Military Review

Vasily Kashirin: Russian troops entered Bessarabia and liquidated the Bujak Tatar horde at the start of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812.

Vasily Kashirin: Russian troops entered Bessarabia and liquidated the Bujak Tatar horde at the start of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812.On the eve of the 200th anniversary of the Bucharest Peace Treaty on May 16 (28), 1812 IA REGNUM publishes an article by the candidate historical Sci., Senior Researcher at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) Vasily Kashirin, which is an expanded version of his report at the international scientific conference "Accession of Bessarabia to Russia in the light of centuries-old Moldovan-Russian-Ukrainian cooperation" (April 2-4, 2012, Vadul Lui Voda, Moldova). In the "paper" version, this article will be published in the collection of conference materials, which will be published on these days in Chisinau under the editorship of S.M. Nazaria.

Any anniversary of a significant event in modern and recent history inevitably turns out to be that politics and ideology are trying to firmly squeeze historical science in their arms. And no matter how much real scientists strive to free themselves from this stifling attention, deep down they realize the impossibility to achieve this fully. Now, during the 200 anniversary of the 1812 Peace Treaty of the year, historians are breaking their spears in debates about whether the annexation of Bessarabia was a beneficence or a crime on the part of Russia. In our opinion, the Russian Empire, long gone, doesn’t need either accusations, excuses, or praise. However, in order to at least partially overcome the aforementioned influence of modern politics and ideology, we need to maintain and expand the positivistic, factual knowledge of what exactly Russia brought to the peoples of the Dniester-Prut region during the war with Turkey 1806-1812. and after its completion. One of the acts of the Russian Empire was the elimination of the Tatar horde, which inhabited the southern part of the Dniester and Prut interfluve, i.e. a region that has long been known under the Turkish name Budzhak, or “Budzhak Tatarlerinum Topragi” (that is, “the land of the Budzhak Tatars” or “Budzhak Tatar Land”) [1].

It seems that, in its consequences, the purification of the lands of Budjak from the Tatars became one of the most significant events for the region of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812. In a historical retrospective, the destruction of the Budjak horde - the last semi-independent fragment of the once great Ulus Juchi - was the final act of the centuries-old struggle of Russia against the Golden Horde and its heirs. And the deep symbolism of this event also prompts us to turn our attention to it.

Separate pages of the history of the Tatars of Budzhaka were studied by many Soviet, Moldavian, Russian and Ukrainian historians, such as I.G. Chirtoaga [2], A.D. Bachinsky and A.O. Dobrolyubsky [3], V.V. Trepavlov [4], S.V. Palamarchuk [5] and others. However, the detailed history of the Bujak horde has not yet been written, and therefore there are many white spots in its past. As far as we know, until now, the subject of special historical research and the military-political circumstances of the death of the Bujak horde have not yet become the subject of a special historical study. We will try to partly fill this gap with this article, and the source base for this will be, in addition to the well-known published notes of I.P. Kotlyarevsky [6] and Count AF Langeron [7], - and a number of documents from the fund "The General Headquarters of the Moldavian Army" (f. 14209) of the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA) [8].

So, what did the Budjak horde represent in the last years of its existence? Its ethnic composition has not yet been fully clarified by historians. At various times, with the permission of the Ottoman Sultan and the Crimean Khan, various tribal groups of the Nogai Tatars moved to Budjak; in particular - after the collapse of the Great Nogai Horde in the XVII century. As a result, the Bujak horde was a complex conglomeration of representatives of different branches of the Nogai tribe and therefore was not so much an ethnic as territorial-political association. In the Russian sources of the beginning of the 19th century it was said that there were “districts” in Budjak under the names Orumbet-Oglu, Orak-Oglu, Edisan-Nogai. All these are the names of different tribes of the Nogai / Mangyt ethnic group [9] that are well-known in historical science. These "counties" were the possessions of the tribal groups of the Budzhak Tatars. It is known that the Tatars of the clans Edisan and Orak-Oglu lived on the lands of the later Russian Akkerman district, Orumbet-Oglu - Kagul district, and the Tatars of the association Izmail-Canessi (Kalesi?) - near the fortress of Izmail, on the Danube girlah [10]. As the modern researchers of history Budzhaka I.F. Grek and N.D. Russev, by the beginning of the 19th century, the "loose Tatar-Muslim community of Bujacs" had not yet managed to consolidate into the people [11]. And, since history does not have a subjunctive mood, we do not know if the Bessarabian Nogais would ever have been able to create a special “Bucacian” ethnos.

The historic "Khalil Pasha border", which separated the lands of the Bujak horde from the Zaprut possessions of the Principality of Moldavia, passed along the Yalpug River, Upper Troyanov Val and the Botna River to the Dniester. Thus, the possessions of Bujak Tatars covered a part of the territory of the present ATU Gagauzia, Taraclia, Causeni, and Stefan-Vodski regions of the Republic of Moldova, as well as most of southern Bessarabia, now part of the Odessa region of Ukraine. According to the calculations of the Soviet historian PG Dmitrieva, in the middle of the XVIII century from the total area of ​​the Dniester-Prut interfluve in 45 800 square. km under the authority of the Moldavian principality was just 20 300 square. km., and more than half, 25 500 square. km occupied the land of the Nogai and the Turkish "rai" (serf areas) [12].

Up until the liquidation of the Crimean Khanate, the Budjak horde was in dual subordination - at the Crimean Khan and at the Turkish Ochakov ayalet. The ruler of the horde was one of the representatives of the Crimean Khan House Girey; he had the title of Sultan of the Bujak Horde and the rank of seraskir. His seat and the capital of the horde was the city of Kaushany. The peak of the power of the Bujak Horde came in the 17th century. According to many sources, at that time the Budzhak Tatars constituted one of the main shock forces in the army of the Crimean Khan in most of his military enterprises, near and far; and for this reason they played a significant role in the internal political struggle for power in Bakhchisarai. Bujacs also took an active part in the military campaigns of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, on their own initiative, they also committed predatory raids on neighboring Christian lands. The evidence of a significant number of sources (including the works of J. de Luc, G. de Beauplan, E. Chelebi, D. Cantemir and many others) confirm the validity of the assessment of Soviet historians Bachinsky and Dobrolyubsky who defined the Bujak horde as "typical military-predatory nomadic integration with the respective forms of life and economic organization "[13].

By the end of the 18th century, the Tatars of Budjaka gradually moved to a settled-nomadic way of life. The basis of their economy was still livestock. During the herding season, the Tatars roamed from pasture to pasture, and for the winter they gathered in villages where the farming was conducted [14]. A Russian witness noted: “The Tatars, by their very nature lazy and unaccustomed to farming, fed on milk and some meat; their income was mainly trade in cattle and horses. They sow little wheat and barley, and breed only maize (Turkish rye) Moldovans call corn. Bessarabia’s magnificent pastures are so large that they allowed in every village not only to keep 20, 30 and up to 100 cattle heads [15], but even the Hungarians and Transylvanians used them, driving huge flocks of sheep and paying for every g tin a small amount of money that made up the income of the country "[16].

At the beginning of the war with Turkey in 1806, the Russian side did not have accurate data on the number of the Bujak horde. So, the Russian officer I.P. Kotlyarevsky, who was directly involved in relations with the Tatars (for more details, see below), wrote that at that time the Budzhak Tatars could have set up 30 for thousands of armed soldiers [17]. However, this number seems to be too high. In the official documents of the Russian command (including reports addressed to the emperor), the total number of the entire horde was determined by an approximate figure in 40 thousand people. Kotlyarevsky himself repeats the same number elsewhere in his Journal [18]. Obviously, it should be considered the closest to the truth.

In comparison with the other Black Sea steppes, Budzhak was populated quite tightly. The number of Tatar villages of Budjaka to 1806 year is known very accurately. According to the "counties" they shared the following:

• Orumbet Oglu - 76 villages

• Orak-Oglu - 36 villages

• Et Yesin (Edisan Nogai) - 61 village

• Izmail district (Kirghiz, Djenbulak, Koybey, Koeleskaya districts) - 32 villages [19]

As a result of two victorious wars with Turkey in the reign of Catherine II, Russia extended its power to the entire northern Black Sea region from the Dniester to the Kuban. This space was the habitat of the Nogai hordes, formerly depending on the Crimean Khanate. By joining it, the Russian Empire was faced with the difficult task of subjugating the Nogais, which required a clear definition of the boundaries of their territories and, if possible, their relocation into the Russian Empire, further from the theater of the next wars against Turkey. The Russian authorities tried to achieve the peaceful relocation of the Nogais, but in the case of disobedience of the latter did not stop in front of tough power measures.

The most striking example of this was the actions of A.V. Suvorov against Nogais in the Kuban. 28 June 1783 of the year on the field under Yeisk Russia took the oath of the Edisan, Dzhemboyluk, Dzhetyshkul and Budzhaksky [20] hordes, as well as Sultan Adil-Giray with his people. The Russian authorities decided to relocate the Nogai hordes to the Ural steppes. The beginning of this operation, entrusted to Lieutenant-General Suvorov, the head of the Kuban Corps, provoked protests by the Nogais. Under the influence of agitation of the rebellious supporters Shagin-Giray Dzhemboyluki and part of the Dzhetyshkulov 30-31 July 1783 of the year rebelled and, with a total number of 7-10, thousands of people rushed to the Kuban, attacking the posts of the Russian troops along the way. On August 1, at the Urai-Ilgas tract, the insurgents were completely defeated by the forces of Butyrka Musketeer and Vladimir Dragoon Regiments of the Kuban Corps, and then in the autumn of the same year, Suvorov himself dealt a series of defeats to the rebel Nogais [21]. Russian military historian General P.O. Bobrovsky wrote: "In the battles at the tracts of Uray-Ilgasy, Kermenchik and Sarychiger, they fell to 7 000 legs, many thousands of them went to Turkey or fled to the Circassians; no more 1 000 people were taken into captivity, except for wives and children. Political originality of the legs was taken as a prisoner 22 23 people other than wives and children. Political originality of the legs was taken as a prisoner than 285 68 people except for wives and children. Political originality of the legs was taken as a prisoner, XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX , the land of the Don troops, constantly barbarously devastating with their raids, ceased "[XNUMX]. However, the Russian authorities realized the erroneousness of their plan to resettle the Nogais to the Urals and therefore decided to transfer part of them to the Caspian Sea, and to set the Edisan and Dzhemboyluk hordes into the Azov Sea, on Dairy Waters [XNUMX]. There, they were allotted XNUMX ths. Dessiatines convenient and XNUMX ths. Dessiatines of uncomfortable land, which formed a triangle from the mouth of the river. Berdy, which flows into the Sea of ​​Azov, to the mouth of the Molochny estuary, and from there up along the left bank of the river Dairy water to the headwaters. Tokmak.

In 1801, the head of the Nogai hordes, the Edisansky Murza, Bayazet-Bey, advanced an ambitious project to convert the Molochans of the Nogai to the Cossack class, which implied the obligation to perform military service in exchange for certain benefits. October 5 1802 was approved by the states of the Nogai Cossack army, which was to consist of 2 regiments, 500 people each. However, this army remained to exist only on paper, as the Nogais did not at all want to bear the Cossack service. As a result, the Nogai army was abolished. 10 April 1804 was followed by the rescript of Alexander I to Kherson military governor A.G. Rosenberg, according to which the Molochans of the Nogai ought to be turned "to agriculture and cattle breeding, was supposed to be the only two branches of their economy". The Committee of Ministers elaborated the “Regulation for the Administration of the Nogai”, which was confirmed by the Emperor 13 of May 1805. This position Nogais equal in the rights and obligations with the Crimean Tatars, and their management was entrusted to the Tauride civil governor. The Nogais directly supervised the Russian official, whose post was called the “bailiff of the Nogai hordes” [24]. Thus, having accumulated in previous years a rich experience of interaction with the Black Sea Nogais and streamlining their position in their possessions, the Russian Empire now intended to solve the issue of the Bujak horde in its favor, a good reason for which was the beginning of the new war with Turkey in 1806. In the initial period of this conflict, the actions of the Russian command in relation to the Budzhak Tatars were determined by the peculiarities of the overall strategic situation in Europe and the Balkans, as well as by the rather specific military and political plan of the 1806 campaign of the year.

The invasion operation into the Ottoman Empire was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the Dniester (later Moldavian) army of the cavalry general I.I. Michelson, which consisted of five infantry divisions (9-I, 10-I, 11-I, 12-I and 13-I). The campaign plan was approved by Emperor Alexander I 15 of October 1806 of the year, which almost coincided with the receipt of news of the defeat of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstedt of 2 (14) of October. The defeat of the allied Prussia meant that now Russia had to bear the brunt of military operations against Napoleon in Central Europe. It was necessary to send additional forces of the Russian army to this theater of war. In particular, the 9 and 10 divisions of the former corps of General I.N. were withdrawn from the Dniester Army. Essen 1 th [25]. Thus, Michelson was forced to start the operation to occupy Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia with clearly insufficient forces - he had only three infantry divisions at his disposal, with a total force of about 30 thousand [26]. The political situation was also very complex and controversial. Formally, Turkey remained an ally of Russia, so the Russian troops entered the Principality without declaring war, under the pretext of preparing the movement for the Adriatic, as well as protecting the local population from the tyranny of rebellious pasha and kyrjali robbers.

The Russian leadership built its campaign plan based on the fact that the advantage of the Russian forces in military readiness, as well as the weakness of the central government in Constantinople and the political anarchy in Rumelia were to help the Russian troops quickly, without hostilities, to take the Principality and achieve Turkish fortresses north of the Danube. This would allow Russian diplomacy to confidently demand political concessions from Turkey - first of all, refusal to cooperate with France and confirm guarantees of the rights and privileges of the autonomous Danube Principles.

Guided by this plan, the Russian command sought to avoid fighting as much as possible with the Turks in the area north of the Danube. For this reason, it attached particular importance to the methods of diplomacy, in particular with regard to the Tatars of Bujak. Of course, since the times of the steppe campaigns of B.K. Minich and P.A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky in the XVIII century, the Tatar cavalry in military terms did not pose any threat to regular Russian troops. However, the safety of Russian communications and the supply of troops with supplies on site, and, consequently, the speed of the operation to occupy the Danube principalities and Bessarabia depended on the behavior of the local Tatar population.

The Russian commander in chief, 67-year-old General Mikhelson, the winner of Yemelyan Pugachev, had not only experience with the Tatar population, but also well-defined plans for the Budzhak Tatars. In 1800-1803 he, being the Novorossiysk military governor, ex officio ruled the Crimean peninsula and the Nogai hordes on the Milk waters. It was then, at the beginning of 1801, that Bayazet-Bey, the ambitious chief of the Molochansky Nogays, invited him, using his kinship and acquaintances, to incline the Budzhak Tatars to resettlement within Russia, which was part of his plan to create the Nogai Cossack army. According to Bayazet-Bey, the Tatars themselves from Bessarabia requested permission to move to their relatives in Russia, away from the violence and arbitrariness of the rebel rulers Osman Pasvand-oglu and Mehmet-Girey-Sultan. 25 February 1801, the emperor Paul I ordered Michelson and Bayazet-Bey to begin negotiations with the Turkish authorities to allow the Tatars to leave Budzhak. However, only two weeks later, Paul I was killed as a result of the March 12 palace coup, and Alexander I, who came to the throne, ordered I to stop the resettlement of the Budzhak Tatars until the issue was agreed with High Port [27]. As a result, the question was postponed for several years.

In early October, 1806, on the eve of the war with Turkey, Mikhelson recalled this project and decided to implement it. In his letters addressed to the Governor General of New Russia, Duke E.O. de Richelieu and the Minister of Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Budberg Mikhelson pointed out that the Bucac Nogais constituted a significant part of the light cavalry of the Turks in the Danube-Dniester theater of war and that with their raids they could create significant difficulties for the Russian troops. In this regard, he offered to choose two or three people from the Nogai living in Russia and send them to convince their Budzhak relatives. Richelieu, approving the plan of Michelson, selected for this mission and sent notable Nogai from the Milk Water to Bujak 4. The documents give their names: Begali Aga, Ilyas Aga, Moussa Celebi and Imras Celebi [28].

According to the plan of the Russian command 1806 of the year, the occupation of Bessarabia was entrusted to the 2 corps of General Baron Casimir von Meyendorff (15 infantry battalions, 15 squadrons, 2 Cossack regiment, more than 10 thousand people) and separate 13 divisions of the XYNUMX squadron. infantry battalions, 11 squadrons). On the night from 10 to 21 in November, Meiendorff’s main forces crossed the Dniester at Dubossary and began to move towards Bender, and at twilight on November 22, his troops entered the fortress without prior fight with Pasha. On the same days, units of the 24 division of Richelieu crossed the Dniester at Mayakov (November 13) and occupied Palanca (November 28), Akkerman (December 29) and Chile (1 December) [9] without resistance.

Under the pretext of a shortage of forage and food, Meiendorf lingered in Bender for more than two weeks, until December 11, and this delay was rightly considered by many historians as the main strategic mistake of the entire 1806 campaign of the year, which had far-reaching consequences. It is noteworthy that Meyendorf himself called the main reason for the delay also the uncertainty of the position occupied by the Budzhak Tatars. Brigadier I.F. was sent for official talks with them. Katarzhi and the captain I.P. Kotlyarevsky, Adjutant Meiendorf, together with a translator. Ilya Filippovich Ka-tarzhi, the brigadier of the Russian service, was a representative of one of the most distinguished Moldovan families. He was the son-in-law of the emperor Gregory III Geeky and at one time he occupied the post of the great hetman of Moldova, and then, after the Yassy world, he moved to Russia. For the Dniester-Danube region, Katarji was undoubtedly a “political heavyweight” and, in addition, had the talents of a diplomat negotiator. Immediately before this, he successfully carried out a responsible mission in Bender, with the consent of the local ruler Gassan Pasha not to resist the Russian troops.

And now Katharzhi and Kotlyarevsky received a new task - "to convince Tatar elders to accept peace-loving proposals, promising them friendship and the most benefits from the Russian troops if they remain friendly to Russia and remain calm when troops move through their lands" [30]. According to Kotlyarevsky, in the Tatar villages they everywhere met "crowds of armed Tatars gathering for advice about the Russian troops" [31]. However, the diplomatic negotiations of the Russian emissaries were successful everywhere, which was unexpected for them. The key role here was played by the news received by the Tatars that in the occupied Turkish fortresses the Russian troops humanely treat the local Muslims, do not threaten their religion and pay money for all supplies.

And indeed, units of the Moldavian army had the clearest orders in no way restraining the Tatars. For example, the commander of the 13 division, General Richelieu 3 of December, ordered the head of his cavalry avant-garde, General A.P. Sass: "I respectly esteem your Excellency in particular for recommending that when you go with your squad through Tatar possessions, you shouldn’t do anything from them, neither supply nor fodder, demand, and even more offense or rudeness not do, but if you need to take [1 word nrzb.] Apartments or carts, then occupy and demand them in the Moldovan villages, if the need happens in the Tatar villages to dwell, then the house under the apartment to occupy Christian, and not Tatar, and even more Murzin "[32]. As we see, political expediency forced the Russian command to impose on the troops on the friendly Christian population, freeing the Tatars from Budzhak from them. As a result, the promise of loyal attitude to the Russian troops was successively given by the tribal "counties" Orumbet-Oglu, Orak-Oglu, Edisan-Nogai and the Tatars of the Izmail region, reinforcing their commitment by sending amanats. Already on the way back, Katharzhi and Kotlyarevsky visited the capital of the Budzhak Tatars, Kaushany, and persuaded the local “voivode” [33] to submit to the Russian authorities and send their brother to Amanat. Kotlyarevsky wrote: “Thus, this barbaric, cruel and incredulous people were safely bowed to the Russian side and calmed when they could gather armed people up to 30 thousand; only Tatar villages belonging to the so-called Izmail paradise, number seven, remained adamant” [34].

The sources known to us do not allow us to find out unequivocally whether the missions of four notable Nogais from Milk Water and Katarzhi-Kotlyarevsky were somehow coordinated among themselves. We can only assume that the trip of the Molochansky Nogays to the Tatar villages of Budjak took place somewhat earlier, on the eve or at the very beginning of the Russian entry into the borders of Bessarabia, and therefore the envoys of General Meyendorff acted on partly prepared soil. In any case, the formal outcome of these missions was a brilliant diplomatic success — the overwhelming majority of the Budzhak Tatars promised to keep the peace and cooperate with the Russian authorities. Command reported the bloodless victory and petitioned for the awards for distinguished - of emissaries-Nogai production of milky water in the next Cossack officer ranks - Ran-Agu in the captains, Ilyas-Agu in centurions, mousse-Chalabi and Imras-Celebi - in cornet with a allowing all of them to wear saber strap [35]. It should be noted that the idea of ​​producing these Nogais for officer ranks looks curious, since the Nogai Cossack army had already been completely abolished by that time. Whether they finally got the required ranks remains unknown.

In addition, on December 7, General Meyendorf appealed to the commander-in-chief with a proposal for the material reward of the noble Nogai of Budzhak for their loyalty. He wrote: "In order to strengthen the loyalty of Tatar officials, it is necessary to make, according to the custom of the eastern nations, gifts to the Causenian governor of the agass and the main murza." Meyendorf compiled a list of noble Tatars, with the designation of gifts due to them [36]. This list looked like this:

Kaushan voivode Agasa Shuba fox rubles in 400

Officials with money

County Orumbet oglu

1 th Oglan Temir Bey Fox coat, thin cloth covered, rubles in 300

2 Boiler Ali aga Shuba Fox with a cloth of rubles in 200

County Edisan Nagay

1 th Olan Aslan Murza Fox fur coat, covered with cloth, rubles in 250

2 Agli Girey Shuba covered with cloth, rubles in 200

3 Khalil Chelebi Fox fur coat, covered with cloth, rubles in 150

County Orak Corner

1 Batyrsha Murza Fur, covered with cloth, rubles in 250

2 Bigin Murza Silver Watch

3 th Chora Murza Silver Watch

County Ethishna Oglu

1 th Ak Murza Fur, covered with cloth, rubles in 200

2 th Ishmael Murza Watch Silver

Kyrgyz Mambet Naza Agli Shuba covered with cloth, rubles in 200

Bay Murza Confident Money

By the way, the presence on this list of "Bay-Murza Confident", i.e. secret agent, who reported information to the Russian command for a cash reward.

Michelson approved the list, and in January 1807 from his headquarters to Meiendorf to distribute Budjak notables were sent foxes to 9 fur coats and 45 arshins of different colors to them, as well as 3 pairs of silver watches [37]. The cost of these gifts was negligible compared to the price achieved by the bloodless diplomatic success. However, as subsequent events showed, it was still too early to celebrate the victory.

Having received assurances from the Tatars in obedience, General Meyendorf, with the main forces of his December 11 corps, finally made his way from Bender to Ishmael. The walls of this fortress Russian troops approached 16 December 1806 of the year. The Russian command had all the data to believe that the locals, remembering the terrible assault of Ishmael 1790 of the year, would easily agree to a peaceful surrender. But military happiness turned away from Meyendorff, as if in punishment for his delay in Bendery. Ahead of him by just one day, Turkish military leader Ibrahim Pehlivan-oglu arrived in Ismail from 4 thousand janissaries, destined to become famous as the most talented and energetic commander of the Ottoman Empire in that war [38].

Having pacified (and partially interrupting) supporters of the surrender with an iron hand, Pehlivan breathed energy into the garrison of the fortress and immediately engaged in strengthening its defense. Meijendorff’s offer to surrender Ishmael Comen-Dante refused; then from the Russian side several cannon shots were fired at the fortress. This was the beginning of the fighting in southern Bessarabia in that war. In response to December 17, the Turks of Pehlivan made a sortie, during which a rather hot cavalry affair took place and both sides suffered losses. The Russian troops near Izmail did not have a siege park, and also experienced an acute shortage of food and especially fodder. Given all this, Meiendorf decided to retreat from Ishmael in the north-west direction, to Falch on the river. Prut, where he located his main apartment [39]. With this movement, he actually lost direct communication with the Russian garrisons in Bender, Kiliya and Akkerman from the 13 division, and also opened the way for the enemy to the central part of Bessarabia [40].

Meidendorf’s retreat from Ishmael was perceived by local residents as a clear and undoubted failure of the Russian troops. It was repeatedly noted that such incidents at the beginning of hostilities always had a great psychological effect on the peoples of the East, drawing in their minds a picture of the imminent near death of the infidels and inspiring them to further struggle. That is why in all wars with Turkey, Russian military leaders tried at all costs to avoid even minor setbacks in the initial period of the struggle. In addition, a few days after the Russian troops retreated from Ishmael, Bujak received the news that on December 18, the sultan finally declared war on Russia. Langeron wrote about it this way: “The Tatars, surprised by Meindorf’s defeat, frightened by Peglivan’s threats, seduced by his promises and connected with the unity of religion, received the firmans of the Sultan who called them to the defense of the faith, first agreed to listen to the proposals of our enemies and ended up accepting them "[41].

Russian troops occupied a cordon disposition in Budjak, which made it easier for the enemy in Izmail to carry out raids and raids on the positions of Russian units. Pehlivan Pasha remained the leader and soul of the active operations of the Turkish garrison of Ishmael. He managed to make a number of long-distance attacks, of which the 22 raid under Kiliya became particularly successful in December, where in the village of Chamashur [42] on the shores of the lake China was crushed by a detachment of Russian cavalry under the command of Colonel Count V.O. Kinson From the documents it follows that the Tatars [43] also participated in the attack. A number of neighboring villages in which Christians lived were destroyed by the people of Pehlivan [44]. He continued to successfully use the tactics of terror, and the Russian troops were unable to stop him. By the way, the Tatars could not count on Pehlivan’s mild appeal. So, according to Lanzheron, he destroyed all the villages near Ishmael, resettled their inhabitants in the fortress and took away all their food supplies [45].

In the light of similar incidents, in the last days of 1806, the Russian command began to dominate anxious moods; considered it probable and feared Pehlivan’s deep raid on Bessarabia and the general uprising of the Budzhak Tatars and Muslims in the occupied Turkish fortresses. So, December 24, Commandant Bender, Major General ME Khitrovo reported to Michelson: "I receive, above all, from various residents and from the officers I send, information that the Tatars, because of the retreat of our troops from Ishmael, are completely hesitant and are secretively preparing weapon, letting go of the sabers and making spears "[46]. And in a report from Kiliya, which Khitrovo also sent to the commander-in-chief, it was said:" Moreover, from among the inhabitants one Moldovan reported that he personally saw in Izmail of the Tatar Khan, who, taking advantage of the retreat of Baron’s corps Meyendorff, performed with thousands of people in the Tatar villages, in order to gather all the inhabitants to stop our relations with Baron Meyendorf, as well as with Akkerman. Troops from behind the Danube are sent to Ishmael every minute, so that Mr. Lieutenant-General Zass has been waiting for an attack on Kiliya all these days. Turks and Tatars with strong tensions tend to destroy the villages of Moldavian and Volosh "[47].

And in the report of the commander of Akkerman General N.A. Loveyko said: “Akkerman Tahir-Pasha, through a translator with me, showed his kindness towards us, let me know that the Tatar Sultan, or a certain rebel, called Batyr-Girey, with 4000, the crowd of intruders is in 10 hours from Akkerman The Turks, who live here, secretly moving to him a few people, consistently have intercourse with him, that they all breathe betrayal to us and keep the party of the famous Pehlivan, and that the attack on Akkerman he believes is inevitable. Following this from the Tatar villages of Mu They came to me with a request to take them into patronage and with the announcement of a revived rebel Batyr-Giray. They confirmed the same thing in his reasoning, canceling only that he was in 25 hours from Akerman and had his own camp in the village of Katlabug, but he returned to Ishmael, and what really is his attempt to attack Akkerman and Tatar villages, not wanting to join him. And containing a cordon from Akkerman to Bender with a Cossack regiment named for his Army Don military commander Vlasov 2 report of m He did not report that the Moldavians living in the village of Kaplan, Basil Busar, had come to him, announced that in the villages of Bulakcha, Shakhai and Totabe, where Temir-Murza lives, on the back of him and about the information he received from Izmail, as near Izmail troops there are few Russian, in order to go to the rear of them together with the Izmail congregation to smash them, armed Tatars gather and intend to carry out this intent into action "[48].

In this report, General Loveyko draw attention to a few things. As we see, local Christians regularly informed the unfriendly sentiments and subversive propaganda among the Tatars. Undoubtedly, their perennial enmity with the Tatars, and the fear of physical violence on the part of Pehlivan and his supporters affected here. Moreover, if you believe the words of Loveyko (and we don’t have any reason to believe), it follows that a number of Tatar murz asked the Russian command for protection against "peglivan robbers" (as we called military forces of the head of defense of Izmail).

Noteworthy is also the mention in the report of Loveyko of the role that a certain Sultan-Batyr-Girey played in the outrage of the Budzhak Tatars. Sources and historiography known to us do not give an answer to who exactly this Tatar leader was. Most likely, he was a representative of that branch of the Crimean Khan's house Giray, which traditionally ruled the Bujak horde. But what were his rights to power in Causeni and the status in the Ottoman military-administrative hierarchy at that moment - it remains to be seen. There is no doubt only that in Russian documents it is called "seraskirom". In the draft report of Michelson to the Highest Name of 18 in January 1807, it was said: “From the Sultan Farman about the war, it is clear that new Seraskirs acted on this decision, on the one hand, Sultan Batyr Giray, who gave hope to raise Tatar against us, on the other hand, Moustafa Bayraktar, whom Porta considered able to forbid us entry into Wallachia "[49]. In another document, Mikhelson reiterated that the change in the mood of the Budzhak Tatars began precisely under the influence of the seraskir of Ismail Batyr-Giray. The phrase "new seraskirs" suggests that Sultan-Batyr-Giray was recently produced by Porto in this high rank, possibly in recognition of his merits in outraging the Tatars against Russia. Or maybe the Ottoman authorities thus approved him just at the rank of the ruler of the Bujak horde (who traditionally had the rank of seraskira).

So, the Russian command began to realize that the peaceful conquest of the Tatars by Budzhak turned out to be an illusion, and moreover, unsafe, and that the situation required urgent countermeasures. Lanzheron wrote: “The Bessarabian Tatars, still very peacefully remaining at their hearths, could easily join Peglivan, and it was very important for us to prevent this intention; we had to force fear or conviction, but force them to join Russia” [ 50]. Commander Mikhelson ordered to keep Tatar amanats [51] more strictly. However, this in any case would not have yielded any results. Having borrowed the practice of amanatstvo among the peoples of the East, Russia still could not use it effectively, since Christian morality and ethics did not allow the cold-blooded murder of hostages, without which their capture and content were meaningless. On this occasion, Langeron wrote: “The fate of these hostages was of little interest to the Tatars, especially since they knew Russian morals too well to think that they would kill them” [52].

It is impossible to ignore another possible reason for the transition of the majority of Bujaks to the Turkish side - the violence and robberies committed by units of the Russian army, with the connivance or powerlessness of command. In the newest monograph by I.F. Grek and N.D. Russev, these phenomena are called as the main and, in fact, the sole reason for the betrayal of the Tatars and their flight to Ishmael and beyond the Danube [53]. However, the source on which this version is entirely based is the Langeron's Notes. Brightly and colorfully written, they are unique in completeness of the memoir of the war 1806-1812. and therefore invaluable to the historian. However, exceptional arrogance, causticity and prejudice of judgments and assessments of their author in relation to people and phenomena of Russian life have been repeatedly and quite rightly noted. The great majority of Russian military leaders, with whom he had to serve and fight, Langeron portrayed as limited, immoral, cowardly and corrupt. A striking example of the tendentiousness of Lanzheron is his rudely offensive in style and absurd in content statements about the commander-in-chief of the Danube army, M.I. Golenishcheve-Kutuzov, on his military and administrative activities.

According to the version of Langeron, the Russian troops very soon after the entry into Budzhak in the winter of 1806-1807. they began to oppress the locals, plundering their main wealth - livestock. He wrote: "The regimental commanders and various special calculators from Odessa and Kherson first bought cattle at a very low price, sending it down the Dniester and selling it there at a high price, but then they got tired of buying cattle from the Tatars and they began to purchase it, a cheaper price from the Cossacks, who stole it from the Tatars, which did not present any difficulties, as the herds grazed without any prizewinner and protection. The unfortunate Tatars, plundered and ruined, tried to complain, but it was useless, because no one even listened to them. until last th extreme, they decided to join the Peglivanu "[54].

Undoubtedly, this evidence of Lanzheron deserves attention and further research. However, any historian who is familiar with the professional basics of his craft is obliged to understand that one single source of memoir character cannot serve as a basis for advancing the concept of causes of an important historical event and then for defending it as an undeniable truth. If there are documents in the archives reflecting the facts of major abuses and violence of Russian commanders and troops over the Budzhak Tatars at the end of 1806 - the beginning of 1807, so far these materials have not yet been introduced into scientific circulation. Undoubtedly, there were certain problems with the discipline and behavior of the Russian troops in Bessarabia and Bujak; first of all, not with regular units, but with Cossacks and volunteer formations.

The command was aware of these destructive phenomena and tried to fight them. So, the same Lanzheron 13 of January 1807 of the year wrote to General Sass: “To keep the Cossacks in the village for the maintenance of the chain, do not leave Your Excellency to confirm strictly, so that they behave in good faith, they will not attempt any offense to the Tatars. the severity of the law must be punished [55]. It should be noted that this order dealt specifically with the Tatar villages of Budzhak and the Cossacks who carried out the outpost service there.

This observation completely coincides with the data of Langeron’s “Notes” on events in the south of Bessarabia. If you read them carefully, it will become clear that, speaking of the abductions of Tatar cattle, he meant, first of all, the actions of the Cossack regiments of the 13 Division (which he himself was appointed to command at the very beginning of 1807, due to serious illness of General Richelieu) - 2 of the Bug Cossack Major Baleev Regiment and Donskoy Vlasov of the 2 Regiment (under the command of the military captain Esaul Redechkin). These regiments, which were part of the Russian avant-garde of General Sass, were stationed in villages from Kiliya to Ishmael, in the most densely populated part of Budzhak. According to Lanzheron, all the other “deceitful subordinates seemed childish games in comparison with what was happening in Kiliya” [56]. It was the Cossacks of the two named regiments of the 13 Division, due to their geographical location, who had the opportunity to seize cattle from the Tatars and sell them to second-hand dealers across the Dniester.

The Bug Cossack army, which arose during the Catherine Wars with Turkey, was abolished by Paul I and restored by Alexander I on May 8 of the year 1803. This army, consisting of three five-hundred regiments, had the right to accept foreign immigrants into its ranks, and therefore it became a refuge for a motley rabble - adventurers, wanderers and criminals from Moldova, Wallachia and because of the Danube. The fighting qualities of the Bug Cossacks at the beginning of the 1806-1812 war. were exceptionally low. But in the case of robbery, they had no equal; to compete with them in this field could only volunteer formations from residents of the Danube principalities and Balkan immigrants, who were widely created by the Russian command in that war and were sources of a severe headache for him.

Lanzheron wrote about the Bug Cossacks and their bosses: "The commanders of these regiments: Yelchaninov and Balayev (Baleyev was correct. - Author) were terrible robbers; they devastated Bessarabia as much as Pehlivan himself could do" [57]. Subsequently, Major Ivan Baleyev for abuses committed by him was committed to a military court and expelled from service. The fact that the robberies in Budjak committed irregular formations in no way relieves the responsibility of the Russian command, which unsuccessfully tried to control the Cossack volunteer freedom. However, we note that the 2-th Bug Cossack Major Baleyev regiment had five hundred, which at the beginning of the war consisted of only 13 officers and 566 Cossacks [58]. The number of the Donskoy Vlasov 2 regiment was comparable with this. So, if you believe the "Notes" Langeron, it turns out that about a thousand Cossacks from the Richelieu division for about one and a half months at the beginning of the winter 1806-1807. the 40-thousandth Budjak horde, which had more than 200 settlements, was destroyed to the ground and thus inclined to go over to the side of the Turks. So far, we have no choice but to leave this grotesque statement on the conscience of Count Langeron himself. However, in reality, it appears that most of the Tatars of Budjak’s transition to the Turkish side at the beginning of 1807 was due to a much more complex set of reasons than some historians see. In our opinion, these reasons included:

• The moral impact of unsuccessful actions of Russian troops in the area of ​​Izmail in the winter of 1806-1807; hopes of the Muslim population to defeat Russia in the war.

• Propaganda, incl. religious, by the Turkish authorities. The influence of the sultan's firm about the holy war against the Russians.

• Active raid actions of Pehlivan Pasha and Sultan-Batyr-Girey in the southern part of Budjak; repression and intimidation on their part.

• Cases of abuse and violence by irregular units of the Russian army, primarily the Cossack regiments of the 13 division of Richelieu (the scale of which needs to be clarified).

At the beginning of the new 1807, in his reports to St. Petersburg, the Commander-in-Chief, General Mikhelson, continued to paint a fairly good picture of relations with the Tatars of Budzhak. For example, on January 18, he wrote: “Although not all, that is, excluding the Izmail districts, Tatar had given a written commitment, which I attach in a copy, in loyalty to us and devotion, and even the chain with our Cossacks Bunar and Musait (where our main posts) contain, considering this action not against Ports, but against the rebel Pehlivan, against whom they have hatred ”[59]. However, in reality, Pehlivan, who received the complete forgiveness of the Ottoman Padishah after declaring war on Russia, was no longer a “rebel”, and not all Tatars felt hatred towards him.

At the headquarters of the Moldavian Army, they quickly realized the seriousness of the real state of affairs. For negotiations with Tatars' foremen, Budzhaka Mikhelson decided to send the court counselor K.I. Fazardi (aka Fazardiy), an official of the diplomatic department, which consisted of his headquarters "for the management of Asian affairs" [60]. Caetan I. Fazardi in 1804-1806 He served as a Russian consul in Vidin, was fluent in Turkish, and was an expert in the region. He had repeatedly been on business in Budzhak and was well acquainted with the local Tatar elite. In particular, it was he who was sent to Budjak with a diplomatic mission in 1801, when the relocation of the Tatars to Russia, which had failed then, was being prepared. Now, at the beginning of 1807, Fazardi received an order from Michelson to persuade the Tatar murz in threatening them, in case of disobedience, death, as well as to incline them to resettlement within Russia, to Dairy Water. Fazardi vigorously set about fulfilling his mission. On January 29, he reported to Michelson from Falcha that, "having been sent several times to Budjak, he had time to get acquainted with these Tatars; to see the former and get acquainted with the new ones" [61]. The overall content of his report was soothing. Fazardi noted “disagreement between enmity, envy and natural distrust of one another” [62]. In addition, according to a Russian official, there was fierce hatred between the Tatars and the Bulgarians and Moldovans living among them “because of religions and perfect fanaticism” [63]. Therefore, the Christians of Budjak were the most correct informers about the intentions and actions of the Tatars, by virtue of which the latter should have been seriously wary of rash steps. All this, according to Fazardi, allowed to hope for a successful development of events in Bucak and for the success of the negotiations.

However, in reality, there was no reason for such optimism. In mid-January, 1807, the real exodus of the Bujak Tatars to the Turkish side began. As Langeron recalled, "most of them were transferred to Ishmael and every day entire villages moved there. Since they moved with all their property and livestock, several cavalry raids inside the country could stop many of them."

Russian commanders tried to stop the flight of the Tatars by force, but were not able to achieve their goal. The troops of the Moldavian Army in southern Bessarabia continued to stand in cordon, in fact - in winter quarters, and still lacked food and fodder. Their commanders tended to act cautiously. For example, February 8 Lanzheron ordered General Sass to send as soon as possible a hundred Don Cossacks to the Yedisan horde Tatar villages of Chavna, Nanbash, Onezhki, Id Zhin Mangut [64] with the following instructions: "If there are people there, you don’t let them choose to connect with Ishmael, and if you’ve already left these villages, is it possible to turn them back, but observe extreme caution, do they not have a cover sent from Ishmael, with whom you can try not to get involved? were uyt I’m going to Ishmael or to turn me back from the road, in that case, take away weapons from them, take everyone to Tatar-Bunar, and immediately let me know ”[65].

Under these conditions, Pehlivan Pasha, the Turkish hero of the defense of Ishmael, still owned the initiative. Although for active actions at a distance from the fortress he could have a detachment of a force no more than 5 thousand people, Pehlivan was not afraid to make long sorties, more precisely, whole raids to cover the movement of the Tatars on the Turkish side.

The decisive events of the 1807 winter campaign in Budjak unfolded near the village of Kuy Bey (Kubiy in Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Kinbey in Langeron; otherwise Koy Bey) on the road from Izmail to Bender. Having learned about the movement of a large mass of Tatars to Ishmael, Pehlivan spoke out to meet the 5-thousand squad, arrived on February 10 in Kuy-Bey and began to strengthen there. The Russian detachment of Major General A.L. was intercepted. Warrior force in the 6 battalions, 5 squadrons, 2 Cossack regiment and 6 equestrian guns.

Attack the enemy Warriors decided on the morning of February 13. However, in preparation for the battle, the Russian commander made several blunders at once. Highlighting the infantry and the cavalry of his detachment in two separate columns, he himself led the infantry and tried to cut off the enemy’s escape route. However, due to an error of the Cossack conductor during the night march, the Warriors could not get out exactly to Kui-Bey, having missed several miles. Pehlivan, strengthened by Tatar horsemen from the surrounding villages, attacked the Russian cavalry and turned it to flight. When Voinov with infantry and artillery approached, at last, to the battlefield, Pehlivan hurried to take refuge in his own retrenchments in Kui Bey. Voinov tried to attack the position of the enemy, but the Turks had fierce resistance, and the Russians were forced to retreat with losses. All in all, on that ill-fated day, Voinov’s detachment lost about 400 people killed and wounded, as well as 3 guns. After this, Pehlivan was able to retreat unhindered to Ishmael along with the entire Tatar wagon train, "triumphantly winning", which Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, the author of the official history of the war 1806-1812, was forced to recognize. [66]

Failure at Kui Bey was a turning point in the struggle for the Tatars Budzhaka. Separate private successes, like the one Langeron wrote about, could not change the course of events unfavorable for Russia: “On the day of the defeat of Voinov, I was happier at Lake Kotlibukh. I know that the Tatars are gathering from all sides to move to Ishmael and The main reservoir was assigned to the valley of the Kondukty River, in which dozens of villages were then located, I moved there with four battalions, five squadrons, a Don Cossack regiment, Shemiot volunteers and 12 guns.Overgoing the Kochegulsky lake, I caught up with this lake and Lake Kotlibukh, an innumerable crowd of Tatars. A small convoy escorted them was defeated by our Cossacks and dragoons, and we seized a lot of carts, horses and cattle, but since it was rather late and darkness came, it was almost we lost half the loot, but the other part was enough to enrich the whole squadron "[67].

Nevertheless, most of the Tatars, Budzhaka, with their herds and other movable property, successfully passed over to the side of the Turks. Around 4, thousands of Tatar warriors joined the garrison of Ishmael, and the rest moved to the south bank of the Danube. Let us give the floor to Count Langeron again: "After the Kinbeya cause, the Tatars somehow completely disappeared, and their villages also disappeared with them, which they themselves, for the most part, destroyed, and their houses built of clay did not last for a month, As these collapsed, once magnificent villages of Bessarabia, there is no mention of them; traces of their existence could only be found through the thick and dark grass that stands out in the meadows "[68].

According to Lanzheron, about three-quarters of all Tatars from Budzhak [69] passed to Ishmael. Only the smaller part of them, namely the so-called, remained in the zone of Russian command. "Beshleyevskiy" Tatars [70] from the neighborhood of Bender, as well as Tatars of the genus Edisan-Nogai, who lived near the Dniester [71]. The Russian command wanted to avoid repeating mistakes and therefore began to act more decisively. The region was patrolled by military teams in order to disarm the remaining Tatar population and curb the rebellious moods among them. February 16 Lanzheron ordered Sass:

"According to the rumors that Tatars are making weapons for evil against us, as a result of the order of Mr. General Baron Meyendorff, favor Your Excellency to order that military teams in a significant number be sent for passing through Tatar villages to a note about any intentions undertaken by Tatar If in any village it was found who would have a weapon, they would be ordered to be taken away and kept from you immediately, and the murz be taken under guard and kept until resolution, not however, in this case there are no offenses and no quarrels; because of the harsh treatment and resentment is not necessary for any need, the military team should only do what is ordered. Assure how many Tatars can be, that this is done in their own favor "[72 ].

During February, the remaining Tatars in Budjak were forcibly disarmed. The provisional councilor Fazardi was involved in ensuring this procedure. Previously, promises of loyalty from the Tatars were first of all gained, now the course was taken to resettle them within Russia. There was a formal reason for this: after the declaration of war by Turkey, all the Turks and Tatars of Bessarabia, as enemy subjects, could be forcibly removed from the theater of operations.

Further events developed as follows. At the beginning of 1807, 120 Tatar families from under Kiliya migrated to the right bank of the Dniester and joined the Bujakian Edisans there. Commander of the Russian Black Sea fleet Admiral Zh.B. de Traverse ordered the commandant of Akkerman, General Loveyko, to ensure the transfer of these Tatars to Russia. However, a slight hitch arose here, since these Tatars from under Kiliya gave the Edisan Horde a promise not to separate from it without her consent. For many reasons, the Russian command did not want to use brute force. And then General Loveyko, with the assistance of a number of interned officers from the Turkish garrison of Akkerman, began negotiations with a group of Edisan elders led by Halil-Celebi and achieved unexpectedly great success. The Edisans gave a written commitment to move their entire horde to Dairy Waters, with the transition to the eternal citizenship of the Russian Empire [73]. Otemali Effendi, Kyuchuk Murtaza Effendi, Khalil Celebi and Inesmedin Celebi put their signatures on this document [74].

An important condition on which the Tatars insisted was the abandonment of one of their compatriots by the chief over them. However, this did not correspond to the general line of Russian politics, since after the abolition of the Nogai Cossack army and the transfer of the Nogai to the "settler state" it was decided in principle that the "official of the Nogai hordes" was a Russian official (at that time Colonel Trevogin). However, the Tatars received assurances that in their internal affairs they would be governed by representatives of their own nobility. For the final conviction of the Buzhak Yedisants, Admiral Traverse on again summoned those four Molochans of the Nogai who had been invited by the Duke of Richelieu to agitate among the tribesmen at the end of 1806. As a result, it was agreed that the Edisans would perform in March. At the request of the Tatars, the Russian command promised until that time to protect them from the Pehlivan units; For this purpose, a military team was sent from one infantry company and several Cossacks [75]. The fact that the Edisans specifically asked for this is another proof that the terror of Pehlivan and the fear of the Tatars before him were one of the factors that determined the behavior of the inhabitants of Budjak at that time.

3 on April 1807, Admiral Traverse, reported to Mikhelson: "On March 16, the entire Horde, starting suddenly from its place, started to cross the Dniester in Mayak of 19, 1 of this April, went to the side of the whole property. On the division into columns, went to with the open sheets of mine with two officials of the Nagai hordes through Voznesensk, Berislav to the Waters of the Molten waters, Tatar Yedisansky, as military foreman Vlasov 2, informs me, passed all without exception to the Beacons of Men 2 342 and women 2 568, all 4 XNUMNNXXNNXX 910]. And in the same place further, Traversa wrote: "Bender's tsinut of beshleev twenty villages for offenses declared prisoners [76], I was ordered to be sent to content under supervision in Yekaterinoslav, but now Your Excellency will go to their counterparts for settlement in Melitopol district" [77 ].

According to the available statistics, the total number of the Budjak horde that moved to Russia in 1807 was 6 404 people. Of these, 3 945 people remained in the Dairy Waters, and the rest were settled in the Kherson and Yekaterinoslav provinces. Here the Russian authorities tried to create favorable conditions for the transition of the Tatars from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle, but this process was not going too well. Many Tatars were unhappy with the new situation and chose not to link their future with Russia. The 7 article of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812 specifically stipulated the right of the Edisan Tatars from Budjak to freely move to Turkey [79]. October 23 1812, at the height of Russia's epic struggle with Napoleon’s invasion, the Budjak horde unexpectedly withdrew, 7 in November, 1812, crossed the Dnieper from Berislavl and proceeded beyond the Danube to the Turkish possessions. According to official Russian data, 3 199 souls of both sexes were left in total, with 1 829 tents and 30 thou. [NNXX]. As we see, exactly half of the Tatars, who were resettled there in 80 from Budzhak, decided to stay on the Milky waters. Here they and their descendants remained until the Eastern war of 1807-1853, after which, during the mass migration of Tatars and Circassians from Russia, all Nogai left Priazovye and moved to Turkey.


So, even before the start of the war with Turkey, 1806-1812. The Russian authorities proceeded from the fact that the strategic interests of Russia in the region require the solution of the Bujak horde issue, and considered possible options for achieving this goal. The main goal of the Russian Empire was to purify Budzhak from the Tatars, which was to finally secure Odessa with its surroundings, as well as facilitate the creation and development of a strategic rear area on the lower Danube for all further wars with Turkey. The most preferable option seemed to incline the Budzhak Tatars to voluntary relocation deep into Russia, to the Dairy Water, further from the border with Turkey. The stake was made precisely on the diplomatic methods of persuasion. And here certain successes were achieved, primarily due to the involvement of energetic and experienced people in the negotiations, as well as Nogai elders from Milk Water. However, due to military and administrative errors, the plan was not fully realized. The indecisive actions of General Meyendorf near Izmail in December 1806 of the year resulted in the initiative being intercepted by two energetic Turkish commanders, Pehlivan Pasha and Sultan Batyr-Girey. By their agitation and bold raids on Bujac, they managed in the winter the 1806-1807. to lure to his side a significant part of the Tatars. And the Russian troops were not able to prevent the Tatars with their families, cattle and part of the property to migrate to Ishmael and from there beyond the Danube.

However, this partial military and political-administrative failure of Russia in the global perspective still had beneficial consequences for the region. As a result of the cleansing of Tatars, Budjak, for the first time since the 15th century, was again attached administratively to the Moldavian principality, and after the Peace of Bucharest 1812 of the year - to the part that became part of Russia, i.e. to Bessarabia. For colonization, economic and cultural development, vast areas of Budjaka remaining practically deserted - 16455 square were opened. versts, or 1714697 tithes and 362 ½ square. sazhen [81]. According to the Kazen-economic expedition of the Bessarabian Regional Government, in 1827, within the limits of Budjaka itself, lived 112722 souls of both sexes [82]. Of these, the Turks were all 5 people, and the Tatars - not one! Thus, the population of the Budjaka steppes, almost "zeroed out" after the departure of the Tatars in the 1807 year, for the first 20 years of the region under Russian rule, exceeded its previous, pre-war value almost three times!

The liquidation of the Budjak horde directly contributed to the expansion to the south, to the Danube beads, the area of ​​settlement of the Moldavian people and its more active interaction with representatives of other creative nations - Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, Jews, and also German and Swiss colonists who started the 1812 development of the year. the steppes of southern Bessarabia.



[1] The Turkish word "Budjak" literally means "corner" in the sense of "edge", "country", "corner". For more information about the meaning and development of Budjak's burying see, for example: Palamarchuk S. Forgotten land: the historic region of Bessarabia. Odessa: Astroprint, 2008. C. 178-189 et al.

[2] Chirtoaage I.G. Administrative division of the south of the Dniester-Prut interfluve under Turkish rule in the XVI - the first half of the XVII century. // Socio-economic and political history of Moldavia during the period of feudalism. Chisinau: Shtiintsa, 1988. C. 72-82.

[3] Bachinsky A.D., Dobrolyubsky A.O. Budzhak horde in the XVI-XVII centuries. (historical and archaeological essay) // Socio-economic and political history of Moldavia during the period of feudalism. Chisinau: Shtiintsa, 1988. C. 82-94; they are. The end of the Bujak Horde: (According to the coin finds in the burial inventory of the burial ground near the village of Bursuchen) // Numismatic research on the history of South-Eastern Europe. Chisinau: Shtiintsa, 1990. C. 208-222.

[4] V. Trepavlov History of the Nogai Horde. M .: Publishing firm "Oriental Literature" RAS, 2002.

[5] S. Palamarchuk Decree. cit. and etc.

[6] [Kotlyarevsky I.P.]. Records I.P. Kotlyarevsky on the first actions of Russian troops in the Turkish war 1806 of the year / Reprint from the magazine "Kiev Starin". Kiev: Typography of the Imperial University of St. Vladimir, 1901.

[7 [Lanzheron A.F.]. Notes of Count Langeron. War with Turkey 1806-1812 / Translation from French manuscript, ed. E. Kamensky // Russian Antiquities. 1907. No. 5-11; 1908. No. 2-4, 6-11; 1909. No. 6-9; 1910. No. 7-10; 1911. No. 7-8.

[8] It should be recognized that in many of the affairs of this foundation relating to the events in Budjak at the beginning of the war 1806-1818. there is a painting of the Moldavian historian I.G. Chirtoaage, who worked with them in the middle of the 1970-ies. Perhaps some of them he used in his writings, but we do not know his work on this topic, published in Russian. The last of his studies in the Moldovan language, unfortunately, are absent in the libraries of Moscow.

[9] V. Trepavlov Decree. cit. C. 453-454 et al.

[10] Akkerman and its surroundings. Guidebook and reference book on Akkerman and Akkerman district on 1895, Akkerman: Publishing of Tipogarfiya I.N. Stafidova and P.Ya. Kamkova, 1894. C. 49.

[11] Gref I.F., Russev N.D. 1812 is a pivotal year in the history of Budjak and the “Danube settlers”. Chisinau: Stratum Plus, 2011. C. 51.

[12] P. Dmitriev Population of Moldova (Based on 1772-1773, 1774 and 1803 censuses). Chisinau: Shtiintsa, 1973. C. 33.

[13] Bachinsky A.D., Dobrolyubsky A.O. Decree. cit. C. 89.

[14] V. Trepavlov Decree. cit. C. 453.

[15] So in the Langeron text, but it seems to be a clear mistake; perhaps you should read "thousands of livestock heads."

[16] Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 597.

[17] Posts by I.P. Kotlyarevsky ... S. 11.

[18] Ibid. S. 8.

[19] Ibid. S. 10-11.

[20] Ie a small part of the Budzhak Tatars, who had previously moved to the east, into the possession of the Crimean Khanate.

[21] A.V. Suvorov. Volume II / Ed. Colonel G.P. Meshcheryakova. M .: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of the Soviet Union, 1951. C. 272-275.

[22] Bobrovsky P. [O.]. Suvorov in Kuban in 1778 year and beyond the Kuban in 1783 year / (With a portrait and two plans). SPb .: Typography of the Main Directorate, 1900. C. 33.

[23] Dairy water is the old name for the Molochnaya River in the north-western Azov Sea, which flows into the Milky Liman of the Sea of ​​Azov. Now - in the Zaporozhye region of Ukraine. The length of the river is 197 km, the basin area is 3450 km².

[24] For details, see: Sergeev A. Noghai on Dairy Waters (1790-1832). Historical essay / Reprint from No. 48 "Izvestia" of the Taurian Scientific Archival Commission. Simferopol: Printing house of the Tauride Gubernia Zemstvo, 1912; Gribovskiy V.V. Nogayska Kozatska vіs'ko: reconsideration and process of formation // Zapiski naukovo-doslіdnoi laboratories іstoryі Pivdennoi Ukrainy Zaporіzka sovereign University: Pіvdenna Ukraine XVIII-XIX Art. Vip 6. Constipation: RA "Tandem-U", 2001. C. 151-171.

[25] [Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, AI]. Description of the Turkish War in the reign of Emperor Alexander from 1806 to 1812 of the year, written by the Highest order, composed by the Lieutenant General and Member of the Military Council Mikhailovsky Danilevsky. With a map of the theater of war and 30-th plans. CH 1. SPb .: Typography of the Headquarters of the Separate Corps of the Inner Guard, 1843. C. 10-15.

[26] Domestic authors give in their writings a slightly different version of the combat schedule of the Moldavian army. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky and Petrov call the number in 30-33 thousand people, whereas Lanzheron speaks of "the army in 50 000 is a man of excellent troops" (and already after the withdrawal of two Essen divisions). It seems that the reason for the discrepancy lies in the fact that Langeron in his notes gives a conditional calculation of the number of battalions and squadrons, and Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky and Petrov, who worked with archival documents, had accurate data on the real cash composition of the units.

[27] Gribovskiy V.V. Decree. cit. C. 160-161.

[28] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 1. 1806-1807 L. 7-8. Michelson - Emperor Alexander I. 25 January 1807. No. 14.

[29] Posts by I.P. Kotlyarevsky ... S. 5-9; Petrov A.N. The war between Russia and Turkey 1806-1812 T. 1. 1806-1807 Michelson and Meindorf. SPb .: Military Typography (in the building of the General Staff), 1885. C. 108-115.

[30] Posts by I.P. Kotlyarevsky ... S. 10.

[31] Ibid.

[32] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 3 / 163 b. St 5. D. 21. CH 1. 1806 G.L. 25. Richelieu - Sassou. From Bender. 3 December 1806. B.N.

[33] Russian sources of that time consistently titled ruler Causen as "voivod". Applied to 1806, the year is called "voivode Agasi", but it is not quite clear whether this was a proper name or rank (from the Turkic "aha"). There is also no clarity as to who ruled in Kaushany in 1806 - the representative of the house of the Girey or some Nogai notable.

[34] Posts by I.P. Kotlyarevsky ... S. 11.

[35] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 1. 1806-1807 L. 7-8. Michelson - Emperor Alexander I. 25 January 1807. No. 14.

[36] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 3. 1806-1807 L. 3. Meyendorf - Michelson. From Falc. 14 January 1807. No. 183. Application.

[37] Ibid. L. 4. Michelson - Meyendorf. 21 January 1807. No. 103.

[38] For details on it, see: [Chuikevich PA]. Strategic discourse on the first actions of Russians behind the Danube 1810 of the year with historical and statistical remarks and biography of Peraevan seraskir captured during the assault of Bazardzhik 22 on May / Who served in the quartermaster retired Major and Cavalier Chuykevich. SPb .: Printing house of the Scientific Committee on the Artillery unit, bg C. 20-24.

[39] Petrov A.N. Decree. cit. T. 1. C. 115-118.

[40] Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 592-593.

[41] Ibid. S. 593-594.

[42] At Langeron - Samagshura. Now the village Priozernoe Kiliysky district of Odessa region of Ukraine.

[43] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 2. 1806-1807 L. 18-18 Khitrovo - Michelson. 24 December 1806.

[44] Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 602.

[45] Ibid. S. 594.

[46] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 2. 1806-1807 L. 14-15 Khitrovo - Michelson. 24 December 1806. No. 433

[47] Ibid. L. 18-18 Khitrovo - Michelson. 24 December 1806. B.N.

[48] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 2 / 163 a. St 17. D. 1. 1807 G.L. 4-4 vol. Loveyko - Sassu. From the fortress Akkerman. 4 January 1807. No. 23.

[49] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 1. 1806-1807 L. 4-6 vol. Michelson - Emperor Alexander I. 18 January 1807. No. 10.

[50] Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 593.

[51] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 2. 1806-1807 L. 19. Michelson - Khitrovo. 30 December 1806. No. 3849.

[52] Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 604.

[53] Gref I.F., Russev N.D. Decree. cit. C. 51.

[54] Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 597.

[55] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 2 / 163 a. St 17. D. 1. 1807 G.L. 6. Langeron - Sass. From Odessa. 13 January 1807. No. 113.

[56] Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 595.

[57] Ibid. S. 601.

[58] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 3 / 163 b. St 5. D. 21. CH 1. 1806 G.L. 13. Statement of the Bug Major Baleev Cossack Regiment. 20 November 1806.

[59] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 1. 1806-1807 L. 4-6 vol. Michelson - Emperor Alexander I. 18 January 1807. No. 10.

[60] The First Serbian Uprising of 1804-1813 and Russia. Book One. 1804-1807. M .: Science, 1980. C. 471. In the index to this fundamental collection of documents Fazardi is listed as "Kastan Ivanovich", but from other sources it is known as "Caetan". In this case, his name and surname leave no doubt that he was a Russified Italian or a Levant of Italian origin.

[61] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 1. 1806-1807 L. 14-14 vol. Fazardi - Michelson. From Falc. 29 January 1807. B.N.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] The names are read by manuscript, so inaccuracies are possible.

[65] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 2 / 163 a. St 17. D. 1. 1807 G.L. 14-14ob. Langeron - Sass. From Kiliya. 9 February 1807. No. 358.

[66] Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky A.I. Decree. cit. CH 1. C. 39-43. See also: Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 608-609; Petrov A.N. Decree. cit. T. 1. C. 142-148.

[67] Notes by Count Langeron ... 1907. No. 6. C. 610.

[68] Ibid. S. 610-611.

[69] Ibid. S. 611.

[70] "Beshlei" at that time were called service Tatars, who had undergone certain military training and were performing military service on more or less regular grounds. Ethnicity "Beshleevskikh" Tatars from under Bender unknown to us.

[71] The Edisans in Budjak were a remnant of the Edisan horde, which in the 18th century dwelt on both sides of the Dniester. During the Russian-Turkish war 1768-1774. The Edisan and Budjak hordes were deposited from the Ottoman Empire and gave Russia a promise of peaceful behavior. Catherine II allowed them to cross the Dnieper and settle down near the borders of Russia, but outside of its borders. After the end of the war, part of the Edisantsians returned to their former habitats, including and to Bessarabia, the rest later assumed Russian citizenship and were settled on the Dairy Waters.

[72] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 2 / 163 a. St 17. D. 1. 1807 G.L. 15. Langeron - Sass. From Kiliya. 16 February 1807. B.N.

[73] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 2. 1806-1807 L. 6-6 vol. Loveiko - Michelson. Report. From the fortress Akkerman. 1 March 1807. No. 643.

[74] Ibid. L. 9, 10. Written guarantee Edisantsev (Arabic script and translated into Russian).

[75] Ibid. L. 33-34 vol. Traverse - Michelson. From Nikolaev. 3 April 1807. No. 2079

[76] Ibid.

[77] What was this "misconduct", to find out yet failed. But it is known that the Russian command considered the Tatars from the neighborhood of Bender unreliable and had previously ordered their disarmament.

[78] RGVIA. F. 14209. Op. 5 / 165. St 21. D. 29. CH 2. 1806-1807 L. 33-34 vol. Traverse - Michelson. From Nikolaev. 3 April 1807. No. 2079.

[79] Yuzefovich T. Russia's political and commercial treaties with the East. M .: State Public Historical Library of Russia, 2005. C. 73.

[80] Sergeev A. Decree. cit. C. 36.

[81] A statistical description of Bessarabia itself, the so-called Budjaka / With the annex of the master plan of its region, compiled during a civil survey of Bessarabia, which, by imperial order, delimited the lands thereof into areas from 1822 to 1828 of Akkerman: Akkerman Zemstvo, XNX. C. 1899.

[82] Ibid. S. 25-26.

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  1. Yoshkin Kot
    Yoshkin Kot 23 May 2012 09: 28
    what kind of Russians are all the same "criminals"
    The elimination of the Budzhak horde directly contributed to the expansion to the south, to the Danube mountains, of the area of ​​resettlement of the Moldavian people
  2. rainer
    rainer 23 May 2012 09: 33
    An excellent article is seen by a professional ...
  3. Ion coaelung
    Ion coaelung 23 May 2012 10: 52
    Was Besso-Arab, became Molodova. Thanks to the brothers Slavs for salvation. And they lived happily ever after until new enemies came under their abbreviated names: USA, EU, NATO ...
  4. DavidLinch2012
    DavidLinch2012 23 May 2012 10: 55
    How many centuries have we been fighting with the Turks?
    Interestingly, in this period of the Turks, too, the Anglo-Saxons pushed, or are they on their own initiative?
    1. datur
      datur 23 May 2012 12: 12
      DavidLinch2012How many centuries have we been fighting with the Turks?
      Interestingly, in this period of the Turks, the Anglo-Saxons also pushed, or did they, on their own initiative? -------- The ears of these fucking islanders were visible everywhere around the world and at all times !! wink
    2. kagorta
      kagorta 23 May 2012 19: 49
      At this time, the Angles ceded their influence to the French. Napoleon seriously calculated that the Turks would draw our forces. But Kutuzov broke it off with the Turks.
  5. ShturmKGB
    ShturmKGB 23 May 2012 15: 24
    I am Nogay, and I see the reason for the destruction of my people in the weak leaders of that time and the Turks, who constantly insisted on Russia. 100 yew was left from the once great people. people all over Russia are scattered from Crimea to the Tatar Strait. Without hope of unity, with legends of past greatness. The fading, memorial phase of the ethnos according to L. Gumelev. At one time, such noble Russian surnames as the Yusupovs, Karamurzins, etc., came out of the Nogais. I am Russian and I love Russia, but it hurts in my soul after such articles when you learn new things about your people. Thanks to the author. The cruelty of truth is better than the mythical story of the winners.
    1. smile
      smile 23 May 2012 21: 29
      The article is really great, but what new, different from the "mythical story of the winners" did you find here? The reason for the loss of your people of their former greatness must be sought in the wise leadership of your rulers and in the methods of fulfilling their valuable instructions. By the way, you noticed. that it was precisely those who went into the service of Russia that had the opportunity to prove themselves? The same Yusupovs and Karamurzins. Probably greatness is quite possible together with the Russian people, otherwise it will not.
  6. Victor
    Victor 23 May 2012 21: 12
    Unique in its historical depth and strategic analysis of the actions of the Russian troops in Bessarabia. These are the pages of history that were not given to us in the Soviet school and all the more so are absent in the modern one. He gained a huge amount of new knowledge on the history of those places where he lived and served when the USSR was. Many thanks to the author human and civil. I hope to continue to read your articles, Vasily.
    1. werevolf75
      werevolf75 24 May 2012 00: 13
      K. Osipov. Suvorov. - Litgosizdat, Riga, 1949.
      They didn’t give it at schools, but on book shelves and in libraries one could find ... Not as detailed as in the above article, but a general idea could be obtained.
      1. Victor
        Victor 24 May 2012 11: 17
        Quote: werevolf75
        K. Osipov. Suvorov. - Litgosizdat, Riga, 1949.

        Thanks for the info, but in 1949 my mother was only 4 years old. And when I was already serving as an officer, time mostly went to questions of service, unfortunately, almost no time was left for libraries.
  7. starch
    starch 24 May 2012 22: 48
    And thus the remnants of the Golden Horde were finally eliminated ...