While we literally stopped waiting for the continuation of the triumphal march of the Russian football team at the playoffs of the World Cup 2018, which happens for the first time in the modern world. stories Very disturbing and equally important news they began to arrive from the unpredictable South Caucasus, which approached such a military-political state, when the scales at the so-called bifurcation point begin to lean toward the chaotic escalation of political tension into another round of large-scale escalation of the conflict, which has centuries-old cultural and historical roots. We are talking about the ethnopolitical Karabakh conflict, which, with a dashing presentation of the military leadership of Azerbaijan, can be quickly transformed into another Armenian-Azerbaijani war. And this is not an exaggeration at all, after 30 of June 2018, Minister of Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic, Colonel-General Zakir Hasanov, during an official meeting with the commanders of the armed forces, said that Baku was ready to resolve the Karabakh conflict by force if the territorial dispute was not resolved by diplomatic means.
Delving into the historical facts, it can be stated that the panacea of this “long-playing” conflict was not the First Congress of Armenians of Karabakh on July 22 1918, the main results of which (the proclamation of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state and the creation of the People’s Government) were parried through the resolution of the Plenum of Armenia The Central Committee of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of 3 July 5 of the year (“leave the NK within the Azerbaijan SSR with the possibility of creating a wide regional autonomy”), nor the conclusion of the 1921 of May 5 of the Bishkek ceasefire agreement I, who was regularly violated by the Azerbaijani side until the “April war” of 1994.
Of course, we will not completely block one of the parties now, which means we will not deny the inhumanity shown in the decapitation of the Armenian soldier Karim Sloyan in April 2016 and the killing of three civilians in the Talish village with further mockery of their bodies, not We will deny incidents involving the destruction of Azerbaijani army units of medieval Armenian cemeteries in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The atrocities and barbarism committed by the hooligan elements of the Armenian side against the Azerbaijani community from September 2010 and 17 cannot be denied: the Armenian groups dissatisfied with the decision of the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, negative for Yerevan, eliminated all the anger for the peaceful Azerbaijani population of the Dashtavan, Masis, Zangilar settlements, Syas, Alishi, Masis, Zangilyar, Syaz, and the peaceful Azerbaijani population of the villages of Dashtavan, Masis, Zangilar, Saz, Sis, Zangilar, Syan, Zaskulyar, Syas, the Syrian population of Dashtavan, Masis, Zangilyar, Syaz, Sisan etc., arranging their mass beatings with heavy bodily harm and destruction of property. All this has already happened and, unfortunately, it is impossible to turn back the clock. And so let's look at the real situation.
Be that as it may, the last years the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan are the main destabilizing component in this complex geostrategic pole of the Eurasian continent. What is the "April war", the active phase of which lasted almost four days (from 1 to 5 of April). There is no need to be grounded by a military-political expert to see a direct relationship between the start date of the offensive actions of the Azerbaijani army along the entire line of contact with units of the Defense Army of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the almost complete breakdown of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Istanbul. It is quite obvious that the Azerbaijani military leadership in this military action against Stepanakert was counting on comprehensive support from Recep Erdogan’s entourage, because the tragic incident with the interception of our Su-24M front-line bomber with AIM-9X rocket from the suspension of the Turkish F-16C Block 50 chimeters and synthesized F-XNUMXC Block XNUMX missiles and synthesized Turkish F-XNUMXC Block XNUMX missiles and synthesized by the Turkish F-XNUMXC Block XNUMX rocket and its keynotes in the Turkish F-XNUMXC rocket and its keynotes. the Turkish-Armenian and Turkish-Syrian borders have only contributed to this.
No less serious reason for Baku’s so bold behavior regarding the Karabakh issue is the recent commissioning of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), designed to transport gas from the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field to the Trans-Anatolian TANAP pipeline system, through which gas will flow through Greece and Albania to Italy via the branch of the Trans-Adriatic gas pipeline and to Central Europe via the 2-th branch passing through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.
Considering the fact that since the beginning of 20-s through SGC, it is planned to pump up to 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas annually to Southern, Central and Western Europe, for the European Union, Baku can turn into a kind of capacity that is even weaker than 5,5 than the “Nord Stream-2”, but still a saving straw that can at least partially support the industrial sector of the EU afloat. Such a model can be considered on the sidelines of the European Parliament in the event of an escalation of the regional military conflict between the Russian Armed Forces and NATO's allied forces in the Eastern European and Baltic theaters of military operations, when supplies of any types of energy from our country will be stopped. So we are witnessing such a painful and bold revival of the military and political ambitions of Azerbaijan towards the NKR. Despite the attempt to secure strong diplomatic support for Ankara, all that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in the “April war” were able to snatch was only a small fragment of Artsakh’s territory. “Speaking in meters, I have to say the following: Armenian forces, which had 800 thousand hectares of territories as a security zone, lost approximately 800 hectares, which is not a thousandth part” (Serzh Sargsyan, source).
Nevertheless, the units of the Army of Azerbaijan against the background of large temporary gaps in the duty of the Armenian army on the western approaches to the villages of Areni, Chiva, Yelpin and Zangakatun managed to get an important tactical advantage in the northern part of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. It consists in taking under fire control of the strategically important highway Aratat - Stepanakert, through which there is a direct transport connection between Yerevan and the capital of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Thus, the distance between the new mountain strongholds of the Azerbaijani military units and this route is from 5 to 3 kilometers. Given the complex mountainous terrain, this may not be enough for an effective fire attack through the Kornet-E anti-tank missile systems acquired by the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry in more than 100 units. more than 10 years ago, but quite enough to create an anti-tank "barrier" with the help of promising ATGM "Spike-ER". The thing is that the Kornet-E 9М133-1 anti-tank guided missiles require a direct view of the target, since they use a semi-automatic laser beam guidance system that is unable to work on objects located behind obstacles (in our case, natural terrain elements); it does not save even a decent range in 3,5 km at night and 5,5 km - in the daytime.
The Israeli Spike-ER ATGM, on which big bets were made in the Azerbaijani army, is a new-generation product using an anti-tank guided missile with a modern dual-band infrared-television IIR homing head and inertial guidance system that provides the missile with the necessary upward flight path for subsequent transfer to a dive and simultaneous search for enemy targets on the surface. The inertial navigation system of this rocket also integrates a module using a two-way secure radio channel to receive video images from the TV / IR sensors of the rocket directly to the operator’s terminal indicator in real time, as well as to correct the targeting flight path from the third-party means of optoelectronic or radio engineering / radar reconnaissance (it can include both drones and ground target designators, as well as radar artillery reconnaissance). As it is known, the Azeri air forces can use the widest list of Israeli-made UAVs: Orbiter-2M, Heron-TP, Hermes-450 / 900 for the implementation of target designation to the Spikes. Due to this, “Spike-ER” can easily hit any equipment, following in Artsakh along the Ararat-Stepanakert branch, including the one that is beyond the line of sight.
Launch of anti-tank / multipurpose missile "Spike-NLOS"
As for the even more long-range modification “Spike-NLOS” (“Non-Line Of Sight”), capable of striking enemy targets at a distance of 25 km, it also entered into service with the Azerbaijani army. Possessing all the tactical and technical advantages of the electronic “stuffing” of the Spike-ER rocket, NLOS poses a much more serious threat to the armed forces of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Its use by Azerbaijani military units almost completely eliminates the need to deploy significant resources for the construction of new fortified areas in remote mountainous areas of Karabakh, since the 25 km is more than enough for fire work from already existing positions. For example, with the help of “Spike-NLOS”, the armed forces of Azerbaijan can without any difficulty open fire on any vehicles crossing the M11 highway and the Sot Pass in the direction of the NKR Martakert region; This highway is the second vital “artery” connecting Karabakh with Armenia. At the same time, the calculations of the “Spikes” do not need to approach the Sotsky pass, but it will suffice to turn south of the Azerbaijani villages of Khoshbulag or Kolla.
Among bloggers and commentators of various analytical resources of the Runet who are aware of the Karabakh conflict issues, there is a perception that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces will under no sauce attack the transport interchanges on Armenian territory until the military conflict shifts to the Azerbaijan-Armenia plane. . It would be possible to agree with this inference, if not for the latest information about the appearance of Turkish tactical long-range tactical cruise missiles SOM-B1 as part of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. The rockets, designed by the Turkish SIC “TUBITAK SAGE”, were presented for a wide review in Baku during the last rehearsal of the military parade in honor of the 100 anniversary of the formation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, held on 26 on June 2018.
As you understand, for the confrontation with the army of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic alone, it would be quite enough for Azerbaijan to have a mixed tank and missile artillery arsenal, represented by several dozen T-90С, 100 — 150 Т-72Б and Т-72M1 “Aslan”, 50 МN 12 "Rapier", the same "Spikes", as well as the MLRS 9K58 "Smerch" and high-precision Belarusian "Polonaise". But here we are talking about a rather long-range rocket “SOM-B1” (in a modification involving an air launch from a multipurpose fighter suspension) with an 250 km radius of action, designed to overcome enemy air defense in following the terrain of an enemy and attacking strategic objects of the enemy in the depth of the territory under his control. The range of these missiles completely covers the territory of Armenia, and therefore it is logical to assume that their mission is to carry out massive anti-radar attacks on the RPN 30H6E and low-altitude detectors 5H66М / 76N6, attached to the S-XNXR-APNC-XNIM armed with the Armenian army. It is known that the Armenian Air Force has approximately 300 C-8PT divisions with towed launchers of the 300P5-85 and C-1PS type with self-propelled 300P5С / Д.
Today, they are considered the most formidable force for Azerbaijan, as they are capable of intercepting not only Israeli drones at Baku, MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft, but also 300-mm T-300 “Kasirga” salvoes, which were Azerbaijan purchased more than 20 combat vehicles, as well as LORA and Polonez guided tactical missiles with an effective dispersion surface (EPR) of at least 0,1 q. m (it is known that C-300PS works on targets with EPR 0,05 sq. m). The Armenian "Three Hundreds" is also in favor of the fact that the NURSs "Kasirga", as well as the guided missiles "LORA" and "Polonaise" are distinguished by rather mediocre maneuverability (in the case of the T-300, their complete absence), which means that anti-aircraft guided missiles 5B55P can intercept them, as they are able to implement an overload in 27-30G. Today we are witnessing the active purchase of tactical missiles SOM-B1 from Turkey by Azerbaijan. These products, the hulls of which have a large number of elements made of composite and radio-absorbing materials, are distinguished by a rather low radar signature (EPR less than 0,1 square meters). The edges of the hull also contribute to a reduction in radar visibility, which form a rectangular cross section and X-shaped aerodynamic rudders in the tail section, a large angle of collapse of which makes it possible to throw most of the electromagnetic radiation from the enemy’s radar into space.
Combat vehicle MLRS T-300 "Kasirga"
Unlike the above unguided and guided missiles approaching Armenian C-300PT / PS along a ballistic trajectory, the SOM-B1 missiles, benefiting from the complex mountainous terrain of the South Caucasus, can become a surprise not only for conventional 36X6 radar radars or radars / targeting 9С18М1-3 "Dome" (included in the C-300PS and Buk-M2E), but also for target illumination radar 30H6, located on the universal 40ВХNUMXДД / ДМ. Indeed, in the areas of mountain ranges and elevations, even these towers “do not make the weather” to increase the radio horizon. Moreover, the use of passive guidance methods in the SOM rockets (inertial navigation system with GPS correction, terrain Reference Navigation Correlation Module, the optical-electronic correlation module “Image Based Navigation”, as well as the infrared IIR sensor) eliminates the possibility of direction finding of these missiles with the help of electronic and electronic intelligence equipment. As you see, one can cite a lot of arguments in favor of the fact that Baku is preparing an escalation scenario of seizing the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic using high-precision SOM-B6 cruise missiles purchased from the Turkish company Roketsan.
Nevertheless, the issue with the air carrier for tactical missiles “SOM-B1” in the Azerbaijani Air Force remains unexplained, since the republic’s aircraft depot includes outdated (in terms of avionics) front-line MiG-XNUMHA / UB fighters, interceptors / reconnaissance aircraft MiG-29PD / RB bombers, Su-25 attack aircraft (including combat training Su-25UB), as well as combat training aircraft M-25 "Aermacchi". The above-mentioned Russian cars are not equipped with the multiplex channel of the intermodular information exchange MIL-STD-346B, and therefore the integration of SOM missiles into their ammunition will not be possible until the above multiplex data bus is received. The scientific and technical base of Azerbaijan does not allow this to be done, and therefore it can be assumed that the relevant work will be performed by specialists of the Israeli concern Israel Aerospace Industries. The only air carriers of the “Somov” in the Azerbaijani Air Force can be Italian combat training aircraft M-1553, which are analogs of the Russian Yak-346 and equipped with the most modern radio electronic “stuffing”, including the standard MIL-STD-130B, especially since their combat load reaches up to 1553 kg. Obviously, rockets weighing 3000 kg will be placed on the root underwing nodes of the suspension, which will create a minimum load on the power elements of the M-591 wing, because initially this aircraft is not intended for the use of such massive weapons.
Tactical long-range missile "SOM-B1", entered service with the Azerbaijani Armed Forces
As we can see, Baku is very thoroughly working out the whole range of technical and tactical issues related to the destruction of Armenia’s air defenses in the very first day after the start of a military resolution of the Karabakh conflict, and therefore it’s time to think about the earliest possible update of the air defense component of the Armenian army on collective security (CSTO). In particular, Yerevan needs a couple-three dozen self-propelled “Tor-M2” air defense missile systems and an “Armor C1” air defense missile system, which would reliably protect all the most important military facilities from Azerbaijani “SOM-B1” suddenly departing from the mountain folds of the South Caucasus . The supply of C-300PMU-2 “Favorite” divisions, which could destroy even smaller targets with the ENF 0,02 square, would not hurt. m, because Azerbaijan every year more and more rattles the hodgepodge of various western, Israeli and Belarusian precision weaponsas well as compact UAVs, the hulls of which are made of composite materials with minimal reflectivity.
It is also necessary to consider the issue of creating an even more reliable “anti-missile umbrella” over the joint-based “Erebuni” airfield, on which the 3624 air base of the Russian Aerospace Forces is deployed: in the region of Avb, a mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade is required as part of the C-300ВХNUMX divisions equipped new missiles with an active homing system 4М9МВ, as well as C-82 “Triumph” battalions with similarly designed 400Н40 missiles (they will be able to intercept attacking Azerbaijani cruise missiles beyond mi radio horizon). Of course, the implementation of this countermeasure will not be without the involvement of at least one aircraft of the radar patrol and A-6U guidance, because the terrain features dictate their own rules. Leaving such an explosive situation without a military response from the CSTO, which could involve both Karabakh and all of Armenia in the war, would be extremely wrong.
As for the individual response of Yerevan in the case of Azerbaijani aggression, the Iskander-M operational tactical missile systems 9K720, equipped with 9X723-1 operational tactical ballistic missiles, will undoubtedly play a special role. As it is known, just a few months after the end of the active phase of hostilities in the “April war” 2016, Armenia purchased from Russia one division (2 batteries) Iskander-M in the number of 4 self-propelled launchers (SPU) 9П78-1 (with 8 missiles ready for launch), 4Т9 transport-charging machines (TZM), command-staff and auxiliary machines. It would seem that the amount is ridiculous against the two ZRDN S-250PMU-300 Favorit, one division of the Barak-2 air defense system, as well as against the 8 launchers of the Iron Dome complex, purchased in Israel. At the resource “Inosmi.ru” you can even find an article “How Azerbaijan will shoot down Armenian Iskanders,” where journalists from haqqin.az based on a conversation with an expert from the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Andrei Frolov praising the possibilities of the Israeli Iron Dome complex, supposedly capable destroy tactical ballistic missiles 4М9-723.
If you look at this question from a purely technical point of view, neither C-300PMU-2 Favorit, nor Barak-8, nor Iron Dome will be able to cope with this task: the probability of successful destruction of the Iskander-M missile on the marching and final sections of the trajectory does not exceed 0,1 — 0,15. Unlike operational tactical missiles “LORA” and “Polonaise”, which are not distinguished by the ability to perform energetic and intensive anti-aircraft maneuvers on the trajectory, 9МXNNXX-723 missiles equipped with aerodynamic rudders, gas-jet thrust vector deflection systems and dual units of maneuvering body patterns and dual-generation maneuvering patterns and air rims, and dual-generation maneuvering patterns and air patterns and dual-generation maneuvering patterns and air rims and dual air-force deflection patterns and dual-generation maneuvering patterns and airplanes. anti-missile maneuvers with overloads in 1 units This requires anti-missiles, firstly, maneuvering with 30 — 70 overload units, and secondly, the presence of PIF-PAF type gas-dynamic transverse-control (DPU) engines, which allow to go to critical overloads not for tenths, but for hundredths of a second. That is, in addition to the traditional smooth increase in the angular velocity of the turn due to the planes, the rocket will be able to make lightning throws in the direction of the Iskander-M maneuvering missile.
The Tamir anti-missiles of the Iron Dome complex, as well as the Barak-8 and 48H6Е2 anti-aircraft missiles, are not equipped with such control systems and can "squeeze" overloads from 30 to 50-60G from themselves. Consequently, the Armenian armed forces should not be puzzled over the interception of the Iskander-M systems by the air defense systems used by the Azerbaijani army. The reciprocal attack of 9М723-1 ballistic missiles on the shelling from Baku, without any doubt, will give an excellent result and make such hot heads think about Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov with his aggressive statements. The only missile defense systems capable of questioning the 100's effectiveness of the Iskanders are the French SAMP-T (using Aster-30 missiles equipped with transverse control engines), Patriot PAC-3 missiles (with MIM missiles -104F MSE), as well as domestic C-400 Triumph and C-350 Vityaz (using 9М96ДМ interceptors); but they should not be expected in the arsenal of Azerbaijani air defense forces in the foreseeable future.