Ishmael battlecruisers

55
The Izmail-class cruisers, perhaps, are one of the most controversial projects of domestic heavy warships. It all began like this ...

The first armored cruisers of post-war construction were created, in essence, on the pre-war concepts, the experience of the Russian-Japanese war in them was minimally taken into account. A series of ships of the type “Admiral Makarov” was built on the model and likeness of the “Bayan” because this ship showed itself well in battles, while at the same time almost no work was done on the project’s shortcomings. As for Rurik II, of course, it was fundamentally different in design from the pre-war armored cruisers, but the international competition for the best design of the armored cruiser was held in July 1904, just then V.K. Vitgeft led his squadron to break through to Vladivostok. A contract for its construction was signed only two weeks after the Tsushima disaster. Thus, when creating the Rurik II, military experience was used to a minimum extent: it was, of course, already obtained, but not yet generalized and analyzed.





In 1906, the Maritime General Staff (MGS) surveyed naval officers as to what the future armored cruiser should be. As it usually happened in such cases, the most polar opinions were expressed: from extreme to prophetic. For example, the captain of the 2 rank, K.I. Defabr considered the armored cruiser as a class of the ship “completely useless. For the squadron, it is weak; for reconnaissance it is heavy and expensive. ” But Vice Admiral K.K. Even then, De-Livron pointed out that “the type of armored cruiser will probably be on par with the battleships, and both will have to take part in the line battle together.”

Basically, the prevailing opinion was that the armored cruiser to the Russian imperial the fleet necessary. However, most opinions agreed that the artillery of such a ship should be as close as possible to squadron battleships: for example, 4-6 254-mm guns or 2-4 305-mm guns were called the main caliber. At the same time, a very high speed was expected from the armored cruiser - at least 23-24 knots. A number of officers, mindful of the "Pacific concept" of the cruising war against England, also noted the need for a long range.

Thus, we can state that in these years the views of the Russian sailors on the place and role of the armored cruiser echoed remarkably, and were very similar to the views of the English sailors. As in England, in Russia they wanted to get a ship capable of acting on ocean communications (only in England - for the purpose of protection, in Russia, respectively, on the contrary). Just as in England, Russia believed that the armored cruiser was too big a ship to refuse to use it in a general battle. Hence, a similar vision of the use of this ship in battle - for example, Lieutenant Count A.P. Kapnist wrote in his note:

“In battle, armored cruisers form volatile detachments that seek to intensify the strike of the main forces, aimed at part of the enemy squadron. They want to go to the flank, to be located in front of his heads, behind his tail, in a word, these detachments play the role that reserve plays in land battles ”.


In other words, the armored cruisers were seen as a “high-speed wing” under the main forces of the squadron, and for this they needed heavy guns and high speed. Already only these two requirements led to the fact that the displacement of the new armored cruisers should have approached the battleships, and it is clear that it was not possible to provide a level of protection similar to the latter. Therefore, no one demanded a strong booking, but when asked what would happen if the ships of the “high-speed wing” “turned their attention” to the enemy's battleships (again, extremely similar to the British ones) reasoned that: “Thanks to the speed advantage armored cruisers will be able to accept or not accept battle with battleships, and if accepted, then for positions and distances advantageous for themselves. ” Probably, John Fisher would be very surprised to learn how widely his ideas about the role of armored cruisers are popular in the ranks of Russian fleet officers.

Of course, after the appearance of the Dreadnought, all projects had to be crossed out and start from scratch: and so, March 18 1907 were determined by the performance characteristics of the armored cruiser of the Dreadnought era. Looking at them, we will see a very great similarity with the British Invincible, but one should not see this as “ape”, because similar views on the concept of armored cruisers should have generated similar projects.

Strictly speaking, the Russian armored cruiser was supposed to be a little better than the British Invincibles and Indefategebls. His weapons were supposed to be the same 8 305-mm guns, but it was about domestic 52-caliber "buttresses", superior in their fighting qualities to the British 45 and 50-caliber twelve-inch guns. Mine caliber, like the British, was represented by 16 * 102-mm guns. The speed should have been 25 nodes, that is, half a node lower than the English, but the defense was slightly stronger.

True, the main armor belt had a thickness of just 152 mm, like the English battlecruisers, but besides it, the second and third armor belts with a thickness of 76,2 mm were also supposed (the British did not have any). In addition, although this is not explicitly stated in the sources, the Russian shipbuilding after the Russian-Japanese war prevailed over the need for a full reservation of the waterline: most likely, the tip of the Russian armored cruiser was supposed to be protected by armor, while Invinsible was fed after the stronghold defended only karapasnoy armored. The horizontal booking of the Russian ship was almost the same: the main armored deck made the same 50,8 mm bevels, in the horizontal part it had only 31,7 mm (in British - 38 mm), but the upper deck reached 44,1 mm (in English - 25,4 mm). Thus, the cumulative horizontal defense was supposed to make up the Russian cruiser 75,8 mm, and the English had 64 mm. The main armored deck of the Russian ship was thinner, but the enemy shell that hit the board under the upper deck had to break through the 76,2 mm belt first, and the English ship had nothing. The defense of artillery in the Russian armored cruiser was supposed to be stronger - 254 mm towers and barbety against 178 mm British armor, conning tower 305 mm against 254 mm.

Thus, we see that the Russian ship was supposed to have a slightly better defense than the British one, but in general it could not withstand the 280-305 mm projectiles (except for the main deck and barrels / barbets of the main caliber). As for speed, it was determined by 25 nodes - half a node less than the English.

However, all these advantages and disadvantages remained on paper: the lack of funds in the Russian empire prevented even the laying of the dreadnoughts, the main force of the fleet, what could be the dream of the battle cruisers (they were called linear only in 1915 g), but because Essentially, since 1907, we designed and built the battlecruisers, then in the future we will call them that). Years passed, and, of course, the above technical specifications soon did not look sufficient, so 1909 had undergone significant adjustments.

By this time, the service during the squadron was already considered the appointment of a battle cruiser, and “deep reconnaissance” and “coverage of the enemy’s head” were seen as the main tasks. Strangely enough, but in Russia, literally in a couple of years, naval thought shifted from the British concept of building the battlecruisers to the German one, according to which ships of this class were primarily a “fleet wing” during a squadron. Although it would be more correct, it would probably still be a question of some kind of intermediate variant, because actions on communications continued to be put in the task book for Russian battlecruisers: they simply were no longer considered the main ones and they, if anything, could have been sacrificed. At the same time, having defined the “squadron” role of the battle cruisers, the domestic military science did not slow down with a completely correct conclusion: once ships of this class have to fight enemy battleships, then they should be protected at the level of battleships. At the same time, unlike the German fleet, in 1909 g it was considered possible to sacrifice the number of guns, but not their caliber, that is, the battlecruisers should receive the same guns as the battleships, only in a smaller number. Thus, the domestic admirals came close to the concept of high-speed battleship, and thus almost were ahead of the rest, if ...

If it were not for one extremely annoying mistake, which became key in determining the protection of our heavy artillery ships.

Despite the fact that the work on creating 305-mm / 52 artillery systems was in full swing, and in spite of the fact that its power far exceeded the capabilities of the old 305-mm / 40 tools of the Russo-Japanese War, it seems that the true capabilities of the new generation of twelve-inch artillery systems neither in MGSh nor in MTC were not realized. It is impossible to explain in any other way that, when designing a linear cruiser, it was considered necessary to protect it from 305-mm projectiles at 40-60 cable distances, and ... at the same time, only an 190-mm thickness armor belt was considered sufficient for that mm armor for him! However, the above condition was minimal, but in general there was a requirement to protect the battlecruisers at the level of dreadnoughts - only the thickness of the main armor belt of the Sevastopol should have been just 50 mm.

In general, the next iteration of the project looked like this - at first MGSH decided to raise the speed to 28 nodes, allowing to increase the displacement to 25 000 t (more than the battleship!), While removing one 305-mm three-gun turret (i.e. was to make 9 305-mm cannons in three three-gun turrets), while the mine artillery and armor protection had to duplicate that of dreadnoughts like "Sevastopol". That is, the Russian understanding of the fast-moving battleship was actually proposed (alas, with its lack of protection), but MTK still found such innovation excessive and reduced the required speed to 25 nodes, and the displacement - to 23 000 t. Again, conceptually it was quite a worthy decision - to build a battle cruiser of equal size and body armor with a battleship, and with guns of the same caliber, but at the expense of reducing the number of barrels to increase speed. A similar concept, perhaps, even surpassed the one under the influence of which the Derflinger was created (after all, not only the number of guns of the main caliber was reduced, but also the thickness of the armor compared to modern battleships), inherited by battlecruisers spoiled everything.

As a result, we came to the ship, which, with an absolutely correct theoretical concept ... turned out to be extremely close to the British battle cruisers of the Lion type. In this respect, the project of engineer I.A. Gavrilova.



The ship’s displacement should have been 26 100 t., The power plant with the rated power 72 500 hp. should have reported speed - 28 nodes, afterburner - 30 nodes. The main caliber was represented by ten 305-mm / 52 guns, placed linearly-sublime in three and two-gun towers. At the same time, Gavrilov would prefer to use 356-mm guns, but did not have their weight data, however, in his view, it was possible to replace 10 * 305-mm with 8 * 356-mm without increasing the displacement. The thickness of the cutting armor, towers and barbets, apparently, was 254, 254 and 203 mm, respectively. But the ship's armored belt had only 203 mm of thickness, and the range at the economic speed of 13 knots was 4 100 miles. Attention is drawn to the not too oceanic range of this ship, but there was nothing to be done about it - any attempts to increase it entailed the most serious increase in displacement.

In principle, specifically for 1910 g, this was a pretty good project, especially when replacing twelve-inch guns with 356-mm. The output would have been a kind of Russian "Congo", despite the fact that the British themselves considered the latter superior to the "Lions", and the "Lions", in turn, still had a certain advantage over the German "280-mm" battlecruisers, including even "Seidlitz ". But, of course, weak armor protection remained the most serious shortcoming of this ship.

Of interest are plans for the power plant of future ships. In this regard, the 10 MTC January 1911 g recommended that designers implement it in three versions:

1. With steam turbines;

2. Combined, with steam turbines and diesel engines;

3. And finally, pure diesel.

Such a strange “diesel optimism” was also due to the fact that MTK had information, “that the Kolomna Plant is completing the production of such [engine] with a power of 1000 hp. on the cylinder. " The black humor of the situation lies in the fact that today, almost 108 years after the events described, the Kolomna Plant did not master the production of reliable diesel engines for surface combatant ships (which, in fact, was the reason for ordering diesel engines for 2011-2020 in Germany, the company MTU). However, even then hopes for the "diesel engine" of the battle cruisers were associated not only with Kolomna - according to other data, "Blom und Voss" was able to supply engines with 2 500 hp power. on the cylinder. Here, I must say, the wishes of the sailors of Russia coincided with their German counterparts - the same A. Tirpitz believed that equipping German battle cruisers with diesel engines was a matter of the very near future.

Interestingly, although no international competition was announced, the desired performance characteristics of the battle cruiser somehow became generally known. Campaigns offered their projects: the German Blom and Foss and the British Vickers. The Germans offered a ship in 26 420 t with 8 * 305-mm and speed in 30 nodes with power EU 95 000 hp. The British - with a displacement in 29 000 t, 28 knots, with eight 343-356-mm and 203-mm armor .

However, the decision to build armored cruisers has not yet been made: given the fact that the “Baltic Fleet enhanced shipbuilding program for 1911-1915 years” was necessary to be coordinated not only with the Sovereign, but also with the State Duma (the latter was certainly not fast) 1911 g should have been wasted - no more time to lay the ships this year. Accordingly, there was a time to improve the project.

18 June 1911 I.K. Grigorovich approved the revised “Design Assignment of Armored Cruisers for the Baltic Sea”, according to which many characteristics of the ship received a significant refinement: for example, the main caliber of the ship was determined in 9 * 356-mm guns in three towers located in the center plane of the ship. Mine caliber reinforced to 24 130-mm guns that were required to be placed in the casemates. The basis of the protection was 250-254 mm of armor belt not less than 5 m in height, in the extremities (outside the citadel to the stem and stern) thinning to 125-127 mm, while 50 mm of armored partition and bevels of the same thickness were located behind it. The citadel was supposed to lock 250 mm by traversing. Above the main armored belt, which should have been protected by machine rooms, boiler rooms, as well as sub-towers of all three towers of the main caliber, there should have been an upper armored belt, 125 mm thick, reaching the upper deck, while he could go to the bow in the nose, but stern they were not allowed to book from the citadel. The cabin booking was 305 mm, the towers 305 mm, and the forehead of the towers was even 356 mm and the roofs were 127 mm, the thickness of the barbets was set to 275 mm. The latter was considered “in aggregate”, that is, above the upper deck, where there was no any additional protection, the thickness was 275 mm, below, behind the 125 mm upper armor belt - 152 mm, etc. Deck booking was somewhat unusual - the horizontal part of the lower deck (from which the bevels departed to the armored belt) was not armored at all and had only 12,5 mm mm steel flooring, the middle deck had to have 25 mm, the upper deck - not less than 37,5 mm.

The speed requirements were somewhat lowered - it was decided to be content with 26,5 knots, but one should not forget that this is speed at the rated power of the machines, that is, without speeding them up.

And then an international project competition was organized: the “Design task for the design of armored cruisers for the Baltic Sea” ”on August 11 1911 g was sent to six Russian and seventeen foreign shipbuilding enterprises. The response was very lively: many companies showed interest in such a “tasty” order. As a result, such a large number of projects were submitted to the competition that their detailed description would require a whole cycle of articles from us, so we will limit ourselves to the most general information.

In general, shipbuilders tried to honestly meet the requirements, although there were certain deviations from the “Task” in individual projects. The largest project turned out to be the British company “William Bairdmore K” - they said in a covering letter that the ship with the characteristics desired by the Russian Naval Ministry would have a normal displacement in 36 500 t., Which is obviously irrational, since no country builds or even intends to lay ships of similar displacement. The company also indicated that the British battlecruiser with 8 343-mm guns had only a 27 500 t displacement, and that there was no point in creating a ship for one cannon more and on 9 000 t heavier, therefore she limited herself to sending a draft design. And at the same time, she also presented a lightweight version of the cruiser on the 9 * 305-mm displacement in 29 500 t. The smallest (of the realistic) variants was the project of the German Blom and Foss - only 27 311 t., But it was abandoned because this could only be achieved with the use of steam boilers used in the German navy. By the way, “Blom and Foss” also became the leader in the nomination of the most “prolific” company - its experts prepared the 11 variants of the battle cruiser with 9-10 356-mm guns and the displacement up to 34 098 t.

Of course, there were many initiative projects. So, for example, the Baltic Shipyard proposed a purely diesel ship, in this case, according to plant specialists, the displacement of the battle cruiser would be just 24 140 t (I must say, simply enchanting optimism).



But the most "all-powerful" of the projects presented was the creation of mechanical engineer A.F. Bushueva, who managed to displace the ship in 30 000 t shove as much 15 * 356-mm guns - again, due to the use of diesel engines.



When selecting projects, in addition to the usual criteria in such cases (elaboration, accuracy of calculations, realism, etc.), the MTC also took into account seaworthiness, which was measured by the presence and height of the forecastle, as well as the all-time arrangement of artillery in the center plane. It must be said that enough projects with a linearly elevated position of artillery were sent to the competition (although the classic version - two linearly elevated ones in the bow and one - in the stern no one submitted). But they were swept aside right away due to the fact that, according to Russian views, such placement reduces the survivability of the ship. But the same Germans had a very interesting project of a ten-cannon ship with a linearly elevated arrangement of four towers (three-gun in the extremities, two-gun — elevated above them).

According to the results of the competition, project No. 6 of the Admiralty Shipyard with a displacement of 29 350 t was recognized as the best one (however, as it worked out, its displacement fairly quickly reached 30 000 t). This ship met the requirements of the “Task” almost completely, both in terms of armament, and in terms of protection and speed.



Without a doubt, option number 6 for 1911 g should be considered very successful for the battle cruiser. From the point of view of protection, this ship was in an intermediate state between British and German battlecruisers, while the assumed armor on it was quite suitable for protection against German 305-mm guns - the defense was not absolute, but recall that on real combat distances the German shells caliber "through time" even coped with 229 mm armored plates of the British battlecruisers. Immediately they were confronted by 250 mm armor with a 50 mm bulkhead behind it. In addition, the British ships 229 mm armor defended only the boiler rooms and engine rooms (and the third tower), and the side opposite the other towers had only 127-152 mm. The height of the Russian armored belt also exceeded the British. Artillery defense (305-356 mm turret with 275 mm barbet) surpassed even that of Derflinger. (270 and 260 mm, respectively). The horizontal defense of the Russian project was rather weak; well, the British and German battlecruisers didn’t impress the imagination at all; here we can talk about approximate parity.

Thus, although Project No. 6 was not at all invulnerable to 305-mm projectiles, it would still be very difficult to pick it up. High-quality 343-mm projectile projectiles would have coped fairly easily with 250 mm side armor, but the British had them only by the end of the war, and Russian defense was quite good against semi-armor 343-mm projectiles like the ones used in Jutland. At the same time, the armament of the Russian battlecruiser — nine 356-mm cannons surpassed that not only in the Germans, but also in the English “brethren”, and the development of high-quality armor-piercing ammunition in the Russian fleet after Tsushima was given special attention. Even the excellent in any respect, the protection of "Derflinger" could well be punched by them. At the same time, the Russian cruiser was not at all a slug, in terms of speed it would have fully corresponded, if not to the British, then to the German battle cruisers.

Thus, the Maritime Ministry really came close to creating the “not having an analogue in the world” line-cruiser - in terms of combat characteristics it would have outpaced both the British Congo and Derflinger and Tiger, but ... the design of the first ships of this class in Russia was just beginning .

To be continued ...
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  1. Cat
    +7
    6 September 2018 05: 39
    Thank you!
    Beautiful cruiser, albeit with dubious utility. Although his failed 356mm orchestra gave impetus to the development of railway artillery already in the USSR.
    Yours!
    1. +4
      6 September 2018 12: 20
      very good artillery systems were created for the GK, but the industry could not produce them in the right quantity and in a short time even for one mortgaged ship of the Izmail series.
      1. +5
        6 September 2018 17: 24
        Quote: yehat
        very good artillery systems were created for the GK, but the industry could not produce them in the right quantity and in a short time even for one mortgaged ship of the Izmail series.

        The Izmailov had a problem not so much with the guns - thanks to the Vickers - but with the turrets themselves.
        However, the difficult economic and political situation in the country, delays in the supply of materials and equipment did not even allow the completion of the head cruiser. An important role in this was played by placing orders at enterprises in Germany and Austria-Hungary, some of which (for example, ball bearings and 203 mm steel balls under the bases of the rotating parts of gun turrets) were not manufactured in Russia. Thus, the towers for Izmail could only be ready by the end of 1919, and for the rest of the ships next year.

        © L. A. Kuznetsov. - "Why not completed the battle cruisers of the type" Izmail "" // "Gangut", vol. 01.
  2. +3
    6 September 2018 06: 58
    An interesting topic has been touched ... Projects of battle cruisers are generally quite interesting, and RIF in particular, since not one was completed. Well, the Italians came to the concept of a high-speed battleship faster than anyone and even embodied it in metal in the Regina Margherita B. Brina series
    1. +3
      6 September 2018 07: 08
      Quote: Nehist
      Well, the Italians came to the concept of a high-speed battleship faster than anyone and even embodied it in metal in the Regina Margherita B. Brina series

      No.
      They increased speed due to the weakening of reservations. The advantage of one and a half knots on paper does not make the wing of such ships capable of dramatically affecting the situation in the short tactical perspective of the battle. And the Italians are still those warriors at sea lol
      So these ships are just one of the variations of the classic battleship of the early twentieth century hi
      1. +2
        6 September 2018 07: 59
        In fact, the advantage is almost 3 knots! The same Dreadnought and Invisible have only 4 knots difference, and there’s nothing to compare in terms of booking. Here are the British with you, well, how to disagree on their calculations, even 1,5 knots of advantage is decisive
        1. +2
          6 September 2018 14: 46
          The British repeatedly realized this advantage against the Italians during the siege of Malta in ww2. the advantage in the course of 1-1.5 knots decided the outcome of several skirmishes.
        2. 0
          6 September 2018 21: 46
          Nehist writes: Actually, the advantage is almost 3 knots!

          Probably before you meant not the type "Regina Margherita" but the next one - "Regina Elena" (Vittorio Emanuele; Roma; Napoli-22,15uz). Because of this, they don't understand you.
      2. +1
        6 September 2018 13: 07
        Quote: Rurikovich
        The advantage of one and a half knots on paper does not make the wing of such ships capable of dramatically affecting the situation in the short tactical perspective of the battle.


        In tests with natural draft, the speed is 19,3 knots, with a forced 20,2 knots. For that time, quite a decent result. In addition, full-fledged battleships did not try to develop full speed in battles, other squadron ships did not allow this.
      3. 0
        7 September 2018 19: 11
        I agree, but it's hard to deny that their ships were excellent
  3. +1
    6 September 2018 07: 42
    Chic car, the basis of the future Mediterranean squadron.
    And after all brought. Nearly...
    It’s a pity that it’s not until the end. But even the tools from the disassembly - were then very useful
    ATP
  4. 0
    6 September 2018 08: 31
    I haven’t read it yet, but thanks, Andrey, as always, prepared something very tasty hi
  5. +1
    6 September 2018 08: 58
    Thank you, I have not read about most of the described projects before.
    How everything looks great in the drawings.
  6. +1
    6 September 2018 09: 05
    Hooray!!!! Waited !!!! We look forward to continuing!
  7. +3
    6 September 2018 09: 36
    That's interesting.
    I did not immerse myself in the development of projects of domestic battlecruisers, so the read is very interesting.
    Thank you dear Andrew!
  8. +1
    6 September 2018 09: 49
    Could you elaborate on the diesel topic in more detail? Why didn't diesel engines take root on large warships? What troubles were with them on the Deutschlands?
    1. +2
      6 September 2018 13: 16
      First of all, strong vibration. This is a common disease of diesel engines of the classical scheme, it was defeated only in the OPOC scheme, which was recently developed, although the principles were known in the 30s.
      1. 0
        6 September 2018 15: 03
        probably, even a steam turbine, with an increase in overall power (on a ship scale), should be more profitable than a diesel engine in terms of efficiency
        1. +1
          6 September 2018 16: 56
          The boiler-turbine unit outperforms the diesel engine only in power plants - even in cogeneration mode, when heat is used for heating. Boilers and steam lines are cumbersome and vulnerable, requiring a lot of armor. Plus inertia - even with the use of boilers with thin tubes, it is not possible to sharply increase the stroke. Therefore, before the advent of efficient gas turbines, diesel seemed a very attractive option.
          1. 0
            6 September 2018 17: 53
            but how bulky can you make a crankshaft?
            1. 0
              6 September 2018 21: 08
              Quote: prodi
              but how bulky can you make a crankshaft?

              In the sense of "bulky"? I do not quite understand.
              The crankshafts of the reciprocating steam engines used everywhere before the introduction of the turbines were very massive forgings.
              1. 0
                7 September 2018 08: 35
                well, compare:
                The 544 gas diesel engine had 4 cylinders, 4,15 liters in volume and 85 hp. power (return from a liter - 20 l. from.)

                Wärtsilä-Sulzer RTA96-C marine diesel engine, created by the Finnish company Wärtsilä in 2002, for installation on large marine container ships and tankers.
                Configuration - 14 cylinders in a row
                Displacement - 25 480 liters
                Bore 960 mm
                Piston stroke - 2500 mm
                Power - 108 920 l. with. at 102 rpm (return from a liter - 4,3 liters. from.)

                1. 0
                  7 September 2018 08: 54
                  And what does the "bulkiness" of the crankshaft have to do with it?
                  Steam engines were of comparable size.
                  Car engine for 20 hp per liter you need diesel fuel, and this one will eat naval fuel oil even with impurities of any garbage, for example, polyethylene. And he has a longer resource due to less stressful conditions.
                  1. 0
                    7 September 2018 08: 59
                    and due to what, do you think the efficiency decreases?
                    1. 0
                      10 October 2018 15: 31
                      Quote: prodi
                      and due to what, in your opinion, the efficiency decreases

                      You need to smoke the theory of heat engines. If very crude, the efficiency of an internal combustion engine is determined by the difference in internal energy (temperature) of the gases generated during the combustion of the fuel and leaving the cylinder at the end of the operating cycle.

                      But in general, here we are not talking about efficiency, but about specific power. A high-speed diesel per unit of time will complete more work cycles than a low-speed diesel, i.e. converts more fuel into mechanical work. And power is just the work divided by time. Therefore, with an equal volume and mass, a high-speed diesel will be many times more powerful, and the mass of the crankshaft has nothing to do with it. Moreover, they can have the same efficiency, i.e. fraction of the energy of fuel combustion converted into useful work. Reckoning for a higher specific power is a more intense temperature regime (and, as a result, a shorter resource) and exactingness to fuel quality.
                2. 0
                  7 September 2018 18: 32
                  The question, as usual, is that marine diesel runs constantly at closer to maximum power, and car diesel at 20-30%
                  Therefore, the apparent difference in power density. In fact, when a car engine is installed on a ship, its power is easily divided by 3. Otherwise, the resource will end immediately.
                  1. +1
                    7 September 2018 18: 41
                    a marine diesel engine, especially a powerful one, is generally a very "delicate" thing, there is no "apparent" difference in power density - it is real: you cannot unscrew a ship diesel engine - it will fall apart
                    1. 0
                      8 September 2018 18: 21
                      So, if you let the car run for 90% of the power of half a day, it will also fall to hell.
                      It is clear that it is not in vain that not many horses are removed from a liter on marine diesels relative to automobiles, etc.
                      1. 0
                        8 September 2018 21: 00
                        according to the legends, automobile cars are millionaires - it’s very good, even by the standards of the fleet, however, FIG knows how much it is by motor hours ... But at full power, it will not collapse around the clock, but will wear out quickly, and not in half- days, and a month or two, I would give him
        2. +5
          6 September 2018 18: 04
          You are in vain. The diesel engine has one of the highest efficiency among heat engines. Almost the entire merchant fleet on diesel engines runs. Another thing is that at the beginning of the twentieth century, technologists were not sufficiently developed for the manufacture of decent large diesel engines.
          1. 0
            6 September 2018 20: 43
            The Germans themselves before the PMV planned to install diesel engines on their battleships, and units with a capacity of 10000-12000 hp. they were made, but were late for installation on ships. After the WWII, the British forced these cars to be destroyed.
            1. 0
              6 September 2018 21: 11
              EMNIP, there still were provided for combined installations. The Germans loved the three-shaft configuration, the diesel was supposed to be on the central shaft.
              And then, when Hitler refused the terms of Versailles, after the Deutschlands, all projects of heavy ships were purely turbine. They tried (unsuccessfully) to increase the specific power due to the high parameters of the steam.
          2. Alf
            +1
            6 September 2018 21: 49
            Quote: MooH
            The diesel engine has one of the highest efficiency among heat engines. Almost the entire merchant fleet on diesel engines runs.

            Merchants do not need high speed, but profitability for them is the first indicator.
        3. -1
          12 September 2018 00: 22
          Even at the beginning of the 1970s. it was considered that in the power class> 50000 hp the ship's PTU is more economical than the ship's diesel engine. And besides, it is cheaper to operate. hi
    2. Alf
      +1
      6 September 2018 21: 47
      Quote: Narak-zempo
      Why diesels did not take root in large warships?

      Noise. And lower speed compared to turbine ships.
  9. 0
    6 September 2018 16: 02
    As always an interesting article.
  10. 0
    6 September 2018 20: 39
    Regarding tower installations for Izmail, the plants (Metallichesky St. Petersburg) were overloaded with production, in addition to orders from the Marine Department for ships, there were also orders for coastal batteries and orders from the military department for coastal batteries (read Amirkhanov’s books). As a result, there was almost nothing to do.
    Thanks a lot for the article. I look forward to continuing.
  11. +1
    6 September 2018 21: 14
    It was necessary to follow the path of the armoring of the battleships, to develop Peresvet. If they had a 20-21 node, new opportunities would immediately open up. Could calmly walk with the retinue of other cruisers to Elliott, depriving the base of all income.
    1. 0
      7 September 2018 10: 44
      Quote: Denimax
      It was necessary to follow the path of the armoring of the battleships, to develop Peresvet. If they had a 20-21 node, new opportunities would immediately open up.

      If we develop the "Peresveta", then the hypothetical high-speed EBR will be late on the RYAV. Even if you build it right after the head "overshoot" at the Baltic plant. Because with our system of constant changes to the project, sluggish approvals of these changes and alterations of the ship under construction "live", the new ship will be handed over, at best, together with the "Borodino".
      And Vickers would hardly have started building Rurik-II for us before RYAV.
      The only option is to abandon Peresvetov altogether and build a "15-ton tower cruiser of the Baltic Shipyard".
      When discussing the project, the Baltic Shipyard proposed making the new cruiser a tower. The preliminary design of such a cruiser with a displacement of 15 tons, developed by the plant, was approved by the tsar in December 000 and, obviously, was based on the experience of creating the battleship cruiser "Peresvet". The plant energetically developed the design of this battleship, and in May 1895 proposed to the Committee an improved version with a 1896-knot speed. The new cruiser could be a lightweight option in the group of tower ships being developed by the plant, which promised both the acceleration of the construction and the similarity of their tactical properties when combined with armadillos. And such a task became common: the Russian fleet began to be replenished intensively with armadillos, and the requirements for their seaworthiness were constantly increasing. So it was with armadillos for the Black Sea and the Baltic. The center of gravity of the policy moved to the East, the squadron of the Pacific Ocean steadily replenished; tactics increasingly insisted on the requirements for cruisers to be able to fight in the same ranks with armadillos, and the seemingly tower cruiser, equally suitable for cruising operations and for fighting in a squadron formation, met these requirements to the greatest extent.
      But that was not done.

      © R.M. Melnikov "Rurik" was the first.
      1. 0
        7 September 2018 13: 26
        And Vickers would hardly have started building Rurik-II for us before RYAV.

        What is so good about seeing in Rurik2? The English ship for Russia is one and a half times more (16kt, 21uz) than the Italian Italian similar in parameters (Pisa - 10kt, 23Uz.)
        1. 0
          13 September 2018 13: 41
          A ship of a smaller size could not be better with all the supposedly the same.
      2. +2
        9 September 2018 10: 37
        Quote: Alexey RA
        If we develop the "Peresveta", then the hypothetical high-speed EBR will be late for the RYA.

        Why not? In theory, we could build two such ships instead of "Victory" and "Thunderbolt"
        1. +1
          9 September 2018 13: 32
          So "Victory" is the improved "Peresvet". And "Thunderbolt" is a large and unfortunately unnecessary armored cruiser.
          1. +1
            9 September 2018 13: 36
            Right. It was instead of them that it was possible to build something more perfect - for example, a pair of high-speed EDBs based on overexposure with 305-mm guns
            1. 0
              9 September 2018 13: 43
              With such military strategists and embezzlers who were in the Russian Empire, it is unlikely.
              1. 0
                9 September 2018 13: 51
                Despite the tragedy and financial costs, a war could become an invaluable experience and a way for the development of the fleet, but the conclusions were made by England, Germany and the USA, and Russia as a strong maritime power ceased to exist, well, maybe this is not so offensive as what happened to France who did not have Tsushima.
              2. +1
                9 September 2018 15: 51
                Well, why? In cost, in principle, it was comparable
  12. +2
    6 September 2018 21: 35
    Wow! Waited !!!
    I fight in ecstasy for about 5 minutes, then I'll start reading.
  13. 0
    7 September 2018 10: 53
    plus to the author, I hope not limited to only one continuation ... hi
  14. +1
    8 September 2018 10: 15
    Thanks Andrew for the article about Ishmael! I already like the project with three towers and enhanced armor, if they started to build it earlier and faster, maybe they could have made it to the war. I would like to see the German project for us, maybe it was better than the Mackensen project?
  15. 0
    10 September 2018 12: 15
    prodi,
    Quote: prodi
    according to the legends, automobile cars are millionaires - it’s very good, even by the standards of the fleet, however, FIG knows how much it is by motor hours ... But at full power, it will not collapse around the clock, but will wear out quickly, and not in half- days, and a month or two, I would give him


    You greatly underestimate the resource of diesel engines.
    Industrial diesel engines such as CUMMINS QSX have a motor resource of 30000-35000 hours before the first overhaul.
    For example, when a stationary generator failed, they were forced to connect a TWM-180 TRYBERG self-propelled welding unit with a Cummins 6BTA-5.9-C180 engine in generator mode (50-90% of rated power - 130 kW), provided the shift camp with electricity for half a year, almost without turning off (only for two maintenance services - oil change and filters).
    In general, this Cummins 6BTA-5.9-C180 engine is deformed to 180 hp. from automobile.
    In the automotive version, it has a large degree of boost and other fuel equipment, providing power of 330-350 hp.

    As a souvenir - these engines work for a year from 3500 to 5500 hours in the mode of welding current generation - that is, 12-16 hours a day, an automatic voltage regulator, adds fuel supply under load, provides stepless energy supply, depending on the load of consumers - one two , three, or four welding stations work simultaneously.
    Of course, a self-propelled welding unit with a specialized Stamford generator, sharpened for welding, put on the generation of a shift camp, it's like hammering nails with a microscope :), but if necessary, it helped a lot.

    The same variants of diesel engines and the Cummins NT855 B BT BTA QSX series have modifications for water transport and have a resource of 30000 minimum hours.

    Marine modification is marked 6BTA5.9-GM100 Dcec Cummins marine diesel engine or marine generator set.
  16. -1
    11 September 2018 23: 14
    The anti-mine caliber, like the English, was represented by 16 * 102-mm guns.

    Such a caliber in the Russian Imperial Navy It was never. 120 mm (more precisely - 119,4 mm). hi
    1. +3
      12 September 2018 14: 43
      Quote: Sergey Goncharov
      There has never been such a caliber in the Russian Imperial Navy

      Well, what then, in your opinion, were the Novik-class destroyers armed with? :))) Was it 102-mm / 60 by chance?
      1. -1
        15 September 2018 01: 23
        Just being in a somewhat cheerful mood I missed request before the word "caliber" the word "mine". hi
        P.S... EMNIS, Noviks armed themselves 4 "/ 62 klb.
  17. 0
    13 September 2018 13: 40
    prodi,
    Millions by mileage. But just at what power? Maximum power is the end of the tachometer. How much will the car engine stretch at these speeds?

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