Prokhorov tragedy of the Soviet tankers. Part of 2
Counter strike tank Rotmistrov’s army in the Prokhorovka area, despite failures in the previous two days, was struck in the morning of July 12. Two tank attacks on the flanks were simultaneously launched: the Katukov tank army in the direction of the Oboyansk highway and from the other flank in the bend of the river Psel. These strikes require separate consideration.
Before applying counterattack at all, from the high command to the ordinary fighters, there was faith in his successful conduct. For the first time since the beginning of the war, such a powerful tank fist was concentrated, almost a thousand tanks in a narrow sector of the front. Everyone saw this power and rushed into battle.
In the tank army of Rotmistrov for many officers and fighters this was the first battle, they were ready to carry it out with dignity. In the first hours of the counter attack, they fell into a terrible meat grinder and were shocked by what was happening, but, recovering, fought bravely. There were more than enough examples of personal and mass heroism.
The counter-attack of the tank corps began in 8.30 immediately after the training, which did not fulfill its task of disrupting control in the enemy’s advanced units and suppressing its anti-tank weapons for successful actions of the first echelon tanks.
Due to the fact that the front edge of the enemy defense was formed only at night before the counterstrike, reconnaissance could not establish the presence and deployment of its fire weapons, therefore the effectiveness of the fire was low. Shooting was conducted on the squares and during the artillery preparation seriously disrupt the enemy's fire system and destroy its anti-tank weapons failed.
When planning a counterattack, the command focused on the rapid advance of tanks into the depths of the enemy’s defenses from the first minutes of the attack. The main blow was aimed at the state farm "October" and the height of 252.2, they had to get into the "fork" between the two advancing tank corps.
One tank corps attacked with two echelons along the railway, the second along the Psel river, its battle formation was built in three echelons. Thus, there were four brigades, one tank regiment, the entire 6 tank and the 234 SAU in the first attacking echelon of two corps in a strip about 19 km wide.
There was no continuous avalanche in the morning on July 12. If the 368 combat vehicles of the two corps actually attacked the Germans in this narrow area of defense at the same time, they would surely break through. But the "armored avalanche" could not be organized.
The bridgehead, from which it was planned to launch a counterattack, the Germans captured the day before, and the initial positions of the brigades were moved several kilometers away from the forward position.
The considerable distance and the rugged terrain markedly increased the interval between the introduction of the first and second echelons of the corps into battle.
Tank battalions from the area of concentration on the source moved in several columns and then through infantry positions and narrow passages in the minefields with company columns began to unfold into battle formation in front of the enemy. Thus, the enemy had the opportunity to observe the construction of a tank wedge and prepare to repel the blow.
The site in front of the state farm and the height, where tank units turned around and began attacking, was also very narrow, only around 900 m. Even a brigade, only a battalion, could not turn around. This led to serious complications from the first minutes of the attack.
First, the corps could not immediately throw a significant amount of armored vehicles into the battle, but introduced it in parts, with significant intervals between them. Secondly, it was also not possible to use the speed of tanks as one of the main elements of a breakthrough. Brigades went on the attack not by a broad front, but by crowded, large groups, in these conditions their crews found it difficult to maneuver.
The maximum force is always invested in the first strike, so it was extremely important at the beginning of the attack to observe the synchronism and continuity of entry into the battle, both of the battalions and brigades. The interval between the entry into battle of the battalions in the brigade was determined in 10 minutes, and the brigade - 30 minutes. But it was impossible to perform.
The significant distance from the place where the second echelon brigades were located to the front edge and the difficult terrain on their way led to an increase in the interval between the introduction of brigades not only into the first and second echelon, but also within the first echelon.
Thus, the corps connections were not a continuous wide stream, but waves, a brigade after a brigade, and the interval between them for a dynamic tank battle was significant, from 30 – 40 minutes to 1 – 1,2 hours. This enabled the enemy to destroy them in turn.
In this regard, in two directions along the railway and from the Petrovka region along the river, in two groups, not connected to each other, only two tank brigades and three SAU batteries with a total number of 115 tanks and SAU . That is, at the beginning of the main forces’s counterattack, it was simply impossible to organize an avalanche of tanks.
In addition to the unsuccessful choice of location for the entry of large tank forces, the command incorrectly assessed the power of the enemy’s anti-tank defense in this sector. It did not expect the enemy to create a stable defense for a short summer night, capable of stopping several hundred of our combat vehicles.
As soon as our tankers reached the enemy’s positions at a direct shot distance, they immediately flared up and smoked around two dozen cars of the first line. There was a feeling that the armored wedge of the brigade stopped abruptly in front of a large but invisible obstacle.
The combat structure was broken, the crews began to maneuver on the battlefield, crawling away, trying to use the terrain folds to get out of the disastrous fire. Much of the first line burned out in minutes. It immediately became clear that the shock wedge of both corps met a well-organized anti-tank defense.
Thus, the first decisive strike by two tank corps failed.
The enemy did not allow the first line of tanks to reach the distance from which the T-34, let alone the T-70, could conduct effective fire. The enemy simply shot the first line, and the rest of the tanks stopped and started firing from the spot.
The command understood that, drawing a frontal impact with two corps, no matter how cynical it sounds, was originally a cross in the first echelon brigades. Burnt out, they had to pave the way for the further movement of the second echelon tanks. The second echelon brigades were drawn into battle only when the first echelon brigades were stopped and half of their vehicles were already hit.
The tanks could not make their way between the railway and the state farm through the ridge of height 252.2, the enemy effectively used the capabilities of its anti-tank defense. As a result, the terrain in 1 km to the north and north-east of the height turned out to be a real cemetery for tank battalions, here at the beginning of the attack they suffered the greatest losses.
After the entry of the second and third echelons, the number of tanks in the direction of the main attack of the two corps increased almost twice, the enemy artillerymen and tankers could not stop the onslaught of our tankers. This helped the group of combat vehicles to break through to the crest of the height and to the state farm area.
From the first hour of the battle for the state farm "October" and the height of 252.2 resembled the surf. Four tank brigades, three SAU batteries and two rifle regiments swept over the area in waves, but, meeting the fierce resistance of the enemy, again retreated. This lasted for almost five hours, until the tankers knocked the enemy out of the area, suffering enormous losses.
It is difficult to understand the logic of command. Why such a long time significant armored forces rushed to a powerful anti-tank stronghold, if after the first hour of the battle it was clear - you need to change tactics?
In 10.30 – 11.00, the advance of four tank brigades was already stopped, and a heavy firefight began with a well-organized anti-tank defense. There was only a local breakthrough of our tankers to the depth of 5 km near the Komsomolets state farm, but the Germans were able to eliminate it. It was the most massive and deepest breakthrough of our tanks, but it turned out to be the last. For its development, the Soviet command no longer had any forces.
The version of the massive head-on collisions of Soviet and German tanks in this battle is not confirmed. There was no need to push German tanks towards the Soviet tanks, which were going at full speed. The Germans had a well-organized defense, their task was to repel the fire of all the available means of the advancing Soviet tanks, which they did.
There were only separate oncoming battles of Soviet and German tanks. Around the height of 252.2 there were several such battles between groups of combat vehicles, but this happened already in the second half of the day, when the Germans launched a counterattack. At this point, the initiative came from their tank divisions. The total number of tanks on both sides involved in such fights did not exceed 50 – 60 units.
With the support of the counter-offensive, our aviation. She was not able to fully provide cover for the counterattack group, and also to inflict sensitive damage to the enemy troops. Moreover, pilots, especially attack aircraft, systematically launched bombing and assault attacks on the troops of almost all the armies that went on the offensive.
Often, the pilots did not pay attention to the signals given by their troops. The matter came to the point that in some areas the infantry units did not specifically indicate the front line with missiles and panels, fearing to fall under their own bombs. Driven to despair, individual compounds "drove off" their planes with small-arms fire. weapons.
Thus, the shock wedge of the tank army, supported by two rifle divisions, despite all efforts, did not manage to overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy. The main forces of our group, taking the height of 252.2, were still in its vicinity to the west and south-west from it.
After continuous attacks, the forces of both tank corps to 15.00 were running out. In brigades, 10 – 15 machines remained in service, and in some even fewer - in 5 – 7. But the counterattack continued, command at all levels received orders not to stop in any way, but to continue pressing on the enemy. But there was no strength, the possibility of connections melted away with each passing hour.
Already after noon it became obvious that the overall operational situation was developing far from what the command had expected. Although it has not lost hope of turning the tide in its favor. But the enemy offered stubborn resistance along the whole front. It became clear that the counterattack of the two Guards armies did not justify the hopes, and the troops suffered heavy losses.
The first strike of the brigades of the two Soviet corps, which looked like one single attack, lasted until about 11.00 and ended with the transition to defense after the liberation of the Oktyabrsky state farm, approximately 13.30 – 14.00. The state farm "October" and the height of 252,2 in the course of the battle several times passed from hand to hand, and only after 17.00 the enemy was last knocked out of the height of 252.2 for the last time and it remained for the Soviet troops.
Between the 14.00 and 14.30, the Germans almost completely halted the offensive of the tank corps and their brigades after the losses incurred and basically lost their combat capability. After 15.00, the Soviet command had no doubt that the counterstrike plan had failed. In addition, it became obvious that the enemy not only stopped the main grouping of troops, but also tries to thrust it. Combat operations between 20.00 and 21.00 were stopped, and rifle divisions occupied the line of defense.
Thus ended the counterattack of the Soviet tankists, on which so many hopes were pinned. Despite the colossal efforts of the high command, officers and ordinary fighters, the goal (breakthrough of the enemy defense) was not achieved. The offensive of the German troops was only stopped. For the sake of completeness, it is probably worth setting out how the German and Soviet sides evaluated the results of this battle and what losses the parties suffered.
The ending should ...
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