Moscow and Damascus on the verge of the “Idlib issue” fiasco: an alarming lull before new trials
Let's remember for a moment what large-scale operational and strategic measures were taken by the naval commanders fleet and the Russian Aerospace Forces in order to minimize the likelihood of a massive missile strike by the United Navy and the Air Force of the Western coalition from the Mediterranean operational direction against the strategically important objects of the Syrian army involved in the preparation of the offensive operation on the fortified Islamic militants in the "Idlib Viper." In addition to creating powerful anti-submarine and anti-ship lines A2 / AD (zones of prohibition and restriction of access and maneuver) all the way to the western coast of Greece or even the Ionian Sea with the aim of complicating the exit of US multipurpose submarines of the Virginia, Los Angeles, and Aegis classes - destroyers URO Arley Burke, as well as British submarines Astute to the launch lines of strategic missiles UGM / RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV, the Russian fleet also took care of the formation of a high-altitude no-fly zone in the airspace above the British air base Akrotiri, zade Having been involved in this operation, the Marshal Ustinov Project 1164 missile cruiser equipped with the S-6F 300-channel naval air defense system with a range of about 75 km. All these procedures were chronologically summed up under the largest exercises of the interspecific grouping of forces and troops of the Navy and VKS in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Around the same period, starting from September 4, front-line fighter-bombers of the Su-34 of Russia under the protection of a powerful air defense “umbrella” began to prepare the ground for the future attack of the CAA assault units, launching powerful point-to-air missile and bomb strikes the strongholds and depots of weapons banned in the Russian Federation "Islamic Party of Turkestan" (near Jisr al-Shugura, where militants with "White Helmets" began preparations for provocation using chlorine gas), as well as the groups "Jash Isaa" and "Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham "in the south of the" Idlib gadyushnik. "
It would seem that all points on the “i” regarding the strategy of actions of the Russian, Syrian and Iranian sides with respect to the Idlib militants were placed by Vladimir Putin during the recent tripartite Tehran summit, when Erdogan and his entourage were made clear that their mercantile interests in relation to shadow trade -economic relations with the field commanders of the Islamic groups of Idlib, as well as the desire to influence the eastern bank of the Euphrates through the coordinated actions of the terrorist DRG not included in the list of interests of Moscow, Damascus and Tehran. Moreover, after about two days after the start of tactical aviation The Russian Aerospace Forces also joined the artillery units of the Syrian Arab army, which began artillery training on the positions of militants from the National Liberation Front and Khait Tahrir al-Sham on the eastern front of the Idlib bridgehead, on the contact line near the cities of Abu Duhur and Hader .
One would have thought that the fate of the pro-Turkish opposition-terrorist groups in Idlib was a foregone conclusion; but Ankara, securing a full patronage of the North Atlantic Alliance, despite the fake “trade war” with Washington, issued an extremely prompt “response” in the form of sending huge armored convoys to its observation posts in Idlib, which was not only enough to stop the offensive actions of government forces, but also to suspend artillery and air training on the "Idlib adder." The attacks on the positions of the militants were stopped not only by the artillery batteries and the Syrian Air Force, but also by the Russian Aerospace Forces, which indicates the seriousness of what is happening. The whole difficulty lies in the fact that amid the firm determination of the Turkish leadership to maintain their presence in the SAR, neither the specialists in the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces nor the command of the SAA can guarantee that at the start of the offensive "throws" of the Syrian army immediately in 3 operational directions (Jisr al-Shugur, Kafr Zita and Sarakib) the Turkish military contingent, as well as powerful mechanized units sent to Idlib supposedly only to protect 12 observation / strong points, will not enter the battle with the 4th tank divisions, as well as the 2nd and 3rd corps of the SAA.
Indeed, in this case, the Turkish group will suffer extremely serious losses, or it will be completely suppressed many times by the numerically superior units of the CAP government forces, which will be skillfully used by Erdogan as “casus belli” to initiate an escalation of hostilities with the CAA both in Idlib and in the province Aleppo. Naturally, in this case, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey will send the main armored, artillery and infantry "kulaks" of the Turkish army, which together with the militants of the Free Syrian Army and "Al-Nusra" (banned in the Russian Federation), captured in the spring of Afrin and Idlib in El-Bab. ) within a few weeks, they implement Erdogan’s plan to take control of the cities of Tel Rifat, Aleppo and Deir Hafer. A full-fledged war with the Turkish army, the CAA is clearly “not taken out”, and it would be extremely naive to reflect on the involvement of the Russian armed forces in order to protect the Syrian Arab army from Turkish aggression, since this would mean not only the transformation of the conflict into an extremely “explosive” Russia configuration NATO, but the failure of the very profitable contract for Rosoboronexport to supply Turkey with the C-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile systems.
Will Moscow take such a strong-willed military-political move in the current economic and geopolitical circumstances? Most likely not. This was clearly demonstrated in January-February of the 2018 year, when the F-16C / D Block 30 / 50 + multi-purpose fighter planes with impunity ironed the Kurdish canton of Afrin, which airspace was not covered by either the Russian air and space forces or air defense missile systems " Buk-M2E "Syrian air defense forces, of course, in view of the agreements with Ankara. Of course, in the current situation in Afrin, there is a considerable share of the guilt and intractable Kurdish YPG / J detachments, which flatly refused to grant the territory of the canton to the units of the CAA. Nevertheless, it was quite possible to provide Afrin Kurds with worthy anti-tank arsenals for defending the Syrian land against the Turkish aggressor, as well as forming an “anti-aircraft umbrella” over Africa with the help of anti-aircraft missile divisions deployed in the Nubl and Zahra regions. Unfortunately, none of the above measures was taken, and Afrin came under Turkish control during Operation Olive Branch, which can be considered the most weighty victory for Erdogan in the Syrian denouement. Why?
The capture of Afrin led to the creation of the operational-strategic link of the “Idlib Gadyushnik” with the so-called “El Babskim bridgehead”, which allowed the regular units of the Turkish army, as well as the Ahrar al-Sham and the Free Syrian Army units, to not only install on the Syrian -Turkish border is a continuous buffer zone with a length of about 400 km, but also to simplify a possible offensive operation on Aleppo and other cities of the Aleppo governorate due to the improved efficiency of the distribution of certain military units throughout the north-west ATS-stand edge. Moreover, the Afrin group of pro-Turkish formations greatly enhances the combat stability of the “Idlib Gadyushnik”, since the “isthmus” of Al-Shayuh Akvil - Atimah (between Idlib and Afrin) opens before the militants of “Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham” reserve loopholes for supplying weapons and receiving logistics The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the operation to liberate Idlib should have been carried out long before the 12 regions with the fortification infrastructure of the Turkish army appeared in this province, and especially the arrival of armored brigades and rocket artillery battalions of the armed forces of Turkey with OBT at their disposal. Sabra and MLRS MLRS.
Operational silence, which has reigned on the Idlib fronts for several days, is associated exclusively with the development in Moscow, Damascus and Tehran of a new strategy for returning the governorate to Syrian control, because the increase in Ankara’s rates creates a number of unpredictable risks that could lead to an escalation of regional conflict with the direct participation of Turkey, Russia and Syria (and indirect participation of other NATO member countries), or to the complete fiasco of the Syrian army in the absence of support from the Russian AIF. A “window of opportunity” for the Syrian Arab Army’s offensive advance into militant positions, bypassing the main Turkish forces deployed mainly in the areas of observation posts, still has Damascus. The successful suppression of the first-line fortifications of the Dzhebkhat Tahrir Surya can be carried out on the western front of the Ilib bridgehead, in 15 km south of Jisr ash-Shugur: neither the Turkish observation posts nor the mechanized units of the Turkish army are seen here.
Military transport aircraft A400M Turkish Air Force, participating in the transfer of additional military units of the Turkish army in Idlib
This area is replete with a number of dominant heights, taking control of which opens up to the Syrian army an open field of opportunities for the development of an attack on such large settlements as Ma'areth-en-Numan, Erich and El-Barah. Moscow and Damascus need to move as soon as possible from the useless diplomatic discussion of Idlib’s issues on the fields of the UN Security Council meetings to concrete military actions, because on Thursday, September 13, there was an urgent arrival from Hatay International Airport news the arrival of the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, which delivered several dozen fully equipped servicemen to the border province; naturally, their final destination was Idlib. And this means that at the slightest delay, the Syrian army can lose the last window of opportunity to launch an offensive by meeting the Turkish military contingent not only in areas of observation posts, but also in all areas of the contact line of the problem province.
Information sources:
https://syria.liveuamap.com/
https://riafan.ru/1098984-siriya-turciya-perebrosila-bronetekhniku-i-specnaz-v-idlib
http://www.trt.net.tr/russian/turtsiia/2018/09/14/nachal-nik-gienshtaba-vs-turtsii-proviel-provierku-voisk-v-khataie-1049727
Around the same period, starting from September 4, front-line fighter-bombers of the Su-34 of Russia under the protection of a powerful air defense “umbrella” began to prepare the ground for the future attack of the CAA assault units, launching powerful point-to-air missile and bomb strikes the strongholds and depots of weapons banned in the Russian Federation "Islamic Party of Turkestan" (near Jisr al-Shugura, where militants with "White Helmets" began preparations for provocation using chlorine gas), as well as the groups "Jash Isaa" and "Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham "in the south of the" Idlib gadyushnik. "
It would seem that all points on the “i” regarding the strategy of actions of the Russian, Syrian and Iranian sides with respect to the Idlib militants were placed by Vladimir Putin during the recent tripartite Tehran summit, when Erdogan and his entourage were made clear that their mercantile interests in relation to shadow trade -economic relations with the field commanders of the Islamic groups of Idlib, as well as the desire to influence the eastern bank of the Euphrates through the coordinated actions of the terrorist DRG not included in the list of interests of Moscow, Damascus and Tehran. Moreover, after about two days after the start of tactical aviation The Russian Aerospace Forces also joined the artillery units of the Syrian Arab army, which began artillery training on the positions of militants from the National Liberation Front and Khait Tahrir al-Sham on the eastern front of the Idlib bridgehead, on the contact line near the cities of Abu Duhur and Hader .
One would have thought that the fate of the pro-Turkish opposition-terrorist groups in Idlib was a foregone conclusion; but Ankara, securing a full patronage of the North Atlantic Alliance, despite the fake “trade war” with Washington, issued an extremely prompt “response” in the form of sending huge armored convoys to its observation posts in Idlib, which was not only enough to stop the offensive actions of government forces, but also to suspend artillery and air training on the "Idlib adder." The attacks on the positions of the militants were stopped not only by the artillery batteries and the Syrian Air Force, but also by the Russian Aerospace Forces, which indicates the seriousness of what is happening. The whole difficulty lies in the fact that amid the firm determination of the Turkish leadership to maintain their presence in the SAR, neither the specialists in the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces nor the command of the SAA can guarantee that at the start of the offensive "throws" of the Syrian army immediately in 3 operational directions (Jisr al-Shugur, Kafr Zita and Sarakib) the Turkish military contingent, as well as powerful mechanized units sent to Idlib supposedly only to protect 12 observation / strong points, will not enter the battle with the 4th tank divisions, as well as the 2nd and 3rd corps of the SAA.
Indeed, in this case, the Turkish group will suffer extremely serious losses, or it will be completely suppressed many times by the numerically superior units of the CAP government forces, which will be skillfully used by Erdogan as “casus belli” to initiate an escalation of hostilities with the CAA both in Idlib and in the province Aleppo. Naturally, in this case, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey will send the main armored, artillery and infantry "kulaks" of the Turkish army, which together with the militants of the Free Syrian Army and "Al-Nusra" (banned in the Russian Federation), captured in the spring of Afrin and Idlib in El-Bab. ) within a few weeks, they implement Erdogan’s plan to take control of the cities of Tel Rifat, Aleppo and Deir Hafer. A full-fledged war with the Turkish army, the CAA is clearly “not taken out”, and it would be extremely naive to reflect on the involvement of the Russian armed forces in order to protect the Syrian Arab army from Turkish aggression, since this would mean not only the transformation of the conflict into an extremely “explosive” Russia configuration NATO, but the failure of the very profitable contract for Rosoboronexport to supply Turkey with the C-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile systems.
Will Moscow take such a strong-willed military-political move in the current economic and geopolitical circumstances? Most likely not. This was clearly demonstrated in January-February of the 2018 year, when the F-16C / D Block 30 / 50 + multi-purpose fighter planes with impunity ironed the Kurdish canton of Afrin, which airspace was not covered by either the Russian air and space forces or air defense missile systems " Buk-M2E "Syrian air defense forces, of course, in view of the agreements with Ankara. Of course, in the current situation in Afrin, there is a considerable share of the guilt and intractable Kurdish YPG / J detachments, which flatly refused to grant the territory of the canton to the units of the CAA. Nevertheless, it was quite possible to provide Afrin Kurds with worthy anti-tank arsenals for defending the Syrian land against the Turkish aggressor, as well as forming an “anti-aircraft umbrella” over Africa with the help of anti-aircraft missile divisions deployed in the Nubl and Zahra regions. Unfortunately, none of the above measures was taken, and Afrin came under Turkish control during Operation Olive Branch, which can be considered the most weighty victory for Erdogan in the Syrian denouement. Why?
The capture of Afrin led to the creation of the operational-strategic link of the “Idlib Gadyushnik” with the so-called “El Babskim bridgehead”, which allowed the regular units of the Turkish army, as well as the Ahrar al-Sham and the Free Syrian Army units, to not only install on the Syrian -Turkish border is a continuous buffer zone with a length of about 400 km, but also to simplify a possible offensive operation on Aleppo and other cities of the Aleppo governorate due to the improved efficiency of the distribution of certain military units throughout the north-west ATS-stand edge. Moreover, the Afrin group of pro-Turkish formations greatly enhances the combat stability of the “Idlib Gadyushnik”, since the “isthmus” of Al-Shayuh Akvil - Atimah (between Idlib and Afrin) opens before the militants of “Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham” reserve loopholes for supplying weapons and receiving logistics The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the operation to liberate Idlib should have been carried out long before the 12 regions with the fortification infrastructure of the Turkish army appeared in this province, and especially the arrival of armored brigades and rocket artillery battalions of the armed forces of Turkey with OBT at their disposal. Sabra and MLRS MLRS.
Operational silence, which has reigned on the Idlib fronts for several days, is associated exclusively with the development in Moscow, Damascus and Tehran of a new strategy for returning the governorate to Syrian control, because the increase in Ankara’s rates creates a number of unpredictable risks that could lead to an escalation of regional conflict with the direct participation of Turkey, Russia and Syria (and indirect participation of other NATO member countries), or to the complete fiasco of the Syrian army in the absence of support from the Russian AIF. A “window of opportunity” for the Syrian Arab Army’s offensive advance into militant positions, bypassing the main Turkish forces deployed mainly in the areas of observation posts, still has Damascus. The successful suppression of the first-line fortifications of the Dzhebkhat Tahrir Surya can be carried out on the western front of the Ilib bridgehead, in 15 km south of Jisr ash-Shugur: neither the Turkish observation posts nor the mechanized units of the Turkish army are seen here.
Military transport aircraft A400M Turkish Air Force, participating in the transfer of additional military units of the Turkish army in Idlib
This area is replete with a number of dominant heights, taking control of which opens up to the Syrian army an open field of opportunities for the development of an attack on such large settlements as Ma'areth-en-Numan, Erich and El-Barah. Moscow and Damascus need to move as soon as possible from the useless diplomatic discussion of Idlib’s issues on the fields of the UN Security Council meetings to concrete military actions, because on Thursday, September 13, there was an urgent arrival from Hatay International Airport news the arrival of the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, which delivered several dozen fully equipped servicemen to the border province; naturally, their final destination was Idlib. And this means that at the slightest delay, the Syrian army can lose the last window of opportunity to launch an offensive by meeting the Turkish military contingent not only in areas of observation posts, but also in all areas of the contact line of the problem province.
Information sources:
https://syria.liveuamap.com/
https://riafan.ru/1098984-siriya-turciya-perebrosila-bronetekhniku-i-specnaz-v-idlib
http://www.trt.net.tr/russian/turtsiia/2018/09/14/nachal-nik-gienshtaba-vs-turtsii-proviel-provierku-voisk-v-khataie-1049727
Information