IL-20. Analysis of the briefings of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation from 23 and 24 September
In a speech by General Konashenkov from 24, September, a new radar information was presented in the form of photographs of the circular view indicator and the range-height indicator of the C-400 SAM, located at Khmeimim airfield. Unfortunately, the video, which allows to determine the trajectory of the aircraft, was not presented. Moreover, the posted photographs of the indicators contain only the part in which there are detected targets. Therefore, it is impossible to establish where the ground level is on the “range-height” indicator, and on the circular view indicator it is difficult to determine the scale in range. Therefore, the assessment of the tactical situation had to be performed by tying the pictures to the figures voiced by Konashenkov. It is especially difficult to analyze the fact that the area where the C-200 air defense system is located is not given and it is not indicated how many air defense systems made one or more launches. Also not specified the number of fired missiles. Consequently, the following numerical estimates are approximate, but they also allow us to estimate that the conclusions voiced by General Konashenkov contradict the data displayed on the indicators.
1. Tactical analysis
17.09.2018 on 20: 31 IL-20 has begun to patrol somewhere near the city of Idlib. In 21: 39, four Israeli F-16 fighters have entered the launch area of the planning GBU-39 bombs. In the wake of this was given a warning about the beginning of an attack in the Russian Aerospace Force. The barrage zone was located in 90 km west of Latakia. The launch was made in 20: 40. These bombs are aimed at specified ground targets and do not pose a danger to other aircraft. Approximately in 7-10 minutes, these bombs reached their targets. Somewhere around this time, the commander Il-20 received, according to Konashenkov, an order to return to Hmeimim airfield. At that moment he was north of the airfield. The cruising altitude of the IL-20 is usually equal to 6 km.
Ris.1
However, instead of landing IL-20, according to the photo in fig. 1, flew south and, flying east of the airfield at a distance 30 km to the south, for some reason turned to the west and went to sea, moving closer to the Israeli group. Then he turned to the north and continued to approach the group. In 21: 51, the Syrian air defense system began shelling Israeli F-16, and in response to this, the F-16 turned on REP.
The speed of the C-200 SAMs exceeds 1 km / sec., Therefore the time of the SAMs flight at a distance of up to 100 km does not exceed 1-2 minutes. Consequently, the Syrian air defense missile systems, even with the launch of a single anti-aircraft missile system, could have fired several pieces by the time IL-20 (22: 02) was defeated. In fig. 2 depicts the moment of approaching the fatal missiles to IL-20.
Ris.2
On a circular indicator, the center of the circle indicates the location of the C-400 radar. The length of the radius drawn from the center to the mark of the target means the range. Based on the fact that the three yellow marks denoting F-16 are, according to Konashenkov, at a distance of 70-80 km to the west from C-400, the range from C-400 to IL-20 is 20-30 km. Mark C-200 is located at a distance of approximately 50 km from C-400 and southeast of IL-20. Between the main group of F-16 and IL-20 there is a rendered single F-16, which, judging by other figures, is patrolling the area. The distance from the C-400 to this F-16 is approximately the same as that of the IL-20, and the distance from the IL-20 to the F-16 is 15-20 km. The distance from the missile to the IL-20 is 30-40 km. According to Konashenkov, the missile is flying in the direction of a single F-16. At the same time IL-20 is located near the line connecting the missiles and F-16.
In fig. 3 depicts the range-height indicator of the C-400 SAM system.
Fig. 3
On it, on the horizontal axis, the distance to the target is deposited, and on the vertical axis - its height, regardless of what azimuth the target is located at. Unfortunately, the indicator is not fully given, and the distance between the rectangular coordinate lines has to be guessed indirectly, based on the fact that the F-16 group has a height difference from 7 to 10 km. The height of a single F-16 - 9-10 km. The figure shows that the height of the IL-20 can be estimated at 5,5-6 km. It follows that the IL-20 flies at cruising altitude. Considering that the distance from the airfield and to the IL-20 is 25 km, and the maximum glide path angle during landing is 4 °, we find that the IL-20 cannot perform a direct landing on the airfield. Hence the most important conclusion: IL-20 DIDN'T GOING TO GET ON THE AERODROME, AND CONTINUED TO OBSERVE THE ISRAELIAN PLANES.
The height of the missiles is estimated at 16-18 km. Based on this, we see that the missile can see both F-16 and IL-20 from above, with F-16 located significantly higher than IL-20, and there can be no talk of "hiding" F-16 behind IL-20. The F-16 pilot can detect an attacking missile defense and interfere with it, intending to evade the attack due to a sharp maneuver with 5-9 overloads g.
Next, the missile system is approaching a single F-16 and at some point changes its direction dramatically and hits IL-20. In fig. 1 visible the last part of the trajectory of the IL-20 with a sharp turn to the east. Apparently, this section corresponds to the time interval when the pilot reports that the plane was hit, and he seeks to eliminate the fire.
2. Features of the functioning of the air defense missile systems with missiles with semi-active guidance
The C-200 SAM system was developed more than 40 years ago and is equipped with rather primitive, by modern concepts, radar and missile defense systems. Despite its enormous dimensions (length 11 m, weight 7 t), the missile system is not equipped with its own radar transmitter. It is guided by a signal reflected from the target. The target is irradiated by a specialized target illumination radar (ROC).
The ROC detects targets not on its own, but according to commands issued from the divisional controls. At KP, information about targets is obtained from a surveillance radar, the antenna of which rotates with a period of the order of 10 seconds, that is, information is updated at KP quite often, and all aircraft maneuvers are not left unnoticed. The Russian Orthodox Church constantly receives information about the azimuth and vertical angles of targets and their range and speed from the surveillance radar. ROC is present in the composition of each battery, which has 6 launchers missiles. The division commander indicates to the battery commander which of the targets should be hit. After that, the Russian Orthodox Church puts its antenna in the direction of the target to be hit, starts its support and prepares for launch.
2.1. Features of the functioning of the ROC
ROC can accompany the target in one of two modes:
- pulsed mode, in which the angles of targets caught in the beam and their distances are measured. The speed in this mode is practically not measured.
- the mode of continuous radiation of a sinusoidal signal, at which the angles and speed of the target are measured, and the distance is not measured. The missile is aimed at a target only in continuous mode.
Thus, the ROC, having received a target designation from the command post, can refine the target range in a pulsed mode, and then switch to a continuous mode and, measuring the target speed, start the missile attack. However, if the ROC commander decides that he does not have enough time to refine the target range, then he can immediately turn on continuous mode, hoping that the approximate data obtained from the surveillance radar on the target range for targeting it is sufficient.
2.2. Features ZUR
Zour receives from the ROC data on the angular direction of the target and its speed. At the same time, it can only be aimed at those targets that are highlighted by the ROC. Despite the fact that the beam of the Russian Orthodox Church is quite narrow (approximately 2 °), several targets can reach this beam, the range to which the SAM can not measure. Therefore, the missile defense will be induced on the target with the speed of movement that is given from the ROC. If the speed of the target being fired and the speed of any other target caught in the illumination beam turn out to be the same while targeting the SAM, then the SAM will be guided by that one whose signal will be more powerful.
The missile defense system has a very weak noise immunity, and the fighters' REB complexes can successfully suppress the received missile signal. In these cases, the missile system goes into a mode of pointing to a source of interference, that is, it measures only angles at the target, but does not measure its range and speed.
The adversary seeks to avoid targeting missiles at a jamming aircraft and usually organizes 2-3 group defense by jammers, the distance between which is about one kilometer. For this, flickering interference is applied, that is, interference is emitted only from one producer, the missile defense begins to be induced on it. Then the first director turns off and turns on the second, the missile is redirected to him, and the enemy makes such switchings every 1-3 seconds. The missile system is swinging the guidance loop, and it misses the target.
3. Reconstruction of the IL-20 defeat scenario
3.1. Tactical Reconstruction
We do not know either the location of the observation radar of the division, nor the type of the specific radar. However, it is clear that in the air defense missile system with a range of 300 km, surveillance radar will be very powerful. At least, even such small targets as F-16 (effective reflective surface of the image intensifier = 2 sq. M) will be detected at distances much greater than 200 km. The GBU-39 F-16 bombs are launched from altitudes of at least 10 km, otherwise they will not fly the required distance 100 km. Even if we assume that the F-16 attacks began at altitudes less than 1 km, that is, they were hiding behind a radio horizon, then at the time 10 km began to climb, they were guaranteed to be detected by a surveillance radar. Suppress surveillance radar interference F-16 is hardly capable. Hence the conclusion that the division commander had clear information about the fact of the beginning of the attack. The only thing that could be hidden by interference was the size of the group. Therefore, the decision to maneuver the IL-20 towards the sea can only be explained by the illiteracy of the air defense command. I would like to ask General Konashenkov: where were our advisers at that time?
Further, the proposed reconstruction comes into irreconcilable contradiction with the version of the Israeli media, according to which the Syrian air defense missile systems opened indiscriminate firing and fired more 100 missiles.
The battery has a total of 6 missiles on launchers, and, given that the weight of the missiles is 7 tons, the recharging time of the launchers should be quite long.
3.2. The author's version of events
The C-200 battery commander received instructions from the division commander to hit the nearest F-16. At the same time at this moment IL-20 was not yet in the beam of illumination. Preparing the missile launcher for launch took 10-15 seconds, and the flight took at least a minute. When approaching the F-16, the missile defense system was aimed at him as a source of interference, that is, she did not determine the target speed. At this time, IL-20, moving north, flew into the illumination beam and headed towards a single F-16. The image intensifier IL-20 can be evaluated in 40-50 sq. That is, at equal ranges, the signal power reflected from the IL-20 is 20-25 times the signal reflected from the F-16. But the IL-20 turned out to be at a crucial moment at a distance from the missile defense system that was half the size of the F-16. This led to an additional increase in the power of the signal reflected from the IL-20, 4-5 times, that is, the signal from the IL-20 was 100-120 times stronger than the signal reflected from the F-16. The beam width of the ZUR antenna is estimated at 5-6 °, that is, the SAM also saw both targets at the same time. Moreover, the signal reflected from the IL-20, was much more powerful than the interference emitted by the F-16. At this moment, in accordance with the statement of General Konashenkov, the missile system sharply refocused and went to the source of a powerful signal - IL-20. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that the SAM, despite the high power of the warhead, could not instantly hit the IL-20. Therefore, at the moment of retargeting, she abruptly changed the trajectory and made a big mistake.
4. findings
Both the battalion commander and the battery commander were required to fully know the tactical situation, since the IL-20 maneuvers had to be informed by the crew commander. The trajectories of the Israeli F-16 reported from the observation radar. No references to the fact that the Syrian air defense missile systems did not have data from the Russian respondents of the system of state identification are invalid, since the tactical situation was very clear without these data. Consequently, the disaster is explained only by the extremely low level of preparation of the calculations of the Syrian air defense missile systems and the insufficient level of interaction with our advisors.
Blaming the command of the Israeli Air Force that they did not forbid their pilots to turn on the jammers and defend themselves against attacks from the air defense missile system - hypocrisy.
5. On the proposals of the Minister Shoigu on the transfer of the C-300 air defense system to the Syrian air defense
5.1. Comparative assessment of C-200 and C-300
C-300 is a qualitatively new development conducted in the 80-s. In C-200, the ROC antenna is mechanically driven and therefore can simultaneously accompany and fire only one target. In C-300, a passive phased array antenna (PAR) has been applied, which makes it possible to instantly switch the radar beam to any direction of the working angle sector. As a result, the C-300 can simultaneously track dozens of targets and direct them to 6 sour simultaneously. On battery launchers can be up to 32 SAM. To reduce the influence of jammers on the radar, it uses three specialized noise cancellers, which significantly improves the C-300 noise immunity with respect to C-200. During the flight, the battery commander can receive data from the missile defense system and retarget it if necessary.
5.2. Evaluation of possible deliveries of C-300 to Syria
Replacing a single-channel air defense system with a 6-channel will require significant retraining of Syrian officers. So powerful weapon in the hands of untrained calculations will pose even greater danger to our aircraft. Apparently, our officers will have to serve C-300.
A single C-300 is unable to repel the attack of the Israeli Air Force, if it is directed at him. Such attacks are accompanied by coordinated use of jammers and anti-radar missiles. To repel such attacks, we will need to install an air defense missile system division consisting of at least three C-300 batteries, which together will be able to destroy jammers. In fact, this means that we will take the defense of Syria against Israeli air attacks. Such a decision can only be made by the commander in chief, given that it will change the entire political map of the Middle East.
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