Military Review

On the technical condition of the squadron of S. Uriu in the battle with the "Varangian" and on the veracity of the Japanese combat reports

70
Having devoted so much time to describing the problems of the Varyag power plant, it would be a mistake not to say a few words about the technical condition of the ships of the Sotokichi Uriu squadron. Domestic sources often sin that, referring to the problems of domestic ships, they provide reference data about Japanese ships: that is, their speeds, which they showed during testing, when the ships were delivered the fleet. But at the same time, many Japanese ships by the time of the battle on January 27, 1904 were no longer new, and could not develop passport speeds.


In addition ... the author has no doubt that dear readers of the article are well aware of the composition and armament of the squadron, which blocked the way "Varyag" and "Korean", but we allow ourselves to remind them again, indicating the strength of the onboard volley of each ship, excluding guns 75-mm caliber and less, as almost incapable of harming the enemy.

So, the cruising forces under the command of Sotokichi Uriu included one first cruiser, two cruisers of 2 rank and three - 3-th. So, the main strike force of the Japanese, of course, was the 1 rank cruiser (armored) "Asama", the normal displacement (hereinafter - according to the "Technical Form") 9 710 t.


"Asama" on acceptance tests


The artillery armament consisted of 4 * 203-mm / 45, 14 * 152-mm / 40, 12 * 76-mm / 40, 8 * 47-mm guns, 4 * 203-45-7-152-mm guns could participate in the sideboard, and 40 * 2-3-18-203-mm guns could participate in the sideboard salvo 152-mm / 5-mm, 45 * XNUMX *, XNUMX * XNUMX * XNUMX-mm / XNUMX guns. On the ship there was a XNUMX rangefinder "Barr and Strud" and XNUMX rangefinder Fiske (obviously, an analogue of our micrometer Lyuzhol-Myakishev). There were XNUMX riflescopes - one for each XNUMX-mm and XNUMX-mm guns, torpedo armament was represented by XNUMX * XNUMX-cm torpedo tubes. We will consider booking this ship a little later.

The speed of “Asama” at the official tests, which took place on 10 in February of 1899, reached 20,37 knots during the natural thrust, and when forcing the boilers - the 22,07 knot. Shortly before the war, in mid-September, 1903, “Asama”, after overhaul in Kure, developed 19,5 knots on natural thrust and at a displacement slightly more than normal, 9 855 tons. As for the tests under forced domination, they are more likely of all, they were not carried out, but it can be assumed that a cruiser would have developed no less than 20,5 ties - by the way, this is precisely how fast the “Assam” was indicated in the Appendix to the Military Instructions of the Japanese fleet.

2 class cruisers (armored) "Naniwa" and "Takachiho".



These ships were of the same type, so we will consider both at once. The normal displacement of each was 3 709 tons, the armament (hereafter - as of 27 in January 1904) was represented by 8 * 152 / 40, from which 5 and 12 * 47-mm guns could fire on one side, and 4 torpedo tubes 36-cm. Each cruiser had one Barra and Stroude range finder, two Fiske range finders and eight optical sights. Both of these cruisers were handed over to the fleet in 1886, and immediately after their official transfer, in February of the same year, were tested by Japanese sailors. When forcing the boilers, the cruisers showed almost equal results: “Naniwa” - 18,695 knots, “Takachiho” - 18,7 knots.

In general, the power plants "Naniwa" and "Takachiho" deserve high marks, however, the first 10 years of service of the cruiser were very intensively exploited, and by 1896 g their cars and boilers were very worn out. Further their история Extremely similar - in 1896-1897 years. the cruisers underwent a thorough overhaul: the Takachiho passed it from July 1896 to March 1897, the tubes in the main and auxiliary boilers were completely replaced, the propeller shaft bearings were pressured and lubricated, all components and mechanisms were checked and repaired and repaired and hydraulic lines. Similar work was carried out on the “Nanivi”, while some of the bearings were replaced by new ones.

However, all this did not help much, and the XaniM g and the Naniwa and Takachiho boilers became practically unusable, as a result of which they had to be changed on both cruisers. Later, both cruisers repeatedly repaired their power plants, and, importantly, the last time before the war they were engaged in 1900 g in January - at the same time both ships passed tests, during which both showed the maximum speed of 1904 knots (though it is not clear , on forced blast or on natural thrust).

The next in our list is the “conditionally-armored” cruiser of the 3 rank “Chiyoda”, concurrently, perhaps, the main misunderstanding of the Sotokichi Uriu squadron.



The normal displacement of the cruiser was just 2 439 t, that is, even less than that of the Novik armored deck, but the ship could boast a long 114 mm armor that covered the ship's 2 / 3 waterline and had a height of 1,5 meter. The ship’s armament was made up of 10 * 120-mm / 40 quick-firing guns and 15 * 47 mm guns of two different types, 6 guns could be fired on board, torpedo guns - 3 * 36-cm TA. The ship had one Barra and Stroude rangefinder, and one Fiske rangefinder, but for some unclear reasons, 1 September 1903 September all the optical sights were removed from the ship, so that on 27 January, the 1904 g cruiser fought without them. I must say that this was completely atypical for the ships of the United Fleet.

Even greater interest is the power plant installation. It must be said that Chiyoda went into service, having fire tube boilers - with the 1891, which took place in January on tests, the cruiser developed an 19,5 knot on the forced draft - quite good for a cruiser of such dimensions and protection. However, in the period from April 1897 to May 1898, during the overhaul of Chiyoda, the fire tube boilers were replaced with water tube, Belleville systems. However, the repair was not done very skillfully (for example, after repair it turned out that the fittings available on the ship did not fit the new boilers, so the fittings had to be re-ordered and the ship was repaired for repair, which ended at the end of 1898. However This was not enough, and from then on Chiyoda repaired the undercarriage from January to May 1900 g, then from October 1901 g to March 1902 g, after which it seemed to be returned to the active fleet, but in April of the same year they were transferred to reserve 3-her turn and again sent for repair. s the cruiser removed the pipe and unloaded all the main and auxiliary mechanisms, the repair was carried out in the most capital way, having completed it after 11 months, in March 1903 g. After that, everything seemed to be good, on the tests of 3 in March 1903. The cruiser developed a 18,3 knot on natural thrust, and according to the tactical form, the speed of the Chiyoda was 19 knots (obviously, when forcing).

But Belleville boilers do not give up so easily. Already in 27 in September 1903 g, that is, after just a little less than 7 months after the March tests, the ship was able to develop only the 17,4 node on the natural load, while the ship continued to pursue power plant failures, it remained unreliable. And as such, it manifested itself during the battle itself. According to "Top Secret War of the Sea 37-38. Meiji "6 th Division" Ships and vessels ", Chapter VI," Power plants of class III cruisers "Niitaka", "Tsushima", "Otova", "Tiyoda", s.44-45 problems with "Chiyoda" arose from the very AM 27 January, when the cruiser, who left the Chemulpo raid and headed for the connection with the main forces to about. Herido, the crawlers of both cars started to clatter, and then began to poison the steam cap of one of the cylinders of the port side machine. Japanese mechanics managed to cope with these problems even before the battle. But when Chiyoda increased speed in 12.30 to follow the wake of Asame, in a few minutes the pressure in the boilers dropped: according to the Japanese, the base of the chimney began to heat up suspiciously quickly. However, then, leaks appeared in the boilers No. 7 and No. 11, and Chiyoda could no longer maintain the speed of the Asama (at that time within the 15 nodes), which made it necessary to withdraw from the battlefield.

Well, as they say, it does not happen to anyone. But here's the thing: if we read the description of the battle between Varyag and Koreyts with the Japanese squadron as edited by A.V. We will see that the distinguished author used slightly different sources, such as: the combat reports of the commanders of Japanese ships, including Rear Admiral S. Uriu, as well as sections of the same “Top Secret War at Sea”, which we already they mentioned, but its other heads, namely: “Actions of the flagship detachment Uriu”, “Covering the landing of the expeditionary detachment and the sea battle at Inchon”, and also “The sea battle at Inchon”. And according to these sources, the malfunctions of the Chiyoda power plant look a little bit different. At A.V. Polutov we read:

"At 12.48, Chiyoda simultaneously with Asama tried to increase speed, but because of poor-quality Japanese coal and fouling of the underwater part of the hull while stationed in Incheon, he could not keep 15 nodes and its speed dropped to 4-7 nodes. In 13.10, the commander of Chiyoda reported this to Naniwa and, on orders from Rear Admiral Uriu, left the wake of Asama, circulated, and ended up in the Naniwa and Niytaka column.


As you can see, there is not a word about the leakage of two boilers, but, out of nowhere, some kind of fouling appeared. From where Before the arrival at Chemulpo, Chiyoda was docked (the exact time at the dock is unknown, but it happened from August 30 to 27 September 1903, it is clear that the bottom had been cleaned), after which the cruiser arrived at Chemulpo 29 September 1903. Attention, the question is - what kind of fouling can we talk about in the northern, in fact, port, in the period October 1903 - January 1904 g, that is, in the autumn-winter months?

It would be much easier to believe in the version about the Great Kraken, which grabbed Chiyoda for the keel at the most inappropriate moment of the 27 battle of January 1904.

Thus, we see a reliable fact - in the battle with “Varyag” and “Korean” “Chiyoda” was not able to support either the 19 nodes put to him by the tactical form, nor the 1903 nodes shown to them at the 17,4 testing in September, he even 15 I could not give nodes, “sifting” in speed up to 4-7 nodes at some point in time. But we don’t understand the reasons that caused this sad fact, because in one source we see reasons for the poor quality of coal and fouling, and in the other - the poor quality of coal and leaking boilers.

For a change, read the description of this episode in the February 9 Battle Report of Incheon by the captain of the Chiyoda Captain 1 rank Murakami Kakuichi, presented by 9 February 37 of the Meiji year, in February - that is, the document was written hot on the heels (February 9 - This is January old style 27), on the day of the battle with Varyag:

“In 12.48,“ Asama ”, by order of the flagship, went north to pursue the enemy and significantly increased speed. Before that, during the 20 minutes, I constantly followed the “Asam” on its starboard side at the aft course corners at a speed of 15 nodes. There were no breakdowns in the engine room, but the chimney began to overheat. At that time, a fire broke out in the aft part of Varyag, and he, together with the Korean, began to move towards the Chemulpo anchorage, and the distance between them and me was constantly increasing and was already ineffective for firing 12-cm guns.

At 13.10, continuing to drive for the Asama has become very difficult, as I reported to the flagship. After that, by order of the flagship, I ended up in the Naniwa and Niitaka columns and turned off the alarm in 13.20, and in 13.21 I dropped the battle flag. ”


As we can see, the report of respected Kaprang directly contradicts information from the “Top Secret War at Sea” - according to the latter, the pressure in the “Chiyoda” boilers fell in 12.30, while Murakami Kakuichi claims that “the movement became difficult” only in 13.10. And if Murakami was right, then the cruiser would never have had time to raise the signal-message “Nanive” on 13.10 - it still takes time. The author of this article does not know a single case so that the materials of the “Top Secret War at Sea” directly lied, unless (theoretically) they could not agree on something. That is, if in the chapter “Power plants of class III cruisers“ Niitaka ”,“ Tsushima ”,“ Otova ”,“ Tiiyoda ”it is stated that“ Chiyoda ”in the 27 battle of January two boilers flowed, then this is true, because these data based on someone else's reports or other documents. Nobody would invent these breakdowns. If in other chapters devoted to the description of Chemulpo’s battle, the leaked boilers are not mentioned, then this can be considered a simple omission of compilers who probably did not analyze all the documents at their disposal - which is not surprising, considering their total number. Therefore, the absence of references to current boilers in some chapters of the “Top Secret War at Sea” can in no way serve as a refutation of another section of it, in which such information is given. And all this means that the boilers at Chiyod in the battle still flowed.

Working with various historical documents and materials, the author of this article derived two kinds of conscious lies for himself (we will not talk about numerous instances of sincere delusion, for this is an unconscious lie): in the first case, the default method is used, when the compilers do not directly lie, but keeping silent about certain circumstances form the reader’s distorted view of reality. Such sources should be approached carefully in terms of their interpretations, but at least the facts stated in them can be trusted. It is a different matter when the drafters of the document allow themselves a blatant lie - in such cases the source is generally not credible, and any fact set out in it requires close cross-checking. Unfortunately, the “Battle Report” of the Commander “Chiyoda” refers to the second case - it contains a direct lie, saying that “there were no breakdowns in the engine room”, while two boilers flew on the cruiser: not to know about this Murakami Kakuichi could not, forget too, because the report was made on the day of the battle. And this, in turn, means that the “Battle Reports”, unfortunately, cannot be considered a completely reliable source.

And again - all this is not a reason to cast doubt on absolutely all the reports of the Japanese. Just one of them was so scrupulous that in the description of the combat damage indicated "A large telescope was damaged as a result of the fall of an injured signalman" (the report of the battleship commander "Mikasa" about the 27 battle of January 1904 near Port-Arthur), and for someone and two poured in a battle boiler breakdowns were not considered. In general, in Japan, as elsewhere, people are different.

And here is another undisclosed nuance of the “behavior” of the Chiyoda power plant in that battle. As we can see, all in all sources four reasons were mentioned for the cruiser’s speed drop - fouling, boiler flow, heating of the chimney and poor quality coal. We will not talk about the first one, and as for the other three reasons, the leakage of the boilers is mentioned only in one chapter of the “Top Secret War at Sea”, but the other two reasons are almost universal (absolutely all sources mention the pipe, only Commander Chiyoda "In your report). But here is the question - what is it about heating the chimney, why can't a cruiser in a combat situation be fully operational? Let us recall the tests of the squadron battleship Retvizan - according to eyewitnesses, a flame flew out of its pipes, and they themselves were heated to such an extent that paint was burning on the smoke housings. And so what? Never mind! It is clear that this is a very extreme way of navigation, and it is better to never bring this up, but if the combat situation requires ... But the Chiyoda didn’t burn anything and the fire didn’t fly from the pipes - it was only about heating. This is the first.

The second. The replicas about "poor quality Japanese coal" are completely incomprehensible. The fact is that the Japanese ships really used both the magnificent English Cardiff and the very unimportant domestic coal. They differed quite seriously and could give significant changes in speed. So, for example, on tests of “Takachiho” 27 February 1902 g was used cardiff, and the cruiser (when forcing the boilers) reached the speed of 18 knots, while the consumption for 1 hp / h was 0,98 kg of coal. And on tests of 10 in July, 1903 g used Japanese coal - with a natural cruiser, the cruiser showed the 16,4 knot, but at the same time the consumption of coal was almost three times higher and amounted to 2,802 kg per 1 hp / hr. However, the opposite happened - for example, Naniwa with almost equal consumption of coal (1,650 kg cardiff and 1,651 kg Japanese coal on 1 hp per hour) in the first case developed 17,1 bonds, and in the second, seemingly the worst Japanese angle - 17,8 bonds! However, again, these tests were separated in time (the cruiser 17,1 showed 11.09.1900 and 17,8 - 23.08.1902), but in the first case the tests were carried out after replacing the boilers, that is, their condition was good, and also in the forced mode, and in the second - with a natural bust.

All of the above indicates one thing - yes, Japanese coal was worse. But not so much worse that the Japanese cruiser was not able to develop 15 nodes on it! But the main question is not even that ...

Why in general during the battle with “Varyag” and “Korean” “Chiyoda” used Japanese coal?

The answer here may be one - there was simply no cardiff on Chiod. But why? There was no overdeficit of this English coal in Japan. On the eve of the war (somewhere in the 18-22 gap in January 1904 g in old style), the ships of the 4 squad, which included Naniwa, Takachiho, Suma and Akashi, took coal to the full supply. At the same time, "Niitaka" on 22 January had 630 tons., "Takachiho" - 500 tons of Cardiff and 163 tons of Japanese coal. Regarding other ships, alas, there is no data, because in the reports they limited themselves to the words “full stock of coal was loaded” without detailing it, but it can be safely assumed that the main stock of them was exactly cardiff, which was to be used in combat, and Japanese coal could spent on other ship needs. However, as we know, since September 1903 was located in Chemulpo, and, in principle, it can be assumed that there was no inviolable cardiff stock on it - although, in fact, this alone does not characterize the cruiser commander in the best way.

Well, let's say, he was not allowed to load English coal, and orders, as we know, are not discussed. But then what? The war was on the nose, and this was well known, including Murakami himself, who began to prepare the ship for battle at least 12 days before the outbreak of the war, and later made stunning plans to drown the Varyag at night in the torpedoes of his cruiser. So why the cruiser commander did not bother to, on the eve of hostilities, delivered several hundred tons of Cardiff? All this testifies to the substantial omission of the Japanese in preparation for military operations - and is it not because of the topic of the drop in the speed of "Chiyoda" in their sources is not disclosed?

The Niitaka 3 cruiser was the most modern ship of the Sotokichi Uriu squadron, which, alas, did not make it the strongest or most reliable Japanese cruiser.



This ship had a normal displacement of 3 500 tons, and its armament was 6 * 152-mm / 40; 10 * 76-mm / 40 and 4 * 47-mm guns, torpedo tubes were not installed on the cruiser. The 4 * 152-mm / 40 guns could participate in the side salvo. Like Chiyoda, the Niitaka was equipped with one Barra and Stroude rangefinder and one Fiske, the cruiser also had 6 riflescopes.

As for the chassis, at the beginning of the hostilities, the “Niitaka” had not yet passed the entire cycle of tests, and if not for the war, then it would not have been accepted into the fleet at all. Regarding its speed, it is only known that on tests of 16 in January of 1904 g (probably in a new style) the cruiser developed the 17,294 node. This is significantly less than the 20 passport units that the cruiser was to reach, but this does not mean anything: the fact is that the power plants of the ships of that time were tested in several stages, gradually increasing the power of the machines on each and checking their condition after the tests. That is, the fact that “Niitaka” developed a little less than 17,3 nodes on pre-war trials does not mean that the cruiser was somehow defective, and could not develop 20 knots, it just “did not get” even before full-speed tests. On the other hand, it is clear that, since the cruiser did not pass such tests, it was dangerous to give 20 units on it in a combat situation - any breakdowns were possible, right up to the most serious, threatening a complete loss of progress.

It is not surprising that in battle the power plant of the cruiser also proved to be not the best: “The top secret war at sea of ​​the 37-38. Meiji says that in the period from 12.40 to 12.46, both Niitaki machines suddenly began to work intermittently, and the speed of rotation uncontrolled changed from 120 to 135 rpm, which prevented the ship from maintaining a stable speed. However, after these six minutes, the cars returned to normal. This event can in no way be reproached either to the crew of the cruiser or to its design - during the tests, far more serious deficiencies in power plants are often identified and eliminated. However, another fact is remarkable - the commander of "Niitaki", Shoji Yoshimoto, also did not consider it necessary to reflect in his report such an "insignificant" nuance.

The 3-class cruiser “Akashi” was considered to be of the same type “Suma”, although in fact these cruisers had quite significant differences in design.

On the technical condition of the squadron of S. Uriu in the battle with the "Varangian" and on the veracity of the Japanese combat reports


The Akashi normal displacement was 2 800 T, the armament was 2 * 152 / 40, 6 * 120 / 40, 12 * 47-mm guns, and 2 * 45-cm torpedo tubes. 2 * 152-mm / 40 and 3 * 120-mm / 40 guns could be fired on one side. On the cruiser there was one Barr and Stroude rangefinder and one Fiske, each 152-mm and 120-mm cannon was equipped with an optical sight, all of them were 8.

In March, 1899 tested the ship for 17,8 ties. on natural bridging and 19,5 knots - when forcing boilers. This, in general, was already a little, but the most unpleasant thing was that the power plant of cruisers of this type turned out to be quite capricious, so that during daily operation even these figures were inaccessible. In fact, “Akashi” did not get out of repairs - being handed over to the 30 fleet in March 1899, he already had a major car breakdown in September, and got up for repair. Next, Akashi 1900 got up for factory repair four times - in January (repair of main and auxiliary mechanisms of both machines and electric generators), in May (repair of bearings of both machines, elimination of leaks in the steam lines of the left-side machine, repair and hydraulic testing of boilers) , in July (replacement of asbestos insulation in furnaces) and in December (post-repair repairs).

Despite this, more than an intensive program, in October 1902 the power plant again required repair and replacement of part of the mechanisms, and, upon leaving the Akashi dock, managed to damage the bottom and blade of the left screw, which necessitated a new repair. But already in January, 1902 g found out that the wear of two boilers is so great that the cruiser is unable to develop a course of more 14 nodes. Nevertheless, in February of the same year, the cruiser was sent to stationary service in South China - on arrival there, the third boiler “covered itself” (stopped holding pressure). As a result, in April 1902 of Akashi rises for the next repair. But a year later (March 1903 d) - another “capital” of a global nature, with the change of worn-out components and mechanisms. It is not clear when this repair was completed, but it is known that in the period from September 9 to October 1 1903, Akashi again made repairs and adjustments to the main and auxiliary mechanisms of both machines and all boilers, in December they fixed the last faults. The cruiser was docking, and, finally, thanks to this whole series of endless repairs, in January 1904 was able to develop the 1904 node on a forced draft.

As for the Japanese destroyers, the picture with them is as follows: S. Uriu had two detachments at his disposal, the 9 and 14, and the 8 destroyers in total.

The 14 squadron consisted of the 1-class destroyers Hayabusa, Kasasagi, Manadzuru and Chidori, which were designed like the French 1-class destroyer Cyclone and produced in France (but were assembled in Japan ). All these destroyers joined the Japanese fleet in 1900 g, except for Chidori (9 on April 1901 g).


"Chidori"


The 9 th detachment consisted of the destroyers of the same type as the 14 th, the only difference was that Kari, Aotaka, Hato and Tsubame were already fully established in Japanese shipyards. On 27 in January 1904 were the newest destroyers: they entered service in July, August, October and November 1903, respectively. By the way, this is often forgotten when evaluating the results of the 9 attack of the Koreyan gunboat detachment: Kari and Hato fired at her, only Kari with a certain stretch could be considered “ready for a campaign and battle”. "- still six months in the ranks, and" Hato "in the fleet was only three months. We should not forget that “Kari” shot when the “Korean” was deployed in Chemulpo, and in this case the correct preemption (even when shooting close) can be taken only if you represent the diameter of the circulation of the ship. In general, the failure of the 9 squad to deal with the Korean is quite understandable, and, in the author's opinion, it is not necessary to draw far-reaching conclusions about the poor preparation of Japanese destroyers.

But back to the destroyers Sotokichi Uriu - as we said earlier, they were essentially a single type of destroyer with a normal displacement of 152 t. The artillery armament was 1 * 57-mm and 2 * 47-mm guns, as well as three 3 * 36 -cm torpedo tubes. It should be noted that during the Russian-Japanese war (at the end of 1904 — early 1905) they were replaced by the same number of 18-inch TAs, but in the battle against Varyag and Korean, they were 14-inch.

These torpedo tubes could fire two types of torpedoes: “Ko” and “Otsu”. Despite the fact that the former were considered long-range and the latter were high-speed, the difference in the performance characteristics between them was minimal — both torpedoes had a weight of 337 kg, carried 52 kg of explosives, fired 600 / 800 / 2500 m. The main difference was that the “Ko” screw was two-bladed, while the “Otsu” had four blades, while the speeds at the indicated ranges differed slightly. For 600 m - 25,4 knots. for Ko and 26,9 for Otsu, for 800 m for 21,7 and 22 knots, and for 2 500 m for 11 and 11,6 knots. respectively.

As for the speed of ships, alas, there are almost no exact numbers. The destroyers of the 9 squadron on the acceptance tests developed from the 28,6 to the 29,1 node, and, in theory, the same speed should have been able to develop on the day of the battle with the Russian stationary. But the fact is that there were problems in the engine rooms at Aotaka and Hato, but it didn’t have any effect on their speed. The same can be said about the "Kari", which flowed in the tiller compartment. The only destroyer, according to which everything is clear, is “Tsubame” - due to the fact that during the pursuit of “Koreyets”, the destroyer jumped from the Chemulpo channel and hit the stones, damaging the blades of both screws, its speed was limited by 12 nodes. Well, according to the 14 squad, there is only test acceptance data, during which the destroyers developed from 28,8 to 29,3 nodes - however this was in 1900 and 1901, what speed they could develop in 1903-1904, in Unfortunately, there is no data. However, there is no reason to believe that their speed too much "slipped" relative to what was achieved in the tests.
Author:
70 comments
Ad

Subscribe to our Telegram channel, regularly additional information about the special operation in Ukraine, a large amount of information, videos, something that does not fall on the site: https://t.me/topwar_official

Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. Conductor
    Conductor 20 September 2018 06: 55
    +3
    And Chioda wasn’t used as an advice note?
  2. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 20 September 2018 08: 40
    +6
    Greetings colleague drinks hi
    As I understand it, the main message of this article is to show that the Japanese are not so crystal-clear people and that they can also misinterpret and undermine in their reports. I agree with this - show me a crystal-clear honest, ideal person and I will kneel down before you repeat As the protagonist of the popular foreign medical series said - "Everybody lies." This is not the point, but the fact that any lie is completely testable, especially over time. And therefore, if the lie of the Japanese sources - they did not indicate the possible hit of the shell, they were deceiving about the quality of the machines on a single ship - is completely harmless and did not have any effect on subsequent events. Unlike Rudnev's reports, in which the super-rate of fire and accuracy of the Varyag artillerymen, coupled with a drowned whole cruiser and damaged others, when the lie has already become almost a quoted truth!
    That's what gnaws at me, Andrei Nikolaevich request Now, if the Asama commander in his report would point out that he drowned the Varyag at Idolmi Island, then I would not consider the Japanese sources as more truthful than the Russian ones (the same Rudnev's report ...
    The breakdown of the Chiyoda machines and the "false" data on the time indicated by you absolutely did not affect the results of the battle! Because they are not essential. In contrast to the deceitful sinking of the "Takachiho" sung in the legends and more than a thousand shells fired at the foe ...
    It is already we, after the fact, we can grind to the bones all the nuances of that battle ... But if the Japanese knew about the real curvature of the Russian gunners (judging by the comparative tables of shooting "Askold" and "Varyag" by the shields that were given in the comments earlier), about the unsatisfactory condition of the machines and that in fact the ship cannot give more than 15-16 knots, then they would not even take "Asama", because even without the BrKr, the total weight of the salvo of five Uriu ships was more than twice as much onboard salvo of Russians (938 - 432). And so if we assume that the Russians can give them 22-23 knots, then it is better to have a ship, albeit formally not capable of catching up on paper, but having a larger caliber art, capable, due to the weight of the volley, to even out the possibly short time spent under fire by the Russians if they really had passport characteristics in terms of speed. But the fact that "Varyag" was crawling for a "breakthrough" with a low-speed gunboat suggests that .... well, there was no breakthrough ... request . Therefore, we can grind the results of the battle for months, dig into the reports of Japanese captains to the smallest detail, trying to catch them in a lie, justify Rudnev for choosing this particular option, but the fact remains - the Russian heroes because they came out against an obviously strong enemy. and all this attempt to understand the results of the battle, its premises and consequences only says that we are trying to call a spade a spade, because with time the concepts change. And with the departure of the USSR legends also left. Therefore, it seems strange and a breakthrough with such a strange speed in conjunction with a gunboat, and the resurrection of a drowned Japanese cruiser, and confusion with shells ... Go figure it out where the truth is, where the lie wink
    In the meantime, Rudnev’s place is next to Sarychev, with the Most Holy Prince Liven, and not with Essen or Schultz ...
    Personally, my opinion hi
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 20 September 2018 09: 44
      +2
      Rurikovich, your comment causes a double impression: I want to put +, but then I want to -, and therefore I will not put anything
      1. Cat
        Cat 20 September 2018 11: 18
        +6
        Dear Svyatoslav, let me disagree with you.
        Rurikovich "inside and out" described my impressions too. To be honest, the cycle of articles about the Varyag is close to its climax and I dare to suggest that Andrey is keeping the "intrigue"!
        So it's worth the wait ...
        Sincerely, Vlad Kotische!
        1. Mikado
          Mikado 20 September 2018 13: 40
          +8
          I completely agree with Rurikovich and GlavKotisch. drinks The author tries to give the most expanded analysis of everything that happened, and his thoughtfulness and painstakingness captivates! hi because the situation of the battle itself is extremely confused, overgrown with myths and "official history". what And there, various pseudo-historians came running, loud journalists, just amateurs .. and even enemies of the people who need "take everything and screw it up". angry which obviously does not add credibility to the history of the battle! stop
          History, in its significance for each particular nation, loves justice! hi
          1. vladcub
            vladcub 20 September 2018 18: 22
            +4
            Dear Koische and Mikado, I agree with you: the cycle about "Varyag" has come to a conclusion and Andrey deliberately pauses, but I want to know the outcome and fearfully: an interesting cycle will end.
            Mikado, you are right: the battle itself was not an ordinary event, and if so, the assessments are not unambiguous. Yes, now there are so-called "lovers of truth" who just give a reason and they will smear everyone with derm
            1. Oleg Fudin
              Oleg Fudin 21 September 2018 06: 13
              +1
              In military significance for that war, this battle was less than an ordinary event. He had absolutely no influence on the outcome of the war.
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 20 September 2018 13: 38
        +3
        Quote: vladcub
        I want to put +, but then I want to -, and therefore I will not put anything

        smile That's your business request
        In life, not the main disadvantage with pluses is the main thing wink
        1. Comrade
          Comrade 21 September 2018 03: 54
          +1
          Quote: Rurikovich
          In life, not the main disadvantage with pluses is the main thing

          That's for sure, especially since the "pluses" and "minuses" now, after the elimination of the rating, perform a purely decorative function.
    2. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 20 September 2018 11: 52
      +9
      And I got the impression that the "main message" is to give the most complete information. Well, and at the same time to show that the problems of "Varyag" with machines / boilers are not something exceptional, indicating the fatal curvature of Russian mechanics.
      this kind of problem happened in all fleets.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 20 September 2018 13: 46
        +2
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Well, and at the same time to show that the problems of "Varyag" with machines / boilers are not something exceptional, indicating the fatal curvature of Russian mechanics.
        this kind of problem happened in all fleets.

        Then Ivan hi , the question arises - what was the Varyag commander counting on when he made a breakthrough at such a speed ??? That the Japanese would simply release him, taking care of their main goal in Chemulpo - the landing?
        Regarding the information content of Andrei’s articles, I fully support you - he gives as much information as it depends on him. Each reader simply draws his conclusions from this information. Democracy, Panimash Lee yes
        Therefore, Andrei Nikolaevich knows that in any case, HIS conclusions will be disputed, because these are his conclusions.
        About the cars. It turns out that the point is in the cars of the Varyag, and not at all in the fact that he heroically did not want to abandon the Korean to the mercy of fate, as we were stuffed by the officialdom all this time wassat
        And this already prompts the idea that not everything is so beautiful in the legend of "Varyag".
        What are we trying to find out smile
        Sincerely, A.N.
        1. Nehist
          Nehist 20 September 2018 15: 56
          +6
          Moriyama Keisaburo, an officer of the headquarters of the Japanese squadron, wrote: “Initially, we assumed that the Varyag would undoubtedly break through and therefore took measures to block his way out into the open sea. But contrary to our expectations, he suddenly turned and went on the opposite course to the anchorage. We could not contain our surprise and proceeded to pursuit him ... "
        2. Cat
          Cat 20 September 2018 18: 11
          +2
          Each reader simply draws his conclusions from this information. Democracy, Panimash Lee

          I dare to correct you, perhaps not democracy (power of the people), but pluralism (diversity) of opinions!
          Yours!
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 20 September 2018 19: 07
            +2
            Quote: Kotischa
            perhaps not democracy (power of the people), but pluralism (diversity) of opinions!

            Hai bude so yes drinks hi But do not deny that pluralism is impossible without democracy repeat
            1. Cat
              Cat 20 September 2018 21: 22
              +2
              At one time I saw a cartography with the inscription "DemocracyYAYAYAYAYA!"
              Regarding pluralism, so today I deleted the comment for which I did not understand, but apparently it is okoyanny! crying
              Yours!
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 20 September 2018 21: 30
                +1
                Quote: Kotischa
                so today I deleted the comment for which I did not understand, but apparently he is okoyanny!

                We are not aware of the thoughts of the arbiters of fate ... crying What is allowed to Jupiter is not allowed to the bull repeat I generally try to be as neutral as possible. For even sarcasm can be punished request
              2. Oleg Fudin
                Oleg Fudin 21 September 2018 06: 19
                +1
                Apparently the depth of thought struck. :))
        3. PPD
          PPD 20 September 2018 22: 28
          +1
          Quote: Rurikovich
          , the question arises - what was the Varyag commander counting on when he made a breakthrough at such a speed ???

          Most likely he did not count on anything. What can one hope for with such an advantage?
          And an incomplete course due to unwillingness to take risks, and even under fire it is difficult to calculate the course.
          1. Oleg Fudin
            Oleg Fudin 22 September 2018 12: 21
            0
            Yes, it is clear that prudence was not one of Rudnev's merits.
        4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          21 September 2018 22: 05
          +2
          Quote: Rurikovich
          Then Ivan hi, the question arises - what was the Varyag commander counting on when he made a breakthrough at such a speed ???

          The answer will be in the next article, it is already written hi
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 22 September 2018 00: 05
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            she is already written

            Look forward to!!!! smile hi
      2. Oleg Fudin
        Oleg Fudin 21 September 2018 06: 18
        0
        However, the curvature of the Japanese had no threatening consequences for them. In addition, it can be seen that energetic and successful measures were taken to resolve the problems. What is the main difference from the Russian fleet.
    3. 27091965
      27091965 20 September 2018 15: 16
      +2
      Quote: Rurikovich
      .And with the departure of the USSR, legends also left. Therefore, it seems strange and a breakthrough with such a strange speed in conjunction with a gunboat, and the resurrection of a drowned Japanese cruiser, and confusion with shells ... Go figure it out where the truth is, where the lie




      This is an English edition and in it some data differs from a similar edition published in Russia, moreover, they are of the same age. Therefore, I think the USSR has nothing to do with it. Each interprets the translation in his own way.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 20 September 2018 19: 09
        +2
        Quote: 27091965i
        Therefore, I think the USSR has nothing to do with it

        Not at all ... It was in the USSR that feat was officially taught. They even shot a movie yes
        1. 27091965
          27091965 20 September 2018 19: 28
          0
          Quote: Rurikovich
          .In the USSR, feat was officially taught


          The fact is that in publications, both Russian and foreign, the actions of the sailors of the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" were assessed as a manifestation of heroism. It would not be wise not to use this for propaganda.
          As for the discrepancy in the data on the number of shells, hits and the movement of ships in battle, there will always be discrepancies. Let's wait for the continuation of articles by a respected author.
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 20 September 2018 19: 57
            +1
            Quote: 27091965i
            The fact is that in publications, both Russian and foreign, the actions of the sailors of the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" were assessed as a manifestation of heroism. It would not be wise not to use this for propaganda.

            And I don’t argue with that yes I have questions for
            Quote: 27091965i
            discrepancies in data on the number of shells, hits and movement of ships in battle, discrepancies will always be.

            It’s okay, when after the fact the parties come to some common denominator when evaluating the battle. BUT SUCH allegations, like the sinking of a cruiser and damage to other ships, have been walking for decades when describing the feat, it’s already No.
            It’s not a half step, it’s a serious distortion request hi
  3. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 20 September 2018 10: 49
    +1
    Brilliant analysis.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 September 2018 22: 06
      0
      Thank you Dmitry! hi
  4. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 20 September 2018 11: 14
    +6
    "The large telescope is damaged as a result of the fall of an injured signalman" (the report of the commander of the battleship Mikasa about the battle on January 27, 1904 near Port Arthur), and for some, two boilers that had leaked in battle were not considered breakdowns. In general, in Japan, as elsewhere, people are different.


    It is quite simple.
    As is customary in almost any army in the world and during the EAR:
    - if the entrusted property has received irreparable damage and is subject to write-off - this must be indicated in the report, which can be referred to when writing off property before the quartermaster’s service. The optical tube is a very expensive tool for that time and broken glass is an event that makes it impossible to use it, therefore it must be written off (the military bureaucracy requires corresponding papers).
    - if the entrusted property had removable defects and material resources that were to be subsequently written off the balance sheet or too much time were not spent on correcting them, such an event might not have been indicated in the report.
    Boilers leaked in battle - this is a temporary malfunction that needs to be repaired - refers to the second type of event.
    It was enough for the commander of the ship to inform the flagship with a signal "I cannot maintain speed" after which the flagship, as appropriate, either reduced the speed, or sent the outsider into the wake of the column until the damage was eliminated.
    Since damage of this kind was quickly repaired, this is a private event and there was no harm to the entrusted property - there was no point in mentioning it in the report.
    By the way, the flagship could insist that the commander point to a similar event if he was in a bad relationship or wanted to remove the commander. After all, the frequent mention of minor failures on the ship casts a shadow on the competence of the commander that he does not sufficiently require service from the engine crew.

    And since in battle a relatively small delay with the full speed of the cruiser did not cause any damage to the operation as a whole, the cruiser commander did not indicate this in the report - such events in the steam fleet were frequent and did not depend on the commander and apparently Uriu did not require this in reports from subordinate commanders, so that they do not "lose face". And this is true by the way - he should go into battle with them, and not carry him with his nose, that his cruiser once again has problems with cars.

    In our army, those who require to indicate in the reports each trifle were called book-eaters and terribly did not like.
    I believe that in Japanese it was about the same, I fixed the damage - I didn’t get out of the battle, it makes no sense to cast a shadow on a good commander.
    A lot is not included in the reports and is decided behind the scenes - especially in the Navy, where everyone is in the same "boat" ...
    Something like this.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 20 September 2018 13: 47
      +3
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      Something like this.

      good hi
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 September 2018 22: 07
      +1
      Quite right. It was these considerations that gave me a reason to assume that one or even two hits of the "Varyag", provided that they did not cause any serious damage, the Japanese could not be reflected in the reports. This, of course, is just a probability, not a fact.
  5. Roman Skomorokhov
    Roman Skomorokhov 20 September 2018 11: 35
    +2
    "Two kinds of deliberate lies" is a masterpiece!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 September 2018 22: 08
      0
      Glad you liked it :) hi
  6. vladcub
    vladcub 20 September 2018 12: 44
    +5
    Once in some cartoon I heard such words: "we have everything like people" and the Japanese: problems with boilers, crooked repairs ("Chiyoda") and "craftiness" with documents.
    Andrey, my gratitude for hard work: how many materials to "shovel"
    1. Cat
      Cat 20 September 2018 18: 09
      +3
      Good evening!
      Traditionally, our brother is inclined to sprinkle ashes on his head, to look first of all for mistakes in himself and his actions, perhaps a mentality? The tendency to idealize the actions of the enemy as if rock has been hanging over us since the time of troubles. Remember back in the early 90s, the memoirs of the Nazis Guderian, Denz, Bok, etc. were perceived as the only and common truth that a whole generation of Russian historians had to wash out. The same thing about the Russo-Japanese War, when, from the first acquaintance with the historical works of the land of the rising sun, the feats of sailors and officers of the Varyag and Koreans began to be watered. Perhaps the work of Andrew is the nail that will be the last. His meticulous work causes nothing but true admiration. In this connection, I repeat, let's wait until the denouement!
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 20 September 2018 21: 54
        +2
        Quote: Kotischa
        Perhaps the work of Andrew is the nail that will be the last.

        Will hope...
        Quote: Kotischa
        His meticulous work causes nothing but true admiration.

        As it were, yes, but you should wait for the ending to compare its findings with your request
        Quote: Kotischa
        Remember back in the early 90s, the memoirs of the Nazis Guderian, Denz, Bok, etc. were perceived as the only and common truth that a whole generation of Russian historians had to wash out.

        In general, the mistakes of our official historians are that they cannot organically fit the changed circumstances or the emerging evidence base into their concepts. They either refute everything at once, based on the thesis "I am a scientist and know better", or they are stupidly silent ... Giving the doubters all the will of their imagination. But what is most interesting, they can be silent because they know that the opponent is right and it is better to be silent here ("it is better to be silent and seem smart than to open your mouth and dispel all doubts"), or because they consider themselves superior to what to tell their vision to ignoramuses (they are scientists request )
        That is why now in the internet serious passions flare up about the vision of history, naval or chronological, it does not matter.
        I remember my teacher of history, now deceased (the earth rest in peace for him - he was a good man), so he answered all the questions asked unambiguously - what they gave me, then I give you ... So they hoped that the smallest questions cast doubt official version, met with hostility. I already know for myself. From that there are even more questions, and there are no answers to them and is not expected ... Question - what can be the attitude to historians?
        It's good that I'm a kind person (self-promotion repeat ), because Andrei Nikolaevich’s attempts (the namesake is almost complete, without a surname), I take it positively, because a person is trying to get to the truth, justifying certain interrogative actions of Rudnev. And, perhaps, at the same time he finds a lot of interesting things for himself, because the information in the comments can also be informative and answer some questions. For what respect, for your own opinion.
        My opinion may not coincide with the opinion of others, but this is my opinion, and comments were invented in order to find out an opinion about the material.
        PS Guderian and Bock's materials can only make a more balanced assessment of what you know. I have on my shelf two books "The War in the Mediterranean: The View of the Victors" and "The War in the Mediterranean: The View of the Vanquished" about the events of WWII through the eyes of the British and Italians ... Very interesting reading, especially from the Italians ... Something like of today's Ukraine. There are many epithets, many excuses, and many amorphous and non-specific.
        So the description of the Battle of Chemulpo will raise many more questions .... hi
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 21 September 2018 10: 36
          +1
          Quote: Rurikovich
          I have on my shelf two books "The War in the Mediterranean: The View of the Victors" and "The War in the Mediterranean: The View of the Vanquished" about the events of WWII through the eyes of the British and Italians ... Very interesting reading, especially from the Italians ...

          Heh heh heh ... in the "Italian" book the most valuable thing is the application tables. Which shatter the complaints of the Germans in general and Rommel in particular about completely inadequate supply by sea. And they already raise many questions for Rommel himself - where 1500–2500 tons of supplies per day, arriving at African ports, disappeared on the way to the front (the same 6 A in Stalingrad calculated only 900 tons per day).
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 21 September 2018 14: 44
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            where, on the way to the front, 1500– 2500 tons of supplies per day disappeared, arriving at African ports

            Alexei, do you really hint at the presence of Jews in the ranks of the Germans? wink lol repeat
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 21 September 2018 15: 36
              +1
              Quote: Rurikovich
              Alexei, do you really hint at the presence of Jews in the ranks of the Germans?

              I hint at the presence of dolboklyuy in the German generals. Unable to assess the increasing losses on the shoulder of delivery from Tunisia and to develop operations taking into account logistics. For example - to concentrate all forces on seizing the port closer to the front line, and not on zerg rush to Egypt. Because German videos may simply not reach Egypt - gasoline from Tunisia will not reach them.
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 21 September 2018 19: 03
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                I hint at the presence of dolboklyuy in the German generals.

                The Italians suffered losses in the shortest section of the transfer. Do you really think that the Italians will be able to conduct convoys along the route even closer to Alexandria if the Germans captured a thread near the front of the port? They equated wiring one convoy to a feat, and bringing the ships to the British side by side would generally be a problem for Italians. Malta didn’t fall; a couple of cruisers-nerds in fear kept the entire Italian logistics. And then lead ships right into the mouth of a lion? No. laughing
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Unable to assess the increasing losses on the shoulder of delivery from Tunisia and to develop operations taking into account logistics. For example - to concentrate all forces on seizing the port closer to the front line, and not on zerg rush to Egypt.

                Italian ships simply would not have sailed to Egypt yes
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Because German videos may simply not reach Egypt - gasoline from Tunisia will not reach them

                hi
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 24 September 2018 12: 14
                  +1
                  Quote: Rurikovich
                  The Italians suffered losses in the shortest section of the transfer. Do you really think that the Italians will be able to conduct convoys along the route even closer to Alexandria if the Germans captured a thread near the front of the port?

                  The Italians delivered to Tunisia 1500– 2500 tons of supplies per day. And most of the delivered was spent ... on the delivery of supplies to the front line. A cry for a lack of supplies and trucks in the African Corps runs through all the memoirs that fought in Africa.
                  Quote: Rurikovich
                  Malta didn’t fall; a couple of cruisers-nerds in fear kept the entire Italian logistics. And then lead ships right into the mouth of a lion?

                  As practice has shown, with the regular impact of backlash on Malta, not only the Kyrgyz Republic, but even the submarines leave the island.
                  In addition, the capture of the base closer to the front allows you to move the supply routes further from Malta.
  7. vladcub
    vladcub 20 September 2018 17: 48
    +2
    Quote: Rurikovich
    Quote: vladcub
    I want to put +, but then I want to -, and therefore I will not put anything

    smile That's your business request
    In life, not the main disadvantage with pluses is the main thing wink

    100% true
  8. Wildcat
    Wildcat 20 September 2018 23: 58
    +5
    Quote: Rurikovich
    Quote: Kotischa
    Perhaps the work of Andrew is the nail that will be the last.

    Will hope...
    Quote: Kotischa
    His meticulous work causes nothing but true admiration.

    As it were, yes, but you should wait for the ending to compare its findings with your request
    So the description of the Battle of Chemulpo will raise many more questions .... hi

    How to wait then ... if only the next article is not about the hydrology of local waters !!!!! stop
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 September 2018 22: 09
      0
      No, there begins the description of the battle itself :)
  9. Every
    Every 21 September 2018 02: 58
    +1
    Andrey, thanks. The article, as always, is on top.
    That's just with color photos did not understand. Where in those years? Or are these drawings?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 21 September 2018 10: 49
      +3
      Quote: Every
      That's just with color photos did not understand. Where in those years? Or are these drawings?

      The answer to the question is given by the lower left corner of the color illustration: Digitally Colorized Photo. smile
      1. Every
        Every 21 September 2018 13: 01
        0
        Overlooked. Thank.
  10. Comrade
    Comrade 21 September 2018 04: 50
    +7
    Dear Andrey, the topic is interesting +!
    A few words in essence :-)
    As for the tests with forced traction, they most likely were not carried out, but it can be assumed that the cruiser would have developed at least 20,5 knots without problems

    There is information from a serious source that such tests were carried out. "Asama" with the power of mechanisms 20 556 l with. developed maximum speed 23,09 knot
    3 of the Fiske rangefinder (obviously, an analogue of our Luzhol-Myakishev micrometer).

    Not really, the appliances were different.
    Rangefinder Fisk. At short and medium distances, it gave a measurement accuracy comparable to B&S FA-2.

    Goniometer of Lujol.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 September 2018 22: 11
      +1
      Thank you, dear colleague, as always, you give completely unique information! hi
      Let me get a little cheeky and ask you if you accidentally know the principles of the Fisk rangefinder — I understand Lyuzhol-Myakishev, but Fisk ... I don’t know anything. That is, it would be interesting to know - is Fisk an idea of ​​a micrometer executed at the best technical level, or is it something completely different according to the principle of operation?
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 22 September 2018 03: 00
        +2
        Dear Andrew,
        Do you happen to know the principles of the Fisk rangefinder?

        AV Polutov's book contains Appendix No. 4 Unusual Rangefinders of the Japanese Navy (pp. 390-396), written by one of the moderators of the Tsushima site, a sympathetic and kind person. There you can get acquainted with the principles of work of rangefinders developed by B. Fisk, an American naval officer who made many discoveries and rose to the rank of rear admiral.
        As you know, at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, Fisk received a patent for two types of rangefinders:
        a) Galvanic

        The average error in measuring it depended on the distance, for example, at 5 000 meters, it was 6,5%.
        b) Stadiametric, also quite accurate. I have specific numbers somewhere, but I could not immediately find them in folders.

        At the end of the Appendix, Skibinsky wonders if the Japanese really had stadium meters on their ships.
        We see the answer to this question in the photograph of the cruiser "Adzuma", on the bridge of which four crew members measure the distance using Fisk's stadiameters during firing practice.

        Alas, when placing a photo, its size is automatically reduced, hence the "philatelic" image quality :-(
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          23 September 2018 12: 27
          +1
          Thank you Valentine! Somehow I missed this application repeat
      2. Comrade
        Comrade 22 September 2018 04: 03
        0
        Yes, and here's another catch-up picture, the location of the rangefinder posts (arrows indicate) on the battleship "Kearsarge", equipped with Fisk's galvanic rangefinders.
  11. Catfish
    Catfish 21 September 2018 13: 50
    +4
    Quote: Mikado

    History, in its significance for each particular nation, loves justice!


    Good afternoon, Nikolai!
    That's right, I subscribe to every word.
    I remember from childhood a wonderful film about "Varyag" and the inspired, courageous face of Livanov, who played the role of Rudnev (and they are similar, by the way), when he made his speech before the battle: "We, the fastest cruiser in the world ..." I do not remember literally further ... And the heroic battle itself and the words of the commander after the battle, when he, without a cap with a bloody bandage on his head, addresses the team with the last words of gratitude: "An enemy cruiser and a destroyer at the bottom ..." and so on.
    We, all the boys, then dreamed of standing next to him on the bridge of the dying, but not surrendering "Varyag"!
    They knew how to make films then, which cannot be said about the present time. But here's the thing, all my life I have not thought about how everything could really happen. There is a given - The feat of the "Varyag"and that’s it! Yes, a feat, yes heroes and no one can argue with this!
    And when later some unpleasant facts began to emerge, the disappointment even for an adult was strong enough. The reverse side, albeit talented, but propaganda?
    For me, much of our history began to "emerge" back in the sixties, when translated memoirs of our allies and enemies fell on our book market. Then I read Guderian, Melentin, Ruge and Morrison. But this only added questions. Who's lying? All? Or through one? Someone was right when they said that the truth is somewhere in between. Most likely it is.

    Yes, and one more thing, about the feat in general: I don't remember whose words it was: “the feat of one, it is almost always the meanness of the other”. I hope that Andrey will figure out all the details of this very difficult story. And he will figure it out in his, as always, meticulous and brilliant manner. And for me his "story about the Varyag" is almost a meeting with a cloudless childhood, for which I am sincerely grateful to Andrey and sincerely grateful! drinks
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 September 2018 22: 13
      +2
      Quote: Sea Cat
      I hope that Andrei will figure out all the details of this very difficult story.

      I hope so too:))))
      Thank you so much for your kind words!
  12. Oleg Fudin
    Oleg Fudin 21 September 2018 14: 18
    +1
    Certainly very interesting and detailed information about the ships of the Uriu squadron, but:
    this next looping from the main topic by 2/3 consists of a description of the suffering of the engine-boiler installation of the cruiser "Chiyoda", which actually did not participate in the battle at all. And it would have been easier not to be distracted by a separate article, but to say this in the main article: due to problems with boilers, the Chiyoda cruiser could not move more than 15 knots, was placed in the tail of the column and did not actually participate in the battle.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 21 September 2018 20: 42
      0
      Even with 15 knots of speed due to malfunctions in the CMU "Chiyoda" could easily participate in the battle, because even at the end of the column the cruiser could shoot if the "Varyag" carried out what the Japanese expected - a breakthrough at full speed. He would simply traverse the positions of all Japanese ships. Would have passed “Asama” - then waited for “Naniwa” and “Takachiho”, would have slipped through them - then there were even weaker rivals - practically untrained “Niitaka”, and “Akashi” with “Chiyoda”. So tactically the ships were located correctly based on the geography of the area and hypothetical expectations from the Russians. Of course, purely (again) hypothetically, if the Varyag had gone to Chiyoda, she would not have caught up with her faulty vehicle, but for a certain time the ship would have been within the reach of her guns, and this is still a few hypothetical 120-mm shells, which are sensitive to the cruiser. In addition to the fact that "Varyag" would have been removed earlier ...
      But "Varyag" with the first two or three shells went back, getting the rest already on the retreat, thereby depriving "Chiyoda" of "happiness" of the first battle in the RYAV ...
      1. Oleg Fudin
        Oleg Fudin 22 September 2018 12: 04
        +1
        Could participate (he, the cruiser) and participated - these are two fundamental differences. History as a science only describes events that actually happened. All assumptions are for alternatives. You probably misunderstood Admiral Uriu's actions. Even before the battle, he divided his squadron into 2 detachments of 3 cruisers each. The first was to fight the Varyag, and the second was to be nearby "just in case." It can be seen that Uriu understood perfectly well that 3 cruisers led by Asam were quite enough not to let the Varyag out into the sea. Therefore, if Chiyoda were not in the Uriu detachment at all, this would not affect the balance of power in any way.
        And about the action of the 120-mm cannons on the cruiser, Novik’s battle with Tsushima in 3600 t is very characteristic. Therefore, on the cruiser the size of the Varyag, the action of the 120-mm caliber is practically negligible.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 September 2018 22: 16
      +2
      Quote: Oleg Fudin
      And it would be easier not to be distracted by a separate article, but in the main article say so

      Sorry, but you are wrong. Of the 6 Japanese cruisers, one (Niitaka) was dangerous to give more 17,5 nodes (did not pass the tests) the second - Chioda - generally managed to turn into a sitting duck on 4-7 nodes in a combat situation, the third (Akashi) - suffered from an energy installation all his life and only by chance was reanimated to 19 nodes just before the war. In addition, the article provides an example of the conscious lie of the Japanese in combat reports. So all this is quite worthy of a separate material
      1. Oleg Fudin
        Oleg Fudin 22 September 2018 12: 17
        0
        I agree that a separate article on the technical condition of the ships of the Japanese fleet would be very interesting, not only from the Uriu squad, but all armadillos and cruisers.
        But for an article about the battle of the Varangian, this does not matter. And I wrote quite rightly that the technical condition of the 2 th trio of cruisers could be stated in the 2 th lines of the main article.
        In addition, it would be stylistically more correct to question the veracity of Japanese combat reports after the exposition of historical events.
        Yes, and I can't help but notice that the term "undercarriage" is not applicable to ships and vessels. This is from auto mechanics. The ships do not have a "running gear", but there is a power plant or a machine-boiler plant.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          23 September 2018 12: 26
          0
          Quote: Oleg Fudin
          I agree that a separate article on the technical condition of the ships of the Japanese fleet would be very interesting, not only from the Uriu squad, but all armadillos and cruisers.

          so this is a separate article, isn’t it? :)))
  13. Catfish
    Catfish 22 September 2018 22: 29
    0
    Quote: Oleg Fudin
    +1
    Could participate (he, the cruiser) and participated - these are two fundamental differences. History as a science, describes only the events that really happened. All assumptions are to alternatives. You must have misunderstood the actions of Admiral Uriu.


    Good evening, Oleg! hi

    It is impossible to explain something to someone who hears no one but himself. Andrei Rurikovich, it seems to me, if you have convinced yourself of something, you cannot prove anything to him. His commander "Novik", who killed people and the ship is a hero, and the commander of "Diana" is almost a traitor, at the same time he also wrote me down as defeatists and cowards. But this, apparently, is simply due to the lack of real evidence of their own innocence. It is in this case that they become personal. hi
  14. Comrade
    Comrade 23 September 2018 03: 31
    +2
    all this is not a reason to question absolutely all the reports of the Japanese. It's just that one of them was so scrupulous that in the description of the combat damage they indicated "The large telescope is damaged as a result of the fall of the injured signalman" (the report of the commander of the battleship Mikas about the battle on January 27, 1904 near Port Arthur), and for someone and two cauldrons leaking in battle were not considered breakdowns.

    Dear Andrei, did the boilers flow in battle, except as a result of enemy influence?

    1 rank captain Murakami Kakuichi wrote:
    “... There were no breakdowns in the engine room, but the chimney began to overheat. .. In 13.10 to continue the movement for "Asama" has become very difficult

    Unfortunately, the “Combat report” of the commander of “Chioda” refers precisely to the second case - it contains a direct lie, saying that “there were no breakdowns in the engine room,” while two boilers leaked on the cruiser

    Sorry, but with all due respect it is difficult to agree with this logic, because the commander of "Chyoda" did not write about the absence of "breakdowns" in boiler installation (CMU). He wrote about the absence of "breakdowns" in machine branch, not branch boiler room.
    Since everything was in order with the cruiser’s car, the report is true :-)
    In addition, we do not know the reason why two boilers started flowing, it didn’t have to be just a "breakdown" of something. Maybe something has worn out there?
    1. Jura 27
      Jura 27 23 September 2018 09: 24
      -1
      [/ quote] Sorry, but with all due respect, it is difficult to agree with this logic, because the commander of "Chyoda" did not write about the absence of "breakdowns" in the boiler plant (KMU). He wrote about the absence of "breakdowns" in the engine room, and not in the boiler room.
      Since everything was in order with the cruiser’s car, the report is true :-)
      In addition, we do not know the reason why two boilers started flowing, it didn’t have to be just a "breakdown" of something. Maybe something has worn out there? [Quote]

      Finally, at least one person wrote that there was no lies in the report of Murakami.
      And the fact that the two pipes in the boiler flowed is a standard operating situation for Belleville boilers.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        23 September 2018 12: 25
        +1
        Quote: Jura 27
        And the fact that two pipes in the boiler flowed is a standard operating situation

        Yura, I understand that you and impartiality are two big differences, but to call a standard operational situation when a cruiser loses speed up to 4-7 knots and cannot fulfill the commander's order in battle ("follow" Asama "") this is even for You are somehow cool
        1. Jura 27
          Jura 27 23 September 2018 15: 44
          -1
          [/ quote] Yura, I understand that you and impartiality are two big differences, but call it a standard operational situation when the cruiser loses speed up to 4-7 knots and cannot fulfill the commander's order in battle ("follow Asama" " ) it's somehow cool even for you [quote]

          And I am becoming more and more convinced that you and your knowledge of materiel are two, not just big, but huge differences.
          Before voicing your irrepressible fantasies about allegedly lying in the Murakami report, it would be good to understand that the engine rooms and boiler rooms are different compartments on the ship under discussion and at the same time it would be nice for you to understand that they led to a drop in speed several factors at the same time, one of which, the leakage of boiler tubes, was an ordinary occurrence in the operation of Belleville boilers (and not only them).
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            23 September 2018 18: 20
            0
            Quote: Jura 27
            And I am becoming more and more convinced that you and your knowledge of materiel are two, not just big, but huge differences.

            Yeah. This is written by a person who tells the world
            Quote: Jura 27
            several factors simultaneously led to a drop in speed

            Among which, in addition to boilers, there was also fouling in the North Sea, bad coal (which did not prevent Chiod from developing at least 13 knots at night in the night channel a day earlier), and, of course, heating the chimney of the ship :)))))
            Yes, Yura, just going crazy, what a combination of factors. It is only surprising how Chioda could have developed at least some speed at the same time, except perhaps negative - aft
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 September 2018 12: 23
      +1
      Greetings, dear colleague!
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear Andrei, did the boilers flow in battle, except as a result of enemy influence?

      No, of course, but it was a critical failure that prevented the fulfillment of the order of the superior commander.
      Quote: Comrade
      Sorry, but with all due respect it is difficult to agree with this logic, because the commander of "Chyoda" did not write about the absence of "breakdowns" in the boiler-machine installation (KMU). He wrote about the absence of "breakdowns" in the engine room, and not in the boiler room.

      Well what can I say? Ueli :)))))) That's right, sir, since the conversation was only about the machine, I admit that I was wrong :)))
      Quote: Comrade
      In addition, we do not know the reason why two boilers started flowing, it didn’t have to be just a "breakdown" of something. Maybe something has worn out there?

      Nuuu, if it wore out and failed during the battle, then it broke, didn’t it? :)))
    3. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 24 September 2018 22: 33
      0
      Quote: Comrade
      In addition, we do not know the reason why two boilers started flowing, it didn’t have to be just a "breakdown" of something. Maybe something has worn out there?

      The reason was indirectly named in the report. Overheating of the pipe is a clear sign of boiler boosting. Interestingly, Asama spent two days, even at anchor, holding full pairs in her old, cylindrical boilers. But from the place tore as much tires squealed.

      But the commander Chioda apparently extinguished part of the boilers. And on alarm, I had to urgently raise the pressure. In the previous parts, we have already mentioned that horizontal water tube boilers really do not like sharp forcing. Knocks, vibrations and water hammering can occur in the tubes, which can damage the tubes with high probability. Which is what happened. We are not fully aware of the reasons, but it turns out that Chioda was not ready for battle completely. This is the jamb of the commander.
  15. kdn79
    kdn79 7 October 2018 04: 27
    0
    Quote: Rurikovich
    but not with Essen or Schultz ...

    And why didn’t you please Schultz?
  16. Edvid
    Edvid 14 December 2018 01: 40
    0
    Japanese cruiser "Iwate" August 14, 1904 received - 23 hits, killed 40 people (2 officers), 37 wounded (3 officers). The cruiser received the most severe damage of all that suffered by the Japanese armored cruisers during the entire war. At about 7.00 hours, an 8-inch shell from the Russian cruiser Rurik pierced the roof of the casemate of 152-mm gun No. 1, located at the level of the upper deck. Once in the rack with ammunition, which was directly near the 6-inch, he caused its detonation. As a result of a powerful explosion, the casemate was completely destroyed: the armor plates fell off the side, and the calculation of the gun simply evaporated. In addition to the 6-inch gun # 1, 152-mm cannons went out of action until the end of the battle - in the lower casemate # 3 and installed behind the shield on the upper deck # 9. The 12-pounder # 3 cannon was also damaged. The explosion instantly killed 31 people, with senior lieutenant Haraguchi and 13 foremen and sailors disappearing without a trace. Warrant officer Nota and 6 sailors died shortly after the battle. And two more of the 16 wounded, taken ashore, died in the hospital. Another 20 crew members were injured. Among the wounded were Senior Artillery Officer Lieutenant Commander Nomura, Senior Mine Officer Lieutenant Commander Kanno, Senior Lieutenant Kanedzaka, Midshipman Matsumura and Senior Clerk Yoshitomi. Another hit, which was noted in the report of the British military adviser, related to a shell that hit the cruiser aft. The explosion destroyed one of the officers' cabins, and fragments piercing the wardroom smashed the ship's chronometer hanging there.