Military Review

Prokhorov tragedy of the Soviet tankers (the end)

183
Prokhorov tragedy of the Soviet tankers (the end)



On the night of July 12, offensive actions near Prokhorovka virtually ceased. The parties began to gain a foothold on the achieved lines. After so many years, there are many versions about the victory or defeat of our troops in this battle. For such an assessment, not all documents were timely opened and not everyone was satisfied with the truth about those events.

No matter how bitter the truth, it is better to know it, the more significant will be the victory achieved in that terrible war. In spite of everything, we persevered and defeated a serious and experienced opponent. Not all victories were easy, one of these was under Prokhorovka.

Much has already been written about that battle, I may be mistaken, but this is most fully and objectively set forth in the book by Valery Zamulin, which I indicated at the beginning of a series of articles. In this voluminous and serious study with hundreds of references to archival documents and the memories of participants in the fighting from both sides, the picture of everything that happened in those days is unbiasedly revealed.

This book must be read more than one day and more than one week with a pencil in hand, in order to appreciate and understand the whole drama of the unfolding battle. In my article, I only briefly outlined the essence of this work, without adding anything from myself. Such a serious research should be known to a wide reader interested in an objective history Great Patriotic War.

The Prokhorov battle is one of the iconic pages of that war, which not everyone appreciates equally. When making such conclusions, it is first of all necessary to assess how well the tasks that the parties set for themselves were realized and what results they achieved.

In the course of the battle, none of the opposing sides managed to achieve their goals. The Soviet command failed to break through the front of the enemy, defeat the enemy grouping and ensure access to the Oboyan highway. The German command was unable to break through the third rear line of the Soviet defense and go to the operating room. In this case, the German offensive was stopped, and the Soviet troops suffered serious losses in equipment and people and were limited in their offensive capabilities.

Formally, as if a draw, but a few days after the counterblow, the enemy was forced to curtail “Operation Citadel” and retreat. So in this sense, the battlefield is left for us, in the end we won. Implementing the goals set when the counterattack was applied to the Soviet command was not allowed by a number of objective and subjective factors that have been repeatedly described, the main ones being the following.

Voronezh Front Command misused tank an army of uniform composition, which was created as a means of developing success after breaking the enemy’s defense. Instead of entering into a breakthrough and developing success, the army was thrown to break its own way in the enemy’s line of battle prepared for anti-tank defense without reconnaissance and the necessary support of artillery and aviation.

The bridgehead for the deployment of groups and the application of a counterattack on the eve was captured by the enemy. The front command did not dare to change the decision approved by the Stavka and struck a blow and brought the tank wedge into battle far from the best place. In this area, bounded by river and railway embankment, as well as saturated with deep ravines and spurs, it was impossible to deploy the battle formations of tank corps and provide them with a jerk to the front edge of the enemy. As a result, the shock "wedge" was deprived of the possibility of maneuver and its striking power; tank corps could not use their numerical advantage.

The command plan to stop a frontal blow to the head of a strong and attacking enemy did not correspond to the changed operational situation. The Soviet command did not establish that by the time of the attack, the enemy had stopped the offensive, organized a stable anti-tank defense and was able to repel a massive attack of tanks.

The underestimation of the enemy forces and its capabilities to effectively counter the attack of Soviet tanks led to catastrophic losses in equipment and people. Tactical successes in certain areas have got such a high price that they cannot be called anything other than Pyrrhic victory.

The blunders of command in the organization of the counterblow allowed the enemy to destroy most of the tanks that took part on the edge of the tank wedge. The losses of Rotmistrov’s tank army were not only very large, they spoke of the drama of her position after the battle. In all units of the army, the enemy hit and burned 340 tanks and 17 self-propelled guns.

And the 194 tank burned, and 146 were hit or out of order on the battlefield and could still be restored. However, a significant part of such combat vehicles was in the territory controlled by the enemy, and he simply blew them up. Thus, the army lost 53% of tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in a counterattack, or 42,7% of all units in service on that day.

The situation was especially terrifying in the two tank corps involved in the main direction of the counterstrike. Archival documents show that during the battle of 348 tanks and 19 SAU, which were available in 29 and 18 tank corps before the battle, they lost 237 tanks and 17 SAU, or slightly more than 69%.

More than two-thirds of the 29 body lost the destroyed and burnt 153 tank and the 17 SAU, which was 77% of the attackers! The 18 tank, or 84% of those involved in the attack, was slightly less damaged than the 56 corps, destroyed and burned. Only in the battles of the state farm "October" and the height of 252.2 was 114 – 116 tanks and 11 SAU destroyed and burned.

There is not much reliable data on the enemy’s losses, but even they speak about incomparable losses in this battle. In the German tank corps, which opposed 12 in July to our two corps, was the 273 tank and assault guns, as well as the 43 anti-tank SAU.

A number of researchers who deal with this problem agree that this corps lost roughly the 154 tank and the 273 assault guns available at the start of the battle, or 56,4%. Nevertheless, the corps retained its combat capability, since there were not so many burned tanks, only a few dozen. The enemy was able to restore most of the wounded combat vehicles, since almost all of them were in the territory left behind by the enemy.

Thus, the real loss of armored vehicles in the Soviet tank corps compared with the enemy is difficult to even compare. Naturally, the loss in manpower was just as significant. The battlefield, about 4,5 km wide, was plowed through with thousands of shells and bombs. Among the heaps destroyed in previous battles and added on the day of the battle, several thousand dead were scattered from both sides. Many participants of those events testified that they had never seen a more horrific picture in life. For an unsuccessful attempt to "break through" the defense of the enemy had to pay a high price.

According to incomplete data, in the tank and combined arms guards armies involved in the counterstrike, the losses amounted to 7019 fighters and commanders. Discovered documents indicate that a total of 3139 people lost tank corps during the battles, of which almost half (1448) died and went missing. The main losses fell on motorized rifle brigades. The 53 group of the motorized rifle brigade had the most difficulty; it lost more than 37% of all personnel.

In this regard, the appropriate question of the loss of the enemy. According to incomplete archival data, the losses of the SS tank corps, which was opposed to our tank crews on the day, were several times smaller — the 842 man, of whom 182 were killed and missing. The loss ratio is just deadly.

Behind these numbers are the losses of the fate of thousands of our tankers, who gave their lives in the name of victory. That's how they described this fight.

“There was such a roar that the membrane pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanking of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild gnash of exploding iron ... From the shots at close range, the turret collapsed, the guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded.
From the explosions, five-ton towers broke off and flew to the side on 15 – 20 and m. Slapping hatches, they tumbled in the air and fell. Often, from strong explosions, the entire tank was falling apart, at the moment turning into a pile of metal. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, looked for enemy crews on the field, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols and grabbed hand to hand.


Traveling for dozens of years past the “thirty-four” pedestal, standing under Yakovlevo, I always say the same words “Eternal glory!” To all who stood to death at this turn and did not let the enemy through.

The Soviet command in the person of Vasilevsky and Rotmistrov after the cessation of strikes against the enemy was well aware that at least two corps of the tank army in a few hours of battle completely lost their combat capability. It was not possible to implement the goals set during the counterattack. The positions of the Soviet troops, with the exception of moving several kilometers in separate sectors, remained on the same lines.

Stalin, having learned about the dramatic events near Prokhorovka, was extremely dissatisfied with the actions of the command. The Voronezh Front, having received from the reserve enormous forces, tank and combined army armies and two separate tank corps, a total of almost 120 thousand people and more 800 tanks, could not achieve serious success in confronting the enemy.

He recalled Vasilevsky, as he was mainly blamed for the unsuccessful counterstrike, sent Zhukov there and appointed a commission headed by Malenkov to find out who made mistakes and what mistakes were made when planning a frontline counterattack. In addition to operational and tactical issues, an impressive group of specialists had to find out the reasons for the high losses of armored vehicles in order to avoid this in the future.

According to the results of the commission’s work, a report was prepared on the reasons for the failure of the counterattack. No organizational conclusions on the report were made, because after a few days the Germans stopped the implementation of Operation Citadel and began to withdraw their troops. The battle of Prokhorovka was interpreted as a serious victory, which led to the defeat of a large German tank group under the leadership of the Soviet command. Based on the results of the work of the technical commission, measures were developed for the effective use of tank groups and introduced into the troops.

The German leadership at all levels highly appreciated the actions of their troops in the battles of Prokhorovka, but this did not affect the decision to curtail Operation Citadel. There are many versions of the termination of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge; probably, a combination of factors played a role in making this decision. The main ones were the successes of our troops on the northern front near Orel, which made the Germans offensive from the south senseless, the possibility of a Soviet frontal offensive in the Donbas, the Allied landing in Italy and, of course, the German offensive near Prokhorovka. In fact, on this day the fate of the operation “Citadel” was decided.

Taken together, all these factors and the results of the July 12 hostilities in the southern and northern face of the Kursk Bulge forced the German command at the July 13 meeting at Hitler’s Headquarters to decide to curtail this operation. The commander of army groups at the Kursk Bulge, it was announced that because of the impossibility of quickly achieving the objectives of the operation "Citadel" it stops.

After eight days of intense fighting, the grand battle on the Kursk Bulge was nearing completion. The plan of Hitler’s command to seize the lost initiative on the Eastern Front after Stalingrad collapsed.

From that moment on, the enemy command was only concerned with the issue of securing a withdrawal. Offensive operations were still being carried out, but their goal was not to defeat the Soviet troops, but to create conditions for the successful withdrawal of their troops from the bulge that rested against Prokhorovka, beyond which the enemy could not pass.

July 16 Day was the final in the Prokhorovsky battle. In parts and compounds of the enemy were preparations for the withdrawal. Rearguard groups were formed, ambushes were made of heavy tanks, and the sappers prepared to mine roads and tank hazardous terrain immediately after the departure to ensure a quiet departure of the main forces.

On the night of July 17, the enemy began to withdraw armored units, as well as rear support units in the direction of Belgorod and Tomarovka. In the morning, under the cover of strong rearguards, the withdrawal of the main forces of the German group began. With the termination of the operation "Citadel", the Prokhorovskoye battle was completed. The Soviet troops 18 July went on the offensive and 23 July reached the line that they held before the offensive of the enemy.
Author:
Photos used:
http://voenpravda.ru
Articles from this series:
Prokhorov tragedy of Soviet tankers
Prokhorov tragedy of the Soviet tankers. Part of 2
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  1. Vard
    Vard 16 July 2018 05: 57
    25
    I had a chance ... In my school days ... A few fights where I really got ... In essence, I lost them ... But they stopped lifting me ...
    1. Huumi
      Huumi 16 July 2018 06: 56
      +5
      The same proposal was, let's go wave and I won’t pester you, go and wave ... Great and outstretched hand and stopped raising me)
      1. vladimirZ
        vladimirZ 16 July 2018 08: 39
        18
        He (Stalin) recalled Vasilevsky, as he was mainly blamed for the unsuccessful counterattack, sent Zhukov there and appointed a commission led by Malenkov to find out who made what mistakes and when making the planning of the frontal counterattack and how the organization of the deployment of the Headquarters reserves was organized . - from article

        Unfortunately, in the postwar period, the mistakes and mistakes of our military commanders were hidden in the historiography of the Second World War, because of which thousands, millions of our soldiers were killed in vain. But in vain.
        Silence covered, attributed criminal negligence, inability to fight, and most importantly in the future condoned the irresponsibility of other military leaders for their affairs.
        1. Andrey NM
          Andrey NM 16 July 2018 12: 55
          25
          In vain or not - a moot point. For general viewing, these misses do not need to be widely exposed, and specialists must be studied. These “wide friends” then use our “sworn friends” against us, bringing the information to hypertrophied values ​​and forms, and they themselves are always conquering, even where they were not there. It will soon come to the point that they will say that the Red Army itself came to Berlin to surrender ...
          1. yehat
            yehat 16 July 2018 14: 11
            18
            not to take dirty linen out of the hut is one thing, but quite another - to make Rotmistrov a hero of the battle of Prokhorovka
            1. MPN
              MPN 17 July 2018 11: 45
              +6
              Quote: yehat
              not to take dirty linen out of the hut is one thing, but quite another - to make Rotmistrov a hero of the battle of Prokhorovka

              We won! And the battle on Kursk and the battle of Prokhorovka WE won! What kind of expressions
              In Soviet military historiography, this episode was portrayed as a victory for Soviet tankers in a battle with the Germans, in which up to 1500 tanks participated on both sides ... ... Historical studies of archival documents showed that this was far from the case.
              For whom is it wrong? It was like that for my grandfather! For me too!!!
              1. yehat
                yehat 17 July 2018 12: 28
                13
                but do not carry nonsense and uri-patridiotism!
                Didn’t you catch yourself at school at what you see - something does not stick together in history? there’s a lot of lies about the war - both among the Germans and us. And to focus on a lie that is pleasant to perceive is not a good idea.
                Did your grandfather take part in the battles near Prokhorovka? Mine participated and where else was in the hardest battles. And he spoke about successes very sparingly, because it was not cheap. Near Kursk, the Germans did their best in terms of using the latest military equipment (which they could not have near Stalingrad), but they were mainly reflected by artillery batteries and infantry, not tanks. My grandfather was an infantry. About the fact that my grandfather was one of the few who survived on the defensive near Balaton, he did not speak at all - I found out by chance.
                You just don’t understand how hard the battles with the Germans were, when they could break with all the dope.
                1. Sergey Pavlovich
                  Sergey Pavlovich 17 July 2018 20: 38
                  +2
                  You write: "... the Germans did their best in terms of using the latest military equipment (which they could not near Stalingrad)"
                  But even near Stalingrad, when it was unblocked by Manstein (Hitler's ungrateful favorite), the Tigers had already been used (though they hadn’t managed to repaint them even from Rommel from Africa).
                  In the Moscow region, in a private museum, along with other equipment, there is this defeated spotted beast (I can publish a photo).
                  1. yehat
                    yehat 18 July 2018 23: 12
                    +7
                    technology does not boil down to a tiger
                    near Kursk, the Germans used more than 5 new types of tanks and self-propelled guns, 3 new versions of attack aircraft, new fighters, new assault self-propelled guns, remote mine clearance tanks, etc. and most of these new products were applied immediately.
              2. Mihail28
                Mihail28 18 July 2018 03: 08
                +2
                And for me, too.
                And so for my children.
                And so it was for my father.
          2. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 16 July 2018 15: 01
            13
            Quote: Andrey NM
            In vain or not - a moot point. For general viewing, these misses do not need to be widely exposed, and specialists must be studied.


            Have children learn fake history?
            Who will ever believe such a story?
            1. DMB_95
              DMB_95 16 July 2018 19: 55
              18
              Quote: DimerVladimer

              Have children learn fake history?
              Who will ever believe such a story?

              Do you propose to study History from the books of Valery Zamulin? No matter how good a historian he is (for someone), there is sure to be someone else who writes professionally about the Great Patriotic War from a different perspective. The History Textbook should help develop a sense of pride in children for their homeland, and for this you can even slightly embellish some events. In all countries they do so, and only we always have some kind of "repentance" ..
              1. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 17 July 2018 08: 13
                +4
                Quote: DMB_95
                Do you propose to study History from the books of Valery Zamulin?


                I have another proposal - it was voiced by both military representatives and former general staffists - to create a commission that would include interested persons - historians, former military men (those who were former but authoritative like Mikhail Khodarenok for example).
                One historian may be wrong - a panel of historians and military personnel - no.
                There must be a strategist — a former general staffer and someone with experience in leadership at the tactical level (battalion regiment division).
                This will make it possible to look at each battle closest to the truth and its contribution to the overall victory.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 17 July 2018 10: 11
                  +8
                  Quote: DimerVladimer
                  One historian may be wrong - a panel of historians and military personnel - no.

                  College of personnel and military historians the last time I wrote the official history of the Second World War with an oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka.
                  1. DimerVladimer
                    DimerVladimer 17 July 2018 12: 38
                    +6
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    The college of personnel and military historians last time wrote the official history of the Second World War with an oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka.


                    I agree - this time is "ideologically correct", and therefore they have created more than one legend.
                    The failures of 1941 were followed by the disasters of 1942 (the Luban offensive operation, the defeat of the Crimean Front, the Kharkov operation and the Rzhev meat grinder) resulting in heavy unjustified losses that have not yet been dismantled and there is no official position on them.
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 18 July 2018 18: 10
                      +3
                      Quote: DimerVladimer
                      The failures of 1941 were followed by the disasters of 1942 (the Luban offensive operation, the defeat of the Crimean Front, the Kharkov operation and the Rzhev meat grinder) resulting in heavy unjustified losses that have not yet been dismantled and there is no official position on them.

                      So ... the problem is that a detailed analysis of the operations of the Second World War is a long and expensive thing. Especially if you know that copies of cases will need to be made not only in our archives, but also requested abroad. But in the end it turns out that through their work the collective of historians denigrates the bright name of some Doctor of History, who defended himself on this topic and has a host of students and followers. And the province will write - about defiler rehistorians © the glorious past and the memory of fighters and commanders.
                      So what remains to read Isaev - we are unlikely to wait for the official version. smile
                2. Sergey Pavlovich
                  Sergey Pavlovich 19 July 2018 21: 16
                  0
                  You suggested: "... it is the former but authoritative like Mikhail Khodarenok for example."
                  Absolutely NOT denying the erudition of the latter - and weekly (when it happens) I listen to him on the radio with pleasure, BUT I doubt very much his OBJECTIVITY and NON-bias - he is still a typical “product” of “perestroika”.
                3. konstantin68
                  konstantin68 27 August 2018 14: 29
                  0
                  Quote: DimerVladimer
                  One historian may be wrong - a panel of historians and military personnel - no.

                  The college is like a herd. Where the beater indicates, there and turn.
              2. Evgenijus
                Evgenijus 18 July 2018 07: 49
                +1
                DMB_95:
                "... to develop a sense of pride in their homeland among children, and for the sake of this, you can even embellish some events a little. In all countries they are doing this, and only we always have some kind of" repentance "..

                Yes, it is in the best traditions of Goebbels and Soviet propaganda. The case of Skripale was painted according to this method, and Poroshenko is building his propaganda this way today. Paint then you have enough? wink
              3. zenion
                zenion 4 September 2018 17: 38
                -1
                A cousin fought in Stalingrad, and fought on the Kursk Bulge, a tankman. He was the commander of a tank battalion. They hid them in forests and plantings and strictly insisted that they not in any case take the initiative, but wait for the order. So they sat in ambush. In the morning, there was a noise from the Germans and German heavy tanks drove up the hill. Before the German tanks was a clean and flat field. For huge German tanks - a trifle and infantry went. When they reached half of the field, suddenly, Mikhail said, something rumbled over our heads and one of the German tanks threw back the tower and turned it over so that it did a somersault in the air. Then this, something flew into other tanks, and they also began to fly apart, as if there were matchboxes. The Germans stopped and began to reverse behind the hill. And then our attack aircraft came and everything started to explode and burn there. About two hours later there was a team on the walkie-talkie, and then the messenger arrived with the order forward. And they went ahead. When we crossed the hill, we realized that it was impossible to go there. Lined tanks and funnels were lying around. They were still fired by Katyusha. I had to report to the command. They waited an hour again and gave them orders to move on another road, and they sent several tanks for reconnaissance. Until the evening they went forward and could not catch up with the Germans. It was impossible to drive along the road, abandoned cars and other equipment that lacked fuel and the Germans did not have time to blow it up. They stopped by night. He asked him what was the best way to destroy German tanks - termite shells, they burned through the armor of the tank and blew everything inside. At first, the Germans did not understand what they were doing. Never, during the whole war, no one dared to ask what kind of thing smashed German tanks. The less you know, the longer you live.
            2. Andrey NM
              Andrey NM 17 July 2018 11: 18
              +5
              Well, you understand me. No need to do self-flagellation.
              In general, the truth can also be presented in different ways. Once upon a time, a person who I knew well enough tried to be elected to the deputies. In his public biography it was written "Married, has two children ...". But in fact - married a second marriage, from his first marriage has two children ... And then, and then - the truth.
          3. vladimirZ
            vladimirZ 16 July 2018 17: 47
            12
            In vain or not - a moot point. For general viewing, these misses do not need to be widely exposed, and specialists must be studied. Then they use these wide expositions against us - Andrey NM (Andrey)

            You're not right. It was on the facts of concealing negative events, including war, that our enemies played during the destruction of the USSR. For example, we still do not know how many of our citizens actually died in the war, due to what efforts our fathers and grandfathers won. At first 7 million people were called, then 20 million, then 27 million, and someone already claims that 40 or almost 60 million.
            The mystery of the reasons for the defeat in the first half of the war, due to the fact that only the "specialists" knew it, thanks to which they happened - the generals and marshals of the Second World War, remained with them - they did everything so that this mystery went away with them.
            And now, historians, including the military, are arguing: "Why, for what reasons did the defeat of 1941-42 happen?" There are no historical conclusions on what needs to be done to prevent this from happening.
            As a result, we got what we got - the USSR was defeated, turned into a raw materials appendage of the West - essentially Hitler’s program was implemented and is being implemented.
            1. zenion
              zenion 4 September 2018 17: 20
              0
              And you yourself did not try to think why at first 7 million, and then the numbers began to grow. 7 million - this is the most accurate for the Army, the Germans on the eastern front died no less. Then came the census and each time the number of civilians was added. After all, the Germans and Banderas, and the allies of the Germans, had a good walk when they entered, the Banderas were "frolicking". When the Germans left, even though they ran, nothing should remain after them. In the area of ​​the town where I lived, accidentally discovered in 1968, a whole chain of mined houses, which seemed to be intact. Half of the city had to be evacuated in order to de-mine it. In the places of Ukraine, where Bandera entered, not a single Jew remained. They stayed, only in places that were under the Romanians in camps and ghettos. When the Germans began to retreat, some were simply told to run into the woods, the Germans would pass here, you will not live.
          4. svp67
            svp67 16 July 2018 19: 18
            20
            Quote: vladimirZ
            concealed the mistakes and mistakes of our military commanders, because of which thousands, millions of our soldiers died in vain

            Quote: Andrey NM
            In vain or not - a moot point.

            No controversial issues. All the victims there were not in vain. The USSR and its Armed Forces in 1941, 42, the first half of 43 years, were WEAKER than Germany, but were able to turn the tide of the SPIRIT OF SPIRIT and CONFIDENCE IN VICTORY. But, then MASTERY came and the enemy was defeated, and the Red Flag was over the Reichstag. Like this.
            The enemy was able to recover most of the wrecked combat vehicles, since almost all of them were in the territory left behind by the enemy.
            Could not. Since, unlike Soviet tanks, they were less maintainable, especially their new Panthers and Tigers.
            The Panthers were assembled as part of the so-called 10th Panther Brigade and ..
            In a ... letter to Guderian, Dekker called the Panther the cause of heavy losses of tanks, the inept actions of the commander of the tank regiment of the Grossdeutchland division von Strachwitz, who "used the" panthers "of the 39th tank regiment as an idiot."
            General G. Guderian, visiting the Great Germany division on July 10, drew up a report sent by him to General Zeitzler, chief of staff of the main command of the ground forces on July 17: “Tactical experience. The tactical use of new types of tanks (Panther) does not exempt the command from the use of generally accepted tactical principles for the use of tanks. In particular, this concerns issues of organizing interaction with other branches of the armed forces (infantry, sappers, artillery, etc.) and the massive use of tank units.
            The inspector general of the armored forces created the headquarters of the tank brigade with the aim of centralized control more than 300 tanksoperating as part of the Great Germany Division (tank regiment of the division and the 39th Panther regiment of the Panther.). Due to friction between individual commanders, this headquarters did not function at the initial stage. Personnel issues should not be reflected in practice when the question concerns the future Reich.
            The number of losses in technology increased during the continuation of the operation. The number of Panthers participating in the battle was small (sometimes only 10 tanks) In this regard, the enemy quite easily repelled their attacks.

            You just get a grasp of having 300 Panthers in your possession, German "super dupers" often could exhibit no more than 10 tanks. And the question is, what are the Germans now "don’t sprinkle ash on their heads"?
            And these “Panthers” captured near Belgorod at the German collection point for damaged cars, they are the same at the expense of Prokhorovka and our other VICTORIES on the Kursk Bulge

            And there was not only Prokhorovka, but there were Ponyry, Teploe, where the shock forces of the “Panzerwaffe” were grinded, precisely those forces that won victories for Germany from 1939 to 1943 ...
            1. leshiy076
              leshiy076 16 July 2018 19: 58
              13
              I completely agree, but with one amendment, not only Germany fought against the USSR, but all of Europe united or occupied by Hitler, with all its resources and production capacities. And our democrats then put up such memorials.

            2. Operator
              Operator 16 July 2018 21: 06
              11
              According to the results of the Battle of Kursk, there is no tenfold difference between the losses of equipment in the military personnel of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in nature.

              The wrecked tanks and self-propelled guns that the Germans were able to evacuate to their re-posts were captured by the Red Army during the subsequent advance to the Dnieper. And the supposedly tenfold smaller losses of Germans in people are explained by the standard Wehrmacht fraud - one-time losses retroactively were recorded in the documents as losses in general for the month.
              1. Cannonball
                Cannonball 17 July 2018 21: 50
                +8
                A significant amount of German armored vehicles evacuated for factory repairs to the front did not return back. So it turns out a lie about small losses in tanks - the tanks seem to have been evacuated, which means they are not lost, but they did not return to service, that is, the losses are obvious.
                1. Operator
                  Operator 17 July 2018 22: 18
                  0
                  I talked about Wehrmacht's army field re-posts, and not about factory repairs of German tanks.
                  1. Cannonball
                    Cannonball 18 July 2018 19: 57
                    +1
                    I just added your message.
              2. konstantin68
                konstantin68 27 August 2018 14: 32
                0
                Quote: Operator
                And the supposedly tenfold smaller losses of Germans in people are explained by the standard Wehrmacht fraud - one-time losses retroactively were recorded in the documents as losses in general for the month.

                Well, you Germans will never lie! These are ours, they are never, therefore we believe them immediately and 100%
                (modern "historians").
            3. Warrior2015
              Warrior2015 17 July 2018 00: 11
              0
              Quote: svp67
              And there was not only Prokhorovka, but there were Ponyry, Teploe, where the shock forces of the “Panzerwaffe” were grinded, precisely those forces that won victories for Germany from 1939 to 1943 ...

              Everything is true, except for one thing - it was 1943 year that showed that the time of the great tank battles has passed and air supremacy becomes a key factor in victory.
              1. svp67
                svp67 17 July 2018 02: 03
                10
                Quote: Warrior2015
                Everything is true, except for one thing - it was 1943 that showed that the time of the great tank battles had passed

                Do not make me laugh. This time has not passed yet.
                Quote: Warrior2015
                air supremacy is becoming a key factor in victory.

                More than one airstrike and complete domination in the sky did not hoist flags on foreign territory ... only a soldier can do this, with the support of aviation, artillery and tanks
            4. Andrey NM
              Andrey NM 17 July 2018 11: 36
              +1
              Quote: svp67
              No controversial issues. All the victims there were not in vain.

              I am not saying that the victims were in vain. It was not about that at all. I say that you do not need to constantly beat yourself with rods and engage in self-flagellation.
            5. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 18 July 2018 19: 37
              +6
              Quote: svp67
              The inspector general of the armored forces created the headquarters of the tank brigade with the aim of centralizing the management of more than 300 tanks operating as part of the Great Germany division (the tank regiment of the division and the 39th panther regiment of the Panther.). Due to friction between individual commanders, this headquarters did not function at the initial stage.

              Hehehehe ... deftly Heinz translated the arrows - "friction between the individual commanders."
              In fact, the reason for the failure was not some kind of "friction", but the fact that 10 TBR was thrown into the battle practically without a headquarters: at the time of entering the battle the headquarters of the brigade had neither equipment nor personnel.
              The decision to form a brigade was made literally in the last days before the Citadel. The officers appointed to the headquarters of the 10th Tank Brigade did not even have time to arrive at the front before the offensive, there was also no necessary equipment, which was vital for the normal functioning of the headquarters. Several vehicles were "borrowed" from the "panther" battalions and one of the Great Germany was shared by one mittlerer Kommandopanzerwagen (a mobile command post based on the Sd. Kfz.251 armored personnel carrier).
              Tomzov / Ulanov
              ICH, Germans wanted the best, but it turned out - as always: 10 TBR was formed
              ... so as not to “overload” Strachwitz with the additional leadership of two hundred of the latest tanks, both regiments were combined into the 10th tank brigade, appointing her commander of another colonel, Dekker.

              Strachwitz is the commander of the tank regiment of the Great Germany division, which was given reinforcements to the 39th Panter regiment of two battalions.
            6. Grigory_78
              Grigory_78 19 July 2018 01: 15
              +5
              I’ll insert my 5 cents. Recently, Di Welt's article on the battle of Prokhorovka was being dismantled at Inosmi. So - the author acknowledged there the loss of only 3 German tanks against 400 T-34. That is, the equipment evacuated from the battlefield was not recognized for losses (yet) - after all, it was taken out for repair. And the same equipment, captured later at repair bases near Kharkov - was not recognized for the losses (already) - it was faulty ...
              1. voyaka uh
                voyaka uh 19 July 2018 01: 58
                +4
                Translated into Russian memoirs of an officer of the SS division Reich. They fought on the southern flank.
                He writes that they were disappointed with Hitler's decision to retreat. Their losses were small. The front was broken by them. They captured a lot of prisoners.
                Hitler curtailed the operation due to its general failure. Surround the ledge failed. The defense of the spacecraft from the north was not broken. Success in the south was not enough. There were no reserves for strengthening forces and developing the offensive. Elite infantry suffered serious losses.
        2. Alekseev
          Alekseev 20 July 2018 15: 27
          +2
          Quote: vladimirZ
          Unfortunately, in the post-war era, the mistakes and mistakes of our military commanders were hidden in the historiography of the Second World War

          Quote: Andrey NM
          In vain or not - a moot point

          That's right!
          But why did this happen under Prokhorovka? Why did not Stalin punish at least at least a gene. Rotmistrova, not to mention the front commander gene. Vatutin and bet representative A.M. Vasilevsky?
          It seems that in 1943 I.V. Stalin began to perfectly understand the complexity and, at times, the unpredictability of the course of hostilities.
          He understood how high the level of training and the strength of the strikes of the best German tank formations were. After all, they actually almost broke through in advance and very carefully prepared defense of the best troops of the Red Army.
          He knew that the use of part of the strategic reserve of the Steppe Front’s headquarters - 5th Guards and 5th Guards - was an urgent compelled measure aimed at eliminating the possible breakthrough of Manstein’s troops in the rear of the Voronezh Front.
          He understood that in terms of the quality of training for military units and the armament of the troops, 5 Guards. TAs were significantly inferior to divisions 2 of the SS CC.
          He also knew very well that Rotmistrov was a good general, but not Napoleon or Suvorov.
          As he previously expressed in relation to Mehlis’s complaints about the command of the Crimean Front: "we do not have the Hindenburgs in reserve."
          The command of the 5th Guards TA in a short time, in a nervous situation, demands to stop the breakthrough of the German armored formations at all costs (actually a battle, although the Germans quite rightly classically repelled a counterattack at this stage, and did not try to attack the 5th Guards ) it was very difficult to organize a successful fight ...
          The calculation was made by a mass attack to “crush” the enemy in spite of the losses, like Zhukov did on Khalkhin-Gol, but the enemy was different ...
          It’s wise to talk about all this now, but then .... For success, Rotmirstrov needed to be a tank Bonaparte and have an army of 45 years old for the preparation of military and technical equipment.
          Stalin understood all this, therefore no one was seriously injured for Prokhorovka ..
    2. Stirbjorn
      Stirbjorn 16 July 2018 08: 58
      +8
      Quote: Vard
      I had a chance ... In my school days ... A few fights where I really got ... In essence, I lost them ... But they stopped lifting me ...
      I think this is a serious argument that should be brought to the boys. That even if they beat them once, then all the same they will cease to bully, finding someone more harmless. Otherwise, they will persecute constantly and will remain clogged for life. Unfortunately, mothers, with their “not good to fight,” do not understand this at all and grow up, as a result, they have full squishies
  2. nivander
    nivander 16 July 2018 06: 54
    +9
    a fig translation of something foreign slippery and foul smelling with trash from the author - the term "bridgehead" instead of "front line / frontier of attack" in English is especially amusing, it's all one word "frontlane" ----- google to help
    1. Narak-zempo
      Narak-zempo 16 July 2018 07: 39
      18
      Quote: nivasander
      fig translation of something foreign slippery and foul smelling

      It is clearly said that the articles were written according to the monograph of V.N. Zamulin "Prokhorovka - the unknown battle of the great war." So you missed.
    2. cariperpaint
      cariperpaint 16 July 2018 09: 23
      +7
      You know, in childhood, one thing sunk into memory ... My father had a bunch of memoirs Ivanovsky, Katukov, Litvyak ... And others, so the term bridgehead was found at times more often than the line of attack. Especially when describing river forcing. So you are wrong.
      1. brn521
        brn521 16 July 2018 15: 37
        +2
        Quote: cariperpaint
        and so the term bridgehead was found many times more often than the line of attack

        Actually, I myself only learned this word from Soviet literature.
    3. Real russian
      Real russian 16 July 2018 18: 23
      +4
      Quote: nivasander
      a fig translation of something foreign slippery and foul smelling with trash from the author - the term "bridgehead" instead of "front line / frontier of attack" in English is especially amusing, it's all one word "frontlane" ----- google to help

      the wildest comment I have ever seen. All Soviet memoirs are streaked with a "bridgehead."
  3. Huumi
    Huumi 16 July 2018 06: 55
    +8
    I watched the infantryman’s interview, the night came and we heard a clang on the field — the Germans were pulling their equipment. That there was no strange order to open fire. And then it started even more fun. German sappers came and just blew up all our unburned cars. Our strategies are burning us the tanker was sent to attack, but they didn’t say that we would have a dug anti-tank ditch there. we started falling there all the way, and as the German said, we stood on the flanks there (and he saw it all, and the ditch and our Tuud’s fall tanks) there were 88 mm flasks and according to him they certainly suffered very serious losses ...
  4. Molot1979
    Molot1979 16 July 2018 07: 16
    29
    Funny with the Germans with losses. Lose, or win, and always lose 10-20 times less than ours. If their losses were really so low (and the tanks almost all adjusted), then this battle would have ended in a different way. But it somehow strange turns out: only 800 people were lost, the armored vehicles were whole, the Russians were smashed to smithereens, and the offensive suddenly failed at first, and then completely went back. Maybe you don’t need to give out 10-day reports on losses for truth in the last resort?
    1. Mountain shooter
      Mountain shooter 16 July 2018 07: 27
      15
      Alas, there are archives. Both ours and German. Meticulous Germans carefully kept their archives ... In this particular battle, ours went. In general, in the Kursk Bulge - the Germans got it. What is surprising?
      1. Sweetheart
        Sweetheart 16 July 2018 11: 04
        20
        Quote: Mountain Shooter
        Meticulous Germans carefully kept their archives.

        Yes cast a shadow on the fence, about the "reliability" of losses according to the Germans ..
        “Officially, the Germans call their losses killed in the war with Poland 10572 people, 30322 wounded and 3409 disappeared. Although, according to BA / MA RH 7/653, there were 16843 people killed and 320 people missing. The number of missing people was reduced 10 times, and the death toll is 1,5 times greater. "
        By the way, the prisoners of war of these countries - France, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Spain, Finland, etc. following the war in the east in the USSR, 1,1 million citizens of European countries were counted, among them 500 thousand Hungarians, almost 157 thousand Austrians, 70 thousand Czechs and Slovaks, 60 thousand Poles, about 50 thousand Italians, 23 thousand the French, 50 thousand Spaniards. There were Dutch, Finns, Norwegians, Danes, Belgians and many others.

        Hungary during the war on the Eastern Front lost almost 810 thousand people, Italy - almost 100 thousand, Romania - about 500 thousand, Finland - almost 100 thousand.

        Thanks to such assistance from Europe, the Germans were able to mobilize 25% of the entire population into the army, and the USSR mobilized "only" 17% of its citizens.

        If German losses were minimal, and the Red Army, according to Mark Solonin and others like him, “collapsed” in 1941, then why was the whole contingent of 1941 born in the fall of 1922 in Germany in the fall of 1923? the year of birth?
        1. SOUL.
          SOUL. 16 July 2018 20: 26
          +8
          As they say, it doesn’t matter how much the Germans lost! It’s important who read them. The thing is, do you know which department counted the losses? When I read it, I was in shock. It turns out the loss calculations for the public were in Goebbels’s department !!!.
      2. Aviator_
        Aviator_ 16 July 2018 20: 40
        +7
        German archives are more than strange. But for historians of "democratic nationality," like Marek Solonin, they are the ultimate truth.
      3. Cannonball
        Cannonball 17 July 2018 21: 54
        +6
        The famous German pedantry often moved aside, especially when it came to victories, obvious and imaginary, as well as losses. This fact has been proved more than once. Take, for example, the "reports" of Hitler’s tank and aviation "aces."
    2. Sergey Sadchikov
      Sergey Sadchikov 16 July 2018 07: 59
      34
      I’ll support you, however, now they’ll quickly explain to you that the Germans have everything written down, you won’t spoil them. “Their apparent soldier and tank are written down”, not that the Russian silver-footed, that all our reports of losses are bullshit and solid nonsense, in the article the losses of the Germans are still divinely given, but at one time they proved to me that the Germans in Prokhorovka lost 5 tanks, but I just can’t understand why the attack stopped then? Why did the Germans go to the breakthrough of the third line, did they hope that they would not have to fight? After all, I think they understood that they would have to break through the defenses, and then the Russians got so framed that they climbed the Tigers themselves, well, judging by all the data indicated in the article, the Germans crushed the Russians by losing a miserly tanks and only 182 people were killed, and Red Army of more than 10 thousand people and almost 400 tanks !!! Yes, one can only dream of such results when breaking through the defensive line, it would seem a counterattack and all the operational space .... The whole problem is that we do not criticize the German fables about losses, they and Hartmann take off in the break between morning tea and it knocks down Russian planes at 5-6 per flight, and the whole squadron confirms this, although he flies off to "hunt" alone, but they are Germans, they will not lie !!! Or another great tanker Carius, after one battle, reports that he knocked out 18 ISs, and 5 T-34-85, which even the battalion’s office could not stand, and reasonably noticed, “darling,” let’s do the opposite 18 T- 34
      and 5 ISs, well, what to do with the "great tank" ace, reluctantly agreed, but of course in his "imperishable" memoirs he corrected everything.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 16 July 2018 11: 58
        11
        Quote: Sergey Sadchikov
        Or another great tanker Carius, after one battle, reports that he knocked out 18 ISs, and 5 T-34-85, which even the battalion’s office could not stand, and reasonably noticed, “darling,” let’s do the opposite 18 T- 34 and 5 ISs, well, what to do the "great tank" ace reluctantly agreed, but in his "imperishable" memoirs he certainly corrected everything.

        In addition, grandfather wrote down on his personal account all the Soviet tanks destroyed in the Malinovo area - regardless of who actually knocked them out.
      2. fighter angel
        fighter angel 16 July 2018 14: 25
        20
        Absolutely agree! The fact that the Germans are lying, I will give a fact. The book "Aviation in the Battle of Kursk". On July 15 or July 16.07.43, 28, the German ace Gerhard Lutte, who had 11 victories, was captured and captured. He voiced the losses of his group in three days: accordingly, 10 on the first day, 9 on the second and 19 on the third. However, these days, according to official German reports, his group lost in three days - 11 aircraft. And another XNUMX - they washed up ... They got lost somewhere ... Here is such a vaunted "German pedantry." Nemchura, too, valued her heads, places, crosses, and a career! Therefore, they had "double-entry bookkeeping." And they will not reveal their true losses to anyone! And to our unfortunate historians they quite successfully insert such false data. And after all, some believe !!! Good thing, not all.
        1. Sergey Pavlovich
          Sergey Pavlovich 17 July 2018 21: 27
          +2
          In connection with the above-mentioned, I recommend the article and its Comments:
          "352 victoires ou 80? Erich Hartmann: un total contesté ”, which in the context can be translated as“ 352 wins or 80? Erich Hartmann - Contested Results ”, published in the February 2005 issue of the French magazine Le Fana de L'Aviation for 423 (Nº XNUMX)
        2. Andrey NM
          Andrey NM 25 July 2018 07: 08
          +1
          Particularly good for Germans are non-lost aircraft with a percentage of damage. Not shot down, not lost ... Well, think about it, it’s 90% damaged ...
      3. hohol95
        hohol95 16 July 2018 18: 36
        +4
        After the battle near or in the village of Malinovo, Karius valiantly “destroyed” another 28 Soviet tanks (unidentified models) with an armored landing! And colorfully it narrates in his memoirs!
    3. CTABEP
      CTABEP 16 July 2018 09: 14
      +3
      Or maybe just somewhere we scammed, having suffered losses 10 times more, but somewhere the Germans? In addition, although the Wehrmacht lost several times less armored vehicles, they initially had it several times smaller.
      1. ARES623
        ARES623 16 July 2018 18: 03
        +2
        Quote: CTABEP
        In addition, although the Wehrmacht lost several times less armored vehicles, they initially had several times less

        It is necessary to keep in mind the difference in the education of the population of the participating countries. Very large losses of equipment were not of a combat nature. There are so many factors in this topic (loss of technology) that you can open a separate discussion thread.
    4. figwam
      figwam 16 July 2018 10: 54
      20
      Molot1979

      Yes, the same thing surprises me as the author writes about big losses on our part, but without data on enemy losses
      There are not so many reliable data on the enemy’s losses, but even they speak of disparate losses in this battle.
      with obstinacy portrays a catastrophic situation for us.
      There is no reliable information, although pedantic Germans have it, but for some reason they have been hiding for so many years, apparently there is nothing to be proud of. But our new cutters believe that the Germans have small losses. Then where is the German advance and completion of the Citadel, where is the capture of Prokhorovka, where is the encirclement and destruction of our units? None of this, because of the large losses of Germans in manpower and equipment, there could be no talk of any offensive or even defense of the lines they occupied, only a retreat of hundreds of kilometers, otherwise surroundings and captivity. So the German "winners" failed the offensive operation and fled from the parts of the Red Army that they had defeated. The logic of modern writers is zero, the main thing is to make noise so that books are sold.
      1. Sweetheart
        Sweetheart 16 July 2018 11: 21
        11
        Quote: figvam
        Yes, the same thing surprises me as the author writes about big losses on our part, but without data on enemy losses

        Even more surprised how the brigadier general determines the catastrophic losses of the Panzerwaffe ..
        "Unfortunately, the 4000 captured French tanks deployed on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1941 did not meet their expectations. Acting as part of separate reconnaissance, auxiliary and transport battalions with infantry divisions, they certainly contributed to the successes of the first week of the war, but then, when crossing the old border, the USSR turned out to be one-day butterflies, and if in the first week of the war they were lost about 20% of the original number, then in the first week of July 1941, 70% were lost! The only place where the French tanks managed to reach at least some success - this is actions in the Crimea - when breaking through the fortifications of Perekop, and even then, of the approximately 500 tanks participating in those battles - about 150 were lost when overcoming the anti-tank ditch, and 120 were destroyed by the Bolshevik artillery and aviation. helped the Wehrmacht divisions reach Sevastopol, losing only 300 cars - but this success was due to the fact that the arid climate of the Northern Crimea excludes the possibility of agriculture, and deep plowing of land is not applied there. But it is used on the southern coast of Crimea - and in particular in the vicinity of Sevastopol. Therefore, during the assault on Sevastopol, units equipped with French tanks lost in each attack up to 70-74% of the participating vehicles. A similar thing can be said about the use of French tanks near Leningrad and Moscow - being on arable land, tanks lost up to 77-73% of vehicles in attacks. The last mass use of tanks on the Eastern Front was carried out in July 86. This was done rather out of hopelessness, because despite the efforts of German industry, it was not possible to fully equip the Wehrmacht’s tank and infantry divisions with new vehicles. Of the 1943 tanks used near Kursk, 400-60% were lost on the first day of the battle, and from 75 to 25% on the second day. "
        http://samlib.ru/t/tonina_o_i/panzer_vermaxt_01.s
        html
        1. figwam
          figwam 16 July 2018 13: 04
          +8
          Quote: The Swordsman
          "Unfortunately, 4000 captured French tanks used in the summer of 1941 on the Eastern Front

          And pseudo-historians have always told us that the Germans had about 3500 tanks against the USSR against our 10000 in the western direction, but it turns out to be a lie.
          1. Sweetheart
            Sweetheart 16 July 2018 13: 13
            +7
            Quote: figvam
            And we are always pseudo-historians

            And these tantrums in the field of history have precisely such a task.
            1. figwam
              figwam 16 July 2018 13: 43
              15
              So it turns out that we didn’t have any multiple quantitative superiority in tanks on June 22, and the Germans, modestly, did not bring all 4000 thousand French tanks into tank divisions, but ranked them as infantry, reconnaissance, transport divisions and nowhere in their battles not taken into account. But in reality, 5600 tanks were concentrated in the German tank divisions along with the allies near our borders, plus the French, and we get more than 9600 tanks of all types, against our 10000-12000 thousand at the western border. And so it turns out that for almost 80 years they continue to humiliate and fool us.
              1. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 17 July 2018 10: 00
                +2
                Quote: figvam
                the Germans, modestly, did not bring all 4000 thousand French tanks into tank divisions, but ranked them as infantry, reconnaissance, transport divisions and they were not taken into account anywhere in the battles. But in reality, in the German tank divisions, along with the allies, at our borders, 5600 tanks were concentrated, plus French and we get more than 9600 tanks of all types


                This can not be considered - some remained in France, the honor was transferred to the Allies, a small part was converted to self-propelled guns, to ammunition transporters.
                In addition, 4000 captured French tanks are a very approximate figure of 4930 tanks and ammunition transporters:

                in fact:
                By May 1940, the French army had 2637 tanks of a new type.
                Among them are tanks:
                B1 (heavy) - 314 pcs.,
                D1 and D2 (medium) - 210 pcs.,
                S35 (medium) - 243 pcs.,
                R35 (lightweight about 800 tanks), AMR (light machine gun), AMS - all of these types about 1070 pieces,
                The Germans transferred part of R35 to their allies: 109 - Italy and 40 - Bulgaria. In December 1940, Berlin-based Alkett received an order to remake 200 R35 tanks in self-propelled guns armed with a Czech 47-mm anti-tank gun

                H35 (light) - 308 pcs.,
                H38, H39, R40 (light) - 392 pcs.
                90 tanks FCM
                In addition, up to 2000 old FT17 / 18 combat vehicles (of which 800 were combat-ready) during the First World War and six heavy 2C were stored in the parks.
                600 armored vehicles and 3500 armored personnel carriers and tracked tractors complemented the armored weapons of the ground forces.
                Read colleagues on the top var - author: Mikhail Baryatinsky https://topwar.ru/28438-trofeynaya-bron%20...%20n
                ciya.html


                French tanks were repaired and sent to Finland, France, North Africa, Russia and the Balkans - so no +4000 thousand for 1941 on the border with the USSR can be considered - this is profanity.

                However, further formation in the winter of 1941 four regiments(!) And the headquarters of the two brigades, things did not go. It soon became clear that units armed with French armored vehicles could not be used in accordance with the tactics of the Wehrmacht tank forces. And mainly because of the technical imperfection of captured troop vehicles. As a result, already at the end of 1941, all regiments that had French tanks were rearmed with German and Czechoslovak combat vehicles. The liberated trophy equipment went to manning numerous separate units and subunits, which carried mainly security services in the occupied territories, including SS units and armored trains. The geography of their service was quite extensive: from the Channel Islands in the west to Russia in the east and from Norway in the north to Crete in the south. - A significant part of the combat vehicles was converted into various kinds of self-propelled guns, tractors and special vehicles.

                So the maximum is 4 regiments on French technology - a little more than one division.
                1. DimerVladimer
                  DimerVladimer 17 July 2018 11: 02
                  +2
                  Here are more accurate numbers for the entire German army:
                  https://history.wikireading.ru/59060
                  Having captured such a large number of French tanks, the Germans began to form regiments, which was enough to create four tank divisions equipped with 399 Hotchkiss tanks and 190 Somois tanks.
                  However, these combat vehicles were not quite suitable for service on the front line, and in the tank units they soon began to be replaced with tanks of Czech and German production.
                  A large number of French tanks of dubious combat quality were converted into more useful self-propelled guns - anti-tank guns or howitzers of 105 mm or 150 mm caliber were installed on the chassis [123]. In 1943, French tanks were turned into anti-tank self-propelled guns. This became possible after the installation of 37-, 47- and 75-mm anti-tank guns on them. A small number of them were installed on the chassis of the Hotchkiss and F.C.M. tanks. An example of such self-propelled guns was Marder I. After installing the gun on the Lorraine tractor, the Panzerjager fur 75 Pak 40 1 (Sf) Lorraine Slepper (f) self-propelled gun was created. In 1942-1943, Becker's factory converted 184 such self-propelled guns. They were stationed in France and took part in the battles in Normandy in 1944.


                  In the spring of 1941, several German units were armed with French tanks intended to invade the Soviet Union.
                  The first part, equipped with French tanks and entered the battle in Russia, was the 21st tank battalion, in which there were S-35 and H-39 tanks. This battalion attacked the territory of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 on the Finnish border, together with the Finnish army, which moved to Leningrad, and the German, which chose the direction of the attack Murmansk. The 2nd Panzer Group, under the command of Colonel General Guderian, which was part of Army Group Center, rushed to the lands of Ukraine. One of the three corps also included the 18th Panzer Division (partially equipped with captured French armored vehicles).
                  After the invasion of Russia, two new tank divisions were created - the 22nd and 23rd, formed in France in September 1941. Initially, they were equipped with French tanks, but a year after their technical flaws became apparent on the Eastern Front, they had to be replaced with German and Czech armored vehicles. A small number of French-made tanks, including several converted into flamethrower, were sent to the Crimea in mid-1941 to support the German and Romanian units that fought there.


                  When the 1942th Panzer Division arrived from France on the Eastern Front in April 6, there were no tanks in it. From the French surplus, the 11th Tank Regiment received 20 Somois and Hotchkisses [128]. Only two months later the division received the PzKpfw III. It was fully equipped in September. When at the end of 1942 the 6th Panzer Division returned to Russia and made the ill-fated attempt to save the 6th Army blocked in Stalingrad, experienced tankers were forced to abandon the French tanks so unloved by them.


                  The French Char B, obviously, could still resist the lighter Soviet tanks, like the poorly armored BT-7 and T-26 (created based on the American and British designs, respectively). However, the French armored vehicles could not be compared with the heavier tanks T-28, KV-1 and T-34 and were quickly used up at the very beginning of the Russian campaign. Part of the French tanks was used during the invasion of the Balkans, where it was later used for guard functions. However, their technical insecurity led to the fact that French-made armored vehicles had to be returned to France, where it was mainly used by Hitler to counter the landing of the Anglo-Americans in 1944. On the Western Front, three German tank battalions and parts of two divisions were equipped with French tanks.

                  "The Great Tank Robbery. Hitler's Trophy Armor"
                  Tucker-Jones Anthony - Read a detailed study of where captured French armored vehicles went.
                  1. Sweetheart
                    Sweetheart 18 July 2018 14: 31
                    +2
                    All your knowledge?
                    Well, it’s necessary in more detail, in more detail, so as not to act as a lawyer for the Panzervaffe and Guitlar to the heap.
                    a detailed study of where the captured French armored vehicles went.
                    http://arsenal-info.ru/b/book/1942787827/6
                    Even such frank trash was used.
                    A story about the use of captured French tanks in the Wehrmacht would be incomplete without mentioning the FT 17/18. As a result of the 1940 campaign, the Germans captured 704 Renault FT tanks, of which only about 500 were in good condition. Part of the cars was repaired under the designation Pz.Kpfw. 17R 730 (f) or 18R 730 (f) (tanks with a cast turret) was used for patrol and security service. Renault also served to train drivers in German units in France. Some of the disarmed vehicles were used as mobile command and observation posts. In April 1941, a hundred Renault FTs with 37-mm guns were allocated to strengthen armored trains. They were mounted on railway platforms, thus receiving additional armored cars. These armored trains patrolled the roads along the English Channel. In June 1941, a number of armored trains from the Renault were allocated to fight partisans in the occupied territories. Five tanks on railway platforms were used to protect roads in Serbia. For the same purpose, several Renaults were used in Norway. Constantly exploited the captured Renault and Luftwaffe, which used them (about 100 in total) to protect airfields, as well as to clear runways. For this, bulldozer dumps were installed on several tanks without towers.
                    Quote: DimerVladimer
                    Here are more accurate

                    Yeah .. more precisely nowhere ...
          2. Vladimir 5
            Vladimir 5 16 July 2018 16: 53
            +1
            You, my dear, seem to be a propagandist without factual (based on documented facts) knowledge - you didn’t use French tanks on the eastern front, you used armored vehicles and cars. You seem to be the one to whom the victory of your opinion is the main thing, the rest is not important ... About the truth, so compare the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht for the entire war, and until 1944 this difference was almost many times more, the German losses went after the assassination attempt on Hitler in July 1944 and further split of the Wehrmacht into Nazis and quiet anti-Nazis. , and it was already another Wehrmacht, it was only retreating and suffering significant losses ... For some reason, they analyze events on the Eastern Front, always in isolation from a temporary cut-off of other events of the World War, although they have a significant effect on everything, including happening on the Eastern Front ..
            1. figwam
              figwam 16 July 2018 17: 54
              14
              Well, if you do not know this, then this is your omission not related to reality.
              June 1941 Ukrainian SSR.



              1. figwam
                figwam 16 July 2018 18: 47
                0
                The same French

                In the ditch our Ba-10

                USSR
                1. figwam
                  figwam 16 July 2018 19: 07
                  +6
                  But the Germans had more than a thousand such armored tractors "Shenylett".

                  With a flick of the wrist, more than 700 pieces that could fight 90% of Soviet tanks in the summer of 1941 turned into a light self-propelled gun.

                  1. yehat
                    yehat 17 July 2018 16: 11
                    +2
                    Germans mainly used such wedges and tractors as artillery tugs
                    they say that German artillery was horse drawn, but this is not entirely true - anti-tank guns were often transported by vehicles and armored personnel carriers
                    field guns and howitzers were hauled by special tractors and trophy wedges from France, Poland and England, which were captured by more than a thousand.
                    I have never seen such self-propelled guns, even references, but given the number of self-propelled guns that were released, even using our captured weapons, I won’t be surprised that there were enough of them.
            2. Vlad.by
              Vlad.by 17 July 2018 09: 20
              +2
              Well, yes, both Czech and Hungarian were not used ...
              Above is just one of the links. Forgot German, revealed a terrible secret ...
            3. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 17 July 2018 11: 19
              +2
              Quote: Vladimir 5
              French tanks were not used on the eastern front; armored vehicles and cars were used.

              What, really and Panzer-Abteilung 211 was not?
            4. bubalik
              bubalik 17 July 2018 22: 25
              +2
              Vladimir 5 ↑
              Yesterday, 17: 53
              You, my dear, seem like a propagandist without factual (based on documented facts) knowledge - you did not use French tanks on the Eastern front,

              ,,,,,, 23 June with the 5.00 Germans began shelling the Citadel, while they had to try not to hit their soldiers, surrounded in the church. Shelling lasted all day. German infantry strengthened positions around the positions of the defenders of the fortress.
              For the first time, German tanks were used against the Brest Fortress. More precisely - captured French tanks Somua S-35 - armed with 47 caliber mm and 7,5 mm machine gun, well-armored and fast enough. They were 3 pieces - part of the armored train N28.
              One of these tanks was hit by hand grenades at the North Gate of the fortress. The second tank broke into the central courtyard of the Citadel, but was shot down by the guns of the 333 regiment. The Germans managed to evacuate both wrecked tanks. The third tank was hit by an anti-aircraft gun in the northern gate of the fortress.
              On 22 June 1941, in the East, there were 6 armored trains with medium-sized Soma S-35 tanks installed on special platforms. According to the folding ramps, the tanks could move to the ground in order to take part in the battle as part of the so-called "amphibious groups". Armored trains N 26, 27, 28 had two 3 tanks on the team, N 29, 30, 31 - two, in total, 15 machines. The S-35 28 armored train was attached to the 45 Infantry Division during the storming of the Brest Fortress.
              1. bubalik
                bubalik 17 July 2018 22: 28
                +2
                Used S-35 on different parts of the Soviet-German front,
            5. Sweetheart
              Sweetheart 18 July 2018 18: 57
              +1
              Quote: Vladimir 5
              - French tanks were not used on the eastern front, armored vehicles and cars were used.

              Quote: Vladimir 5
              a detailed study of where the captured French armored vehicles went.
              http://arsenal-info.ru/b/book/1942787827/6
              Even such frank trash was used.
              A story about the use of captured French tanks in the Wehrmacht would be incomplete without mentioning the FT 17/18. As a result of the 1940 campaign, the Germans captured 704 Renault FT tanks, of which only about 500 were in good condition. Part of the cars was repaired under the designation Pz.Kpfw. 17R 730 (f) or 18R 730 (f) (tanks with a cast turret) was used for patrol and security service. Renault also served to train drivers in German units in France. Some of the disarmed vehicles were used as mobile command and observation posts. In April 1941, a hundred Renault FTs with 37-mm guns were allocated to strengthen armored trains.

              Study .. At the same time, look at the photo, look at the self-propelled gun base ..
          3. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 19 July 2018 02: 08
            0
            There were no 4000 tanks in the entire French army. The Briton has a clear typo: instead of 400 - 4000. But even these 400 were not allowed into battle in June 41st. Only with the capture of Sevastopol they were used. It was them who had to be blown up by bundles of grenades to sailors.
            1. Sweetheart
              Sweetheart 19 July 2018 06: 41
              +6
              Quote: voyaka uh
              But these 400 were not allowed into battle in June 41st. Only with the capture of Sevastopol they were used

              "Why then are there photos of broken tanks from Brest to Moscow? Tanks, self-propelled guns, of French origin, are it unprofitable for you to see this?"
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 19 July 2018 10: 29
              +3
              Quote: voyaka uh
              But these 400 were not allowed into battle in June 41st.

              Somua S35 armored train number 28 went into battle during the storming of the Brest Fortress.
              Panzer-Abteilung 211 on the Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H38 participated in the Kandalaksha operation (started July 1, 1941).
      2. kig
        kig 17 July 2018 10: 16
        +1
        Well, what are you all about the author! The author read the book, got excited, and presented us with something like a compendium on the topic of what he read. Read the source, there are a lot of links to archives, maps, the issue of losses and calculation methods is also addressed there. Read books, not statements!
    5. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 July 2018 11: 52
      +4
      Quote: Molot1979
      Funny with the Germans with losses. Lose, or win, and always lose 10-20 times less than ours.

      So the reasons for our high losses near Prokhorovka were voiced, EMNIP, in all articles of the cycle - the battlefield remained with the Germans.
      As a result, all the equipment remaining on the battlefield, including the one that could be repaired, went into irrevocability with us. And the Germans were able to repair or evacuate their damaged cars to the rear.
      1. yehat
        yehat 16 July 2018 14: 26
        0
        our equipment even in the year 44, when it was constantly advancing, was far from always being repaired
        the approach is partly to blame - the resources of the tanks were small and did not bother with the repair - they just received new equipment brought in from the rear communications.
        but often there were stupid things - for example, tankers began to fight like infantry, often with guns or trophy equipment alone and the crew disappeared, but they no longer needed the tank.
        1. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 16 July 2018 15: 15
          +4
          Quote: yehat
          our equipment even in the year 44, when it was constantly advancing, was far from always being repaired


          Not true!
          The return from damaged tanks in the second half of the war (when the battlefield mostly remained with us) from an average of 3 to 4,6 - this is in addition to the fact that the chassis (track rollers of the sloth track) was often repaired by the crew without reaching the rematt.
          That is, in addition to irretrievably lost tanks, each could be repaired several times. At the beginning of the war, all slightly damaged tanks that lost the ability to move were lost to our troops.
          4,6 - a figure from the Berlin operation, when hits from a panzer shrek or faustpatron led to the death of the crew, and in most cases the tank remained intact and even on the go.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 16 July 2018 16: 43
          +6
          Quote: yehat
          our equipment even in the year 44, when it was constantly advancing, was far from always being repaired
          the approach is partly to blame - the resources of the tanks were small and did not bother with the repair - they just received new equipment brought in from the rear communications.

          Just in 1944, the issues of military repair of equipment were taken seriously. On the one hand, the factories began to send brigades to the front, who in practice trained military repairmen. On the other hand, repair units began to saturate with technology - in which, in particular, land lease helped. On the third hand, they began to change the OSh of repairmen - strengthening existing units and creating new levels. So, in 1944 the number of mobile tank repair plants (PTRZ) and mobile tank aggregate repair plants (PTARZ) was brought to 4 and 9, respectively.
          The capacities of repair divisions of tank formations and units increased. So, the production capacity of the RTO in current repairs was (units per month): in a separate tank brigade - 130, in a tank brigade that is part of the corps - 107, in a heavy tank regiment - 33, in a heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - 36, in the tank regiment - 20.
          © tankfront
          1. yehat
            yehat 17 July 2018 12: 38
            0
            all this is so, only my grandfather told me that along the roads there were full abandoned tanks, or just a breakdown, or the engine was pulled out, or something else, but there were a lot of them. You have given the rate of return after repair during shelling with Fausts.
            And where did they return and when? The crews on the t34 steadily suffered serious casualties and even if the tank was ready, the crew could not be repaired. Therefore, a return coefficient of 4.6 looks strange. In general, I believe that in the statistics you quoted there is a lot of guile and a game of numbers. According to our data, about 1800 of our vehicles were hit in the Berlin operation (not only tanks, but also self-propelled guns and other armored vehicles like tractors), about a quarter with a complete loss of crew, many with partial losses. Suppose all these tanks were repaired the next day - who will drive them ??? A tank is not a PCA. It can’t be mastered in a couple of hours.
            ps that’s why our tankers loved drawing - the crews there suffered relatively low losses due to powerful reservations and, unlike the IS, could quickly get out of there when hit.
            1. The comment was deleted.
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 18 July 2018 18: 46
              +6
              Quote: yehat
              all this is so, only my grandfather told me that along the roads there were full abandoned tanks, or just a breakdown, or the engine was pulled out, or something else, but there were a lot of them.

              If the tank is pulled out to the road, it means either it is waiting for evacuation, or it simply fell behind on the march.
              Quote: yehat
              And where did they return it and when? The crews on the t34 steadily suffered serious casualties and even if the tank was ready, the crew could not be repaired.

              No one has canceled the replenishment.
              Moreover, usually the numbers and percentages of crew losses are given not for damaged, but for destroyed tanks (including those burned down) that could not be restored. In the event of damage, anything happened ... remember the classic:
              Maleshkin’s self-propelled gun was stolen from the ferry and dragged to the rear to change the gun. The guys fought, fought for Kiev, and all this time he was sitting near the empty case of his self-propelled guns. For this, Pashka Telenkov awarded him the title of “corps general”. It stuck to Maleshkin so much that now rarely did anyone call him junior lieutenant.
              © Kurochkin
              Or the dreams of the driver Shcherbak about the disc in the MTO: the car - kaput, and everyone is alive.
              Moreover, one can believe this artistic story - for under the guise of Maleshkin, the book describes Lieutenant Kurochkin himself from 1893 sap. The only inconsistency - the author still survived, although he was seriously injured in 1945. And the rest - everything is generally true, there were even knocked out “tigers” (moreover, confirmed by the docks of “Leibstandart”). smile
              A careful reading of the volume of Schneider also reveals that the scene "... They entered the battle suddenly, on the move for the village of Antopol-Boyarka ..." (c) is not a writer's fiction of uv. Victor Alexandrovich Kurochkin. As well as the 2 Tigers destroyed there on December 29, 1943. Only the "animals" in the village were not "Dead Head", as it is written in "NKNV", but "Adolf Hitler", and not with some nameless "Fritzs" on board, but with the participation of the crews of Wendorf and Wittmann, as well as their themselves.
              1. bubalik
                bubalik 18 July 2018 19: 40
                +3
                for the village of Antopol-Boyarka

                December 29 "tiger" company "Leibstandard" wrote off two of its four tanks: the machine Untersharführer G. Kunze (badly wounded) and G. Staak (wounded). For this battle, and the "tiger" shot down, Lieutenant Kurochkin was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, II degree.

                Victor Kurochkin
                1. Sergey Pavlovich
                  Sergey Pavlovich 19 July 2018 22: 22
                  +1
                  However, in his doc. Book, he (V. Kurochkin) describes the death of Mr. Maleshkin from an accidental fragment - WHY? if stayed alive.
                2. Yuri Nikolaev_2
                  Yuri Nikolaev_2 19 July 2018 23: 21
                  +2
                  And after the war, when several of his books were already published, our valiant muses, oh, I’m sorry, the policemen, made the hero disabled, which greatly shortened his life. And you can still recall the military legless disabled people that our "people's proletarian" state collected as stray dogs, and in a crowd drove to the "Solovetsky sanatorium", where they were kept a little better than cattle. As the "great leader, father of the people" said: there is no man - there is no problem.
    6. yehat
      yehat 16 July 2018 14: 16
      0
      Well, partly you are right, but on the other hand, there are simply not voiced aspects.
      For example, the monstrous consumption of ammunition by the Germans. In principle, they could not conduct active actions for more than a few days. Near Prokhorovka we had huge stocks of shells and bombs, but the Germans spent even more.
    7. Warrior2015
      Warrior2015 17 July 2018 00: 16
      +1
      Quote: Molot1979
      And then it somehow strange turns out: all 800 people are lost, the armored vehicles are whole, the Russians were smashed to smithereens, and the offensive suddenly failed at first, and then completely went back.

      In fact, everything is more complicated. When there was already a deadline for the implementation of the Citadel plan, the German strategists as a whole did not plan a strategic or operational environment anymore, since They started talking about multilayer defense lines (this was planned only with a very favorable set of circumstances). At the end of the Germans, the battle of Kursk was conceived for another - to make a second Verdun, to grind Soviet shock armor and aviation. Which in many respects was possible, simply with much larger losses than the Wehrmacht strategists had planned ...
    8. Grigory_78
      Grigory_78 19 July 2018 01: 32
      +2
      I already wrote above, but I repeat. Pisaka and Di Welt, using archival documents, convincingly said that under Prokhorovka the Germans lost 3 tanks against 400 destroyed T-34s. The whole point is that the Germans did not consider the equipment evacuated for repair to be lost, no matter how badly it was damaged. In fact, they did not manage to restore most of the tanks. And the same tanks captured during our attack on repair bases near Kharkov were again not taken into account in losses - they were faulty, did not participate in battles, they just became "temporarily unavailable for repair". The Germans have the same statistics about losses - in the memoirs of war veterans it is often mentioned that they had heard from the enemy trenches the speech of Italians, Poles, Slovaks, Romanians ... So - the Wehrmacht took into account the losses of the Germans, leaving the Allies to consider their losses themselves. How many Hungarians died during the Second World War on the side of the enemy is not a fact that someone will want to answer truthfully. But some indirect evidence speaks for itself.
      https://topwar.ru/120039-o-vengrah-kotoryh-pod-vo
      ronezhem-ne-brali-v-plen.html
      http://m.mywebs.su/blog/history/2282/
      1. Sergey Pavlovich
        Sergey Pavlovich 19 July 2018 22: 36
        0
        Gregory_78
        Quite right, the Germans had a VERY casuistic accounting system for tank losses - in practice, the tank was “crossed out” ONLY when it PHYSICALLY ceased to exist. The German almost always exploded, and then burned (but not always, but ours, by the way), such a tank practically had only a hull, but remained “on paper in the ranks”, because it can still be repaired i.e. COMPLETE ALL over again.
        If they happened to "return" their tanks (which ours used as trophies), and it was already decommissioned, they simply did not know how to legalize it, they had to write "an unknown tank was captured."
    9. Nikita_Shmik
      Nikita_Shmik 2 December 2018 09: 51
      0
      Have you even tried to read further? The offensive "failed" so much that it continued for three more days. Moreover, we are not talking about some small attacks, there was a full-fledged environment in which several tens of thousands of servicemen of the 48th rifle corps fell.
      Only after that did the Germans begin to dismantle the strike force, freeing up mobile reserves for the needs of the front.
  5. Mountain shooter
    Mountain shooter 16 July 2018 07: 24
    12
    The bitter truth is better ... than any half-truth. To the author - respect. We bow to the earth to the courage of our soldiers. The enemy was strong and terrible. But we defeated him. Having learned, including what had to learn at Prokhorovka.
    1. Sweetheart
      Sweetheart 16 July 2018 11: 25
      16
      Quote: Mountain Shooter
      The bitter truth is better.

      When the already bitter truth is begun to be filled with fables and horror stories, the main thing is lost in the understanding of the former- "ARMOR.


      To the question with whom and how the Wehrmacht fought in 1945.

      According to the presence of German armored vehicles on the Eastern and Western fronts in 1944 - 1945, there is very reliable information on the number, types of armored vehicles, its combat readiness. Let us consider in more detail the statistics for the last year and a half of the Second World War. And so that we are not accused of "communist propaganda", we will use only German data.
      On June 10, 1944, the inspector general of the armored forces provided A. Hitler with a report on the presence of armored vehicles on the Western Front. However, it should be borne in mind that only three of the listed divisions were directly on the front line, while the rest were reorganized and received a new material part. Including those formations that were withdrawn from the Eastern Front.


      Thus, at the beginning of June 1944, there were 39 “three rubles”, 758 “fours”, 655 “panthers”, 102 “tigers”, 158 self-propelled guns “shtugs” and 179 captured (mostly French) tanks on the Western Front. A total of 1891 units of armored vehicles. A very high indicator, since most of the compounds just received a new technique.

      On the Eastern Front, there are no less comprehensive data:

      * In brackets - received during June 1944.

      Thus, on May 31 on the Soviet-German front there were available: 176 self-propelled guns "Shtug", 603 "fours", 313 "panthers" and 298 "tigers". Another 92 "pieces", 123 "fours", 265 "panthers" and 32 "tigers" entered the troops from May 31 to June 30, 1944. On June 30, 1902 tanks and self-propelled guns were available, excluding those lost during the Bagration operation by the Soviet troops, due to the specifics of accounting for German armored vehicles, they fell into “no return” in the next two months.
      Consequently, even on the eve of the Allied landing in Normandy, which Hitler was so afraid of, the number of armored vehicles on the Eastern and Western Front was equal. But if we try to compare these indicators in dynamics, then the picture will be completely different (only tanks without self-propelled guns,).

      According to Thomas Jents [3], in May 1944:
      West: 53 tigers, 543 panthers, 759 fours. Only 1355 units.
      East: 307 tigers, 292 panthers, 771 quartet. Only 1370 units.

      As you can see, in the month of May parity between the West and the East remained. Already in September (data for September 15, 1944), the situation is changing:
      West: 45 Tigers, 150 Panthers, 133 Fours. Only 328 units.
      East: 267 “tigers”, 728 “panthers” and 610 “fours”. A total of 1605 units.

      Obviously, a certain amount of armored vehicles was lost by the Germans on the Western Front during the battles with the Anglo-American forces. However, it is also evident that the bulk of the new armored vehicles went to the Soviet-German front. In particular, the number of “panthers” in the East has grown two and a half times in just three months.

      September 30, 1944. West: 54 tigers, 194 panthers, 123 fours. A total of 371 units.
      East: 249 “tigers”, 721 “panthers” and 579 “fours”. Only 1549 units.

      As can be seen from the statistics and at the end of September, the main part of the Panzerwaffe's combat vehicles, 5/6, is on the Soviet-German front.

      October 31, 1944. West: 49 Tigers, 222 Panthers, 243 Fours. A total of 514 cars.
      East: 278 “tigers”, 672 “panthers”, 707 “fours”. A total of 1657 cars.

      November 15, 1944. West: 88 Tigers, 329 Panthers, 293 Fours. Only 710 units.
      East: 276 “tigers”, 658 “panthers”, 687 “fours”. A total of 1621 cars. That is, in November more than 2/3 of the tanks were on the Soviet-German front.

      November 30, 1944. West: 62 tigers, 285 panthers, 328 fours. Only 675 cars.
      East: 246 “tigers”, 625 “panthers”, 697 “fours”. A total of 1568 cars. Again more than 2/3 of the tanks in the East.

      December 15 1944:
      West: 123 “tigers”, 471 “panthers”, 503 “fours”. Only 1097 cars.
      East: 268 “tigers,” 737 “panthers,” 704 “fours.” A total of 1709 cars.

      It is clearly seen that on the Western Front the concentration of armored vehicles for the Ardennes operation ended. However, on the Eastern Front, the Germans are preparing for the January "Konrad" - attempts to unlock the garrison of Budapest. On the Soviet-German front almost every 2 out of 3 German tanks.

      December 30 1944:
      West: 116 tigers, 451 panthers, 550 fours. A total of 1117 cars.
      East: 261 tigers, 726 panthers, 768 fours. A total of 1755 units.

      The Germans are advancing on both fronts (formally, “Konrad I” began on January 2). And again, the ratio of German armored vehicles is 1,5: 1 in favor of the Soviet-German front. Although the Ardennes counterattack is in full swing.

      15 January 1945:
      West: 110 Tigers, 487 Panthers, 594 Fours. Only 1191 cars.
      East: 199 tigers, 707 panthers, 736 fours. A total of 1642 units.
      The ratio remains 1,4: 1.

      March 15, 1945, latest update:
      West: 36 tigers, 152 panthers, 257 fours. A total of 445 units.
      East: 208 “tigers”, 762 “panthers” and 1239 “fours”. A total of 2209 units of equipment. "
      Every 5 out of 6 German tanks are at war with the Russians!
      And here the author bothered to calculate meticulously who. Where, when and how much ..
      https://mihalchuk-1974.livejournal.com/156353.htm
      l
      So, according to the data of the German General Staff (very incomplete) presented to A. Hitler, the irretrievable losses on the Eastern Front from December 1, 1943 to March 31, 1944 amounted to: combat vehicles based on Pz. II - 40 pcs., Pz. III - 121 pcs., Pz. III Flamm - 21 pcs., Pz. IV of all modifications - 816 pcs., Ammunition transporters based on Pz. IV - 20 pcs., Pz. V Panther - 347 pcs., Pz. VI Ausf E. "Tiger" - 158 pcs., Pz. VI Ausf B "Royal Tiger" - 8 pcs., Commander tanks - 184 pcs., StuG self-propelled guns of all modifications - 1085 pcs. Total for 4 months: 2 units of armored vehicles were destroyed on the Eastern Front.

      During the same time, Italy was destroyed: combat vehicles based on Pz. II - 4 pcs., Pz. III - 11 pcs., Pz. III Flamm - 5 pcs., Pz. IV of all modifications - 75 pcs., Ammunition conveyors based on Pz. IV - 2 pcs., Pz. V Panther - 11 pcs., Pz. VI Ausf E. "Tiger" - 8 pcs. , commander tanks - 8 pcs., StuG self-propelled guns of all modifications - 28 pcs. Total: 152 units of armored vehicles.
      1. figwam
        figwam 16 July 2018 14: 27
        +8
        Sweetheart

        Statistics, a stubborn thing, as it is known, it shows the scale of the hostilities and how our artillery, infantry, tankers and aircraft fought compared to the second front and who broke the back of Nazism and made it possible for us to live.
        Thank you
        Sweetheart
        to you for interesting links.
        1. Sweetheart
          Sweetheart 16 July 2018 14: 30
          +5
          Quote: figvam
          Thank you
          Swordsman for interesting links.

          Always happy to help. soldier
  6. andrewkor
    andrewkor 16 July 2018 08: 27
    0
    And at this time, on July 9-10, the operation "Husky" -Attachment of allies in Sicily began! Somehow in time, do not you?
  7. RomanRoman
    RomanRoman 16 July 2018 09: 04
    10
    The biggest problem of most local analysts is that they retell Soviet literature, mentioning only a few archival data. Reading the cycle, I was waiting for a short talk about the tragedy itself under Prokhorovka.
    And the truth is very simple. Because of the stupid command of those who later wrote their memoirs, the battle was completely lost.
    The battlefield was left for the Germans, who at night quietly drew off their wrecked tanks for repairs (there were more than 30), and all the wounded Soviet tanks that could not be repaired and put into battle were simply undermined.
    As a result, the irretrievable losses of the spacecraft are the 324 of the tank (various sources give approximately such a number with small deviations). The Germans irretrievably lost THREE tanks !!!
    That's what you need to talk about, not about Rotmistrov and Zhukov.
    This will make it possible to understand what kind of commanding stupidity and the blood of ordinary fighters gave a general victory, and draw at least some conclusions for the future.
    Speaking of losses on the Kursk Bulge. Some crews during the battle changed the top ten combat vehicles.
    That's because they jumped out of the tanks at the first hits. That is why such a difference in losses between the Russians and the Germans.
    If the battlefield under Prokhorovka had been left behind us, I have no doubt that more than half of the lost tanks would be back in the day after the 1-2.
    That's what you need to write about. Although the author still thanks.
    1. demiurg
      demiurg 16 July 2018 09: 22
      10
      Quote: RomanRoman

      The Germans irretrievably lost THREE tanks !!!

      Do not borscht, as many as three tanks. Let's at least two.
    2. figwam
      figwam 16 July 2018 11: 02
      +9
      Quote: RomanRoman
      The Germans irretrievably lost THREE tanks !!!

      Another iksperdik ...
    3. Sweetheart
      Sweetheart 16 July 2018 11: 37
      +8
      Quote: RomanRoman
      Reading the cycle, I was waiting for a short talk about the tragedy near Prokhorovka.

      Is the tragedy of the Panzerfaffe and the Wehrmacht important to you?
      You directly feared for the exterminated hordes of invaders.
      Colonel General G. Frisner, commander of the Army Group Southern Ukraine: “It is absolutely true that the highest Soviet command, starting with Stalingrad, often exceeded all our expectations. It masterfully carried out a quick maneuver and transfer of troops, shifting the direction of the main attack, showed skill in creating bridgeheads and equipping them with their initial positions for the subsequent transition to the offensive ... "
      Wehrmacht veterans Wieder and Adam say: “In 1943, the defeats of the Wehrmacht were served by victories. The "cemeteries" of Soviet tanks, motor vehicles, killed and prisoners were shown. In the newsreel, after several shots, the Russians started to flee. But in the cinema halls where the wounded German front-line soldiers were sitting, a whistle was rising, shouts were lies! Not a single soldier or officer is now talking dismissively about Ivan, although not long ago they said that all the time. The soldier of the Red Army every day more and more often acts as a master of close combat, street battles and skillful disguise "
      Quote: RomanRoman
      If the battlefield under Prokhorovka had been left behind us, I have no doubt that more than half of the lost tanks would be back in the day after the 1-2.

      Well .. and now Heinrici will answer you. Beaten German general.
      "General Heinrici, claims that despite the minor discrepancies of the 4th TA Gotha during the operation, the Citadel lost up to 60% of tanks and assault guns, of which 15-20% could not be recovered. This would amount to 629 armored vehicles from of which 20% (126) are subject to cancellation. Kempf lost 336 armored units, of which 67 (20%) are irretrievable, and the 9th Army of Model 647 and 130, respectively. The resulting total losses of GA South amounted to 193 armored vehicles irretrievably. In total, according to Heinrici, German troops lost 1612 tanks and assault guns during the Citadel operation, 323 of them were destroyed. Given that the actual decrease was much higher, not 193, but 290 units — the loss of both army groups would amount to about 420 armored units . "http://www.battlefield.ru/kursk-bat
      tle-totals / stranitsa-4-poteri-protivnika-v-bronet
      ekhnike.html
      1. Vlad.by
        Vlad.by 17 July 2018 09: 37
        0
        Yes, they all lie!
        The "expert" told you clearly and authoritatively - only 3 (three) tanks irretrievably lost throughout the Kursk Bulge!
        Do not belittle the great German army. How can you!
    4. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 16 July 2018 15: 46
      +2
      Quote: RomanRoman
      If the battlefield under Prokhorovka had been left behind us, I have no doubt that more than half of the lost tanks would be back in the day after the 1-2.


      Quite right - the probability that the tank will burn out completely (and the T-34 was blown up in the armored hull when the tank exploded and the tank could no longer be restored) is not too high - each wrecked tank with a damaged landing gear or stuck in an anti-tank ditch could be restored within 2-4 days (if the battlefield was ours).
      According to statistics, armored vehicles underwent up to 3 4 repairs in the battalion in the second half of the war.
      That is, thirty-four after the Prokhorov massacre, it was probably possible to recover more than half of those killed - crew losses of about 27-30%.
      The T-70 is more complicated - a light tank with symbolic armor was usually destroyed with a high probability.
    5. not main
      not main 17 July 2018 00: 16
      +2
      Quote: RomanRoman
      As a result, the irretrievable losses of the spacecraft are the 324 of the tank (various sources give approximately such a number with small deviations). The Germans irretrievably lost THREE tanks !!!

      I’ll probably run into a ban! But I will say: "pi..t’t not turn bags!"
  8. Lebedev
    Lebedev 16 July 2018 09: 10
    +7
    Forty and forty, forty ruble .... Did you take matches? I didn’t take ... Three sixty!
  9. Yuri Guliy
    Yuri Guliy 16 July 2018 09: 28
    +2
    How great is the power of art and the possibilities of propaganda! All domestic films I saw about the Kursk Bulge, as well as school education and literary works, have convinced us about our unconditional victory in the greatest oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka. Everything turns out "a little" differently ...
    Someone from the overseas said that they can transform their defeats into victories, I wonder if he admired us or vice versa?
    1. yehat
      yehat 16 July 2018 14: 39
      +3
      judging by the reports, the Prokhorov battle was of 3 stages
      Stage 1 is what the author of the article describes. the crowd of t34 and t70 is pushed in a narrow place under 2 km of the continuous field covered by artillery of the PTO, which is guaranteed to penetrate from 1.5 km and t34 and t70 plus field howitzers, from which the mortars cutting off infantry also got joy.
      the second stage - complete chaos on the battlefield, rapprochement ends and mutual cutting often begins at point blank range, everything is smoky and nothing is visible.
      the third stage already in the evening - the counterattack of the tiger battalion with support from the flank - this is the part that was described in history, silent about the first two.
    2. Yuri Nikolaev_2
      Yuri Nikolaev_2 19 July 2018 23: 53
      +1
      When filming "Liberation", a whole group of consultants with big stars constantly slowed down the process, forcing the director to redo this or that episode. One person from the author's team at that time met with disgraced Zhukov and asked him why they were so nit-picking?
      - "They want to win in the cinema those battles that (I apologize - direct speech) swept through life."
      Zhukov for me is by no means an authority, but nonetheless.
  10. vindigo
    vindigo 16 July 2018 09: 38
    +4
    I remember reading the Soviet military encyclopedia. And after a brief description of the battle and the consequences for the course of the war, the losses of both sides were indicated there. So the difference there was almost 1 to 10. I still remember thinking what a victory it was, that so many of our people died? And how is it that in the battle the defender suffers greater losses than the advancing one?
  11. vvvjak
    vvvjak 16 July 2018 10: 01
    +2
    Some time ago I read analytical material conducted by the US military on tactics of the USSR army in the Second World War. The bottom line is that if the US military unit finds itself in a difficult combat situation (for example, encirclement), they try to save him by any available means, regardless of the associated losses. Russians (as a rule) sacrifice those around them (attracting as many enemy forces as possible to destroy the unit), while doing counterstrikes (or counterattacks) in other places. Comparing these two tactical tactics, the military came to the surprising conclusion that in the second case there are fewer losses and the Russians still have a strategic advantage when, as a US unit, they actually leave the battlefield. So in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Pyrrhic victory turned into a victory throughout the WWII.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 July 2018 12: 12
      +3
      Quote: vvvjak
      Some time ago I read analytical material conducted by the US military on tactics of the USSR army in the Second World War. The bottom line is that if the US military unit finds itself in a difficult combat situation (for example, encirclement), they try to save him by any available means, regardless of the associated losses. Russians (as a rule) sacrifice those around them (attracting as many enemy forces as possible to destroy the unit), while doing counterstrikes (or counterattacks) in other places.

      The US military pulls an owl on a globe. In a big war, units and formations surrounded during an enemy breakthrough save only if possible. Otherwise, they are given the order to hold on, and they themselves prepare a counterattack in a tactically advantageous place.
      Patton was not eager for Bastogne at all because it was necessary at all costs to save the formations surrounded there. And because Bastogne was the most important transport hub of the southern front of the German offensive: its control by the Americans sharply reduced the Germans' ability to supply and maneuver forces, and Patton’s mechanical units access to it allowed the attack to be developed to the north, cutting this wedge (while having a rear base supplies and good roads).
    2. yehat
      yehat 16 July 2018 14: 48
      +1
      there is no connection between Prokhorovka and the tactics of the encirclement.
      as for the Pyrrhic victory, Vatutin’s great desire for offensive actions affected it. Of the tankmen, only Katukov objected to him, and this was the only tank unit that did not suffer heavy losses when meeting with the German spearhead. Moreover, Vatutin repeatedly proposed to advance, without waiting for the Germans attack.
      1. Yuri Nikolaev_2
        Yuri Nikolaev_2 20 July 2018 00: 05
        0
        The second time I hear about Vatutin’s adventurous, unprepared counterattacks, which cost our big, unjustified losses. The first time I don’t even remember where and from whom. And for those who offer can’t stand dirty linen from the hut, I’ll say that rats and cockroaches will prevail.
        1. yehat
          yehat 20 July 2018 08: 50
          0
          Quote: Yuri Nikolaev_2
          The second time I hear about the adventurous, unprepared counterattacks of Vatutin, which cost our big, unjustified losses.

          Read about Vatutin information. He was very imprisoned for offensive actions and knew how to develop an offensive, he well understood the logistics and the necessary measures, but he greatly overestimated the force of strikes in the conditions of saturated enemy technical means. In general, the embodiment of the pre-war doctrine "in a foreign territory by small ...". He greatly overestimated the ability of the junior commanders to creatively and competently fulfill the general order. Underestimated the role of support means - such as howitzer batteries behind a river near Stalingrad or when crossing the Dnieper. His decisions were often extremely aggressive. As a result, this behavior finally failed him - he ran into partisans and was mortally wounded.
  12. Sinbad
    Sinbad 16 July 2018 10: 27
    0
    Eternal glory !!!
  13. atos_kin
    atos_kin 16 July 2018 10: 44
    +1
    The troops of the Central Front (commander - Army General K.K. Rokossovsky, member of the Military Council - Major General K.F. Telegin) defended the northern face of the Kursk ledge. Troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - Army General N. F. Vatutin, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General N. S. Khrushchev) - southern front.
    It would be interesting to read the analysis by historians in comparison with the decisions made by the commanders and their results during the Battle of Kursk. According to my IMHO, the operation "Citadel" basically blew up the northern face.
    1. yehat
      yehat 16 July 2018 14: 53
      +1
      there not only solutions need to be analyzed
      Vatutin initially got much more difficult conditions - defense in the bare steppe without support points of the relief with troops close in strength, and Rokosovsky had only narrow passages and an advantage over the infantry and a number of other resources.
      Therefore, in the north, the situation from the beginning was almost twice as simple.
      In addition, in the south, the Germans steered Manstein - their best attacking commander.
      If the Germans with the Panthers weren’t so sad (almost all couldn’t join the battle), I don’t know if they could keep the defense.
    2. alstr
      alstr 16 July 2018 21: 02
      +1
      I read the recollections of one of the staff officers. So he said the following about the Kursk Bulge.
      In the North and in the South, similar defensive anti-tank defense lines were created.
      Several BCs were allocated for VET
      However, the difference was that Rokossovsky decided to store the BC mainly near the VET, and Vatutin in the division warehouses. As a result, with a massive German offensive in the south, the defenders quickly ended with BC, but they could not give him a lift, because everything was shot through. Hence the breakthroughs.

      By the way, then at 44 in Belarus the opposite situation happened - the ammunition was laid out next to the guns, but it was not needed. As a result, they left in place, which then affected the pace of the offensive, because it was difficult to deliver from the former base locations of the BC. Until now, they are periodically finding warehouses.
  14. Maltus
    Maltus 16 July 2018 10: 50
    +9
    The author wrote three articles, not a single one, not a map or a diagram!
    1. figwam
      figwam 16 July 2018 11: 01
      +6
      Quote: maltus
      The author wrote three articles, not a single one, not a map or a diagram!

      And why does he need this, then more questions will arise.
  15. wow
    wow 16 July 2018 11: 10
    +6
    "..... stupid Zhukov, Rokossovsky and others ...". But for some reason, the opposing German marshals and generals did not think so at all and sent “faithful sons of Vaterland” to lay tens of thousands every day under our guns, tracks, machine guns and airplanes ...! In another war, unfortunately, are not won. Especially SUCH!
  16. gorenina91
    gorenina91 16 July 2018 11: 21
    +6
    -Something strange ... -under Stalingrad, Hitler rested like a ram, when there was still the opportunity to withdraw and save the army of Paulus ....
    -And near Germans, the Germans were doing much better ... more successful ... and there were real chances to succeed ... -Yes, and our troops suffered such terrible losses, they were practically bloodless and all reserves were spent ... and Hitler suddenly agreed to curtail the operation and the withdrawal of German troops ... -Are the Germans really scared so the Allied landing in Sicily ..?
    1. vvvjak
      vvvjak 16 July 2018 11: 56
      10
      Quote: gorenina91
      Is the Germans scared so the Allied landing in Sicily ..?

      Yeah, "scared scary." If you have won the death fight of a tiger, you are ready to strangle it completely and suddenly release it from a death embrace. a mosquito bit for "opu", then landing in Sicily is a "serious" argument.
      1. Vladimir 5
        Vladimir 5 16 July 2018 19: 58
        -1
        This is already a strategic goal (which is often not taken into account), and Hitler began preparations for the future front in Italy, for which he began to gather and maintain forces, and therefore stopped the attack, and for the same reasons the Germans later retreated. The Allies began military operations in Europe, and through the north of Italy an exit was planned to the underbelly of Germany with all nearby airfields for bombing the south of Germany and the Allies and other bonuses. Because Hitler had to block Italy with a fortified line, and for her to gather strength, which he began to do ...
        1. Vladimir 5
          Vladimir 5 16 July 2018 20: 33
          -1
          Addendum: The Battle of Kursk, as a turning point in the Second World War, is explained to us, but we must consistently add that the defeat at Stalingrad and the African Corps in May 1943, where the Germans' losses are almost comparable to the Stalingrad ones, led the Germans to exhaustion of forces for offensive tactics, and the Citadel was the last breakthrough of breakthroughs on the Eastern Front. Over time, the Red Army, with the supply of allies and its own efforts grew stronger, because the failure of a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front meant a lost war, because to fight in the near future on three fronts: Eastern, Southern Italy and the future Western, Germany meant a clear defeat in WWII ... that the Battle of Kursk was crucial, but only in conjunction with all other events, especially with the emergence of the Southern Front and the planned withdrawal of an ally of Italy from the war with further anti-German actions ... There was a German joke: in order to keep Italy in allies, 10 divisions were needed, to neutralize (occupy) only one ...
    2. figwam
      figwam 16 July 2018 12: 14
      +3
      Quote: gorenina91
      and Hitler suddenly agreed to curtail the operation and the withdrawal of German troops ... -Are the Germans really scared so the Allied landing in Sicily ..?

      Only the remnants of one SS Adolf Hitler division were withdrawn to Italy due to heavy losses, and then only the personnel, of the 190 tanks and self-propelled guns, remained about 50, they gave all the remaining equipment to the SS Reich and Dead Head divisions, which simply retreated because there were not enough people or equipment to hold positions.
      1. vvvjak
        vvvjak 16 July 2018 12: 33
        +3
        They transferred one SS division "Leibstandart" (and not "Adolf Hitler"), without equipment, and then after reformation and replenishment. She "sat" in northern Italy until November 43, especially not taking part in hostilities, and she was thrown back to the eastern front.
        1. figwam
          figwam 16 July 2018 18: 52
          +1
          Quote: vvvjak
          Threw one SS division "Leibstandart" (and not "Adolf Hitler")

          ))) So its full name sounds like that - the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandart SS Adolf Hitler"
    3. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 16 July 2018 15: 55
      +2
      Quote: gorenina91
      -Something strange ... -under Stalingrad, Hitler rested like a ram, when there was still the opportunity to withdraw and save the army of Paulus ....


      This is well known - the front fell apart Italians and the Romanians were broken, the road to Rostov on the Don was open, if Paulus had not been in the ring of battle, the group in the Caucasus would have been cut off and would not have managed to form a new front.
      Yes, and go into light weapons - having abandoned all the equipment and heavy weapons - it would be a useless army that could not contain our attack. And so in the boiler with the available supplies they won time.
      1. Warrior2015
        Warrior2015 17 July 2018 00: 25
        0
        Quote: DimerVladimer
        Yes, and go into light weapons - having abandoned all the equipment and heavy weapons - it would be a useless army that could not contain our attack. And so in the boiler with the available supplies they won time.

        Goering’s factor, which promised a supply by air of the Demyansk type (which the Luftwaffe managed then), was also very affected.
    4. Warrior2015
      Warrior2015 17 July 2018 00: 24
      0
      Quote: gorenina91
      near Stalingrad, Hitler rested like a ram, when it was still possible to withdraw and save the army of Paulus ....

      but after that, not a single large boiler comparable to the Stalingrad one happened on the Soviet-German front. However, they learned from mistakes (unlike ours in 41-42).

      Quote: gorenina91
      And near Kursk, the Germans were doing much better ... better ... and there were real chances to succeed ... Yes, and our troops suffered such monstrous losses, were practically bloodless and all reserves were expended.

      More successful than in Sicily? hmm ... And about the losses - as I already said, the main goal was to inflict losses on our people and stop the offensive power; success in strategic outreach was only "optically" planned.
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 17 July 2018 09: 11
        +4
        Quote: Warrior2015
        but after that, not a single large boiler comparable to the Stalingrad one happened on the Soviet-German front. However, they learned from mistakes (unlike ours in 41-42).


        That is, the Courland boiler (an estimated 250000 people) is not a big enough boiler? Collapsed Army Group Center as a result of Bagration's operation?
        There, a series of boilers of which the largest is Minsk (the collapse of the 4th Army - more than 72 thousand German soldiers died, more than 35 thousand were captured).
        Operation Bargation is a brilliant strategic operation that has ruined the German front in the aggregate of how many hundreds of thousands of prisoners and killed are the largest in terms of the combined forces and assets. The exact losses are unknown.
        Soviet data: 409 thousand German soldiers who died and disappeared,
        150 thousand wounded 158 480 prisoners (!)
        David Glanz: lower estimate - 450 thousand losses to the German side.
        1. Warrior2015
          Warrior2015 17 July 2018 10: 06
          0
          There were no large boilers until the spring of 45, and even Cherkasy and Bagration did not give a large environment. Courland is essentially blocking.

          We better keep silent about Bagration’s “brilliance” - if we compare it with the speed and level of losses among the Germans when they seized the same territories, the picture is not in favor of the Red Army ... But, of course, it looks better than most other Soviet offensives of that time.

          The model resulted in essentially one operation in the Soviet army in the Second World War - Manchurian. But there is another opponent ...
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 18 July 2018 19: 28
            +2
            Quote: Warrior2015
            There were no large boilers until the spring of 45, and even Cherkasy and Bagration did not give a large environment. Courland is essentially blocking.

            Chihiks ... I’m remembering one operation to encircle when the defensive line curved towards the enemy with the German army in the center and the Romanian troops on the flanks was broken through on the flanks, followed by the encirclement of the Germans and the defeat of the encircled group. The number of the German army - 6. Guess the year and place? wink
            Quote: Warrior2015
            It’s better to keep silent about Bagration’s “brilliance” - if you compare the Germans with the speed and level of losses when they captured the same territories, then the picture is not in favor of the Red Army ...

            Well, this is how to look. Both in 1941 and in 1944, operations began on the same day - June 22.
            In 1941, advancing from the border, July 11, the Germans took Vitebsk, July 14 - Mogilev.
            In 1944, advancing from the Vitebsk-Mogilyov line, on July 8, our troops liberated Baranovichi, on July 12 cleared the Minsk boiler, on July 13 freed Vilnius, July 16, Grodno, July 20, Kobrin. In a first approximation, the pace is comparable.
            1. Rt-xnumx
              Rt-xnumx 23 July 2018 08: 32
              0
              In 1944, advancing from the Vitebsk-Mogilyov line, on 8 on July our troops liberated Baranovichi, on July 12 they cleared the Minsk boiler, on July 13 released Vilnius, on July 16 on Grodno, on July 20 Kobrin. In a first approximation - the pace is comparable.


              And the balance of power? Also the same? If the Soviet troops in Belarus in 1944 had the same ratio with the Germans as the German army in 1941 with the Red Army, I’m afraid our troops would not be able to break through the front.
    5. yehat
      yehat 20 July 2018 09: 03
      +1
      near Kursk, the Germans and the Red Army suffered approximately equal losses in manpower, but the material costs and losses of the Germans were much higher. And initially, the Red Army already had about a double numerical superiority in the infantry, and less, but also significant by other means. Therefore, after the completion of the Wehrmacht offensive, it turned out that the Red Army already has a 2-4-fold superiority in forces. Actually, the realization of this made the Germans stop. And the competent strategy of the headquarters of the Red Army allowed to realize this temporary advantage in a very successful counterattack operation.
  17. vanavatny
    vanavatny 16 July 2018 11: 30
    0
    by the way about Kursk: there in the center there is a pedestal with the inscription ,, to tankmen - Heroes of the Battle of Kursk ,, (it seems so), and on it IP 3 ... they managed to paint it in the zero even in the color of granite ...
  18. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 16 July 2018 12: 18
    +4
    And the 194 tank burned, and 146 were hit or out of order on the battlefield and could still be restored. However, a significant part of such combat vehicles was in the territory controlled by the enemy, and he simply blew them up. Thus, the army lost 53% of tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in a counterattack, or 42,7% of all units in service on that day.

    As expected, the loss of Soviet tanks 42,7% of those in service on this day. Even less from all tanks (in service and in repair), but it is not known how many. Irreversible losses of 24,4% of those in service. The enemy blew up a certain number of tanks, but it is not known which one. And having irretrievably lost more than 24%, but it is not known how many tanks, Soviet troops lost their combat effectiveness.
    A number of researchers who deal with this problem agree that this corps lost roughly the 154 tank and the 273 assault guns available at the start of the battle, or 56,4%. Nevertheless, the corps retained its combat capability, since there were not so many burned tanks, only a few dozen. The enemy was able to restore most of the wounded combat vehicles, since almost all of them were in the territory left behind by the enemy.

    The Germans lost 56,4% of the "available" tanks (unknown from all or only from combat worthiness), then they also restored it is not known how many tanks and most importantly it is unknown when they were able to recover, but they remained "completely combat ready". Again, we believe that the Soviet troops are losing 43% and are already combat-ready, the Germans are losing 56% and remain fully combat-ready.
    Soviet troops lost 340 T-34 and T-70 tanks, the Germans - 154 tanks and assault guns, or 2,2 times more, and as a cost, German losses in tanks will be much larger.
    Losses in people are also incomplete, but the Soviet over 7 thousand, and the German only 800. Let’s say that this is true in taking episodes separately, but this particular battle should beat very unusual because with such a loss ratio (9: 1) In 1943, after losing in 1941, and 1942, the war was almost impossible to beat.
  19. dokusib
    dokusib 16 July 2018 12: 55
    12
    I don’t quite understand the author’s logic. According to him, the task of the German troops was to break through the Soviet line of defense. But instead of developing their success, the Germans stop and form a fortified line of defense. After which, reflecting the attack of the Soviet tank units, they destroy from 56 to 77% of their composition, which is a catastrophic loss for the USSR while they themselves lose (sitting on the defensive) the same 56%, but for the Germans it is fie, some dozens of tanks that have some kind by magic power (Ananerbe must) immediately get into operation. In other words, victory, if not absolute, is then quite significant. But Hitler was a little scared of something and turned off the operation "Citadel". And the cunning Russians took advantage of this and lied to everyone that they had won the Battle of Kursk. Or did I misunderstand something? In my opinion, a fairly accurate statement of the meaning of the article. Then I repeat the question: "Where is the logic?"
    1. vvvjak
      vvvjak 16 July 2018 13: 23
      +8
      And you are not looking for the logic of the author, he honestly admitted that in an abridged version he retold the work of the author Zamulin. But the position is simple - the “mediocre” Soviet command once again “dead” abandoned the battlefield, and the Germans lost again thanks to Hitler’s “stupidity” and “timely” help from the Allies (well, there’s still a couple of three points, though not connected with courage and heroism of our soldiers). Now, sitting on the couch, we can talk about the correctness or incorrectness of the Prokhorovsky battle, about the mistakes made. And then it was urgent to "put out the fire" (to liquidate the breakthrough) and the task was completed. If your house is on fire, you need to extinguish it with everything that comes to hand (even with a sheepskin coat for $ 5), otherwise it may be too late for a ride.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 July 2018 14: 21
      +3
      Quote: dokusib
      I don’t quite understand the author’s logic. According to him, the task of the German troops was to break through the Soviet line of defense. But instead of developing their success, the Germans stop and form a fortified line of defense.

      Here everything is just logical - the Germans were waiting for our counterattack, predicted before the start of the operation. And it’s best to meet tanks at prepared positions, having the ability to attract towed anti-tank vehicles and field artillery to the VET. So he sat down 2 CC CC on the defensive just before the impact of Rotmistrov.
      Quote: dokusib
      In other words, victory, if not absolute, is then quite significant. But Hitler was a little scared of something and turned off the operation "Citadel".

      I haven’t turned yet - on July 13-15, 2 CC SSs and 3 TCs “pit” 48 sk 69 A. Ours left a practically closed boiler with heavy losses. There was nothing to fend off German strikes - in 5 Guards. TA in fact there were only 3 brigades, of which only one tank. The army was confined to the mechanized corps in one battle.
      In addition, the Germans were extremely unhappy with the situation on the northern edge of the arc, where their offensive failed miserably.
  20. Bigriver
    Bigriver 16 July 2018 13: 16
    +5
    When did our historians really get their hands on the Kursk then? We continue to chew on Prokhorovka as the fateful battle that became such under Khrushchev and the main marshal of the armored forces of Rotmistrov.
    Katukov and Chistyakov spent a week chopping off in the Oboyan direction, and there was silence about them. And the Germans then shifted the blow to the right, because they could not enter the operational breakthrough through the 1st and 6th armies.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 July 2018 14: 25
      +1
      Quote: BigRiver
      When did our historians really get their hands on the Kursk then? We continue to chew on Prokhorovka as the fateful battle that became such under Khrushchev and the main marshal of the armored forces of Rotmistrov.

      And what do you dislike about Zamulin’s books? In addition to the analysis of Prokhorovka and the events of July 13-15, he does have a “Kursk break”, dedicated to the fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge as a whole. There are Katukov and 6 Guards. AND.
      1. Bigriver
        Bigriver 16 July 2018 16: 15
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Quote: BigRiver
        When did our historians really get their hands on the Kursk then? We continue to chew on Prokhorovka as the fateful battle that became such under Khrushchev and the main marshal of the armored forces of Rotmistrov.

        And what do you dislike about Zamulin’s books? In addition to the analysis of Prokhorovka and the events of July 13-15, he does have a “Kursk break”, dedicated to the fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge as a whole. There are Katukov and 6 Guards. AND.

        Um ... I read only Zamulin "Prokhorovka-unknown battle of the great war." In general, I’m more about the fact that Prokhorovka is still chewed in the media annually. On the southern front (Oboyan) I read a little with Mellentin, Katukov, Popel, and Glantz’s book.
        By the way, a fresh interview with Zamulin AIF in Kursk.
        http://www.chr.aif.ru/society/history/gitler_somn
        evalsya_stalin_deystvoval_istorik_o_sobytiyah_kur
        skoy_bitvy
  21. shadow
    shadow 16 July 2018 14: 49
    +1
    But the Germans had 5 mobilization and this is not counting the rest of Europe.
  22. 2ez
    2ez 16 July 2018 15: 15
    0
    It was carried out by the troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts. In the course of the hostilities, the Steppe Front Command, the 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, and 53rd Combined Arms, 5th Guards Tank and 5th Air Armies, 5 tank and 1 mechanized corps were introduced 19 divisions and 1 brigade. Within the framework of this operation, a front-line defensive operation in the Oryol-Kursk direction and a front-line defensive operation in the Belgorod-Kursk direction were carried out.

    Duration - 19 days. The width of the battle front is 550 km. Depth of retreat of Soviet troops - 12-35 km.

    Combat composition, troop numbers and casualties

    Name of associations and terms of their participation in the operation Combat composition and number of troops at the beginning of the operation Human losses in the operation
    Number of connections Number Irrevocable Sanitary Total Average Daily
    Central Front 5.7 - 11.7.43 g. Sd - 41, id - 1, tk - 4, sbr-5, otbr-3, UR-3 738000 15336 18561 33897 4842
    Voronezh Front the entire period sd-35, mk-1, shopping mall - 4, select - 6 534700 27542 46350 73892 3889 XNUMX
    Steppe Front 9.7-23.7.43 g. - - 27452 42606 70058 4670 XNUMX
    Total Division-77, shopping mall. MK-9, brigades - 14, UR-3. 1272700 70330
    5,5% 107517 177847 9360
  23. 2ez
    2ez 16 July 2018 15: 16
    0
    Data from the site www.bdsa.ru
  24. staviator
    staviator 16 July 2018 16: 36
    +2
    “There was such a roar that the membrane pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanking of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild gnash of exploding iron ... From the shots at close range, the turret collapsed, the guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded.
    Five-ton towers were torn off and blown away from explosions by 15–20 m. Flapping hatches, they tumbled in the air and fell. Often from strong explosions the whole tank fell apart, at the moment turning into a pile of metal. Our tank crews, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, looked for enemy crews who were also left without equipment on the field, and beat them with pistols, grabbed hand to hand ”

    After such a description of goosebumps, the horror that our veterans experienced, I bow my head before their courage. soldier
  25. ikrut
    ikrut 16 July 2018 16: 40
    10
    There is a wonderful book by Lopukhovskiy "Prokhorovka without signature stamp". It was written later by Zamulinsky, and includes its analysis and other documents. There almost hourly battles on the southern front are described. And the battle of Prokhorovka is almost minute by minute. There was no oncoming tank battle. And there was an attempt to overcome a very serious anti-tank defense without its preliminary suppression. The attempt failed. The losses were huge on both sides. Ours were higher. But in the strategic and operational plan, the outcome of the defense operation of the Voronezh Front was a foregone conclusion. The goal of the defense - the reflection of the enemy’s advance was achieved. The enemy was not allowed in and inflicted losses on him, which led to the abandonment of the further offensive. The Citadel failed. The revenge for Stalingrad did not take place. And in the second half of the summer until August 18, EIGHT Soviet fronts advanced on a front up to 2 thousand km wide. Guderian later wrote: "As a result of the failure of the Citadel operation, we suffered a DECISIONAL defeat. The armored forces ... due to large losses in people and equipment were permanently incapacitated. The initiative completely passed to the enemy" (c) So that even Despite a number of tactical miscalculations and difficult results of the battles near Prokhorovka, the general battle was won.
    1. Terror
      Terror 16 July 2018 21: 48
      +2
      Quote: ikrut
      But in strategic and operational terms, the outcome of the defense operations of the Voronezh Front was a foregone conclusion. The goal of the defense - the reflection of the enemy’s advance was achieved. The enemy was not allowed in and inflicted losses on him, which led to the abandonment of the further offensive.

      Dear, let me disagree with you. The goal of defense was not achieved! The enemy broke through the defense zone of the Voronezh Front to the entire depth and repelled the counterattack of the Soviet troops near Prokhorovka. The Germans after the Prokhorov battle could calmly continue their offensive and undoubtedly it would lead to disastrous results for the Soviet army in the Kursk ledge. Everything hung in the balance or, if you like, in the game of nerves of the commanders of opposing armies! The Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk were saved not by defense, but by a decisive and successful offensive in the Oryol direction, which began on July 12 on the day of the battle of Prokhorovka! It was precisely because of this successful offensive by the Soviet troops that the Germans curtailed the further continuation of Operation Citadel.
      1. figwam
        figwam 16 July 2018 22: 59
        +3
        Quote: Terror
        The Germans after the battle of Prokhorov could calmly continue

        They no longer had the strength to attack. Big blue arrows, this is what was supposed to be, and small, what happened.
        1. Terror
          Terror 17 July 2018 00: 11
          +2
          Quote: figvam
          Quote: Terror
          The Germans after the battle of Prokhorov could calmly continue

          They no longer had the strength to attack. Big blue arrows, this is what was supposed to be, and small, what happened.

          No, dear, you are wrong! The Germans also had the strength to attack after Prokhorovka! All divisions of the shock group of the Germans, with the exception of one panzer, remained combat-ready. In addition, the 24th Panzer Corps with the 17th Panzer Division and the Viking SS Division remained in reserve. And the Germans did go on the offensive after the Prokhorov battle!
          On July 13-15, the Germans continued their offensive in the direction of Volobuyevka - Shakhovo, where they surrounded 4 Soviet rifle divisions and almost completely destroyed them (infa according to German sources, according to Soviet data, these divisions moved to the northeast, but their losses are not reported) .
          You can see this German advance on this map, you can see how 2 blue arrows converged at Shakhovo:
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 17 July 2018 13: 34
            +1
            Quote: Terror
            On July 13-15, the Germans continued their offensive in the direction of Volobuyevka - Shakhovo, where they surrounded 4 Soviet rifle divisions and almost completely destroyed them (infa according to German sources, according to Soviet data, these divisions moved to the northeast, but their losses are not reported) .

            It has long been reported - losses of 48 ck 69 And in the battles from July 10 to July 15, 1943 were given to Zamulin.
            According to Table 16, the number of 48 sk at 10.07.43 was 38152 people. Total losses from July 10 to July 15 amounted to 15639 people, including 10377 people irrevocably. That is, the corps irretrievably lost 27% of the personnel.
          2. figwam
            figwam 17 July 2018 14: 14
            +1
            Quote: Terror
            On July 13-15, the Germans continued their offensive in the direction of Volobuyevka - Shakhovo

            Well, right, the Germans were already advancing in reduced numbers, the personnel of the SS "Leibstandart" division with their 70% losses went to reorganize in Italy, then the already trimmed tank army reached the second line of defense and got bogged down in battle, having an average of 40% losses, and still it was necessary to get to the third line through the minefields and make their way there, so they didn’t have the strength to do this, which proves the subsequent retreat.
      2. ikrut
        ikrut 18 July 2018 02: 01
        +2
        The fact of the matter is that the Germans did NOT break through the entire defense. Remained not broken one, the last frontier. ONE OF FIVE. But stayed. But the Germans did not have enough strength and the pace of the offensive was lost. The German command no longer made sense to continue to advance further. And that’s quite reasonable.
      3. The comment was deleted.
      4. fighter angel
        fighter angel 24 July 2018 09: 51
        +2
        Terror, I quote you: ".. The enemy broke through the defense line of the Voronezh Front to the full depth and repelled the counterattack of the Soviet troops near Prokhorovka. The Germans after the Prokhorov battle could calmly continue their offensive and undoubtedly it would have led to disastrous results for the Soviet army in the Kursk ledge. .. "
        I don’t agree; the Germans didn’t “break through” the defense of the Voronezh Front to the end. The Red Army remained on the defensive line. The Germans also did not enter the operational space. And as for the alleged "ability of the Germans to calmly continue the offensive" - ​​so the hell with two, dear! Behind the fronts of Rokossovsky and Vatutin stood a RESERVED STEPPE FRONT, under the command of Ivan Stepanovich Konev. And according to the idea of ​​the Supreme High Command Headquarters, it was precisely designed to prevent the consequences of unexpected enemy breakthroughs. This task was set by Konev personally by Stalin! And he coped with it, the breakthrough did not take place, and the Steppe Front subsequently switched to active offensive actions. That would not be unfounded, here are the sources of information: KK Rokossovsky "Soldier's Debt", I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander." Read, and penetrate, if not already read! Therefore, there is no need to excuse me here, "weaving" that the Germans allegedly "a little bit was not enough." The Soviet command was taken into account! It’s not time right now, it’s in the 90s, yes, it was fashionable to throw excrement on the heroic past of the country, but, thank God, everything is back to square one!
  26. Fox
    Fox 16 July 2018 21: 14
    +3
    the uncle there fought with a 34-mm mechanic ... bk pulled, he alone survived from the crew. until I reached Berlin, I completely changed 3 crews ... and my grandfather lost a hand near Oryol.
  27. zenion
    zenion 16 July 2018 22: 48
    0
    In general, I understood everything long ago by reading the correct authors. I also agree with them. The Red Army took doping in the form of drug addicts with one hundred grams, but the Germans were not poured. Therefore, the victory is not considered valid. Berlin was captured by American troops who transported Hitler to the Antarctic. And since Hitler was not found, the Red Army lost. Hitler’s poet to clone again and start the battle in a new way. All authors of these articles should be at the forefront with a counter for wrecked tanks. The Germans also pour a hundred grams from the People's Commissar especially before the attacks.
  28. LeonidL
    LeonidL 17 July 2018 06: 22
    +5
    The strategic goal was achieved - the failure of the entire operation "Citadel". The very successful actions of the “northern front” under the command of Rokossovsky and the tankers Katukov were correctly noted. They practically did not suffer losses. On the whole, the Battle of Kursk was a funeral march for German tank forces, especially since hundreds of German tanks were captured at repair plants, bases and echelons in Kharkov, Belgorod, and Orel when they went on the offensive. Here we must also take into account the very crafty statistics of the loss of German tanks - their "gradation" from completely destroyed and damaged. What could be considered completely destroyed by Soviet standards was loaded into the train and was dragged into Germany, ostensibly for restoration ... well, there we could even talk about remelting. The main thing is not to spoil the statistics. Guderian after Kursk fell ill with severe diarrhea and called the Citate’s failure the funeral march of the Panzervaffe. By the way, one can read about this in tankers' memoirs, including from SS divisions. so Prokhorovka can be considered a bloody but a victory.
  29. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 17 July 2018 10: 25
    +2
    The goal of defense was not achieved! The enemy broke through the defense zone of the Voronezh Front to the entire depth and repelled the counterattack of the Soviet troops near Prokhorovka. After the battle of Prokhorov, the Germans could calmly continue their offensive and undoubtedly it would lead to disastrous results for the Soviet army in the Kursk ledge. Everything hung in the balance or, if you like, in the game of nerves of the commanders of opposing armies! The Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk were saved not by defense, but by a decisive and successful offensive in the Oryol direction, which began on July 12 on the day of the battle of Prokhorovka! It was precisely because of this successful offensive by the Soviet troops that the Germans curtailed the further continuation of Operation Citadel.

    You have an insurmountable contradiction:
    1. The Germans could continue the offensive, which led the bears to a catastrophe of the Soviet army.
    2. Soviet troops saved the offensive on the Oryol direction.
    It is impossible to understand what actually saved the Soviet troops.
    1. If the German offensive on the southern front led to the defeat of the Soviet troops, it could continue, despite the Soviet offensive on the northern front of the arc, and this led to the disaster of all Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge, then the German commanders made a mistake - they did not correctly assess the situation and did not continue the offensive. Although it is very difficult to believe in this, it was beaten by the best commanders with great experience.
    2. If the Soviet offensive on the northern front excluded the possibility of encircling and defeating Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge, then the Prokhorov battle was no longer decisive. Then, at best, we can talk about the tactical success of the Germans without operational significance.
    One of the two is necessary because the two statements are incompatible.
    1. Terror
      Terror 17 July 2018 21: 45
      +3
      Quote: Kostadinov
      You have an insurmountable contradiction:
      1. The Germans could continue the offensive, which led the bears to a catastrophe of the Soviet army.
      2. Soviet troops saved the offensive on the Oryol direction.
      It is impossible to understand what actually saved the Soviet troops.

      The Soviet troops in the Kursk ledge were saved not only by the offensive that began on July 12 north of the city of Orel, but precisely because it was successful. By the end of July 18.07. enemy penetration defense depth reached 16 to 70 km. in different areas. If there had been no breakthrough of the enemy’s defense in this direction and the attacks of the Soviet troops were repelled, the Citadel would most likely continue with catastrophic consequences for the Soviet armies.
  30. Andrey VOV
    Andrey VOV 17 July 2018 10: 30
    +1
    Quote: Warrior2015
    There were no large boilers until the spring of 45, and even Cherkasy and Bagration did not give a large environment. Courland is essentially blocking.

    We better keep silent about Bagration’s “brilliance” - if we compare it with the speed and level of losses among the Germans when they seized the same territories, the picture is not in favor of the Red Army ... But, of course, it looks better than most other Soviet offensives of that time.

    The model resulted in essentially one operation in the Soviet army in the Second World War - Manchurian. But there is another opponent ...

    You can not compare the German offensive in 41 years and the operation "Bagration". A completely different level in all aspects .. incorrect
  31. Dzafdet
    Dzafdet 17 July 2018 17: 43
    -1
    Quote: yehat
    but do not carry nonsense and uri-patridiotism!
    Didn’t you catch yourself at school at what you see - something does not stick together in history? there’s a lot of lies about the war - both among the Germans and us. And to focus on a lie that is pleasant to perceive is not a good idea.
    Did your grandfather take part in the battles near Prokhorovka? Mine participated and where else was in the hardest battles. And he spoke about successes very sparingly, because it was not cheap. Near Kursk, the Germans did their best in terms of using the latest military equipment (which they could not have near Stalingrad), but they were mainly reflected by artillery batteries and infantry, not tanks. My grandfather was an infantry. About the fact that my grandfather was one of the few who survived on the defensive near Balaton, he did not speak at all - I found out by chance.
    You just don’t understand how hard the battles with the Germans were, when they could break with all the dope.

    Tanks do not fight tanks. It was precisely for the destruction of tanks that artillery was created. It must be understood that Stalin and Kulik missed the preparations for the war and we did not have anti-tank artillery, as well as anti-aircraft. It is Stalin who is responsible for the deaths of millions of troops ..
    1. yehat
      yehat 17 July 2018 21: 26
      +5
      Well, yes, Stalin is to blame for the fact that intelligence could not properly analyze the data obtained, and contrary to Stalin, by the middle of the war, she still learned))))
      Stalin is to blame for the fact that such deer as Tukhachevsky footballed for several years of testing promising VET guns
      Stalin is to blame for the fact that in the manufacture of cheapened shells for the 45th Ke some Stakhanovite went for the forgery of these tests and the infantry was unarmed against the tanks in 41 years.
      Stalin is to blame for the fact that after the WWII, the bourgeois revolution and the civil war that the Entente intervened, after the rapid growth of the economy over 2 five-year periods and colossal efforts, they could not catch up with the European level of industry, but for the first time in recent centuries they have become a developed industrial power and generally were able to make anti-aircraft guns.
      the infection is to blame everywhere
      ps and about tanks do not fight tanks - the panther was originally created to fight primarily with tanks. Matilda in general, except armor-piercing, had no other shells.
  32. Sergey Pavlovich
    Sergey Pavlovich 17 July 2018 20: 58
    0
    “Tactical experience. The tactical use of new types of tanks (Panther) does not exempt the command from the use of generally accepted tactical principles for the use of tanks. In particular, this concerns the organization of interaction with other branches of the army (infantry, sappers, artillery, etc.) and the massive use of tank units ...
    ... The number of Panthers participating in the battle was small (sometimes only 10 tanks) In this regard, the enemy quite easily repelled their attacks. [/ I]
    You just get a grasp of having 300 Panthers in your possession, German "super dupers" often could exhibit no more than 10 tanks. And the question is, what are the Germans now "don’t sprinkle ash on their heads"?

    There is a respected case in the “features” of the T-6, which could shoot accurately only with a stop and on a solid EXACT basis. The fact is that an absolutely overloaded frontal part of the tower could safely fire a shot ONLY when the tower was tilted +/- 5 degrees, and with a larger tilt it JAMED and it could not be returned to its working position in combat conditions (see the charter for crews T- V).
    1. yehat
      yehat 18 July 2018 08: 45
      +1
      you decide t5 or t6? )))
  33. Sergey Pavlovich
    Sergey Pavlovich 17 July 2018 21: 01
    0
    Quote: svp67
    Due to friction between individual commanders, this headquarters did not function at the initial stage. Personnel issues should not be reflected in practice when the question concerns the future Reich.
    The number of losses in technology increased during the continuation of the operation. The number of Panthers participating in the battle was small (sometimes only 10 tanks). In this regard, the enemy quite easily repelled their attacks.

    There is a respected case in the “features” of the T-5, which could shoot accurately only with a stop and on a solid EXACT basis. The fact is that an absolutely overloaded frontal part of the tower could safely fire a shot ONLY when the tower was tilted +/- 5 degrees, and with a larger tilt it JAMED and it could not be returned to its working position in combat conditions (see the charter for crews T- V).
  34. Cannonball
    Cannonball 17 July 2018 21: 46
    +4
    Again, a lazy photo was posted. Well, there was no T-34-85 on the Kursk Bulge. From the word "completely" was not.
    1. Evgenijus
      Evgenijus 18 July 2018 07: 57
      +1
      Most likely, this modification of the tank went to the troops at the beginning of 1944. Fair remark.
  35. Chaos
    Chaos 17 July 2018 23: 04
    +2
    Again, the generals were poured with mud. Listen, author, and what you have achieved in life. Little finger is not worth Rotmistrov and Vasilevsky. Battles should be studied in military institutes in the most detailed way. And the people should be presented as victories over a strong and treacherous enemy. No one really needs yours. There are people who make history. They are real, they live life. And there are others, follow the trail, sniff out. Yeah, but at this stage the general screwed up, joyfully rubbing his hands, dug up. Yes pah on you.
    1. Evgenijus
      Evgenijus 18 July 2018 07: 53
      +2
      Chaos:
      Listen, the author, and you have achieved something in life

      Rudeness, it is of course, gives authority to the speaker and gives weight to the opinion ...
      1. Chaos
        Chaos 18 July 2018 09: 37
        +2
        Rudeness of our commanders to pour mud on. Recently, Kutuzov was persuaded in every way. I hope there is no need to explain that our independence is thanks to them.
        1. Evgenijus
          Evgenijus 18 July 2018 10: 12
          +1
          From Wikipedia:
          Rudeness - the type of human behavior, characterized by a rude, arrogant and harsh way of communication. A person uses rudeness in communication in order to clearly demonstrate his superiority, higher social status, while recognizing his complete impunity.
          I think that the “debriefing” of generals according to historical documents does not apply to human relations. If someone believes that these documents do not reflect the picture of events in which the generals participated, the critic should simply not agree with his opponent, but put forward his version, supported by facts, but not crude rhetoric.
          As in the cartoon: "Leopold, let's live together!" wink
  36. Crossbill
    Crossbill 18 July 2018 08: 33
    +2
    Quote: Andrey VOV
    Quote: Warrior2015
    There were no large boilers until the spring of 45, and even Cherkasy and Bagration did not give a large environment. Courland is essentially blocking.

    We better keep silent about Bagration’s “brilliance” - if we compare it with the speed and level of losses among the Germans when they seized the same territories, the picture is not in favor of the Red Army ... But, of course, it looks better than most other Soviet offensives of that time.

    The model resulted in essentially one operation in the Soviet army in the Second World War - Manchurian. But there is another opponent ...

    You can not compare the German offensive in 41 years and the operation "Bagration". A completely different level in all aspects .. incorrect

    Dear Andrei, for such "strategists" as this Ratnik it is not considered shameful to compare warm with soft. Any bastard will be in the drain, if only it would make it possible to exalt the twilight Teutonic genius and throw mud on the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army.
  37. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 18 July 2018 11: 45
    +2
    Quote: Terror
    The Soviet troops in the Kursk ledge were saved not only by the offensive that began on July 12 north of the city of Orel, but precisely because it was successful.

    This is already better. Successful the Soviet offensive on the northern front of the arc did not leave the Germans any chance to surround and destroy the Soviet troops despite their “successes” on the southern front. But this leads to the next question - why did the Germans continue the offensive in the south to 15 July if they lost all the chances?
    Quote: RomanRoman
    The battlefield remained with the Germans, who calmly pulled out their wrecked tanks for repairs at night (there were more than 30 of them), and all the wrecked Soviet tanks, which could not be repaired and put into battle, simply undermined. As a result, the irretrievable losses of the KA - 324 tanks (different sources give about this number with slight deviations). The Germans irretrievably lost THREE tanks !!!

    1. It’s interesting where did they (the Germans) drag out 30 tanks - somewhere in a field repair factory or in Germany? And what happened with these tanks then?
    2. Why did the Germans undermine Soviet tanks, which didn’t hinder the ability to repair them? Are they crazy? And what did the Germans do with Soviet tanks, which could be repaired? Also calmly delayed for repairs and then brought into battle?
    3. At Prokhorovka, the German irretrievable losses were only 3 tanks, and they destroyed 324. I believe that it was so beating. But look at how many tanks the Germans irretrievably lost in July 1943 - 932 tanks and self-propelled guns along Müller-Gilebrand. Among them - 189 T-3, 290 T-4, 83 Panthers, 33 Tigers, 141 self-hawks based on the T-3 and T-4 and 39 Ferdinand. Where did it beat, where did they all lose this armored vehicle? Maybe a bit in Sicily or against partisans or from the bombing of the allies? If the ratio of losses of armored vehicles in the East hit 1 to 100, then with German losses of 800 vehicles, the Soviet should beat 80 (eighty thousand) in one month.
    Suppose that under Prokhorovka the Soviet losses were unjustifiably large and that the counterattack did not have operational significance, that the Soviet commanders made mistakes, but this only means that in other episodes everything turned out much better because the average ratio of losses cannot be changed. And this is the average ratio of irretrievable losses of armored vehicles in the East in 1943 that hit no more than three to one and not a hundred or fifty or ten to one. With this, the ratio did not exceed one on one in the cost of lost armored vehicles. Why and to whom then needs to relish the unknown loss ratio in a particular episode and from it will create some sort of "disaster", "tragedy" and so on?
  38. nekromonger
    nekromonger 18 July 2018 19: 59
    0
    where on the southern front we beat the Germans this Verkhnopenie, but Ryzhkov liked Prokhorovka and he appointed her the center of events, not very familiar with the history.
  39. chant
    chant 18 July 2018 22: 12
    +5
    Yesterday I looked at the "Star" movie about the operation "Citadel". The bottom line is: Hitler wanted to recoup for Stalingrad to the fullest, surround a large Red Army compound near Kursk, defeat in order to turn the tide of the war. Collected the best German tank divisions. Ours understood everything, prepared, and waited. When it all started, they clashed. The veteran of those events spoke, the tankman, told how they captured fascist mobile repair plants for tanks, captured tanks and equipment were poisoned to the rear. Disabled German armored vehicles as they could. Aviation helped. The fighting was fierce and, in general, crushed the German tank fist. With the cost of a “tiger” of 250 Reichsmarks, “Panthers”, “Ferdinands”, etc. according to nomenclature the same for 000, Germany was not able to restore the number of tanks until the end of the war.
    Then someone thinks something, brings arguments, mistakes of commanders. We had to go left, and they drove right. We had to go, and they stood. Fools, did not calculate everything in advance. And what was there in reality? No one really knows. But the IS-2 and its modifications appeared at the end of 43 years for a reason. This battle pushed Soviet tank construction so much that so far no one can catch up. And I think so, it was a complete and unconditional victory! And the price cannot be greater or less, it is what it is. Glory to the heroes! Eternal memory to the dead!
    1. Evgenijus
      Evgenijus 18 July 2018 22: 21
      +1
      scander:
      And the price can not be more or less, it is what it is.

      I agree! Therefore, it was not necessary to hide the price of victory after the war. But they hid it, and still hid it, on the shelves of military archives are hundreds of kilograms of documents with the stamp secret and above. Nowadays, the Russian Defense Ministry proudly says - they opened and declassified a few more pieces of paper! Like, it is time to submit to the order those who have decided to declassify the documents of that war. Absurd ...
  40. bulbash70
    bulbash70 18 July 2018 23: 08
    +3
    I read one author who challenged the "Prokhorov tragedy" with simple facts from the reports of the German and Soviet command on dates. Therefore, all tryndezh that the Germans suffered a minimum of losses, the tanks managed to recover and more. Especially interesting is the calculation of how fast and how fast the number of repairmen had to work for the Germans to repair the damaged tank !!! repairmen from the “formula” quietly smoke aside!
  41. Fagotron
    Fagotron 21 July 2018 15: 04
    0
    Judging by the description (and the article is very high quality), the tactical, especially aviation, reconnaissance of the Germans worked brilliantly.
  42. Sergey Pavlovich
    Sergey Pavlovich 24 July 2018 21: 10
    0
    Quote: Terror
    with high probability
    - THIS is "Novice" laughing
    You Terror, that REALLY DOES NOT understand that in World History there is NO possibility to redo REALITY - although of course the "West" and its servants are trying to do this, especially in the last 30 years.
    You Terror - contradict yourself, but the map proposed by YOU is clearly visible, the rout of the Nazis (their complete retreat) was successfully carried out in the Belgorod direction.
  43. vel1163
    vel1163 25 September 2018 23: 04
    0
    How much can you read all the nonsense of the authors, who enthusiastically prove the Mazahists how everything was bad with us. We won the facts near Kursk, we won the war against Europe and Hitler. There’s nothing to do with verbiage. Try to fight yourself.