Russian OGRF in Transnistria "on the fly" at HIMARS
At the moment, the attention of almost all analytical and news portals, blogs and TV channels sharpened at the final stage of the preparation of the Syrian Arab Army, the Russian Aerospace Forces, Hezbollah units, units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and even a XNUMX contingent of Kurdish YPG units for an offensive operation against the thousands-strong conglomerate of Islamist groups ("Khr -Sham "," Jaysh al-Ahrar "of the" Islamic Movement of East Turkestan ", etc.), for several years controlling the vast territory of the" Idlib gadyushnik "at the suggestion of the Turkish leadership. Even before the start of a large-scale assault, with a high degree of probability, it can be argued that the "blitzkrieg" that was observed during the liberation of the "southern de-escalation triangle" from the FSA, al-Nusra and ISIS (all these terrorist groups are prohibited in the Russian Federation) is here not expected.
Indeed, against the background of the fall of the national currency, as well as new duties on the import of aluminum and steel, Ankara is hardly ready to lose the friendly “Idlib gadyushnik”, which, first, over the past two years, managed to partially integrate into the Turkish economy (already more than 2 years, the energy sources were supplied to this Syrian province), secondly, for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey, it became a kind of testing ground for various weapons without positioning itself as a party to the conflict and as a military-political tool to influence rec-Syrian and Turkish-Russian relations. And therefore for a long time to exaggerate this topic makes no sense.
A much more burning issue today is the security of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in the Transnistrian region (RLP PRRM), represented by the 82-m and 113-m individual guards motorized rifle battalions, as well as the 540-m control battalion, assigned to military units №XNXX No. 13962 and No. 22137, respectively. Since 09353 May 21, a one-and-a-half-thousandth (2015 military personnel or more) OGRF performing peacekeeping tasks in the Dniester area, as well as guarding artillery arsenals near the settlement. Sausage, faced with significant difficulties in the implementation of the rotation of personnel, organized at the legislative level with the filing of the Parliament of Moldova. On this day, during the verification of documents by the Moldovan border police officers, reserve sergeant Evgeny Shashin was detained and deported to Russia, who arrived at Chisinau airport for further dispatch to the post of service - military unit No.1412 in the post of 13962 motorized rifle battalion. Thus, Chisinau grossly violated all existing agreements on the presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.
Later, on July 28, 2017, there was an incident with an order from the Romanian air traffic controllers to ban the use of the country's airspace by S7 Airlines flight, on board of which was Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin with a delegation traveling to Transnistria. In Bucharest, such a decision by the country's leadership was explained by the fact that Rogozin is a “sanctioned person”. Naturally, a similar ban on the use of Romanian airspace also applies to military transport aviation Russian Aerospace Forces, as well as other aircraft carrying out the transfer of personnel and military cargo in any direction. Thus, the Russian contingent in Transnistria was in almost complete blockade, without the possibility of rotation according to the standard and previously developed scheme, as well as without a single chance to replenish the arsenals of two motorized rifle regiments with new rifle and anti-tank weapons, as well as new military air defense systems and electronic communications equipment, which OGRV against the background of modernization of the Romanian, Moldavian and Ukrainian armies is in dire need for a long period of time.
If we assess the situation from the point of view of a simple and ordinary person or a couch columnist of news feeds and Internet resources, then it can be argued that the OGRF (together with the armed forces of the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika) will easily maintain combat stability and at the expense of the available military equipment, as well as presented by shells for cannon and rocket artillery with a total mass of more than 20 thous. tons located near the settlement of Kolbasna, while the logistical support of the 82 and 113 SMEs can t maintained at the required level, thanks to the power available in most of the unrecognized republic. This conclusion can be argued that the OGRF has the possibility of holding regular military exercises together with the Transdniestrian Army. But if everything was so simple, then there would be no need for the existence of military-analytical resources. The complexity and explosiveness of the situation lies in the fact that the tension around the Operative Group of Russian Forces in the Transnistrian region that is artificially injected by Washington’s supply does not end with the usual “diplomatic butting” of Chisinau and Bucharest with Moscow.
The West is carefully and methodically preparing an escalation of the Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict, the result of which, in the vision of the European command of the US Armed Forces, should be a military defeat of a small OGRF and its “shameful withdrawal” from the territory of Transdniestria. At the same time, in order to heighten the effect, the beginning of the escalation scenario in Transnistria is brought under a new round of hostilities in the Donbass theater of operations, which, in theory, can put our leaders and the General Staff before a serious choice, because the “units” of the Southern Military District (“not only”) case will have to immediately two nehily front.
Firstly, it is a tiny Transnistrian theater, which is on the west of the operational areas are closely 6-thousandth of the Moldovan army available to 37 100-mm towed anti-tank guns 2A29 «Rapier», 52 152-mm towed gun / gun-howitzer "Hyacinth AB "And D-20 and 11 MLRS" Uragan ", and from the eastern operational direction - much more numerous Ukrainian military formations, including artillery units capable of opposing the Transdniestrian Forces and the Russian contingent in the" boiler " The number of barrel and rocket artillery units, as well as 1 or 2, are full-fledged mechanized brigades. Having opened artillery fire from two operational directions at once, NE Moldavia and Ukraine can inflict irreparable damage on both the PMR army and the Russian motorized rifle regiments, because the main artillery "fist" of Transnistria is around 80 MLRS "Grad", whose range is limited to 20,4 km due to availability of only obsolete unguided rockets of the 9М22 / У / У1 family. At the same time, the Moldovan and Ukrainian Hyacinths-B and Hurricanes are able to work for the distance 30500 and 35800 meters, respectively. Some may note that when using standard unmanaged OFS, these systems have extremely dubious accuracy and, consequently, efficiency, but it is necessary to remember the Romanian Armed Forces, which in the case of large-scale conflict are unlikely to sit still without supporting the Moldovan side. And food for thought here is very serious.
In recent years, the conclusion and implementation of multibillion-dollar defense contracts between the Government of Romania and the Pentagon through foreign military sales (FMS) has been promoted. At the same time, as practice shows, in transactions with Bucharest (unlike other European and Asian states) there are absolutely no “pitfalls”, delays, and even more refusals to be delivered by the US defense department: all stages of the implementation of contracts are in clear the graphics. This is not surprising, since Romania is viewed by Washington as a strategically important springboard for parrying the broadest operational and strategic capabilities of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces, achieved thanks to the deployment of a powerful mixed military grouping in the Republic of Crimea.
At the same time, the greatest fears of the US Air Force and Navy commands, as well as the NATO air forces are caused not so much by subsonic and low-maneuverable strategic cruise missiles of the 3M14K / T family, which are part of the ammunition of frigates of Project 11356 ("Admiral Series"), low-noise diesel-electric submarines, etc. 636.3 “Varshavyanka”, how many coastal missile and rocket-artillery brigades of the 22nd Black Sea Army Corps fleetwhich are armed with more than 11-15 mobile launchers of the coastal anti-ship missile system K-300P "Bastion-P", equipped with 22-30 supersonic highly maneuverable anti-ship missiles 3M55 (if we take into account only the 11th brigade). Also, we can talk about dozens of 2,5-flight “direct-flow” anti-ship missiles of the X-31AD type, which can be placed on the suspensions of multi-generation fighters of the “4 ++” Su-30SM generation, which are part of the 43rd separate Black Sea Fleet aviation assault regiment , as well as fighter-bomber Su-34. And there are also long-range 4,5-missile multi-purpose air-to-surface missiles X-32 and hypersonic Kh-47M2 “Dagger” (the former are carriers of the Tu-22M3, the latter are the MiG-31K and Tu-22M3), which finally puts the United States in a difficult position, because in the range of these missiles is the most important element of the US global missile defense system in Southeast Europe - the Aegis Ashore anti-ballistic missile interception system, located near the Romanian commune Devesela and the eponymous air base.
The Aegis Ashore complex, controlled by one of the latest modifications of the combat information control systems Aegis, BMD 4.0.1, is equipped with 24 interceptor missiles RIM-161B / C, housed in transport-launch glasses of the Mk 21 mod 2. The whole hitch lies in the fact that the Mk 142 combat stage of these interceptor missiles can operate effectively only in the most rarefied layers of the mesosphere and thermosphere, for which it was equipped with 10-nozzle solid-fuel “belt” of transverse control DACS engines, the thrust moment of which is directed perpendicular to the longitudinal axis Mk 142. At the same time, the hypersonic flight speed in 12600 km / h does not allow the Mk 142 to operate effectively in the stratosphere due to the strong aerodynamic heating of the optical transparent radome of the infrared homing head; and the irregular cylindrical shape of the Mk 142 (without aerodynamic control surfaces and wings) is more like the modules of orbital stations and spacecraft, and therefore atmospheric interception is out of the question. SM-3 Block IA / IB anti-missiles will not be able to withstand the broadest range of multi-purpose cruise and aeroballistic missiles used by the Russian Navy and the Russian space forces from the Black Sea operational direction.
It is for this reason that the issue of supplying the Romanian side of the 7 modern mid-range / long-range anti-aircraft missile systems Patriot PAC-2 / 3 is not so much important to Bucharest as to Washington, which is trying to create an effective endoatmospheric anti-missile umbrella to cover the complex as soon as possible. Aegis Ashor in Deveselu. The first data on the planned transaction appeared on 12 on July 2017, when the US Department of Defense Agency for Military Cooperation (DSCA) sent a notice to the US Congress about the forthcoming delivery of these types of 7 to Romania. In the figure contract: 7 multifunction radar AN / MPQ-65 c slightly enlarged elevation angle of the scanning beam, 7 points AN / MSQ-132 combat control, 7 generators type EPP III, 28 inclined M903 launchers, 56 SAMs long range MIM- 104E GEM-T (modified MIM-104C, adapted to intercept ballistic targets), 168 MIM-104F MSE missiles, capable of destroying maneuvering ballistic and cruise missiles using the direct hit method, and 13 hoist-mast devices. As you can see, the anti-missile "cap" is planned to be quite serious.
For example, the AN / MPQ-7 65 multifunctional radar, linked to a network-centric air defense system via the Link-16 radio channel, can accompany enemy air targets on the 875 aisle (radar objects tracked on 125). At the same time, the number of targets that are simultaneously intercepted by the Patriot anti-aircraft missiles “Patriot” achieves 7 targets even with the use of regular MIM-56C / E missiles with semi-active radar GOS. And we also have 104 new PAC-168 MSE interceptors with active radar seeker and the possibility of obtaining individual targeting from AWACS XRUMN aircraft through Link-3 terminals integrated into the information field of AN / MSQ-16 battery command posts. As a consequence, a canal can reach dozens of simultaneously fired targets, because the computational tools of the MPQ-132 radar can then be released from the flow of old targets and be included in the process of detecting, tracking and firing new objects.
There is another unpleasant fact, which, of course, can be extremely painfully perceived by the hurray-patriotic part of the readers. The MIM-104F MSE interceptor missiles, in contrast to the SM-6 (RIM-174 ERAM) and RIM-162A / B ESSM reviewed in our previous reviews, are much more valuable anti-missiles for the destruction of super-maneuverable means of air attack. For example, if the ESSM has only a gas jet system for deflecting the thrust vector (it works only when the solid propellant charge of the engine burns out) with a sufficiently “viscous” change in the direction of flight after turning the OBT nozzles, then in PAC-3 MSE (ERINT) for “extreme maneuvering” 10 “gasdynamic belts” correspond to 18 pulsed micro rocket solid fuel engines in each (180 engines) located in front of the center of mass of the rocket. This design of the auxiliary control system allows the PAC-3MSE to literally “jump” in lightning speed in the airspace with overloads of more than 60 units. (similar to the serial French “Aster-30” and our, not brought to a large series, 9М96ДМ). Conclusion: Neither the Caliber, nor the X-32, nor the anti-radar X-31P and X-XNUMHUSHK can easily crack the umbrella formed by the Patriot PAC-58 5 — 7. In this case, all hope remains only on the 3-flywheel "Daggers", since the computing base of the new "Patriot" radar AN / MPQ-10 has a speed limit at the mark 65 m / s (2200М).
Now let us return to the consideration of another ambitious and very serious Romanian-American contract concerning the sale of the Romanian Armed Forces of mobile high-precision multi-functional jet systems HIMARS ("High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System") for a total estimated amount of about 1,25 billion dollars (recall that the Patriot deal is valued at 3,9 billion dollars). Here we are talking about the delivery of the 8 of the mixed artillery brigade to Alexander Ioan Kuza, and possibly other artillery units, 54 modular highly mobile M142 HIMARS launchers, designed for various types of rocket and rocket-artillery "equipment." As the "equipment" in the transaction are listed: 81 tactical guided missile GMLRS (M31A1) c a range of about 70 km, 81 tactical unitary shell with an alternative warhead M30A1, and 54 tactical MGM-140B / M57 ballistic missiles (ATACMS Block IA) with a range of 300 km, equipped with M74 warheads with 300 submunitions. Arsenal is quite serious. But what threats can it create by the Russian Armed Forces at the operational-strategic level?
Start OTBR family ATACMS
If HIMARSs with OTBR ATACMS Block IA are transferred to the Romanian port city of Sulina on the Black Sea coast, then the entire range of the West Coast of Crimea (possibly including Sevastopol) will be within range. Meanwhile, these missiles are equipped with standard aerodynamic rudders and do not have the ability to intensively maneuver on the cruising and descending sections of the trajectory, with an altitude of 60 — 35 km (for 9М723-1 “Iskander-M” missiles, there are tail blocks of paired gas-dynamic rudders). As a result, even in the course of a major conflict involving NATO’s joint armed forces (including Romania) and Ukraine, Russian C-300PM1, C-300В4 and C-400 Triumph, covering the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, will easily intercept all ATNS Romanian tactical missiles ATAC .
The potential use of the M30A1 guided missiles against the OGRF in the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika where the Rumania takes the side of Chisinau during the escalation of a major conflict causes great fears, because our motorized rifle regiments near the Dniester river have neither the latest Pantsyres nor the Thors -M2U "capable of destroying these shells on approach. The Ukrainian side has long taken all possible measures to exclude the possibility of delivering any equipment or equipment to our servicemen in the area through military transport aviation: in the vicinity of Odessa and the Dniester estuary, the C-300PS anti-aircraft missile systems were deployed, as well as military "Buk-M1" in the number of several more divisions. The introduction of the illegitimate Ukrainian elite into the acute question of the “Transnistrian settlement” finally indicates that the West is not going to calm down without drawing Moscow into a “big war”. And this means that very soon our leadership will be faced with yet another inevitable choice, which will again emphasize the degree of our military-political will and maturity.
Information sources:
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=21540
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/atacms/atacms.shtml
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/index-240.html
Information