Military Review

A. Isaev: "In no case can not talk about the" backwardness "of the Red Army!"

A. Isaev: "In no case can not talk about the" backwardness "of the Red Army!"The historian is confident that the failures of 1941 of the year are due not to poor preparation, but to political circumstances.

According to military historian Alexei Isaev, the opinion about certain mythical "backwardness" of the Red Army which has been strongly imposed on society in recent years has no basis: it was very advanced for its time. The failure of the initial period of the war, he is convinced, is largely due to the fact that the military industry was destroyed:

- The Soviet Union and Germany used the experience of the First World War in different ways. We focused on strategy, and they - on tactics. Our country was intensively preparing for the war to be long. USSR in 1930-s. struggled to raise the industry, which until then was at a relatively low level.

How did the Red Army come from defeat to victory? To begin with, the defeats of 1941 of the year are explained not by weak preparation, but by political circumstances. It was not the army that was bad, but the conditions in which it found itself, being underdeveloped and unmobilized by the start of hostilities, were bad. In other words, in time they did not press the "red button" of the advancement of troops from the depths of the country to the border. I am convinced that if it were possible to avoid this mistake, there would be no retreat to Moscow and the Volga, which I prove in my book “The Great Patriotic Alternative.”

At the same time, a large gap in the Soviet armed forces was independent mechanized formations. Germany went ahead in this plan, we tried to copy its steps, but until we received the captured documents on the organization of the armed forces of the enemy, we acted to the touch. This led to strange results in the appearance of the 29 1941 mechanized hull of the year. This weakness aggravated the situation with underdevelopment. Here are two factors that led to dire consequences.

But on the whole, the army was built up modern, personnel were trained on the basis of modern education, and its general ideological principles can be called advanced. For comparison, take France 1940 of the year. Its army did not conduct any operational counterattack, and the USSR constantly counter-attacked the enemy both at the tactical and operational levels. This was the general strategy of the Red Army. So it was in the Baltics, and in Ukraine, and in Belarus, and in Moldova. Countermeasures mehchastey as the basis of defense - the striking difference between the USSR and France. Therefore, the Red Army was advanced, I emphasize once again. From the events of 1941, no need to make wrong conclusions!

But then factors often forgotten played. We lost many powder factories. Even those who were evacuated, did not immediately come into operation in a new place. Accordingly, the 1942 year the army lived on a starvation ration for ammunition. Suffice it to say that in the 1942 year, the USSR produced two times less powder than Germany. Plans for the supply of gunpowder to the army were buried. The failure of the 1942 positional battles of the year - the Rzhev-Vyazma operation, the offensive near Rzhev, the initial phase of Stalingrad, the Crimea - is largely due to the lack of ammunition.

Until 1943, we were getting out of the crisis in the war industry. And then it went like a knock-off - after all, we already possessed modern military thought, and energetic commanders, and experience - and the industry rose from its knees. Using the experience of the enemy, we supplemented it with our own developments. For example, the Germans created combat tactical groups for a specific task, and we already had ready-made combat groups represented by tank and motorized brigades. At the same time, the status of the commander of the mechanized formation was relatively high.

The Red Army has shown that it can wage a war of maneuver, and the clear evidence here is the liberation of Ukraine in the 1943-44 campaign. Skills for maneuvering war were previously, but at first these tools were not attached to the appropriate tools. But then, for example, in the campaign of the autumn 1943 - the spring of 1944, our army successfully carried out maneuvering actions, although the poverty of industry sometimes continued to be felt, for example, in the insufficient production of high-speed artillery towers.

In summary, I want to say that if the German air force was defeated mainly by our Western allies, the ground army of the enemy was defeated first of all by the USSR, and 75% of the losses of the German armed forces fall on the Eastern Front. This is how the Red Army came from defeat to victory.

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  1. esaul
    esaul 11 May 2012 08: 11
    In general, the conclusions of this article are correct, but, personally, I have disagreements with the author about the fact that the proper organization in the conduct of actions appeared only after studying the trophy documents. It cannot be said unequivocally that only thanks to this ... The first weeks and months of the war crystallized some experience among those military leaders who, in that crazy situation, found in themselves the ability to think sensibly, with a cool head and were not afraid to go contrary to stupid "indisputable instructions" It was from such commanders that a whole cohort of Victory Generals grew up
    1. Churchill
      Churchill 11 May 2012 08: 54
      Stalin made the main guarantee of the Victory back in the late 30s, when he destroyed the fifth column in the country. Therefore, the country, people, army did not lose their integrity. They did not plunge into the schism, as happened under the tsar. Or in the same France. Hence the ability to mobilize, learn from the defeats and reorganize industry to the new realities. Fortunately, we entered the war without liberals!
      1. Vadim555
        Vadim555 11 May 2012 16: 52
        Quote: Churchill
        Stalin made the main guarantee of victory in the late 30s, when he destroyed the fifth column in the country

        Quote: Churchill
        Fortunately, we entered the war without liberals!

        In the summer of 1941, the US Ambassador to the USSR, Joseph E. Davis, wrote in his diary:
        “Today we know, thanks to the efforts of the FBI, that Hitler’s agents acted everywhere, even in the United States and South America. German entry into Prague was accompanied by active support from the Helena military organizations. The same thing happened in Norway (Quisling), Slovakia (Tiso), Belgium (de Grell) ... However, we do not see anything like this in Russia.
        "Where are the Russian accomplices of Hitler?" - they ask me often.
        “They were shot,” I reply.
    2. Reddragon
      Reddragon 11 May 2012 12: 31
      Quote: esaul
      I personally, have discrepancies with the author over the fact that proper organization in carrying out actions appeared only after studying the captured documents

      That's right, there is 2 confirmation: the warfare pattern was developed in the USSR + there were German military schools on the territory of the USSR and the fact that the 1,5 councils of the year could observe the course of the German occupation of Europe.
      1. 755962
        755962 11 May 2012 16: 49
        The unity of the front and rear. The slogan "Everything for the front, everything for Victory!" expressed the essence of the program actions developed by the Soviet government to transform the country into a single military camp, subordinated to the sole goal - victory in the Great Patriotic War. The slogan was supported by all segments of the population of the USSR. He echoed the slogans "In labor - as in battle!", "The front needs - we will do it!"
  2. FiremanRS
    FiremanRS 11 May 2012 08: 44
    Yesaul, I agree with you in evaluating the article. However, I would like to note the following, the Germans at the time the war began had nevertheless more developed weapons. This is true both in the armament of ground units and in the armament of mechanized units and in aviation. The Germans in Europe, before attacking the Soviets, tested most of the new tactics using tank formations, while ours sucked it all out of the finger right on the battlefield.
    1. esaul
      esaul 11 May 2012 09: 40
      Denis, the statement that the Germans were totally superior in armaments is not entirely accurate. KV tanks made so much rustle from the first days of the war that the Germans were discouraged. The anti-tank field artillery could do nothing with them. 34-ki were already produced at the beginning of the war in small series, but the gun - let us down and eventually it was changed to a more powerful one. The Germans became a panacea for our tanks anti-aircraft guns 88 caliber. The engine life of the tanks at the beginning of the war was extremely small, the repair facilities in the confusion of the early days, could not provide timely repairs, so there were a lot of abandoned tanks. Means of communication, or rather, an almost complete absence in the early days (as sabotage groups violated communication systems). led to the fragmentation of the actions of units. The losses of the Germans were completely unpredictable by them and, in many ways, were inflicted by individual units on the basis of personal initiative and perseverance. In aviation, the lag was in altitude and in armament, but the advantage in maneuverability. Then the missing links were strengthened. It should be added another deletion of MTS databases.
    2. Syrdon
      Syrdon 11 May 2012 10: 57
      Technically, we did not lag behind, and in some ways surpassed the enemy. The reasons for the failure - Blitzkrieg was a refined technology based on the deep interaction of the military branches. That is precisely what the Red Army could not boast of and learned from its mistakes. I’m generally silent about the connection, as it was not in its proper form during the Second World War, and now there is none, war 8.8.8 is an example of this.
      1. datur
        datur 11 May 2012 14: 21
        I support you. And the funny thing is that, in 1940, the Anglo-French forces were both qualitatively, technically more advanced and quantitatively more powerful than the Germans, and what ??? belay shame of dunkirk !!!! laughing
  3. Ross
    Ross 11 May 2012 09: 02
    In my subjective opinion, the author did not indicate a serious miscalculation in the tactics and combat training of troops. The lack of interaction between the combat arms led to the permanent disruption of all counter-strikes and unjustified losses. Having gained experience with the commanders and having established modern tactics, they began to win. Of course, there were reasons indicated by the author, but they are not the main ones.
  4. YARY
    YARY 11 May 2012 09: 23
    German air forces were defeated mainly by our Western allies,

    Chago-chago ??! angry And for this, and in ryah is possible, God forbid, of course !!! angry
    75% of the losses of the German armed forces are on the Eastern Front.

    Belyany old man has eaten up ??! angry
    There were previous skills for maneuver warfare, but at first these tools did not come with the appropriate tools.

    And in what year did Zhukov GK ponder the first timeAm crashed into fosks ??! Do not you remember? Yelnya is unknown to you ?? !!! angry

    the army was built modern, personnel trained on the basis of modern education

    author -> author -> author forgot a little of the truth that "The army is preparing for the last voyne" !!! angry

    1. Drednout
      Drednout 11 May 2012 17: 06
      Quote: Ardent
      German air forces were defeated mainly by our Western allies,

      Chago-chago ??! And for this, and in ryah is possible, God forbid, of course !!!

      I am joining! One air defense of Moscow and Leningrad was worth it!
      Gritting my teeth I agree only that Kriegsmarine was defeated mainly by the forces of the Allies, but not by the Luftwaffe!
  5. neri73-r
    neri73-r 11 May 2012 09: 31
    Like it not, but you can learn to fight only in war !!! The Germans already had real combat experience, there was fighting coordination, we have no objective reasons, we can’t consider Finnish, because we tried to take it abruptly and the fighters ’motivation wasn’t normal. There were also local battles with the Japanese. Unfortunately, the study cost us dearly enough, but we did it and it pleases! Victory is ours!!!
    1. nimboris
      nimboris 23 June 2016 07: 44
      The Germans also studied in the war, before we started. But the conclusions from their imminent victories made erroneous, which turned out to be fatal for them.
  6. patriot2
    patriot2 11 May 2012 09: 35
    Basically, the author is right, but that’s why the Kharkov Tractor Plant riveted tanks for the Nazis before the start of the war (this could be confirmed by the wife’s parents, but they are already gone - they died).
    And no instructions and instructions on life give an answer to all new questions that arise unexpectedly and non-standardly.
    The 5th column was destroyed by us and we won, I think not quite like that. Everything was more complicated.
    Article +
    1. Dust
      Dust 11 May 2012 10: 17
      You want to say that German tanks were made at KhTZ? Was there nothing else to do? And how could the Germans entrust an unknown task to whom so crucial?
      1. Dust
        Dust 11 May 2012 10: 49
        So do German tanks at the KhTZ still do?
        I believed that in these busy days there all the forces were directed to the manufacture of the T-34 ...
  7. 8 company
    8 company 11 May 2012 09: 51
    The author of the article writes nonsense, trying not to notice that the Red Army was beheaded, there were almost no worthy, highly professional commanders in it. In the rank of brigade commander, the marshal before the war was shot more than 500 people! Having tanks 3 times more than the Germans, including the KV and T-34, whose analogues even the Germans did not have, we at 1941 suffered one catastrophic defeat after another under the leadership of the genius Mehlis, Tymoshenok, Voroshilov and Dzhugashviley. We were saved only by the fact that Stalin, under the threat of complete defeat and loss of his power, changed his personnel policy, stopped political purges and executions, and in the war commanders of a new formation began to grow: the Rokossovskys, Katukovs, Baghramyans, Gorbatovs ... Shame on Russian liars and perverters stories!
    1. Winter
      Winter 11 May 2012 11: 06
      8 company,
      You write nonsense, Rota! Give the names of those shot Trotskyist fosterlings, and then do not be lazy to find out their fighting past! One Blucher, drunk and tyrant, what it costs! About the talents of Tukhachevsky, who, except in punitive operations, has not succeeded anywhere, can not be spread!
      Your pathological stalinophobia deprives you of an elementary ability for objective thinking. love
      1. 8 company
        8 company 11 May 2012 14: 26
        Quote: Winter
        One Blucher, drunk and tyrant, what it costs! About the talents of Tukhachevsky, who, except in punitive operations, has never succeeded anywhere,

        You, my dear madam, must first of all calm down. And then give concrete examples of Blucher's "tyranny and drunkenness". I will learn about them with interest if the sources are serious. About Tukhachevsky .. In my opinion, even schoolchildren know that T. commanded one of the most efficient armies of the Eastern Front, which defeated Kolchak, and then was a lump. The southern front, which completely defeated Denikin. He would have defeated the Poles if a group of mediocrities trampled under Lvov had carried out the order of the RVS to give Tukhachevsky the 1st Horse. By the way, with the direct participation of T., the RNII was created and the development of jet weapons began, and the first radars were created precisely with his support.
        1. Tirpitz
          Tirpitz 11 May 2012 15: 22
          Tukhachevsky was not a very competent commander. The Poles have demonstrated this. But he loved all sorts of military theories and proposed creating a tank army of 52000 tanks. The complete idiocy. How to serve it all?
          1. 8 company
            8 company 11 May 2012 15: 46
            Quote: Tirpitz
            proposed to create a tank army of 52000 tanks.

            Stalin's fans love to misinterpret this story. In fact, at the end of the 20s, Tukhachevsky proposed simply to make changes to the projects of the tractors being produced, allowing, if necessary, to quickly convert them into some kind of light tanks. Tanks in those years were almost never released, but you need to defend yourself with something. Stalin's lackeys drove a wave to him, Stalin also joined, but then, to his credit, he figured out the situation and apologized to Tukhachevsky in a personal letter. By the way, the idea of ​​"tractor tanks" was embodied in 1942 near Stalingrad, when the tractor plant, which was still operating, produced a number of such hastily converted machines.
            1. Drednout
              Drednout 11 May 2012 17: 18
              Quote: Company 8
              By the way, the idea of ​​"tractor tanks" was embodied in 1942 near Stalingrad, when the tractor plant, which was still operating, produced a number of such hastily converted machines.

              Back in 41, in Odessa, they were already sculpted "Shushpanzer" on the basis of the "Kommunar" tractor.
            2. Brother Sarych
              Brother Sarych 11 May 2012 22: 35
              You have a story of your own!
              Tanks were made of tractors in Odessa from the greatest need, and they were called NI (to be afraid, according to legend) - nobody seemed to be puzzled by such a problem anymore, tanks were produced at the Stalingrad Tractor without any alterations, we can say that the last ones released into battle the workers themselves went ...
      2. Vadim555
        Vadim555 11 May 2012 17: 02
        Quote: Winter
        Winter Today, 11:06 AM 4 8 companies,
        You write nonsense, Rota! Give the names of those shot Trotskyist fosterlings, and then do not be lazy to find out their fighting past!

        He doesn’t write nonsense, he brazenly juggles and misinterprets the facts. Why? This is another question. Read all his feces, continuous juggling and bile.
  8. Oladushkin
    Oladushkin 11 May 2012 10: 11
    Regarding professionalism in the ranks of the officers. Unfortunately, the tone of the training of practical officers was set by the well-known theoretician from the war, Tukhachevsky, who, being in a more than favorable position, managed to lose the Polish campaign to the white-poles. Because of him, more than a hundred thousand Red Army men were captured and simply killed. The bad results of the war in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War are greetings from the other world, Academician Tukhachevsky, who was the head of the Red Army Academy, which trained personnel for the real army and introduced its ideas into all branches of military affairs. As soon as these unfortunate graduates with the ideas of Tukhachevsky, I’m sure that the honest patriots of the USSR, the Germans really knocked out or captured, other people came who did not graduate from Tukhachevsky’s academy and learned to fight directly. So they defeated fascism.
  9. Dust
    Dust 11 May 2012 10: 16
    To my mind. the author contradicts himself!
    It is poor preparation that can explain the failures of the first period of the war - but what else? The army has grown many times numerically, there simply weren’t enough trained personnel for so many units, units didn’t have basic training for a modern war, miscalculations in the organizational structure — all this was, they tried to solve it, but didn’t have time ...
    1. Tirpitz
      Tirpitz 11 May 2012 15: 46
      Why, they were preparing for another war, not in our territory, the troops had maps of Warsaw, Leipzig .... but of their locality, this is part of the disorganization and panic.
  10. schta
    schta 11 May 2012 10: 43
    Of course! A counterattack is a very important tactical moment that cannot be underestimated! A counterattack is an attack on an enemy who did not have time to erect fortifications, mine approaches, saturate the cutting edge with artillery, and even an attacking enemy can bluntly run out of shells and gasoline.

    In the end, it is much easier to carry out a counterattack than to storm the fortifications.
  11. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2012 11: 20
    Absolutely disagree with the author.
    It is very disappointing when the author, even with the best of intentions, begins to lie to his readers. This is especially unforgivable if the author is a historian. The Red Army in 1941 had very big personnel and organizational problems and was frankly poorly prepared for war. But the thing is that there is nothing shameful or surprising about it.
    You just need to remember that the Red Army during this period experienced painful growing pains. We somehow forget that for a long time the Red Army numbered 500-600 thousand people and was almost a militia-type formation. That by the end of the thirties the army had tripled - up to 1,5 million people, but was it easy when there were only 500 army officers? That back in 1938, out of 99 rifle divisions of the Red Army, only 51 were personnel, and the rest were of a territorial and mixed type - i.e. headed by "commanders" who had studied at the training camp for three months and left back to the national economy. That back in 1938, a huge number of Red Army officers did not own weapons, and those who knew how, received a special mark in their personal files. That universal conscription was introduced in the USSR only on September 1, 1939. That from the end of 1939 the army had to be increased again, urgently, and many times over, and for this there were no trained officers, no weapons, no trained reservists. That the same rifle divisions, according to the report of the People's Commissar of Defense in August 1939, had only 55% of artillery, 13% of anti-aircraft artillery, about 50% of rifles and machine guns, 0% of large-caliber machine guns, 0% of 50-mm and large-caliber 107-120- mm mortars, 0% anti-tank rifles. That in that de 1939, a significant part of the officers of the Red Army preferred not to use the radios, even if they were at their disposal (vimo - well, her out of harm's way, this shaitan-arba). That when accepting cases from Voroshilov in the same 1939, Timoshenko stated the complete absence of the country's military plans in case of aggression.
    You can continue indefinitely - or rather just read the orders and instructions of NGOs for 1938-1940.
    But the most interesting thing is that, despite all the horrors of facts, we have nothing to be ashamed of. For one simple reason. There is some time that must pass from the moment of the introduction of universal military service and the transition to a mass army until the army gains combat capability. Do you think the Germans had better?
    The Germans introduced universal service with 1935 year. A year after this momentous event, the German army enters the Rhineland. So, in this very area, several German regiments managed to LOSE (!), And the command could not find the missing regiments on their own (!!). I had to ask for help ... local policemen (!!!) And in 1938 year (ie, 3 year after the introduction of universal military service), the valiant Wehrmacht, during the Anschluss, threw down the roads of Austria with broken equipment on the march ... And only in the 1939 year (after 4 of the year), the Wehrmacht still gained some fighting ability, at least it was enough to smash the inferior, very inept and technically much inferior to the Germans (Poland), but the Wehrmacht showed real fighting capacity after the introduction of the military duties - 5, during the Battle of France.
    So, the Red Army introduced universal conscription 1 of September 1939 of the year - attention is the question - and what do we want to receive in June 1941 ie in less than 2 years? !! Ideal combat-ready army and equal to the Wehrmacht in all respects? Yeah, schazzzz.
    But 5 years later after the introduction of universal conscription in the Red Army came ... 1944. Should I comment on the fighting efficiency of the Red Army in 1944? So the German general did it much better than me, Mellentin is his last name. In a note to his memoirs, he called the Soviet tank corps of the XNUMX model - "The greatest striking force in the history of mankind" and the Soviet infantry - "One of the main pillars of the universe" .... And I have nothing to add here.
    1. saturn.mmm
      saturn.mmm 11 May 2012 21: 12
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Absolutely disagree with the author.

      A wonderful comment, I won’t even add anything else, definitely a plus.
  12. Pacifist
    Pacifist 11 May 2012 11: 55
    Summarizing the above, I want to say that if the German air forces were defeated mainly by our Western allies,

    This is what builds such conclusions? Where are the numbers and calculations of losses?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2012 12: 04
      Quote: Pacifist
      This is what builds such conclusions? Where are the numbers and calculations of losses?

      I suggest to look here
      Somewhere else there was information that up to 75% of all German fighter aircraft was involved in the defense of Germany and Europe from raids at certain moments. Well, the vast number of anti-aircraft guns
      What do you think about this? I myself am not strong in WWII aviation
      1. Born in USSR
        Born in USSR 11 May 2012 12: 42
        2/3 of the losses of German aviation occurred on the Soviet front, losses among personnel (including aces) are distributed approximately the same. Pilots transferred from the western front to the eastern often lost their way in the first battles.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2012 13: 14
          Quote: Born in the USSR
          2 / 3 German aviation losses occurred on the Soviet front

          And where did the data come from? Tell me please !
      2. Pacifist
        Pacifist 11 May 2012 13: 15
        The data is incomplete, compiled randomly ... in addition, the author himself indicates their incompleteness ... there are several places where the numbers do not converge ... table 2 was especially impressed ... either someone is lying godlessly ... or in parallel with war with the USSR, Germany waged a war of the same volume ... either the Luftwaffe pilots at once forgot how to fly exactly in the first half of the 42nd. In general, a rather controversial document.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2012 13: 18
          Are there any other statistics? I would not refuse very much, but I only have this
  13. USNik
    USNik 11 May 2012 12: 30
    The question of authorship of the article immediately arises. Isaev wrote this? Or is it outlined by Isaev’s thoughts in his interpretation of Kaptar Dionysus?
    The opinion about the lack of shells in '42 is rather controversial, what kind of shells or cartridges were missing !? And how can you connect
    "industrial poverty"
    with some
    "high-speed tractors"
    (what kind of animals ?? like the championship on truck racing appeared in 70 ??) and how could they speed-tow artillery systems on muddy roads? Well, the pearl about the fact that
    "Allies destroyed fascist aviation"
    generally raises a suspicion of mental disorder of the author.
  14. apro
    apro 11 May 2012 13: 01
    I do not agree with the author in Russia - the USSR the succession of the military school was interrupted from the social upheaval of the 20s of the last century; therefore, to summarize the experience of World War I by a large one the top leadership of the tsarist army were exterminated; units could join the ranks of the Red Army; it was a mistake to use the experience of the civil war. examples of armaments on a world level but using other people's experience and under other people's concepts of warfare. In addition, the weakness of the industrial base greatly limited our military capabilities. The first two years of the war for our army was a bloody school and the Germans could not be stronger than us throughout the war in technical and organizational terms. The Soviet army became an army of the modern type only after the penetration of the armament of the armored self-propelled howitzers of the BMP and complete radioization.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2012 13: 13
      What about learning the materiel?
      Quote: apro
      to summarize the experience of 1 World War on the large, no one. The top leadership of the tsarist army was exterminated. One could join the ranks of the Red Army

      Well, the French succession was olichnaya ... It helped them?
      Quote: apro
      to use the experience of the civil war was a mistake

      N-dya? And nothing that the actions of the 1 th cavalry army is to a certain extent probably the best prototype of the tactics of the mechanized troops of the future, which was only in WWI and GV?
      Quote: apro
      Yes, weapons were created at the world level, but using other people's work

      So what? Indeed, much was taken from the same Germans, but what's the problem?
      Quote: apro
      and under other people's concepts of warfare

      What kind of FOREIGN concepts were in the Red Army? :))))
      Quote: apro
      In addition, the weakness of the industrial base severely limited our military capabilities.

      And is it really so weak was our base? And where do you see her weakness?
      Quote: apro
      the Germans were stronger than us throughout the war in technical and organizational terms

      Aha. They and the Great Patriotic War did not lose - apparently, just committed suicide from contempt for the enemy wassat
      Quote: apro
      The Soviet army became an army of the modern type only after penetrating the armament of the shpil self-propelled howitzers of BMP and complete radio installation.

      1. apro
        apro 11 May 2012 14: 58
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk, let’s justify the experiment to the French; the Germans didn’t defeat the Entente in the military sense. The allies didn’t break through the German defenses and the Germans knew how to do this; they had special assault units and artillery offensive tactics 1 civil war special experience without a solid equipped front with the enemy which you can agitate 2 tank bt was a technological dead end like the t-3 and t-28, not talking about universal guns 35 But was our base really so weak? And what do you see her weakness? most importantly, the industry could not give the army a normal truck of 4 -3 tons in the required quantities; powerful and tenacious aviation engines and communications equipment 7 Aha. They didn’t lose the Great Patriotic War - apparently, they just committed suicide from contempt for the enemy - they won and learned something in two years by the number and competent actions
  15. 8 company
    8 company 11 May 2012 13: 13
    I recommend the author to write articles based on primary sources - historical documents, and not based on any fiction. Here, for example, the materials of the meeting in April 1940 in the Central Committee following the results of the Finnish war (I quote briefly some statements):
    "Kombrig Pshennikov:
    "... Up to 47% of the Red Army personnel did not know the material part of the weapons put to them ... The command personnel did not know each other and the fighters ..."
    '... Up to 60% of the 40% vehicles that the division received according to the standard timesheets required immediate maintenance and average repairs, there were absolutely no spare parts, rubber and tools.'
    "Of the commanding staff of the division, only 17% were familiar with the compass, map and able to walk in azimuth ... There was practically no control of fire and movement on the battlefield."

    Comdiv Kirponos:
    '... The questions of covert control were poorly worked out ... All control was carried out in clear text by telephone. Divisional Commander Kurochkin calls me: 'Tell me, where is your command post?'

    Major Mukhin:
    "It was said here that the battalions were commanded by junior lieutenants, and we were commanded by captains, but they could not set artillery tasks correctly."
    "With regard to intelligence, we must reproach the command that we did not have any intelligence."

    Major Bychevsky:
    “We did not have extensive camouflage work. All warehouses, stations, airfields, OP, firing positions were poorly camouflaged ... There was no organizer of camouflage work. '

    Brigade Commander Nedvigin:
    "The newly arrived commanders who graduated from military schools have absolutely no hand weapons, are not familiar with topography, the exactingness of such a commander is extremely low, he has almost no knowledge of the regulations."

    Brigadier Commissioner Muravyov:
    “The headquarters did not have a well-thought-out plan with the calculation of forces and means of communication ... The 18th Infantry Division abandoned the radio station on its territory and crossed the state border without radio equipment. The 20th tank brigade, crossing the state border, completely lost contact and had to send a special commander with a radio station. The same situation was with the 10th Panzer Corps, which also had to be looked for ... '
    'The weak link in the work of communications should be attributed to command and control in military units: battalion-company-platoon. The simplest means: missiles, tracer bullets, conventional bursts of machine guns, small walkie-talkies, light-signaling means were ignored. Our troops and command personnel are not trained in this. '

    Brigade Commander Kravchenko:
    '... Our bombing accuracy is insufficient ... At such railway junctions as Tampere, Rahimäki, Hanamäki 130 bombers were flown, and the next day we saw that this unit was working.'

    Comcor Frolov:
    “We met a pretty good opponent. Border guards, working companies from nickel mines, power plants and local residents fought against us ... The enemy's preparation was good ... The Finns were shooting well. '
    “Our junior commander is poorly prepared ... The enemy can send small groups to our rear. Who is leading them? The sergeant, the corporal is in charge, they are firing at our convoys, but we don't have that. We cannot send a junior commander on such a mission, since he is not prepared for this. '

    Comcor Chuykov:
    "There was essentially no interaction between the departments of the army headquarters ... The operations department is only interested in its own troops, and as for the enemy, it is not at all interested in them."

    Commander Kurdyumov:
    'Operational documents were poorly drafted ... The situation was bad with the covert command and control of troops ... The headquarters do not have the skills and ability to organize the interaction of troops ... The infantry was not sufficiently prepared for operations in the forest with deep snow ... forest ... '

    Commander Meretskov told how the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Mehlis tried to organize a 'socialist competition' between the soldiers at the front: who will be the first to destroy the firing point. Meretskov explained that there can be no 'social competition', because the fighters must follow the orders of the commander, who organizes the battle and determines the order of destruction of enemy firing points. At the same time, Mehlis entered into an argument with Meretskov, saying that "we must compete effectively."
    Meretskov also mentioned that the commanders of the Red Army categorically refuse to travel abroad for reconnaissance purposes in peacetime, as they believe that the fact of being abroad will be included in a personal file and can be used against the commander in the future. "

    Further - more, from the above facts, any military professional will stand on end. Here it is - the real combat capability of the Red Army in the prewar years. It’s a sin not to attack such an army, using the moment that Hitler did.
  16. kagorta
    kagorta 11 May 2012 17: 00
    The counter-attack of the tank brigade de Gaulle still had a place to be.
  17. AK-74-1
    AK-74-1 11 May 2012 17: 42
    The article was not in favor. Some kind of mess of either the author, or some Isaev. Looked at the comments. And the only conclusion about the results of 1941, I have a question: "If you are all beautiful and smart, you have a good weapon and you are the king of the parquet in your area, then what will you do for the first 15 seconds after you have some bum very good kick in the egg? "
    Surprise is a great plus for the striker. And the Red Army is absolutely not a backward army, which was demonstrated at Khalkhin Gol. No need to carry nonsense about BT, T-28, T-35 are the best cars of the 1933-1940 period. There were simply no analogues to them in other armies. Take a trip to Kubbinka and see how the T-1 or T-2 fascists looked against the background of our not even BT, but T-37 and T-40. Take a trip to Monino to look at our planes of those times.