At the 26 minute of the film, the announcer said: “Even before the storming of Grozny, Pavel Grachev met several times with Dzhokhar Dudayev. They have been familiar since the days of Afghanistan. Grachev tried to convince the leader of Ichkeria to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. ” Further - S.V. Stepashin: “And Dzhokhar says to him:“ I can do nothing. I am a hostage to the situation. I will fight to the last. ” Paul says to him: “What are you, stupid, or what? This is the army! This is not a joke! "". Announcer: “But the leader of Ichkeria wanted Yeltsin personally to negotiate with him with respect.” Then - journalist E. Kirichenko: “It was enough just one phone call. Dudayev himself spoke about this to Poltoranin when they met. Dudayev would have turned into a dog of the same kind as Grachev. And Chechnya would never break away from Russia. ” Next, journalist V. Baranets: “What did he say, Yeltsin? “So that this stinking shepherd shook my hand in the Kremlin?”
First, why did the announcer decide that if Dudayev admits himself a hostage to the situation, he wants to negotiate with Yeltsin? What's the point of this? M.N. Poltoranin, in 1990-1992 - Minister of Press and Information of the Russian Federation, and in 1992 - Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, in his memoirs, this is how Dudayev sent his request to Yeltsin: “Tell Boris Nikolayevich that I earnestly ask you to meet him. Meetings without any noise. I have some serious suggestions. We had a long conversation with Dudayev. It's amazing how frank he was. So much so that I had a doubt: did Johar sleep our vigilance? Not for the sake of meeting with the president to speculate on this fact? "(Poltoranin M. Power in TNT equivalent. The legacy of Tsar Boris. M., 2010, p. 231-232).
Poltoranin confirms that Dudayev really was under the control of his own entourage: “I noticed: at the talks, when Yandarbiyev was next, Dudayev behaved tough, intractable, and changed without him, he became a prudent interlocutor, as if he were freed from the press . True, it was impossible to break away from Zelimkhan: Dudaev and I went outside to breathe — he was near, we, talking too much, stopped on the stairs — he immediately hurried to us (after the murder of Dzhokhar, Zelimkhan would immediately become Ichkeria’s president) ... Zelimkhan was stuck in networks special services of Turkey, Jordan and God knows what other countries. Literally before his eyes, he was reborn as an implacable enemy of Russia and became the main ideologue of separatism in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. With ferocious zeal, he played the role of overseas politicians in the North Caucasus entrusted to him by foreign chefs. And managed the finances that came “from there” to warm up Vainakhia ”(p. 223-224).
Secondly, apparently, Dudayev spoke to Poltoranin not about a phone call from Yeltsin, but about a personal meeting. Where did E. Kirichenko think that after this conversation “Dudayev would have turned into the same devoted dog as Grachev,” even if Yeltsin had agreed with Dudayev on conditions most favorable to the latter for the future? Doesn't the journalist understand that Dudayev really didn’t belong to himself, and that he needed a conversation with Yeltsin as a trump card against the local opposition? Moreover, Chechnya has already begun to break away from Russia!
Third, with regard to the words of Baranza: but then Yeltsin had already pressed Dudayev’s hand in the Kremlin by that time. By the way, where did he get the quotation about “stinking shepherd”?
To confirm my words, let me give two quotes from the memoirs of two more statesmen of the time in question.
R.S. Mukhamadiev, in 1990-1993 years. - The head of the permanent commission under the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on culture and national issues, gave a capacious description of the state disintegration under Yeltsin: “At the beginning of the 90, when the collapse of the Soviet Union began, after Russia and the Union republics, yesterday’s autonomous states were involved in the sovereignty parade. of the republic. Yes, I emphasize, they were drawn. The desire for self-determination of the republics was provoked from the center, namely the leaders of democratic Russia. I happened to be a witness when a young, handsome Soviet General Dudayev was being held in the reception room of Boris Yeltsin, who was then the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. He stood beside him when Burbulis reassured him, advised him not to worry, and for the first time took Yeltsin into the office. And just a few days later, a coup took place in the city of Grozny, as a result of which “the place of the conservative communist Zavgayev was taken by the democratically-minded young general Dzhokhar Dudayev”. It was literally written, almost all Moscow newspapers stated. I remember how the democrats were happy about this event, sent congratulatory telegrams to Grozny.
Dudayev was specially invited, persuaded in Moscow and given to him weapon, promised full support. This is the work of Yeltsin and his team, he is their product. It was then that he became interested in independence, was out of control of Yeltsin. If they had not found Dudayev then, they would have found another and would have provoked him. This war was invented by militant democrats to solve their more important strategic goals of the economic plan. In muddy water, the fish is well caught, so they robbed the whole country ”(R. Muhamadiev Wreck Chronicle of rabid days. M., 2002, p. 116).
Muhammadiev's words are confirmed by Yu.M. Voronin, in 1991-1993 - Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation: “Since Chechnya, under Dudayev, was one of the first to support the elimination of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (read: the regional committee of the CPSU, since the posts of first secretary of the party and the chairman of the Supreme Council were combined), ”, Encouraging the process of sovereignty, of course, took an active part in the destruction of the Supreme Council of the autonomous republic. G. Burbulis, M. Poltoranin, G. Starovoitova, F. Shelov-Kovedyaev worked most actively in the collapse of Chechnya. At the first stage, they openly put on D. Dudayev, against the current leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, and especially the regional party committee, but at the same time tried to reach an agreement with him and other local politicians on ways to achieve a peaceful, “democratic” solution to the issue of power in Chechnya. Soon they had to make sure that Dudayev was an extremely absurd, ambitious, non-constructive and, most importantly, insincere partner. He easily changed positions and defiantly did not fulfill his obligations ”(Voronin Yu.M. Strapped Russia: political and economic portrait of Yeltsinism. M., 2003, p. 406).
With the help of rather large quotations, I tried to keep the context of the thoughts of the above authors. From Mukhamadiev’s quotation, we can conclude that Dudayev “threw” Yeltsin not for that, in order to return to his hand again. And Voronin clearly points to the inconsistency and rogue Dudaev. It would be extremely naive to believe that Dudayev saw himself as a Yeltsin’s man even for a minute and that he could become for Yeltsin what R.A. Kadyrov for V.V. Putin's
The same Poltoranin writes: “I cannot help saying ... about the role of the trinity - Yeltsin, Khasbulatov, Gaidar - in instilling a regime hostile to Russia in the Caucasus. How did it happen that not the Vainakh adat gave way to the laws of civilization in our country, and the country took the wildest norms of adat as a rule of life? ”(P. 193). I can clarify that the adat (local Caucasian customs) has always stood above the provisions of the Shari'a - general Muslim legal norms.
The most disgusting thing to admit is that the Chechen conflict of the beginning of the 90s, with its escalation into war, was conceived in Moscow. Why Chechnya? The Chechens themselves played along with the Moscow “democrats” by staging persecution of non-Chechens, that is, ethnic cleansing, at the beginning of the 90's: this did not happen in other regions of post-Soviet Russia, including in other Caucasian republics. Poltoranin: “For some reason, it is believed that the anti-Russian orgy in Chechnya began with the arrival of Dudayev. No, Dudayev got up just on this wave. Having received an indulgence from the Khrushchev team, the mountaineers set to work on their own and began to build their lives according to the inhuman norms of the adats, from which Kazakhstan had weaned them. Anti-Russian propaganda was long held in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic at the official level. I have been to this republic many times and observed how the officials themselves persistently raised the degree of hatred of the Vainakhs towards all foreigners ”(p. 219).
There were, of course, other reasons for the situation in the Caucasus at the beginning of the 90s, but this is a topic for another big conversation.
Nevertheless, the analogy of the situation with Chechnya in the military sphere (as the most painful for the people) and the situation with the default 1998. Suggests itself. As in the war, the enemies of Russia earned, so they earned a default. As ps Grachev was not fit for the post of Minister of Defense, and S.V. Kiriyenko was no good for the post of prime minister. Someone must have been in 90-s. here and there become extreme ...