"Russian Verdun". Carpathian 1915 operation. Part of 2. Defeat of E. Ludendorff

From March 1, the general offensive of the 3, 8 and 9 (newly formed) Russian armies began.

March 9, without waiting for salvation, fell Przemysl (more than 123 thousand prisoners, including 9 generals, and 1 thousand guns, became trophies of the South-Western Front). March 11 The 24 Corps captured the main Beskid ridge.

In the battle on the Lubensky Heights 16 - 19, the Austrian 2 Army was defeated in March, and the 3 Army and German corps G. counterattack was repulsed.

On March 30, the Carpathians were forced.

During the March battles, the South German army and the Beskyd corps were defeated as a result of the actions of the 8 army and the left group of the 3 army. The words of the Austrian General K. Novak testify to the defeat of the Austro-Germans: “The Carpathian passages — Uzhloksky Perval, Dukla — found themselves in Russian hands” (Nowak KF Der Weg zur Katastrophe. Berlin, 1919. S. 76.).

It is worth noting the significant superiority in the Carpathian battles of the Austro-Germans over the Russians in terms of numbers and materiality. Thus, in January, 1915, 41,5, the Austro-German infantry and 8 cavalry divisions of the Pflanzer-Baltin army group, the South German, Austrian 3 and 4 armies opposed the 31 infantry and 11 cavalry forces.Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. S. 89.). At the end of March, 30 infantry (of which 9 was German) and 1 cavalry (German Marshal) enemy divisions in the Austrian 3 and 5 armies, the German Southern Army, and the Beskyd corps were opposed by Russian 8 and 9-ya my army, the South Southern army, the Beskid corps were opposed by the Russian 7 and 22-ya my army, the Southern Southern army, the Beskid corps were opposed by the Russian 23,5 and 7-ya forces of the yay army of the South of Germany. individual corps (XNUMX and XNUMX army) - XNUMX infantry and XNUMX cavalry divisions (Borisov A.D. Decree. cit. C. 105.). In addition, Russian troops were distinguished by a shortage of personnel and a lack of ammunition.

The highest generals of the Austrian army during the period of the Carpathian operation. They sit at the table (facing the reader and from left to right): Chief of the Field General Staff, General of the Infantry, Count Franz Conrad von Gettsendorf, Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Army, Field Marshal Ertsholz Erdoll, Commander of the 2 Army, General of the Cavalry E. Bemoll

Austrian 3 Army Commander General of the Infantry S. Boroevich von Boin (pictured as Field Marshal Lieutenant)

Of particular interest are the results of the operation.

The Carpathian operation was of paramount operational and strategic importance. This operation is another proof of the ability of the Russian army to win oncoming battles, but in this case, even in difficult climatic conditions with the beginning of the supply and armament crisis. The Russians entered the Hungarian plain, putting the German block on the brink of defeat.

episode of the Carpathian battle

Austro-Germans could not break through the Russian front. Peremyshl fell, and as a result, the Russian Blockade army was liberated.

On the Austrian front, the German troops could neither reverse the course of events in favor of the German bloc, nor reanimate the capacity of the Austrian ally. As the Austrian historian V. Rauscher writes: “In the Carpathians, for the first time, a mixed army was formed consisting of German and Kaiser and royal formations ... under the command of General Alexander von Linsingen. Technically, he was given Ludendorff as Chief of Staff ”(Rauscher V. Hindenburg. Field Marshal and Reich President. M., 2003. C. 71.). Accordingly, the failures of the German-Austrians in the Carpathians are also the defeat of the “invincible” E. Ludendorff.

South German army A. von Linsingen in the Carpathians

parts of the German 2 of the Bavarian reserve corps of the General of the infantry F. Count von Botmer in the Carpathians, Zvinin mountain range

Austrian 305-mm howitzer in the Carpathians

The entry of Germany’s supposed Balkan allies into the war was in question. The plan to reach out to Russian forces in Poland through concerted actions by Austro-Germans failed.

General E. Falkengine assessed the completion of the Carpathian operation not only as the last point in the combat elasticity of the Austrian ally and his impending demise, but also as the last link in the collapse of the "Winter Strategic Cannes" aimed at covering the flanks of the Russian front. He wrote that it was very desirable to liberate the Allied-Austrian front for a long time from the pressure of the Russians. But there was little chance. In the Carpathians, not counting the additional Austrian forces, four German corps were isolated (Falkengayn E. Decree. cit. C. 59.). The catastrophe associated with the fall of Hungary would have been fatal - it was necessary to move on to the immediate and immediate support of the Carpathian Front. The latter had already swallowed the German forces assigned to the operation at Pilica required additional forces - because after the fall of Peremyshl, an “irreparable breakthrough into Hungary” followed (Ibid. C. 62.).

The Austrian offensive in the Carpathians, in which the Southern Army, commanded by infantry general von Linsingen, took part as part of the German 3 and several Austrian divisions, stalled after minimal progress. It was not even possible to completely liberate Hungarian territory from the Russians, and even more so it was impossible to count on the Peremyshl’s de-blockade or “some other crushing success” (Ibid. C. 64). The general stated the collapse of the "Winter Strategic Cannes", noting that operations against the flanks of the Russian front did not meet such serious expectations. But the troops deployed for this strategic operation remained on the Russian front (Ibid. C. 66).

In this testimony of the Germanic Glavkoverha - the merit of the Carpathian operation as before other sectors of the Russian front, and before the front of the allies on the Entente.

episodes of the war in the Carpathians

The Russian operations of 1915, which overwhelmed the enemy’s “Winter Strategic Cannes” (the Second Prasnyshskaya and Carpathian operations) and the preparations for the Gorlitsky operation, led to a reinforced transfer of German-Austrian troops to the Russian front.

In March, 1915 German 5 (19-i and 20-i-roo), infantry and 11-cavalier (Guards, 82-i-roo) and cavalry 81 (guards, cavalry (3) . All but the 3 of Bavarian (transferred from Germany) arrived from the French front.

By March, the Austro-Hungarians increased their grouping into 3 divisions on the Russian front. Spring 1915 - peak (up to 50 divisions, counting with individual brigades) of the number of Austrian troops on the Russian front. The transfers bared the Austrian Balkan front, as evidenced by Admiral O. R. Wulf, who reported that the Austro-Hungarian command had transferred the 14th, 15th and Consolidated Corps to the Carpathians in the winter of 8/13, leaving only a land assault and the Danube against Serbia flotilla (Wolf, O. R. Austro-Hungarian Danube Flotilla in World War 1914-1918. SPb., 2004. C. 19.). E. Falkengine writes about this, noting that for Serbia not only the Austro-Hungarian troops could not be removed from the Carpathian front, but on the contrary, they had to transfer troops from the Danube to the Carpathians (Falkengayn E. Decree. cit. C. 62.).

By the end of the battle for the Carpathians, the 5 of the Austro-Hungarian armies and the 5 of the German corps operated against the South-Western Front.

Opponents suffered heavy losses.

Thanks largely to this battle, the number of Germans in Russian captivity increased from about 15 thousand people by the end of November 1914 to almost 50 thousand people by February 1915, and the Austrians for the same time from about 200 thousand to more than 360 thousand people [RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 426; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 6. Ii. Berlin, 1929. S. 367.].

In total, the Austro-Germans for the entire period of the Carpathian battles (including the autumn and winter of 1914) lost up to 800000 people [Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914 -1918. Bd. Ii. Wien, 1931. S. 270.], including 150 thousand prisoners.

Reports from the Southwestern Front about trophies confirm this figure. So, only in the 20 period. 02. - 19. 03. 1915 Russian trophies were up to 59 thousand prisoners, 21 gun, about 200 machine guns [Ivanov FK The Great War. M., 1915. CH 2. C. 205-206.]. 6 - March 30 Russians captured 70 thousand prisoners, more 30 guns and 200 machine guns [Military collection. 1915. No. 5. C. 225 .; The Great World War. Ibid. P. 58.].

The following facts testify to the tremendous cost of the Carpathian front for Austria-Hungary and Germany:

1) story Carpathian battles are full of cases when entire units were captured who found themselves in a hopeless situation in the midst of a mountain war. For example, the 21 March, the 28 th Prague Infantry Regiment surrendered (1,1 thousand of lower ranks and 21 officer).

2) The enemy's frontal attacks on mountain heights resulted in extremely high losses. For example, the losses of the Austrians in the area of ​​the famous Kozyuvka (the height of 992) during the month of 2 fighting approached 30 thousand people. The German Southern Army lost only 2 weeks (February 26 - 10 March) to thousands of soldiers lost to 7, and the Russian Front veteran and one of the best Kaiser units - the German 1 Infantry Division lost 3 months (January - March) man, that is, changed the composition.

In the period January - April 1915, during the Battle of the Carpathians, Russian trophies became up to 60 guns, up to 460 machine guns, 8 flamethrowers (all flamethrowers were taken on Makuvka mountain of 21 April) enemy [Oleynikov A.V. Captured in battle. Trophies of the Russian army in the First World War. M .: Veche, 2015. C. 316].

Describing the damage during the implementation of the "Winter Cannes" E. Falkenhayn noted the huge losses of opponents (Falkenhayn E. f. Decree. cit. C. 66.).

The Austrians estimated the losses of the German bloc in the Carpathian Battle (without taking into account the garrison of Przemysl) to be approximately 600-800 thousand people, and the Russian losses were the same (Wagner A. Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wien, 1993. S. 91.).

Historians D. Keegan and N. Stone considered only Austrian losses and only for the first 3 of the month 1915 were equal to 800000 people (Keegan D. The First World War. M., 2004. C. 217; Stone N. The First World War. M., 2009. C. 98.).

The British official publication noted that Austrians lost 1 to 3 every day in the Carpathians, while March losses outnumbered thousands in 100 (The Great World War. A history. General Editor Frank A. Mumby. Volume 3. London, 1917. P. 50.) (in one week from 7 to 16 of March - 202 officer and 16210 of the lower ranks only prisoners, Russian 62 machine guns and 10 guns became trophies of the Russians (Ibid. P. 58.).

Therefore, it becomes clear that the Austro-Hungarian army, having lost no less people in the Carpathian battle than for the entire 1914 campaign on the Eastern Front, could not continue active operations without German help.

Total Russian losses in the Carpathian battle - up to a million people (Nowak KF Op. cit.). So, the Germans declared their trophies for February: 59 thousand prisoners, 24 guns, 129 machine guns (Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. S. 143.). The 35 reserve division reported 14 to thousands of Russian prisoners from the 3 and 8 armies taken in the battles for Mesolabor to March 20 (Ebd. S. 147.) etc.

This operation is in every sense one of the biggest battles of world military history.

In battles, the 24 th Army Corps of A. A. Brusilov’s army and, above all, the 4 Rifle “Iron” Brigade acted superbly. The Beskid corps of the Germans also proved to be an elite mix - both in terms of the quality of the selected fighters and their training, and in perseverance in the mountain war. One of the most brilliant operations of the Russian cavalry in the war was also here. The cavalry corps of Lieutenant-General A. M. Kaledin and Count F. A. Keller attacked and routed the enemy bypassing the bypassing left flank of the Russian 9 Army (a rare case of crushing infantry with cavalry formations in world war).

The Carpathian operation is a vivid example of the courage and valor of the Russian troops. According to the testimony of General Yu. N. Danilov, Russian troops fought with extraordinary courage, often practicing close combat and often turned into hand-to-hand combat. The battles of Lupkov, Smolnik, Kozyuvka and other points are witnesses to the feats of the Russian units. But the enemy not only defended - not sparing the soldiers, losing them every day by the thousands, attacking to the waist in the snow, he tried to tear the front. German troops everywhere were interspersed in the Austrian front to give the latter stability (Yu. N. Danilov. Russia in World War 1914-1915 Berlin, 1924. C. 313.).

It should be said that in many respects the actions of the German units retorted the successes of the Russian troops that could be even greater and did not allow the operational successes to result in strategic ones.

But the operation was not completed. Historian Colonel A. Borisov wrote: “The Carpathian operation, conceived by the command of the Russian South-Western Front ... was carried out without proper training and without adequate provision of forces and means. It was the stillborn operation of the Russians, which weakened only the entire Russian front ... The Carpathian operation was the last active operation of the Russians in 1915, after which the Russian armies moved to a strategic defense and retreated to the east "(Borisov A.D. Decree. cit. C. 103.).

So, the value of the Carpathian battle is most noticeable in three aspects.

Firstly, in terms of the volume of the sides entered into the battle, the duration and severity of the battles, the losses incurred, the Carpathian operation may well be called the “Russian Verdun”. But the "Verdun", not meaninglessly grinding the enemy's living force, but leading to a meaningful result - opened the way to Hungary, and the forces of the Austrian army were torn. The German-Austrians suffered huge losses, in which the outstanding merit of the troops of the South-Western Front to the Allies and to the rest of the Russian army.

Secondly, the southern “claw” of the “Winter strategic enemy cannes” was crushed and its operational planning was destroyed. For the enemy, the time has come for improvisation, which in the future led only to squeezing the Russian army, but without decisive results.

Thirdly, thanks to the Carpathian operation, the Germans not only could not withdraw troops and send them to the French front, but were also forced to reinforce their contingent in the Carpathians. A vivid testimony to this is the words of the head of the German army, E. Falkengine, who noted that the Russian attacks on the Carpathian front were not weakening, and the Austro-Germans were forced to strengthen this front. So, in March, the German 3-divisional Beskid corps von der Marwitz was again moved to the Beskids - to balance the serious setback suffered by the Austro-Germans (Falkengayn E. Decree. cit. C. 66.).

And this is also the merit of the Carpathian front in front of the allies. The impending catastrophe of Austria-Hungary led the German command to prepare a new operation to break through the Russian front in the operational zone of the Austrian troops.

We believe that the Battle of Carpathians, if I may say so, “broke the backbone” of the Austrian army. It was a gigantic battle for the Carpathians - the bloodiest battle in the history of Austria-Hungary, which finished off the remnants of the once brilliant Austro-Hungarian army and contributed to the transfer of the gravity of the Austro-German operations on the Russian front to the zone of the Southwestern Front. This battle, which surpassed the Galician 1914 of losses, led to the fact that Austro-Hungarians lost the ability to conduct offensive operations without the direct support of the German troops.

This operation is, in our opinion, the most effective operation of the Entente in 1915 year.

Sources and Literature

RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 2. D. 426.
Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 6. Ii. Berlin, 1929.
Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. Berlin, 1931.
Nowak KF Der Weg zur Katastrophe. Berlin, 1919.
The Great World War. A history. General Editor Frank A. Mumby. V. 3. London, 1917.
Wagner A. Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wien, 1993.
Brusilov A. A. My memories. M., 1980.
Borisov A.D. Carpathian Operation // Army and Revolution. 1940. No. 3. C. 103-116.
Military review // Military collection. 1915. No. 5. C. 221-238.
Wolf, O. R. Austro-Hungarian Danube Flotilla in World War 1914-1918. SPb., 2004.
Hoffman M. The war of missed opportunities. M.-L., 1925.
Yu. N. Danilov. Russia in World War 1914-1915 Berlin, 1924.
Russian conquest of eastern Galicia. M., 1914.
Zayonchkovsky A.M. World War. The agile period of the 1914-1915 war in the Russian (European) theater. M.-L., 1929.
Ivanov FK The Great War. CH 2. M., 1915.
Keegan D. The First World War. M., 2004.
Lesevitsky N. The First Campaign of the 24 Army Corps to Hungary in November 1914 / / War and Revolution. 1928, Vol. 12. C. 103-115.
Rauscher V. Hindenburg. Field Marshal and Reich President. M., 2003.
Ritter H. Criticism of World War. PG.1923.
Stone N. The First World War. M., 2009.
Strategic essay on the war 1914 — 1918. CH 2. M., 1923.
Strategic sketch of the 1914-1918 war. CH 3. M., 1922.
Falkengayn E. background. High Command 1914-1916 in its most important decisions. M., 1923.
Cherkasov P. Sturm of Przemysl on October 7 (September 24). 1914 L - M., 1927.
Yakovlev V.V. The history of fortresses. The evolution of long-term fortification. St. Petersburg, 1995.

Comments

[Albatroz]

Winter Gangnam kerdyk, fended off.
It’s a pity that then they looked at Gorlitsa.
Informative, thanks!

[Cartalon]

They didn’t look at the turtle dove, the Turtle dove was a consequence of the Carpathian operation, even if the Russian troops were in a normal material and technical condition, and that terrible arc of the front in April 15 would be difficult to defend, and it was simply impossible in those dire conditions.
The Russians took up positions for the offensive, not being able to advance.
The assault on the Carpathians was a mistake and difficult, since it would still not be possible to launch an offensive in Hungary, the troops in the Carpathians could hardly be supplied, the Carpathians would have to advance without supplies and Gorlitsa would become an absolute disaster, the troops simply could not return from Hungary.
The offensive in the winter of 14-15 in East Prussia made more sense from an operational point of view, since it could lead to a reduction in the front line, but the technical condition of the troops did not make it possible to achieve success against the Germans.

[Albatroz]

Do not look at the turtle-neck

I do not agree. Here is what the experts write:

To mislead the Russian command, a false railway maneuver was undertaken: the formations intended for the theater were sent to East Prussia, and the 11th Army followed them along the same route - they turned off to Silesia only from Stettin, Berlin and Poznan. This was to mislead Russian intelligence. The reconnaissance of the advanced Russian positions near Gorlice was carried out by German officers dressed in Austrian uniforms. This measure was intended for Russian military intelligence. The main blow was accompanied by distracting actions in other sectors of the front.
The matter was compounded by the insufficient attention of the Russian command to the threatened combat area.

Our command did not apprehend the data of Russian intelligence. After all, even with the available forces, options were possible.

The assault on the Carpathians was a mistake and difficult

There is another point of view.

The offensive in the winter of 14-15 in East Prussia made more sense from an operational point of view, as it could lead to a reduction in the front line

It was just a gnawing war. It was not without reason that positional methods were used at that time. East Prussia is one large fortress and a local theater of operations, whose task is to guarantee the northern flank of the "Polish balcony".
And about the Carpathians. Of course, in hindsight, Colonel Borisov wrote:

The Carpathian operation, conceived by the command of the Russian Southwestern Front, was a stillborn operation of the Russians, weakening only the entire Russian front

On the other hand -
A) a bridgehead was seized for a promising breakthrough to Hungary (not necessarily immediately, but after solving communication and technical issues) - that’s why the Germans were so afraid of it and wanted to quickly throw the Russians out of the Carpathians;
B) ground the core of the Austro-Hungarian army and a huge number of German troops were drawn;
C) the southern claw of the "Winter Strategic Cannes" was parried and the fall of Przemysl was ensured (as for the first time, field troops did not break through to it).
A lot, right? No wonder the author noted:

This operation is, in our opinion, the most effective operation of the Entente in 1915 year.

Indeed, what else could the Entente boast of in 1915: the Dardanelles and Champagne?

[Cartalon]

The turtledove was not a swift breakthrough; there was a time to close the breakthrough but it was strong enough.
The offensive in East Prussia is just as erroneous; it is simply more obvious on the map.
It makes sense to seize bridgeheads for the offensive if you can attack from them, the Russians in the spring and summer of 15 could not attack.
The core of the Austrian army was paid for by the loss of its cadre army. Engaging the Germans to the east of achievement to the detriment of themselves, had it not been for Falkenhain would have gladly arranged Verdun a year earlier.
Winter Cannes is an attempt with unsuitable means, if there hadn’t been a catastrophe in the Augustow forests, everything would have ended in zilch, and in principle, an absolutely impossible task to surround almost the entire Russian army.
The fall of Przemysl is thought to have been possible without such a massacre.

[Albatroz]

The turtledove was not a rapid breakthrough, it was time to close the break

Naturally, saying that options were possible - I said that. I hope the author will dwell in detail on the Gorlitskaya operation, especially since it is multi-stage and lengthy.

It makes sense to seize bridgeheads for the offensive if you can attack from them, the Russians in the spring and summer of 15 could not attack

Why? After regrouping and pulling up the rear and ammunition - in one strategic direction they could.

Winter Cannes is an attempt with unsuitable means, if there hadn’t been a catastrophe in the Augustow forests, everything would have ended in zilch, and in principle, an absolutely impossible task to surround almost the entire Russian army.

only the Germans did not think so. No wonder they concentrated in Vost. Prussia double forces and pulled into the Carpathians all that is possible.
Well, providing Przemysl is not the only task, the fight against the Winter Cannes is in first place.
By the way, the personnel armies perished among all the opponents, there is something to be done. If the German 1st Front changed its composition in the Carpathians, this also speaks of something. The operation lasted six months, and even in such difficult conditions, from the loss.
But the Carpathian operation at least had operational and strategic reasons under it, in contrast to the French Verdun, where there was only one reason - stupid and criminal grinding for grinding, a pump for pumping out lives.
A theater is very important (and promising) - it is not for nothing that the Russian army again, for the second time, came to the Carpathians in the autumn of 1916.

[Brutan]

I hope the author will dwell in detail on the Gorlitsky operation

Yes, please!

not for nothing that the Russian army again, for the second time, came to the Carpathians in the autumn of 1916.

it was the forested Carpathians then, in the fall of the 16th, that turned out to be the most promising direction

[Cartalon]

Explain how to conduct a strategic offensive if there are no shells and until the next year, and actually no rifles, although I don’t remember exactly when the deficit of rifles formed, but by the end of the 15th year it was definitely there.
The winter cannes are more likely caused by Ludendorff’s desire to take as many divisions as possible, the plan is very unrealistic and Falkenhayn did not agree with him, the Germans had a dispute no worse than the Russians, but a high planning culture and clear leadership at the army - corps level saved Well, having fire superiority, you can afford more liberties.

[Albatroz]

I read the materials of the meeting at Headquarters plus the relevant comments - the general conclusion is that if both fronts had not realized their offensive plans (East Prussia, the Carpathians), and there was one carefully prepared blow, then there would be enough resources.
I know about the discord among the Germans - the High Command was pulled in one direction, the command of the Eastern Front in the other. And Winter Cannes - not so much triggered

Ludendorff’s desire to take as many divisions as possible

although he was pulling Hindenburg — Ludendorff all that was lying badly to himself, how much the idea was of fixation — to chop it down with the blows under the base of the Polish balcony, encircling troops in Poland. And in the winter and summer of the 15th this is the central feature

having fire superiority you can afford more liberties.

agree

[Cartalon]

Even if we assume that the Russians have resources for an offensive on one flank, which I do not believe in, we look at the situation, East Prussia with the complete success of the offensive, the Russians go to the Wisla with its fortresses in the rear of Konigsberg, the map looks beautiful in fact the situation is extremely difficult . In the Carpathians, I repeat again, if the Russians could not establish logistics in Galicia, then providing the supply of action in Hungary is fantastic.
Further, if the Russians are advancing on one flank, then the enemy will advance on the other flank, and if the South-Western Front could have managed on its own, then the North-West Front would almost certainly be in a critical situation, given the capabilities of its command and the quality of the German troops.
And in principle, one cannot require troops to attack an enemy better than the armed one, the price of tactical success does not justify this success and it is difficult to turn it into an operational one, and it is not possible into a strategic one, which actually confirms all attempts to attack the Germans.
As for the winter cannons, I could be wrong, but it seems Falkenhain wanted to cut off the Polish ledge, and Ludendorff was planning some incredible entry in the spirit of Schlieffen through Courland somewhere into the deep rear of the Russians.

[Albatroz]

And I will repeat
In one strategic direction - it is possible.

if the Russians could not establish logistics in Galicia, then the supply of actions in Hungary

Time cures. Everything would be fixed, there would be time.

Given the ability of its command and the quality of the German troops, the NWF would almost certainly be in a critical situation.

As the events of the 2nd Prasnyshsky operation showed, the NWF completely coped on its own - it beat the Germans and discarded the northern claw of the Winter Cannes.

Falkenhain wanted to cut off the Polish ledge, and Ludendorff was planning some incredible entry in the spirit of Schlieffen through Courland somewhere in the deep rear of the Russians.

Naturally, Ludendorf-Hindenburg commanded only the German Eastern Front, and this is not their scale. Such a large operation (especially involving the Austrians in Galicia) was carried out by the High Command in the person of Falkenhayn.
I wanted to write above when you wrote that

Winter Cannes is more likely caused by Ludendorff’s desire to take as many divisions as possible

that you are mistaken and the Winter Cannes (like the Summer ones) - this is the brainchild of the High Command, and not Ludendorff - he didn’t.

[Cartalon]

Now I have once again looked at the actions of the Germans in the winter of the 15th year, as if there were no strategic cannons, it doesn’t work out, Ludendorff, in principle, only speaks about the disruption of the Russian offensive without any special long-range tasks, I don’t have the opportunity to dig into this question now, but this the feeling that these strategic cannons were at the level of a deep invasion of Germany, well, it’s good to take it, only for the enterprise there are no forces and opportunities, even the weather is not the same, in fact, after the defeat of Sievers’s army, the Germans could not advance anywhere because of evozmozhnosti establish supply, the end of winter, beginning of spring worse time for an attack you can imagine.
Yes, Courland, I sailed out of business.
A common feeling, both sides attempted unsuitable means and both sides remained with their own, but the Germans defeated Sievers' army.
As regards the Germans ’failure on Narew, the Russians were about to attack there but didn’t achieve anything, so in general the winter company remained in the NWF with the Germans and they got a springboard for the offensive. We can say that the Carpathian company is equally behind the Russians, but the Germans could launch an offensive in the spring and summer, but the Russians weren’t, besides, the Russian positions in the Carpathians were not secured from the flags, while East Prussia was no longer in danger.

[Albatroz]

What doesn’t work out there ??
This is not a notion, but reality. Read the work of Korolkov.
And the parties, as you say, remained at their own because Russian counteroffensives in the Carpathians and Prasnysh almost at the same time crushed these cannons.

Russian, but the Germans could launch an offensive in the spring - summer, but the Russians did not

Why??

in addition, Russian positions in the Carpathians were not provided with flags, while East Prussia was no longer threatened by anything.

How did it not threaten? It could well invade the 3rd time.
And the positions in the Carpathians were partially secured by the Polish balcony

[Adjutant]

The fact that the title of the article reads "The defeat of E. Ludendorff" means not that he was the creator of the "Winter strategic Cannes", but that he commanded the German Southern Army in the Carpathians together with Linsingen. And the defeat of the German Southern Army is also a personal defeat for Ludendorff

“In the Carpathians, a mixed army was formed for the first time, consisting of German and Kaiser and royal units ... under the command of General Alexander von Linsingen. From a technical point of view, Ludendorf was given to him as chief of staff ”

.
As for the "Winter Strategic Cannes", it is the brainchild of the High Command - Falkenhain. No wonder he stated the collapse of these "Winter Cannes", writing in his work:

"The operations against both flanks of the Russian front did not live up to the far-reaching expectations imposed on them."

We are talking about flank attacks - in the Carpathians (but the Russians defeated the Austro-Germans in the oncoming battle) and in East Prussia (the Germans first won the Second August Operation, but then were defeated themselves during the counterattack in the Second Prasnysh Operation).

[migrant]

Great article. As always, the photo material is on top. Who knows what rank is Field Marshal Lieutenant

[Albatroz]

Great article. As always, the photo material is on top

I totally agree.

Who knows what rank is Field Marshal Lieutenant

Austrian analogue of the Russian and German ranks "lieutenant general"

[migrant]

Thank you for the clarification

[Brutan]

It seems that the German and Austrian systems are related, and such differences even in ranks.
Still, the original Austro-Hungarian army, sincerely sorry for her. Like the rest, especially ours

[Black joe]

Lyudendorf's talent means did not help, the Carpathians forced the same.
But Verdun really how many people suffered
Thanks for the loop

[Brutan]

Talent Ludendorff means not helped

"will flash" more than once, both in the east and in the west))

Thanks for the loop

[XII legion]

In a coalition war, the strike should be directed against the weaker enemy of the enemy bloc. After all, putting him out of action will shake the whole coalition. In this case, Austria-Hungary. And so the strike with access to the Hungarian plain was correct, with the prospect of withdrawing from Germany a key ally of Germany.
The strike in Poland during this period was unpromising, and the strike in East Prussia did little to solve and could not influence the withdrawal of Germany from the war.
Another thing is that the logistics could be different, as well as supplying the operation with reserves.
But nonetheless...
Thank you!

[barbiturate]

I wonder where the author counted 9 infantry and 1 cavalry GERMAN divisions in March 1915? Or does the author know what the South German (supposedly) army was like? Ours all the time beat the Austrians, Germans there were liquid blotches there and as soon as they approached, success ceased and stubborn positional battles began.

[denatured alcohol]

Or does the author know what the South German (supposedly) army was like? Ours all the time beat the Austrians, Germans there were liquid blotches there and as soon as they approached, success ceased and stubborn positional battles began.

Oh really?))?
Well, let's see what data the Reichsarchive leads on January 23, 1915 (according to the New Style) on the composition of the German Southern Army - that is, to the period when the Russians still could not achieve success and they were ahead of S. 453-454:
1) Hoffmann Corps: Austrian 55th Infantry Division and 131st Infantry Brigade, German 1st Infantry Division
2) 24th reserve building - German 48th Reserve Division, Austrian 19th Infantry Division;
3) German 3rd Guards Infantry Division;
4) Austrian 10th cavalry and German 5th cavalry divisions.
Total - from 5,5 infantry divisions - 3 German and from 2 cavalry divisions - 1 German.
More than half the army consisted of German troops.
And there were Beskydy corps, etc.
It is a

fluid inclusions

??
And this is in January, and then in January - March, the Southern German Army was beaten and on March 30 the Russians crossed the Carpathians

[barbiturate]

So you brought data on 4 divisions, they are well known about them. Where are 6 more divisions? 6 Infantry divisions on March 1915? And we take a look at the Reichsarchive. What are the numbers of divisions, their battle path is easily traceable.
And against the background of the Austrian armies, 4 divisions are liquid blotches. If the South Army itself was half Austrians. You write about the lack of staff of the Russian armies, and the Germans write about their:
Seit 13. Jänner wurde das deutsche Karpatenkorps mit 23.000 Soldaten unter General Alexander von Linsingen mit der 1. und 3. Garde-Division, der der 48. Reserve-Division und der 5. Kavallerie-Division zur Verstärkung der Österreicher herangeführt.
You see, 23 thousand German soldiers for 4 German divisions, not a few, no? And this is the data for January 13th ... oh how many Germans.
And on April 21, 8 German divisions of 11 armies began to arrive and then followed on May 2, 1915 ...

Give the numbers of another 6 German GERMAN infantry divisions in March?

By the way, when I wrote about the "pitiful blotches" of the Germans, I meant more than one Southern Army, I know its composition very well. I thought they would understand me correctly - we are, of course, talking about the general forces of the enemy - the Austrians and their few allies - the Germans

[barbiturate]

Already found it myself, at the end of March arrived

"5 German (19th and 20th infantry, 11th Bavarian infantry, 82nd and 81st reserve) infantry and 3 cavalry (Guards, 3rd and Bavarian) divisions. All except the 11th Bavarian (transferred from Germany), arrived from the French front. "

"By the time the battle for the Carpathians ended, 5 Austro-Hungarian armies and 5 German corps were operating against the Southwestern Front."

By the time of completion!

The Reichsarchive cites data that 33 and 37 German infantry divisions operated since January 1915 in the Carpathians.

In short, it takes a long time to figure it out, but as far as I can see, the number of German divisions is far-fetched) Well, the Beskydy Corps generally began to be called that way from April 1, 1915, and the divisions of this corps arrived from Poland to Hungary only on April 2, 1915. .. (25th backup and 35th backup)

The case is fascinating, but now there is no time. If you have it and have a desire ... In theory, it should be if you write articles on this topic, and it was the Germans who appeared to us as the evil genius of that war, and not at all the Austro-Hungarians whom we beat more than once, and the Turks.

[denatured alcohol]

23 thousand German soldiers for 4 German divisions, not a few, no? And this is the data for January 13th ... oh how many Germans.

January 13 is the New Year in the old style, 1915 has not yet arrived. It was thrown gradually. And 23 thousand for 4 divisions - so they are battered))
Find such a book

It clearly states that the loss of the 1st German Front in the Carpathians is 10 thousand — that is, its full composition!

The case is fascinating, but now there is no time.

This is where you start, dear.
And then about liquid inclusions))
We have already established that in January 4 German divisions operated in the German Southern Army:
1st infantry;
3rd Guards Infantry;
48th reserve;
5th cavalry.
In the Carpathians, they remained.
And the Beskydy corps, even according to Falkenhayn, did not climb out from the Carpathians. And he was a 3-division.
So it runs.
And it ran up to 5 German corps at the end of the Carpathian operation (they themselves recognized).
5 corps - after all, no matter how you twist 2 armies - in addition to the 5 Austrian.
This is the scope of the Carpathian battle!
And the Austro-Hungarians, whom it is unclear why you underestimate (better read Western literature on this subject), have been the backbone of the Eastern Front for at least a whole year. And they beat us - periodically, and the Italians regularly. Just like the Turks beat the British. But the bits are by us. Not because we are weak, but because we are stronger.

[barbiturate]

It turned out that 33 and 37 divisions did not act in the Carpathians at all, I made a mistake and looked incorrectly)

In the end, what is the balance? The southern German army, only half German and it consisted of 3! divisions all the same, the 5th cavalry was not included in its structure and all historians, both ours and foreign, give its composition as

das Korps “Gerok” mit der 48. Reserve-Division, der kuk 19. Infanterie-Division und 12. Landsturmbrigade operierte auf dem Ostflügel,
das kuk Korps “Hofmann” mit der deutschen 1. Division, kuk 55. Infanterie-Division und 131. Landsturmbrigade stand in der Mitte und
die 3. Garde-Division unter General von Marschall bildete den linken Flügel.
Apparently she was subordinate to Linsingen, but not part of the Southern Army.
So, the Germans in the South Army are a minority. (23 in January)

The Beskydy Corps, as I wrote above, was transferred on April 2 from Poland.
Well
"" 5 German (19th and 20th infantry, 11th Bavarian infantry, 82nd and 81st reserve) infantry and 3 cavalry (Guards, 3rd and Bavarian) divisions. All except the 11th Bavarian (transferred from Germany) arrived from the French front. "

"By the time the battle for the Carpathians ended, 5 Austro-Hungarian armies and 5 German corps were operating against the Southwestern Front."


In total, we have 3 German infantry and 1 cavalry division, the rest arrived either to hat analysis (late March - early April) or even after the end of the Carpathian operation, that is, they are simply far-fetched, for beauty)) Well, or name the numbers of German divisions .

I really want to figure it out

[denatured alcohol]

Well, you are at the conclusions. So understand, really

33 and 37 divisions did not act at all in the Carpathians, I made a mistake and looked incorrectly)

Why? Because this American little book says that?

And if the Reichsarchive does not agree with this?)) Then after all, some formations received different numbers.

das Korps “Gerok” mit der 48. Reserve-Division, der kuk 19. Infanterie-Division und 12. Landsturmbrigade operierte auf dem Ostflügel,
das kuk Korps “Hofmann” mit der deutschen 1. Division, kuk 55. Infanterie-Division und 131. Landsturmbrigade stand in der Mitte und
die 3. Garde-Division unter General von Marschall bildete den linken Flügel.
Apparently she was subordinate to Linsingen, but not part of the Southern Army.

I do not know where it comes from, but you are mistaken.
Apparently, not visible, historians say something there. I say - what is said in the SOURCE.
Both the 5th Cavalry Division and the 3rd Guards Division are part of the Southern German Army. The Germans themselves talk about this - I brought the pages of the Reichsarchive, so do not fantasize.
The Beskydy Corps periodically moved to the Carpathians. Last time - take away 2 days from April 13 (our style) and it turns out March. Just March 30, the Carpathians were forced, and the German Southern Army and the Beskydy Corps were defeated.
The numbers I called:
1st infantry;
3rd Guards Infantry;
48th reserve;
5th cavalry.
It is part of the South Germanic.
plus the 4-division Beskyd Corps. Plus, for sure, something else. The latter needs to be clarified.

[denatured alcohol]

3 divisional typo

[denatured alcohol]

And one of the 3 divisions of the enth Beskid Corps of Marwitz is the German 25th Reserve.
Based on the booklet, the cover of which I cited, she already fought in the Carpathians in the end of February (that is, according to our style in mid-February) in 1915 - and it was in the Marvits corps (which, as you said, allegedly arrived only in early April)). Here is an excerpt from her combat path.

That is, to the 4 named German divisions in the German Southern Army added the fifth? Yes.
So until eight and get
So look - and you will find

[barbiturate]

I figured out the Southern Army and the Reichsarchive really counts the 5th German Cav. a division in its composition, and I agree with that. BUT! The Reichsarchive DOES NOT Bring More German Units, ONLY AUSTRIAN !!! The list is just according to the S. 453-454 you quoted (there you need to turn a couple of pages back for a complete list with the Austrians) And this is the thing, I didn’t give in German the COMPOSITION of the Southern Army, but the DIVISION of this army into BATTLE GROUPS in directions.

das Korps “Gerok” mit der 48. Reserve-Division, der kuk 19. Infanterie-Division und 12. Landsturmbrigade - East wing of the Southern Army.

das kuk Korps "Hofmann" mit der deutschen 1. Division, kuk 55. Infanterie-Division und 131. Landsturmbrigade - Center for the Southern Army.

die 3. Garde-Division unter General von Marschall - Left wing of the Southern Army

Such a division leads: Hermann Cron: Geschichte des Deutschen Heeres im Weltkriege 1914–1918. Berlin 1937. S. 80.
The author of the famous and other interpretations and breakdowns of the Southern Army I have not seen.

As we see not a lot of Germans, the 5th cavalry division is not included in the battle groups at all, but why is it? In the snow and in the passes? Cavalry didn’t play a special role in that war, and it is not in the battle groups of the army. Where is she? She fought in Poland, in January and half of February 1915 she was in the RESERVE of the Southern Army, then participated in several affairs again in Poland, Upper Silesia and on March 24 - May 8 - Fighting posts on the Dniester and on the Bessarabian border.
In fact, she was engaged in reconnaissance and combat posts, this division can not be taken into account in fact. And they do not take it into account !!! Even you! In the article you refer to Falkengine and quote it yourself:
"The offensive of the Austrians in the Carpathians, in which the Southern Army also took part under the command of General of the Infantry von Linzingen, consisting of 3 German and several Austrian divisions, died out after a minimal advance. It was not even possible to completely free Hungarian territory from the Russians, and even more so it is impossible could count on the release of Przemysl or "some other crushing success" "
(Falkengine E. Decree. Op. S. 62.).

Here they are - 3 !!! GERMAN divisions in the Carpathian operation in 3 BATTLE GROUPS and Falkengine. And only then, from the end of March to the end of April, the German divisions - 4 corps began to arrive, and taking into account the Botmer Corps formed later from the 1st Infantry Division and 3 Guards Infantry Division (on March 23, the 1st German Infantry Division was taken from the Austrian Hoffmann Corps and connected with the free 3rd Guards Infantry) - 5 corps to the 4th redeployed. BUT these corps were no longer transferred for the Carpathian battle ...

This is a discussion of the participation of the Southern Army - the Reichsarchive does not lead the Germans anymore, I believed historians in some places and realized that they were mistaken and apparently simply rewrote the numbers from each other, but I got in touch with other divisions, I just won’t fit into one message time is short)

[denatured alcohol]

barbiturate

The Reichsarchive really numbers 5 German caves. a division in its composition, and I agree with that. BUT! The Reichsarchive DOES NOT Bring More German Units, ONLY AUSTRIAN !!!

I brought you the German formations indicated by the Reichsarchive as part of the Southern German Army in January: 1st Infantry;
3rd Guards Infantry;
48th reserve;
5th cavalry.
Or also attach a page?
And will you send me any pages other than goloslovshchina?

[denatured alcohol]

Well, barbiturate, we get it. the author wrote about 9 German infantry and 1 cavalry divisions in the Carpathians Towards the end of March 915
With the cavalry, we decided - this is the 5th cavalry.
4 infantry found earlier:
3rd Guards, 1st Infantry, 25th Reserve, 48th Reserve.
I found 2 more:
4th Infantry

and 47th reserve

That is, even offhand, we found German in the Carpathians in the winter of 1915:
Guards, 2 infantry (1st and 4th) and 3 reserve (25th, 47th and 48th) divisions.
In total - 6 infantry and cavalry. To this is added the 35th reserve division, transferred to the Carpathians TO APRIL (that is, according to the Russian style - anyway in March).
To summarize - without a hitch we found 1915 German infantry and 7 cavalry division operating in the Carpathians by the end of March 1 (having missed something at the same time, I looked selectively, but did not even look at new formations and landver divisions).
As required to prove - the German group in the text of the article is given exactly.
And this German group was defeated, failing to prevent the Russian Carpathians from forcing - what happened on March 30 of the old style or April 12 of the new style of 1915

[denatured alcohol]

And all these troops, except for the 35th reserve, operated in the Carpathians in the WINTER of 1915. This is indicated by the Reichsarchive and the American book on the path of divisions.
Fact.
What and in what article do I refer? Surround))

[barbiturate]

Quote: denatured alcohol

What and in what article do I refer? Surround))

It’s just that I thought this was your article, since you are defending it), under which we write comments here, and this article just contains an extensive quote from Falkenhayn and it’s about 3 German divisions in the Southern Army, but if this is not your article , then I'm sorry) Although Falkenhayn's quote is nowhere to be found)

Well, now, in fact. The author gives us 2 times the composition, for January and March 1915.
"So, in January 1915, 41,5 Austro-German infantry and 8 cavalry divisions of the Pflanzer-Baltina army group, the South German, Austrian 3rd and 4th armies were opposed by 31 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions of the Southwestern Front (Reichsarchiv . Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. S. 89.) "
We found out that when the Austrians "went to work" in early January 1915 Of the 41,5 infantry divisions, there were only 3 German divisions. Not much. Of the 8 cavalry, 1 is Germanic. Moreover, the Germans indicate the composition of their 4 divisions of 23 soldiers.
And various sources indicate and agree that the German Southern Army, the Austrian 4th, 3rd, 2nd armies, the Pflanzer-Baltin group participated in the Carpathian battle or the Winter Battle in the Carpathians.
ALL!!! No one else !!! , including in the REICHSARCHIVE !!! no forces are SPECIFIED in the CARPATHIAN BATTLE, until its completion !! Of the Germans - the Southern Army, although the author here did not make a breakdown into German and Austrian, otherwise the presence of the Germans would have looked very fluid)

But the Author brings us the COMPOSITION for the end of March 1915, but in the first - this is the very end of the battle and these units (if they were) didn’t advance anywhere, just ours, and in the second - 9 !!! German infantry and 1 cavalry division is the Southern Army ?? Indeed, besides her, no one is indicated from the German units as a participant in the Battle of the Carpathian !!!
About 3 German infantry and 1 cavalry, we have already figured out - the Southern Army and the analysis is done. Move on.

25th Infantry Reserve Division, what kind of beast, look?)
Oops, she didn’t participate in the Carpathian battle, she wasn’t there !!!

ab 18. Dezember --- Kämpfe bei Dachowo, Schlacht an der Bzura-Rawka (This is Poland, December 1914)
bis 15. März --- Kämpfe bei Dachowo, Schlacht an der Bzura-Rawka (again Poland !!!
18. bis 31. März --- Reserve der OHL (Reserve !!!! General Staff)
2. bis 13. April --- Osterschlacht im Laborczatal (Easter battle, but that's another)
14. April bis 4. Mai --- Stellungskämpfe im Laborczatal (positional battles in Easter)

Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee. Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs. Militär-Verlag. Berlin 1927 S. 68, 125.
That is, she took part in the Easter Battle (Mount Makovka just), that's all her participation until May !, and the 1st German infantry division, the 25th, suffered the main efforts and losses from the Germans (so there again the Austrians at the base) the German infantry reserve did not play there at all and did not lay bones, and this is NOT a Carpathian battle.

Here is a typical far-fetched division, let's start disassembling the rest and the same thing !!!!

And this infa does not contradict the American book that you cited as evidence, the Germans have pointed out since March 18 in the General Staff reserve, that means the Americans are right about the end of February, apparently the division started loading in late February, while replenishing and transporting, she entered the battle only in April and in another battle, here you have the Carpathians

[denatured alcohol]

I just confirm the allegiance of the author. And who are you really? I will not speak))

Well, now, in fact. The author gives us 2 times the composition, for January and March 1915.
"So, in January 1915, 41,5 Austro-German infantry and 8 cavalry divisions of the Pflanzer-Baltina army group, the South German, Austrian 3rd and 4th armies were opposed by 31 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions of the Southwestern Front (Reichsarchiv . Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. S. 89.) "
We found out that when the Austrians "went to work" in early January 1915 lol, out of 41,5 infantry divisions, there were only 3 German divisions.

Why are you stupid?
7 Germanic, we found out above. 3rd Guards, 1st and 4th Infantry and 25th, 47th and 48th Reserve, 5th Cavalry. That is just thick.

And various sources indicate and agree that the German Southern Army, the Austrian 4th, 3rd, 2nd armies, the Pflanzer-Baltin group participated in the Carpathian battle or the Winter Battle in the Carpathians.

Naughty uncle. The German Beskyd Corps and the Austrian 5th Army also participated.
That is why this surge

ALL!!! No one else !!! , including in the REICHSARCHIVE !!! no forces are SPECIFIED in the CARPATHIAN BATTLE, until its completion !! Of the Germans - the Southern Army, although the author here did not make a breakdown into German and Austrian, otherwise the presence of the Germans would have looked very fluid)

- in fact bullshit. If you do not even know the composition of the troops involved. This time.
They did not see the Reichsarchive in their eyes, because this is the uhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee. Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs. Militär-Verlag. Berlin 1927. It is unknown what and where it is unknown - on the Internet.
Can attach a page ?? Not her, because not.
The Reichsarchiv looks like this: Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. Berlin, 1931. And not otherwise. The volume was published in 1931 in Berlin, and this is not Militär-Verlag
Just because

In the American book that you cited as evidence, this infa does not contradict at all

we see that the 25th reserve division is a participant in the Carpathian battle - and was part of the Marwitz corps. Page 356.

By the way - in addition to the Reichsarchive and Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army which Participated in the War (1914-1918). Washington, 1920. I have a very entertaining little book.
The composition of the German mobilized field corps, cavalry divisions and reserve corps (according to March 1, 1915). It gives the distribution of troops along the fronts.

So what did we find out.
By the end of March 1915, Germanic forces were operating in the Carpathians
3rd Guards
1st Infantry,
4st Infantry,
25th reserve,
35th reserve,
47th reserve,
48th reserve.
5th cavalry.
I repeat - the list is incomplete

[denatured alcohol]

barbiturate

and these units (if they were) didn’t advance anywhere, just ours,

Naturally, as I wrote above. Ours came and crossed the Carpathians on March 30, which the Austro-German could not stop them from. A bunch of German and even a big bunch of Austrian divisions.
However, they counterattacked, and sometimes they also attacked. General Yu. N. Danilov wrote: “Our troops fought with extraordinary courage, at close distances, often turning into hand-to-hand combat. The battles in the areas of Smolnik, Lupkov, Kozyuvka and other points were marked by the high exploits of our units. But our opponents not only defended themselves. pitying people, losing thousands of them every day, they, waist-deep in snow, swiftly tore up our front. Particularly stubborn pressure of the enemy went on our 8th corps, against which German units were also discovered. "

[barbiturate]

Quote: denatured alcohol

Why are you stupid?
7 Germanic, we found out above. 3rd Guards, 1st and 4th Infantry and 25th, 47th and 48th Reserve, 5th Cavalry. That is just thick.

In my opinion, you’re stupid)) The Southern Army of the Germans participated in the Carpathian operation, it had 4 divisions, and actually 3 participated! About the 25th division, I already wrote to you above !!!, the 4th infantry was during the assault on Zvinin (Erstürmung des Zwinin), but did not go on the attack, the 1st and 3rd Guards and 55 Austrians stormed there.
The 47th reserve also did NOT PARTICIPATE in the Carpathian battle, you at least watch your scans !!!!!!!!!!! Where was the division ?? Well, right, the Germans say that from December 18, 1914, the division fought positional battles on the lower Danube and only appeared at Gorlitsa in early May.
Well, where is 7 !! divisions? In fact, 3 divisions of the Southern Army and 1 cavalry division, which in fact did not participate in the Carpathian operation.

Quote: denatured alcohol

Naughty uncle. The German Beskyd Corps and the Austrian 5th Army also participated.

And then the Austrians, if we are talking about the Germans))
So are you naughty)) Do you know what the Beskydy Corps is?)) And what did you not bring in its composition, eh?))
So it consisted of the 25th reserve and the 35th reserve German divisions, about the 25th I already wrote in a previous post, you read.
The 35th division arrived only on the 2nd of April from Poland to Hungary and managed to take part only in the Easter battle, and that, very modest, is almost never mentioned, where is the Carpathian battle?

Quote: denatured alcohol

- in fact bullshit. If you do not even know the composition of the troops involved. This time

What are you, the composition of the German troops is in the Reichsarchive, you yourself threw me a link. And now drag German divisions there, and they rest))

Quote: denatured alcohol

They did not see the Reichsarchive in their eyes, because this is the uhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee. Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs. Militär-Verlag. Berlin 1927. It is unknown what and where it is unknown - on the Internet.
Can attach a page ?? Not her, because not.
The Reichsarchiv looks like this: Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. Berlin, 1931. And not otherwise. The volume was published in 1931 in Berlin, and this is not Militär-Verlag

Do not fantasize)) Are you there not drunk by chance?)) If you can’t understand what I pointed out is not the Reichsarchive))
Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee. Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs. Militär-Verlag. Berlin 1927. S. 69, 133. (This is for you in the 35th division)
Drive on the Internet and look at the name of the work, find out who German Kron is and his work based on the documents of the Reichsarchive)) Well, you give a damn, you are interested in PMV and don’t know German Kron, you won’t even make a stupid translation of the name of the book on the Internet))

Quote: denatured alcohol

we see that the 25th reserve division is a participant in the Carpathian battle - and was part of the Marwitz corps.

Uhaha, do you know what the name of the Marwitz Corps was called?)) The Biscid Corps was created on April 1, 1915 and I am already above, in the same post I wrote about it.
The 25th reserve division was not a participant in the Carpathian battle, this is what your American book says, I already dismantled this division above))

That is, in fact, AT THE END OF THE CARPATHIAN BATTLE, if you count all German divisions in a large radius, maybe 9 or 10, but only 3 German divisions actually participated in the Carpathian battle, the rest did not focus at all for this.

[denatured alcohol]

Our question was how many total divisions of the German imperial army were involved in the Carpathian operation in January - March 1915. What they specifically did is the second thing. The main thing is that they were on the Carpathian front.
I wrote to you:
By the end of March 1915, Germanic forces were operating in the Carpathians
3rd Guards
1st Infantry,
4st Infantry,
25th reserve,
35th reserve,
47th reserve,
48th reserve.
5th cavalry.

Which is what you recognized.
I quote you:

The Southern Army of the Germans participated in the Carpathian operation, it had 4 divisions, and actually 3 participated! About the 25th division, I already wrote to you above !!!, the 4th infantry was during the assault on Zvinin (Erstürmung des Zwinin), but did not go on the attack, the 1st and 3rd Guards and 55 Austrians stormed there.

That is, you recognized 4 German divisions of the Southern Army + 4th Infantry. Already progress !!!

Next.

From the scans it follows that the 25th reserve appeared on the Carpathian front in mid-February (moreover, in the Marvits corps), and it is written about the 47th reserve (see the scan yourself carefully !!!):

On January 10, 1915, the 47th Reserve Division was identified on the Dunajec-Gorlice front. From the end of January to April, she held positions with Tarnov

But this is the Carpathian Front !!!

So we found out that there were 6 divisions operating on the Carpathian Front. Progress on the face !!

Then you write that

The 35th division arrived only on April 2 from Poland to Hungary and managed to take part only in the Easter Battle and that, very modest, is almost never mentioned where the Carpathian battle is

What does the source tell us about her? And here is what:

From April to June it took part in the operations in the Carpathians

That is, from April to June, she participated in the Carpathian operation. But even if you believe your words that she arrived on April 2, then according to our style this is mid-March, i.e., the Carpathian operation.

Are you not drunk by chance?)) If you can’t understand that I didn’t indicate the Reichsarchive)) Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee. Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs. Militär-Verlag. Berlin 1927. S. 69, 133. (This is for you in the 35th division)
Drive on the Internet and look at the name of the work, find out who German Kron is and his work based on the documents of the Reichsarchive)) Well, you give a damn, you are interested in PMV and don’t know German Kron, you won’t even make a stupid translation of the name of the book on the Internet))

Well, then do not indicate this material in conjunction with the Reichsarchive!

I quote you further:

The Biscid Corps was established on April 1, 1915

Firstly, not Biskidsky, but Beskydy, and secondly, before that it was called - the Marwitz Corps. Third, on April 1, in a new style - it’s still the Carpathian operation. After all, the Carpathians were forced by the Southwestern Front on March 30 (April 112, according to a new style) - and the German Beskydy Corps and the Southern Army were defeated.

The 25th reserve division was not a participant in the Carpathian battle, this is what your American book says, I already dismantled this division above))

Just the same book, which you are guided by, says that the 25th reserve was on the Carpathian Front. I quote S. 356:

At the end of February, 1915, it was engaged in the Carpathians north cf the Dniester (Von der Marwitz Detachment)

What does it mean:

At the end of February, he held positions in the Carpathians north of the Dniester (in the Marvitsa junction)

What conclusions do we draw from here? 1) Division - operated on the Carpathian Front; 2) acted at the end of February 1915 (in our style - in the middle of February); 3) The Marwitz compound (that is, the Beskydy Corps, it’s not the name) fought already in February, and not on April 1 as you said.

in fact, AT THE END OF THE CARPATHIAN BATTLE, if you count all the German divisions in a large radius, maybe 9 or 10

Bravo, here you yourself have confirmed the correctness of the conclusions of the author of the article!

And finally the last. You wrote:

but only 3 German divisions actually participated in the Carpathian battle, the rest were no longer concentrating for this at all

in reality, to one degree or another, all German divisions participated in the Carpathian battle. And the Germans pumped the Carpathian front in order to prevent the Austrian front from falling apart and to protect access to the Hungarian plain.
Do not confuse this process with the concentration of German troops before the Gorlitsky breakthrough - for the shock task in the formation of the German 11th Army.
If the Carpathians in January - March 1915 were saturated with German divisions mainly due to other sectors of the Russian front, then in front of Gorlitsa, forming the 11th army, the Germans transferred the 19th and 20th infantry, the 11th Bavarian infantry, 82- th and 81st reserve divisions and Guards, 3rd and Bavarian cavalry divisions - from the French front (only the 11th Bavarian was transferred from Germany)

[Kapitan a]

As always, interesting material. Thanks to the author for his work in the vastness of this site. I look forward to further publications of the Author. Thank you in advance.

[barbiturate]

denatured alcohol,

Quote: denatured alcohol

Our question was how many total divisions of the German imperial army were involved in the Carpathian operation in January - March 1915. What they specifically did is the second thing. The main thing is that they were on the Carpathian front.
I wrote to you:
By the end of March 1915, Germanic forces were operating in the Carpathians
3rd Guards
1st Infantry,
4st Infantry,
25th reserve,
35th reserve,
47th reserve,
48th reserve.
5th cavalry.

Which is what you recognized.

Yes, I admit it, especially since I wrote about some divisions. Here, apparently, my fault is that I did not explain what I argue with and we did not understand each other For me, the main thing was not their presence in the Carpathians by the end of March 1915, but what they were doing, whether they were defeated and how much the Germans won.

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That is, you recognized 4 German divisions of the Southern Army + 4th Infantry.

In fact, 3 German divisions of the Southern Army took part in the battles in three battle groups, I already wrote in detail about this and what the 5th Cav Division was doing. But you can count) That's what I argue with, the author of the article attracted everything that is possible and the reader gets the impression that our South-Western Front fought against 5 Austrian armies and 10 German divisions and "made" them, but in fact it was not ...
I also wrote about the 4th Infantry, it appeared at the beginning of March and was under Zvinin, but HERE ISN’T MENTIONED Her combat work in this battle, apparently the reserve and, moreover, came from the reserve.
It turns out even in March 1915 in the battles she actually did not participate.

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From the scans it follows that the 25th reserve appeared on the Carpathian front in mid-February (moreover, in the Marvits corps), and it is written about the 47th reserve (see the scan yourself carefully !!!):

Well, I already wrote in detail about the 25th reserve) Yes! She was on the Carpathian front! But your scan of the American source says simply - from the end of February it was transferred to the Carpathian Front, and German sources DO NOT CONFLICT it, but ADD TO IT !! that they transferred and until March 31 she’s in reserve !!!, and then the positional battles in the Easter battle. In the end, yes, if you consider the Easter battle as part of the Carpathian battle - she was and managed to participate.
Well, about the 47th, I also wrote. Yes! Of course, the more I wrote about it myself, it was on the Carpathian Front, positional battles on the Lower Danube from December 18, 1914 to May 1915. In fact, it is on the Carpathian Front, I wrote about it myself, but did it bleed in the battle of the Carpathians, still not.

Now for the 35th reserve infantry division. There, the transfer is not the Carpathian operation, but the operations in the Carpathians from April to July.

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That is, from April to June, she participated in the Carpathian operation. But even if you believe your words that she arrived on April 2, then according to our style this is mid-March, i.e., the Carpathian operation.

Yes, she was in the Carpathians, I wrote about it myself, but as I wrote at the beginning of this post, I was interested not in her presence as such, but in combat participation. In the Easter battle she was and fought in positional battles, and she wasn’t defeated I could not stand there. If, as in the case of the 25th Easter battle in April 1915, be considered the Carpathian battle, then yes, she was and managed to take part in this battle.

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Well, then do not indicate this material in conjunction with the Reichsarchive!

I already wrote to you that this is the name of the AUTHORITIES SOURCE and a bunch with the Reichsarchive in its name !!! Do you want to change the name?
Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee. Herausgegeben auf Grund amtlichen Materials des Reichsarchivs. Militar-Verlag. Berlin 1927
Translate
Hall of Fame of our old army. Published based on the official materials of the Reichsarchive.
Posted by Herman Kron
It is the Germans and the British who like to refer to it, if you see where - Cron is on it.

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Firstly, not Biskidsky, but Beskydy, and secondly, before that it was called - the Marwitz Corps. Third, on April 1, in a new style - it’s still the Carpathian operation.

I agree.

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After all, the Carpathians were forced by the Southwestern Front on March 30 (April 112 according to the new style) - and the German Beskydy Corps and the Southern Army were defeated.

But I can’t agree with this, in the first place it says a lot that the crossing of the Carpathians did not work out, or was partial and the offensive was completely exhausted after that, and the defeat of the Beskydy Corps and the Southern Army is not at all a fact, this is far-fetched by the Author.

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What conclusions do we draw from here? 1) Division - operated on the Carpathian Front; 2) acted at the end of February 1915 (in our style - in the middle of February); 3) The Marwitz compound (that is, the Beskydy Corps, it’s not the name) fought already in February, and not on April 1 as you said.

Here I have not figured it out yet. Marvitz really commanded already in February in the Carpathians and was even awarded the highest award on March 7, but it is not clear what divisions he commanded. The Beskydy Corps included 25 and 35 reserve, but they could not take part in February 1915, and he left his 75th and 76th reserve from the 38th Corps in Poland. Hmm, I'll figure it out how time will be))

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Bravo, here you yourself have confirmed the correctness of the conclusions of the author of the article!

I guess, yes)
After reading and searching a lot, I agree with the Author that these divisions were there, the degree of their combat participation is another matter. I did not like the nature of this article, because many people do not so bravely evaluate the results of this operation, even I would say badly.

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in reality, to one degree or another, all German divisions participated in the Carpathian battle. And the Germans pumped the Carpathian front in order to prevent the Austrian front from falling apart and to protect access to the Hungarian plain.

I agree, it is.

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Do not confuse this process with the concentration of German troops before the Gorlitsky breakthrough - for the shock task in the formation of the German 11th Army.
If the Carpathians in January - March 1915 were saturated with German divisions mainly due to other sectors of the Russian front, then in front of Gorlitsa, forming the 11th army, the Germans transferred the 19th and 20th infantry, the 11th Bavarian infantry, 82- th and 81st reserve divisions and Guards, 3rd and Bavarian cavalry divisions - from the French front (only the 11th Bavarian was transferred from Germany)

I understand this and I know the composition of the 11th army, it’s just that many divisions that were deployed to the Carpathians near the end of the Carpathian battle have this mark starting with the Gorlitsky breakthrough - Verfolgungskämpfe in Mittelgalizien - Persecution in Central Galicia. That is, it seems to me that the Germans were transferring their divisions already planning not only to cement the front and not allow them to enter the Hungarian plain, but also their further participation in the planned Mackensen operation.


Well, in general, as I said above, by the end of March there were indeed 9 + 1 cav German divisions, but I admitted it long ago by actually pointing out the combat path of the divisions, but we argued not realizing that we were proving to each other) Well, we took out the Carpathian battle the Germans, in my opinion, have the 1st Infantry, the 3rd Guards Infantry, and the 48th Reserve Infantry. True, we must also deal with the Beskydy Corps, who and what Marwitz commanded in February, and so successfully that Pur la Merit seized

[denatured alcohol]

the crossing of the Carpathians did not work, or was partial, and the offensive finally ran out of steam, and the defeat of the Beskydy Corps and the Southern Army is not at all a fact, this is far-fetched by the Author.

On March 30, the telegram of Yanushkevich Alekseev contains the following significant phrase:

“There are indications of the likelihood of a German strike on the center of the 3rd army, with the goal of reaching the right flank of our troops, crossed the main Carpathian ridge, what blow can promise success because of the stretch of the front of the named army.

Specially highlighted for you in bold - about forcing the main main Carpathian ridge. And look at the settlements that are mentioned at that time - this is Hungary. In italics, I emphasized the regular concern of the Stavka on the eve of Gorlitsa.
The author is not far-fetched. Did the German Southern Army and the Beskyd Corps try to prevent the Russian Carpathians from being forced to enter the Hungarian plain? Even as they tried.
Managed? No.
Isn't that a defeat? Of course, defeat, even with such losses.
The author does not write about their defeat or destruction. So everything is reliable and correct

[denatured alcohol]

And about the crossing of the Carpathians, I want to quote a famous historian Anton Kersnovsky (History of the Russian Army. T. 3. P. 268):

On March 20, the Third Austro-Hungarian Army and the Beskyd Corps von der Marwitz launched a counterattack, but this counterattack was broken in the following days by the 8th Army strike group and the 3rd Army's left-flank group.
March 30, the Carpathians were forced. They suffered the fate of the Alps, the Caucasus and the Balkans

I will allow myself to cite a rare, in my opinion, illustration from a publication of those years.

Stunning feat of Russian weapons. And victory !, even if it did not bear strategic fruits.

[barbiturate]

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The author is not far-fetched. Did the German Southern Army and the Beskyd Corps try to prevent the Russian Carpathians from being forced to enter the Hungarian plain? Even as they tried.

Just the GUA and the Beskydy Corps - the fire brigade and they completed their task.
If you look at how the Austrian armies 2 and 3 were subjected to defeat in the Carpathians, then you begin to respect the Germans more and more. Our armies had enough forces to occupy the passes (not all) and partially to enter the foothill zone and that’s all. After the Carpathians, 30 km is still a piedmont zone, but ours came out as parts of one building (like the 8th, you won’t remember everything). Our hollow Austrians, but as soon as the Germans come ...

“The Russians also tried to attack against the right flank of the 3rd Austrian Army. The 29th Corps continued to operate in conjunction with the 8th Army. On April 2, it crushed the flank divisions of the two Austrian armies, advanced along the main Beskids ridge and began to bypass Virava from the east. But then the German 25th RD began to operate in this area, and an END was laid to any advance of the Russian troops. "
So much for the defeat of the Beskydy Corps

Or
"... having liquidated the Russian breakthrough east of Virava with an onslaught from the flank, and badly battered the 81st division of the 29th corps. (The Germans took about 2.000 prisoners here.) It had to be supported by units of the 58th division from the front reserve. Nevertheless, After occupying the dominant heights west of Virava, the Germans won a local victory. While these heights were in the hands of the Germans, the Russians could not advance on Humennoe either along the Laborets River or along the Virava River.

This part of the Easter battle ended in a draw, but the Russians lost the initiative and were forced to defend on the scale of the entire 3rd Army.
This ends the advance of the Russian troops beyond the Carpathians. On April 10, General Ivanov signed a directive stating that the 3rd and 8th armies should go over to the defensive and "firmly establish themselves in the occupied position." The resumption of the operation was planned in early May, BUT ... "

Well, summing up the Carpathian battle, is this a breakthrough on the plain?

"At the same time, the Russian armies could not complete the assigned task and deeply invade Transcarpathia, they could not even reach Humennoe, from where they could launch an offensive into the rear of the German Southern Army. They also did not reach Bartfeld and the upper reaches of the Ung (Uzh) River. that strategically, almost nothing had changed, for the front had only slightly moved southward and stretched out, while the further Russian offensive in the Carpathians was in doubt, since the Austrians HAVE MAINTAINED IMPORTANT PASSES to the east of Meso-Laborce, and at Meso-Laborch had strong positions. Due to this, the units of the 8th Russian army that broke through the Carpathians did not have reliable supply routes, except for the Rostok Pass (for supplying the 8th and partly 17th corps). "

This is despite the fact that the Southern Army did not operate at the passes; at that time it was occupied by our 11th army, there was only the Beskydy Corps. At the same time, the Southern Army accomplished a very important task with its ACTIVE ACTIONS so as not to describe it itself, this is how the historians describe it.
“But Ivanov’s attention was drawn to the success of the Germans in full. The insignificant Kozyuvka, behind which there were several more possible lines of defense and 20 kilometers of space to the Stryi River, for a long time became the subject of concern of the headquarters of the South-Western Front. In 5 days, the 37th division arrived in Kozyuvka, and then it was decided to urgently deploy 4 Finnish rifle brigades in the division.As a result, instead of 64 battalions, 96 battalions should have appeared on the Stryi direction (that is, almost one and a half times more than in the German Southern Army). a Russian offensive would have no strategic prospects!

The actions taken to increase the number of troops in this area could not be completed before the start of the German offensive at Gorlice and Tarnov, but the battalions, batteries and stocks of shells that Brusilov and Radko-Dmitriev badly needed were in a completely different place. (Ie Linsingen won a small strategic victory ...) "

These are the defeats suffered by the Germans)
By the way, in the Beskydy Corps
"..... The crisis that arose (the danger of the collapse of the front in three places at once) was considered by Konrad as extremely serious. This made him turn to Berlin for help. As a result, the 35th RD from the Voyrsch Group and 25 -I RD from the 9th German Army, they were united by the management of the 38th RK, which was later called the Beskydy Corps.Also, the 4th German Infantry Regiment from the Southern Army was transferred to this area. These reinforcements began to arrive in the Beskydy from the 29th March, in order to reliably cover the direction to Humennoye. And on March 28, near Meso-Laborch, it was possible to transfer part of the forces from the right flank of the 2nd Austro-Hungarian Army. "

Everything is beating, as I said, Cron did not write garbage, these divisions could not operate in February, I spoke about this, and even the Beskydy corps itself did not exist ...

The truth is in the middle, otherwise they forced, defeated, defeated - all these are big words, and when you start to look at other stories of historians about these events, you begin to understand more

[denatured alcohol]

Well, I wrote above that the Marvitz detachment already existed in the winter, then it was simply called the Beskydy Corps.
And take my word for it - I can also bring a cloud of quotes and statements by historians about the victories of Russian weapons over the Austrians and Germans in those battles. With links to documents) Naturally

Truth in the middle

and the battles went on with varying success.
The fact remains that by March 30, 1915, the Russian troops (as indicated in the document noted in the Strategic Essay), having crossed the Carpathians, reached a number of sections on the Hungarian Plain, having mastered several settlements.
And the Austrians could not stop them even with the help of the Germans - even though they tried very hard.

[barbiturate]

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Well, I wrote above that the Marvitz detachment already existed in the winter, then it was simply called the Beskydy Corps.

Marvitz’s detachment probably existed by what he commanded, but the divisions that were part of the Beskyd Corps did not fight there in winter, the facts are stubborn. The time of arrival is given by both Kron and our historians, as well as the time of the formation of the Beskyd Corps. Marwitz still needs to be figured out, but the fighting path of the divisions is clearly known.

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And take my word for it - I can also bring a cloud of quotes and statements by historians about the victories of Russian weapons over the Austrians and Germans in those battles. With links to documents)

I believe that what, but we knew how and are able to report and tell stories about victories, that's how the author of the article) Or what is Kersnovsky's syllable - "fate befell ..."
Is it just that? Objectively, no. Despite the small number of German troops, they did not allow the Austrians to be defeated as an army, although ours beat them severely. It was the Germans who allowed the Austrians to keep part of the passes and strong positions at the captured passes, did not allow them to go to the Hungarian plain, pulled over the very large forces of our armies, but I wrote and quoted expressions of those with whom I agree, having read and studied patriotic pinks without a bang points.

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And the Austrians could not stop them even with the help of the Germans - although they tried very hard

Well, how to look, the loss of a million soldiers for actually "reaching the passes" and taking some of them, and in fact, after all, they did not fulfill our tasks, which were set, how could they not interfere?)

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Stunning feat of Russian weapons. And victory !, even if it did not bear strategic fruits.

A tremendous feat of our soldiers - a thousand times YES !!!!!! But I do not see a victory. In fact, they broke through the Austrian front many times to a shallow depth and defeated the Austrian divisions and corps, pushing them farther and farther to the passes, at last some took and froze in anticipation of reserves ... Many victories over units of the Austrian army did not result in VICTORY. For example, a solid exit to Transcarpathia and the accumulation of reserves there, for subsequent operations, say, in the summer of 1915 - this is Victory.

[denatured alcohol]

Marvitz’s detachment probably existed, than he commanded, but the divisions that were part of the Beskyd Corps did not fight there in winter

So it included other divisions, Marvitz in this period commanded the corps.
Why, for example, could it not include the 47th reserve, already operating on the Danube - Gorlice since January 10? It could have.
And as for the 25th reserve, it’s said so -

in February 1915 acted as part of the Marwitz detachment.

Here it is just more or less clear.

stories, here's how the author of the article) ... Or what is the syllable of Kersnovsky - "suffered the fate ..."

I see you are more skilled in throwing stones at the garden of others, but larger tales than from you - I have not heard, by God. The article is just built on a serious source base. Yes, and you above, no matter how you got out, were forced to admit that the author was right - about 9 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions of the Germans operating in the Carpathians. And even more so, there’s nothing to touch Kersnovsky - you and I are far from him.

It was the Germans who allowed the Austrians to retain part of the passes and strong positions at the captured passes, did not allow them to enter the Hungarian plain, and pulled over very large forces of our armies

Great discovery)) This is what the article says. I quote:

in many respects, the actions of the German units countered the successes of the Russian troops, which could be even greater, and did not allow operational successes to turn into strategic ones.

so why bust open the door?
German divisions made it possible to preserve the Austrian front - and that is why, regardless of the sector or tasks to be solved, their transfer to the Carpathians was important, and they therefore all solved important tasks.

the loss of a million soldiers for actually "reaching the passes" and taking some of them, and in fact, after all, they did not fulfill our tasks that were set, how could they not interfere?)

And they have 800 thousand losses. But we were mostly advancing, and the losses were almost 1 to 1. Did you prevent us from entering the Hungarian plain? Do not interfere.
Victory, albeit without strategic consequences. What I wrote above about, and what is written about in this article, and many more where.

[denatured alcohol]

and here's another thing barbiturate

many times broke through the Austrian front to a shallow depth and smashed the Austrian divisions and corps, pushing them further and further to the passes

amendments: 1) the Austro-German front broke through many times, and not the Austrian one (the Austrians mixed with the Germans, as they established - by the end of March 1915, that is, by the time the Russian forces crossed the Carpathians from 30 divisions - 20 Austrian and 10 German, i.e. one third are Germans); 2) not to a shallow depth, but to a decent one. measure with a compass. but try not on the map but in the snow, in the mountains and under fire?

[barbiturate]

Quote: denatured alcohol

So it included other divisions, Marvitz in this period commanded the corps.
Why, for example, could it not include the 47th reserve, already operating on the Danube - Gorlice since January 10? It could have.
And as for the 25th reserve, it’s said so -

Here it’s necessary to understand, it’s just work now, but it’s not clear in these divisions, the 25th is definitely not in February, but the 47th ... you still have to read different authors and Germans

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I see you are more skilled in throwing stones at the garden of others, but larger tales than from you - I have not heard, by God. The article is just built on a serious source base. Yes, and you above, no matter how you got out, were forced to admit that the author was right - about 9 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions of the Germans operating in the Carpathians. And even more so, there’s nothing to touch Kersnovsky - you and I are far from him.

Whatever historian you take, everyone has a serious source base), and everyone’s conclusions are different, how to present the material, here it is presented as a victory, and for others you read - a useless meat grinder without any benefits for Russia.
Yes, I did not get out, we just did not understand each other, I was interested in the role of the Germans and how many there were, what divisions they were defeated, if any. By the way, I came across an authoritative reference that the Cavalry division of the Germans in the Carpathians practically didn’t fight, and the actual German divisions were 6 - 1,3, 48 GUA and 25, 35 + attached to the 4th (Beskydy Corps)
Well, I did not touch Kersnovsky, I just amazed at his style, as they usually describe unprecedented victories or the death of empires)) "Fate has met"

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And they have 800 thousand losses. But we were mostly advancing, and the losses were almost 1 to 1. Did you prevent us from entering the Hungarian plain? Do not interfere.
Victory, albeit without strategic consequences. What I wrote above about, and what is written about in this article, and many more where

"At the same time, the Russian armies could not complete the assigned task and deeply invade Transcarpathia, they could not even reach Humennoe, from where they could launch an offensive into the rear of the German Southern Army. They also did not reach Bartfeld and the upper reaches of the Ung (Uzh) River. that strategically, almost nothing had changed, for the front had only slightly moved southward and stretched out, while further Russian offensive in the Carpathians was in doubt, since the Austrians held important passes east of Meso-Laborch, and at Meso-Laborch had strong positions. Due to this, the units of the 8th Russian army that broke through the Carpathians did not have reliable supply routes, except for the Rostok Pass (for supplying the 8th and partly 17th corps). "

[denatured alcohol]

there were 6 really operating German divisions

given that they helped to maintain the front, all German divisions carried a real load.

Cavalry German division in the Carpathians almost never fought

this is an erroneous opinion. I found in 2 sources an indication of a battle at Neviska.
Please look at this material written on the basis of real railway shek
https://topwar.ru/117641-nezviska.html
The battle between the German 5th Cavalry Brigade and units of the 1st Don Cossack - in the first part of this article.

It’s necessary to figure it out, it’s just work now, but it’s not clear for these divisions, the 25th is definitely not in February

Just the 25th reserve - exactly yes. I quoted a quote:

in February 1915 acted as part of the Marwitz detachment.

they couldn’t even reach Humennoy, from where the offensive to the rear of the German Southern Army could begin.

So Humennoe, in my opinion, was taken, like Mesa LaBorch

Strategically, almost nothing has changed, because the front only slightly moved south and stretched out.

Unfortunately.
There simply were no strategic reserves for the development of the Carpathian operation (as in 1944). But the fact of a breakthrough on the Hungarian plain had a place to be, therefore victory.

[barbiturate]

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amendments: 1) the Austro-German front broke through many times, and not the Austrian one (the Austrians mixed with the Germans, as they established - by the end of March 1915, that is, by the time the Russian forces crossed the Carpathians from 30 divisions - 20 Austrian and 10 German, i.e. one third are Germans); 2) not to a shallow depth, but to a decent one. measure with a compass. but try not on the map but in the snow, in the mountains and under fire?

1)
Well, let's calculate, on the first of April, 30 divisions out of which 10 are standing against us (for example, there were not ten Vedbas but 6 actually and essentially, but okay) GERMAN divisions, the final phase of the struggle for the passes - the Easter battle - begins.
We consider our LARGE breakthroughs through the "German" defense with the defeat of the damned Teutons)
Front of the 2nd Austrian Army:
April 2 - our 7th and 28th corps broke through the defenses of the 18th Austrian corps and defeated the 5th Austrian corps
April 6 - AUSTRIANS by this time had retreated and regrouped, but the front of the 18th AUSTRIAN Corps was broken again and the Austrian Schmidt Corps was very disheveled - the front was broken again, but could not be used as a breakthrough, the AUSTRIANS retreated.
Front of the 3rd Austrian Army
April 2 - our 29th corps crushed the 2 flanking divisions of the AUSTRIANS at the junction of the 2nd and 3rd armies and went along the Beskid main ridge and began to bypass Virava from the east, but the 25th reserve Germans came up and ... EVERYTHING - they say so - every advance of the Russian troops was END
On April 6, the breakthrough of our 12th and 24th corps through the battle formations of the 7th and 17th corps of the AUSTRIANS was practically a breakthrough, but ours did not go further and began to gain a foothold at new frontiers.
Here you are actually 4 !! breakthrough and EVERYTHING through the Austrian army, but as soon as the Germans approached ...
And this April - 4 breakthroughs, and it was the AUSTRIANS who broke through earlier.
Further, I will simply quote why in my own words to rewrite, just about the role of the Germans, I have already cited this, but it is also appropriate here.
As you can see - the Germans just run and put out the Austrian fires)

"German units at the beginning of the" Easter battle "appeared against the junction of the 12th and 29th corps, where an oncoming battle took place in the Laborets river valley. The Germans responded to the local breakthrough of the Russians on the eastern bank of Laborets by concentrating up to three divisions on the front about 10 km (two of them were German), but achieved only minor successes, occupying some heights about 10 km south of Meso-Laborcha (west of Virava), eliminating the onslaught from the flank of the Russian breakthrough east of Virava, and badly patting the 81st division of the 29th corps (The Germans took about 2.000 prisoners here.) It had to be supported by units of the 58th division from the front reserve. Nevertheless, having occupied the dominant heights west of Virava, the Germans won a local victory. While these heights were in the hands of the Germans, the Russians could not advance on Humennoe neither along the Laborets river, nor along the Virava river.

This part of the Easter battle ended in a draw, but the Russians lost the initiative and were forced to go over to the defense on the scale of the entire 3rd Army. "


2) By God, only from work and hunting is, and not write) you can just a small copy-paste))

"It is interesting that during the three weeks of the offensive (Carpathians, April 1915) the Russians tore apart the enemy's front in different places about 10 times and inflicted very serious tactical defeats on him. Due to these breakthroughs, it was possible to move forward 5-10 kilometers, but they failed to develop a breakthrough. never."

[denatured alcohol]

Bon Appetit)
I will not write the same terribly large posts with an exposition of the course of the database in support of my point of view, although believe me there is that)))
At least for the same Beskydy corps of Germans, which in March got quite)

[barbiturate]

Thank you) already the next day's dinner
Well, exchanged views)
But Marvitz will need to be read, until I can find what he commanded, all the same, Kron clearly described 25 divisions, and you can translate according to your scan - from the end of February, she has been busy transferring to the Carpathians and crediting Marvitz to the compound, but the Germans then clearly indicate - reserve until the end of March.
Well, the fact that the Germans also got a lot of fun - I’m absolutely sure that they just had a different technique, a completely different spirit, a desire to win, and most commanders match. For sim time to finish writing , but don’t disdain) a quote comparing the Austrians and Germans just on the front in question in 1915, so to speak, the testimony of some participants:

“At the beginning of each artillery skirmish,” wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, recalling his command of the company in the 409th Infantry Novokhopersk Regiment on the border of Bessarabia and Bukovina in the spring of 1916, “we glanced at the color of the gap and, seeing the familiar the pink haze that the Austrian shells gave out sighed with relief ": this means that the Austro-Hungarian units in this area have not yet been replaced by" German ".
“The white and red smoke of the breaks is better than the white German one,” the soldiers of the 1915th Sevsky Infantry Regiment, who were defending in Western Galicia on the Dunajec River, said bluntly in April 34, in front of the front of which, instead of gray-blue overcoats and caps, black ones appeared overcoats and pointed helmets - Bavarians ...
“The Germans immediately forced them to be more careful and vigilant both in the trenches and in the guard service, thanks to their activity,” noted Captain D. N. Tikhobrazov, who recorded the words of the Sevets, from the headquarters of the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front. Comments by other soldiers of the same army, recorded a month later in the 366th field hospital by the doctor of the 70th park artillery brigade L. N. Voitolovsky, are characteristic:
“- Is it so difficult to fight with the Germans?”
“Difficult,” the chorus of voices answers.
- Strong people.
- Heather hurts.
- Trickier than the cunning. You can’t get him down ...
“Is it easier to fight the Austrian?”
- Yes, it’s easier with him. He is shy. Now surrenders ...
- ... German is that fierce. Cunning. Strong. No harm with him. ”

Here, perhaps, the main distinguishing feature of the army of William II is noted - assertiveness, perseverance, tireless activity, "iron spirit of attack." Hence the astonishing Russians already in August 1914 “the extraordinary mobility of the German troops, their constant desire to attack, their ability to take constant risks, their stubbornness in achieving their goals, the ability of units to remain in order even in the most difficult situations.” (Rogvold V. Russian cavalry before the war and during the war // Cavalry men in the memoirs of contemporaries. 1900-1920. Issue 3. M. 2001. P. 121.)

[denatured alcohol]

I know all the quotes
Who argues) But other armies were also strong - among the Austrians, for example, why didn’t the Germans serve in a number of regiments? And the Hungarians? Stronger than the German were, in many positions.
I met on the pages of many documents lines like the Germans RUN under the blows of our troops. The fighters are strong, whatever you say, but more than once beaten in a series of large and small operations by us and our allies, so there is nothing to idealize them.
How to underestimate the Austrians or Turks

[barbiturate]

denatured alcohol,
The Austrian army was very heterogeneous in its composition, less motivated, it did not have a German teacher, officers were worse, the Slavic regiments frankly did not want to fight and surrendered whole regiments at the beginning of the war, cases were described by witnesses. The Hungarian units were excellent, but five in terms of a soldier, and the higher up the command ladder ...
In terms of combat readiness, I would be the first to put the Germans, the second of ours and the third French with the British, and of the Hungarians.
Well, on command and technical equipment, here the Western allies and Germans make us like children, well, much has already been written about this.

[denatured alcohol]

The Austrian army was beautiful. Yes, heterogeneity reduced potential. But how the whole regiments surrendered in the 1914 campaign ... This is later, just a breakdown after the Battle of Galicia - already in the Carpathians. And our army led to a breakdown - it’s enough to remember how the battle of Galicia was on the verge and with varying success.
The death of the personnel especially affected the Austrian army. But even after that, she fought beautifully - regularly clashing the Italians, periodically us. The Germans even used 2 Austrian divisions in 1918 on the French front.
And I would put our and Germans in first place in terms of combat readiness (although even more than ours - it’s enough to recall a number of cases of panic in the German operations on our front already in 1, and with the beginning of the decomposition after the November Revolution, the German army immediately surrendered, and ours at the stage of decomposition of the YEAR fought and tried to advance).
I will also quote the participant in the war.

The Germans told me: during the Great War, we placed the Imperial Russian Army above all, then the French, then the English, and didn’t consider Italians and Americans anything. But higher than the Russian cavalry was and even equal to it, we do not have

[barbiturate]

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The Austrian army was beautiful. Yes, heterogeneity reduced potential. But how the whole regiments surrendered in the 1914 campaign ... This is later, just a breakdown after the Battle of Galicia - already in the Carpathians. And our army led to a breakdown - it’s enough to remember how the battle of Galicia was on the verge and with varying success.
The death of the personnel especially affected the Austrian army. But even after that, she fought beautifully - regularly clashing the Italians, periodically us. The Germans even used 2 Austrian divisions in 1918 on the French front.

But I still don’t agree, I don’t see anything outstanding and beautiful with the Austrian army, either in organization or in command. She also had stable units from Germans and Hungarians, well, there are such units in any army, another thing is when the whole army is such a + command at the level. These were the Germans. The case of the surrender of the Czech regiment was described, for example, by General B. Gerua — he surrendered in full strength to our Voronezh regiment after simulating an attack. Just December 1914.
And I read and repeatedly with the French front that the Germans very low appreciated the fighting ability of the Austrians and when it became completely unbearable, they attracted everything !!! 2 divisions. All the same, it was not for nothing that the French army was called - the first sword of the Entente, it almost always diverted much more German forces than the Russian one.

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And I would put our and Germans in first place in terms of combat readiness (although even more than ours - it’s enough to recall a number of cases of panic in the German operations on our front already in 1, and with the beginning of the decomposition after the November Revolution, the German army immediately surrendered, and ours at the stage of decomposition of the YEAR fought and tried to advance).
I will also quote the participant in the war.

The fact of the matter is that personally I know only one case in the whole war when GERMAN BIGGER !!! units arbitrarily began to withdraw in a panic. This is the battle of Gumbinnen.
The Germans, after the successful Stallupeni battle for them, underestimated the defensive capabilities, the accuracy of the shooting and the fighting spirit of the Russian infantry, went directly to shrapnel and paid for it (ours buried 2000 German corpses right on the field). Almost all officers and non-commissioned officers and Germans were knocked out, at first slowly, then more and more quickly began to withdraw, and ours were NOT pursued. Ours overestimated the results, and the Germans then returned ... it seems under Soldau.
Where else did the Big German units panic? Well, in local battles, what just doesn’t happen, it happens that the most stable and reliable units give in to panic, conclusions must be drawn throughout the army.
Well, how our YEAR fought in decay, it's a shame to mention even these "combat" operations) How did the attempt to attack end? The army was already dead, only the corpse was pulled by the strings, trying to move its arms and legs)

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I don’t agree, I don’t see something outstanding and beautiful in the Austrian army, either in organization or in command.

I totally disagree. A topic for a very serious conversation.
By the way, it was Goetzendorf who considered the German Max Hoffmann the best strategist of the German bloc.

Just December 1914.

Still, December and not the Battle of Galicia))

it almost always diverted much more German forces than the Russian.

not so, the Franco-Anglo-Belgian forces distracted the German troops.
and the Russian army - the Austro-German forces. The proportions are determined by the specifics of deployment. But there is a tendency to constantly build up the German contingent on the Russian front.
You are DEEPly mistaken. I know a series of such episodes - all the way up to the division. Not only Gumbinnen.
But I think this is a promising topic for the article, there is nothing to highlight them) Even in discussions with Germanophiles))

Well, how our YEAR fought in decay, it's a shame to mention even these "combat" operations)

Take a look at the article on the VO in 3 parts - the Artillery Standard. About the offensive of the 10th army in the summer of 17. When there was a breakthrough in the German defense - they didn’t develop it, due to various circumstances.

What ended the attempt to advance? The army was already dead, only pulled the corpse for the strings, trying to move his arms and legs)

The Nosha army lived decaying year. The German was not able to even this, fell apart in 2 revolutionary November weeks of 18.

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You are DEEPly mistaken. I know a series of such episodes - all the way up to the division. Not only Gumbinnen.

I wrote this about the panic of the Germans.
By the way, the Hungarians as warriors are equivalent to the Germans, and maybe stronger

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Perhaps you, barbiturate, have inattentively read a series of articles on A.V. VO Oleinikova on the East Prussian operation.
There are interesting quotes from Russian and Soviet military historians - military experts.
As for the combat qualities of the Russian and German troops, as the Red Army brigade commander N. Evseev wrote, both German and Russian troops equally “underwent panic when they failed, leaving the battlefield. Some of our authors, who criticize the old Russian army for its many shortcomings, often condemn the troops for supposedly worse training, lack of valor, etc., and, contrasting them with the Germans, praise their excellent qualities. In fact, both Germans and Russians fought approximately the same, moreover, in the “Tannenberg” battle, as well as in the Gumbinnensky, panic-dominated palm rather belongs to the Germans"Evseev N. The August Battle of S. 153.

Panic arose:
1) in the German troops at Gumbinnen,
2) in the ranks of the German 37th Infantry Division in battle on August 11,
3) in the Unger's division in battles on August 14 (in the last two cases, the 15th Army Corps of the Army of A.V. Samsonov was the culprit)
4) in the 41st Infantry Division at Vaplitsa in other cases.

So, Colonel of the Soviet Army F. Khramov wrote: “The panic that arose on the morning of August 28 (new style) in the ranks of the 41st infantry. the division, defeated by parts of the 15th corps, swept other troops, spreading by the evening of the same day to the rear units and institutions of the gene group. Scholz. Gene. Hindenburg tried to drive by car to the headquarters of the 20th Corps and to the panic-stricken area, with the goal of personal presence to restore order, but he failed to do this. In the Tannenberg area, the panic took on a spontaneous character. Towards the car gene. Hindenburg rode carts of rear institutions - parks, transports, ambulances, etc. - with shouts: "The Russians are coming." The roads were clogged. Gene. Hindenburg was forced to return. ”Temples F. East Prussian Operation 1914. Operational and strategic outline. M.: Military Publishing, 1940 S. 60.
The same specialist wrote: “Before the war, the Germans considered the Russian troops tactically poorly trained. However, the course of the entire operation showed the opposite. The tactical training of the Russian troops was no lower than the German one, and the preparedness of the Russian artillery undoubtedly stood above the German one. This is confirmed by a number of remarkable tactical victories won by the Russians: near Gumbinen, near Orlau, in the Vaplitsa area and others. ”

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And one more thing. Regarding surrendered regiments.
In the Second Prasnyshsky operation, one of the oldest regiments of the German army, 34th Pomeranian Life-Fusilier, surrendered to Siberians, about 1000 people, with command staff.
And nothing in this case, a regiment composed of true Aryans , did not differ from the Prague regiment (also 1000 people) from the Czechs, who surrendered to the Russians in the Carpathians.
The vicissitudes of war, lodge

[barbiturate]

YOU confuse panic and unauthorized retreat without the order of large units. Panic, there is still no abandonment of their fighting positions and the spontaneous flight of units, the Germans I do not remember this, except for Gumbinnen, well, 1918 on the Western Front.
There are many examples of such confusion in our upcoming units.
Aug 11 (24) 1914, Colonel Krymov, who traveled around the advancing, then, 2nd Army Corps wrote a field note to the headquarters of the 2nd Army:
"11 pm. No. 3. Lizanken. Gen. Samsonov
Field note
... "Having approached Lippau, I saw a terrible picture: complete panic, killed people, heaps of wounded, abandoned equipment, charge boxes overturned.
It turns out that someone in the head of the division's column shouted: “Enemy cavalry!”, The ammunition boxes turned around, rushed to gallop, the infantry began to shoot at each other.
A picture of despair.
For a long time it was impossible to put in order.
The division chief was in Scottau, where I went to report to him about the incident, since he did not yet know about the panic. "
In this note, Colonel Krymov describes a case of panic in parts of the 2nd infantry. division, which on this day is 11 (24) Aug. came in columns of the main forces to the village of Lippau mentioned above, and the vanguard, at which the division commander was the gene. Minging, reached Scottau.

So panic is bad, but unauthorized withdrawal from our positions ...

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2) in the ranks of the German 37th Infantry Division in battle on August 11,

I did not see panic and unauthorized withdrawal there, although the division was defeated on the second day of the battle.
The retreat of the Germans was deliberate, and the blow of parts of the 15th Russian corps fell on the battered battle and the mixed regiments of the 37th German division. As Max Hoffman evaluated this fight, one could also say, but you have already quoted Kersnovsky more than once, here is his assessment.
"On August 10/23, a bloody battle took place near Orlau, which cost the Russians 2,5 killed. The area was equipped by the Germans with so-called" wolf pits "and barbed wire fences. The battle lasted a day and ended in Russian success. Two heavy guns, two machine guns were captured. charge boxes and many prisoners. The Germans lost 1700 killed in the battle near Orlau. "

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3) in the Unger's division in battles on August 14 (in the last two cases, the 15th Army Corps of the Army of A.V. Samsonov was the culprit)

Which division is this? I don’t remember the general. And I don’t remember the battle) It’s necessary to read, but right away I come across this. The rout of our 4th Infantry Division on the morning of August 27 (according to our style, of course)
The Russian historian A. Kersnovsky wrote bitter words about this:
“On the right flank, our 4th Infantry Division of the VI Army Corps was attacked by the 1st Reserve and 17th German Army Corps and defeated. The confused commander of the corps, General Blagoveshchensky, threw the troops entrusted to him and fled. The corps followed its commander and went straight south, abroad, without warning either the army headquarters or the neighbor — the XIII corps, whose flank and rear were exposed to attack. The 4th division in the battle of Gross Bessau and Ortelsburg lost 73 officers, 5283 lower ranks, 16 guns and 18 machine guns. The 16th division lost no more than 1500 people. General Blagoveshchensky stated that he was "not used to being with the troops."

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in the 41st Infantry Division at Vaplitsa in other cases.

This incident is simply exemplary, General Martos foresaw everything, but the Germans, on the contrary, contrary to the opinion of the corps and division commander, drove the 41st under attack
“The commander of the 41st German Infantry Division was confused in the current situation. His units were mixed, the division was counterattacked by the Russians from three sides, there were no reserves, the division's units were already retreating from Waplitz. At 7 hours, the division commander gave the order to retreat. "

Again, the Germans were defeated, they twice made a mistake with and alternately put their 37 and 41 apart in a blow, but at that time our corps themselves were confidently heading for their rout, there was a rout of 41, but again, I didn’t see an unauthorized flight, the Germans did everything on command.

“Frankly speaking, the decision of the commander of the 41st German division, General Sontag, to launch an offensive at NIGHT, in a thick FOG, in several columns, was a considerable adventure, not too typical for the actions of German generals of the First World War. arrived late at the start of the battle. "

Thus, you confuse the private defeat of the Germans and unauthorized flight. Nobody argues that our troops had successful battles with the Germans, but these are all minor successes, against the background of the general routs and flight of our corps and divisions with tens of thousands of prisoners

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YOU confuse panic and unauthorized retreat without the order of large units. Panic, there is still no abandonment of their fighting positions and the spontaneous flight of units, the Germans I do not remember this, except for Gumbinnen, well, 1918 on the Western Front.

You do not remember that. And venerable military historians - cite these cases. Cases are precisely PANIC in the ranks of the German troops.
Study the works of Evseev, Khramov and the Collection of documents of the General Staff of the Red Army East Prussian operation.
These materials are worth dozens of arguments of barbiturates, denatured alcohol and other various degenerates.
So the German formations were panicked several times only during the East Prussian operation.

Thus you confuse private defeat of Germans and unauthorized flight.

Therefore - I do not confuse anything.

but these are all minor successes, against the background of the general defeats and flight of our corps and divisions with tens of thousands of prisoners

Of course, a series of routs of corps and divisions with their thousands of prisoners was also waiting for the Germans during the East Prussian operation. The Russian troops won victories on a brigade, division and corps scale, but the tactical advantages of the Russian troops were not used by the operational leadership. And the defeat of the entire operation nullified the AMAZING successes of the Russian troops.
We give the floor to the specialists of the General Staff of the Red Army:

On the fields of East Prussia in bloody battles, military doctrine and combat training were tested the two most powerful opponents. In terms of their tactical training, the Russian troops were in no way inferior to the Germans during all the battles in East Prussia, inflicting a number of heavy defeats on the Germans.
August 19 (hereinafter - the new style) 25th and 29th infantry. Russian divisions defeated the left flank of the 1st German Corps gene. Francois;
On August 20, the 1st and 17th armies were defeated near Gumbinen. housing;
during the August battle of the Samson army, the Russians defeated the 6th and 70th landver brigades at Gross-Beccay and Mühlen, the Goltz’s land division and the 3rd res. Hochenstein’s division, 41st infantry. division at Vaplitsa, 37th infantry. the division at Lahn, Orlau, Frankenau; finally, they defeated the 2nd infantry. divisions under Uzdau.
But some brilliant tactical successes of the Russian troops were not tied into a common victory. The Germans suffered a number of brutal defeats in separate battles, but won the operation in East Prussia.

A collection of documents of the world imperialist war on the Russian front (1914-1917). East Prussian operation. M .: Military Publishing, 1939.S. 23.

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You do not remember that. And venerable military historians - cite these cases. Cases are precisely PANIC in the ranks of the German troops.
Study the works of Evseev, Khramov and the Collection of documents of the General Staff of the Red Army East Prussian operation.
These materials are worth dozens of arguments of barbiturates, denatured alcohol and other various degenerates.
So the German formations were panicked several times only during the East Prussian operation.

Reread again, just the PANIC happens at separate units in ANY army on the WAR !! I tell you this, but where is the unauthorized abandonment of positions at the Large German formations and units?
Reread my answer.
- YOU confuse panic and unauthorized retreat without the order of large units. Panic, is not yet the abandonment of their fighting positions and the spontaneous flight of units, the Germans I do not remember this, except Gumbinnen, well, 1918 on the Western Front.

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Therefore - I do not confuse anything.

You confuse it, you are actually trying to attribute to me the assertion that the Germans are not people, but gods and they do not have panic, defeats, unsuccessful battles, they cannot get into ambushes and fire bags, like the 37 and 41 German divisions.

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Of course, a series of routs of corps and divisions with their thousands of prisoners was also waiting for the Germans during the East Prussian operation. The Russian troops won victories on a brigade, division and corps scale, but the tactical advantages of the Russian troops were not used by the operational leadership. And the defeat of the entire operation nullified the AMAZING successes of the Russian troops.

And how does this contradict my words about the Germans? Did I say that no German unit can not be killed, smashed?
I spoke about the AUTHORIZED RUNNING OF GERMAN units, left without officers near Gumbinnen, whom NO ONE HAS BEEN PURSUING AND GIVEN AN ORDER TO RETREAT !!! Well, since you believe only the "specialists of the Red Army" and Evseev, then we will quote Evseev following the results of the FIRST East Prussian CATASTROPHE! (and I completely agree with Evseev !!!)
"In the afternoon of August 30, the Russian troops no longer represented a military formation. Scattered detachments of both sides fought on the battlefield. But the army operation ended. In this battle, the Russians defeated the 6th and 70th Landwehr brigades at Gross-Bessau and Mühlen, -
Goltz's vision and the 3rd res. the division near Hohenstein, the 41st infantry division near Vaplits, the 37th infantry. division under Lana, Orlau, Frankenau; finally, they defeated the 2nd infantry. divisions under Uzdau, but individual successes of the Russians were not tied into a common victory. The chain of victorious battles of individual Russian regiments and divisions resulted in the defeat of six divisions (one at Gross-Bessau and five at Kommuzinsky
The Germans suffered a number of severe defeats in separate battles, but won the operation in East Prussia. "

Just do not forget that this is the opinion of the Russian and Russian historians, the Germans themselves are much more merciless for us to write about our rout and our desire to smooth out the rout is understandable. This also needs to be taken into account, otherwise it turns out that the Germans beat us, and then he defeated us) We mean they inflicted a number of defeats on the Germans in separate battles, but ours did not bear any defeats, immediately defeat)
This is the strength of the Germans, about which I said that the Germans broke the network of our local successes, were able to correctly assess the situation, and completed their network of successful local operations that led to the CATASTROPHE of our army.

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to the catastrophe of our army

To the disaster of 2 corps of the 2nd Army. So more precisely.
Disasters of a similar level for all opponents in the WWII are all the time. Suffice it to recall the Lodz Cauldron for the Germans.
In short, I’m not worth idealizing anyone. The Germans considered themselves super-warriors - and in both warriors they washed themselves with a bloody yushka.

[barbiturate]

There is already no catastrophe of the 2nd army, so, 2 corps

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Why not? The attack group of the 2nd Army - 5 divisions (2,5 corps) was surrounded.
Since this is the core of the 2nd Army, it is called the "Samson catastrophe".
The Germans also surrounded 5 divisions near Lodz and no more of them remained than what came out of the "Tannenberg cauldron". The scale is the same, the losses are almost the same.
But fanfare is trumpeting about our catastrophe - what Russian fools, but they are silent about the German one (they do not call it a "Mackensen catastrophe") - they are cool)
In short, I am only against a policy of double standards, nothing more.

[barbiturate]

You’re a strange person, you don’t see the difference, for example, between voluntary surrender of the Czech regiment according to the PRELIMINARY conspiracy, when he is on the defensive in good fortified positions and surrenders the rest of the 34 fusilier’s prisoners after he was marching under the ice rink of a fresh Siberian corps and fought all day fiercely, when all the chances were 0, then 12 officers and about 800 soldiers surrendered (in fact, they were less than a battalion from a full-blooded regiment at the beginning of the battle), they also didn’t want to hand over the banner and hid it in the well. And you write - it's the same thing.
Then I and Kersnovsky are both cool historians, he wrote books and I write here, what's the difference? It is resolved.
So with the catastrophe of the second army, the army was completely crushed, the commander shot himself !!!, two corps (75000 soldiers and officers) simply ceased to exist, MANY tens of thousands of prisoners, the rest of the corps suffered heavy losses and just flee leaving ... the remnants of the second army then for a month and a half they brought to life at the border and - the Battle of Lodz with an undefined result, where a "layer cake" of ours and the Germans turned out and, in fact, by accident (no one planned it), the Schaeffer Group was surrounded, which then also made its way out of the encirclement, keeping the artillery and the wagon train, took out some of the wounded, although the loss in people was enormous (35000), BUT !!! Nobody defeated anyone and both sides !!! suffered severe losses. As a result, a draw - ours were not allowed to invade the German Empire, which we were going to do once again, and we were not allowed to encircle the second army. The Germans solved the strategic problem, and ours ...
Well, the loss can simply be quoted.
"during the battle of Lodz, not a single large unit was completely defeated, however, the 1st Army Corps, 5th Siberian Corps, 4th, 6th and 14th Siberian Rifle Divisions, 43rd and 50th Infantry divisions, the 1st Infantry Brigade by the end of the battle were non-combatant.On the German side, three divisions from the Schaeffer Group and the 38th Infantry Division from the 11th AK were in the same position.In general, this list very clearly shows who was closer to victory at Lodz.

The losses from the Russians during the battle were very heavy. The 2nd Army lost a little less than half of its strength, i.e. more than 60 thousand people. The 30th Army lost about 5 thousand people. Churin’s group lost more than 25 thousand fighters, and a third of the losses fell on the 6th Siberian. page division. Plus, at least 15.000 people lost the 1st Army during the defense of Lovich.

German losses - at least 80.000 people, of which (according to the Germans themselves) at least 35.000 fell on the Schaeffer Group. "

Therefore, if we compare purely by people, then it is comparable, and there and there - tens of thousands, but according to the results and consequences - like heaven and earth are the difference.

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surrendering the remnants of the 34 Fusilier Life Label

nevertheless surrendered, and defended himself in the village - not without reason the Germans hid the banner in the well. From the Prague regiment, too - the remnants.
About disasters. Although the commander shot himself (although it is not known for certain), several German generals also died in the Lodz boiler. This is not the case.
Better let's compare the boilers by numbers.
East Prussian operation.
In the boiler there were about 70 thousand people of Russian soldiers and officers. About 20 thousand broke out of the environment. Total losses in the boiler - 50 thousand people.
Lodz operation.
The boiler turned out to be 50 thousand Germans. It broke through the environment - about 8 thousand people.
Total losses in the boiler - 42 thousand people.
I do not clutter up links to sources.
Comparable? Of course.
Effects.
After the East Prussian operation in September 1914, the Russians of the 1st and 10th armies conducted the First August Operation, defeated the Germans, and again occupied half of East Prussia, reaching the Masurian Lakes.
After the Lodz operation, in December 1914, the stabilization of the Polish theater of military operations. In fact, for six months.
To whom it is profitable - decide for yourself.

[barbiturate]

The remains of the German 34th regiment surrendered, a fact, but I do not consider such surrender to be shameful or cast a shadow on the army. In such conditions, both ours and the Germans and the French gave up with the British, and I do not say anything about the Austrians.
Whether the Prague regiment surrendered or not, I didn’t find any clarification, but it’s written like this in Gerua:

“Voronezh at dawn attacked the enemy located opposite them, broke through the front, captured the district artillery and numerous prisoners, whole battalions with all their superiors.
Soon, these gray-blue columns of the Austrians, almost without a convoy, appeared in the village where the division headquarters stood. They walked cheerfully and cheerfully, grunting and joking with the Russian soldier, who poured out to stare at the living trophies.
All these prisoners, without exception, turned out to be Czechs. "

I doubt that these are RESIDUES - WHOLE BATTALONS with artillery. Rather, the full-blooded regiment did not want to fight.

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Comparable? Of course.

I agree with you, although everyone’s numbers are floating, but it’s natural, everyone wants to underestimate their losses and overestimate others

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Effects.

If we take the results of these battles - Lodz and the defeat of Samsonov's Second Army, then Lodz is a battle where the parties simply "stuffed each other in the blood and parted" with the strategic advantage of the Germans, and their advantage in artillery equipment began to be strongly affected in losses - they did not let ours again invade the borders of their empire, but the Second Army was precisely defeated, that is, according to the same terminology, "they stuffed us in the face and we rushed to run." The difference in political and propaganda terms is so HUGE.
And I understand perfectly well that our soldiers are no worse than the German ones, they are facing each other, but all our failures came from the commanders and poor technical equipment.

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After the East Prussian operation in September 1914, the Russians of the 1st and 10th armies conducted the First August Operation, defeated the Germans, and again occupied half of East Prussia, reaching the Masurian Lakes.

Here we must take into account the fact that despite the defeat of the Second Army, we only gained momentum in mobilization in the autumn of 1914 ...

"During this period, the Russian army, having completed the mobilization and transportation of troops to the active army, received an overwhelming numerical and qualitative advantage over the enemy."

And again, I do not see the defeat of the Germans in the First August operation, the Germans are being systematically squeezed out. Here, in my opinion, the correct definition of the results of the First August.
"At some moments of this operation, the Russians had a threefold advantage over the Germans in the number of divisions. In manpower, the Russians at times outnumbered the enemy by 4 times. But the result of the operation was only a slow squeezing of enemy troops to the fortified line of the Masurian Lakes, which the Russian troops could not break through. neither in the fall of 1914, nor later. The Russians paid for advancing 100 kilometers forward with the loss of more than 100.000 people. And since it was impossible to advance further, and since it was not possible to pin down significant German forces in East Prussia, strategically these losses are not justified. "

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I doubt that these are RESIDUES - WHOLE BATTALONS with artillery. Rather, the full-blooded regiment did not want to fight.

In the Prague regiment at the time of delivery there were 1100 people. That's why I compared this scale with the 34th Pomeranian - in which at the time of delivery there were about 1000 people.

If we take the results of these battles - Lodz and the defeat of Samsonov's Second Army, then Lodz is a battle where the parties simply "stuffed each other in the blood and parted" with the strategic advantage of the Germans, and their advantage in artillery equipment began to be strongly affected in losses - they did not let ours again invade the borders of their empire, but the Second Army was precisely defeated

After the reorganization, the 2nd Army went forward again. It was replenished - and it turns out that the mass of people did not even have time to get into the composition of their units before the operation (memoirs of a front-line soldier), arriving later.
What is the result? As one historian of the 30s wrote. - this is only a private defeat of 2 buildings, despite the fact that the history of the First War knew a lot of cases of such local defeats. Hole latali - and this did not lead to a radical change in the situation.

And again, I do not see the defeat of the Germans in the First August operation, the Germans are being systematically squeezed out.

The German 8th Army suffered a serious defeat, even the Germans admit it.

The Russians paid for the advance of 100 kilometers by the loss of more than 100.000 people.

I do not know for what period the figures are taken. In the First August Operation itself, September 12-30, 1914, the parties lost 20000 each - both Russians and Germans.

[barbiturate]

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In the Prague regiment at the time of delivery there were 1100 people. That's why I compared this scale with the 34th Pomeranian - in which at the time of delivery there were about 1000 people.

The scale may be one, but the circumstances are fundamentally different! One deserted and surrendered, and the second was taken wounded on the battlefield - but we can say that both are captured.
In addition, we generally, as I understand it, are talking about different cases.
You are talking about the 28th Prague Regiment, which our Orovai 195th Infantry Regiment (49th Division) made a very successful attack and took a lot of prisoners, so there’s a dark story in general. It turns out there and the surrender of the regiment was not there. Read for yourself how it was presented by propaganda.
The case, about which Gerua spoke, happened during an attack by conspiracy on the position of the Austrians of the 124th Voronezh Infantry Regiment (31st Division).

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After the reorganization, the 2nd Army went forward again. It was replenished - and it turns out that the mass of people did not even have time to get into the composition of their units before the operation (memoirs of a front-line soldier), arriving later.
What is the result? As one historian of the 30s wrote. - this is only a private defeat of 2 buildings, despite the fact that the history of the First War knew a lot of cases of such local defeats. Hole latali - and this did not lead to a radical change in the situation.

Well, yes, the 2nd Army was defeated and fled, it was brought back to life, replenished with people and sent to battle again, what is unusual here and what does it prove?
Well, one or more historians (s) may still not write something that would justify and smooth out)) Here is a private local defeat, a trifle, it happens. This is just true for the Schaeffer Group, nothing has changed, the parties scattered each other and stopped to catch their breath (with a decently large loss to us), and the 2nd Army was defeated and fled, speaking Russian.

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The German 8th Army suffered a serious defeat, even the Germans admit it.

God be with you, where you only collect these tales. The 8th Army held the front and this despite the fact that it was greatly weakened after the transfer of 2 (1AK and 25RK) corps to help in the Battle of Lodz. Ours there really, by the end of the operation were able to break through the defenses, but after 20 km they again ran into the fortifications (Letzen Fortress) and stopped there, the 2nd East Prussian operation ended.

"This, one might say, ended the 2nd East Prussian operation, which can be called the longest and most obscure offensive operation of the maneuvering period of the First World War.
So, during the 2nd East Prussian operation, the Russians failed to fulfill their strategic tasks. But the Germans successfully coped with the defense of East Prussia. Even during the Lodz operation, when the Germans had to throw all available forces on the offensive in order to thwart the Russian invasion of Germany, the front of the 8th army held on and chained to itself twice the superior Russian forces.

German losses in East Prussia were small, but sensitive. They can be estimated at about 20-25 thousand people (excluding irregular units), which is much less than the attackers. Moreover, a significant share of the losses fell on the untreated 25th RK, which desperately but ineptly attacked Graevo at the end of October .. Landwehr units, which were hit by the 1st Army near Verzhbolovo, suffered greatly. The 1st AK suffered losses, which repeatedly had to go on the offensive in order to attract all the Russian attention to itself. "

Hmm, how do you drag the Germans to defeat, we would quickly defeat you, declare ANY (the impression is) an operation with your victory and declare the enemy defeated and that’s it, victory !!)))

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I do not know for what period the figures are taken. In the First August Operation itself, September 12-30, 1914, the parties lost 20000 each - both Russians and Germans.

This data is at the very end of November and the end of the 2nd East Prussian operation. Accordingly, the loss.

[denatured alcohol]

God be with you, where you only collect these tales. 8th Army held the front

The 8th Army in the First August Operation did not deter any front - it was kicked out of the Suwalk province. Yes, and chopped back half of East Prussia.

it was greatly weakened after the transfer of 2 (1AK and 25RK) corps to help in the Lodz battle.

it has nothing to do with it. The first August operation is September, and Lodz - November to December.
So which of us is a storyteller?))

German losses in East Prussia were small, but sensitive. They can be estimated at about 20-25 thousand people (excluding irregular units), which is much less than the attackers. Moreover, a significant share of the losses fell on the untreated 25th RK, which desperately but ineptly attacked Graevo at the end of October .. Landwehr units, which were hit by the 1st Army near Verzhbolovo, suffered greatly. The 1st AK suffered losses, which repeatedly had to go on the offensive in order to attract all the Russian attention to itself. "

It’s fundamentally wrong.
In the East Prussian operation, the Germans lost 37000 people, in the First August War - 20000 (this is all German data). These are common losses. And there were October - December 1914
For 1939, in East Prussia, there were burials from 27860 dead German soldiers and officers of the First World War. Only the dead!

Hmm, how do you drag the Germans to defeat, we would quickly defeat you, declare ANY operation (such an impression) the operation with your victory and declare the enemy defeated and that’s all, victory laughing !!)))

I'm not dragging anyone anywhere. The first August operation - a recognized victory of Russian weapons.

This data is at the very end of November and the end of the 2nd East Prussian operation. Accordingly, the loss.

Whose data is the source ??

[barbiturate]

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The 8th Army in the First August Operation did not deter any front - it was kicked out of the Suwalk province. Yes, and chopped back half of East Prussia.

Tired of your fairy tales, enlighten me with the results of the First August
"The results of the operation before its suspension were: the clearing of Russian territory from German troops and heavy losses of the Russians. Although the Russians were able to win a significant piece of territory (and secured the Grodno region), they could not speak of victory, because they could not do anything with the 8th German Two beaten Landwehr divisions - the maximum that was achieved in a military sense.The Germans, one might say, fulfilled their task of holding back the Russian offensive and defeated several Russian divisions, however, their success was incomplete, because they had to retreat to their own territory, it took reinforce the 8th army with one corps, and the Russians were able to transfer the entire 2nd army and 2 corps from the 1st army beyond the Vistula. "

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it has nothing to do with it. The first August operation is September, and Lodz - November to December.
So which of us is a storyteller?))

This is a continuation of the operation - after the First of August, ours continued to try to advance further, these are all stages of the 2nd VPO, and the storyteller is you, and the great one)

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It’s fundamentally wrong.
In the East Prussian operation, the Germans lost 37000 people, in the First August War - 20000 (this is all German data). These are common losses. And there were October - December 1914

Well, you yourself are talking about September, yes there - about 20 thousand each, for this you climbed into the August forests - to nullify the German advantage in maneuvering and heavy artillery. He also saw Oleinik’s data with reference to the Reichsarchive, he was checking laziness, although such a comrade might lie, his goal is clear - we won the WWII

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I'm not dragging anyone anywhere. The first August operation - a recognized victory of Russian weapons.

Recognized by you)) I do not see any victory

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Whose data is the source ??

http://istoriya-kg.ru/index.php?option=pmvrufr&view=article&Itemid=vost-prus-914b-vvedeniye

I agree with the author, offer your figures for losses in the Second East Prussian, it is very little described where, here the person collected data bit by bit. And he does not scribble nonsense about our "loud" victories.

[denatured alcohol]

Although the Russians were able to win a significant piece of the territory (and secured the Grodno region), they could not talk about victory, because they could not do anything with the 8th German army. Two battered landver divisions - the maximum that was achieved in the military sense.

Lost the 1st and 20th German army corps - well-beaten.

This is a continuation of the operation - after the First of August, ours continued to try to advance further, these are all stages of the 2nd VPO, and the storyteller is you, and the great one)

Am I a storyteller?))
Do not mix the First August Operation and the Second Campaign in East Prussia,

He also saw Oleinik’s data with reference to the Reichsarchive, he can check laziness even though such a comrade can mess up, his goal is clear - we won the WWII

Yes, you hamlyuk my friend. You can’t check it, because for this it’s worth working, going to the library. Just a nonsense - with a much greater probability, not a doctor of sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, but a candidate-culturologist from the region, masquerading as a barbiturate))

Recognized by you)) I do not see any victory

And do not see. For you are nobody for history. And I meant historians.

I agree with the author, offer your figures for losses in the Second East Prussian, it is very little described where, here the person collected data bit by bit. And he does not scribble nonsense about our "loud" victories.

read the Reichsarhiv and the Plume - and you will see. And you yourself will not write nonsense.
And in general, I personally am convinced that such a long correspondence (as we have with you) makes sense (if at all) makes sense only in the relationship between a guy and a girl))
You're a girl ??
If you are a girl - continue to write to me)
The truth is not sure that I will answer))