"Fantomas" of the KGB and the CIA
In the image of a spy that has developed in the mass consciousness, camouflage is one of the most important places. The most common stereotype tells us that a scout should wear an unremarkable coat and an equally average hat. However, fashion is changing and intelligence is forced to follow it. This does not in any way contradict another widely held opinion among the “uninitiated” —the scouts use makeup. Due to the mass of books and films, this version among the general public has not been questioned for a long time. In turn, the security services do not share it. According to the former head of the press service of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia B. Labusov, all this does not make sense. A scout must work under the guise and disappearance of one person (diplomat or businessman - agents are often masked as them) in one place and the sudden appearance of another person in another place will surely cause questions to the counterintelligence of the enemy. On the other hand, counterintelligence, tracking the enemy spy, masking or makeup in some circumstances will be useful, for example, in situations where the "ward" begins to guess about the presence of surveillance.Anyway, domestic special services used little disguise and change of appearance. At least in those transactions about which there is open information. For the entire State Security Committee there were only a few people involved in this area. All of them were part of the 7-th control. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformations that followed it, specialists on appearance changes became employees of the FSB operational search department. According to various estimates, the total number of makeup specialists in the FSB fluctuates around three to four dozen. Such a small number of employees can be explained by the same dislike of domestic special services for makeup and their habits costing more simple means.
These simpler means most often were cars or clothes. The fact is that by no means in all cases can an adversary 'out-of-the-box' fully recognize the person she is following. Therefore, agents of the same height, build and with similar, for example, hairstyles can cause a lot of problems to counterintelligence agents. The main thing is to exchange “means of masking” so that no one will notice. In addition, several times domestic intelligence officers used mannequins to distract surveillance. Almost always it was an “operation” in the style of Sherlock Holmes, when the dummy was installed so that it could be seen from the window outside. External observation recorded the presence of "scout" in a certain place, and he was in the other and did everything that he needed. A similar technique was used with cars: a car with a dummy of an embassy employee went one way and took the surveillance, and the employee himself went where he needed to. Specifically, this counterintelligence countering technique was used by many countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States. However, this method is not a panacea. If counterintelligence agents guess that they are being led by the nose, they can simply increase the number of followers. Of course, it takes power, but it increases the reliability of the "ward."
Despite some hostility towards them, the secret services still used make-up and other methods of changing faces. It is worth making a small comment about the reasons for this dislike. The same theatrical makeup is unsuitable for the agency for the reason that at short distances the make-up person looks rather ridiculous and, as a result, attracts attention. Thus, if shadowing is carried out on the makeup, the entire “cover” can be spoiled by the specific reaction of ordinary passersby. Another more promising, but still not universal way to change facial features is the use of masks. According to intelligence officer J. Baranovsky, back in the beginning of the 70s, a technology for producing latex masks that had a good resemblance to a real human face was created in one of the domestic research institutes. This "method of Fantomas" also gave no guarantees, however, it allowed to significantly change the facial features. According to a number of sources, over time, it was possible to start the production of such masks that did not betray a person a couple of meters away. However, early versions of latex camouflage could be used with sufficient effect. To do this, it was necessary to impair visibility - to be behind a dirty window glass or to sit in a car with the windows closed. In most cases, this was enough so that surveillance could not understand who it was in front of her.
An interesting fact is that the attitude to the makeup of the special services of different countries is slightly different. Soviet, and then Russian intelligence officers do not like this way of changing their appearance. Americans, in turn, also do not consider it a panacea, but if appropriate, they are not neglected. In the CIA, as in the KGB and the FSB, there is a special department dealing with such matters. His historyas far as is known, makeup in the CIA has been leading since the mid-sixties. Then a certain Tony Mendez was hired to work in the Office. In 65, he was an unknown artist, and in the future he was destined to become a living legend of American intelligence. After passing all the necessary checks, Mendez got into the department that was involved in the preparation of documents, money, etc. His duties included the manufacture of fake papers and certificates, which were intended for agents thrown through the Iron Curtain. Along the way, with the falsification of documents, Mendez, who had figured out in the dressing-up business, was gradually pushing another idea of disguise. Until a certain time, management looked at its proposals exclusively as a regular project. Nevertheless, Mendez continued to insist on his own and eventually offered to conduct an experiment. In its course in just a couple of hours, the artist made two Caucasians from Asian and African. The manual, to put it mildly, was surprised. It was even more surprised when these two “Caucasians” quietly left the territory of the CIA department, where they were made up, and then they got there again. The appearance and documents of the two "experimental" did not raise any questions for the guard.
After a successful experiment, Mendez received a promotion and a lot of work. Since the end of 60 and the beginning of 70 cannot be considered a quiet time in political and intelligence aspects, Mendes had to work very hard. The bulk of the tasks for his department, which received the nickname "Magic Kingdom", concerned the provision of import and export agents from the USSR. Mendes taught his skills to several of his employees and they occasionally traveled to different countries and worked on make-up there. At the start of 1974, the Magic Kingdom received a particularly important and major mission. From Moscow it was necessary to take out several people at once. Using their own make-up and documents of their manufacture, several make-up artists arrived in the capital of the Soviet Union. Among the experts in disguise was T. Mendez. The removal of the embassy staff, agents and make-up artists ended up without any problems, but Mendez himself was very nervous. Colleagues from the CIA told him that his name, special signs and information about the nature of the activities first fell into the hands of counterintelligence of North Vietnam, and from there went to the KGB and, as a result, to all Soviet embassies around the world. Fortunately for Mendez, everything worked out and he quietly went home to the States.
Much more popular in the field of appearance changes are simple dressings. It is simple and quite effective. At least, passers-by, upon seeing a disguised intelligence officer, react calmly and do not give him away, as is the case with theatrical makeup. Most often, dressing up was used to distract surveillance on a third person: the scout and the assistant changed clothes, as a result of which the "outdoor" was far from being followed by whom she was from the very beginning. But this requires finding a suitable place for exchange and there is not always such an opportunity. Another way of dressing up is that the “ward” of external surveillance goes somewhere and does not go out. Or rather, it goes, but in different clothes. In some circumstances, this technique works quite successfully. However, it is not a universal remedy for all occasions. For example, dressing did not help the American agent Martha Peterson. Arriving at one of the Moscow movie theaters by car, she went into the hall and pretended for some time that she was watching a movie. As if helping the employees of the Soviet counterintelligence, she was dressed in a noticeable white dress with large flowers. Minutes through 10-15 after the start of the session, Peterson quickly put on a jacket and pants over the dress, just as quickly changed her hairstyle and left the room, if you can say so, a completely different person. Riding on a bus, subway and trolleybus, an employee of the CIA went to the place where she had to make a “bookmark” for an agent known under the codename Trigon. True, Peterson did not succeed in leaving the place of the “bookmark”. State Security officers on time saw through the trick of an American and calmly led her to the very place of the assignment. It should be noted that in the retelling of Yu. Semenov (“TASS is authorized to declare ...”) this story looks less exciting and interesting.
Yet various methods of disguise are the exception rather than the rule. Changing clothes can not change the shape or plastic of a person; makeup requires lengthy preparation, as well as appropriate weather and other conditions, and so on. The really popular and most common method of changing the “personality parameters” in intelligence and counterintelligence is the preparation of documents for the agent. Properly made service certificate or passport of another country can not only ensure the execution of the task, but also reduce the likelihood of failure. At the same time, in some circumstances it is necessary to resort to other means besides documents. The development of various technologies in the very near future may make it possible to increase the effectiveness of make-up or special masks. But, unfortunately, the general public will know about it in thirty years, not earlier.
On the materials of the sites:
http://www.agentura.ru/
http://www.argumenti.ru/
https://www.cia.gov/
http://www.cicentre.com/
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