Continuing to talk about our future fleet, from the very beginning it is worth noting the main emerging point: none of the high-ranking officials can even say today approximately what naval construction will look like in general.
And whether it will be at all.
Yes, you can swing as much as you like on showcases of the “ARMY ...” type with models and models of ships. Modelki is good. But from the plastic model to the ship in the metal sometimes passes (and we always have) a lot of time.
However, today it is simply impossible to determine where the main trends of the state armaments program are directed. Everything is hidden in such a fog that it is worth guessing on sea kale.
Divination, of course, is so, for the sake of wit. In fact, there are facts, and you can push off from them. The main thing is to do it calmly and without screams.
The main conclusion that was made in one of the previous materials is simple. The fleet of Russia in the coming 10-12 years will greatly reduce the number of combat-ready surface ships of the sea and ocean zone.
Pros even more than required. The main one - after the 2014 events of the year, we actually lost our hands and places, which could build large-capacity ships and repair them.
Crimea is good, but Nikolaev is very much, if not all. The gap with Ukraine, political and economic, destroyed and (first of all) such a thing as shipbuilding cooperation. That is, Russia was left without Ukrainian marine diesel engines and hulls.
Actually, you can not continue further, because there is no ship without a hull and an engine.
In fact, we have “shifted to the right” endlessly the construction time of the frigates of the 11356 and 22350 projects and the problems with repairing a number of ships of Soviet construction. And if you can somehow get out of the repair at the expense of other shipyards (although it’s still a pleasure to drive the “Moscow” through half the world), then we have a complete nightmare with ship diesel engines.
There is a tendency (rather logical) to build what can be built. That is, the "mosquito" coastal fleet instead of the ocean.
Pretty logical. Suppose they are not on 100% themselves, but with the help of China, but we can build 22160 project corvettes and small rocket ships of 21631 and 22800 projects. While we can.
At the same time (and this pleases), the construction of the 20380 project ships, their more expensive and complex version - the 20385 project, as well as the increased size and received a number of other major changes of the 20386 project continues.
5 corvettes project 20380 and the same in construction - this is not bad. Plus two ships of the project 20385. But if you look at the forecasts, then the corvettes of the 2038x family to the 2028, should be at least 18 units in the composition of the Russian Navy. That looks a bit shakozakidatelski, because the problem with the engines has not yet been resolved.
The same applies to the 21160 project ships series. The head ("Vasily Bykov") is being tested, another 5 in varying degrees of construction. And the series can be extended to 12 ships.
Following the corvettes seem to be well-proven small rocket ships of the project 31631 ("Buyan"). Criticism is rather low, perhaps, seaworthiness, but these IRCs are not for the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. And for service in the Baltic, Caspian or Black Sea - completely.
And to 6, the existing IRAs are still building 6. Plus you should not forget about the “work on the mistakes”, that is, “Karakurt”, he is the 22800 project. The project has a greater seaworthiness in comparison with the "Buyani", which is undoubtedly a plus in the situation.
In general, if we talk about ships with a displacement of up to 3000 tons, here everything looks more or less nothing. The only thing that causes confusion is still a large number of missile boats (1241 Ave.), small rocket ships (1234 Ave.) and small anti-submarine ships (1124 Ave. and 1331 Ave.) of Soviet construction. In general, these ships among this weight class has 62 units, which is about 90% of the total number of small ships.
Whether our shipbuilding industry will be able to build corvettes, IRAs and other ships at a pace to compensate for the natural loss of ships due to obsolescence - that is the question.
But again, in the coastal zone, which can be controlled by the "mosquito" fleet, everything looks tolerable.
But what cannot be said about the renewal of the grouping of surface ships of the distant sea and ocean zone is impossible. The situation is critical in all classes of ships that could perform certain tasks in the far ocean zone.
Missile cruisers. Here is a nuance. Very expensive, but there is. If you spend time, resources and money, the number of cruisers will increase to 5. This, as you already understood, is both the 1144 and 1164 project. But this ships of the end of the last century, anyway. Russia cannot build something like this today.
Destroyers and BOD. Here, too, is a mortal longing. Currently, the fleet has 10 ships in varying degrees of combat readiness. If subjected to capital modernization anti-submarine ships of the project 1155 (those that still can), then for some time, you can extend the existence. But after 10 years, according to forecasts, we will have no more than 3-4 ships of this class.
The program for the construction of new destroyers and frigates is constantly being adjusted and postponed (in terms of destroyers) and freezes (in terms of frigates).
To be honest with ourselves, the inability to build in the proper quantity and quality of ships of the far sea zone automatically removes any tasks related to this zone from the defense doctrine.
If the fleet is not able to perform tasks far from its shores, it means that these tasks should not even be formulated. The coastal zone is our everything. In general, hello, Ukraine, however, is not in such a disgraceful form.
And do not discount this most natural loss of ships. I gave the 5 figure in the cruisers calculations, but you know, it is very conditional and optimistic.
Admiral Lazarev is teetering on the brink of life and death from 1999, almost 20 years. And I don’t dare say how much money, resources and time will be needed to reanimate it. Accordingly, in the pessim of cruisers we have 4. This is if they bring to mind the "Nakhimov".
Meanwhile, another nuance. A cruiser, a destroyer, a BOD, a frigate, in contrast to a small rocket ship or boat, is under construction for a very long time. And the ships that we inherited from the USSR, I repeat, are by no means an infinite resource.
And, let's face it, a small number of these ships, which survived to the present time, may not live to see the time when they are replaced by new destroyers, the construction of which is constantly being postponed.
It may even turn out that by the year of 2028, when the state armaments program expires, the number of DMZ ships can be reduced to 15-17 units. If we recall that our ships are actually divided between four fleets without the possibility of collecting in one shock fist, then you can forget about the possibility of the Navy to react quickly to changes in the world situation in the form of formation of efficient connections of ships as to solve problems in remote areas, and to protect your own coast.
No, of course, if the Chinese navy helps us ...
But in general, the situation is very sad. And the way out of it seems to be one: to sign on their own powerlessness and to bet not on what I would like to have (all these model-model dreams in the furnace), but on what can really be built.
That is, the coastal fleet of the ISCs, MRAK, corvettes and other trifles, armed with cool broadsheets of the Caliber type and nuclear submarines for work in the far zone.
Not the most beautiful picture, but you really have what we have.
Goodbye sea depths?
- Roman Skomorokhov
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