Fight at Raseinya 24 June 1941 of the year

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In the evening of June 23 1941, on the road near the village of Dainiai, near the Lithuanian town of Raseiniai, a lone KV-1 type tank appeared. Slowly, moving in the direction of the road connecting Raseiniai and Šiluva, the car stopped. Most likely, ran out of fuel. This is where the fun begins. The tank stopped in a rather tactically comfortable locality, the road laid through the marshes, going onto the track, as they say today, was of federal significance. In other words, the tank got up like a cork in a bottle. To get around it, would have to make a significant detour.

Commander tankapparently appreciated the situation and made a decision. The crew remained in a stopped car. What debate was boiling at that moment in a lonely tank, now no one will tell. The fact remains: not a single person from the crew quit their posts and went east.



Rustic picture gradually became familiar: the tank froze on the side of the road and did not show any signs of life. I think many local residents then decided that the tank was abandoned, as were dozens of its fellow soldiers on the roads of war.

Fight at Raseinya 24 June 1941 of the year

Tank KV-1

On the morning of June 24, a German motorcade appeared from Raseinää. And then the tank came to life, the tower turned smoothly, the shot rang out.

Later, locals saw burned bodies of Wehrmacht soldiers at the cores of the cars of this column. This is likely to indicate that the vehicles transported ammunition or fuel.

The explosion attracted the attention of the German command. The road needed to be cleared to bring reinforcements, ammunition, and fuel to the approaching Raus campground group. Intelligence was sent to assess the threat. Yes, only light armored cars - on one tooth tank gun caliber 76,2 mm.

After the destruction of the reconnaissance group, they took the tank seriously.


Captured from the Raseinia German-Czech trophy, summer 1941 of the year

An anti-tank battery armed with the latest RAK-38 guns was sent to destroy the interference that blocked the road. But the guns, hidden in position at 500 meters from the tank, were methodically fired upon by a revived tank. The return fire was ineffectual, 50-mm armor-piercing shells only left blue marks on the armor. Having lost several guns (destroyed - two, damaged - two) and most of the personnel, the gunners were forced to withdraw to a safe distance. The shelling of a 105-mm field howitzer did not bring the expected result either.

The time has come for the Luftwaffe. The German command did not call aircraft: for a dive bomber, a single tank is too small a target. Under aviation German command was the most effective armor-piercing 8,8-cm anti-aircraft gun.


8,8-cm anti-aircraft gun FLAK-36

Under the cover of car bodies, the column pulled the gun to the effective range of 700 meters. But the movement on the ground was again stopped by the fire of a tank gun! 76,2-mm shells tank guns covered the position, mixing gun and calculation with the ground.

Noise required to remove, and urgently. KV created problems in transporting goods to the front line. And on the night of June 25, miners went ahead. The charges laid by them exploded the earth around the vehicle and finally deprived the tank of mobility by tearing down the tracked belts. But the crew of the KV continued its war, the tank was snapped up by rare gun shots and machine-gun fire.

The point in his fate put only 8,8-cm anti-aircraft guns, covertly installed in the rear of the HF - to the accompaniment of a false attack conducted by German armored vehicles. The German tanks, maneuvering, distracted the crew of the tank, while the calculation of anti-aircraft gunners dragged and guided "AHT-AHT". After firing from anti-aircraft guns, the tank died.

There is a legend that when German infantrymen tried to break open the hatches of a tank, its tower was set in motion again, but the terrified fascist thrust a hand grenade into the hole and everything calmed down after the explosion.

Parse this storieswhere is truth and where is fiction is very difficult. There are practically no eyewitnesses to this fight, and the documents speak in a dry, compressed language and often contradict each other.

The crew of the destroyed but not defeated tank was removed and buried on the side of the road by local residents, driven by the invaders. Their documents were taken by the German officers who were in charge of the destruction operation. The tank itself subsequently got melted down.


Wounded tanks KV 2-th Panzer Division

Only in 1965, in one of the Lithuanian newspapers there was information about the heroes. When transferring the dead to the cemetery, two officer belts were found, three soldier flasks, other personal belongings, including spoons, and a cigarette case. Inscriptions were carved on spoons, and in the cigarette case a Komsomol card and a certificate were found. So the names of Ershov Pavel Egorovich, Smirnov VA were established. and the unknown soldier with the initials Sh.N.A.

Now let's try to answer the main question: where did the heavy Soviet tank come from on this road, and why was it alone?

The 3 th mechanized corps of the Red Army located in Lithuania consisted of two tank divisions (2 and 5 etc.) and a 84 motorized division. The 2 Panzer Division under the command of Major General Solyankin E.N., which will be discussed, on June 22 1941 was located at the station Gayzhyuny. On the day of the beginning of the war, on order, the division with its full complement reached the center of concentration and received an order to advance to the city of Raseiniai. Division units entered the battle on the morning of June 23, while crossing the Dubica River, the bridges over which were already seized by Wehrmacht 6 units, etc. Wehrmacht, divided into two campframes: 1-group, under the command of Routh, captured the bridgehead on the east bank of the Dubitsa River, and 2 Zekendorf's group, which won the Raseiniai.

2-I tank division, turned into battle formations, attacked the enemy and literally stunned him. The Wehrmacht’s 6 Tank Division was armed with the Czech tanks PzKprf.35 (t), PzKprf.38 (t) and a small number of medium tanks PzKprf.IV, the anti-tank artillery consisted of the main 37-mm anti-tank guns of the RAK-XNUMN.IV anti-tank guns at that time, anti-tank artillery that consisted of the main 37-mm anti-tank guns of the RAK-XNUMN.IV anti-tank guns at that time, which consisted of the 32-mm anti-tank cannon anti-tank guns of the main anti-tank guns of the RAK-XNUMN.IV anti-tank gun, which consisted of the main 1-mm anti-tank guns of the RAK-XNUMN. While the Soviet division was armed with 19 KV-2 and 28 KV-26, not counting the medium T-8,8 and light BT and T-269. But, nevertheless, the offensive division was stopped by the use of anti-aircraft 36-cm cannons, in addition, the Soviet tanks fully developed fuel, as there was no supply of projectiles and cartridges. After that, the 1-I, 6-I infantry and 2-I and XNUMX-I armored divisions of the Wehrmacht, taking Soviet forces in the ring, completely defeated the remnants of XNUMX etc. Red Army.


Roads under Raseiniai

The 2-th tank division of the 3-th mechanized corps was disbanded, as was the corps itself. It so happened that the 5 Division and the 84 Division of the Motorized Division were completely defeated by the morning of June 23. Division commander, Major General Solyankin E.N. killed in battle 26 June 1941 of the year.
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  1. +20
    14 July 2018 06: 17
    So from separate battles ... And the victory developed ...
  2. +26
    14 July 2018 06: 54
    The battles of single, lagging KV-1 are not isolated. But the battle of Raseinia is not surpassed.
    On July 7 on 1941, on the 20 kilometer of the Opochka-Sebezh highway, due to technical reasons (oil pipe burst), the KV-1 tank, 42 tank division of the 21 mechanized corps stopped. In addition to the crew, the repair crew of the 21 mechanized corps participated in the repair of the tank. When the Germans appeared, the partially repaired tank began to move. At the time of the start of the battle, the tank commander, being on the armor, was wounded and fell under the shoulder. Later, through partisans, he returned to the mainland. After a kilometer, the tank stopped, and took the battle along with the repairmen. According to the locals, the battle was hard, and after it the Germans removed anger on the local population by shooting the male population of one of the villages. The terrain allowed the Germans to go unnoticed to the tank. As a result of the battle, a crew of four tankers made self-explosion. Since the BC was most likely used up, the internal explosion was not large. Due to self-explosion, the Germans could not use this tank, and after a while it was blown up. They claim that the remains of the tank stood before 1947.
    A little information about the crew of this tank.
    Radio operator TARABRIN MIKHAIL ULIANOVICH 1918 year of birth. A native of the village of Dyakovka, Krasnokutsky District, Ryazan Region. Called 25.02.1940 of the year by the Krasnokutsk RVC. Father TARABRIN U.O.
    Gun commander SOROKIN NIKOLAY ALEXANDROVICH 1915 year of birth. Shumovsky village council of the Buisky district of the Yaroslavl region
    Driver-mechanic POLESHCHUK KUZMA KIRILLOVICH 1918 year of birth. Ukrainian SSR Kirovograd region Suspicious (inaudible) area of ​​the village of Lebedyanka.
    Charging BELOKONSKY ANATOLIY ELISEEVICH 1921 year of birth of the Ukrainian SSR Chernihiv region Olishensky district of the village of Krasilovka.
    1. 0
      14 July 2018 10: 37
      The photo does not correspond to the time.
      1. +4
        14 July 2018 13: 50
        Photos from the Luga-Leningrad region. Screens began to set in August 1941
        1. +8
          14 July 2018 14: 12
          Legends about the executed population, due to tankers who did not surrender, about the commander who fell from the tank and fled with the help of partisans, were invented after the death of I.V. Stalin. So that the descendants did not doubt his bloodthirstiness. To belittle the role of the country's leadership in the victory over fascism. It is high time to understand that a foolish and cruel leader will not succeed in rallying dozens of peoples around the general idea of ​​liberating their homeland. Partisans in July 1941 in the Pskov region, as in the Baltic states, were not there. A standing tank behind enemy lines, without infantry cover, is not a problem. And the Germans shot mainly for help in the fight against them.
        2. +5
          14 July 2018 16: 08
          Correct about the screens. On March 15, 1941, the USSR SNK decree on the screening of the KV-1, on May 13, 1941, the final drawings were approved, on June 16, 1941, the first three tanks were screened and then growing.
        3. +2
          14 July 2018 16: 25
          Shielded HF-1 with the head. No. M-4777. Tank due to a technical malfunction ("the oil pipe burst") stopped in the area of ​​the village of Ekimtsevo 8 July 1941 of the year . During the clash, the tank commander was wounded and remained lying on the battlefield, and the tank, having driven another kilometer, finally stopped. The tank itself after some time was blown up by the Germans and stood in this state until the 1947 year. In 1947, the tank wreckage was cut into pieces and taken to scrap ..
          1. 0
            14 July 2018 16: 50
            Captured Soviet tankers from the 2-th tank division of the 3-th mechanized corps of the North-Western Front near their KV-1 tank. At the end of June, 1941, in the area of ​​the city of Raseiniai, together with another KV-1 of the same part, fought for a fork in the road. After losing the ability to fire was surrounded by German soldiers, the surviving crew members were taken prisoner after the Germans managed to break the driver's hatch with a crowbar.
        4. +2
          14 July 2018 19: 52
          Quote: Pattern
          Photos from the Luga-Leningrad region. Screens began to set in August 1941

          Photo just in place. From under Opochki.
          Very often all the way, and Opochka, and the Island, and Pskov are considered battles near the Luga.
          1. +1
            16 August 2018 16: 11
            Screens. Armor .... You are primitive nonhumans. You better look at the faces of our captive tankers. Perhaps a couple of minutes after photographing they were no longer alive.
        5. +2
          14 July 2018 20: 04
          Quote: Pattern
          Screens began to set in August 1941

          Screened KV-1, shot down on July 5 near Karpovo (Island).
    2. 0
      14 July 2018 12: 31
      But the battle under Raseinya is not surpassed.
      ,, why, what about Dmitry Sholokhov?
      1. +10
        14 July 2018 13: 34
        There is a difference between a tank ambush and standing at a crossroads, with no chance of survival. The battle near Raseiniai is primarily an attempt to delay the German offensive, albeit at the cost of tanks, regiments and divisions. And Dmitry Sholokhov - this is the destruction of targets of choice, a dangerous, but not suicidal occupation.
    3. 0
      14 July 2018 16: 43
      Some information about the crew of this tank
      ,, car commander?
      1. +2
        14 July 2018 19: 54
        Quote: bubalik
        ,, car commander?

        The comment indicated that the commander was wounded, and in the future, did not participate in the battle.
        1. +4
          15 July 2018 09: 18
          Thanks to the author for the article. Memory of the Dead.
  3. +3
    14 July 2018 07: 05
    The German command did not call aircraft: for a dive bomber, a single tank is too much small target.

    For a dive bomber, a standing single tank is an ideal target.
    The 6th tank division of the Wehrmacht was armed with Czech tanks PzKprf. 35 (t), PzKprf. 38 (t) and a small number of medium tanks PzKprf.IV, anti-tank artillery consisted of the then-main 37-mm anti-tank guns RAK-37. While in service with the advancing Soviet division was 32 KV-1 and 19 KV-2, apart from the medium T-28 and light BT and T-26.

    The overwhelming advantage in technology and, nevertheless, defeat ....
    There was enough courage, the skill was yet to be acquired ....
    1. +13
      14 July 2018 07: 45
      [quote = Olgovich] [/ quote]
      For a dive bomber, a standing single tank is an ideal target.
      [[/ quote] the dispersion circle of the bombing for Yu-87 is about 30 meters, one 100-250 kg bomb, only a direct hit will damage a KV tank ... To surely hit a target, several planes are needed, the resources to destroy a single tank are too large.
      As for the skill - the skill was there, there were no resources - fuel, ammunition, by the way, armor-piercing shells were generally absent on the KV part.
      1. +1
        14 July 2018 09: 21
        [quote = Yakov Volgushev] [quote = Olgovich] [/ quote]
        For a dive bomber, a standing single tank is an ideal target.
        [[/ quote] the dispersion circle of the bombing for Yu-87 is about 30 meters, one 100-250 kg bomb, only a direct hit will damage a KV tank ... To surely hit a target, several planes are needed, the resources to destroy a single tank are too large.
        As for the skill - the skill was there, there were no resources - fuel, ammunition, by the way, armor-piercing shells were generally absent on the KV part. [/ Quote]
        Yu-87 G "tank hunter" with 37 mm guns since 42 years.
        1. +7
          14 July 2018 09: 37
          It's about the border battles of the Red Army of the 1941 of the year, with all due respect to German military power - they did not have a time machine (((
        2. +3
          14 July 2018 11: 56
          "circle of scattering" - how is it? In the theory of shooting, two criteria are used: "circular probable deviation" (CVO) and "sigma" "mean square deviation" (the expectation is assumed to be zero). CVO = 0,674 sigma. If the KVO is 30 meters and the scattering along two axes is the same (which is quite plausible), then the probability that the bomb will lie in a circle of 30 meters is (approximately) 0,25. But since the size of the tank is much less than 30 m, the probability of a direct hit is negligible and a guaranteed direct hit into the tank may require a very large outfit of aircraft, which the German command could not afford in a blitzkrieg.
          1. +2
            14 July 2018 14: 22
            The scattering circle is quite a commonly used symbol equivalent to the scattering ellipse in artillery, as you know, the KVO is not applicable to free-falling bombs, for this reason the circle is used
            1. +1
              14 July 2018 15: 06
              Give an example from special literature with reference to the “circle of dispersion”.
              The dispersion of the point of impact of bombs is characterized by two probable deviations - the probable deviation of the point of fall in range and the probable deviation of point of fall in the direction.
              If these values ​​are not equal, then the dispersion will be elliptical, if equal, circular.
              Read the chapter of any textbook on the theory of bombing on the laws of dispersion and do not mislead readers.
              1. +4
                14 July 2018 15: 32
                as I wrote below, I propose to dive into the reference literature yourself, you can still read the Kolomiyts, everything is written more accurately for him))) Especially in the history of T-34 ... That's it for me, I'm finishing writing
          2. +1
            15 July 2018 00: 44
            Quote: iouris
            "........ then the probability of a direct hit is negligible .......

            A bit from another opera, it does not coincide in time, but it was recalled that a nearby bursting shell of the SU 152 blasted a tower of a German tank. This is to say that a direct hit is not required, and even more so with an aerial bomb.
        3. 0
          15 July 2018 00: 02
          Only dive Yu-87G could no longer. According to Rudel and due to the lack of brake flaps.
      2. +2
        14 July 2018 14: 30
        Quote: Yakov Volgushev
        the dispersal circle of bombing for the Yu-87 is about 30 meters, one 100-250 kg bomb, damage to a KV-type tank will only cause a direct hit ... To surely hit a target, several planes are needed, the resources to destroy a single tank are too large.

        Not this way:
        In general, the command of the Luftwaffe was pleased with the actions of its Ju 87. The "Stucks" struck very accurately. Usually, all bombs fit into the 30th a circle.

        http://www.airpages.ru/lw/ju87bp.shtml
        ALL bombs fit into a 30 circle, and bombs - ten pieces of 50 kg. So there are even a lot of chances.
        And how accurately did they plant bombs, for example, under each gun see batteries Mikhin
        Junkers from l / StG2 destroy 20 to 30 tanks from de Gaulle's division,
        Quote: Yakov Volgushev
        As for the skill - the skill was there, there were no resources - fuel, ammunition, by the way, armor-piercing shells were generally absent on the KV part.

        There was no ability to steal subdivisions in gachal, and this is not my opinion. It appeared later.
        You know the others - bring.
        1. +3
          14 July 2018 15: 30
          Quote: Olgovich

          http://www.airpages.ru/lw/ju87bp.shtml
          I propose to look at the reference books, I met half the number of bombs in a circle of 30 meters relative to U-87В, but not on this site and in this context. And about the bombs, U-87В and Р which at that time could not be carried more than 3- 5 bombs, you know they didn’t have bombs ... For this reason, the chances of a single aircraft are practically zero
          1. +1
            15 July 2018 06: 34
            Quote: Yakov Volgushev
            I propose to look at reference books, I met the figure half of the bombs in a circle of 30 meters relative to the Yu-87V

            Almost ALL bombs in a circle of 30 m - see reference books. This is a practically guaranteed hit.
            How many tanks were destroyed by dive-bombers during the initial period of the war - see memoirs.
      3. 0
        14 July 2018 21: 24
        Yakov, I agree about the bombing, the German attack aircraft “confidently” hit tanks from an onboard cannon in the tower (there is such a book, “Pilot”, “I destroyed half of the Russian tanks), but in 1941 did they still have anti-tank aircraft?
        Before the war, Polikarpov’s design bureau worked on a VIT: an air tank destroyer, but work was slow + "competitors-colleagues" knocked "and the parameters of Polikarpov’s closest assistants were arrested. This was published in the 80s
        1. Alf
          +3
          15 July 2018 15: 06
          Quote: Royalist
          (there is such a book "Pilot" thing ": I destroyed half of the Russian tanks),

          Like, only half? And what prevented the finish off the second half?
          Quote: Royalist
          Parameters of Polikarpov’s closest assistants were arrested.

          What are these parameters? A person can either be planted or not, and no one has succeeded in planting a person’s parameters.
    2. +17
      14 July 2018 08: 40
      Quote: Olgovich

      The overwhelming advantage in technology and, nevertheless, defeat ....

      Mr. Treplo in his repertoire Yes - tear out a piece of text, ignore the rest:
      the division’s advance was stopped by the use of 8,8-cm anti-aircraft guns, in addition, Soviet tanks fully developed fuel, since there was no transport of shells and ammunition.
      - and then in your comment smear the Red Army stop
      1. +2
        14 July 2018 10: 59
        Providing ammunition and fuel, not to mention food, was one of the main causes of defeats at times more powerful than the Red Army. The supply was often absent due to the overwhelming superiority of German aircraft, cars were either destroyed or expected darkness for movement, and the results of the battle were determined not by the day, but by the hours in the absence of ammunition. Of course, command and control of battles is a separate song, - lack of communication, loss of control, defeat of headquarters aviation, alarmism ... Why separate KV tanks could achieve convincing results, and entire companies and battalions of KV tanks did not make a change in tank battles with weaker ones German tanks ... Remembering the recent Finnish war, it couldn’t be otherwise ...
      2. +2
        14 July 2018 14: 38
        Quote: rkkasa 81
        Mr. Treplo in his repertoire - to tear piece of text, ignore the rest:
        the division’s advance was stopped by the use of 8,8-cm anti-aircraft guns, in addition, Soviet tanks fully developed fuel, since there was no transport of shells and ammunition.
        - and then in your comment smear the Red Army

        1. Yes, no, it’s just that kind of thing for you — when it seems that which, in fact, is not. It hinders to live a full life, but you are doing well, right? hi
        2. Successful logistics is an important part of the ABILITY to fight, cut a bundle on the nose. As well as normal communication and competent management of units, which were in the beginning, very few.,

        Light spot Rokossovsky's mechanized corps
        1. +8
          14 July 2018 17: 33
          Quote: Olgovich
          Successful logistics is an important part of the ability to fight

          For successful logistics, cars and tractors are needed. Plus - air supremacy so that they are not bombed along the way. You Mr. Treplo, claim that we had "overwhelming technical advantage", so tell us about the number of cars and tractors in the Red Army, and in the Wehrmacht. And about air supremacy.
          PS By the way, how was it on artillery, who has the advantage?
          1. +1
            15 July 2018 06: 55
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            For successful logistics, cars and tractors are needed. Plus - air supremacy so that they are not bombed along the way. You are Mr. Treplo, claiming that we had an “overwhelming advantage in technology,” so tell us about the number of cars and tractors in the Red Army and in the Wehrmacht. And about air supremacy.

            1. belay fool Can you read? I commented on an excerpt from an article about TANKS.
            2. Cars in the tank units of the Red Army were. Do not know?
            3. There were more aircraft in the USSR Air Force in 2, 5 times. than the Germans.
            4. More guns in almost twice more.
            5, Tanks - more than in three times more
            Remember and don't ask stupid questions anymore. lol
            1. 0
              15 July 2018 19: 28
              Quote: Olgovich
              2. Cars in the tank units of the Red Army were. Do not know?

              The need for war:
              Passenger cars and PIKAP - 49305
              Trucks GAZ - 213571
              Trucks ZIS - 257256
              Workshops type "A" - 7972
              Workshops type "B" - 4378
              Gas tank trucks - 60914
              CCD - 2571
              Other special vehicles - 159911
              Total vehicles: 755878

              Availability on 15.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
              Passenger cars and PIKAP - 17280
              Trucks GAZ - 117415
              Trucks ZIS - 75803
              Workshops type "A" - 2729
              Workshops type "B" - 1556
              Gas tank trucks - 11252
              CCD - 725
              Other special vehicles - 45380
              Total vehicles: 272140

              Lack of income taking into account from the Nar. farms:
              Passenger cars and PIKAP - 8161
              Trucks GAZ and ZIS - 67729
              Workshops type "A" - 5243
              Workshops type "B" - 2822
              Gas tank trucks - 49662
              CCD - 1846
              Other special vehicles - 108531
              Total vehicles: 243994
              © Report of the Chief of the State Academic Technical University to the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the status of providing armored and transport equipment of the Red Army
              The situation was aggravated by the fact that the main shortage was just at the three-ton ZIS. The directive replacement in the configuration of the GMS states with GAZ led to the fact that the rear of tank formations could not even theoretically provide them.
              1. +1
                16 July 2018 10: 13
                Quote: Alexey RA
                © Report of the Chief of the State Academic Technical University to the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the status of providing armored and transport equipment of the Red Army

                Why did they stop? We look further:
                Tanks

                It should be in wartime states - 37 886
                On 1.06.41, consists of: 23256

                Ay-yai-yay: also what a "shortage" !. The main thing is that "just" something in four times more than German.
                By car:
                1. WHO prevented mobilizing a / cars from the national economy before June 22, putting them in order, as the Germans did in 1940?
                2. Someone thought of letting go of tens of thousands of tanks, not provided with appropriate repairs, spare parts, maintenance, transportation of fuel and ammunition? What did this lead to? Release fewer tanks, but fully secured, non-obvious?
                3. The Germans had only twice as many cars
                4. We have horses, more than half a million, the Germans-183 thousand.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                The directive replacement in the configuration of the GMS states with GAZ led to the fact that the rear of tank formations could not even theoretically provide them.

                "again" enemies of the people "?
                1. +1
                  16 July 2018 11: 14
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  1. WHO prevented mobilizing a / cars from the national economy before June 22, putting them in order, as the Germans did in 1940?

                  Tear down the sowing and deprive the freight transport industry? Good offer ...
                  I'm not talking about the fact that NPOs lack spare parts even for peacetime vehicles:
                  To ensure in 1941 the operation of the available fleet of vehicles, as well as to lay in the Red Army an inviolable stock of spare parts, spare parts and assemblies are required:
                  a) tank spare parts allocated for 219 million rubles. instead of 476 million rubles required by application;
                  b) automobile and tractor - funds allocated to 112,5 million rubles against 207 million rubles at the annual application.
                  The revenue from the automotive spare parts industry (per vehicle) decreases year by year for tank parts, with almost no increase, despite the fact that the cars age and wear out.
                  All the stocks of tires available at the People’s Commissariat of Defense were used up for the period 1939–1940.
                  In 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense declared 525 sets of rubber. For the first half of 000, a fund of 1941 sets was allocated, or 195% of the annual application.
                  To meet the current demand for rubber and to replace worn-out rubber in the military districts, it is necessary in the second half of 1941 to allocate 430 sets of rubber to the People's Commissariat of Defense.
                  © Fedorenko
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  Someone thought of releasing tens of thousands of tanks, not provided with appropriate repairs, spare parts, maintenance, transportation of fuel and ammunition?

                  So theoretically in the 30s tanks of tank brigades had everything they needed. It took war with Poland and Finland to understand that practical needs are different from theoretical calculations. And with the enlargement of BTV, the need for a / m increased even more.
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  "again" enemies of the people "?

                  No. An attempt to somehow rectify the situation: it is better to have GAS instead of VMS than "nothing" instead of VMS.
                  1. +2
                    16 July 2018 12: 13
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    Tear down the sowing and deprive the freight transport industry? Effective offer...

                    This is neither an offer nor mine: it is an approved PLAN for mobilizing vehicles and horses, according to which they entered the troops from the Narkhoz.
                    And he acted, but already in a mess and the defeat of the outbreak of war, despite the "sowing". And you know that very well!
                    I'm talking about the fact that this had to be done before June 22
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    I'm not talking about the fact that NPOs lack spare parts even for peacetime vehicles:

                    Machines were transferred (according to plan) repaired and with all funds of spare parts.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    So theoretically in the 30s tanks tank brigades had everything you need. It took war with Poland and Finland to understand that practical needs are different from theoretical calculations. And with the enlargement of BTV, the need for a / m increased even more.

                    There were maneuvers 36, 37, Hassan, Khalkhin-Gol, in the end
                    And enlarge the BTV, dissolving well-coordinated t. brigades in the mass of formed buildings, in conditions going WWII is generally insane.
                    1. 0
                      16 July 2018 17: 54
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      This is neither an offer nor mine: it is an approved PLAN for mobilizing vehicles and horses, according to which they entered the troops from the Narkhoz.
                      And he acted, but already in a mess and the defeat of the outbreak of war, despite the "sowing". And you know that very well!
                      I'm talking about the fact that this had to be done before June 22

                      Do you understand that you are proposing to begin mobilization before the war? That is, in fact, provoke the Reich to strike and give a weighty argument in the hands of Hitler - we only defended, Stalin wanted to attack first. After all, mobilization is a war. And the main difference between mobilization and fees in those days was precisely the transfer to the army of n / x vehicles and traction.
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      Machines were transferred (according to plan) repaired and with all funds of spare parts.

                      In the dreams of the compilers of the mobplan. In fact, even in the Soviet-Finnish from n / x equipment came in the form in which it was - with dead engines and bald tires.
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      There were maneuvers 36, 37, Hassan, Khalkhin-Gol, in the end

                      On Hassan, tanks were used extremely limited. It was impossible to verify anything at Khalkhin Gol, simply because the tanks were advancing to a shallow depth, and even at the speed of a turtle — it took us almost a week to overcome 25 kilometers. And the big maneuvers of 1936, as you probably know, were a big show - those who were selected in advance won there.
                      1. +1
                        16 July 2018 17: 59
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Do you understand that you are proposing to begin mobilization before the war?


                        That would be sensible and correct.

                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        That is, in fact, provoke the Reich to strike and give a weighty argument in the hands of Hitler - we only defended ourselves, Stalin wanted to attack first.


                        In real life, Hitler struck unprovoked, with exactly the same argument (which many still believe), and the USSR somehow did not get much better.

                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        In the dreams of the compilers of the mobplan. In fact, even in the Soviet-Finnish from n / x equipment came in the form in which it was - with dead engines and bald tires.


                        This is very bad. And that’s how it is - on a piece of paper the numbers of tanks, planes, cars are remarkable - industrialization, the industrial giant, the second world economy and all that. And how it came to ...
                      2. +2
                        17 July 2018 10: 08
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Do you understand that you are proposing to begin mobilization before the war? That is, in fact, provoke the Reich to strike and give a weighty argument in the hands of Hitler - we only defended ourselves, Stalin wanted to attack first. After all, mobilization is a war.

                        Do you need to explain that wars do not begin when provocation occurs, but when they are ready to fight? And that is exactly what Hitler did.
                        According to your logic, the MOBILIZATIONS were OBLIGED to be carried out, because the German army standing opposite us was ALREADY mobilized long ago, and this, in your opinion, is a war against us
                    2. 0
                      5 March 2019 22: 10
                      for the gifted: Germany declared the RI war only because of the beginning of mobilization. and start mobilization (and this is what you propose is necessary to do) - the Germans would declare war guaranteed earlier - as soon as they had noticed hints of mobilization - and this was precisely what Stalin and the company were afraid of. IMHO - fears were justified, especially given the catastrophic failures of intelligence at the beginning of the war. in other words - get out of a utopian ideal world - there was no war there. but where the war was and what was done by the leadership of the USSR on the eve of and the beginning of the war - albeit with numerous errors - it was generally true. it is simply impossible to foresee absolutely EVERYTHING. besides, the Wehrmacht by June 1941 was not just the most powerful army - it was the most experienced army in the world. the experience of our military leaders with rare exceptions is almost zero. this is evidenced by the level of controllability of troops in the first half of the war, not only in 1941.
            2. 0
              15 July 2018 19: 44
              Quote: Olgovich
              3. There were 2, 5 times more airplanes of the USSR Air Force than Germans.

              That's just without pilots planes can not fly. And with the pilots in the Red Army Air Force in June 1941 was a big strain.
              Moreover, not only new types of vehicles had problems (for example, there were 1002 pilots on 3 MiG-494s, 234 on 1 Yak-58s, 57 on 2 Il-0s, 285 crews on 2 Pe-76s), but also old ones too:
              DB-3: 887 vehicles, 460 crews.
              Sat: 3376 vehicles, 3435 crews.
              I-153: 2630 cars, 2030 pilots.
              I-15: 633 cars, 286 pilots.
              I-15 bis: 306 cars. 183 pilots.
              I-16: 3643 cars, 2826 pilots.
              The situation was aggravated by the fact that part of the air regiments in the spring and summer of 1941 underwent retraining for new equipment, as a result of which they had a double set of equipment with the number of crews 80-90% of the state. And other regiments were in the formation stage - there are crews, equipment or not, or not enough.
              It’s not for nothing that the column “appeared in the Air Force’s strength tables”the number of combat-ready crews capable of simultaneously flying into the air to carry out a combat mission, depending on the availability of operational combat aircraft and combat-ready crews in the aviation regiments". To assess the difference between the number of aircraft, combat-ready crews and capable of simultaneously flying into the air combat-ready crews, we can take the KOV figures as of 22:
              Aircraft - 1901.
              The combat-ready crews - 1682.
              Of these, it can simultaneously fly into the air - 1227.
              Like this. Nearly 700 aircraft in some regiments of the district are forced to stand on the ground - for them there are no crews. And in other regiments of the same district more than 450 crews are sitting on the ground - there are no planes for them.
              The ratio is similar in ZAPOVO: 1658 aircraft, 1702 crews and only 973 of them can simultaneously fly into the air. In PribOVO - 1200, 787, 711. In OdVO - 962, 827, 482.

              The reason is simple - the schedule for the formation and retraining of the Red Army air regiments is designed so that this procedure should be completed in the fall of 1942. Nobody was counting on a war in the summer of 1941.
              1. +2
                16 July 2018 10: 29
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Aircraft - 1901.
                The combat-ready crews - 1682.
                Of these, it can simultaneously fly into the air - 1227. Here it is. Nearly 700 aircraft in some regiments of the district are forced to stand on the ground - for them there are no crews. And in other regiments of the same district more than 450 crews are sitting on the ground - there are no planes for them.

                I don’t understand: why are you writing this?
                1. even in this state of affairs, the ratio was in our favor. Although better organized, no one interfered.
                2. The defeat took place not because of a lack of crews, but because of a blatant unpreparedness for a surprise attack, when most of the aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and those who flew out due to a mess suffered huge losses in the air .. They fought with dignity in the very first days, but the organizational beginning of resistance is a minimum.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                The reason is simple - the schedule for the formation and retraining of the Red Army air regiments is designed so that this procedure should be completed in the fall of 1942. Nobody was counting on a war in the summer of 1941.

                Is it not the duty of management to rely on just that? request
                1. 0
                  16 July 2018 11: 26
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  1. even in this state of affairs, the ratio was in our favor. Although better organized, no one interfered.

                  Try to organize better when half of the regiments of the frontier garden retrain on new equipment. When the VNOS system is essentially absent - from this abbreviation you can safely delete the letter C - communication. For radio stations in this structure were 10% of the state, and telephone communications equipment - no more than a third. The industry promises to cover the shortage - but by the end of 1942. And without a full service of airborne aerospace defense, the airfield often found out about the approach of enemy vehicles only when they were discovered by the duty unit.
                  And in order to separate the Air Force into a separate structure and assemble aviation in it from all levels, subordinating it to the aviators, we needed the experience of war. For theoretically, the corps-army-district subordinate structure of the Air Force provided the same infantry with shorter reaction times for “their” aircraft and constant air support.
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  Is it not the duty of management to rely on just that?

                  If you count on an attack at any time, then no reforms can be carried out. For the army must always be ready.
                  Management counted on the attack within the time specified by intelligence. And intelligence, with tenacity worthy of better use, said that Germany would not attack the USSR before the war with England ended and that Germany would put forward its demands through diplomatic channels and hold negotiations before the war began. And if the "exact dates of the German attack on the USSR" were regularly canceled, then these two theses remained unchanged.
                  1. +2
                    16 July 2018 12: 38
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    Try to organize better when half of the regiments of the frontier garden retrain on new equipment. When the VNOS system is essentially absent - from this abbreviation you can safely delete the letter C - communication. For radio stations in this structure were 10% of the state, and telephone communications equipment - no more than a third. The industry promises to cover the shortage - but by the end of 1942. And without a full service of airborne aerospace defense, the airfield often found out about the approach of enemy vehicles only when they were discovered by the duty unit.

                    Just as they did in the Second World War: at the front remained READY formations, as well. compounds that are switched to other types of machines were taken to the rear in full force and retrained.
                    Retraining in shelves on the border is utter nonsense.
                    What prevented the development of communication? Wasn’t there an experience of just passing WWI, where she showed her absolute necessity and importance? So, it was necessary to produce much fewer tanks, but much more radio stations.
                    .
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    If you count on an attack at any time, then no reforms can be carried out. For the army must always be ready.

                    belay
                    Even during the war itself, haven't reforms been carried out ?! Also what! And in peacetime it is much easier to carry them out, it’s obvious!
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    Management counted on the attack within the time specified by intelligence. And intelligence, with tenacity worthy of better use, said that Germany would not attack the USSR before the war with England ended and that Germany would put forward its demands through diplomatic channels and hold negotiations before the war began. And if the "exact dates of the German attack on the USSR" were regularly canceled, then these two theses remained unchanged.

                    During the GOING, it’s already 2 years near the borders of World War II, concentration a multimillion MOBILIZED army at your borders — counting on someone else's “reports”, promises, “calculations”, arguments of “logic” is pure madness and stupidity.
                    In WWI, Germany declared WAR immediately after only the announcement of mobilization in Russia, and then the army had already mobilized, and someone ... a delay was waiting .... belay request
                    1. +1
                      16 July 2018 18: 09
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      Just as they did in the Second World War: at the front remained READY formations, as well. compounds that are switched to other types of machines were taken to the rear in full force and retrained.
                      Retraining in shelves on the border is utter nonsense.

                      And where else to retrain them? We have no unnecessary airdromes in the rear. In fact, each air regiment had one site on which it was based.
                      Here is the approximate number of air regiments that need to be taken to the rear in KOVO:
                      15 garden - 2 IAP to the rear.
                      16 garden - 1 IAP and 3 BAP to the rear.
                      17 garden - 3 bap to the rear.
                      19 bad - 3 bap to the rear.
                      36 Iad - 2 Iap to the rear.
                      44 Iad - 3 Iap to the rear.
                      62 bad - 3 bap to the rear.
                      63 garden - 2 IAP to the rear.
                      64 Iad - 3 Iap to the rear.
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      What prevented the development of communication?

                      Lack of communications. Well, the industry could not give them - there were no personnel.
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      In WWI, Germany declared WAR immediately after only the announcement of mobilization in Russia, and then the army had already mobilized, and someone ... was waiting for a delay.

                      Where did you come from? The Germans did not have enough forces on the border to strike - which was repeatedly reported to us by intelligence. ICH, until June, she was not mistaken - the bulk of the German troops came in June. and transportation continued after the outbreak of war.
                      1. +1
                        17 July 2018 10: 31
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        And where else to retrain them? We have no unnecessary airdromes in the rear. In fact, each air regiment had one site on which it was based.

                        An amazing statement: in the Second World War they found airfields in the rear (the same factory ones), and in PEACE time is a problem! request
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Well, the industry could not give them - there were no personnel.

                        TASKS were not set: tens of thousands of tanks, could, but no radio?
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Where did you come from? The Germans did not have enough forces on the border to strike - which was repeatedly reported to us by intelligence. ICH, until June, she was not mistaken - the bulk of the German troops came in June

                        Well no :
                        On June 2, the Main Directorate of the Border Troops informed the higher command that the Germans concentrated near the Soviet border during April-May from 80 to 88 infantry divisions, from 13 to 15 motorized divisions, 7 tank divisions, 6 artillery regiments, etc. 6 June GUPV informed that near the Soviet borders about 4 million German troops, 8 German armies are concentrated on Polish territory.

                        On the border, a mobilized fighting army. Against her, an unmobilized army living in peacetime. This is NOT OK by the standards of all times.
            3. +1
              16 July 2018 01: 19
              During the day, German aviation bombed 66 border airfields, destroyed 1200 aircraft, most of which remained on the ground.
          2. +1
            15 July 2018 10: 22
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            For successful logistics, cars and tractors are needed

            Let's put it another way: it is necessary to be able to fight, to ensure communications and coordination of troops, reconnaissance and replenishment of fuel and lubricants and ammunition
          3. +1
            15 July 2018 10: 28
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            And about air supremacy

            The fact that they lost dominance in the air is a separate issue. Historians still scratch their turnips as possible. There is an opinion that planes were simply thrown at airfields, evacuating personnel. Some pilots managed to land at the limit of range from their own airfield
            It is no secret that the Germans quickly transferred their planes to different sectors of the front, providing local superiority
            1. 0
              15 July 2018 19: 58
              Quote: Pilat2009
              The fact that they lost dominance in the air is a separate issue. Historians still scratch turnips as possible. There is an opinion that aircraft were simply thrown at airfields, evacuating personnel.

              In the spring-summer of 1941, another reform of the Air Force base system took place.
              ... in accordance with the Decree of the party and government of April 10, 1941, it was decided to introduce a new organizational structure. The territory of the western border military districts was divided into 36 aviation-based districts (RAB). Each district was intended to provide three to four air divisions.
              The newly created aviation rear structure was a significant step forward. The military rear has become more flexible and agile.
              The reorganization of the rear was planned to be completed by August 1, 1941.
              © Colonel General of Aviation A. Zakrevsky
              The lack of automobiles and special equipment was superimposed on it and the start of the scamming only after the start of the war. As well as the flaws of theorists who have forgotten, for example, about warehouses and motor vehicles in the link "airborne-based area".
              In addition, already in the early days of the war, an urgent need emerged to increase the number of BAO, to have warehouses in the composition of aviation-based areas for providing parts with material resources, as well as own vehicles.
              © he
              As a result, in the first weeks of the war, BAO were able to provide normal basing and repair of aircraft only in stationary peacetime airfields. And an alternative from the series "loomed before the teams of air unitsboth worse": either disperse the squadron over the field sites and get huge problems with repair and supply, or leave the regiment at a fixed location and substitute it for enemy raids.
              The situation was further aggravated by the fact that due to the rapid advance of the enemy, air units were forced to quickly and quickly change their places of deployment, leaving equipment that they had not been able to repair on old sites.
      3. +1
        15 July 2018 10: 34
        Quote: rkkasa 81
        the division’s advance was stopped by the use of 8,8-cm anti-aircraft guns, in addition, Soviet tanks fully developed fuel, since there was no transport of shells and ammunition.
        - and then in your comment smear the Red Army

        From the rearrangement of the terms, the sum does not change. The result is important.
        They fought well, if possible, at least. But this is not easier. Martial art consists in putting the enemy in a losing position. To do this, there is the General Staff, plans and supply planning
    3. +7
      14 July 2018 22: 32
      From the memoirs of the German Colonel General Erhard Raus it follows that a request was given on June 25, 1941 to call the Yu-87 to destroy the lone KV-1! The refusal was motivated by the fact that dive bombers were required literally everywhere! And no one will drive them for the sake of a lonely tank!
      The Routh group of our tank cost about 12 trucks, 4 Cancers, 38 Flak1 / 18/36, as well as several dozen Germans killed and died from wounds.
      1. +1
        15 July 2018 07: 25
        Quote: hohol95
        And no one will drive them for the sake of a lonely tank!

        Give this phrase in denial.
        1. +4
          15 July 2018 13: 15
          Do you have a phrase to confirm the application for the U-87? And the dive bombers used against the lone KV-1? Look for the memoirs of Colonel-General Erhard Routh - maybe you will find a phrase about the refusal to use the Yu-87.
          1. +1
            16 July 2018 10: 41
            Quote: hohol95
            Do you have a phrase about application confirmation on the U-87?

            belay You yourself claimed that the application was and want from me ... confirmation? belay
            WHO disputed it, if Raus clearly wrote about it himself. As well as the fact that he was not given, because Junkers were needed everywhere.
            Quote: hohol95
            Look for the memoirs of Colonel General Erhard Routh - maybe you’ll find a phrase about the refusal to use the Yu-87

            Those. You brought this phrase from the answer to Routh:
            hohol95 (Aleksey) = And no one will drive them for the sake of a lonely tank!
            and to me, at my request to confirm it, you suggest ... to search for it?
            this is absurd, dear Alexey! request
            1. 0
              16 July 2018 18: 01
              It is absurd to demand confirmation of the refusal of the Yu-87 - in the story of Routh their application is not described! And it is Routh who writes about the refusal! Don't you believe Routh?
              And you demand from me DOCUMENTARY confirmation that Raus refused to send Yu-87 to destroy a single KV-1!
              And which of us did more absurd?
    4. 0
      15 July 2018 09: 54
      Quote: Olgovich
      For a dive bomber, a standing single tank is an ideal target.

      This is if the crew is qualified. By the way, it’s not the fact that the dive bombers were within a radius of 500 km:
      “The dive bomber aircraft was completely equipped with the Shu-87 Stuk aircraft. [5] Even at that time, the Yu-87 was considered to be a medium-range short-range aircraft, the main advantage of which was not the speed, range or bomb load, but the accuracy of the bombing”
      "By the time of the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, the Germans had managed to assemble 324 Ju 87 dive bombers from the Soviet borders, of which 233 were combat-ready."
    5. +2
      15 July 2018 20: 30
      Quote: Olgovich
      The overwhelming advantage in technology and, nevertheless, defeat ....

      With KV pre-war release is not so simple.
      In connection with a letter sent to my name by a military engineer, Comrade Kalivoda (former military representative of the ABTU KA at the Kirov plant) in which he said that KV tanks had serious design flaws, the People's Commissariat of State Control, in agreement with Comrade Voroshilov, checked tank production at the Kirov Plant HF As a result, the following was established.
      The guaranteed mileage established for HF in 2000 km for individual units and assemblies is not maintained, which is confirmed by a number of tests carried out by the plant.
      KV gearbox does not have sufficient strength ... Introduced in August this year in the design of the gearbox, the lock fixing the position of the gears reduces the possibility of emergency breakdowns, however, the strength of the gearbox itself is still unsatisfactory. In October, the plant received an act of complaint from the military unit, which stated that in the tank No. 3622 (adopted by the military representative on September 3), the intermediate shaft of the gearbox was twisted and the tapered bearing was destroyed.
      The HF cooling system does not ensure the normal operation of the engine, due to high temperatures and oil in the radiator. On-board friction clutches fail due to overheating due to poor lubrication of the friction clutch bearings. The labyrinth seal introduced by the factory does not hold grease.
      In tanks KV No. 3652, 3653, which passed control tests with mileage and were accepted by the military representative in September, when preparing to ship them to the military unit, a leak was detected through the oil seals of final drives.
      The engine air filter does not provide normal cleaning of air from dust, as a result of which the engine refuses to work when driving along a dusty dirt road.
      Drawings and technical specifications (TU) for the manufacture and acceptance of KV tanks by the factory have not yet been fully developed and the ABTU KA has not been approved. The lack of approved drawings and technical specifications complicates the work of military acceptance and hinders the deployment of mass production.
      It is especially necessary to note the presence of the main design flaws of HF to be eliminated as soon as possible:
      1) insufficient engine runtime without repair (80-100 hours), which reduces the combat readiness of the tank;
      2) poor visibility from the tank, inferior to medium German tanks.
      3) the difficulty of controlling a tank in battle.
      © Mehlis
      Moreover, the shortcomings of the HF in the letter of the Mehlis are still smoothed. In fact, the suspension and transmission of the 46-ton HF were designed for a tank weight of 40 tons, the drive of the 7-ton tower - for 3 tons. When driving through the country road, it was necessary to clean the air filter every 1,5-2 hours. And when moving on the highway already at a speed of 24,3 km / h, the temperature of the water and oil in the cooling system reached 107 and 112 degrees, respectively. And before the start of the war, the plant did not correct a single design flaw - instead, Salzman fed the GABTU with unsubscribes that they would all be eliminated in KV-3.
      In short, the best use of HF could be either to use it as a bunker, or to move slowly along flat terrain as a tank of an RPE.
      1. +1
        16 July 2018 10: 56
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Moreover, the shortcomings of the HF in the letter of the Mehlis are still smoothed. In fact, the suspension and transmission of the 46-ton HF were designed for a tank weight of 40 tons, the drive of the 7-ton tower - for 3 tons. When driving through the country road, it was necessary to clean the air filter every 1,5-2 hours.

        Dear Alexei, I know this and I’m not trying to challenge in any way. The first T 34 had huge problems with the box, I am silent about T 28, T 35.
        It seems to me that seeing initially, from the moment mass production of tanks began, that such problems inevitable- It was possible to focus on increasing resources for repair, maintenance and maintenance, modernization, albeit by reducing the number of tanks released
        1. 0
          16 July 2018 18: 16
          Quote: Olgovich
          It seems to me that seeing initially, from the moment mass production of tanks began, that such problems were inevitable, one could concentrate on building up resources for repair, maintenance and maintenance, modernization, albeit by reducing the number of tanks produced

          But how?
          On the one hand, the USSR needs to ensure the security of its borders from the Finnish-Polish-Romanian block of the “sanitary cordon”. And also from Japan. That is, we have two loosely coupled theater of operations, each of which has an adversary with a considerable amount of infantry.
          On the other hand, the People’s Commissariat for breathing in the back of the NPO has no money for a massive army. 20 personnel divisions (10 in the Far East and 10 in the entire ETVD) - the limit for the USSR in the mid-30s. It is impossible to increase the size of the army. And without increasing numbers, the only way to build up strength is through mechanization. So our military hit an increase in the number of infantry brigades, believing that a tank platoon is equivalent to a rifle company.
  4. 0
    14 July 2018 09: 21
    Very interesting case
    Super good
  5. +12
    14 July 2018 10: 18
    On armor Ivan Chobitka there is a memory of this battle.

    ..... Meanwhile, Germany attacked the USSR. In early July, Porsche and Aders were urgently summoned to Kummersdorf. Guderian, who had flown from the front for half an hour, met them right at the car, and, gently hugging his shoulders, led him into a hangar.
    - Well, gentlemen, what do you say to that? - Heinz's voice could be spread on bread instead of jam.
    - Donnerwetter! - Aders sat where he stood, and Porsche grabbed his heart.
    In the middle of the hangar there was a smoked monster without caterpillars, with armor resembling a lunar landscape.
    - What is it? - hoarsely Porsche.
    - It? - Guderian's voice was sweeter than saccharin. - Ooo, it's a very interesting thing. This is a Russian heavy tank. Half of the 6 Division fired at him, and he stopped only when he ran out of fuel. There was a tantrum with Leeb ... And now !!!!
    The temperature in the hangar dropped ten degrees, Aders looked with longing for the eyes of Manstein ... Guderian dragged Speer and Todt. He burst out and screamed:
    - Arsch mit Ohren !!! These Bierfickeren have been making caterpillar toilets for four years and call them heavy tanks! Mit solchen Arschloecher werde ich bald fertig! Todt, let me go, I'll tear them arsch! While the German people under the leadership of the great Fuhrer ...
    At these words, Todt and Spee made Heil Hitler, releasing Guderian, and he slightly kicked the designers. Tired, he straightened his uniform and said:
    - So, Arschlochen. Russian tank you saw. If in six months my eagles won’t have the same, it’s only better, I will tear both of you Eier. Or not, I'll call Himmler and say that both of you are hidden Jews ....
    1. +2
      14 July 2018 10: 53
      Story! The Germans were well aware of the state of affairs of the Red Army!
      1. +5
        14 July 2018 10: 58
        Sense of humor unfortunately vaccinated on to start.
  6. +5
    14 July 2018 11: 14
    Bright memory to heroic ancestors! soldier
  7. 0
    14 July 2018 14: 28
    Dear author! How the Germans fought tanks with the help of aviation, you can learn from the story of Viktor Kurochkin "In war, as in war." In it, a tank writer specifically describes the destruction of a tank column. Do not be lazy.
    1. 0
      15 July 2018 09: 57
      Quote: Pattern
      In it, a tank writer specifically describes the destruction of a tank column

      It’s easier to destroy the column, even dive-bombers are not needed. One or two staffs, together with Messers. The surviving tanks light up from damaged ones.
      1. Alf
        +1
        15 July 2018 15: 09
        Quote: Pilat2009
        The surviving tanks light up from damaged

        With what joy ?
        They broke through the roof of the MTO, the tank caught fire, why should the next tank catch fire from it? Or did the board break through, should the neighboring tank break out?
      2. +1
        15 July 2018 16: 00
        You read the first memoirs of Rudel himself - in his description he flew several times on his Yu-87D on burning tanks at the time of the explosion of the ammunition in them! And the tower that never came off in this case didn’t smash his Stuck into a pile of duralumin scrap ...
        So, the memoirs of German ASU (pilots, tankers) should be treated with a great deal of sound skepticism!
    2. +1
      15 July 2018 16: 17
      It’s strange - here I’m re-reading “At war, at war” and I don’t find the destruction of the tank column by German aviation! Maybe you have a text, some other not 27 pages, but suppose 270?
      Or for the destruction of a column of tanks or self-propelled guns, you took the following text -
      ... On the horizon, as if from the earth, a purple cloud crawled out. The sun, hiding beneath it, scattered long red stripes across the sky. The snow from them became scarlet. And suddenly the Junkers surfaced from the cloud, followed by the second, third. Sanya counted twelve. They swam slowly, in gang, and resembled huge, bellied dragonflies. The head "Junkers" suddenly slid down the gutter, disappeared behind the forest, and then soared up, caught up with the last bomber, landed in his tail and again rushed to the peak. The Junkers described circle after circle. It seemed that a giant, ferris wheel was spinning between heaven and earth. Explosions were heard deaf, as if from underground. "Junkers" bombed, and to replace them from the same purple clouds crawled out "heinkels", similar to scanty crows. They walked even slower, and then began to pour bombs out of the bag. Nobody bothered them.
      “Yes,” Sanya sighed.
      “Yes,” the corporal repeated.
      “Bastards,” Sherbak said, almost crying.
      The self-propelled regiment, without slowing down, went there, towards a forest as dark as a curved eyebrow, over which fascist vultures had fun with impunity.
      So the Germans are bombing the FOREST, not the convoy ...
      1. +1
        15 July 2018 21: 11
        Quote: hohol95
        Strange - here I am re-reading "In war, ka in war" and I do not find the destruction of the tank column

        Probably refers to the work "Iron rain" of the same V. Kurochkin. I am not sure, I read it for a long time, but, in my opinion, it is there that the German air raid on our tanks is described. About the column I will not say, but something like that was.
        1. +1
          15 July 2018 23: 17
          Yours is true! I did not read this work, but now I “googled” and found a passage - it tells us that the company column was of five T-26 and three KV-1! The company lost 1 KV and 3 T-26.
          1. +1
            15 July 2018 23: 30
            Quote: hohol95
            Yours is true! I did not read this work, but now I “googled” and found a passage - it tells us that the company column was of five T-26 and three KV-1! The company lost 1 KV and 3 T-26.

            Lekalo (Alexey), apparently, just confused, it happens smile And the work is good, I was impressed in my time. I recommend to get acquainted in full. True, it left me with an impression of incompleteness, I really wanted to continue ... By the way, it was from this work that I learned about such a character as Kurt von Tippelskih, I remembered, then I saw his book in a bookstore - I bought it without a doubt. smile
            1. 0
              15 July 2018 23: 45
              Still, it was easier to hit the German pilots on the Yu-87 or Me-109/110 light tanks from T-26 and BT-2/5/7 to T-60/70! And the "swimmers" T37 / 38/40 and even more so! It all depended on the crews themselves. Their raids!
              By 1943, it became more difficult for Germans to bomb from a dive and simply shoot equipment, but the actions of their "hunters" before the battles near Kursk are also described in "The Tale of a Real MAN" -
              At that moment, he threw himself into the grass and fiercely shouted:
              - Get down!
              And now an intense roar of motors sounded, and two huge shadows, shaking the air and strangely rattling, swept over their very heads. And it seemed to the young man not very scary: ordinary planes, probably ours. He looked around and suddenly saw that the overturned rusted truck lying on the road was smoking, quickly flaring up.
              “Look, they are incendiary,” the driver grinned, looking at the wall pierced by the shell and already burning. - Out on the car.
              “Hunters,” said the senior lieutenant calmly, lounging comfortably on the grass. - We'll have to wait, they will be back soon. The roads are shaving. Take away, friend, the car away, out there though under that birch.
            2. +2
              16 July 2018 20: 06
              Yes. Mixed up. I repent. About the incompleteness of the work ... My personal opinion. In the years 60-70, it was fashionable to assert that all those who escaped from the encirclement fell into three places: penal battalion (company), camps and a common grave (execution). V. Kurochkin, as a person who survived the siege of Leningrad and a front-line soldier, a combat officer, did not become like his colleagues. Imagine the situation: V. Vysotsky, the favorite of L. Brezhnev, yells about the penal battalions loudly, and then some V. Kurochkin writes in the second part of the story Iron Rain, that tankers who have escaped from the encirclement and escaped from captivity receive equipment and lead there is a battle on it. Not in Feng Shui somehow it turns out. Nevertheless, a dishonorable person could not become a people's judge. Either censorship did not pass, or he himself did not want to write about everything. A criminal case launched on the brakes about the beating of a writer by policemen, after which he became an invalid. K. Simonov was also pressured by the Union of Writers. The Living and the Dead fit poorly into the generally accepted framework. Therefore, the film turned out to be truncated and incomplete.
      2. +2
        16 July 2018 19: 26
        Sorry. Wrong. I have a collection book of V. Kurochkin was 1968. Naidu-quote. Almost at the very beginning there is a description of the battle during the retreat at the beginning of the war. Kv-1, Bt-7 left at the forefront. Junkers flew in and, with a direct hit, destroyed the HF.
        1. +1
          16 July 2018 22: 55
          Destroyed! And during the bombing of columns and during the bombing of trains with equipment!
          But all their laudatory reports and reports on the destruction of the "red hordes" were, to put it mildly, "very bloated"!
          Yes, and the Germans well concealed their own losses and are still hiding it! One example of a Böke regiment is that at the beginning of the formation on January 25, 123 Panter tanks and 69 Tiger tanks were equal in strength to the Soviet tank corps! Moreover, the Germans themselves do not indicate this number of tanks! But in February, Böke under the command was already 34 “Tigers” and 47 “Panthers”! And where did the rest go - not a word ... As if they were not there ...
  8. +4
    14 July 2018 14: 47
    Maxim Kolomiets has been dealing with this episode for more than 20 years, collecting information bit by bit, including in the German archives.
    His collection has completely unique photographs, including this one ..

    June 25, 1941 German soldiers visiting the "Raseiniai tank". Photo from the personal archive of Maxim Kolomiyets.
    He also has an excellent article on this topic. http://www.mk.ru/social/2015/04/29/odin-den-iz-zh
    izni-klimenta-voroshilova.html
  9. +4
    14 July 2018 17: 15
    Here the phrase "Glory to the heroes who fell in the fight against fascism." soldier
  10. Alf
    +1
    14 July 2018 18: 38
    Having looked at the title of the article, I, by a sinful thing, thought that Roman Roman, again, went to the literary path, thank God, he was mistaken.
    I often argue with you, dear colleague, but I liked your article. Clearly, concisely, without tales and with numbers. hi
  11. +2
    14 July 2018 21: 35
    Eternal Memory to Heroes.
  12. 0
    15 July 2018 12: 14
    Version about HF under Raseiniai (material from the Internet):

    "At 20.00, the 6 Brigade commander, Erhard Raus, resorted to the last means he had before darkness. However, this audacious operation was not crowned with success: neither the caterpillar nor the trunk could be damaged. By the way, this speaks in favor of the KV-15 standing on the road. The fact is that according to the experience of the Finnish war on the 2- mm howitzers put on armor rings. Such a ring could protect Itit barrel from the charge of explosives. "
    I did not serve in the tank forces, so maybe the tankers will check this version?
    1. Alf
      +1
      15 July 2018 14: 58
      Quote: Evgeijus
      The fact is that according to the experience of the Finnish war, 152 mm howitzers were put on armored rings.

      First, what are these rings?
      Secondly, nothing will save from the explosives stuffed into the barrel.
      1. 0
        15 July 2018 20: 12
        Quote: Alf
        First, what are these rings?

        Additional reservation barrel M-10T.
        To protect the howitzer barrel from fragments and bullets outside, special armor rings (of 10 mm armor) were put on it, fixed with a special nut.
        © M. Kolomiyets
        1. Alf
          0
          15 July 2018 20: 30
          Quote: Evgenijus
          Two charges - 15 kg under the caterpillar and a smaller one in the barrel - should deprive him of the ability to move and fire

          Quote: Alf
          Secondly, nothing will save from the explosives stuffed into the barrel.

          But not right?
          At least some rings put on, but if a pound of TNT was pushed into the trunk ...
      2. 0
        15 July 2018 20: 27
        On the website https://military.wikireading.ru/38653 talk about the device of the barrel of the KV-2:
        "... To protect the barrel of the howitzer from shrapnel and bullets, special armor rings (made of 10 mm of armor) were attached to it outside, fixed with a special nut."
        On the "Military Review" in a publication from 12 this May "For the Germans, the meeting with the HF-2 was a real shock" Kirill, the author Ryabov, describing the battle at Raseiniai, indirectly mentions the KV-2.
        In general, my comment was about the KV-2 tank, allegedly participating in the battle of Raseiniai. A technical question arose indirectly, I can not comment on this question, not an expert in this matter.
        1. 0
          16 July 2018 20: 08
          I, too, first heard this story with the participation of KV-2.

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