Well, fortunately, this document is not secret and is open for downloading and reading for everyone. Surprisingly, but the fact is: nothing of what has been stated in it inspires reflection on the future priority of the “mosquitoes”: moreover, the “Strategy” directly hints at the desire to build ships of the ocean fleet. Let's see what exactly the “Strategy” says about the prospects for the development of the Russian Navy. Quote #1:
“At present, in the interests of defense and security of the state, Russian enterprises are building:
- nuclear and non-nuclear submarines;
- multipurpose ships (corvettes and frigates);
- patrol and border ships;
- amphibious ships;
- rocket ships;
- Mine defense ships (minesweepers);
- various special vessels, vehicles and support vessels.
When updating the Russian submarine fleet, emphasis is placed on the construction of multipurpose and strategic nuclear submarines. In the surface shipbuilding priority is given to the creation of ships of the "mosquito fleet" (ships of small displacement, intended for conducting combat operations in coastal areas). "
- nuclear and non-nuclear submarines;
- multipurpose ships (corvettes and frigates);
- patrol and border ships;
- amphibious ships;
- rocket ships;
- Mine defense ships (minesweepers);
- various special vessels, vehicles and support vessels.
When updating the Russian submarine fleet, emphasis is placed on the construction of multipurpose and strategic nuclear submarines. In the surface shipbuilding priority is given to the creation of ships of the "mosquito fleet" (ships of small displacement, intended for conducting combat operations in coastal areas). "
That is, the “Strategy” says directly that the priority is given to the “mosquito” fleet now, today, and all those who are interested in the state of the modern Russian Navy know the reasons why this happened. However, the current description of the situation does not mean that we will continue the course on the "mosquito" fleet in the future. On the contrary, “Strategy” says:
“Construction of serial surface ships (NK) and submarines (submarines) under current projects will be completed by 2022 - 2025 years. In the same period, the creation of head surface ships (including distant sea and ocean zones of operation) and submarines of new projects will begin. ”
What does this mean? To date, we have in different stages of construction and delivery of ships to the fleet (not counting MRKs, boats, and other PDRCs and floating craft "from 80 tons of displacement", which our Defense Ministry so likes to include in reporting on the replenishment of the Russian Navy):
SSBN of the Borey A project 995 - 5 units;
MAPL project 885 "Ash-M" - 6 units;
The diesel submarines of the 636.3 "Varshavyanka" project - 2 units. (and 4 is also contracted, and with a high degree of probability these EPDs will indeed be built);
ДЭПЛ project 677 "Lada" - 2 units;
frigates of the project 22350 "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov" - 4 units;
20380 / 20385 / 20386 project corvettes - 5 / 2 / 1, and 8 units in total;
BDK project 114711 "Peter Morgunov" - 1 units.
In principle, all of them (or at least most of them) can actually be transferred to the fleet before 2025 g, and, apparently, in the future, the Ministry of the Judiciary is already preparing to build ships of the ocean fleet. What kind?
"To a large extent, these ships will be the result of the evolutionary development of the NK and the submarines of the current generation, which will ensure the continuity of tooling at the construction plants and reduce costs in the full life cycle."
It is not clear, however, whether this item is the wish of the Ministry of Industry, or a fait accompli. But in general, it can be assumed that both the prospective corvette (if it will be at all), the frigate (22350M), and the diesel-electric submarine submarine (something based on the Lada) will not be something completely different from .
Further, “Strategy” reports the presence of three scenarios for the development of the shipbuilding industry: which one of them “works” depends on the general state of the country's economy.
The first and the most deplorable option for us is conservative, it assumes the cost of a barrel of oil at the level of 40 dollars, GDP growth in the period of 2018-2035. - on average, 1,2% per year, and the dollar rate in 2035 g - 94,2 rubles. In this case, a complete failure is assumed ... no, not all large ships, but only part of them - the construction of promising destroyers and an aircraft carrier (more precisely, the naval aircraft-carrying complex, or IAC) is postponed, until 2035 will not proceed to it. But, strictly speaking, even in this case, it is probably impossible to talk about the priority of the “mosquito” fleet in the surface forces, since we will continue to build SSBNs, MAPLs and surface ships on a frigate inclusive. And if you call a spade a spade, then, perhaps, a destroyer, since preliminary estimations of the 22350M frigate brought its displacement to 8 000 t., That is, it is a destroyer. True, the timing of the laying of part of these ships can be shifted in 2025 g, and until that time we will limit ourselves to the completion of only those ships that had already been laid - and, perhaps, with quite a few new ones.
The second scenario is called very innovative today by the word "innovative." The situation in the economy is supposed to be much better than the conservative - oil on 60 dollars per barrel, average GDP growth 2% per year, dollar rate in 2035 g - 85,4 rubles. Everything is much better here - already in the 2018-2022 period. One should expect the intensification of research and development on ocean-going ships and:
"The beginning of the procurement of head and serial promising samples of TDC (including large NK far sea and ocean coverage) after 2020."
The third scenario is called target (or forced) - oil at 75 dollars / barrel, average annual GDP growth 3,4%, dollar rate in 2035 g - 77,2 rubles. In these circumstances, the laying of the ocean ships, as well as in the previous scenario, should start after 2020, but, obviously, the construction will be somewhat more large-scale.
Not quite clear, but, most likely, in the target, that is, the most favorable scenario, in the period of 2018-2035. (2018-2030 is indicated in the text of the document, but most likely it is a typo), our shipbuilding industry should build for the Russian Navy and for export the 533 ship, vessel and floating craft with a displacement of more than 80 tons. Where there are Americans with their 300-ship fleet ... Seduce, of course, is not worth it: it should be understood that in the period 2014-2017. inclusive according to the National Institute of Higher School of Economics Research (yes, the very same) of such ships and watercrafts, we built 336 units. It would be interesting, of course, to see what kind of watercraft such are, because the author of this article has long had a persistent feeling that not only lifebuoys are taken into account in this statistics, but perhaps even galley tanks ...
But, be that as it may, it should be admitted that the “Strategy” has turned out to be very encouraging - today the cost of a barrel of oil is 72,57 dollars, and there are no special prerequisites for its sharp fall in the near future. Therefore, in accordance with the document, in the period 2020-2022. we should expect the laying of the first ocean surface ships and say that the country finally refused to build ocean power, limiting itself to small rocket ships, it is impossible. Of course, we all remember very well where the road paved with good intentions leads, but still such plans by the Ministry of the Judiciary in respect of military shipbuilding look quite positive and can not but rejoice. However, the “Strategy” is not limited to the military fleet alone, and it considers the prospects of civil shipbuilding in the Russian Federation. And there…
To be honest, the author of this article is very surprised at the frankness with which the “Strategy” reveals the situation with our civilian fleet. Just a few numbers.
Over the past 30, international trade volumes have increased by 5 times, with 85% of its volume being transported by sea. The value of sea and river transport of the Russian Federation continues to grow, the Strategy states:
“The dynamics of the turnover of Russian ports in recent years shows steady growth. Cargo turnover of Russian seaports in 2016 amounted to 721,9 mln tons. It is predicted that it will reach 2020 mln tons by 884, 2025 mln tons by 995, xNUMX mln tons by 2030 ».
This, of course, is wonderful, but ... In order to ensure this cargo turnover, we need to build 2035 1 cargo ships with 470 million tonnes DWT before 22,9, while 1 069 ships must replace similar ships, which due to old age will be Scrapped, and the 401 ship should be put into operation beyond what we have today. But do not forget to provide the fleet - before 2035 g, 1 600 of such ships should be commissioned, of which 1 088 units. 512 units will be used to replace those leaving the line. - on the increase relative to the current amount. And this number does not include vessels for servicing offshore fields, which, according to the Ministry of Food Industry, we will need to build more 2035 units before 140. In addition, to keep the passenger traffic at the current level and to meet the growing needs of the northern delivery, it is necessary to build an 42 marine passenger vessel.
Fishing fleet? Today, its number exceeds 2 000 ships, and most of them are operated with a large excess of the standard service life. In simple terms, people risk their lives by going to sea on such vessels. And even continuing this practice, by 2035 we will have no more than 240 fishing vessels, that is, to at least keep our fishing fleet at the current level, we should build about 2035 1 of such vessels to 800.
The research fleet today is 79 units, the average age of which exceeds 30 years, and to support the research that we are going to conduct, we will need 2035 ships before 90.
Icebreaking fleet - today we have atomic 6 (of which only 4 is operating) and 30 diesel-powered icebreakers, and all existing nuclear-powered icebreakers must leave the building before 2025. There are no… not, not so - things can be relatively good, since we in 2015-16, the 3 diesel icebreaker was put into operation, and now we also have 8 units. in different stages of construction. But in order for our icebreaking fleet to fulfill its tasks, it is necessary to build 3 nuclear icebreakers for the 10510 project, five for the 22220 project and four more icebreakers to export LNG and oil through the Gulf of Ob - seven of them should be commissioned before the end of 2025, but they have not yet been laid ...
The river fleet ... its total strength, unfortunately, the “Strategy” does not indicate, but it is reported that it has 11 855 vessels whose age exceeds 20 years. At the same time, the average age of a cargo river vessel is 36 years! The river passenger fleet incorporates 658 vessels, whose age exceeds 20 years, before 2030 g it is necessary to replace more than half of them. In addition, there are cruise ships (90 units) 50, of which will be decommissioned in the coming decade.
Thus, we see that the need for civilians, both river and sea, is enormous in our country - we are talking about many thousands of units. And then there are two questions:
1. The “strategy” very correctly argues precisely on the number of ships we need, in order to ensure and develop the existing maritime trade. But, besides this, it would be interesting to know - can our shipowners be able to pay for the purchase of all these transports, rollers, tankers and seiners? That is, it is clear that we now have 2 000 fishing vessels, it is clear that if their number falls, the volume of fishing will begin to decrease proportionally. But do enterprises with these vessels have money to purchase new seiners? After all, if they are not there, then no “Strategy” of the Ministry of Industry will help anything - we should talk about the strategy to support fishing enterprises.
2. To what extent are our production facilities ready for a radical renewal of the civilian fleet? Unfortunately, the "Strategy" does not directly answer this question. Let's try to figure it out for yourself.
So, all those interested in naval subjects are perfectly aware of how slowly, with what tremendous creaking and backlog from the schedules, the national navy is being replenished with new warships. Alas, the “bottom” of our fleet has not yet been reached - at least over the next decade the number of ships being withdrawn from the fleet for recycling (or to the reserve, which, in fact, is delayed disposal) will exceed new arrivals. It is needless to mention that the program of updating the Russian Navy under the state armament program on 2011-2020 was not only failed, but failed with a deafening crash. In other words - the construction of the navy is neither shaky nor roll. But with all this, the "Strategy" reports:
“In the last 5 years, military products accounted for up to 90% of the commercial output of enterprises. Volumes of civilian production remain relatively low and unstable. ”
In general, what the military fleet has been receiving in recent years should be characterized by the words “very little” and “absolutely not enough”, but the civilian have to be content with 10% of the above. Although, of course, the cost of a warship is many times higher than that of the same transport vessel of equal displacement, and it would be nice to add more quantitative data to the cost data, but the “Strategy” gives up - there is almost no data on the production of the shipbuilding industry in Russia . Let's try to refer to other sources.
Unfortunately, as it turned out, the data characterizing our civil shipbuilding, for some reason, is not readily available. But according to the INFOline agency, over the past 7 years, in the period from 2011 to 2017, we have commissioned civilian ships (and watercrafts, of course) with a tonnage of 1 977 thousand tons.
Is it a lot or a little? Given the fact that 2008 g required tonnage for the period 2010-2015. estimated at 6 178,9 th. tons. - very few. In the past three years, we have not even built civil tonnage per year on 200 (although, for example, in 2012 r we built 515,9 thousand tons) —and we should only build transport ships (not counting all others) in the nearest 18 years - 22,9 million tons, that is, we need to build an average of 1 347 thousand tons of transport ships alone! Not counting icebreakers, fishing and so on and so forth.
River fleet is still worse - to restore it, we need to build five to six thousand ships over the next 18 years, and over the past seventeen, in the period from 2000 to 2016 g, we have mastered only 317 cargo river transports (this is already according to the ).
So, we can say that our branch of civil shipbuilding is in a state of crisis - we face challenges that we are unlikely to adequately respond to. The schedule for commissioning civilian tonnage indisputably testifies to the hardest hit that the industry received during the 2014 crisis, after which it did not recover even now, and did not come close to the pre-crisis figures (over half a million tons of deadweight in 2013 g and less than 190 thousand . tons in 2017 g.). Even more frightening is the fact that, most likely, this crisis is dictated by the lack of effective demand for the products of the industry. That is, we have a huge fleet of obsolete transport and fishing vessels, but it’s far from the fact that the firms operating them have the financial resources to resume this fleet. Again, you should pay close attention to the fact that in the presence of the domestic industry, many companies prefer to order ships abroad. For example, the very significant events of 2015 g are:
1. Launching the trawler manufactured by "Tersan Shipping" Inc. (Turkey, Istanbul) by request of Nenets Rybaksoyuz LLC (Russia, Murmansk);
2. Launching an icebreaker manufactured by Arctech Helsinki Shipyard (Finland, Helsinki) by order of an unknown Russian company;
3. Tanker laying by Samsung Heavy Industries, Ltd (South Korea, Seoul) commissioned by Sovkomflot PJSC (Moscow, Russia);
4. Laying down of a gas carrier by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co Ltd. (South Korea, Seoul) by order of PJSC "Sovcomflot" (Russia, Moscow).
The production capacities of domestic shipbuilding enterprises need serious renovation and modernization. On the one hand, it is pleasant to note that, as the secretary general said one evil memory, “the process has started” - according to the “Strategy”, in recent years the share of fixed assets that are less than 10 years old has been steadily increasing. However, the “Strategy” immediately notes the main shortcomings of domestic enterprises. One of the main ones is the impossibility for most of them to implement the construction of ships in a large-block way: enterprises do not have the ability to install such units or the infrastructure to transport them. It is noted that the full modular modular methods are used only in the construction of submarines. There is also obsolescence of the machine park, a small proportion of CNC machines, weak automation and production robotization. Interestingly, information technologies are being introduced quite widely in our country, but due to the outdated nature of the machine park, this does not give the effect that could be expected. It is noted that a number of enterprises have unique technologies (processing and welding of titanium structures, equipment for the installation of large assembly units, measuring and testing complexes, etc.), surpassing the world level in technical characteristics, but inferior in terms of the degree of mechanization and automation.
A critical situation has developed in the area of quality components. "Strategy" notes that domestic manufacturers are uncompetitive across virtually the entire spectrum of ship component equipment, with the greatest lag in the production of power equipment: diesel engines, diesel generators, gas turbine engines, etc., cranes, auxiliary machinery, pumps, and equipment for the oil and gas sector. The consequence of such regrettable condition of our manufacturers is that the share of imported component equipment in our civilian vessels is 70-90%. Worse still, that:
“A high degree of use of imported components and materials is typical for military shipbuilding, especially when building surface ships of small and medium displacement (up to 80%).”
The “Strategy” reports that at present they are trying to improve this situation - the import substitution plans have been created and are being implemented, within the framework of which lists of equipment to be replaced in the first place are determined and, although this is not said directly, these plans are carried out with the support of state (including financial). In addition, now the industry is trying to improve the quality of components by creating joint ventures with leading manufacturers of such equipment, but here, alas, the Strategy does not announce any concrete achievements.
In general, we can state the following. Our shipbuilding industry today is underutilized - according to the "Strategy", existing orders load existing production facilities with 50-60%, but at the same time we are inferior to the world's leading shipbuilders in the construction of ships, ships and their components. Such a backlog calls into question our ability to ensure the reproduction of our transport, fishing, river and other fleets. We are threatened by a massive reduction in the number of civil shipbuilding, in the image and likeness of the military, and this is an extremely negative scenario for our economy as a whole. For example, the reduction of the fishing fleet will lead to a decrease in the gross national product, to the bankruptcy of a number of enterprises and to replenish the number of unemployed with its employees. At the same time, the need for their products (fish and seafood) will cause the need to purchase them abroad.
Shipbuilding problems complement the complexity of ship repair enterprises. The “Strategy” explicitly says that domestic operators of the civilian fleet prefer to repair ships abroad, since our ship repair centers (even large ones) cannot compete with foreign ones. The complexity of logistics of spare parts and equipment (including due to insufficiently effective customs procedures), as well as the natural and climatic conditions of Russia, which increase overhead costs (for the maintenance of capital buildings and structures, their heating, etc.) are noted. As a major drawback, “Strategy” notes our lack of proposals for integrated servicing of the life cycle of vessels, from their design and construction to recycling inclusive.
The only positive that the author of this article has been able to see is that, judging by the text of the Strategy, our Ministry of Industry is very well aware of the problems facing domestic shipbuilding, and it does not close their eyes to them, but tries to solve them, and to solve them systematically. As far as he succeeds, the future will show, and we can only wish his managers and specialists good luck and hope for the best.