Nuclear circumcision (part of 1)
In my publications on the Military Review (and not only) I have repeatedly considered the issue of the American nuclear arsenal, the difficult, if not worse, situation with it, the development and production of new warheads and everything connected with it. In particular, they talked about the currently unrealistic plans for the creation of warheads (BB) of particularly low power for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (TRBM) of the Trident-2 D5. In addition, they are not reflected in the official plans of the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) of the US Department of Energy, the country's main nuclear organization. Obviously, due to the practical impossibility of creating any new ammunition in the medium term (12-15 years at least) perspective. But, as it turned out, there is a solution that allows both to fulfill the foolish demands of politicians, and to create something there. True, the solution looks much so-so, if not worse ...
What are these ultra-low charges for the Trident-2 for? The top military and political leadership of the United States declared them "a response to Russia and China in the field of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) "and" a measure to counter Russia's violations of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF). Well, it is clear why Russia in terms of TNW: the total superiority of the Russian Federation in the field of TNW is an open secret, how many times, or, rather, what exactly to write in the word with the ending "... tatsat times" at the beginning. It is not very clear why China is mentioned: the Chinese arsenal of TNW is generally small. But, apparently, a significant number of non-strategic carriers the Chinese are afraid of Americans. As for the INF Treaty, too, in general, it is understandable, although it is funny when some American leaders accused China of “violating” this treaty, which he did not sign. But for Americans, this is normal.
The idea of such BB of ultra-low power is clear - the Americans are well aware that their small arsenal of TNW in the form of half a thousand (of the once released 3155) B-61 free-fall bombs of various series (power up to 170-340 CT) is not a competitor to many thousands and developed multilaterally Arsenal TNK RF. And the matter is not even in quantity, although in it too: the reliability of delivery of air bombs is extremely low, of course, if we don’t carry "light and heat" (or, if you like, "democratic values") to some natives without normal air defense. No, it is also a weapon and is quite applicable, but you need more. And it is not. And the implemented alteration of all 4 (B-61 mod. 3,4,7 and 11) remaining modifications of B-61 from 11 created, in 12-th modification, is a kind of ersatz-CAB (well, there is a GPS correction, but you cannot call it planning) - does not solve the problem. This bomb flies too close, the survival rate of the carrier almost does not increase, the reliability of delivery - too. Its power is greatly reduced (up to a maximum of 50 kt), accuracy is higher - but only. And here it is possible to get "ersatz-TNW", with high reliability of delivery and high response time. And the lack of opportunities to recreate medium-range ballistic missiles in the foreseeable future can also be compensated by the same Tridents-2 with such BBs. It would seem that...
It is not very clear why the American political leadership decided that such an “ersatz-TNW” could be used without a risk of receiving in response a massive nuclear attack of the SNF of another superpower? After all, the missiles are not visible, what is there for the power of warheads and what is their task. It is also not very clear what the British, who are from the 8 SLBM, who are now installed instead of 16 on their SSBNs on patrol, partly equip the BB in the minimum power configuration, thought to the same account. But it is obvious that the Americans used the English idea as ready. It is clear that they are trying so hard to compensate for the complete absence of tactical nuclear weapons, but the enemy is unlikely to be embarrassed by such problems, because the answer will be massive and BB with normal power charges. In general, this is a very dangerous undertaking, such blocks. But the mechanism for implementing the decision of the White House in the absence of the possibility of producing a new nuclear weapon was quite curious and even funny.
According to the resource Warrior Maven in the article for the authorship of a certain Chris Osborne, the Americans decided on the requirements for nuclear warheads of particularly low power and began to plan its development. This was reported by the press secretary of the Defense Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Michel Baldanza. "The Nuclear Weapons Board held a meeting and approved a draft development plan. The Board agreed to allow the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) to proceed to the appropriate development of the scope, schedule and costs," she added. She also said that we are talking only about a set of tactical and technical requirements that will guide the initial research work (that is, the stage of research, and not OCD, if in our opinion). And here in the article appears the same omnipresent Hans Christensen from the “Federation of American Scientists”, which gives a number of details on this project. It is interesting, of course, that from this he was really whispered, and that he simply thought out, however, as will be seen from the text below, it would be realistic to guess about the “thought out” Mr. Hans.
According to Christensen, the W76-2 BB of especially low power is planned to be created on the basis of the WNNXX-76 thermonuclear BB with 1in power. After castration of this unit, that is, the removal of the entire thermonuclear charge, the entire thermonuclear charge stage, only the nuclear fuse will remain, which will give 100-5 CT, according to Christensen. Honestly, I doubt that in the initial charge, the fraction of the splitting reaction was only 6%, there is a feeling that the power only of the igniter will be of the order of 5 or a little more kt, but not so important, in the end. “It's much easier than building a brand new warhead,” says Christensen, deftly “forgetting” to add, ”especially if you can't create and produce this newest warhead.” It is not easier, just other options and no. Christensen believes that the W10-76 circular deviation (CVT) will be 2-130 meters, as in W180-76. At the same time, in the QUO question, contradicting himself a year ago with a “radius” with radar fuses for W1-76, where he pointed out a completely different, promotional character, QUO, and besides, leading it to a flat trajectory, although he was there would be very, very different.
Strictly speaking, the BB itself is called the Mk4, and the W76-1 is its warhead, but this is it.
But here it is worth noting Mr. Christensen that the accuracy of the lighter BB will not improve at all, but most likely will worsen, and decently. This is if during the charge vivisection its alignment is not disturbed, in this case not only the accuracy will drop even more, but the BB may also enter the dense layers of the atmosphere at a non-optimal angle with subsequent destruction without triggering. The option of serious alterations to the hull and design of the BB does not suit Americans at a price, and even in terms. There is, of course, an option when thermonuclear components will be replaced by weight-sized simulators and weight, weight distribution and centering of the BB will not change - then the QUO will remain unchanged. But with such a penny power, such accuracy is not enough either for pinpointed or protected targets, or even area targets may not be enough - it depends on the target. That is, we obtain ammunition with the effectiveness of a homeopathic "medicine", such is the "nuclear occillococcinum", but it is extremely dangerous to use because of the high probability of a massive response to its use.
So why then do we need to redo a good thermonuclear BB into some kind of sacrifice of underground nuclear abortmakherov? And there are no ways to drastically improve the accuracy in this case. More precisely, there is such a way, but for the Americans it is completely inaccessible so far - you need to make a controlled and maneuvering combat unit.
That is, provided that the information on W76-2 is correct, there is simply an attempt to do something that can be stated as a "powerful response of Russia." And so that Mr. Trump could then tweet something like that, that is, we have not a combat unit, but a “political” unit. And there is no other way to blind the required low-power BB in the medium term in the situation of impotence of the country's nuclear weapons complex, which knows how to, but cannot, does not come up with anything. But the idea itself is obviously idiotic and useless, that is, it is desirable that the Americans do more of their W76-1 in this way, but they are unlikely to go for it. Most likely, if they decide, no more than a few dozen disfigure in this way. The same question of identification is also incomprehensible - do they allocate special Ohio-type SSBNs for such missiles? And how are they going to inform the foe about the use of the non-strategic variant of the rocket? However, there are similar questions around the Americans' dreams of a “fast global strike,” which is still far from being realized, and Russia already has it, in various ways. There, too, there are non-nuclear applications, and variants with BB of particularly low and low power, and so on. In general, this very question of identifying the seriousness of a launched threat, it is very important in fact and makes the whole situation very dangerous.
What are these ultra-low charges for the Trident-2 for? The top military and political leadership of the United States declared them "a response to Russia and China in the field of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) "and" a measure to counter Russia's violations of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF). Well, it is clear why Russia in terms of TNW: the total superiority of the Russian Federation in the field of TNW is an open secret, how many times, or, rather, what exactly to write in the word with the ending "... tatsat times" at the beginning. It is not very clear why China is mentioned: the Chinese arsenal of TNW is generally small. But, apparently, a significant number of non-strategic carriers the Chinese are afraid of Americans. As for the INF Treaty, too, in general, it is understandable, although it is funny when some American leaders accused China of “violating” this treaty, which he did not sign. But for Americans, this is normal.
The idea of such BB of ultra-low power is clear - the Americans are well aware that their small arsenal of TNW in the form of half a thousand (of the once released 3155) B-61 free-fall bombs of various series (power up to 170-340 CT) is not a competitor to many thousands and developed multilaterally Arsenal TNK RF. And the matter is not even in quantity, although in it too: the reliability of delivery of air bombs is extremely low, of course, if we don’t carry "light and heat" (or, if you like, "democratic values") to some natives without normal air defense. No, it is also a weapon and is quite applicable, but you need more. And it is not. And the implemented alteration of all 4 (B-61 mod. 3,4,7 and 11) remaining modifications of B-61 from 11 created, in 12-th modification, is a kind of ersatz-CAB (well, there is a GPS correction, but you cannot call it planning) - does not solve the problem. This bomb flies too close, the survival rate of the carrier almost does not increase, the reliability of delivery - too. Its power is greatly reduced (up to a maximum of 50 kt), accuracy is higher - but only. And here it is possible to get "ersatz-TNW", with high reliability of delivery and high response time. And the lack of opportunities to recreate medium-range ballistic missiles in the foreseeable future can also be compensated by the same Tridents-2 with such BBs. It would seem that...
It is not very clear why the American political leadership decided that such an “ersatz-TNW” could be used without a risk of receiving in response a massive nuclear attack of the SNF of another superpower? After all, the missiles are not visible, what is there for the power of warheads and what is their task. It is also not very clear what the British, who are from the 8 SLBM, who are now installed instead of 16 on their SSBNs on patrol, partly equip the BB in the minimum power configuration, thought to the same account. But it is obvious that the Americans used the English idea as ready. It is clear that they are trying so hard to compensate for the complete absence of tactical nuclear weapons, but the enemy is unlikely to be embarrassed by such problems, because the answer will be massive and BB with normal power charges. In general, this is a very dangerous undertaking, such blocks. But the mechanism for implementing the decision of the White House in the absence of the possibility of producing a new nuclear weapon was quite curious and even funny.
According to the resource Warrior Maven in the article for the authorship of a certain Chris Osborne, the Americans decided on the requirements for nuclear warheads of particularly low power and began to plan its development. This was reported by the press secretary of the Defense Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Michel Baldanza. "The Nuclear Weapons Board held a meeting and approved a draft development plan. The Board agreed to allow the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) to proceed to the appropriate development of the scope, schedule and costs," she added. She also said that we are talking only about a set of tactical and technical requirements that will guide the initial research work (that is, the stage of research, and not OCD, if in our opinion). And here in the article appears the same omnipresent Hans Christensen from the “Federation of American Scientists”, which gives a number of details on this project. It is interesting, of course, that from this he was really whispered, and that he simply thought out, however, as will be seen from the text below, it would be realistic to guess about the “thought out” Mr. Hans.
According to Christensen, the W76-2 BB of especially low power is planned to be created on the basis of the WNNXX-76 thermonuclear BB with 1in power. After castration of this unit, that is, the removal of the entire thermonuclear charge, the entire thermonuclear charge stage, only the nuclear fuse will remain, which will give 100-5 CT, according to Christensen. Honestly, I doubt that in the initial charge, the fraction of the splitting reaction was only 6%, there is a feeling that the power only of the igniter will be of the order of 5 or a little more kt, but not so important, in the end. “It's much easier than building a brand new warhead,” says Christensen, deftly “forgetting” to add, ”especially if you can't create and produce this newest warhead.” It is not easier, just other options and no. Christensen believes that the W10-76 circular deviation (CVT) will be 2-130 meters, as in W180-76. At the same time, in the QUO question, contradicting himself a year ago with a “radius” with radar fuses for W1-76, where he pointed out a completely different, promotional character, QUO, and besides, leading it to a flat trajectory, although he was there would be very, very different.
Strictly speaking, the BB itself is called the Mk4, and the W76-1 is its warhead, but this is it.
But here it is worth noting Mr. Christensen that the accuracy of the lighter BB will not improve at all, but most likely will worsen, and decently. This is if during the charge vivisection its alignment is not disturbed, in this case not only the accuracy will drop even more, but the BB may also enter the dense layers of the atmosphere at a non-optimal angle with subsequent destruction without triggering. The option of serious alterations to the hull and design of the BB does not suit Americans at a price, and even in terms. There is, of course, an option when thermonuclear components will be replaced by weight-sized simulators and weight, weight distribution and centering of the BB will not change - then the QUO will remain unchanged. But with such a penny power, such accuracy is not enough either for pinpointed or protected targets, or even area targets may not be enough - it depends on the target. That is, we obtain ammunition with the effectiveness of a homeopathic "medicine", such is the "nuclear occillococcinum", but it is extremely dangerous to use because of the high probability of a massive response to its use.
So why then do we need to redo a good thermonuclear BB into some kind of sacrifice of underground nuclear abortmakherov? And there are no ways to drastically improve the accuracy in this case. More precisely, there is such a way, but for the Americans it is completely inaccessible so far - you need to make a controlled and maneuvering combat unit.
That is, provided that the information on W76-2 is correct, there is simply an attempt to do something that can be stated as a "powerful response of Russia." And so that Mr. Trump could then tweet something like that, that is, we have not a combat unit, but a “political” unit. And there is no other way to blind the required low-power BB in the medium term in the situation of impotence of the country's nuclear weapons complex, which knows how to, but cannot, does not come up with anything. But the idea itself is obviously idiotic and useless, that is, it is desirable that the Americans do more of their W76-1 in this way, but they are unlikely to go for it. Most likely, if they decide, no more than a few dozen disfigure in this way. The same question of identification is also incomprehensible - do they allocate special Ohio-type SSBNs for such missiles? And how are they going to inform the foe about the use of the non-strategic variant of the rocket? However, there are similar questions around the Americans' dreams of a “fast global strike,” which is still far from being realized, and Russia already has it, in various ways. There, too, there are non-nuclear applications, and variants with BB of particularly low and low power, and so on. In general, this very question of identifying the seriousness of a launched threat, it is very important in fact and makes the whole situation very dangerous.
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