Vietnam Air Defense System (part of 1)
The air force and air defense forces of the Vietnamese People’s Army were officially formed on 1 on May 1959. However, the actual formation of anti-aircraft units began at the end of the 40-ies during the anti-colonial uprising, which soon turned into a full-scale national liberation war.
Vietnamese guerrilla groups conducted successful offensive operations on the ground, but their actions were severely constrained by the French aviation. At first, the Vietnamese detachments did not have specialized anti-aircraft weapons, and the Vietnamese could only counter fire from small arms weapons and the art of camouflage in the jungle. In order to avoid losses from air raids, the Vietnamese guerrillas often attacked strongholds occupied by French troops at night, very good results were obtained by ambushes in the jungle, arranged on the supply routes of the French garrisons. As a result, the French were forced to use transport aircraft to supply and transport troops and spend considerable forces on the protection and defense of air bases.
In 1948, the French command tried to turn the tide in Indochina in their favor. In order to encircle the partisans, capture or physically eliminate the leadership of the Viet Minh, several large airborne assault forces were landed. The actions of the paratroopers were supported by Spitfire Mk.IX fighters and SBD-5 Dauntless carrier-based dive bombers operating from the Arromanches aircraft carrier and ground airfields. During the operation, which took place from November 29, 1948 to January 4, 1949, the Dontlesses made as many bombing sorties as the entire aviation of the Expeditionary Force for the entire 1948 year. However, despite the involvement of large forces and significant costs, the operation did not achieve its goal, and the partisan detachments avoided encirclement, evading a direct collision with paratroopers and disappeared into the jungle. At the same time, the pilots of the Dontless and Spitfires noted the increased intensity of anti-aircraft resistance. Now, in addition to small arms, 25-mm Type 96 anti-aircraft guns, inherited from the Japanese army and captured from the French, 12,7-mm Browning M2 machine guns and 40-mm Bofors L / 60 anti-aircraft guns fired at the aircraft. Although the accuracy of the fire was low due to the lack of experience of the Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners, French aircraft regularly returned from sorties with holes. In total, by the end of 1949, the partisans shot down three and damaged more than two dozen aircraft. Several aircraft, which received combat damage, crashed while landing.
I must say that the French aviation group was quite motley. In addition to Spitfire Mk.IX and SBD-5 Dauntless, captured Japanese Ki-21, Ki-46, Ki-51 and Ki-54 were involved in bombing and assault strikes on rebel positions. Former German J-52 and C-47 Skytrain transports received from the Americans were used as bombers. In the second half of 1949, worn-out Japanese and British-made aircraft were replaced by American P-63C Kingkobra fighters. Due to the presence of a 37-mm cannon on board, four heavy machine guns and the ability to carry a bomb load of 454 kg, the P-63S were capable of delivering powerful bombing and assault strikes. However, the partisans also did not sit idly by, in 1949, after Mao Zedong came to power in China, the Vietnamese communists began to receive military assistance. In addition to light small arms and mortars, 12,7 mm DShK anti-aircraft machine guns and 37 mm 61-K anti-aircraft guns appeared at their disposal. Already in January 1950, near the border with China, the first Kingcobra was shot down by dense fire from 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. As the partisans gained experience, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire from small arms also increased. In small detachments, where there were no specialized anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light machine guns were used to repel air raids, and they also practiced concentrated volley fire at one aircraft. Often this led to the fact that the French pilots, having fallen under heavy fire, preferred not to risk it and got rid of the combat load by dropping it from a great height.
The small arms of the partisans were the most diverse. At first, the Viet Minh detachments were armed mainly with rifles and machine guns of Japanese and French production. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1950, the Soviet Union began to provide military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At the same time, in the 50s, the Vietnamese were given a significant amount of German small arms captured by Soviet troops as trophies during the Great Patriotic War. Cartridges for rifles and machine guns made in Germany came from the People's Republic of China, where the 7,92 × 57 mm weapon was officially in service.
Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners with MG-34 machine gun
Initially, the French 50-x transferred to the Indochina received from the US carrier-based fighter fighter F6F-5 Hellcat. In general, this machine is well suited for counterinsurgency. In front of the anti-aircraft fire, the pilot was covering a powerful and reliable star-shaped air-cooled motor. And the built-in armament of six large-caliber machine guns made it possible to mow in real jungle in the jungle. The external combat load of up to 908 kg included 227 kg bombs and 127-mm missiles. Also against the partisans in Vietnam acted four dozen twin-engine bomber of American production B-26 Invader. This very successful bomber proved to be a very effective anti-insurgent aircraft. He could carry 1800 kg bombs, and in the front hemisphere there were up to eight 12,7-mm machine guns. Simultaneously with the combat vehicles, the French in the form of military assistance received military transport C-119 Flying Boxcar from the USA. Which were used for dumping tanks with napalm, supplying isolated garrisons and disembarking parachute assault forces. However, after several X-37 and C-47 were shot down by 119-mm anti-aircraft machine guns, the Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners disarmed the pilots of military transport aircraft from flying at an altitude of less than 3000 m.
In the first half of 1951, F8F Bearcat fighters began to take part in airstrikes. Just at that time, Birkaty began to decommission the US Navy and donated them to the French. Deck fighters F8F later series were armed with four 20-mm guns and could carry 908 kg of bombs and NAR.
Suspension 227-kg bombs on the fighter F8F
In the role of "strategic" bombers, the French used six heavy anti-submarine aircraft PB4Y-2 Privateer. This machine, created on the basis of the B-24 Liberator long-range bomber, could carry a bomb load of 5800 kg. Taking into account carrier-based aviation based on French aircraft carriers, more than 300 fighters and bombers operated against the Vietnamese. But, despite the high intensity of air strikes, the French expeditionary contingent failed to turn the tide of hostilities in Indochina.
Anti-submarine aircraft PB4Y-2 French Navy
In the spring of 1953, detachments of Vietnamese communists began to operate in neighboring Laos. In response, the French command decided to cut off the supply lines of the partisans, and not far from the border with Laos, in the area of \u15b\u1954bthe settlement of Dien Bien Phu, they created a large military base with an airfield where six reconnaissance aircraft and six fighters were based. The total number of the garrison was 50 thousand. In March 250, the battle for Dien Bien Phu began, which became the decisive battle in this war. More than 37 12,7-mm anti-aircraft guns and XNUMX-mm machine guns were used for anti-aircraft cover for the advancing Vietnamese troops with a total strength of about XNUMX thousand.
Vietnamese anti-aircraft calculation 12,7-mm DShK machine gun
Simultaneously with the start of the offensive operation, Vietnamese saboteurs destroyed 78 combat and transport aircraft at the Gia Lam and Cat Bi airbases, which significantly worsened the capabilities of the French contingent. Attempts to supply the Dien Bien Phu garrison from the air were thwarted by heavy anti-aircraft fire. After a number of aircraft were shot down and damaged during the landing approach, the cargo was dropped by parachute, but the accuracy of the drop was low and about half of the supplies went to the besiegers. Despite the efforts of the French pilots, they failed to stop the offensive outburst of the Vietnamese. During the siege of Dien Bien Phu, anti-aircraft guns shot down 62 combat and transport aircraft and damaged another 167.
Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners and downed military transport aircraft C-119
7 May 1954, the garrison base Dien Bien Phu capitulated. 10 863 surrendered to the French military and Asians who fought on their side. All equipment that was in Dien Bien Phu, was either destroyed or captured. The grouping of French troops in Indochina suffered serious losses in manpower, equipment and weapons. In addition, the capitulation of a large garrison caused great damage to the prestige and influence of France internationally. The result of the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, which in Vietnam is considered to be its Stalingrad, was the beginning of peace negotiations and the withdrawal of French troops from Indochina. After the official cessation of hostilities, according to the agreement concluded in Geneva, Vietnam was divided into two parts along the 17 parallel, with the Vietnamese People’s Army regrouping to the north and the forces of the French Union to the south. In 1956, free elections and the unification of the country were envisaged. In October 1955, as a result of the proclamation in the southern part of the Republic of Vietnam and the refusal to hold free elections, the implementation of the Geneva Agreements was thwarted.
Understanding that as long as the country was divided into two parts there would be no peace in the region, the DRV leadership used the respite to strengthen its defense capability. In the late 50s, the construction of a centralized system began. Defense North Vietnam. Batteries of 85 and 100 mm anti-aircraft guns with radar guidance and searchlight installations appeared around Hanoi. The total number of 37-100 mm anti-aircraft guns available in the DRV exceeded 1959 units in 1000. Regular units of the Vietnamese army were saturated with Soviet-made equipment and weapons. Taking into account the experience of fighting French aviation, special attention was paid to the skills of firing at air targets with small arms. In the late 50s, several groups of Vietnamese cadets were sent for training in the USSR and the PRC. At the same time, runways, aircraft shelters, repair shops, fuel depots and aviation weapons were being built. In the early 60s, several radar posts equipped with P-12 and P-30 radars were already operating in the DRV. In 1964, two training centers were established in the vicinity of Hanoi, where Soviet specialists trained Vietnamese air defense crews.
The first North Vietnamese combat aircraft on which the air victory was achieved was the piston training T-28 Trojan, which was actively used as a light counter-guerrilla aircraft during the Vietnam War. The twin Troyan developed 460 km / h speed and could carry a combat load up to 908 kg, including heavy machine guns in suspended gondolas.
T-28D
In September 1963, a pilot of the Royal Lao Air Force hijacked a Trojan in the DRV. After the Vietnamese pilots mastered this machine, in January 1964, the T-28 began to be raised to intercept American aircraft that regularly flew over North Vietnam. Of course, the piston Troyan could not keep up with the jet reconnaissance aircraft, but at night the Americans often flew over the RFE in transport aircraft adapted for reconnaissance and special missions. Luck smiled on the Vietnamese on the night of February 16, 1964, the crew of the T-28, having received target designation from a ground-based radar in the area bordering Laos, by the light of the moon discovered and shot a C-123 Provider military transport aircraft in the air.
Military transport aircraft C-123
In February 1964, the first jet fighters appeared in the DRV, a batch of 36 single-seat MiG-17F and two-seat MiG-15UTI trainers arrived in Hanoi from the USSR. All aircraft entered the 921st Fighter Aviation Regiment. By the mid-60s, the MiG-17F was no longer the latest achievement of the Soviet aviation industry, but with proper use, this fighter could pose a serious danger to more modern combat aircraft.
MiG-17 fighters from the 36 of the first batch of aircraft transferred to the Air Force of the DRV
The advantages of the MiG-17F include ease of operation, good maneuverability, simple and reliable design. The fighter’s flight speed was close to the sound barrier, and powerful weapons included one 37 and two 23-mm guns.
Almost simultaneously with the delivery of jet MiGs to North Vietnam, SA-75M Dvina air defense missile systems were sent. This was a simplified export modification of the complex with an anti-aircraft guidance station. missiles, operating in the 10-centimeter range. In the early 60s, the USSR Air Defense Forces already had S-75M Volkhov anti-aircraft missile systems with a guidance station operating in the 6-cm frequency range. However, in the 60s, the Soviet Union, fearing that more advanced SAMs could end up in China, did not supply them to Vietnam. The operation of all modifications of the "seventy-fives" was complicated by the need to fill the missiles with liquid fuel and oxidizer.
Behind the Vietnamese soldier, the anti-aircraft missile B-750В on the CM-90 launcher
Nevertheless, the SA-75M air defense systems were a valuable acquisition for the air defense of the DRV. The range of destruction of air targets reached 34 km, and the maximum reach in height - 25 km. The anti-aircraft missile division had six launchers with B-750V missiles ready for launch, another 18 missiles were to be located on transport-loading vehicles and in storage facilities. During the combat work of the division as part of a regiment or brigade, target designations issued from the command post of the unit were used to search for air targets. In addition, a separate SA-75M zrdn could conduct combat operations independently using the P-12 radar and the PRV-10 radio altimeter attached to it.
At the beginning of the 60-x object and army air defense of North Vietnam was reinforced 57-mm anti-aircraft guns C-60 with radar-guided and 14,5-mm single, twin and quad anti-aircraft machine guns.
Vietnamese calculation with ZPU-2
The ZU-2, ZPU-2 and ZPU-4 fires were particularly destructive for attack aircraft and combat helicopters operating at low altitudes. 14,5-mm machine-gun installations are able to effectively deal with covered armor air targets at a distance of up to 1000-1500 m.
Part of the 14,5-mm twin anti-aircraft guns in the ZPTU-2 modification was installed on the BTR-40A armored personnel carriers. In addition to Soviet equipment, the North Vietnamese army had a number of improvised SPAAGs in the form of former French 40-mm Bofors L / 60 assault rifles mounted on the chassis of GMC trucks. Also widely used were 12,7 mm ZPU mounted on various vehicles.
At this time, the guerrilla movement was gaining strength in South Vietnam. Most of the peasants living in the south of the country were dissatisfied with the policies pursued by President Ngo Dinh Diem, and supported the People's Liberation Front of South Vietnam, whose leaders promised to transfer the land to those who cultivate it. The North Vietnamese communists, not seeing peaceful ways of reunifying the country, made a choice in favor of supporting the South Vietnamese partisans. In mid-1959, supplies of weapons and ammunition began to the south. Military specialists who grew up in these places and ended up in the north after the division of the country also went there. At the first stage, the illegal transfer of people and weapons took place through the demilitarized zone, but after the military successes of the communist rebels in Laos, the delivery began to be carried out through Lao territory. This is how the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" arose, which ran through Laos and further south, entering the territory of Cambodia. In 1960, many rural areas of South Vietnam were under the control of the Viet Cong. Wanting to prevent the expansion of communist influence in Southeast Asia, the Americans intervened in the Vietnamese conflict. The matter was no longer limited to the supply of weapons and financial support, and at the end of 1961, the first two helicopter squadrons were deployed to South Vietnam. However, US aid did not help stop the communist advance. In 1964, the People's Liberation Front of South Vietnam, supported by the DRV, by 1964 controlled over 60% of the country's territory. Against the background of the military successes of the guerrillas and internal political instability in South Vietnam, the Americans began to increase their military presence in Southeast Asia. Already in 1964, there were almost 8 American troops in Indochina.
The official beginning of the armed confrontation between the DRV and the USA is considered to be the clash that occurred between the American destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731), F-8 Crusader fighters called to its aid, and North Vietnamese torpedo boats, which occurred on August 2, 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. After the radars of the American destroyers allegedly detected the approach of unidentified vessels during a tropical storm on the night of August 4 and opened fire on them, President Lyndon Johnson ordered air strikes on North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel depots. Anti-aircraft fire returned fire artillery An A-1H Skyraider piston-engine attack aircraft and an A-4C Skyhawk jet were shot down.
After the first bombings, the flywheel of the war began to spin, and American reconnaissance and attack aircraft began to appear regularly in the airspace of the DRV. In response to the activity of South Vietnamese partisans in February 1965, two air raids were carried out as part of Operation Flaming Dart (Russian: Flaming Spear). On March 2, 1965, the United States began regular bombing of North Vietnam - the air operation Rolling Thunder (Rus. Thunder) - the longest bombing campaign by US aircraft since World War II. In response to this, in July 1965, the DRV and the USSR signed an agreement on assistance from the USSR in developing the national economy and strengthening the defense capability of the DRV. After the conclusion of this agreement, military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union increased many times over. China also made a significant contribution to ensuring the defense capability of the DRV during the Vietnam War. By the beginning of 1965, there were 11 regiments in the combat composition of the air defense forces, of which three were attached to radar units. The radar stations were equipped with 18 separate radar companies. The Air Force command had ten active airfields at its disposal.
Aerial view of the parking lot of the North Vietnamese MiG-17F at the Fuk Yen airfield, made by an American reconnaissance aircraft
After the start of massive bombardments, the main burden of countering American aviation fell on anti-aircraft artillery. Due to the small size and lack of experienced pilots, North Vietnamese fighter aircraft could not have a noticeable effect on the course of hostilities. However, flying on not the most modern fighters, the Vietnamese managed to achieve some success. The main tactic of the MiG-17F pilots was the sudden attack of American strike vehicles at low altitude. Due to the numerical superiority of American combat aircraft, the Vietnamese pilots tried to withdraw from the battle after the attack. The main task was not even to knock down the American fighter-bombers, but to make them get rid of the bomb load and thus protect the covered objects from destruction.
Preparation of the North Vietnamese fighter MiG-17F for combat mission
The first air combat of the pilots of the 921st Fighter Wing took place on April 3, 1965, when a pair of MiG-17Fs intercepted two Crusaders. According to Vietnamese data, two F-8s were shot down that day in the Ham Rong area. However, the Americans admit that only one carrier-based fighter was damaged in the dogfight. The next day, four MiG-17Fs attacked a group of eight F-105D Thunderchief fighter-bombers and shot down two Thunderchiefs. After that, the Americans drew the appropriate conclusions and now the strike group was necessarily accompanied by cover fighters, which flew light without a bomb load and carried only air combat missiles. The American pilots of the "air clearing" group, operating in conditions of overwhelming numerical superiority, had good flight training, and not very experienced MiG pilots began to suffer losses. The actions of the Vietnamese fighters were also constrained by the fact that ground-based radar posts, having detected approaching enemy aircraft, notified anti-aircraft gunners and the Air Force command about this, after which, to minimize losses, they most often turned off their stations. Thus, Vietnamese fighters, which did not have airborne radars, were deprived of information about the air situation and, often being detected by Phantom radars, were subjected to a surprise attack. Having received a warning about the presence of enemy aircraft in the air, their own anti-aircraft artillery often fired at the Vietnamese fighters. Shortly after the start of air battles, the Americans deployed EC-121 Warning Star early warning and control aircraft in South Vietnam. Flying radar posts patrolled at a safe distance and could warn American pilots of the appearance of MiGs.
AGM-4 Bullpup F-12C with two missiles
However, the main opponent of the air defense forces in the sky of Vietnam were not the "Phantoms". Approximately 70% of combat missions to bombard facilities located in North Vietnam were performed by F-105 fighter-bombers. These aircraft were the priority targets for the pilots of the MiG-17.
Pilots of the Vietnamese MiG-17F rush to take seats in the cockpit of their aircraft
In order to at least somehow increase the chances of the Vietnamese for timely detection of enemy aircraft and actions in conditions of poor visibility, at the end of 1965, a batch of ten MiG-17PF interceptors was sent to DRV. Visually, this aircraft was distinguished by the influx at the top of the air intake. The dielectric fairing closed the radar sight antenna RP-5 "Emerald", providing automatic tracking of the target at a distance of 2 km.
MiG-17PF
Instead of 37-mm guns, a third gun of the caliber 17-mm was mounted on the MiG-23PF. In addition to the radar sight, the MiG-17PF was distinguished by a number of improvements and was equipped with the Sirena-2 radar warning warning station and the NN-50B navigation indicator. However, by the middle of the 60-x, the RP-5 “Emerald” radar sight did not meet modern requirements and for this reason the MiG-17PF was not widely used in Vietnam.
J-5 in camouflage color, adopted in the air force of the DRV at the beginning of 70-x
As the conflict escalated, the military aid provided to the DRV by the Soviet Union and China increased. The North Vietnamese Air Force, in addition to the Soviet MiG-17F / PF fighters, received Chinese J-5s. The fighters supplied from the PRC were the Chinese version of the MiG-17F. In general, these aircraft had the same flight data as the Soviet prototypes and similar weapons. Simultaneously with the receipt of new fighters at the end of 1965, pilots and technicians who were trained there arrived from the Soviet Union and China.
The Vietnamese carefully studied the tactics of American aviation and analyzed the course of air battles. Purposeful interrogations of downed American pilots were carried out. It soon became clear that the pilots of the Air Force and US Navy fighters were trying to avoid horizontal battles with the more maneuverable MiG-17s, shifting air combat to the vertical. The Americans entered the battle in highly open combat formations. In the event of a fight with a single “flash”, the Americans tried to use numerical superiority, when meeting with several “flashes” they dispersed into pairs, trying to impose a duel situation on the enemy.
Vietnamese MiG-21 various modifications
In addition to the swept-wing fighters, the MiG-21F-13, which had a delta wing, were supplied to Vietnam from the USSR. The nature of the air battles has changed in many ways after the appearance of modern at that time MiG-21F-13 fighters in Vietnam.
MiG-21F-13 frontline fighter
The MiG-21F-13 reached speeds of up to 2125 km/h at altitude and was armed with one built-in 30 mm NR-30 cannon with 30 rounds of ammunition. The armament also included two R-3S short-range air combat missiles with a thermal homing head. The R-3S missile, also known as the K-13, was created on the basis of the American air-to-air missile system AIM-9 Sidewinder and could be used at a range of 0,9-7,6 km. However, the effectiveness of the use of missile weapons was reduced by the fact that on the first mass modification of the MiG-21, the radar was not included in the avionics. And the aiming of weapons at the target was carried out with the help of an optical sight and a radio range finder. The first air battles involving the MiG-21, which took place in April 1966, showed that the Soviet fighter had the best horizontal maneuverability, however, due to their own inexperience and better information awareness of the enemy, the Vietnamese fighters suffered losses, and therefore the tactics of air combat were changed .
The most numerous modification of the "twenty-first" in Vietnam was the MiG-21PF, modified for operation in the tropics. The MiG-21PF front-line interceptor was equipped with an RP-21 radar and targeting equipment for commands from the ground. The fighter did not have built-in cannon armament and at first carried only two R-3S missiles, which limited its combat capabilities. Air combat missiles had restrictions on overload during launch (only 1,5 G), which made it impossible to use them during active maneuvering. Guided missiles could effectively fire at targets maneuvering with an overload of no more than 3 G. Due to the lack of cannon armament, after the launch of missiles, the MiG-21PF became unarmed. A significant drawback of the MiG-21PF was a weak and insufficiently noise-protected airborne radar, which, according to its characteristics, was actually a radar sight. This made the fighter dependent on a system of ground-based target designation and guidance stations. These shortcomings affected the methods of using front-line missile interceptors.
MiG-21PF front interceptor with P-3C missiles
A surprise missile attack by American combat aircraft flying in close formation at a speed of 750-900 km/h from the rear hemisphere has become a standard combat technique. At the same time, the speed of the MiG-21PF itself was 1400-1500 km / h. To increase the probability of hitting a target, in one combat run, as a rule, two missiles were launched. Quite often, subsonic MiG-17Fs were used as bait, which forced enemy aircraft to gain altitude. An unexpected attack and a timely exit from the battle at high speed ensured the invulnerability of the missile interceptor.
According to Vietnamese data, in the first four months of 1966, 11 American aircraft and 9 North Vietnamese MiG-17s were shot down in air battles. After the MiG-21 was introduced into battle by the end of the year, the Americans lost 47 aircraft, the losses of the DRV Air Force amounted to 12 aircraft. In connection with the growth of losses, the American command increased the air cover squad and organized massive air strikes on the airfields based on North Vietnamese fighters. However, in 1967, the ratio of losses in air battles was not in favor of the United States. In total, 124 American aircraft were shot down and 60 MiGs were lost. For three months in 1968, the fighter aircraft of the Vietnamese People's Army in air battles were able to shoot down 44 American aircraft. At the same time, Vietnamese fighters operated in very difficult conditions. American pilots have always been outnumbered and generally better trained. On the other hand, the pilots of the DRV Air Force were better motivated, they were not afraid to engage in combat with an enemy outnumbered, and were ready for self-sacrifice. The Vietnamese flexibly changed tactics, due to which they achieved significant success in repelling US air raids. Despite the losses, thanks to Soviet and Chinese assistance, the strength of the North Vietnamese Air Force grew. At the beginning of the war, the DRV Air Force had 36 pilots and 36 MiG fighters. In 1968, North Vietnam already had two fighter aviation regiments, the number of trained pilots doubled, the number of fighters five times.
Before the start of full-scale bombing for the Americans, there was no secret of the presence of fighter jets and anti-aircraft missile systems in the DRV. American radio reconnaissance aircraft RB-66C Destroyer in the middle of July 1965 fixed the work of the SAM stations, while the photo reconnaissance RF-8A took pictures of the missile positions.
Aircraft EW and electronic intelligence RB-66C
However, the American command did not attach any importance to this, believing that the SA-75M, created to combat bombers and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, did not pose a great threat to tactical and carrier-based aircraft. It soon became clear that the B-750V missiles, called “flying telegraph poles” by American pilots, are deadly for all types of combat aircraft participating in air raids on North Vietnam. According to Soviet data, on July 24, two anti-aircraft missile divisions shot down 4 American F-3C Phantom II fighter-bombers at the expense of 4 missiles. "Phantoms" were in close formation with a bomb load at an altitude of 2 meters. The Americans recognized only one F-000C shot down, and the other two were damaged.
At the first stage of hostilities, the control and maintenance of anti-aircraft missile systems was carried out by Soviet calculations. Fire divisions, formed from Soviet specialists, had a strength of 35-40 people. After the first shock caused by the use of air defense systems passed, the Americans began to develop countermeasures. At the same time, both evasive maneuvers were used, and intensive bombing of the identified firing positions of the air defense system was organized. Under these conditions, measures to comply with the regime of masking and radio silence began to be of particular importance. After combat launches, the anti-aircraft missile division had to immediately leave the area, otherwise it was destroyed by a bombing and assault strike. Until December 1965, according to American data, 8 SA-75M missiles were destroyed and disabled. However, not infrequently, American aircraft fiercely bombed false positions with sham missiles made of bamboo. Soviet and Vietnamese calculations announced the destruction of 31 aircraft, the Americans admitted the loss of 13 aircraft. According to the memoirs of Soviet advisers, before the anti-aircraft missile division was disabled, on average, it managed to destroy 5-6 American aircraft.
During 1966, five more anti-aircraft missile regiments were formed in the air defense forces of the DRV. According to Soviet sources, until March 1967, 445 combat firings were carried out, during which 777 anti-aircraft missiles were used up. At the same time, 223 aircraft were shot down, with an average consumption of 3,48 missiles. The use of air defense systems in combat forced American pilots to leave medium flight altitudes that were previously considered quite safe and switch to low-altitude flights, where the threat of being hit by anti-aircraft missiles was much less, but the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery sharply increased. According to Soviet data, by March 1968, 1532 aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft guns in Southeast Asia.
After the American command realized what a threat the Soviet-made air defense systems posed, in addition to the standard means of combat in the form of bombing positions and setting active and passive interference, the creation of special aircraft designed to combat anti-aircraft systems and surveillance radars began. In 1965, the first six two-seat F-100F Super Sabers were converted to the Wild Weasel variant. This modification was intended to perform the tasks of detecting, identifying and destroying radars and guidance stations for air defense systems. The F-100F Wild Weasel was equipped with electronic systems designed for the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. The equipment included AN / APR-25 radar radiation source detection and direction finding equipment, capable of detecting radar signals from air defense systems and anti-aircraft artillery guidance stations. The crew of the aircraft consisted of a pilot and an operator of electronic equipment. Modified F-100Fs were supposed to hit detected targets with 70-mm unguided rockets; for this, two LAU-3 units with 14 NARs were suspended under the wing. "Wild weasels" usually found the target, "marked" it with the launch of the NAR, after which fighter-bombers and attack aircraft of the strike group took over.
F-100F Wild Weasel 6234 Tactical Fighter Wing
However, "hunters" themselves often became "game". So, on December 20, during the next sortie, the Wild Weasel fell into a trap. An F-100F Wild Weasel escorting a strike group of four F-105Ds, covered by two flights of F-4Cs, tracked the radar, which was identified as a CHP-75 missile guidance station. After performing several descent maneuvers aimed at disrupting the escort, the “radar hunter” came under concentrated fire from 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and was shot down.
In fairness, it should be said that the creation of a specialized aircraft to counter air defense radars based on the Super Saber was not fully justified. This fighter had small internal volumes for mounting special equipment, carried a relatively limited combat load and had an insufficient combat radius in the strike version. In addition, the F-100 was inferior in speed to the F-105 fighter-bombers. F-100 fighter-bombers were used quite intensively at the initial stage of the Vietnam War to strike partisan positions in the South, but by the beginning of the 70s they were replaced by more payload combat aircraft.
In 1966, Wild Weasel II, created on the basis of the two-seater training F-105F Thunderchief, entered the business. The “wild caress” of the new generation was carried by AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles, which at first had high hopes. The Shrike was aimed at the radiation of a working radar. But the rocket had a number of flaws, in particular, the range of its launch was less than the range of the launch of the B-750 B-9N SA-75М. In addition to the Shraykov under the F-105, F Wild Weasel II was often hung with cluster bombs CBU-24. Wild Weasel II was also equipped with active jamming stations and more advanced radio intelligence equipment.
The double "radar hunter" F-105D Wild Weasel II with suspended UR AGM-45 Shrike, and a single-seat fighter-bomber F-105D with a load of 227 kg bombs
"Double radar hunters" flew, accompanied by a single F-105G, which, after hitting a guidance station with an anti-radar missile, bombarded the position of the anti-aircraft division with high-explosive bombs and fragmentation cassettes.
Often, the position of the air defense system was detected after the Wild Weasel was taken for escort by the guidance station, or even after the launch of an anti-aircraft missile. Thus, the "radar hunter" actually played the role of a decoy. Having discovered a launched missile, the pilot directed the aircraft towards it in order to perform a sharp maneuver at the last moment and avoid defeat. A few seconds before the rocket approached, the pilot put the plane into a dive under the rocket with a turn, change in altitude and course with the maximum possible overload. With a lucky coincidence for the pilot, the limited speed of the guidance and control system of the missile did not allow compensating for a newly occurring miss, and it flew by. In the case of the slightest inaccuracy in the construction of the maneuver, fragments of the rocket warhead hit the cockpit. To perform such an evasive maneuver required considerable courage and endurance. According to the memoirs of American pilots, a missile attack always had a strong psychological effect on them. In a duel situation between the calculation of the air defense system and the pilot of the Wild Weasel, as a rule, the one who had the best training and greater psychological stability won.
The moment of defeat of the F-105 fighter-bomber with an anti-aircraft missile
In response to the appearance of “radar hunters” in the US Air Force, Soviet experts recommended that the air defense system be deployed with careful geodetic support. Equip false and spare positions and cover the air defense systems with batteries of anti-aircraft guns. In order to prevent the unmasking of the locations of anti-aircraft missile divisions, before the start of combat work, it was forbidden to turn on guidance stations, surveillance radars, radar rangefinders and go on the air of radio stations.
The great success of the US Air Force was achieved on February 13, 1966. On this day, B-750V anti-aircraft missiles unsuccessfully fired at an AQM-34Q Firebee unmanned reconnaissance aircraft equipped with electronic intelligence equipment. As a result drone information was recorded on the operation of the missile guidance systems and the radio fuse of the missile warhead. This made it possible to develop organizational and technical countermeasures, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of the use of air defense systems.
Intelligence UAV AQM-34
During the fighting in Vietnam, 578 AQM-34 UAVs were lost. But according to the American press, the data collected on Soviet air defense systems, in their value, paid off the entire program of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. Active jamming containers appeared very quickly on Air Force and US Navy aircraft. At the end of 1967, the Americans began to interfere with the missile channel. Under their influence, the guidance station did not see the rocket, which was flying on autopilot, until the self-destruction system was triggered. Thus, the effectiveness of the SA-75M air defense system dropped sharply and the consumption of missiles per hit target was 10-12 missiles. The raid on Hanoi, carried out on December 15, 1967, was especially successful for the Americans. Then, as a result of the use of electronic jamming, about 90 anti-aircraft missiles were "neutralized" and not a single aircraft was shot down during this raid. It was possible to restore the combat capability of anti-aircraft missiles by restructuring the operating frequencies of the transponders and increasing the power of the response signal. In the process of the improvements made, it was possible to reduce the lower boundary of the affected area to 300 m, to reduce the minimum range of targets to 5 km. To reduce vulnerability from AGM-45 Shrike missiles, the CHP-75 equipment was improved, while the reaction time of the complex was reduced to 30 s. Anti-aircraft missiles supplied from the USSR began to be equipped with a new warhead with a wider field of fragmentation, which made it possible to increase the probability of hitting an air target. In November 1967, the method of target tracking without SNR radiation began to be used - according to the mark from the active interference of self-covering, when firing at a group of combat aircraft, this method gave good results. Subsequently, the SA-75M crews switched to using field commander's periscopes for visual tracking of the target, mounted on the "P" cockpits and coupled with air defense control units. In a number of cases, the calculations performed a "false launch" by switching on the corresponding mode of the guidance station without actually launching the rocket. As a result, an alarm began to chirp in the cockpit of the fighter-bomber, informing the pilot of the approach of an anti-aircraft missile. After that, the pilot, as a rule, urgently got rid of the bomb load and performed an evasive maneuver, exposing himself to anti-aircraft artillery fire. The greatest benefit from the "false launch" was achieved at the time of the direct attack of the object - the pilots of attack aircraft immediately became out of touch with the ground target.
Radar P-15
To prevent the possibility of a breakthrough by American combat aircraft at low altitudes in 1967, the supply of P-15 radar stations placed on the ZIL-157 chassis was requested. Simultaneously with the P-15 radar, the air defense forces of North Vietnam received P-35 standby radars and PRV-11 altimeters, which were also used to guide fighters. In total, by 1970, more than a hundred radars were delivered to the DRV.
In addition to increasing the combat capability of the Air Force, ZRV and radio engineering units of the VNA, during this period there was a significant increase in the number of anti-aircraft artillery. A year after the start of large-scale bombing of North Vietnam, more than 2000 37-100-mm caliber guns could participate in repelling American air raids, and the number of anti-aircraft guns supplied from the USSR and China was constantly increasing. If batteries of 85 and 100-mm anti-aircraft guns, which mainly fired barrage, were located around Hanoi and Haiphong, then 37 and 57-mm quick-guns, which also had better mobility, were used to protect bridges, warehouses, fuel storage, cover airfields, positions SAM and surveillance radar. Also, a lot of anti-aircraft guns were deployed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. To escort military and transport columns of the Vietnamese People's Army, anti-aircraft machine gun installations of 12,7-14,5-mm caliber installed in the back of trucks were widely used. Since the ZPU fire at an altitude of more than 700 m was ineffective, American aircraft bombed without entering the zone of destruction of anti-aircraft machine guns.
ZSU Type 63
In the late 60s, Type 63 Chinese ZSU appeared in the North Vietnamese army. These self-propelled anti-aircraft mounts were created in China by replacing the turret tank T-34-85 open top of the tower with a twin 37-mm anti-aircraft gun B-47.
ZSU-57-2 in Vietnam
The Soviet ZSU-57-2, built on the basis of the T-54 tank, had a greater range and height of destruction of air targets. The self-propelled anti-aircraft gun was armed with a 57-mm twin C-68. A common drawback of the Chinese and Soviet ZSU was the lack of a radar sight, data on the height and speed of the target were entered manually, and therefore the accuracy of the shooting turned out to be low and, in fact, 37 and 57-mm ZSU fired barrage. However, these machines played their part, forcing American aircraft to drop bombs from high altitudes, which reduced the effectiveness of the bombing.
Although domestic and foreign literature on the war in Southeast Asia, in the confrontation between the air defense system of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and American aviation, much attention is paid to the combat use of North Vietnamese air defense systems and fighters, anti-aircraft artillery still carried the main load. It was precisely the anti-aircraft guns that hit the 2 / 3 aircraft that were shot down during the Vietnam War. For more than three years of incessant massed air strikes, aircraft of the Air Force, Navy and USMC have lost a total of 3495 aircraft and helicopters. Due to increased losses and the unpopularity of the US war, peace negotiations began in Paris 1968 in Paris, and the air raids on the territory of the DRV were temporarily stopped.
To be continued ...
Based on:
https://www.flying-tigers.co.uk/2018/vietnam-peoples-air-force-new-corgi-announcement-new-model-arrivals-and-updated-photo-gallery/
http://pvo.guns.ru/s75/s75.htm
https://theaviationist.com/2014/03/13/wild-weasel-f-100/
https://airport.cv.ua/sistema-pvo-severnogo-vetnama/
http://army.lv/ru/PVO-v-lokalnih-voynah-i-vooruzhennih-konfliktah-Vetnam/2632/4716
https://warspot.ru/3537-zenitnye-rakety-vo-vietname-pervaya-krov
http://www.airaces.ru/stati/sovetskie-specialisty-vvs-i-pvo-vo-vetname.html
https://vpk.name/news/172728_vetnam_predstavil_modificirovannuyu_versiyu_rls_p19.html
https://coollib.com/b/255638/read
http://arsenal-info.ru/b/book/26184032/8
http://www.plam.ru/transportavi/tehnika_i_vooruzhenie_2003_04/p2.php
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