Sorry, I don't remember exactly which one. I understand, it's like on TV, if you don't like it, then you switch to the channel that suits you :-)

[aKtoR]

Something in the form of instructions came from Moscow, most of the events initiated by the management of Pribovo.
It happened in all districts. In each district there was some kind of initiative. Lenvo about we reviewed. There was an initiative of the district commander and commander of the 14 Army. Separately, there was an initiative of the NS in Leningrad about disrupting concreting plans for the bunkers. Kirpanos, Muzychenko, Ryabyshev and other persons from KOVO had their own initiative. In ZOVOVO, we were faced with the initiative of the commandant of the Grodno Oblast, with Pavlov’s order to open packages, which was not in PribOVO or KOVO at the time when such an order went to ZOVOVO. We will also see in the OdVO - the personal initiative of the NSh of the Okrug on many issues and such events did not occur in any other border district either. The leadership of the districts did not punish for arbitrariness ...

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

Something in the form of instructions came from Moscow, most of the events initiated by the management of Pribovo.
This happened in all districts. Each district had its own initiative.

You just have wild ideas about the army, which is why you put forward unhealthy ideas. Only an utter fool can start unplanned movements of troops at least without a DIRECT instruction from Moscow, and our commanders were not like that. That is why directives came from the General Staff for any activities related to the movement of troops, and this is not just because of fear of Stalin, but because the General Staff are required to know the exact location of troops at the moment and monitor the situation daily. Even if some commander moved the connection to the border on his own initiative, he was obliged to immediately report the decision to the General Staff with an encryption or to personally call an NGO or NHS.

Quote: aKtoR

The leadership of the districts was not punished for arbitrariness ...

There was no arbitrariness - the directives of the General Staff from June 11-12, 1941 were already given to you.

[ccsr]

Quote: vladcub

The Baltic Military District took up positions for another week and the commander was not arrested for arbitrariness. So there was an indication of Moscow, but forgot to call Minsk?

Of course, we did not forget to inform Minsk, it is a fact. But historical myths developed that were beneficial to some of our leaders, that it was easier to blame everything on surprise than to ask, for example, a simple question to Zhukov - did he conduct at least one training session until June 22 to raise cover units by signal from Moscow, in order to to estimate the real time required for them to occupy stealthily positions in PP. I have never heard that there was a similar check using the technical means of the People’s Commissariat of Communications, and only exclusively on the communication systems of NPOs, through radio nodes, for example. The question is very difficult and clarifies a lot why this happened on June 22. But this can be appreciated by those who themselves raised the parts on alarm, or participated in bringing the signals.

[vladcub]

If you look closely, though the author does not say directly, but leads to the conclusion: Stalin is to blame, and this is close to the assertion of the "faithful Leninist" NS Khrushchev

[8Schlaf]

If you look more closely, I think the author does not say that Stalin is to blame. The author is trying to build another line.

1 - the number of German troops is estimated by the highest Soviet command to attack the Soviet Union in 180 divisions. This is a mistake of the high command of the Red Army and the General Staff.

2 - according to intelligence, the exact number of German divisions was not revealed at our border at an operational depth of up to 400 km. This amount was overpriced. Therefore, the arriving divisions in April-June remained unnoticed. They were already listed at the border.

3 - the main strike groups (tank groups) were not identified by intelligence before the outbreak of war. Without them, deep offensive operations are pointless.

4 - was not opened by reconnaissance and reported to the top command staff of the Red Army A TIMELY LASTING EXIT OF GERMAN FORCES to their original areas for an attack directly at the border.

5 - according to Sudoplatov, the leadership of the country and the Red Army were convinced that the parry of the German group by our forces would keep Hitler from war with us. Just do not at the same time make sure that our groups exceed the German ones and do not carry the threat of an Soviet attack on German troops.

What is the fault of Stalin or the leadership of the Red Army? They see intelligence information, trust it, as it is confirmed by various sources. The military minds in charge of the relevant issue determined how many and which divisions the Germans should concentrate to war with us near the border.

No guilty.

Stalin rightly feared provoking a war, putting his troops on alert and not pulling additional divisions to the border. I think the Germans were allowed to conduct reconnaissance flights for the sole purpose of: do not be afraid. WE ARE NOT PREPARING FOR WAR WITH YOU AS THE ENGLANDS are deceiving you. And if war is expected, then intelligence will warn the leadership of the USSR and the Red Army in a timely manner and units will leave military camps, camps and major airfields in a few hours. In this case, German intelligence will lose relevance.

[8Schlaf]

The leadership of the Red Army fully trusts intelligence data, since there is no reason not to trust them. It was alarming and various rumors circulated at the border, and in the capital everything was much calmer and everything was predictable.

Intelligence was not to blame either. Until now, there have not been such large-scale disinformation events in all directions.

I think no one is guilty until the evening of June 21, 1941.

I see the guilt of Tymoshenko and Zhukov only in that they avoided transmitting specific instructions to the district commanders starting from 23-00 on June 21. But this defeat of our troops at the border could not be avoided. If the troops were withdrawn, they were exhausted and aimlessly wasted by generals-commanders who had no experience of war with the Germans.

[aKtoR]

You guessed it and described one of the main conclusions of the cycle - there are practically no guilty ones. It sometimes happens ...
But in vain so early you posted such information))))))
I also agree with your assessment in terms of reconnaissance flights on the eve of the war in terms of military deployment sites. I did not think about this, since this did not apply to the stated material in the cycle.

[Olgovich]

Quote: aKtoR

You guessed and described one of the main conclusions of the cycle - there are practically no perpetrators.

There are: these are those who ordered not to succumb to provocations, hoping, avoiding them, to avoid war.

Like the one who answered the question "Give me a smoke!" holds out a packet, naively believing that this will not provoke an attack. Not realizing that they do not want to smoke, but to beat.

[Mordvin 3]

Quote: Olgovich

There are: these are those who ordered not to succumb to provocations, hoping, avoiding them, to avoid war.

Somehow in the AIF I read one historian. So here. He claimed that the USSR planned to attack Great Britain, and Germany - to Iran. We had to let the German troops through our territory. And they are ours, through Europe. To do this, introduced cowards, and medallions. Even Beria did not know about these plans. Poganets Hess all messed up. Very interesting version.

[ccsr]

Quote: Mordvin 3

Very interesting version.

Another version from the "Alternative History" series, which has nothing to do with the real planning of those years. I think the author of the version is a patient of psychiatrists.

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

You guessed it and described one of the main conclusions of the cycle - there are practically no guilty ones. It sometimes happens ...

Don’t lie, it’s not like that in the army. And the example with Rust showed that even for minor transgressions, they can be kicked out of the Armed Forces with the shameful stigma of "service inconsistency." On the contrary, in the army, as nowhere else, they punish even for trifles, and at the same time they do not notice the merits - this will be confirmed by anyone who has served for many years.

[aKtoR]

The problem with Rust was a bit different. It should have eaten the view of the sun - air defense. Moreover, his plans were known in advance. Extreme, as always, the lower instances became the commander of the Baltic Air Defense Division, Kromin, who reported to the command post in Elektrostal about a light-engined aircraft, but did not receive an indication of its destruction. Subsequently, the magnetic film on the gearbox of the main headquarters of the air defense system disappeared randomly. True, it didn't help Koldunov. By the way, this information is not known to ordinary users)))

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

The problem with Rust was a slightly different plan.

How do you know that? Or were they a member of the commission of inquiry into the state of emergency?

Quote: aKtoR

It was necessary to eat the type of aircraft - air defense.

Nonsense - after the flight of Rust, air defense troops existed for many more years.

Quote: aKtoR

who reported to KP in Elektrostal about a light-engine aircraft, but did not receive an indication of its destruction.

Actually, the country's KP air defense was in Black - can you do without lies?

Quote: aKtoR

By the way, ordinary users do not know this information)))

Since you "know" this information, it is better not to know it at all ...

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

The problem with Rust was a slightly different plan. It was necessary to eat the type of aircraft - air defense.

And why then was the Minister of Defense removed if the whole issue was air defense?

[ccsr]

Quote: 8Schlaf

according to intelligence, the exact number of German divisions at our border at an operational depth of up to 400 km was not revealed.

If only we had no disgrace, during the war we did not consider strategic depth of 400 km, and you came up with the figure of 400 km for operational planning with an unmobilized army.

Attraction of significant forces in participation in operations
allowed the Soviet command to conduct operations with large spatial and temporal indicators. However, the depth of the strategic offensive operations in the first and second periods of World War II, due to the lack of experience and low mobility of the advancing troops, did not exceed 100–250 km.

[Olgovich]

Quote: 8Schlaf

No guilty.

Of course - "no": on the border there is a mobilized army that has been at war for two years, which has suddenly and treacherously attacked a dozen countries, but this is not a reason not only to declare mobilization, but even ... to bring the troops to combat readiness

Quote: 8Schlaf

Stalin rightly feared provoking a war, putting his troops on alert and not pulling additional divisions to the border.

World Wars - NEVER started because of today's random provocations. They start according to decisions made long Before the beginning War.

And the hope of avoiding war by avoiding "provocations" is a priori stupid.

War will begin only when appointed, regardless of them.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

And the hope of avoiding war by avoiding "provocations" is a priori stupid.

There was hope to delay the outbreak of war under any pretext, at least for several months, and this was a reasonable decision. If the Germans started the war as they had originally planned, on May 15, for example, because of our spring mobilization, it would still be unknown if our troops could keep Moscow — you simply do not want to see this point blank.

Quote: Olgovich

War will begin only when appointed, regardless of them.

Nothing of the kind - the Germans had the Altona signal to cancel the start of the war, and this tells the specialists everything.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

Was hope delay the start of the war under any pretext, at least for several months, and this was justified decision.

But the Germans didn't give a damn about the "decision".

Hope, there is no .... "solution".

And there was no justification for hope, either.
It was stupidly mistaken: "I am smarter and more cunning than everyone."

Quote: ccsr

If would the Germans started the war as they originally planned, on May 15, for example, because of our spring mobilization, we were still unable to would our troops hold Moscow - you just this fact Do not want to point blank.
I see and know that your "would" are not worth nothing.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Olgovich
War will begin only when appointed, regardless of them.

Nothing of the kind - the Germans had the Altona signal to cancel the start of the war, and this tells the specialists everything.

everything is like that: the war began exactly when it was appointed in advance, regardless of the presence or absence of Soviet "responses" to provocations.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

But the Germans didn't give a damn about the "decision".

Hitler was a mystic and could, by some whim of his own, postpone the start of the war to a later date, which of course would be to our advantage. Judging by various sources, the Germans could actually start a war in the first decade of June, but the "stars" and astrologers suggested to Hitler that the war should be started on the longest day of the year, which influenced his choice of date. So no one has yet denied the role of personality in history.

Quote: Olgovich

the war began just when it was appointed in advance,

There were several dates for the start of the war, beginning in May - you mean what "appointed"?

[antivirus]

I agree with the chchsr - see "Pokrovskie Vorota" - there Hobotov cooked eggs in a mug at the beginning of the film - the "cook" told him his ex-wife
who is your "ex-wife"? - USSR-Russia?

[Catfish]

Quote: antivirus

maybe on a monument to Zhukov near Kr Square tie a black ribbon on his neck - for such a hand-in of the Red Army?

Yeah, right. He has a lot of things to hang black ribbons for. And the mare is generally painted black. I’m only afraid that the anonymous and eternal minus sign ccsr He will open the mare, and tear off the ribbons. For Zhukov is the only light in the window for him, and he does not see others point blank. I hooked here to the author with this RF connection, well, if there was nothing to say on the case, I would have sat and kept quiet. So no - you have to earn another minute. Zhukov’s horse is already neighing.

[aKtoR]

Not far colonel can I attach to any pillar - this is a matter of principle. Thank you for your support, dear Sea Cat)))))))

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

Not far colonel can I attach to any pillar - this is a matter of principle. Thank you for your support, dear Sea Cat)))))))

Do not write your nonsense, and no one will find fault with you. And if you decide to promote your fantasies, then there is nothing to cry in the waistcoat for various amateurs, like a cat who does not chop in military matters. What was sown ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Sea Cat

For Zhukov is the only light in the window for him, and he does not see others point blank.

Do not attribute your fantasies to me - I have not written about this anywhere.

[antivirus]

the level of leadership in the USSR was at the LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF PEASANTS-
not pulled in the beginning of the Second World War, BUT OLGOVICH WRITTEN MUCH ABOUT BAD USSR AND GOOD RI ---
- IT IS NOT YET KNOWN HOW IT WOULD BE 1 AND 2 MB, IF KAISER MOVED A TROOS IN 1914 WITHOUT PRELIMINARY "LOVE" - ZHUKOV and IVS in 41 turned out to be in a worse position than Nik2 14 g

[ccsr]

Quote: vladcub

If you look closely, though the author does not say directly, but leads to the conclusion: Stalin is to blame, and this is close to the assertion of the "faithful Leninist" NS Khrushchev

Moreover, Vesma persistently pushes her theory, which indicates the clearly custom-made nature of her articles. It is a pity that amateurs are bought on them in military affairs, including those who wore epaulets, but by the level of understanding they did not reach the stars they wore.

[aKtoR]

This answer is the author aKtoR puts not as an answer to the user Artem Popov, but as a clarification of some questions for users our site "Military Review".

Meet Artem Popov, known on the site "Military Literature" under the name "Ratriot"You can watch the curious performances of this person on the specified site.

The author was very curious who would respond to Kozinkin's hysterical appeals for help on the Military Literature forum after the publication of the first part about the ZAPOVO and now he appeared)))

The author today communicates with you for the last time, dear readers, and only therefore places this text so that you know who will appear in subsequent comments. I also want to inform you that the subsequent parts will also continue to come out, but at somewhat longer intervals, because they will be placed by another person on my behalf.

To my readers, who are awaiting the release of the next part, to my regret, they will not meet her next Saturday. And if I appeal to you, thankful readers, for the last time, I would like to make a traditional request-appeal.

Those who want to express gratitude to the author for the work done, then post them in the comments of the last part. Those who agree with the position of the author, respond to his request, expressed in the comments to the tenth part (where you will see a picture with a winter landscape). I remind you that the author asks to add only those people who can actually fulfill his request plus the indicated comment. That wish applies not only to the military leaders indicated there, but also to all commanders who took the initiative on the eve of the war. Those who can fulfill the request of the author - a separate Thank you!

And now we proceed to the consideration of the statements of Artem Popov.
Artem Popov"Where is at least one in the planned volume performed by the PTR? with waterlogging, tying trees, etc.? Somewhere in the exercises for the sake of appearance, a piece of the terrain was picturesquely equipped, no more. The truth is that NOBODY was going to carry out these works according to the charter. If only because there was a critical shortage of this very wire, both barbed and ordinary, there were no mines, there was no experience in setting up barriers. The soldier was barely taught to dig in right away, because they sabotaged with all their might at first - and that's good! Later this was repeated in all local wars - the "militias" did not contemptuously dig trenches until the first serious battle. The most important thing is that everyone did not give a damn about these statutory requirements. Seriously, is this waterlogging? Has this ever been done in practice? wrapping trees with wire - so that a motorcyclist does not drive crazy through the forest? Blockages and mines were made only in tank-hazardous areas, the wire was placed during a long defense, the trashneys also dug (connecting single ones) as time was available. All these paper fantasies have NEVER been used in the statutory volume..."

First of all, it should be noted that the PTR device in KOVO was planned from the first day of mobilization and therefore these areas could not be planned in the districts or be built on the eve of the war. There is a simple amateurishness in this matter. The man did not even find the engineering standards that existed at the time for the creation of such areas. This is the first.

The second. He did not find the document with the calculation of the required funds for the creation of the PTR, released in PribOVO 18 on June 1941. This shows the relevance of this issue 3,5 the day before the start of the war. He also did not see a similar document prepared in KOVO 19 in June of the same year. Not seeing these documents, how can you say something, except to express your own opinion of an amateur or a provocateur ...

[aKtoR]

Artem Popov"Further, on numerous excerpts from the memoirs of veterans, one could check whether this is so. Numerous excerpts from the memoirs of the SS soldiers would confirm that they were going to collect flowers for herbaria. And the real archival documents - Directive No. 1 and other mobilization and defense documents of May - June 1941 - these are all inventions and myths! One single document with archival requisites turns into dust the labor of pulling on a long footcloth of hundreds of "memories" ... For some reason you do not indicate the MOST IMPORTANT thing - Madame denies Directive No. 1 as a fact!.. "

It should be noted that we again see the opinion of an amateur. Why? Yes, because those who are interested in history know that real documents are extremely insufficient! That is why almost all researchers and literary figures use the memoirs of veterans in their books. Almost everything. Probably the only researcher who could do without them is only Sergey Leonidovich Chekunov. He has a huge amount of information. Unfortunately, according to him, readers will not be able to familiarize themselves with the information on the eve of the war in his books. Pre-published books (volumes) of this researcher with documents from (possibly) from 1927 year and more ...

Currently, without the memories of veterans, it is impossible to create a version of events on the eve of the war. May not associate May documents with June 1941 documents. If only because after mid-May a military conflict was expected with Germany. At the end of April, as we saw in the Republic of Moldova, the peak concentration of German troops near the border (although in fact it was not so!). The Soviet leadership could assume that the rate of concentration of German troops in May will only increase, because they have not yet reached the maximum throughput of the railways. RM was also pushed towards this with the expected conflict of May 17-20.

By the middle of May, part of the cover (p. Battalions, artillery batteries, tank platoon) are being advanced to the outposts. During this period, stocks of ammunition and food are loaded into long-term facilities, the buildings are occupied by garrisons. And in early June, ammunition and food are being unloaded from almost all the facilities, garrisons are being withdrawn. Therefore, it is impossible to say unequivocally that there is a direct relationship between all documents developed in May and in June. If, on the whole, we discard all memoirs, then a wide field of activity is created for charlatans. It’s no secret that swinging the situation in the country and in the network structures in particular in any field is beneficial to overseas partners ...

The author never claimed that Directive No. XXUMX did not exist - it is a forgery. Virtually no one but S.Chekunov saw the original of Directive No. XXUMX. The author constantly emphasizes only that the original of Directive No. XXUMX is deliberately not published. I wonder why? MO only published the encryption SECHOVO ... And the author only emphasizes the opinions of war veterans, expressed in their memoirs, about its ambiguous and contradictory nature.

Not everything in the events related to its preparation on the eve of the war is unequivocal. That is why we do not see in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov a description of the events on the eve of the war. That is why he distorted the events, as a result of which the Chief of the General Staff got to the meeting in the office of Joseph Stalin late in the evening 21.6.41.

The author in his materials cited only one statement of S.L. Chekunov, which this researcher allowed to use. The rest of the statements of this researcher are used without his permission and only in the comments, and not in the materials of the cycle. I publicly apologize to Dear Sergei Leonidovich Chekunov for using his comments from the Military Literature forum without his permission! Perhaps he will be somewhat lenient towards the author of these lines, since this will shed some light on the events on the eve of the start of the war for users who are interested in these events.

Part of the comments of S.L.Cekunov was given in the author’s comments in 18 cycle. Here I will post a few more comments from a researcher who knows how things really were on the eve of the war.

[aKtoR]

S.L.Cekunov: "Kozinkin ... if you knew where the 16th Army was being taken out, you wouldn't talk nonsense about the "war with Germany" ... The place of its new deployment does not in any way correlate with the war with Germany "...»

This statement alone negates many of the documents developed by NGOs in May 1941. Therefore, without knowing the contents of many documents, it is not possible at the present time to make versions of events on the eve of war without using memoirs ...

S.L.Cekunov: "Kozinkin writes: "And who is to blame that having received the director of the General Staff on June 11 - for the withdrawal of the second echelons - Pavlov did not begin to withdraw this SC since June 11 - as expected?"

S.L.C. Your answer ... shows that you ... do not understand army realities, especially in 1941 conditions of the year...

Kozinkin writes: "By 21 o'clock [21 June 1941 of the year] In the evening Zhukov brought a directive to Stalin that he brought another 11 of June - to enter the PP [Cover plans] "

S.L.C. Lies.

Kozinkin writes: "Stalin again slows it down and gives instructions - write another text - to enter the full bg. After that, the draft is written in Zhukov's notebook ... in the workbook that he brought with him because THIS is supposed to be done .. . "

S.L.C. Lies.

Kozinkin writes: "Then he and Tymoshenko go to the People's Commissariat, taking with them Vatutin who was in the Kremlin, but did not enter the office..."

S.L.C. You are with me [took] ...

Kozinkin writes: “In Tymoshenko’s office, they rewrite the text from the draft into white paper forms in a cipher pad, for which N. Kuznetsov found them at 23 pm. Well, then the same Vatutin took the text to the General Staff for sending.. "

S.L.C. Kozinkin, you do not know where Tymoshenko’s office was and you don’t know who copied and wrote what. You do not know where SHO was sitting and where was CSS [communication center] GSH.

Kozinkin writes: "The order on the withdrawal of border crossing points was made 3-4 days before June 22 - June 18 ... And after the directive of the General Staff of June 18, Pavlov did not bring the district to the BG (Grigoriev)

S.L.C. This is a directive on the allocation of front field control. There was no instruction in it to bring the county on alert. By studying the set of documents, it is clearly seen that Pavlov CLEARLY carried out all the orders of the General Staff. No ad-libbing, only the execution of orders.

Kozinkin writes: "Zhukov was in the tyrant's office that he couldn't give the command to the General Staff to ring up the districts from there ??"

S.L.CH. Zhukov would not do this. Just because he is a competent high-ranking military. It could not have occurred to him. Unlike ... Kozinkina.

Kozinkin writes: "madam also sure that the deer. b.n. - did not write in the Kremlin "

S.L.C. И It's right. Documented ...

Kozinkin, and what text are you talking about? I told you a long time ago that NEW documents and NEW CERTIFICATES about sending the directive were found. About whom you know not know and never heard ...

[aKtoR]

Comments S.L.Cekunova regarding the events on the eve of the war, which you will meet in the section dedicated to the OdVO.

S.L.Cekunov"Slan [which madam] writes: “Zakharov:“ ... At about 23 pm I decided to call the commanders of the 14th, 35th and 48th battalions and NSh 2 kk.
The commander of the 35 corps, Major General DG Egorov, was the first to approach ST-14, the second was Commander 35 Corps commander I.F. Dashichev, and then NSH 2 KK Colonel MD Gretsov. The 48 Corps Commander R.Ya. Malinovsky received the order through the Morse machine. All of them were given the following instructions: 1) to raise headquarters and troops on alert and withdraw from settlements; 2) cover units occupy their areas; 3) establish communication with border parts ..."

S.L.CH. I can say this: on 48, ck neither Zakharov, nor Batyunya, nor Litvinov wrote the correct data. The most accurate description of the events of the night 21-22.06, which fully coincides with the documents, was given by R.Ya. Malinovsky in his unpublished memoirs.

Kozinkin writes: "So Zakharov raised his corps at midnight? the lady says no... "

S.L.C. Kozinkin, uch. Slan writes something completely different, namely that you ... are not able to understand and analyze documents and memoirs.

Kozinkin writes: "How do you think - Cherevichenko called Zakharov - how did he know that an important encryption would come at 22 o'clock?"

S.L.C. Yes, there was no call in 22 hours. At this time, Zhukov and Tymoshenko were still sitting near Stalin. Calls started about 23 hours.

Kozinkin writes: "How do you think Zakharov at 22 o'clock could receive a command from Cherevichenko to wait for an important encryption?"

S.L.CH. I could not, because he did not receive such a command in 22. He got her about 23 hours... "

In conclusion, I would like to note:

1) Thanks for the answers of Sergey Leonidovich Chekunov to some questions. which the author secretly used;

2) I'm glad to know that there are quite a lot of people who support the author and try to imitate him))))) "so that there are "one-format", written clearly by one person. Stylistics, syntakisis, the lexicon used, the nature of the semantic reduction - everything is like a carbon copy... »Thank you, my dear readers, !!!!!! I don’t know if I will be able to meet with you)))

[BAI]

Thank you my dear readers !!!!!! I don’t know if I will still be able to meet with you)))

And what kind of funeral? Sentenced to the highest degree?

[ccsr]

Quote: BAI

And what kind of funeral? Sentenced to the highest degree?

Apparently an act of self-immolation is planned - I mean the "ideas" of her articles ...

[aKtoR]

A few more comments Sergey Leonidovich Chekunov.

Kozinkin writes: "Slavin asserts that the order was to bring in b.g. not only for the Air Force, Air Defense and fleets in those days of "June 18" but also for the troops - from the General Staff - as an addition to the orders to withdraw"
S.L.C. Lies.

Kozinkin writes: "20 June district in the General Staff reported - the troops are given in bg and are derived or already withdrawn by PP are located in areas of PP"
S.L.C. Lies.

Kozinkin writes: "He [G.K.Zhukov] in 22 hours, 21 June gives the command to the districts - WAIT an important encryption - about the TRANSFER OF ALL troops, air force, air defense and fleets to FULL bg"
S.L.C. Lies.

Kozinkin writes: "And in 23-24 hours he [G.K.Zhukov] and the NGO calls the districts and indicates that the order for the complete bg will be fulfilled more quickly."
S.L.C. Lies.

Kozinkin writes: "In 24 hours go and instructions - quickly carry out the order - on the alarm and full bg. And in 2.30 there is an order - open the package."
S.L.C. Lies.

Kozinkin writes: "In 2 hours there is a notification-check and update - - report on the readiness to accept this encryption. "[This is a directive invented by Kozinkin on opening packages and carrying out PP measures]
S.L.CH. Lies.

Kozinkin writes: "So am I really to blame for that PP as full bg. maple bricks [badly injected]? What claims to me then?"
S.L.C. You [are deceiving] that in 2-30 there was a command to enter the PP.

Kozinkin writes: "Will you assure that the PP team did not give anyone to NGOs in 2-30?"
S.L.C. None of the NCOs gave such a command to 2-30 or later.

Kozinkin writes: "Type themselves in the districts these things have come up and led the orders of the Air Force Air Defense, etc. - in bg high alert number 2"
S.L.C. It was only in PribOVO. There is all correspondence on this issue. There is no 18.06 directive there. NO.

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

The author never claimed that Directive No. 1 did not exist - this is a forgery. Virtually no one except S.L. Chekunov saw the original of Directive No. 1. The author constantly emphasizes only that the original of Directive No. 1 is knowingly not published. I wonder why?

Here the author again podnavrala - Chekunov could not see the original Directive b / n (No. 1), and only got acquainted with her draft and there was a dispute on the milter many years ago. And after a page scan from the draft of this directive was posted, everyone realized that TsAMO did not have a genuine copy of the directive, which was stored in the General Staff and which has not yet been published. And he does not publish because not all documents are removed from the stamp. So there is no intrigue here - the document itself is not of particular interest, not to mention that there is a printed version of the text of the directive.

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

First of all, it should be noted that the PTR device in KOVO was planned from the first day of mobilization and therefore these areas could not be planned in the districts or be built on the eve of the war. There is a simple amateurishness in this matter. The man did not even find the engineering standards that existed at the time for the creation of such areas. This is the first.

The author of the article looks like a dilettante in this matter because she does not understand that PTR equipment is just an element of the engineering equipment of the entire theater of operations, which is produced regardless of whether there is a threat of a tank attack at the moment or not.
The enchanting stupidity of her statements lies in the fact that if you start to equip the anti-tank missile system on the eve of the war, the enemy will reveal the exact location of the area with intelligence and strike in another place, and all the colossal costs will go to waste. However, I always said that only amateurs in military affairs, who take all her stupidity "with a bang", can believe in what she writes. Madame, with her answer to another author, proved that she doesn’t understand a fig in military affairs at all, so she’s talking nonsense about the start of work on the creation of the PTR.

[ccsr]

Author:
aKtoR

The commander of the Air Force Zapovo Kopets and the commander of the artillery of Klich district were also random and not corresponding to their positions.

Both he and the other, like Pavlov himself, were participants in the war in Spain and had no experience in managing troop formations: Klich had been a teacher and head of the artillery department at the academy for a long time before traveling to Spain, and Kopets before Spain commanded the squadron (in the early days of the war Kopec shot himself).

Was it possible to appoint Pavlova, Kopets and Klich with their light military-scientific baggage and experience to such high positions in the most important VOK? The answer is obvious. I summarize the following:

1. The main fault in the defeat of troops Zapov in the initial period of the war should be removed from the command of troops Zapov.

Madame’s attempt to whitewash some military leaders on the basis of Sandalov’s opinion (by the way, why didn’t he report this immediately after the war?), Was made with one purpose - to distort our military history.
To prove this, I will ask a simple question - WHERE are the reports of all injured military commanders that they are not ready to take these positions due to their unsuitability for such a post. As far as I know, not a single appointment to a HIGHER position is complete without the prior consent of an official, especially of this level. It turns out that people have agreed to advancement in military service, and when they are recruited for inconsistency with their positions, they immediately become "victims."
So their fault, at least in careerism, which led to dire consequences at the beginning of the war, is obvious to any military professional. But not to our grief historians ...

[Catfish]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: aKtoR

Not far colonel can I attach to any pillar - this is a matter of principle. Thank you for your support, dear Sea Cat)))))))

Do not write your nonsense, and no one will find fault with you. And if you decide to promote your fantasies, then there is nothing to cry in the waistcoat for various amateurs, like a cat who does not chop in military matters. What was sown ...

But where can we Cats, sacred and ancient animals, "cut in military matters." But being, in your words, a "well-mannered villain" I cannot help but notice that, besides you, a "great specialist", no one is particularly nagging about the Author. But you, mon cher, break all records, I mean by cons. Doesn't that make you think about anything? If, of course, there is a device available that allows you to do this work.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Sea Cat

For Zhukov is the only light in the window for him, and he does not see others point blank.

Do not attribute your fantasies to me - I have not written about this anywhere.

Yes, you don’t really write anything at all, and perhaps only you have fantasies.

With sincere zoological interest, your M.Kot.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sea Cat

With sincere zoological interest,

Bestial?

[Essex62]

Quote: aKtoR

If, however, all memoirs are discarded, a broad field of activity is created for charlatans. It is no secret that the swaying of the situation in the country and in network structures in particular in any field is beneficial to overseas partners ...

Sorry, I did not understand. What does your butting with the caller, in assessing the events of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, have to do with swaying and mealy evil spirits? I am reading your publications with great interest, a great deal of work has been done. Thank! You should not just give a political assessment, incite and the impression is changing. History is a dry fact and date. Like dad Müller, he conveyed, she said .......... I will draw conclusions myself, based on my worldview and political preferences.

[ccsr]

Quote: Essex62

You should not just give a political assessment, incite and the impression is changing. History is a dry fact and date.

In my opinion, the author’s cycle of articles is clearly political in nature. And her ignorance in military matters just makes known facts be interpreted in a light favorable for her customers. That is why only those who have no knowledge of military istria, including the initial stage of the war, at least at the level of already well-known historical documents, of which there are many over the past twenty years, can take its conclusions seriously.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

Pts. I recommend the author to highlight the directive of Timoshenko and Zhukov dated May 14, 1941, No. 503920 / SS / OS / in PribOVO and similar directives in other border districts. The content is set out in the book by V. Krasnov "Unknown Zhukov". M. 2000, ed. OLMA-Press, add. edition 2002, 575 pages, on page 179. This directive set specific goals and objectives, such as "destroy the port of Memel", designated specific railway junctions for strikes, etc. - upon receiving a command to start hostilities. After the report to Stalin and his harsh warning, the chief executives of the NKO and the General Staff were forced to cancel these directives. But the deployment of troops remained the same - "counterblow".

[Catfish]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Sea Cat

With sincere zoological interest,

Bestial?

Do not look for like-minded people, do not. Here the club is for OTHER interests.

[gregor6549]

Stalin needed people to blame for the terrible defeat of the Red Army in the first days and weeks of the war. He assigned the task of identifying such people to his faithful dog Mehlis. He completely coped with the task entrusted and identified such people (from the former commander of the Western Front to the former chief of Voentorg of the same Front). Stalin was enough of these people for demonstrative flogging and avoiding personal responsibility as the Head of the USSR Government for the above-mentioned defeat.
Well, the accusation mechanism of ANY person was worked out before they were still in 20 and 30.
At the same time, compromising evidence was prepared on the most prominent figures, both military and civilian, which, if necessary, could be imprinted on ANYONE to the firing line. This method worked quite "successfully" until Stalin's death.
But the real culprits, including Stalin himself, Zhukov, Mekhlis and others like them, who put the entire Kyrgyz Army in such a "pose" that with a sudden attack by the Germans, defeat was inevitable, remained unblemished.
What could Pavlov or anyone else in his place have done if, on the orders of Timoshenko and Zhukov, most of the 1st Strategic Echelon of the Red Army with all its weapons, ammunition supplies, fuel and lubricants, etc., was concentrated at the very border and was preparing to strike a surprise attack on the Wehrmacht, but not preparing for defense. And the Germans struck a sudden blow, and at the time when many of the units that were supposed to be part of the 1st strategic echelon were on the way, a significant part of the artillery was delivered to the concentration areas without calculations, etc. There is a lot of evidence about this, but still remains popular songs about the betrayal or negligence of the "scoundrel" Pavlov and his associates. After all, this is more easily perceived by the plebs than the harsh truth about the true reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, and even allows this plebs to be fed what is called the official history of the Great Patriotic War. Otherwise, after all, the last braces will crumble to smithereens. How, then, to keep the people in check and rob them to the bone? It will be difficult.

[AsmyppoL]

K.N. Galitsky (56 cd 4 ck): “... 12 June I was summoned to the district headquarters ... I was immediately invited to the commander. Major General V.Ye. Klimovskikh was in his office as well. Greeting, Army General D. G. Pavlov said: "... In the second half of June they will be held, apparently, large exercises of the troops of the district, during which the 24th Rifle Division will be transferred by vehicles of two automobile brigades to the Grodno region. Now we need to start preparing the teachings ... "

According to the approved plans, at the end of 1940 of the year, from 9 to 13, July 1941 of the year was planned by the General Staff in Zapovo Experimental Training on Road Transport. Control was to carry out the brigade commander Slavin. The exercises probably decided to move for two weeks due to the situation on the border ...

[AsmyppoL]

Similar exercises for the transfer of rifle divisions by road were planned for 1941 in many districts, including rear ones. For example, in the North Caucasus Military District