Projects and solutions in missile defense and US nuclear forces
About DARPA, many people know that this agency was at the origin of the Internet. Yes, this is so, and not only the Internet, however, besides successful projects, the agency actively supports various kinds of projecting and sawing projects, or expecting that crazy ideas can “shoot” unexpectedly, or in the same way, mastering "allocations. They could not get past the "burning" topic - the fight against hypersonic KR, RCC and aeroballistic maneuvering hypersonic combat equipment (AGGB) ICBM, SLBM, etc. Type the same Avant-garde 15Ü71.
The agency presented the Glide Breaker hypersonic interceptor concept at the D60 exhibition dedicated to the DARPA 60 anniversary. The "concept" itself was presented in the form of a pair of drawings by the artist with explanations, apparently, there is nothing else and yet. According to the developers, this “interceptor” will be a small maneuvering device capable of detecting and hitting hypersonic maneuvering targets not by any means, but by a direct hit, that is, kinetically. To be honest, the developers either lost their impudence or finally, or in the agency itself, someone really wanted to take the money away from interested pockets, because the concept does not hold water.
Even the task of detecting and determining the exact, up to meters, location of a hypersonic warhead or CD / CRP is quite complicated due to the plasma "tail" reaching for the object. This is if you use radar, but if you use infrared or electron-optical systems, the task is also not simplified.
Recall what was written over 10 years ago by the then head of the 4 Central Research Institute of the Defense Ministry, Major General Vasilenko, in the remarkable article "Asymmetrical Response", in which the potential enemy’s countermeasures, then implemented in the new missile defense system (PCB), were partially communicated new ICBMs and SLBMs of Russia. That material was mainly about non-maneuvering, classic war blocks, but a lot applies to maneuvering as well.
In any case, there is a trace or not, you still need to determine the exact location of the device itself. Therefore, to get into such an object with a kinetic interceptor is almost an unsolvable task for a country with a higher level of development of air defense systems and missile defense systems than the United States. And it is also necessary to take into account that the object maneuvers, and it is rather unpredictable, and even if its trajectory were predictable, the interceptor needs maneuverability several times higher than the target. Is it possible at hypersonic speeds? Let's clarify: is it possible at such speeds for Americans, who in the area of hypersound, as if to put it mildly, are not champions?
In addition, who said that the AGGBO maneuvering in the ionosphere or upper stratosphere will not have the means to overcome missile defense?
“Vololet” is just a hypersonic “glider”, that is, we are talking about maneuvering false targets after the apparatus under cover. But even without false goals, the task of kinetic interception of such goals, either at the current or at the promising (at least in the short and medium term) level of development, is practically unsolvable. A different, more realistic method would be offered for free, such as directional flows of heavy shards or lethal elements created by controlled warhead detonation - but not the same. Moreover, the “successes” of the same kinetic interceptors against never-maneuvering or even intercontinental radius of warheads during the testing of the GBI and SM-3 interceptors, in general, cannot please the creators. Not to mention the programs themselves. Over the 20 years of development, the GBI system was able to bring only anti-missile 44, capable of repelling only medium-range threats in the absence of any opposition and means of overcoming. And then - only on landfills. SM-3 is also not happy with the progress, and the SM-3 Block 2B version has been stopped to develop, and is unlikely to return to this idea (it's not about the money, as stated, but about technical difficulties). The split warhead program with MKV interceptors to intercept missiles with split warheads is also dead. And if it were not so - with those successes in identifying targets and detuning from interference and false targets that exist, these MKVs have little sense.
And then suddenly they decide in DARPA, as it was said in the beloved film of all, "to wipe William himself, you see, Shakespeare." On the other hand, the topic is topical, the ruling circles of the United States have a strong burning sensation in all parts of the body because of the fact that Russia has far surpassed the "shining hail on the hill" in such ultra-modern technologies of warfare. And allocate a lot of money. Yes, but money will not help much if there are no solutions. If the Americans learn to shoot down not just hypersonic rockets and devices, but also maneuvering ones, this will happen very, very soon, and the solution is unlikely to be as outlined above.
But behind the antimissile unsolvable problems, others are not forgotten either. A conservative and informed (linked to the US Department of Defense and the CIA), American journalist Bill Hertz in a recent article complained that the US Armed Forces do not have nuclear weapons capable of hitting highly secure, buried targets like bunkers and underground factories and storage facilities. They say that the Russians, and after them the Chinese and even the North Koreans, create strong air defense and missile defense zones that cannot be penetrated by conventional means adapted to destroy such targets (as if there are conventional ammunition capable of hitting targets at depths of tens and hundreds of meters). And it’s strange that the term “create” is used in relation to Russia, because Russia is full of the notorious “access restriction zones”, as the Americans call our zones and near our territory, where you can: shoot them full airborne from air defense fighters and air defense systems level C-300 and C-400, to scrape the sea from coastal and aviation and sea accommodation supersonic anti-ship missiles for operational purposes and still heavily covered by EW. At the same time, it is interesting how nuclear weapons can help in such zones, if it is a matter of B. Hertz’s material about bombs - it’s almost impossible to deliver them to areas with even military air defense.
Hertz writes that the US Air Force had previously used strategic bombs B83-1 with power up to 1,2 Mt and tactical B61-11 with power up to 400 kt, this version was intended to defeat protected objects. They have not yet been completely destroyed - all B61 will be converted (with a reduction in numbers from 500 to 400) into a “high-precision” modification of B61-12, starting with 2020, up to 50 кт. And B83-1, which, by the way, wasn’t intended for hitting heavily buried targets, couldn’t be solved at the expense of the power of all tasks, other solutions are also needed - it has long been assigned for recycling. And this recycling went at a good pace along with the rest of the ammunition until this year, when Trump allegedly ordered it to be held until an "adequate replacement."
But what the matter is - no one has developed and is not going to adequately replace it, it has declared the very same 50-кт В61-12, and moreover, the plans of the US Department of Energy have no words that there are any changes in the fate of B83. This is understandable: there is not enough arsenal capacity to maintain the number, production is also impossible now, and you still need to get rid of "ballast" (and even useful ammunition sometimes), and Trump's instructions will not help here. Because you can't fool physics, especially nuclear, and if you cannot maintain the ammunition, then it is better to destroy it, otherwise you can get into trouble. And B61-12, which we consider to be somehow capable of defeating underground shelters (to be honest, this statement seems to be propaganda, based on available data), is not considered by Americans to be. Even when it is buried in the ground on 3-6 m, it will, of course, create a wave in the ground, similar to an aboveground explosion from a much more powerful bomb (about 700 CT), but it is unlikely to be able to hit any buried structures more “dirty” blast than with an air blast. But B61-11 could supposedly penetrate into the ground where it is deeper and hit objects at depths up to 100 m.
And now in the US they are trying to come up with a solution: what to do in order to preserve at least some opportunities in unprotected strong air defense zones to defeat relatively buried targets. The use case mentioned by Hertz in the X-NUMX X-warhead of the W-76-2 warhead already described in one of the articles looks even more questionable than the B5-61 due to its power, and W12 was not intended for such purposes. The problem is the same: even if you know how to do it, but you cannot produce ammunition from scratch, you will have to redo something from the existing one, but there are no suitable solutions. Although it is possible that a certain amount of B-76-61 will try to be left in the service, although there were very few of them - 11 pieces. In any case, even 50 bombs of this type, given that the opponents of the United States, according to the CIA, have more than 50 strongly protected underground objects, are a drop in the ocean. True, given that among such objects were mentioned non-existent in the real world “tunnels hundreds of meters deep for rocket trains in Russia”, it should be assumed that this figure is somewhat overestimated.
It is also not very clear how Hertz, writing about the defeat of highly protected deep-seated objects in Moscow, expects to take any kind of bomb through the air defense of the Central Industrial Region. Is that the Americans invented teleportation. If we are talking about the fact that such objects will be amazed after the exchange of massive nuclear missile strikes, and not even one by one, when the air defense system is already destroyed, so there are very big doubts that after them someone will deliver such cargo, and especially - give such an order. The fact is that in the Russian strategic nuclear forces issues of defeating underground targets are also solved, and much more efficiently than in the United States.
The agency presented the Glide Breaker hypersonic interceptor concept at the D60 exhibition dedicated to the DARPA 60 anniversary. The "concept" itself was presented in the form of a pair of drawings by the artist with explanations, apparently, there is nothing else and yet. According to the developers, this “interceptor” will be a small maneuvering device capable of detecting and hitting hypersonic maneuvering targets not by any means, but by a direct hit, that is, kinetically. To be honest, the developers either lost their impudence or finally, or in the agency itself, someone really wanted to take the money away from interested pockets, because the concept does not hold water.
Even the task of detecting and determining the exact, up to meters, location of a hypersonic warhead or CD / CRP is quite complicated due to the plasma "tail" reaching for the object. This is if you use radar, but if you use infrared or electron-optical systems, the task is also not simplified.
Recall what was written over 10 years ago by the then head of the 4 Central Research Institute of the Defense Ministry, Major General Vasilenko, in the remarkable article "Asymmetrical Response", in which the potential enemy’s countermeasures, then implemented in the new missile defense system (PCB), were partially communicated new ICBMs and SLBMs of Russia. That material was mainly about non-maneuvering, classic war blocks, but a lot applies to maneuvering as well.
In the atmosphere, the luminosity of its co-wake has a decisive influence on the optical visibility of the block. The achieved results and realized developments allow, on the one hand, to optimize the composition of the heat-shielding coating of the block, removing materials from it most conducive to the formation of a trace. On the other hand, a forced injection of special liquid products into the trace region is performed in order to reduce the radiation intensity.
In any case, there is a trace or not, you still need to determine the exact location of the device itself. Therefore, to get into such an object with a kinetic interceptor is almost an unsolvable task for a country with a higher level of development of air defense systems and missile defense systems than the United States. And it is also necessary to take into account that the object maneuvers, and it is rather unpredictable, and even if its trajectory were predictable, the interceptor needs maneuverability several times higher than the target. Is it possible at hypersonic speeds? Let's clarify: is it possible at such speeds for Americans, who in the area of hypersound, as if to put it mildly, are not champions?
In addition, who said that the AGGBO maneuvering in the ionosphere or upper stratosphere will not have the means to overcome missile defense?
In this regard, another method and countermeasures corresponding to it - small-sized atmospheric false targets with a height of 2 ... 5 km and relative weight in 5 ... 7% by weight of the combat unit come to the fore. The implementation of this method becomes possible as a result of solving a dual task - a significant reduction in the visibility of the combat unit and the development of qualitatively new atmospheric false targets of the "wavelength" class, with a corresponding decrease in their mass and dimensions.
“Vololet” is just a hypersonic “glider”, that is, we are talking about maneuvering false targets after the apparatus under cover. But even without false goals, the task of kinetic interception of such goals, either at the current or at the promising (at least in the short and medium term) level of development, is practically unsolvable. A different, more realistic method would be offered for free, such as directional flows of heavy shards or lethal elements created by controlled warhead detonation - but not the same. Moreover, the “successes” of the same kinetic interceptors against never-maneuvering or even intercontinental radius of warheads during the testing of the GBI and SM-3 interceptors, in general, cannot please the creators. Not to mention the programs themselves. Over the 20 years of development, the GBI system was able to bring only anti-missile 44, capable of repelling only medium-range threats in the absence of any opposition and means of overcoming. And then - only on landfills. SM-3 is also not happy with the progress, and the SM-3 Block 2B version has been stopped to develop, and is unlikely to return to this idea (it's not about the money, as stated, but about technical difficulties). The split warhead program with MKV interceptors to intercept missiles with split warheads is also dead. And if it were not so - with those successes in identifying targets and detuning from interference and false targets that exist, these MKVs have little sense.
And then suddenly they decide in DARPA, as it was said in the beloved film of all, "to wipe William himself, you see, Shakespeare." On the other hand, the topic is topical, the ruling circles of the United States have a strong burning sensation in all parts of the body because of the fact that Russia has far surpassed the "shining hail on the hill" in such ultra-modern technologies of warfare. And allocate a lot of money. Yes, but money will not help much if there are no solutions. If the Americans learn to shoot down not just hypersonic rockets and devices, but also maneuvering ones, this will happen very, very soon, and the solution is unlikely to be as outlined above.
But behind the antimissile unsolvable problems, others are not forgotten either. A conservative and informed (linked to the US Department of Defense and the CIA), American journalist Bill Hertz in a recent article complained that the US Armed Forces do not have nuclear weapons capable of hitting highly secure, buried targets like bunkers and underground factories and storage facilities. They say that the Russians, and after them the Chinese and even the North Koreans, create strong air defense and missile defense zones that cannot be penetrated by conventional means adapted to destroy such targets (as if there are conventional ammunition capable of hitting targets at depths of tens and hundreds of meters). And it’s strange that the term “create” is used in relation to Russia, because Russia is full of the notorious “access restriction zones”, as the Americans call our zones and near our territory, where you can: shoot them full airborne from air defense fighters and air defense systems level C-300 and C-400, to scrape the sea from coastal and aviation and sea accommodation supersonic anti-ship missiles for operational purposes and still heavily covered by EW. At the same time, it is interesting how nuclear weapons can help in such zones, if it is a matter of B. Hertz’s material about bombs - it’s almost impossible to deliver them to areas with even military air defense.
Hertz writes that the US Air Force had previously used strategic bombs B83-1 with power up to 1,2 Mt and tactical B61-11 with power up to 400 kt, this version was intended to defeat protected objects. They have not yet been completely destroyed - all B61 will be converted (with a reduction in numbers from 500 to 400) into a “high-precision” modification of B61-12, starting with 2020, up to 50 кт. And B83-1, which, by the way, wasn’t intended for hitting heavily buried targets, couldn’t be solved at the expense of the power of all tasks, other solutions are also needed - it has long been assigned for recycling. And this recycling went at a good pace along with the rest of the ammunition until this year, when Trump allegedly ordered it to be held until an "adequate replacement."
But what the matter is - no one has developed and is not going to adequately replace it, it has declared the very same 50-кт В61-12, and moreover, the plans of the US Department of Energy have no words that there are any changes in the fate of B83. This is understandable: there is not enough arsenal capacity to maintain the number, production is also impossible now, and you still need to get rid of "ballast" (and even useful ammunition sometimes), and Trump's instructions will not help here. Because you can't fool physics, especially nuclear, and if you cannot maintain the ammunition, then it is better to destroy it, otherwise you can get into trouble. And B61-12, which we consider to be somehow capable of defeating underground shelters (to be honest, this statement seems to be propaganda, based on available data), is not considered by Americans to be. Even when it is buried in the ground on 3-6 m, it will, of course, create a wave in the ground, similar to an aboveground explosion from a much more powerful bomb (about 700 CT), but it is unlikely to be able to hit any buried structures more “dirty” blast than with an air blast. But B61-11 could supposedly penetrate into the ground where it is deeper and hit objects at depths up to 100 m.
And now in the US they are trying to come up with a solution: what to do in order to preserve at least some opportunities in unprotected strong air defense zones to defeat relatively buried targets. The use case mentioned by Hertz in the X-NUMX X-warhead of the W-76-2 warhead already described in one of the articles looks even more questionable than the B5-61 due to its power, and W12 was not intended for such purposes. The problem is the same: even if you know how to do it, but you cannot produce ammunition from scratch, you will have to redo something from the existing one, but there are no suitable solutions. Although it is possible that a certain amount of B-76-61 will try to be left in the service, although there were very few of them - 11 pieces. In any case, even 50 bombs of this type, given that the opponents of the United States, according to the CIA, have more than 50 strongly protected underground objects, are a drop in the ocean. True, given that among such objects were mentioned non-existent in the real world “tunnels hundreds of meters deep for rocket trains in Russia”, it should be assumed that this figure is somewhat overestimated.
It is also not very clear how Hertz, writing about the defeat of highly protected deep-seated objects in Moscow, expects to take any kind of bomb through the air defense of the Central Industrial Region. Is that the Americans invented teleportation. If we are talking about the fact that such objects will be amazed after the exchange of massive nuclear missile strikes, and not even one by one, when the air defense system is already destroyed, so there are very big doubts that after them someone will deliver such cargo, and especially - give such an order. The fact is that in the Russian strategic nuclear forces issues of defeating underground targets are also solved, and much more efficiently than in the United States.
- Ya. Vyatkin, especially for "Military Review"
- depositphotos.com
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