Atomic Multifunctional Submarine Cruiser: Paradigm Shift

This article is a continuation of the previously published material on the concept of the atomic multifunctional submarine cruiser (AMFPK): “Atomic multifunctional submarine cruiser: an asymmetrical response to the West”.

The first article caused a lot of comments, which can be grouped in several ways:
- the proposed additional equipment will not fit in the submarine, since everything is already packed in it;
- the proposed tactic roughly contradicts the existing tactics of submarine use;
- distributed robotic systems / hypersound better;
- own carrier strike groups (AUG) better.

To begin, consider the technical side of creating AMPPK.

Why did I choose strategic missile submarines (SSBN) of the 955A project as the AMPPK platform?

For three reasons. First, this platform is in a series, therefore, its construction is well mastered by industry. Moreover, the construction of the series is completed in a few years, and if the AMPPK project is worked out in a short time, the construction can be continued on the same stocks. Due to the unification of most of the structural elements: the body, power plant, propulsion, etc. the cost of the complex can be significantly reduced.

On the other hand, we see how slowly the industry is introducing completely new types of weapons into the series. This especially applies to large surface ships. Even new frigates and corvettes are going to the fleet with a significant delay, and I will keep silence about the time frame for the construction of prospective destroyers / cruisers / aircraft carriers.

Secondly, a substantial part of the AMPPK concept, the re-equipment of SSBNs from the carrier of strategic nuclear missiles to the carrier of a large number of cruise missiles, has been successfully implemented in the United States. Four Ohio-type ballistic missile submarines (SSBN-726 - SSBN-729) were converted into carriers of BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, that is, there is nothing impossible or unrealizable in this process.

1 image. SSGNs based on the SSBN type "Ohio"

Thirdly, the project 955A submarines are one of the most modern in the Russian navy, respectively, have a significant reserve for the future in terms of tactical and technical characteristics.

Why not take the 885 / 885М project in the series as a platform for AMFPK? First of all, because for those tasks for which I consider the use of AMPPK, on ​​the boats of the 885 / 885М project there is not enough space to accommodate the necessary ammunition. According to information from the open press, the boats of this series are quite complex in production. The cost of submarines of the project 885 / 885М from 30 to 47 billion. (from 1 to 1,5 billion dollars), while the cost of SSBN of the 955 project is about 23 billion rubles. (0,7 billion dollars). Prices when the dollar exchange rate 32-33 rub.

In the possible advantages of the platform 885 / 885М - the best sonar equipment, high-speed low-noise underwater travel, greater maneuverability. However, taking into account the absence in the open press of reliable information on these parameters, they have to be put out of the brackets. Also, the re-equipment of the US Navy's SSBN "Ohio" in the SSGNs with the ability to deliver reconnaissance and sabotage groups indirectly indicates that submarines of this class can effectively act "at the front line." SSBN type project 955A should at least not yield to the SSBN / SSGN type "Ohio" in their capabilities. In any case, we will come back to the 885 / 885М project.

Any promising platforms (nuclear submarines (PLA) of the Husky project, submarine Robots etc., etc.) were not considered for the reason that I have no information about the state of the work in these areas, how long they can be implemented and whether they will be implemented at all.

Now consider the main object of criticism: the use of a long-range anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) on a submarine.

Currently the only way to counter aviation the submarines are man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) of the Igla type. Their use involves the ascent of the submarine to the surface, the exit of the MANPADS operator to the hull of the boat, visual detection of the target, capture by infrared head and launch. The complexity of this procedure, coupled with the low performance of MANPADS, involves its use in exceptional situations, for example, when recharging the batteries of a diesel-electric submarine (DEPL) or repairing damage, that is, in cases where the submarine cannot be submerged.

The concept of using anti-aircraft missiles from under water is being worked out in the world. This is also the French A3SM Mast complex based on MBDA Mistral and A3SM Underwater Vehicle based on medium-range anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) of the MBDA MICA class with a firing range of up to 20 km (East 1).

2 image. A-series submarines A3SM Mast and A3SM Underwater Vehicle

Germany offers IDAS air defense system designed to hit low-flying low-speed targets. (East 2, 3).

3 image. IDS submarines

It should be noted that all of the above-mentioned air defense missile systems according to the modern classification can be attributed to short-range complexes with limited capabilities for hitting speeding and maneuvering targets. Although their use does not involve surfacing, it requires lifting to the periscope depth and advancing means of reconnaissance over water, which seems to be considered acceptable by developers. (East 4).

At the same time, the danger to aviation from submarines is increasing. With the 2013, the US Navy began to arrive long-range anti-submarine aircraft of the new generation P-8A "Poseidon". In total, the US Navy plans to purchase the Poseidon 117 to replace the rapidly becoming outdated P-3 Orion, which was developed in the 60s (East 5).

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can pose a significant danger to submarines. A feature of the UAV is their extremely high range and flight duration, which allows controlling large areas of the surface.

For the first time, the US Navy deployed an MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle (Predator B) in anti-submarine exercises. The exercises themselves took place last October. The UAV, capable of floating in the air for up to 27 hours, was equipped with a system for receiving signals from sonar buoys scattered from helicopters and data processing equipment. Reaper was able to analyze the received signals and transmit to the control station over a distance of several hundred kilometers. Also, the drone demonstrated the ability to pursue underwater targets (East. 6).

4 image. Prototype UAV General Atomics Guardian - Marine Patrol version of the UAV MQ-9 Predator B

In the arsenal of the US Navy is also a high-altitude UAV long duration flight MC-4C "Triton" (East 7). This aircraft can, with high efficiency, carry out reconnaissance of surface targets and in the future can be equipped to detect submarines by analogy with the sea version of the MQ-9 Predator B. UAV.

Do not forget about the antisubmarine helicopters type SH-60F Ocean Hawk and MH-60R Seahawk with lowered sonar station (GUS).

Since World War II, submarines are virtually defenseless against the actions of aviation. The only thing that a submarine can do when it is detected by an airplane is to try to hide in the depths, get out of the detection zone of an airplane or a helicopter. With this option, the initiative will always be on the side of the attacker.

Why, in this case, the modern air defense missile systems were not installed on submarines before? For a long time, anti-aircraft missile systems were extremely cumbersome systems: bulky rotating antennas, beamed holders of missiles.

5 image. Giant superstructure with heavy nuclear missile cruiser (TARKR) antennas Peter the Great

Of course, there is no question of placing such a volume on a submarine. But gradually, with the introduction of new technologies, the dimensions of the air defense system decreased, which allowed to place them on compact mobile platforms.

In my opinion, there are the following factors that make it possible to consider the possibility of installing air defense systems on submarines:

1. The appearance of radar stations (RLS) with an active phased array antenna (AFAR), which do not require mechanical rotation of the antenna.
2. The appearance of missiles with active radar homing heads (ARLGSN) that do not require illumination of the target radar after launch.

At the moment, it is close to adopting the newest Prometheus C-500 air defense system. On the basis of the land variant, the design of the marine version of this complex is expected. In parallel, we can consider the creation of a variant of the C-500 “Prometheus” air defense missile system for AMFPK.

When studying the layout, we can be based on the structure of the C-400 SAM system. The basic composition of the system 40P6 (C-400) includes (East 8, 9):

- Combat Command and Control Station (PBU) 55K6Е;
- radar complex (RLK) 91H6E;
- multifunctional radar (MRLS) 92НХNUMXЕ;
- transport launchers (TPU) of type 5P85TE2 and / or 5P85SE2.

6 image. The composition of the air defense system C-400 "Triumph"

A similar structure is planned for the C-500 air defense system. In general, the components of the system:

- control equipment;
- radar detection;
- radar guidance;
- means of destruction in launch canisters.

Each element of the complex is located on the chassis of a special off-road truck, where, besides the equipment itself, there are places for operators, life support systems and energy sources of the elements of the complex.

Where can these components be located on AMFPK (platform project 955А)? To begin with, it is necessary to understand the volumes released when replacing the Bulava ballistic missiles with the AMFPK arsenal. The Bulava missile in a container is 12,1 m, the 3М-54 rocket of the Caliber complex is up to 8,2 m (the largest of the rocket family), the 800 P Onyx missile is 8,9 m - 40 m. On this basis, the volume of the weapons compartment can be reduced in height by about three meters. Taking into account the area of ​​the armament compartment, this is quite a flat, that is, the volume is significant. Also, to ensure the launch of ballistic missiles in the SSBN, it is possible that there is some specialized equipment that can also be excluded.

Based on this…

The control equipment of the air defense missile system can be placed in the compartments of the submarine. Since the design of the SSBN of the 955A project, about five years have passed, during this time the equipment changes, new design solutions appear. Accordingly, when designing AMPPK, it is quite realistic to find several cubic meters of additional volumes. If not, then place the control compartment of the air defense missile system in the free space of the weapons compartment.

Means of destruction in launch canisters are placed in the new weapons bay. To ensure the ability of the air defense missile system at periscope depth, of course, with the advancement of the radar mast to the surface, the missile defense system can be adapted to launch from under the water, by analogy with the Kalibr / Onyx missiles or in the form of pop-up containers (East 10).

All the other weapons offered for AMFPK initially have the ability to use from under water.

Placement of radar on a lifting mast. Depending on the layout of the weapons compartment, two options for radar placement can be considered:

- Conformal accommodation on the sides of the felling;
- placing the horizontal along the body (in the folded state inside the weapon compartment);
- vertical placement, similar to the placement of the Bulava ballistic missiles.

Conformal placement on the sides of the felling. Plus: does not require massive retractable structures. Minus: degrades the hydrodynamics, degrades the noise of the stroke, requires an ascent to apply the missile defense, there is no possibility to detect low-flying targets.

Placement horizontally along the hull. Plus: you can implement a fairly high mast, which allows you to raise the antenna at the periscope depth. Minus: in the folded state may partially overlap the starting cells in the weapons compartment.

Placement vertically. Plus: you can implement a fairly high mast, which allows you to raise the antenna at the periscope depth. Minus: reduces the amount of ammunition in the weapons compartment.

The last option seems to me preferable. As mentioned earlier, the maximum height of the compartment is 12,1 m. The use of telescopic structures will allow the radar of ten to twenty tons to be brought to a height of about thirty meters. A submarine located at the periscope depth will allow the radar to be raised above the water to a height of fifteen to twenty meters.

7 image. An example of the capabilities of the telescopic design length 13 m in the folded state

As we saw above, the C-400 / C-500 type air defense system consists of two types of radar: search radar and guidance radar. First of all, this is due to the need for guiding missiles without ARLGSN. In some cases, as for example, it is implemented in one of the best destroyers of the Dering type, the radars used differ in wavelength, allowing you to effectively use the advantages of each (East.11).

Perhaps, taking into account the introduction of the AESA in C-500 and the expansion of the range of means of destruction with ARLGSN, in the maritime version it will be possible to abandon the surveillance radar, carrying out its guidance radar function. In aviation technology, this has long been the norm; all functions (and reconnaissance and guidance) are performed by one radar.

Cloth radar should be removed in a sealed radio transparent container that provides protection from sea water at periscope depth (up to ten to fifteen meters). When designing the mast, you need to implement solutions to reduce visibility, similar to those used in the development of modern periscopes. (East.12). This is necessary to minimize the probability of detecting AMPPK when AFAR is operating in the passive mode or in the LPI mode with a low probability of signal interception.

In the low probability of intercept (LPI) mode, the radar emits low-energy pulses in a wide frequency range, using a technique called broadband transmission. When multiple echoes are returned, the radar signal processor combines these signals. The amount of energy reflected back to the target is at the same level as that of a conventional radar, but since each LPI pulse has a significantly smaller amount of energy and a different signal structure, it will be difficult to detect the target — both the signal source and the fact of irradiation radar.

For missiles with ARLGSN, the possibility of issuing target designation from a submarine periscope can be realized. This may be necessary, for example, if it is necessary to destroy a single low-altitude, low-speed target of the anti-submarine helicopter type, when it is impractical to advance the radar mast.

8 image. Unified Periscope Complex "Parus-98"

The complex provides:

- a circular view of the drive surface and airspace during daylight, at dusk and at night;
- detection of surface, air and coastal objects;
- determination of the distance to the observed sea, air and coastal objects;
- determination of the bearing of objects;
- measurement of course angles and elevation angles of objects;
- reception of signals from satellite navigation systems "Glonass" and GPS.

CPC "Parus-98E" consists of a commander's periscope and a universal non-penetrating type periscope (optronic mast). The commander’s periscope includes a visual optical channel and a night television channel. The universal periscope includes a television channel, a thermal imaging channel, a laser distance measuring channel, an antenna system for receiving signals from satellite navigation systems (East 13).

In any case, this will require additional interfacing between the air defense system and the ship's systems, but it is more efficient than installing a separate optical radar station (OLS) on the mast or placing it (OLS) on the radar mast.

I hope the question “the proposed equipment will not fit into the submarine, since everything is already packed in as close as possible ”, it has been considered in sufficient detail.

The cost issue.

The cost of SSBN of the Borey 955 project is 713 million dollars (the first ship), the Ohio SSBN is 1,5 billion (in 1980 prices of the year). The cost of conversion of the Ohio-type SSBN to the SSGN is about 800 million dollars. The cost of one C-400 division is about 200 million dollars. Roughly from these figures it is possible to form the order of prices for AMFPK - from 1 to 1,5 billion dollars, that is, the cost of AMFPK should approximately correspond to the cost of submarines of the 885 / 885М project.

We now turn to the tasks for which, in my opinion, AMPPK is intended.

Despite the fact that the largest number of comments caused the use of AMPPK against aircraft carriers, in my opinion, the most priority task of AMPPK is the implementation of antimissile defense (ABM) at the initial (possibly average) segment of the flight of ballistic missiles.

Quote from the first article:

The basis of the strategic nuclear forces of NATO countries is the maritime component - nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBN).

The share of US nuclear warheads deployed on SSBNs over 50% of the entire nuclear arsenal (of the order of 800 — 1100 warheads), Britain — 100% of the nuclear arsenal (of the order of 160 warheads on four SSBNs), France — 100% of strategic nuclear charges (of the order of 300 on nuclear submarines) four SSBNs).

Destruction of the enemy's SSBNs is one of the top priorities in the event of a global conflict. However, the task of destroying a SSBN is complicated by the concealment by the enemy of the SSBN patrol areas, the difficulty of determining its exact location and the presence of combat escort.

If there is information about the approximate location of the enemy SSBNs in the oceans, AMPPK may be on duty in the area along with hunter submarines. In the event of a global conflict, the hunter boat is assigned the task of destroying the enemy SSBNs. In the event that this task is not completed or the SSBN began launching ballistic missiles before the moment of destruction, AMPFK is charged with the task of intercepting the launching ballistic missiles in the initial part of the trajectory.

The ability to solve this problem depends primarily on the speed characteristics and range of the use of promising missiles from the C-500 complex, intended for anti-missile defense and the destruction of artificial earth satellites. If these capabilities are provided with missiles from the C-500, then AMPPK can realize a "blow to the head" to the strategic nuclear forces of the NATO countries.

The destruction of the launching ballistic missile in the initial part of the trajectory carries the following advantages:

1. The launching rocket cannot maneuver and has maximum visibility in the radar and thermal range.
2. The defeat of one missile can destroy several combat units, each of which can destroy hundreds of thousands or even millions of people.
3. To destroy a ballistic missile in the initial part of the trajectory, knowledge of the exact location of the enemy SSBNs is not required, it is sufficient to be in the range of the antimissile action.

For a long time, the topic has been discussed in the media that the deployment of missile defense elements near the borders of Russia will potentially allow the destruction of ballistic missiles in the initial part of the trajectory until the separation of combat units (CU). Their deployment will require the deployment of a ground-based missile defense component deep in the territory of the Russian Federation. Similar danger to the maritime component is represented by the United States AUG with Ticonderoga type cruisers and the Arly Burke destroyers. (Source 14, 15, 16, 17).

9 image. US missile defense zones in Europe

Having deployed AMPPK in the US SSBN patrol areas, we will turn the situation on its head. Now the United States will have to look for ways to further cover its SSBNs to ensure the guaranteed possibility of a nuclear strike.

The possibility of creating hit-to-kill warheads in Russia, which defeat a target with a direct hit at high altitudes, is under question, although for C-500 this possibility seems to be as stated. However, since the USSOLS positioning areas are located at a considerable distance from the territory of Russia, special combat units (MF) can be installed on AMFPK antimissiles, significantly increasing the likelihood of launching ballistic missiles. Radioactive fallout in this version of the missile defense missile will fall at a considerable distance from the territory of Russia.

Considering that the naval component of strategic nuclear forces is the main one for the USA, the threat of its neutralization cannot be ignored by them.

The solution of this task by surface ships or their connections is impossible, since they are guaranteed to be detected. In the future, the US SSBN will either change the patrol area, or, in the event of a conflict, the surface ships will be preventively destroyed by the US Navy and Air Force.

You can ask the question: Is it not wise to destroy the missile carrier itself - the SSBN? Of course, this is much more efficient, since with one blow we will destroy dozens of missiles and hundreds of warheads, however, if we learn by agent or technical means to know the SSBN patrol area, this does not mean that we can find out its exact location. To destroy an enemy submarine SSBN by an underwater hunter, he must approach it at a distance of about fifty kilometers (the maximum range for using torpedo weapons). Most likely, a PLA of cover may be located somewhere nearby, which will actively counteract this.

In turn, the range of promising antimissiles can reach five hundred kilometers. Accordingly, at a distance of several hundred kilometers to find AMPPK will be much more difficult. Also, knowing the enemy's SSBN patrolling area and the direction of the missile flight, we can place AMPPK on a follow-up course, when anti-missiles will hit ballistic missiles flying in their direction.

Will AMPPK be destroyed after the radar is turned on and anti-missile missiles are launched against the launching ballistic missiles? Perhaps, but not necessarily. In the event of a global conflict, missile defense bases in Eastern Europe, Alaska, and ships capable of performing missile defense will be struck weapons with nuclear warheads. In this case, we will find ourselves in a winning situation, since the coordinates of the stationary bases are known in advance, surface ships near our territory will also be detected, but whether an AMFPK will be detected is the question.

In such circumstances, the likelihood of large-scale aggression, including the application of the so-called disarming first strike, becomes extremely unlikely. The presence of AMPPK in service and the uncertainty of its location will not allow a potential adversary to be sure that the “disarming” first strike scenario will develop according to plan.

This task is, in my opinion, the main one for AMFPK!

Justification of the need to deploy a full-fledged air defense missile system on submarines, tactics of using AMFPK, comparison of functionality with surface ships, incl. with carrier strike groups I will try to consider in the next article.

List of sources used
1. DCNS Offer ZRK for submarines.
2. Submarine armament replenished with anti-aircraft missiles.
3. France creates a submarine SAM system.
4. The development of submarine air defense systems.
5. US Navy Aviation Received New Anti-Submarine Aircraft.
6. US drone first went on the hunt for a submarine.
7. UAV scout "Triton" will see everything.
8. Anti-aircraft missile system of long and medium range C-400 "Triumph".
9. Anti-aircraft missile system C-400 "Triumph" in detail.
10. Anti-aircraft autonomous universal self-defense complex of submarines.
11. Dragons in the service of Her Majesty.
12. Raise the periscope!
13. Unified Periscope Complex "Sail-98".
14. The Russian Armed Forces General Staff told how the US missile defense can intercept Russian missiles.
15. The US missile defense threat to the nuclear potentials of the Russian Federation and China has been underestimated.
16. "Aegis" - a direct threat to Russia.
17. EuroPRO threatens Russia's security.

Comments

[Vard]

An interesting article .. there are certainly controversial points ... But overall it is very interesting ...

[MPN]

Quote: Vard

An interesting article .. there are certainly controversial points ... But overall it is very interesting ...

For general development will do.

taking into account the absence in the open press of reliable information on these parameters, they have to be put out of brackets.

Husky project, underwater robots, etc., etc.) were not considered for the reason that I have no information

Etc. , in fact, the author’s evidence of the correctness of his ideas is undeniable.

[Totah155]

I would like to see the implementation of the radar. It is not as simple as it seems.

[Res_Ullus]

Damn ..., well, that is, just before our eyes, the floor of the loaf was taken away from E. Damantsev and everyone is happy ????? Well, you know (((((((

[wooja]

not meaningless ..., one must look at the pitfalls.

[EnGenius]

I believe that the article touches on one single important topic of the future - the SSBNs may be under the vigilant control of the numerous drones of the near future - both air reconnaissance and small-sized high-speed reconnaissance ships with ASGs, capable of long pursuing our submarine cruisers. Plus, the missile defense system on destroyers and cruisers, capable of intercepting ICBMs at the starting sections of the trajectory, even if a ship with a missile defense will be in a radius of 200-500 km.

And you know how to solve this problem asymmetrically ?! Russian Arctic! Under its conditions, all these threats are not tacked and there will only be a “classic” possible threat with the escort of a US hunting boat such as Virginia in patrol areas. That is why bases and military infrastructure are being developed along the NSR in order to be able to prevent URO destroyers from patrolling the missile defense system there, drones will not be able to be used there either, unless you monitor surface ships and ships from the air.

[sleeve]

It seems to me that the author grabbed the indirect arguments for changing the concept of further building the fleet. Well, really getting such "arguments" at the disposal is more than attractive. And even if the SSBNs do not undergo "hypermodernization" with a change in the construct, but get a "set of designers" to change the configuration of weapons, everything’s to life. 9M96E - the most effective option for air defense "Borea" with a range and weight corresponding to the "anti-aircraft momentum". To have the opportunity to "cast off" the main enemy from the sky without risking falling under fire even with future hypersonic things is an undoubted strategic argument. The ammunition of these missiles is simply enchanting. Without alterations using modular containers, Borey will be able to receive up to 16 missiles from the Bulava mine. However, nevertheless, the purpose for such a “shield” will still be PLUR to a greater extent than aviation. BUT ... Suppose that we are witnessing the emergence of a new subclass of ships - RPKOP (missile submarine fire support cruiser) for the connection. The presence of a protected missile platform capable of dramatically enhancing the air defense of a connection using NK detection tools, plus a certain amount of missile defense on board, is a direct bonus. Well, in principle, such a concept fails to use Boreev individually. It is only necessary to place anti-torpedo systems in the same mines, reinforcing the "individual" protection. Own weapon system-UAV underwater launch (experience is on the same 949A). And by the way on occasion ... God forbid war. What is the matter with nuclear missiles capable of becoming a flying radar for a many-day (if not many-month) period? Means of stable communication, even using a periscope complex, I think the issue is being solved now.

[Romario_Argo]

TPK for diesel-electric submarines and nuclear submarines under TA 533-mm with missiles from SAM Buk 9М317М with AGSN, with a range of 50 km are already in service with.

[sleeve]

Here you will need more massive TPKs under the standard of the Bulava mine (diameter 2 meters). In principle, the model made for Ohio is very good for this task and very similar in size. So we can talk about 7 missiles in the mine type "Caliber" and about 28 (!) Indicated by me. Then the ammunition amazes with power. Taking into account the unification of calibration, one of these 7 eggs can be inserted into three TPK-PS or NK.

[ZVO]

Quote: Romario_Argo

TPK for diesel-electric submarines and nuclear submarines under TA 533-mm with missiles from SAM Buk 9М317М with AGSN, with a range of 50 km are already in service with.

Come on, come on ..
Share the source ...

Not a searchlight. not a layout that is not backed up by anything.
And a real source that writes about real-life samples and real tests ...

[Per se.]

Plus the article is that the author has his own opinion, on the basis of which conclusions and proposals are drawn. In general, I do not agree with the author, since his very promise in creating the "concept of the atomic multifunctional submarine cruiser (AMPPK) is a" very dubious "paradigm shift." The goal of creating submarines with anti-aircraft missiles and antimissiles is generally considered to be utopia, in the direct and figurative sense, in relation to a submarine. Fighting enemy aircraft, intercepting missiles launched from surface ships en masse, is a losing perspective. Moreover, it is not the task of a submarine, the main purpose of which is stealth and attack. If a boat is found, it is too late to fight off aircraft with its anti-aircraft missiles, and if not, it is foolish to unmask yourself with missile launches on airplanes or helicopters. How does the author imagine the fight with the squadron of the same American destroyers, who began launches of their missiles, in a preemptive strike, in general, the question. First, the boat will find itself when the first antimissile is launched, and secondly, how many such boats should we have, where, in any way, a surface ship can take more missiles than the anti-missile boat, with total US domination allies. For Russia, with our realities, it is generally better for us to focus on deploying our strategic submarines under the polar cap of the Arctic, where they would be masked by the natural noises from the cracking ice, and there was cover-up with ice from aviation and surface ships of the enemy. As for our presence in the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, our diesel engines, low noise and relatively cheap, such “wolf packs” armed with “caliber” with “yadren” head, could exacerbate the threat of unacceptable damage for the Americans . Dream and clouds of boats "AMPPK", and even on the basis of "Boreev", it is hardly reasonable, excuse me, dear Andrei Mitrofanov.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Per se.

Firstly, the boat will find itself when launching the first anti-missile

Much earlier. As soon as the radar turns on :)))

[g1v2]

Well, about and long-range air defense on the pl of course while utopia. But the main weapon of the American squad is aviation, and specifically Poseidons, for the purchase of which a large contract was recently concluded. Plus, they ordered Norway. And it is clear that in order to track our pl with SF. It is clear that the needle from the Poseidons will not save the submarine. Including some more serious air defense with the possibility of launching from under water - clearly begs for and will be implemented in the relatively near future. Most likely there will be no special problems with the underwater launch itself. But the problem of target designation is clear what remains. I think that it is technically solvable. The most obvious is some kind of third-party target designation. Well, or to place some systems on the rocket itself, which will obviously be more expensive. Although the submarine will be much more expensive.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: g1v2

But the main weapon of the American plane is aviation

Not Already - Premier League

[g1v2]

The area of ​​responsibility of the American Navy is the whole world. Even the states have too few nuclear submarines to control all danger zones. To control all the sea trade supply routes, territorial waters, your coast and allies, and to block the exit areas of our and Chinese submarines to the operational space - no apl will suffice. Moreover, Apple does not have such features. But aviation allows you to control large spaces and is relatively cheaper. Plus apl more armament rather than defensive. But aviation is relatively cheap and efficient. Large orders for Poseidons confirm this.
Of course, there is another option for the mass construction of small anti-submarine ships such as our IPCs, but no hints have been received from American sources.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: g1v2

The area of ​​responsibility of the American Navy is the whole world.

Which, in the event of hostilities, "shrinks" to several areas. Because

Quote: g1v2

To control all sea trade supply routes, territorial waters, your coast and allies

no one will be with the outbreak of war. And here

Quote: g1v2

to block the exit areas of our and Chinese submarines in the operational space

The submarines are quite enough. In abundance.

Quote: g1v2

But aviation allows you to control large spaces and is relatively cheaper.

I would not risk asserting this so categorically - in terms of cost. There is no doubt that PLO aviation is necessary and useful, but it is not a panacea

[g1v2]

They cannot block the exit areas of our submarines by 100 percent. Especially if they start to leave before the beginning of the database. Moreover, they will not be able to completely shut off the tap with Chinese - the geography in the area is too complicated. There they can’t bring out the pirates, but here Well, if at least a part passes, then it will be extremely difficult to find them. All American, Canadian, British and Australian trade will be in jeopardy. The supply lines are too long to cover them all. The same insurance will fly to heaven, and this is a serious damage to the economy.
And if ahead of time to prepare the base in third countries, then the Anglo-Saxon economy will howl completely. She is too import-dependent. Plus, the vast majority of strategically important centers are in accessibility from a strike from the sea. PM will not be able to cover all this - we need much cheaper and more effective means of control. And aviation is out of competition here. She can examine large areas and point hunters to the discovered pl, if necessary. But pl will not be able to do anything to the same Poseidon without surfacing. And not the fact that the needle will get it.
Naturally, aviation is not a panacea, and when armed with something more serious than a needle, its role will sharply decrease. But by the way, this was my first koment - that pl needed air defense means.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: g1v2

They cannot block the exit areas of our submarines at 100 percent. Especially if they start to leave before the beginning of the database.

But they will try. Because this is the most effective way of counteracting our nuclear submarines (which are practically absent today for shipping to the same Atlantic), but they certainly will not try to find a needle in a haystack in the ocean - this is pointless.

Quote: g1v2

The same insurance will fly to heaven, and this is a serious damage to the economy.

:))))) We are talking about a war of nuclear powers with powerful arsenals, and you are writing about ... insurance? :)))))))

Quote: g1v2

And if ahead of time to prepare the base in third countries, then the Anglo-Saxon economy will howl completely.

Please tell me how many bases do you need for Pacific Fleet, provided that on the go today there is only one MAPL Shchuka-B, and they will not send PLARK to the ocean, since this is our only anti-aircraft weapon? And despite the fact that, in fact, we also need to protect the SSBN deployment areas?

[g1v2]

Are you sure that the parties will immediately go for a complete exchange of nuclear buns in the genre of apocalypse? With the risk of mutual destruction for fun to third countries? And if such an exchange does not happen, then in the war by conventional means the economy is a key point. This was shown by both world wars. And their experience is worth seriously studying.
Germany has shown how to fight a continental power against naval forces in two wars. We have no more studied and large-scale experience of such a global naval war. The damage that the German submariners inflicted in both wars to their opponents and their economy is enormous. And the sharp increase in the cost of insurance for shipping for the Americans was much more serious than the defeat at Pearl Harbor. I repeat - the vast majority of the Anglo-Saxon supply routes are marine. They are all import dependent. Japan too. Shipments of raw materials, goods, etc. by sea are critical. Not to mention a simple thing. that they have elective power, and with a serious drop in living standards, discontent will immediately begin, which management cannot but take into account. There we have a quarter in 15, prices rose due to conflict, so half the country in hysterics has started beating - like a government on a dime. And if they had grown 2 times like a dollar? They have the same picture - a drop in living standards can lead to the resignation of their governments and a drop in interest in continuing the war.
The fate of the war will in any case be decided on land. And American. Australian and Canadian brigades will be delivered to European or Asian TVD by sea. One convoy destroyed can decide the fate of the land battle. The enemy has not many of these brigades (especially heavy ones), and the successful operations of our submarine fleet can seriously swing the pendulum.
Well, do not write off our repaired Apple from the accounts. Someday they will come out of repair. Plus, if you have bases in third countries, you can get by with a dap. They are cheap, quickly built. For example, the same Warsaw women can be deployed not only at the Admiralty Shipyards. There are trump places for shooting, where there is the possibility of arranging such bases within walking distance for diesel-electric missiles - the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the East Atlantic, the Strait of Malacca, and the Caribbean Sea. Where there are major trade routes. Bases can be placed - in Venezuela, East Africa, Indonesia and so on. There are places where it will be difficult even for the locals to find a disguised base.
Well, in my opinion, the absolute squandering and stupid waste of a valuable resource is to guard the deployment zones of the strategic missile regiment. The submarine is an attack weapon. More effective, we do not. And aviation will take over the defense of the deployment areas. corvettes, dap. The submarines will not be able to do anything to protect that cannot be done by other means. Well, and if these funds, in your opinion, still cannot provide protection, then what for are we generally such a vulnerable thing? Replace the SSBN with ground yars and strategic bombers. Valuable apl are not needed to protect them. Although, in my opinion, they can cover the deployment zones of the SSBN and the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet.

[Golovan Jack]

Quote: g1v2

Are you sure that the parties will immediately go for a complete exchange of nuclear buns in the genre of apocalypse?

The launched rocket is clearly visible on, ahem, the corresponding devices. But, here's the trouble - they can’t see whether it has a nuclear warhead or not at all. Therefore, the answer will be based on the fact that the warhead is nuclear.
And this is the same "apocalypse scenario."
IMHO you have written so many letters in vain, still as simple as an orange

[g1v2]

Well, we kind of scratch languages? Why not scratch if you have something to say? And as for the rocket, it’s clear what and where it flies from. MBR is one thing, and Tomahawk is another. In response to the Trident, something correspondingly flies. But on the tomahawk - no. Well, again, a single missile is visible, or there was a massive launch from mines and submarines. Th not a fact. that the answer to even a single trident will be a salvo from all the barrels.
There is no special difference - it is visible or not. what is its filling.

[ZVO]

Quote: g1v2

The area of ​​responsibility of the American Navy is the whole world. Even the states have too few nuclear submarines to control all danger zones. To control all the sea trade supply routes, territorial waters, your coast and allies, and to block the exit areas of our and Chinese submarines to the operational space - no apl will suffice. Moreover, Apple does not have such features. But aviation allows you to control large spaces and is relatively cheaper. Plus apl more armament rather than defensive. But aviation is relatively cheap and efficient. Large orders for Poseidons confirm this.
Of course, there is another option for the mass construction of small anti-submarine ships such as our IPCs, but no hints have been received from American sources.

You understand a little differently.
You can search for a boat in the ocean, or you can just take it for escort right at the base exit.
And you can’t even really hide it.
No need to play cat and mouse.
Just taken for escort.
One boat leading a clear coincidence.
The second hidden - leading secret escort.

And hell you hide from them.
But you are so well done. that in 1 case out of 1000, you managed to leave and hide, then for this situation hundreds of Poseidons are produced ...

Here's a modern concept: grab hold of it right at the beginning and then don't let it go ...

And not outdated and childish concepts - look for a needle in a haystack.

[voyaka uh]

The radar should definitely not be on the boat. Submarine should not float.
SAM itself on the submarine is not difficult to place. It’s easy technically to shoot from under the water.
Snag:
1) when to shoot - intelligence
2) how to direct a rocket.
3) how to connect 1 and 2.
I do not see a rational solution.

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: voyaka uh

I do not see a rational solution.

Maybe ... satellites, sir?

[Blackmokona]

Which from the very beginning of the war will become a bunch of garbage?

[ZVO]

Quote: Nikolaevich I

Quote: voyaka uh

I do not see a rational solution.

Maybe ... satellites, sir?

Satellites detecting flights of planes and helicopters over the sea?
Real-time targeting satellites?
Satellites having equipment for high-speed transmission of information to boats going under water?
Satellites who know the exact location of their boats to really select a "dangerous" flight / departure from a "non-dangerous"?

This is abruptly the lunar program once every 30-50 ... And every 10 times abruptly the Martian program ...

[Akabos]

A cable, an ordinary pop-up buoy for receiving information, and the boat will be able to receive data for launching missiles, from AWACS aircraft or even from space radar satellites. It is completely solvable, like there are even systems that allow radio communications under water to a shallow depth of up to 10 meters.

[Blackmokona]

The AWACS will not allow the enemy to enter their rear areas, and space will quickly become non-flying from the wreckage of satellites on both sides

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: voyaka uh

The radar should definitely not be on the boat. Submarine should not float.

The use of cruise missiles (any) is conducted at shallow depths. For Tomahawk, this is 30-60 m. For Caliber, the application is claimed up to 35 meter, i.e. this is maximum. Periscope depth 10-15 meters. At this depth, you can push the radar. Or shoot the OLS missiles with ARLGSN.

Quote: voyaka uh

ticking:
1) when to shoot - intelligence
2) how to direct a rocket.

1. Radar preliminary search in passive mode, then LPI mode
2. ARLGSN (inertial guidance at the beginning + from a certain distance the rocket has its own radar homing head)

[voyaka uh]

"Radar can be advanced at this depth" ///

Radar is a pretty big thing. How to put it forward?
This is not a thin periscope.
And all sorts of optical instruments work in a very narrow sector.
They can be used if the moving target is directly at you. Or you know in advance where it will fly.
(For example: two fighters approach each other).
In general, of course, it is tempting to shoot from under the water
the plane or drone that seeks submarines. But unrealistic.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: voyaka uh

"Radar can be advanced at this depth" ///
And all sorts of optical instruments work in a very narrow sector.
They can be used if the moving target goes straight at you. Or you know in advance where it will fly. (For example: two fighters approach each other).

For shooting at the launching ICBM there are options:
"AN / AAQ-37 - Electron-optical system (EOS) of an F-35 distributed-aperture (DAS) aircraft, consisting of 6 IR sensors located on the fuselage with a viewing range of 360 degrees, allows you to detect group launches of ballistic missiles at 1300 range km, accompany these targets and provide target designation for each of them in automatic mode. "

The idea is not very cumbersome design.

[Blackmokona]

And how to raise this tool to a height of ten kilometers?

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: BlackMokona

And how to raise this tool to a height of ten kilometers?

Why lift? This is a fairly compact equipment that can be placed on the periscope. The range will certainly fall, but we do not need 1300, 400-500 km is enough for high-altitude targets.

[Alex_59]

Quote: AVM

2. ARLGSN (inertial guidance at the beginning + from a certain distance the rocket has its own radar homing head)

It would be interesting to hear the order of guidance of missiles with AGSN in your view)))

Periscopic depth 10-15 meters. At such a depth, radar can be advanced

It would also be interesting to see the calculation of the strength of the structure, which has a length of 25-30 meters, fits on a submarine and is able to withstand the mass of the radar in storm and wave conditions and work with loads in two environments. As well as the size and design of the drives of its layout and cleaning. Apparently, the author did not lay out the communication mast in the field in the wind. And then the sea, the excitement, the wind, the lack of the ability to drive up to the crane and there’s nothing to hook on stretch marks. The submarine with the support of the high-voltage transmission line attached to the hump should be funny)))

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Alex_59

It would be curious to hear the procedure for setting up missiles with AGSN in your presentation

Target detection (determination of its coordinates, direction of movement, speed)
Calculation of the proposed meeting point with missiles ARLGSN
Data entry in the missile with ARLGSN
Release
After launch, the missile defense is guided by the inertial navigation system (INS) and flies to the meeting point with a target.
At a certain stage, the radar rocket is turned on, completes the search for the target and corrects the course of the rocket.

Quote: Alex_59

] It would also be interesting to see a calculation for the strength of the structure, which is 25-30 meters in length, fits on the submarine and is able to withstand the radar mass and work with loads in two environments. As well as the size and design of the drives of its layout and cleaning

Of course, I cannot make such a calculation, but I cannot deny what is possible and what is not, I will not undertake. For a mast with a radar there is a mine with a depth of 12 meters and a diameter of more than 2,2 meters, you can figure something out in such dimensions. When extending (as when firing rockets), the speed of the submarine stroke is limited, the housing cover of the antenna web can be made streamlined and when extended, it is turned by the narrow side. etc.
And the very radar canvas can be reduced. The first article lists the new planar radar with a thin body.

Yes, and by the way for many types of weapons there are restrictions on storm conditions.

Quote: Alex_59

Apparently the author did not lay out the communication masts in the wind in the field.

The author laid out. Mast 11 m. Together with a partner.

[Alex_59]

Quote: AVM

Target detection (determination of its coordinates, direction of movement, speed)

That's it! Not through the holy spirit, but by radar detection. That is, firing a rocket “somewhere there” before the target is in direct line of sight of the radar is a waste of money and ammunition. Thus, prior to the launch of a SAM, such an air defense system needs a radar in the same way as a semi-active guidance air defense system. And it’s good if the target is high-altitude - then it still makes sense to fence a garden with a long-range air defense system, and if the target is low-altitude, then sticking out on the radar mast at 10 meters from the water will not see anything much beyond the radio horizon, which will be roughly 25-30 kilometers. So missiles with a range of 150 km are out of place. One must either lift the radar higher, or ask the target to fly higher. But that's okay, because right here:

After launch, the missile defense is guided by the inertial navigation system (INS) and flies to the meeting point with a target.

also not everything is so beautiful, since the target usually has electronic warfare equipment and is able to understand what’s going on and for some reason usually doesn’t want to be hit. And begins to maneuver. If you shoot not far, at the same 15-20 km, then the target may still not have time to leave the meeting point pre-registered in the missile system and this missile will be detected. But if the distance is greater, then the target will wave with a pen and fly away to where the missiles will not search for this target. Consequently, it is necessary to correct the missile flight mission after launch in the radio command mode. And for this (damn it!) It is required to continue to observe the target using radar. Yes, and to transmit information aboard the missile to correct the lead point. And this must be done until the missile launcher reports that the target is captured by its own GOS. That is, before approaching with a target of up to 10-15 km. And if the goal also puts interference and then even closer.
But if the submarine so "shone" with its radar, and even shot a missile launcher - it can be said that it all in the vicinity of a hundred kilometers reported the exact coordinates of its location and now it is a matter of technology to kill it. But the plane will bring down, maybe one or two. Good exchange.

For a mast with a radar, there is a shaft with a depth of 12 meters and a diameter of more than 2,2 meters, something can be figured out in such dimensions.

This "figure out" in practice will be a very big problem. See the 40B6 tower. Just the right length. It decomposes a crowd of people during the day. It stands on outriggers and stretch marks. This is without sea rolling and lack of space - there is a free approach to it from all sides. What the submarine will not be in principle.

The author laid out. Mast 11 m. Together with a partner.

Well, so I laid out and folded. ))) I think in a submarine this will be a funky ride. )))

[Alex_59]

Quote: AVM

So the main task of AMPPK, considered in this article is shooting at the launching ICBMs. Large, clearly visible, almost non-maneuvering target, the height of which is increasing.

An even less realistic task, as if you know the position of the enemy SSBNs and are nearby intending to shoot down the launching ICBMs, then it is easier to destroy the SSBN itself and hello. As they say, "before the division of the goal." And so your AMPK is a suicide who, after raising the radar, will be drowned immediately, without talking. Such movements in the zone of domination of the enemy is just the finish. Even without these ammunition with missiles and radar to track the enemy SSBNs and at the same time not be detected by yourself - today the task is on the verge of possible. We need to not only secretly find the needle in someone else's haystack, as it now looks for our nuclear submarines, but also do it with songs, dances and playing the button accordion.

But missiles with ARLGSN also incorrectly program so that they can conduct an additional search for the target, "guide the radar" around.

additional search for a target is a loss of kinetic energy, maneuvering, reduction of available overload of missiles. Ideally for missiles generally fly straight after working out solid propellant rocket engines. In a narrow sector, an additional search is possible, but not at 180 degrees in front and height. The aim of the guidance is precisely to bring the missiles as accurately as possible to the lead point (which also constantly shifts) with minimal body movements - thereby significantly increasing the likelihood of damage.

Do not forget about the different modes in the radar - passive

Passive - is it at the reception? Again, this must be agreed upon with the enemy so that he himself necessarily radiates something on your frequencies. Does he need this? Are submarines looking for a radar?

Who will sink a submarine if the Hokai that discovered it is downed, Poseidon is downed, there is no other boat nearby, etc.

How is it not? Do you want to enter the zone of domination of the enemy fleet (and its SSBNs do not go where there is no support on their own PLO forces) and so that no one is around? Fairy tale. Near the SSBNs, the submarine ships and multi-purpose submarines that launch missiles unambiguously will be categorized. You will bring down one Poseidon, will the enemy really not understand that somewhere nearby, within 50-100 km there is an enemy? And if your submarine is also shining the radar ... But the Hokai here is generally not clear why - it is not a PLO plane.

Mass radar F-35 553,7 kg, and its capabilities are extremely high.

For the aircraft, yes. And for the air defense system - no. Especially if you want to knock something in the near space (the middle segment of the flight of an ICBM).

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Alex_59

if you know the position of the enemy SSBNs and are nearby intending to shoot down the launching ICBMs, then it is easier to destroy the SSBN itself and hello. As the saying goes, "before dividing the goal." And so your AMPPK is a suicide who, after raising the radar station, is immediately drowned, without talking.

This question is considered in the article:
"You can ask the question: is it not wise to destroy the missile carrier itself - SSBNs? Of course, this is much more effective, because with one blow we will destroy dozens of missiles and hundreds of warheads, however, if we know the SSBN patrolling area by means of intelligence or technical means, that we can find out its exact location. To destroy the enemy's SSBNs by an underwater hunter, he must approach it at a distance of about fifty kilometers (the maximum range for using torpedo armament). on the next may be a cover, and the PLA, which will counteract this actively.

In turn, the range of promising antimissiles can reach five hundred kilometers. Accordingly, at a distance of several hundred kilometers to find AMPPK will be much more difficult. Also, knowing the enemy's SSBN patrolling area and the direction of the missile flight, we can place AMPPK on a follow-up course, when anti-missiles will hit ballistic missiles flying in their direction.

Will AMPPK be destroyed after the radar is turned on and anti-missile missiles are launched against the launching ballistic missiles? Perhaps, but not necessarily. In the event of a global conflict on missile defense bases in Eastern Europe, Alaska, and ships capable of performing missile defense functions will be hit by weapons with nuclear warheads. In this case, we will find ourselves in a winning situation, since the coordinates of the stationary bases are known in advance, surface ships near our territory will also be detected, but whether an AMFPK will be detected is the question. "

Quote: Alex_59

The additional search of the target is the loss of kinetic energy, maneuvering, reduction of the available overload of missiles. Ideal for missiles generally fly straight after practicing solid propellant rocket motors. In a narrow sector, additional searching is possible, but not by 180 degrees in terms of the front and height. The task of targeting is precisely to bring the missile defense as precisely as possible to the lead point (which is also constantly shifting) with minimal gestures — thereby significantly increasing the probability of hitting.

Yes everything is correct.

Quote: Alex_59

Passive - is it at the reception? Again, this must be agreed upon with the enemy so that he himself necessarily radiates something on your frequencies. Does he need this? Are submarines looking for a radar?

Even the exchange through communication channels such as Link-16 is traced. And yes, they are looking for periscopes that have subsided over diesel-electric submarines.

Quote: Alex_59

Do you want to go into the zone of domination of the enemy fleet (and its SSBNs do not go where there is no support for their own PLO forces) and that there is no one around? Fairy tale. Next to the SSBNs, the PLO ships, and the multi-purpose submarines, which launch the missile attack system uniquely classify, will necessarily be attached. You pick one Poseidon, do not the enemy really understand that there is an enemy somewhere nearby, within 50-100 km? And if your submarine is also shining the radar ... And the “Hokai” is not at all clear to what - it is not a PLO plane.

Multipurpose PLA in the protection of SSBNs can not be much (1-2). Here, when you try to destroy the SSBN itself, we will face them for sure. And 50-100 km is considered lucky. In the event of a global conflict, the survival of the AMFPK will not be in the first place. Each downed ICBM is 6-10 of nuclear charges - each is a whole city. Especially if in the AMFPK antimissile system there will be YABCH.

Quote: Alex_59

Mass radar F-35 553,7 kg, and its capabilities are extremely high.

For the aircraft, yes. And for the air defense system - no. Especially if you want to knock something in the near space (the middle segment of the flight of an ICBM).

With regard to the radar with AFAR everything is not so clear. Modules AFAR as chips, the larger the series, the better. I would not be surprised that the same modules were used for C-500 as for the Squirrel Radar Su-57.
Now in general, a lot of "cross-pollination" is coming. Missiles from aircraft (AIM-120) are used as missiles, for example.

[Alex_59]

In turn, the range of promising missile defense can reach five hundred kilometers.

It is surprising why in C-400 or C-500 still no radar is used in this case the size of an airplane? Catch the problem?

Accordingly, at a distance of several hundred kilometers, it will be much more difficult to detect AMPPK.

AMPPK which shines radar on 500 km difficult to detect? Yes, even if it does not shine. Do you think the guard forces of the American SSBN cannot move away from it to such distances?

Link-16 communication is even detected.

That is, do you plan to equip your submarine with some kind of super-radar, which in passive mode will detect all the available frequency ranges of radar radiation, and in the active detect aircraft, missiles in near space and direct missiles at them and still have weight and dimensions of the aircraft? Yes, you need to give the Nobel, if you do this. As regards the intersection of the exchange via radio channels, without any problems you can make such a channel through which two planes flying directly above your submarine will exchange, but nothing will be noticed on the submarine at all. Guess how?

And yes, they are looking out for periscopes that have floated DEPL.

Not the main intelligence method for PLO explicitly. Counting on the fact that here and now someone is looking for DEPL re-scopes is somewhat naive. And I repeat once again - the frequency. Are you sure that they will search at the frequencies that your radar is capable of perceiving?

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Alex_59

That's it! Not by the holy spirit, but by radar detection. That is, a bullet rocket "somewhere there" before the goal is in the line of sight of the radar is a waste of money and ammunition. Thus, before the launch of the SAM, such an air defense missile system needs a radar just like a semi-active air defense missile system. And it’s good if the goal is high-altitude - then it makes sense to make a garden with a long-range air defense system, and if the goal is low-altitude, then the radar sticking to the mast in 10 meters from the water will not see anything further than the radio horizon, which will be roughly 25-30 kilometers. So the missiles with a range in 150 km here as if out of place. It is necessary either to radiate higher than the radar, or to ask the target to fly higher.

So the main task of AMPPK, considered in this article is shooting at the launching ICBMs. Large, clearly visible, almost non-maneuvering target, the height of which is increasing.
Other tasks that were considered in the first article are the defeat of aircraft of the DRLO aircraft carrier group, transports on US-Europe routes, Triton-type UAVs, tanker aircraft, etc. those. large high-altitude targets.
From low-altitude only Poseidons and PLO helicopters. So under them and ammunition is different. In the first article, the small XURN on 4 small are indicated in a large cell.

Quote: Alex_59

"After launch, the missile defense is guided by an inertial navigation system (INS) and flies to the meeting point with a target." Also, not everything is so beautiful, since the goal usually has EW facilities and is usually unable to understand what is going on and be brought down. And begins to maneuver. If you are shooting not far away, on the same 15-20 km, then the target may still not have time to leave the meeting point that was previously registered in the SAM, and this missile will be detected. But if the distance is greater, then the target will wave with a pen and fly away where the missile defense will not search for this target. Therefore, it is necessary to correct the flight mission of the missile defense system after the launch in the radio command mode. And for this (damn it!) You need to continue to observe the target using radar. Yes, and send on board the Zour information to fix the lead point. And this should be done until the ZUR reports that the target is captured by its own GOS. That is, to get closer with the goal to 10-15 km. And if the goal also puts interference and even closer.

The trajectory of the ICBM is predictable, and for maneuvering targets it is clear that there may be a miss. But the missiles with ARLGSN are probably being programmed so that they can conduct an additional search for the goal, “driving the radar station” around.

Quote: Alex_59

But if the submarine so “svetanula” with its radar, and yes even the Zur has fired off - it can be said that she told everyone in the district about the exact coordinates of her location and now it is a matter of technology to kill her.

Like any launch of rockets from under the water. Do not forget about the different modes in the radar - passive / LPI (although his planes "learn" to detect, but he himself is changing).
And in general, it is a matter of time / probability of hitting / losing. How long does the missiles fly? Who will sink the submarine if the Hokai, who discovered it, is shot down, Poseidon is shot down, there is no other boat nearby, etc. I will try in the next article to consider this issue in more detail. I focused on the problem of missile defense.

Quote: Alex_59

This "figure out" in practice will be a very big problem. See the 40B6 tower. Just the right length. It decomposes a crowd of people during the day. It stands on outriggers and stretch marks. This is without sea rolling and lack of space - there is a free approach to it from all sides. What the submarine will not be in principle.

I do not say that it is simple, and unequivocally say that it is not possible impossible. There are new materials, composites. Well, the mass of the radar should be reduced.
Mass radar F-35 553,7 kgand its capabilities are extremely high. According to our not found the mass.

[ZVO]

Quote: AVM

The use of cruise missiles (any) is conducted at shallow depths. For Tomahawk, this is 30-60 m. For Caliber, the application is claimed up to 35 meter, i.e. this is maximum. Periscope depth 10-15 meters. At this depth, you can push the radar. Or shoot the OLS missiles with ARLGSN.

Note that Poseidon detects the periscope at a distance of 10km.
And Triton is 15km.

Poseidon can strike 20 seconds after detection.
Those. no more than a minute or two will pass before the actual hit on the target.

In 2 minutes, death to everything. Just at the stage "find out the situation" ...

[Shopping Mall]

At the periscope now also introduced ways to reduce visibility.
He can strike a blow if he flies in the direction of the goal, and he also needs to turn around.

In any case, I agree with you, the deadlines are tight.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

I rarely write this, but I have to. The author is absolutely divorced from reality, and has absolutely no idea what he is writing about. Especially touched by this

AMFPK’s top priority is missile defense (missile defense) in the initial (possibly middle) ballistic missile flight

As if for this we need air defense systems ....

[Shopping Mall]

Aegis, which is located on Ticonderoga and Destroyers, Arly Burke initially performed the functions of the air defense missile system, then added the missile defense functions (radar upgrade, SM-3). How now to call this system, missile defense "Aegis"? AIRS "Aegis"?
For C-500, the missile defense function was originally declared, but it is positioned as an air defense system, i.e. ZRK. It all depends on the composition of the ammunition, may need additional elements of the radar. Now the concept of air defense missile / missile defense is increasingly blurred.
Unless of course consider the highly specialized complexes such as GBI, THAAD

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AVM

Aegis, which is located on the Ticonderoga cruisers and destroyers, Arly Burke originally served as an air defense system

I hasten to disappoint, “Aegis”, aka “Aegis” on US ships (not to be confused with the missile defense program of the same name) is a combat information-control system (BIUS) that integrates the reconnaissance and combat means of the ship into a single system. Air defense is one of the functions of Aegis, which is based on the presence of SAMs in American ships, and missile defense is an extension of the functionality of SAMs.
Yes, and why this conversation about the terms? :))

[Lopatov]

Theoretically, this can be done. That is, to create a system, of which the submarines will become a part, as carrier platforms for antimissiles.
But in practice it is meaningless. Very expensive. In addition, it will require to cover such an anti-missile veil AUG. As a result, a reasonable question will arise, why not put the missiles on surface ships from the covering forces. The same is unequivocally simpler and more efficient. 8))

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: Spade

why not put missiles on surface ships from the cover forces. This is clearly simpler and more efficient. 8))

Duc, the Americans do it .... in the sense of: missile defense on ships.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Spade

Theoretically, this can be done. That is, to create a system, of which the submarines will become a part, as carrier platforms for antimissiles.
But in practice it is meaningless. Very expensive. In addition, it will require to cover such an anti-missile veil AUG. As a result, a reasonable question will arise, why not put the missiles on surface ships from the covering forces. The same is unequivocally simpler and more efficient. 8))

By rough estimation of 1-1,5 billion dollars, taking into account the development and novelty, the first ship is possibly more expensive, but in any case is comparable to X. 885 pr.

With surface ships, incl. AUG has nothing to do.
The submarine as a carrier of anti-missile missiles is needed only because our surface fleet will never be able to get into the USSARB patrol zone.

[Alex_59]

Quote: AVM

The submarine as a carrier of anti-missile missiles is needed only because our surface fleet will never be able to get into the USSARB patrol zone.

Can it be underwater?
If our submarine fleet can break into the patrol zone of US SSBNs and can detect and track these SSBNs there, then it would be most logical to destroy the enemy SSBN before the ICBM launch, or at the start of the launch procedure.

[ZVO]

Quote: AVM

With surface ships, incl. AUG has nothing to do.
The submarine as a carrier of anti-missile missiles is needed only because our surface fleet will never be able to get into the USSARB patrol zone.

Your idea can only work if you can provide high-speed communication channels with submarines in the ocean at the same speeds, the same “channel thickness”, and the same security.
What would it be "like in the air", the same thing could be "so in the water."
And it is desirable and secretive and noise immunity. otherwise all submarines will be "visible to the whole world in full view" ...
And they need communication for interaction, target designation, etc.
You want to "Burke" under the water to drive ...
Accordingly, you need to repeat it, otherwise it will not be Burke, but a surrogate.

Somewhere I saw a scheme for exchanging information in an AUG order - however, the word is impressive - it is putting it mildly ...

[andrewkor]

Everything rests on financing, Russia is not the United States and the ruble is not the world currency for which this whole world works!

[Nikolaevich I]

Honestly ... I envied the author’s neighbor "at the time of writing" of this article! Of course, the Author at that moment "... had with him"! (Otherwise, I can’t imagine that without "doping" fantasy could "break out" like that! ) And I also wanted to hear: what is the name of the condition (syndrome) in which the brow does not leave obsessive ideas for a long time? Well, like the S-400 / 500 air defense missile system in a submarine? Well, really ... "unkillable" SAM! No matter how much the forum users "bombed" him ... the author still has it "more alive than all the living"! I wish the author also to draw this marine mega- "Death Star" (!): S-500, and the Sarmatov and BNSN, and Sakharov’s super torpedoes .... what did I forget? Oh yes, 6 generation fighters! Trump will surely be laid out, and tutky y Melanu will ask for a rest! Yes ! Stephen King's personal doctor must be warned that he promptly injected a sedative into his ward .... I feel sorry for him .... there are few of those left ...! And so ..... Good article! Optimistic! Just imagine ...: people are tormented: he cannot sleep ... then the boss with bad intentions appears before his eyes, then his wife already in July demands a fur coat for the coming winter, then her daughter did not come home to sleep ... some terrible things! And suddenly the pictures (!): On the left is the underwater armored division of Sea Lions, on the right are the floating S-500 Sea Prometheus, in front of the Buryat scuba divers special forces, and behind is the Peter the Great underwater hybrid, and An-222 "Mriya!" Calm and peace comes immediately. And sleep ... I hope not "eternal" ....

[Nikolaevich I]

PS So I thought: suddenly the State Prize will be given to the Author someday or they will write a name on Wikipedia! And I'm criticized! I decided, just in case, to support the Author with additional ideas (!): A) Two-hull (!) Nuclear submarine cruiser ... (we take 2 nuclear submarines and .......); b) "Separate" complex of several "specialized" submarines: 1. missile-strike .... 2. "anti-aircraft" with air defense systems .... 3. underwater aircraft carrier with fighter-interceptors (or, better, with bombers?) ; 4.EB submarine; 5. UXO submarine ... 6. underwater special forces of protection ...... And this is a "symbiosis"!

[Mooh]

You’re angry Nikolaevich, he’ll leave you :) and he won’t share his “dope” :))

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: MooH

"dope" will not share :))

Duc, we, most importantly, throw a "dream-idea"! And we will find doping ourselves!

Quote: MooH

he will leave you :)

And where would he go without "grateful listeners"? Won Kobzon how many times "left" ...... A. Pugacheva ......

Quote: MooH

Evil you Nikolaevich ...

I'm not evil .... I'm just mischievous!

[ZVO]

Quote: MooH

You’re angry Nikolaevich, he’ll leave you :) and he won’t share his “dope” :))

We ask the author a question: “What did the shaman smoke and where to find such grass?” .... :)

[Alceers]

Hm! And now with all this garbage we’ll try to take off! Blackjack with whores is not enough ... Another paper sofa theorist

[Alex_59]

I haven’t read such a fantasy for a long time. Therefore, I will put a plus.
"You wouldn’t have pictures, boss, you should write books!" (C) Trickle

[Paul zewike]

I’ve also been thinking about this idea for a long time. If implemented correctly, this will be a very strong argument for our "partners."

[Cympak]

The larger the submarine, the greater its physical fields, the larger the reflection area, the easier it is to detect.

[Reklastik]

Project 955A submarines are one of the most modern in the Russian fleet; accordingly, they have a significant reserve for the future in terms of tactical and technical characteristics.

- The T-64A tank was also once modern, and, accordingly, had to have reserves for development. However, did not possess ...

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Romario_Argo

TPK for diesel-electric submarines and nuclear submarines under TA 533-mm with missiles from SAM Buk 9М317М with AGSN, with a range of 50 km are already in service with.

And there is no link where about it can be read? On the web, information is only about western projects.

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: AVM

And there is no link where about it can be read? On the web, information is only about western projects.

And I was terribly "intrigued"! On land, yes! At sea (on ships), yes! But under water (on submarines!) - ??? Link! Link!

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Per se.

Fighting enemy aircraft, intercepting missiles launched from surface ships en masse, is a losing perspective. Moreover, it is not the task of a submarine, the main purpose of which is stealth and attack. If a boat is found, it is too late to fight off aircraft with its anti-aircraft missiles, and if not, it is foolish to unmask yourself with missile launches on airplanes or helicopters. How does the author imagine the fight with the squadron of the same American destroyers, who began launches of their missiles, in a preemptive strike, in general, the question. .

In this article, I considered the option of intercepting ICBMs at the initial (possibly middle) segment, starting from the SSBN. The surface ship does not roll, because It is unlikely that the US SSBNs are deployed in the uncontrolled US district. On Ohio, they are now on 20 pieces. The anti-missile missile pack fits 80. The principal possibility of this is confirmed by the deployment of US missile defense positions near our borders.

[Per se.]

Quote: AVM

The anti-missile missile pack fits 80. The principal possibility of this is confirmed by the deployment of US missile defense positions near our borders.

That's the point, Andrei, that the system you are proposing will be more costly than the Yankee missile defense system. They put rockets on surface ships as missile defense, and are ready to deliver a massive strike with all forces of the fleet, including surface ones, you offer to counteract submarines, such as Borey, which we have been building for many years ... if the same destroyer of the USA can go into the Black Sea, where your rocket carriers who replaced the “paradigm” should be on duty, how can you intercept everything everywhere, how many there should be? I repeat, a submarine, a secret vessel, all of whose strength and meaning lies in stealth and attack, and not in the performance of air defense or missile defense tasks. Think better about the possibility of strengthening our deterrence forces by arming cruise missiles with special submarines and diesel-electric boats (especially when they are equipped with a VNEU).

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Per se.

You offer to counteract the submarines, such as "Borey", which we have been building piece for many years ...

We have all built and built over the years, boats, such as "Borey" is still nothing.

Quote: Per se.

Moreover, if the same destroyer of the USA can also enter the Black Sea, where your missile carriers who have replaced the “paradigm” should be on duty, how can you intercept everything else, how many there should be?

They do not have to follow destroyers, only the Ohio SSBNs. Yes, and follow the wrong term, rather is in the area. The goal, like the US missile defense, is not “Tomahawki” but ICBMs, the number of which is limited by the START treaty.

[xomaNN]

It is unlikely that such a task can be done by the shipbuilding industry and design bureau in the current conditions.

[Akabos]

Do not forget about another option now promising, the placement of the radar on the drone (quad / multi-copter) powered by a long cable from the submarine itself,
pluses are obvious:
Greater freedom of placement on the boat itself,
high height / depth of use,
the ability to detect low altitude targets,
the possibility of emergency dropping and avoiding the attack.
Of the minuses, low carrying capacity is possible (although with a mast it is not better)

And yes, with the mast missed the moment of stability, a heavy radar on a long mast, it’s almost fantastic at sea. (Turns or breaks on the pitch)

And so, I completely agree with you, half a century ago it became clear that a surface ship is a victim for aviation,
the future of the fleet is for submarines or, as a last resort, “diving” ships, so you can consider the option of using AMPK as a typical modern multi-purpose destroyer that can urgently escape from a missile attack by immersion.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Akabos

Do not forget about another option now promising, the placement of the radar on the drone (quad / multi-copter) powered by a long cable from the submarine itself,

Forget about such nonsense immediately. The pressure on the cable when the submarine is moving (I'm not talking about fresh weather) that in order for the quadcopter not to be dragged into the water, Mriya will need to

[Akabos]

The question is, why should she move? I suspect that they do not use the periscope at full speed either, and you won’t shoot missiles from the carts, the application will obviously be short-lived, it floated out, looked around, pulled back and left the position.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Akabos

The application will obviously be short-lived, floated it out, looked around, pulled it back and left the position.

was covered by enemy PLO and died.
Such a system makes sense only if it can constantly work, protecting the submarine from aviation attacks. If they cannot, they will identify and kill as an ordinary boat, especially since the radar + launch of the rocket unmasks the position of the boat more than completely

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Such a system makes sense only if it can constantly work, protecting the submarine from aviation attacks. If they cannot, they will identify and kill as an ordinary boat, especially since the radar + launch of the rocket unmasks the position of the boat more than completely

If any launch of missiles, including, for example, anti-ship missiles or ship-to-surface, unmasks a submarine, why do we need Ash and Antey at all then? All suicide bombers? So can give a suicide bomber a chance to fight back?

And by the way constantly no air defense works at all. They are made mobile including. for quick change of positions. Any stationary goal will be thrown gifts without options.

[Denimax]

A submarine air defense system makes sense if used against anti-submarine aircraft or AWACS aircraft. And do it as discreetly as possible. To do this, it is better to release a buoy with optics from a depth in a passive mode and, upon detection of a target, release a container with missiles, in which the target parameters will already be laid.

[Shopping Mall]

About this in the next article, if the hands reach.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Akabos

Do not forget about another option now promising, the placement of the radar on the drone (quad / multi-copter) powered by a long cable from the submarine itself.

Unfortunately, we have problems with drones in Russia, the radar mass is quite large. I was interested in this direction, but I didn’t find anything to push off from.

Quote: Akabos

And yes, with the mast we missed the moment of stability, the heavy radar on the long mast, it is almost a fantasy in the sea. (It will turn it over or break it on a roll).

I agree, but here only strength calculations. Yes, and without understanding what mass radar we can get, there will be no exact answer.

If we consider AMFPK as a missile defense system, with the main task of destroying the launching ballistic missiles, then you can do with just one optics:

"AN / AAQ-37 - Electron-optical system (EOS) of an F-35 distributed-aperture (DAS) aircraft, consisting of 6 IR sensors located on the fuselage with a viewing range of 360 degrees, allows you to detect group launches of ballistic missiles at 1300 range km, accompany these targets and give target designation for each of them in automatic mode "

[NordOst16]

The only problem is that during the threatened period it will be necessary to constantly be at the surface. In this case, the nuclear submarine will be in the zone of dominance of the naval and air forces of the enemy. And, if I'm not mistaken, modern optics finds objects such as a periscope from a fairly large distance. At the same time, missile-carrier patrol areas also patrol enemy multipurpose nuclear submarines. As a result, there will be a high probability of detection and destruction of nuclear submarines even before all SLBMs are destroyed. At the same time, nothing prevents the missile carrier from launching only part of its ammunition, wait a certain time and give another salvo.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: NordOst16

That's just the problem that in a period of danger it will be necessary to constantly be at the surface. In this case, the submarine will be in the zone of domination of the Navy and Air Force of the enemy. And if I am not mistaken, modern optics find objects like periscope from a rather large distance. At the same time, the patrol areas of the missile-carriers are patrolled by the enemy’s multi-purpose submarines. As a result, there will be a high probability of detecting and destroying submarines even before all SLBMs are destroyed.

AMPPK can be located in 200-300 km from SSBNs at the missile launch rate, or even in 500. Periscope does not need to push. If I understand correctly, the cosmic part of the missile attack warning system is now being restored. Those. just push a thin antenna to receive a signal from it. Or even under water by VLF communication.

Quote: NordOst16

In this case, the missile carrier does not prevent anything from launching only a part of its ammunition, wait a certain time and give another volley.

Yes, but this is a tactic. After all, the United States is building a missile defense base, despite the fact that we can move positions inland. In any case, they "bind" us.

We must do the same. Let them look for AMPPK, maybe it is not there, but their fleet is diverted, resources are being spent - the resource of ships and airplanes, hydroacoustic buoys, fuel, and equipment wear out. There will be more about yourself thinking less about how to stick your nose, such as Ukraine or Syria.

And after the SSBN volley also unmasks itself, then it can also be found by a multipurpose hunter.

If the missile will be special. The BC then the surface fleet will be full of other problems.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Akabos

Do not forget about another option now promising, the placement of the radar on the drone (quad / multi-copter) powered by a long cable from the submarine itself,

Forget about such nonsense immediately. The pressure on the cable when the submarine is moving (I'm not talking about fresh weather) that in order for the quadcopter not to be dragged into the water, Mriya will need to

They are trying to work slowly in this direction:
https://www.popmech.ru/technologies/236880-podvod
nyy-dron-vmesto-periskopa-podvodnoy-lodki /

[Old26]

Quote: sleeve

Without alterations using modular containers, Borey will be able to receive up to 16 missiles from the Bulava mine.

Have you tried to mock up? TPK rocket 9M96M has dimensions 420x489 mm. It is very, very necessary to try to stick at least 2 such TPKs into the shaft for a rocket with a diameter of 11 meters. Are you already going to bend 16 there? Sledgehammer?

[NordOst16]

Mace of course.

[Curious]

The forum "horror of the depths" is on the forum.worldofwarships.ru website. There are many such projects as the author.

[Berkut154]

As they say, I would not have served in the Navy if it hadn’t been so funny))))
The author is very far from the realities of the fleet and the tasks being solved. Purely for the fantastic novel a la “Hunting for Red October” is perfect! And so the general conclusion on the article suggests itself: why goat button accordion?

[NikWik]

Well why. Very cool fantasy story. Anything can be invented and even realized with the current development of technology. Only you asked the absolutely correct question - fig goat button accordion.

[NordOst16]

This is still interesting, but here I would like to notice the following things (and I will call this submarine a “miracle”):
1) LPI mode is not a panacea, and there are DER systems that are capable of detecting this radar operating mode.
2) AUG always accompany the submarine, and when the submarine launches or launches the missile or anti-ship missiles, they will immediately be unmasked from the submerged position and a multi-purpose submarine will immediately be released to destroy a very large submarine, which is more likely to be fatal to the first one.
As soon as RER ship systems detect the operation of the radar of a given miracle, the approximate location of this submarine will be immediately calculated, after which a large number of anti-ship missiles can immediately be launched to destroy this radar. I think that five minutes will be many. At the same time, it is possible to launch missiles in reception mode and immediately a large number of targets, with a greater degree of probability, will overload the air defense system of this miracle (I do not think that it would be possible to put radars with characteristics equal to the radar of surface ships on a telescopic mast) after which the submarine will again become vulnerable to missile and anti-submarine aircraft. It is worth noting that the AUG can constantly support specialized airplanes RER and EW or drones with a similar function in the air. These aircraft and ships can put powerful obstacles to the drones of our miracle and I do not think that these few drones can digest them all. A patrolling strike aircraft (aircraft and drones) can almost immediately begin to eliminate the targeting radar, and then the submarine itself, or miraculously, will engage in multi-purpose nuclear submarines at a depth.
3) As for the destruction of SLBMs, there is a problem. Our underwater "cruiser" will need to operate in the zone of dominance of both naval and air forces of the enemy, which imposes certain requirements for the invisibility of our miracle. Also in the threatened period, it will be necessary to raise the mast from the radar to search for SLBMs that will start, which will immediately unmask our “cruiser” with very sad consequences for it (see above). Moreover, missiles on enemy ships can serve as interceptors for missiles launched from nuclear submarines.
At the same time, possible technical difficulties in the implementation of this project and its price are not affected at all.
As for me, the idea, although it has advantages, but it also has disadvantages which, in my opinion, make this project doubtful.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: NordOst16

1) LPI mode is not a panacea, and there are DER systems that are capable of detecting this radar operating mode.

Yes, there are. The eternal confrontation of the sword and shield, improve the radar modes, improve the systems that detect it.

Options may be considered:
- detection of covering forces due to their radar emissions, engine noise;
- detection of a torch of launching missiles by optical systems (I already wrote about them here).


After the launch of the ICBM, all this will not be so important - because This is a nuclear war. AMPPK will have time to complete the task.

Quote: NordOst16

2) AUG always accompany the submarine, and when the submarine launches or launches the missile or anti-ship missiles, they will immediately be unmasked from the submerged position and a multi-purpose submarine will immediately be released to destroy a very large submarine, which is more likely to be fatal to the first one.
As soon as the ship’s radar systems detect the radar operation of this miracle, the approximate location of this submarine will be calculated immediately, after which a large number of anti-ship missiles can be launched to that area to destroy this radar. I think that there will be a lot of five minutes.

We are already delving into such nuances that can only be understood with detailed design.

Now there is so much misinformation on the characteristics of weapons, both in advertising and for the purpose of secrecy, that two tanks cannot normally compare which one is better and which one will do. How can we now calculate all the nuances of the interaction of such a complex system of systems?

It makes no sense to climb into constructive, if for example, C-500 stupidly can not work normally. Then there is nothing to discuss.

[NordOst16]

I already wrote to another commentator that this submarine should be constantly located at the surface to search for launching SLBMs even by infrared radiation or to receive a signal from a satellite. And this is a pretty high probability of finding a cruiser. Moreover, due to its size, it will be much more noisy than multi-purpose nuclear submarines, which does not add to the security. At the same time, the enemy multi-purpose nuclear submarines will constantly be in the area of ​​the bases of the Russian Navy to detect the submarine's cruising patrol and escort operations, which leads to the necessity of escorting this cruiser with multi-purpose nuclear submarines (and also the Russian SSBNs must be protected), and with the overwhelming superiority of submarine forces ( and after the project of submarine missile carriers will be put on the conveyor, I don’t think that the Pentagon will spare the money for the construction of new multi-purpose nuclear submarines) of the Americans - it will look very sad.

[bk0010]

The author scored on the radio horizon. The author seriously believes that conventional rocket launchers will be able to catch up and overtake the ICBM. The air defense system on the submarine is the same as a tank catapult - incompatible with the main means of protection. All IMHO, of course.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: bk0010

The author scored on the radio horizon. The author seriously believes that conventional rocket launchers will be able to catch up and overtake the ICBM. The air defense system on the submarine is the same as a tank catapult - incompatible with the main means of protection. All IMHO, of course.

And here is a radio horizon for high-altitude purposes, which, moreover, are gaining altitude?

At the end of the article list of sources used. Sources 14, 15, 16, 17 speak about the possibility of intercepting ICBMs in the initial segment, i.e. "Zour", or rather the anti-missile is exactly what it does.

In the C-500 complex, two anti-missiles 77H6-H and 77H6-H1 are declared. They should do this.
The mass thrown by the missile is much less than the mass thrown by the ICBM. For the interceptor missiles they are doing very intensive overclocking, read about the speed of ascent by Soviet missile defense missiles.

[voyaka uh]

"which are gaining height?" ///

They climb incredibly fast.
After you do not intercept the ICBM by any force. Zero chances.
The entire missile defense system is based on interception towards the descent (like the TKhaad or Hets-2), or transversely towards,
on a high trajectory. Like Aegis and Hetz-3 (against the BDSD) and the Ground-Based Interceptor which are in Alaska (against the ICBMs).

[Shopping Mall]

Alex_59,

Quote: Alex_59

It is surprising why in C-400 or C-500 still no radar is used in this case the size of an airplane? Catch the problem?

So with C-400 / C-500, the detection range of 400 / 500 km. At AMPPK so much is not necessary. Xnumx km is enough. The launching ICBM is not a combat unit, stealth technology is not particularly implemented on it.

Quote: Alex_59

AMPPK which shines radar on 500 km difficult to detect? Yes, even if it does not shine. Do you think the guard forces of the American SSBN cannot move away from it to such distances?

Unfortunately, I am not quite familiar with the tactics of guarding US SSBNs. I think that there is a certain compromise. Surface escort forces should be near, but not close, or they themselves will give out the location of the SSBN to the enemy, first of all, the multipurpose SSN, which can destroy the SSBN as a whole.

The question is still in the speed of anti-submarine weapons. Well, let's say, the SSBN started shooting ICBMs. This is a nuclear war. Whether or not AMPPK will eventually be destroyed if it kills half / one third of the ICBMs, this is not so critical.

Even if the carrier of anti-submarine weapons is almost a number of 30-50 km, even a rocket-torpedo needs time to fly, then a torpedo discharge, etc. During this time, AMPPK otkrelyaetsya antimissiles.

Quote: Alex_59

That is, do you plan to equip your submarine with some kind of super-radar, which in passive mode will detect all the available frequency ranges of radar radiation, and in the active detect aircraft, missiles in near space and direct missiles at them and still have weight and dimensions of the aircraft? Yes, you need to give the Nobel, if you do this. As regards the intersection of the exchange via radio channels, without any problems you can make such a channel through which two planes flying directly above your submarine will exchange, but nothing will be noticed on the submarine at all. Guess how?

According to open information, the radar with AFAR is exactly what this is doing:
http://www.iarex.ru/articles/55991.html?utm_campa
ign = transit & utm_source = mirtesen & utm_mediu
m = news & from = mirtesen

“4 AFAR-stations of the on-board Belk RLC will be tested in the passive mode of reconnaissance of the enemy’s radio-emitting targets, for example, working on the transfer of tactical information exchange terminals via the radio link-4A and Link-11 / TADIL-A” installed on airplanes
Peace Eagle, Link-16 terminals (onboard the F-16C Block 50 +), as well as radiating devices located on ground and air units. Such a method of using the Belka airborne radar complex in Syria’s airspace will help to adapt the Su-57 fighter’s weapons control system not only to carry out operations to gain air supremacy and strike ground targets, but also to conduct strategic air reconnaissance without opening its own location . This technique of using the X-NUMX-generation F-5A Raptor fighter for several years has been used by the flight crews of the US Air Force over both Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, which the 22 dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Research, General US Air Force Lt. David Deputla. "

Link-16 guidance:
https://topwar.ru/122997-protivokorabelnyy-kapkan
-dlya-flota-ssha-v-atr-v-stroy-vstupit-strategich
eskiy-vozdushnyy-ubiyca-aug-h-6n.html

"It is also possible to point to tactical radio sources of the Link-16 network. Circular probable deviation using passive X-ray guidance can range from 50 to 30 m."

In the course of the Nobel already someone got ...

Quote: Alex_59

To rely on the fact that here and now someone is looking for scrolls of diesel-electric submarines is somewhat naive. And I repeat once again - the frequency. Are you sure that they will search for those frequencies that your radar is capable of perceiving?

I do not know, Hokai always shines (he seems to be able to detect periscopes), and certainly the launching missiles. Poseidon on the situation of active / passive search. The wavelengths and frequency ranges of their radar are known.

[Alex_59]

Quote: AVM

Alex_59,

Quote: Alex_59

It is surprising why in C-400 or C-500 still no radar is used in this case the size of an airplane? Catch the problem?

So with C-400 / C-500, the detection range of 400 / 500 km. At AMPPK so much is not necessary. Xnumx km is enough. The launching ICBM is not a combat unit, stealth technology is not particularly implemented on it.

That is already 200 km? ))) Previously, you wrote

AMPK can be located in 200-300 km from SSBNs at the rate of missile launch, or even in 500. You do not need to push the periscope.

Now we are not talking about 500, just 200. Damn, really, if our fleet is able to find all enemy SSBNs in the "threatened period", establish continuous monitoring and tracking of them and not be detected by the PLO forces, then excuse me, the question of how to kill SSBNs is no longer worth it. The war has already been won.

Well, let's say SSBN began shooting ICBMs. This is a nuclear war. The AMFPK will eventually be destroyed or not, if it hits half / third of the ICBMs, this is not so critical.

It will be easier. Your AMPK, if it is being built, will be built in an amount precluding the ability to track each SSBN of the enemy, even in theory. And taking into account KOH, the maximum you will bring out 2-3 such boats at sea, while the enemy has 10-15 SSBNs. Further, due to the lack of a developed system of lighting the underwater situation in the oceans of the world, your AMFPK will never be able to autonomously find at least the number of enemy SSBNs equal to the number of their own boats entering the sea. And with rapprochement, they will overcome the boundaries of enemy PLO from NK, aviation and NATO multipurpose nuclear submarines. Even if someone is fabulously lucky and he finds an enemy submarine in the world’s oceans, it will still be necessary to classify it and understand exactly whether it is a SSBN or an ordinary multi-purpose submarine. Submariners can only judge this with some degree of probability. But even if one of ours is fabulously lucky here and really hooks on SSBNs, then at the start of the ICBM launch, your AMPK will be allowed to knock down 5 ICBMs from the salvo from the volley - because then they will detect it and begin to wet it. And the AMFPK commander will have a full-time question - to fight off the forces of the anti-aircraft defense trying to survive, or shoot at ICBMs, and then die heroically. If he chooses the first, he will hit the 5-10 ICBM, and then die. The remaining ICBMs will arrange in the Russian Federation a small branch of the apocalypse, which is not much different from a large branch of the apocalypse. If the commander chooses the second, he will also knock down 5 ICBM pieces and then roll his radars and begin to break away from the attacking forces of the PLO in an attempt to survive.
I think that to solve such a problem it is necessary to build pieces of 40-45 boats of the same project. Because, taking into account our KOH, there will only be 20-25 combat readiness, and for each SSBN you need to withdraw at least two of your AMPKs for guarantee, so that at least one of them will be guarded by the submarine’s security forces, the second one will do more troubles. Fantasy in its pure form is. Plus - Kamikaze sailors. The fun is shorter.

Link-16 guidance:

Links to Damantsev are worse than links to Stanislav Lem. Actually, don’t do it anymore, my personal “fairy tale meter” has gone wild.
I wrote to you above about the connection. And why are the antennas so different for different types of radar and communications. And this is the key question. Learn what an antenna pattern is. And you will understand that making the exchange in the radio channel absolutely invisible to an outside observer is no problem. How is it not possible to intercept, for example, the drone control channel through a satellite without being on the line between this drone and the satellite. Especially from the ground.

[ZVO]

And still, I don’t see any real reason to drive Orly Burke under water ...

Well, they will equip their naval UAVs like GlobalHawk and Triton - with one missile of the promising FASGW (H) / AHL or Brimstone (to the extreme) type - and any surfacing of the AMPK will lead to its damage even before he manages to raise his radar.
Poseidons and Orions are already equipped with Harpoons on an ongoing basis.

[Shopping Mall]

Their speed is significantly less than the speed of missiles - two to three times or more. AMPPK will bring down carriers earlier and back under water. Anti-radar missiles are more dangerous, but their speed is lower than the SAM, + you can get rid of them by turning off the radar immediately after launching the missiles with ARLGSN. In any case, the submarine will move, i.e. Inertial guidance system rocket will not help.

When working with AMFPK as a missile defense system, the main thing is to complete the task.

[ZVO]

Quote: AVM

Their speed is significantly less than the speed of missiles - two to three times or more. AMPPK will bring down carriers earlier and back under water. Anti-radar missiles are more dangerous, but their speed is lower than the SAM, + you can get rid of them by turning off the radar immediately after launching the missiles with ARLGSN. In any case, the submarine will move, i.e. Inertial guidance system rocket will not help.

When working with AMFPK as a missile defense system, the main thing is to complete the task.

1. You won’t get rid of PRLR - they remember the coordinates of the signal - and anyway they are undermined there.
And their flight speed is the same 4-5 Mach.

2. Do not multiply entities beyond measure.
Attempts to defeat high-tech things with even higher technologies lead to collapse.
If your saw is stuck in the working position, then we are not trying to stop the saw blade with heavy-duty materials, heavy-duty protective gloves. We simply pull the wire out of the socket with our bare hands ...

The same is the case with the launch of ICBMs from SSBNs.
Missile launch techniques necessarily require following the so-called “launch corridor”.
This is a certain depth, a certain speed. a certain minimum travel time, open mines, certain manipulations, etc.
And they are known to both ours and non-ours.
Necessary.
Just grab the ticks in someone else's SSBN, do not let it hide, and in the case of access to the "corridor" open torpedo tubes.
So it is now being done.
Submersible knows about it.
Whatever your order would be, but you do not have time to release more than 2-x (well, 3-x edge) ICBMs before they sink you from a pistol.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: ZVO

. You do not get rid of the RLPD - they remember the coordinates of the signal - and still they are undermined.
And their flight speed is the same 4-5 Mach.

I agree, the speeds are comparable, but the submarine is moving, in case of loss of the signal, the RLP will fly into the water, and at the SAM - ARLGSN. Poseidon does not run away from her, too massive and slow.
In extreme cases, it will only damage the radar, the carrier is too massive for the RLP and under water.

Quote: ZVO

Whatever your order would be, but you do not have time to release more than 2-x (well, 3-x edge) ICBMs before they sink you from a pistol.

If so, then great. But if you intercept the remaining 2-3 ICBMs, it will be quite good.

Or if a multipurpose PLA fails, then shoot down at least as much as a backup option.

[NordOst16]

Quote: AVM

AMPPK can be located in 200-300 km from SSBNs at the missile launch rate, or even in 500. Periscope does not need to push. If I understand correctly, the cosmic part of the missile attack warning system is now being restored. Those. just push a thin antenna to receive a signal from it. Or even under water by VLF communication.

Yes, only now it is necessary to find out the area for patrolling targets. at least one more multipurpose submarine is needed. After this, the multi-purpose submarine should transfer the coordinates to the submarine cruiser and there is a risk that surface ships will intercept this message and even if they cannot calculate the coordinates of the multi-purpose submarine, they will know for sure about the presence of the enemy submarine in the patrol area of ​​their missile carrier. That will lead to the departure of the missile carrier to another patrol area and the beginning of the hunt for a multi-purpose submarine, and there it’s not long before the submarine can detect it.
Further, there is a problem with the noise of the submarine cruiser, because 25k tons of underwater displacement is a lot and it will by definition be louder than nuclear submarines of lesser displacement and it will be very risky to release these submarines into the zone of domination of the enemy Navy and Air Force. At the same time, more quiet American multi-purpose nuclear submarines will be on duty in the area of ​​Russian naval bases to take underwater cruisers to escort. Therefore, such a cruiser will need a string of multipurpose nuclear submarines for the successful withdrawal of US SSBNs to patrol areas.
As for the intercept range of SLBMs, even in the acceleration section, I don’t know anything, but most likely no more than 200-300 km. And for a guaranteed interception it will be necessary to be even closer due to the unknown position of the enemy SSBNs, while the patrol areas can be significant.
At the same time, the space SPRN does not immediately fix the launch, but only some time after the launch of the BR (most likely at a certain height). In Korea, they launched SLBMs every 10 seconds. This is of course fortune-telling on coffee grounds, but by the time SSBNs are discovered, they will have time to fire two or three missiles, then it will take time to process the data from the satellites and bring information about the launch of the SLBM to the underwater cruiser. The cruiser itself will need about five minutes to prepare for the interception of SLBMs, as it seems to me by that time the SSBN will have time to empty all or most of its mines, so that perhaps half of the missiles will have time to go beyond the intercept range of the missile submarine cruiser. We can say that an underwater hunter is more likely to destroy SSBNs than an underwater missile cruiser.

Quote: AVM

We must do the same. Let them look for AMPPK, maybe it is not there, but their fleet is diverted, resources are being spent - the resource of ships and airplanes, hydroacoustic buoys, fuel, and equipment wear out. There will be more about yourself thinking less about how to stick your nose, such as Ukraine or Syria.

To stick your nose into Syria or Ukraine, you don’t need much and that’s certainly not a hindrance to it. Deploy more ground-based ICBMs. There is also an option with an increase in the number of SSBNs and here they overtake us how to drink, something tells me that they will be able to rivet a lot more SSBNs than we have all types of submarines combined.

So, as for me, underwater hunters will be much more efficient at lower costs.

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: NordOst16

Yes, only now it is necessary to find out the area for patrolling targets. at least one more multipurpose submarine is needed. After this, the multi-purpose submarine should transfer the coordinates to the submarine cruiser and there is a risk that surface ships will intercept this message and even if they cannot calculate the coordinates of the multi-purpose submarine, they will know for sure about the presence of the enemy submarine in the patrol area of ​​their missile carrier. That will lead to the departure of the missile carrier to another patrol area and the beginning of the hunt for a multi-purpose submarine, and there it’s not long before the submarine can detect it.

I thought about it. Yes, ideally they should work in pairs. How to transfer coordinates?
AMPPK is sufficient to know the coordinates of the SSBN with an accuracy of the order of 50-100 km. SSBNs should go at a speed of 5 nodes, i.e. approximately 10 km / h. Suppose the MTSAP follows a SSBN at a distance of 50 km. At a certain moment, it releases a disposable container - a satellite signal transmitter containing the coordinates of the SSBNs. The transmitter is small-sized, comparable in cost to a modern satellite phone. After the ascent, only the 10-15 cm antenna should hang around, wait around 3 hours, short sending of coordinates to the satellite and self-destruction (flooding + thermal charge). AMPPK occasionally contacts the satellite and receives updates to the coordinates.

Quote: NordOst16

there is a risk that surface ships will intercept this message and even if they cannot calculate the coordinates of the multi-purpose submarine, they will know for sure about the presence of the enemy submarine in the area patrolling their missile carrier. That will lead to the departure of the missile carrier to another patrol area and the beginning of the hunt for a multi-purpose submarine, and there it’s not long before the submarine can detect it.

Of course, there is a risk, but there is also a risk that they will stupidly notice the MTSPL. Use small antennas, short packets ...

Quote: NordOst16

Further, there is a problem with the noise of the submarine cruiser because 25 tons of submarine displacement is a lot and it will by definition be louder than smaller displacement submarines and it will be very risky to release these submarines to the domination zone of the enemy Navy and Air Force.

Most recently, in some source I saw information that 955 Borey is almost quieter than 885 because of the water jet propulsion. Most likely the noise is comparable at low speed. With an active search, yes, 955 should be more noticeable. But, on the other hand, non-strategic SSGNs of the 949 / 949А project have been exploited for a long time and nothing, but they are healthier than 955.

Quote: NordOst16

To stick your nose into Syria or Ukraine, you don’t need much and that’s certainly not a hindrance to it. Deploy more ground-based ICBMs. There is also an option with an increase in the number of SSBNs and here they overtake us how to drink, something tells me that they will be able to rivet a lot more SSBNs than we have all types of submarines combined.

So this and one of the goals - to force the enemy to spend resources. Infinitely many of them no one has. Ground-based ICBMs have their drawbacks. And the number of carriers and warheads is still limited by the START Treaty. Let them be in our shoes, let their media write about the defenselessness of the United States when we strike and they cannot answer (as our media now). Political and informational action is also not to be underestimated. After all, it’s not a fact that in the event of a conflict, the US missile defense system in general will be able to intercept at least something from our missiles, but how many stinks about this?

Quote: NordOst16

So, as for me, underwater hunters will be much more efficient at lower costs.

One complements the other.

PS Someone would explain to me, according to, again, open source 955 costs 23 billion rubles, and 885 / 885М - 30 / 47 billion rubles. (prices for the first ships in the series) Why?

[Vladimir1155]

nevertheless, the main advantage of the submarines is secrecy, if you shoot down the enemy’s plane, the search area for the submarines will be narrowed and its chances are not great, because even the AB or TARK are rather weak, and the submarine is by definition poorly armed, so the author’s concept is more than controversial

[Old26]

Quote: AVM

I thought about it. Yes, ideally they should work in pairs. How to transfer coordinates?
AMFPK enough to know the coordinates of SSBNs with an accuracy of about 50-100 km. SSBNs should go at a speed of 5 knots, i.e. about 10 km / h Let's say ICAPL follows SSBNs at a distance of 50 km. .

You build your theory on a mass of assumptions, not the fulfillment of each of which multiplies the entire concept by zero.
How do you write, SSBN should go at a speed of 5 knots? And if not 5, but 10, then what. Do not forget that until recently, the Americans had a quieter speed than ours. This is the first. The second one. The missile-carrier patrol area will always be covered by multipurpose boats. The radius of the cover zone? You write that our platform will be permissible at a distance of 50 km from SSBNs. And if these 50 km are included in the zone of responsibility of hunters? What then?

Quote: AVM

At a certain point, she releases a disposable container - a satellite signal transmitter containing the coordinates of the SSBN. The transmitter is small-sized, comparable in cost to a modern satellite phone. After the ascent, only the antenna 10-15 cm should stick out, it waits about 3 hours, a short sending of coordinates to the satellite and self-destruction (flooding + thermal charge). AMPPK occasionally contacts the satellite and receives coordinate updates.

Do not quite understand your passage about the container that will contain the SSBN coordinates? What is this for? If you have the SSBN coordinates, why bother with this garden.
Next, well, how do you write a short satellite premise and self-destruction? Why is there a satellite and why send coordinates from the container to the satellite?
Further. let's say a satellite is involved. Which one? The one that can detect a boat, for example a radar reconnaissance satellite? What is still not a fact that they will be able to detect in an underwater position (probability tends to a value called zero). Well, let's say the satellite turned out to be so "advanced" that it spotted the boat (SSBN). What's next? An information package from such a satellite, even in real time, will go to the Center for processing, where they must determine what it found in the ocean. After processing the information, it will need to be transferred to a boat with a missile defense system. How much time will it take. Communication satellites will not hang around this boat all this time processing information. So the dumping of the information package on the missile defense boat can occur both in an hour and in 12 hours. Do you think SSBN will be motionless or move on one course she knows? Having left for 10 hours another hundred kilometers (at a speed of about 5 knots).
But suppose everything has grown together. The missile defense boat knows the coordinates of SSBNs with an accuracy of even 1 km. The distance, as you write, setting the boundary conditions, between the boats is 50 km. But you do not know from the word of a completely flight mission of a rocket located on SSBNs. Where, with what directional angle with respect to your missile defense boat this missile will go. Perhaps even in the opposite direction from you. Further. Your missile defense should not only be fired from a submarine, but also overcome at least 50 km of space. It is possible to follow the rocket with SSBNs. The characteristics of all SLBMs with solid-fuel engines are widely known. Their distinctive ability is a quick set of speed and fast passage of the active part of the trajectory. The final speed for such missiles will be, by definition, 2 times, or even 3 times higher than your missile defense. The engine of the SLBM runs much longer than the anti-aircraft missile. Fuel burns out at an anti-aircraft missile in 40-50 seconds and what's next. The flight of the PRo rocket will be straightforward with an already established speed, and SLBM will increase speed at this time. Further, on what basis will the guidance of your missile defense be based? Will the active radar seeker react to the separated first stage as a higher priority target closer than the retiring SLBM ???

Quote: AVM

Of course, there is a risk, but there is also a risk that they will stupidly notice the MTSPL. Use small antennas, short packets ...

The risk is almost 100%.

Quote: AVM

Most recently, in some source I saw information that 955 Borey is almost quieter than 885 because of the water jet propulsion. Most likely the noise is comparable at low speed. With an active search, yes, 955 should be more noticeable. But, on the other hand, non-strategic SSGNs of the 949 / 949А project have been exploited for a long time and nothing, but they are healthier than 955.

And what, often with a tail of 949 following American SSBNs? Even leaving and escorting the AUG was considered difficult and the EMNIP was precisely for such a fixation and quite a long escort that the commander of the dead Kursk received the title of Hero ..

Quote: AVM

So this and one of the goals - to force the enemy to spend resources. Infinitely many of them no one has. Ground-based ICBMs have their drawbacks. And the number of carriers and warheads is still limited by the START Treaty. Let them be in our shoes, let their media write about the defenselessness of the United States when we strike and they cannot answer (as our media now). Political and informational action is also not to be underestimated. After all, it’s not a fact that in the event of a conflict, the US missile defense system in general will be able to intercept at least something from our missiles, but how many stinks about this?

In order for them to be in the shoes of defenselessness, the threat must be real, not mythical. Yes, the United States missile defense, and not only the United States, but ours is NOT ABLE to intercept targets in a massive strike. It is well understood by all that missile defense only protects against strikes with single missiles. For example, the US strategic missile defense system is likely to intercept ALL North Korean ICBMs because of their simplicity and small number. But they will not be able to intercept the strike of at least a dozen of our “Governors” from the word at all. Having spent all the ammunition, God forbid they will intercept 2-3 ...
But they are well aware that such a missile defense is sufficient to protect the United States from the blow of rogue countries and is not intended to protect against Russian missiles. Just like our missile defense is not able to protect Russia from the blow of the Americans.
So do not think that the Americans will be mindlessly spending resources to protect their SSBNs from the mythical Russian missile defense missile boats. the threat must be real, not mythical. And she is mythical.

Don’t be offended, Andrey, the idea of ​​a missile defense boat is good for a science fiction novel (by the way, in some novels this already happened), but not for the realities of the present world

[Shopping Mall]

A bit on the topic:

https://lenta.ru/articles/2008/08/01/podlodki/
Prospective submarines, in addition to solving traditional tasks in the fight against surface ships and submarines, will have combat capabilities to contain the enemy with the threat of a massive rocket attack, cover for ship formations, participation in the missile defense system, fire support of ground forces and strikes against ground targets (including protected, mobile and hidden).

http://pentagonus.ru/publ/26-1-0-362
- Missile and air defense. It is believed that in the near future submarines may become one of the components of a national missile defense system and a missile defense system in a theater of operations. When deployed near the coast of the enemy, they will be able to intercept ballistic and operational-tactical missiles in the active part of the trajectory. In addition, in the future, the boats are supposed to be equipped with anti-aircraft missiles for self-defense and the defense of the area from helicopters and airplanes.
Author: Captain 1 Rank V. Konstantinov

http://army-news.ru/2014/11/luchshie-mnogocelevye
-apl-chetvyortogo-pokoleniya /
Water jet instead of the usual screw, cruciform tail, high level of automation and A3SM (MICA) anti-aircraft missilescapable of hitting anti-submarine helicopters from a submerged position!

https://inosmi.ru/military/20180608/242423200.htm
l
The main armament system of the Husky-class submarine is based on the installation of a vertical launch on a simultaneous loading 20 units. It can be charged with several types of missiles, including ballistic missiles, anti-ground, anti-ship cruise missiles and even anti-aircraft guided missiles.

https://flot.com/nowadays/structure/sub_future.ht
m? print = Y
Ammunition varies depending on the tasks and loaded weapons - from 24 to 96 units. (from 1 to 4x units in the mine). The composition of the ammunition may include: small-sized BR with monoblock warhead, OTR, anti-ship missiles of various classes, TFR, Missile launcher missile defense systems, missile defense components on theaters and national missile defense systems, ultra-small PL-robots, light PH for emergency launch of low-orbital reconnaissance satellites, etc. 4 TA caliber 650 mm. 4 TA caliber 533 mm. Ammunition - 50-60 torpedoes, rocket-torpedoes, KR, fake targets, sea mines, special purpose vehicles.
Crew - 45-50 man, reduced by high automation.

https://topwar.ru/62173-smert-atomnyh-podvodnyh-l
odok-francuzskaya-oboronnaya-kompaniya-dcns-group
-pokazala-noveyshuyu-koncepciyu-smx-ocean.html
An advanced submarine built by the French defense company DCNS Group. The length of the submarine is 100 meters, the height of the 15,5 meter and the width of the 8,8 meter. On board, it has 34 weapons systems, including torpedoes, mines, anti-ship missiles, ballistic missiles and anti-aircraft missiles.

http://www.modernarmy.ru/article/433/stroitelstvo
-podvodnogo-flota-ssha
The existing installation of the vertical launch of the 36 Mk on the 12 sea-based cruise missiles (SLCM) "Tomahawk" was replaced by two mine launchers (silo, diameter 2,2 m). They contain interchangeable modules of combat load, including launch canisters, tested on nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (SSGNs) of the Ohio type. Each module provides for the shooting of six SLCMs or the SD “Sidewinder” of the advanced C-Serpent anti-aircraft missile system. The latter (the developer - the company "Raytheon") is designed for the self-defense of the PLA from anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, as well as to destroy unmanned aerial vehicles and boats. The rocket is scheduled to be placed in an airtight pop-up capsule (diameter 0,51 m, length 6,1 m), which will allow it to be used from depths to 50 m.

In the multi-purpose version, the prospective boat will be able to carry two (placed in the silo) large-sized uninhabited submersible vehicles (NPA) of increased autonomy, Tomahawk or SLCM Sidewinder anti-aircraft missiles.
Captain 1 rank I. Belousov, "ZVO"

[Shopping Mall]

Quote: Old26

You build your theory on a mass of assumptions, the execution of each of which multiplies the whole concept by zero.

Yes, definitely. I do not pretend to be the ultimate truth. And AMPPK is not a “child bore for years”. This is just a concept. Does it have a right to exist? In my opinion, yes, because there is not a single element in it that violates physical laws, there are no fantastic constructions. Where there is to DARPA and with their wonders. Yes, and with us, try someone a year ago to write about a cruise missile with a nuclear engine and an unlimited range of flight - they would immediately determine the foolish person, and here it is on you, CAM tells it.

If you break the concept into two parts - the air defense missile system on submarines and the AMFPK itself, then on the first question I am definitely sure - the air defense missile systems on submarines will be actively introduced, more precisely they are already being implemented. First, a small and medium-range, then get to the big one. They will direct according to data from advanced periscopes (OLS) and passive radiation sensors on it, then, for example, will put conformal antennas on the periscope. Maybe some pop-up solutions.

As for AMFPK, there are many questions here that I cannot reliably answer, just as my opponents cannot answer - my assumption / prediction against them.

An example is whether or not the SSBN cover ships detect a short transmission to the satellite (packet less than a second in duration), from what distance, with what probability? Who will answer this question? Yes, there are new means of reconnaissance and control, but there are also noise-like signals, and frequency hopping and a narrow radiation pattern. For submarines, laser communication systems are being developed (and may already be developed): (http://www.libma.ru/tehnicheskie_nauki/sovetskie
_atomnye_podvodnye_lodki / p21.php).

Similarly, there is no data on the speed of the low-noise course of our and American boats, everything can be built only on indirect data.

I believe that the fleet needs a carrier of a large amount of weapons, similar to the SSGNs based on the Ohio. Even if the information on the Zirkon complex is correct, then you should not rely on it as a “kladenets” sword. Hypersound is not a panacea, such missiles also learn how to shoot down, so the possibility of a volley in 100-140 missiles is a good way to score an enemy with a number. Of course, such boats must operate in conjunction with the 885 / 885M.
And the launch of 400-600 KR at the same time in a small country, in the event of a conflict, from four submarines can significantly undermine the economy of such a country, for example, Qatar - factories / airfields / bases. According to the cost, "Borey" seems comparable to "Ash" (and even cheaper without nuclear weapons). Those. make four "Ash" to carry as many missiles as one of the upgraded "Borey", will not work.

As for the missile defense function, the decisive factor here will be the TTH of the antimissile of the C-500 complex - the possibility of defeating the ICBM after it, to what altitude, in which area, at what distance, how far you can be from the launch point, etc. Based on this, you can look at factors such as time on the ascent, the survival rate of the submarine, etc. And if the anti-missiles show unsatisfactory performance, then there is nothing to talk about, the missile defense function for AMPPK disappears. If everything is normal with antimissiles, then it is already possible to proceed to the question of what kind of radar is needed, how to place it, etc.

But the air defense function is still important, because in the absence of a surface fleet of comparable strength, the enemy will always have an advantage at the expense of DRLO airplanes hanging in the air. Air carriers of the spacecraft will detect and destroy, before entering the launch area, low-flying RCCs to strike outside the radio horizon. And in this case, the air defense system on a submarine will provide an opportunity to turn the tide, creating favorable conditions for attacking the enemy's ship order with a group of submarines (possibly together with aviation), which again brings us back to the concept of AMFPK in one form or another.

[Simeonov]

As O. Bender said, "Come on, dengi ..."
Things are not going well with surface ships and their repairs, the deadlines are postponed for several years ..
This is a whole industry and the United States has been moving towards this for decades.
By the way, there is nothing to bring the SSBNs to Kamchatka. There is nothing to provide PLO. There are simply no means.
And how is the idea of ​​1000 "Armat" to be assembled? Still alive ?
And pay attention to this: "The freezing of the project of the Russian heavy attack flying drone is caused by the lack of funds for high-tech microelectronics, writes the weekly" Zvezda ".

"The lack of domestic microprocessors, sensors, software products that meet modern requirements - all this recently put an end to the promising project of a heavy shock-reconnaissance drone," the newspaper writes.