Artillery. Large caliber. 122 mm howitzer sample 1910 / 30's. "Outdated" war hero

The hardest thing to talk about the tools that have long been at the hearing. In the prewar period, according to this indicator, the first place must be given without hesitation, the 122-mm divisional howitzer of the 1910 / 30 model.

Probably, there is no military conflict of that time, where these howitzers would not shine. And in the frames of the chronicles of the Great Patriotic War, these tools are constant heroes of battles. And you can see them on both sides of the front. The command "fire" sounds in Russian, German, Finnish, Romanian. Opponents did not disdain to use trophies. You must admit that this is a rather important indicator of the reliability, quality and good combat characteristics of the weapon.

First of all, it should be explained historical the need for the appearance of this particular weapon. We already talked about the problems of the Red Army of that time. As well as about the problems of the entire USSR. Deterioration of guns, lack of production capabilities of high-quality spare parts, obsolescence of weapons.

Add to this the lack of engineering and design personnel in industry, the obsolescence of production technology, the absence of much of what has already been used in the defense industry of western countries.

And all this against the background of the openly hostile environment of the country. Against the background of outspoken preparation of the West for a war with the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the leadership of the Red Army and the USSR understood perfectly well that without taking urgent measures to rearm the Red Army, the country would not only be an outsider of the world artillery powers in the near future, but would also have to spend huge amounts of money on the purchase of outdated Western artillery systems. Modern artillery was needed here and now.

The Red Army in 20 had two 48-linear (1 line = 0,1 inches = 2,54 mm) field howitzers: the 1909 and 1910 samples. Developed by Krupp (Germany) and Schneider (France). In the middle of the 20-s, after the final transition to the metric system, it was these tools that became the 122-mm howitzers.

Comparison of these howitzers is not the task of the authors of this article. Therefore, the answer to the question of why exactly the howitzer of the 1910 model of the year was chosen for the modernization will be voiced with only one comment. This howitzer was more promising and had a greater potential for further modernization in terms of long-range.

With equal and sometimes better (for example, by the weight of a heavy high-explosive grenade - 23 kg versus 15-17 for Western samples), the howitzer played well in the firing range of Western models (German 10,5 cm Feldhaubitze 98 / 09 or British Royal Ordnnute inch howitzer): 4.5 km vs 7,7 km.

In the middle of the 20-s, an understanding of the imminent possible backlog of Soviet howitzer artillery transformed into a direct order to expand work in this direction. In 1928, the design bureau of the Perm Gun Factory (Motovilihinsky) was given the task of upgrading the howitzer and increasing its range to the level of the best samples. In this case, the advantage in weight of grenades must be maintained.

Vladimir Nikolaevich Sidorenko became the head of the design group.

What is the difference between the howitzer of the 1930 model of the year and the 1910 howitzer of the year?

First of all, the new howitzer is distinguished by its chamber, which was extended by boring the rifled part of the barrel by one caliber. This is done in order to ensure the safety of shooting new grenades. The required initial speed of a heavy grenade could only be obtained by increasing the charge. This, in turn, increased the length of the ammunition on the 0,64 caliber.

And then simple physics. In the standard sleeve, either there was no room for all the beams, or there was not enough volume to expand the gases generated during the combustion of gunpowder if an increased charge was used. In the latter case, an attempt at firing led to the rupture of the gun, since due to the lack of volume for expansion of gases in the chamber, their pressure and temperature greatly increased, and this led to a sharp increase in the rate of chemical reaction of the combustion of gunpowder.

The next change in the design is due to a decent increase in recoil when firing a new grenade. Enhanced recoil devices, lifting mechanism and the carriage itself. The old mechanisms could not withstand firing long-range ammunition.

From here came the next upgrade. Increasing the range required the creation of new sights. Here the designers did not reinvent the wheel. On the modernized howitzer installed the so-called normalized sight.

The same sights were installed at that time on all the upgraded guns. Differences consisted only in cutting the distance scale and fixtures. In the modern version, the scope would be called unified or unified.

As a result of all upgrades, the total mass of the gun in a combat position — 1466 kilograms — increased slightly.

Upgraded howitzers, which today are in various museums of the world, can be recognized by marking. On the trunks are obligatory embossed inscriptions: "Extended chamber". On the gun carriage - "enhanced" and "sample 1910 / 30." on the spindle, the regulating ring and the back of the rollback.

It was in this form that the howitzer was adopted by the Red Army in 1930. Produced at the same factory in Perm.

Structurally 122-mm howitzer arr. 1910 / 30 (the main series according to the "B" drawings) consisted of:
- a barrel made of a pipe fastened with a casing and a muzzle or a monoblock-barrel without a muzzle;
- the piston lock opening to the right. Closing and opening the shutter was done by turning the handle in one step;
- single-bar carriage, which included a cradle, anti-recoil devices, assembled in a sled, machine, guidance mechanisms, running gear, aiming devices and shield cover.

Towing tools carried horse (six horses) or mechanical thrust. Be sure to use the front and charging box. Transportation speed was only 6 km / h on wooden wheels. Springs and metal wheels appeared after adoption, respectively, the towing speed increased.

There is another merit of the modernized 122 mm howitzer. She became the "mother" of the Soviet self-propelled howitzer SU-5-2. The machine was created as part of the design of triplex division artillery. Based on the chassis tank T-26 SU-5 installations were created.

SU-5-1 - self-propelled mount with 76-mm gun.
SU-5-2 - self-propelled installation with 122-mm howitzer.
SU-5-3 - self-propelled unit with 152-mm mortar.

SU-5-2

The machine was created at the plant of an experienced mechanical engineering plant named after S. M. Kirov (Plant No. XXUMX). Passed factory and state tests. It was recommended for adoption. It was built 185 self-propelled guns. However, they were used to solve completely unusual tasks.

Light tanks were intended for offensive operations. This means that tank units do not need howitzers, but assault guns. SU-5-2 was used as an artillery support weapon. And in this case, the need for fast movements disappeared. Mounted howitzers were preferable.

Nevertheless, these machines, even with such a small number, are fighting. In 1938, five self-propelled howitzers fought with the Japanese at Lake Hassan as part of the 2 mechanized brigade, the feedback from the brigade command was positive.

SU-1939-5 also took part in the campaign 2 of Poland. But information about the fighting has not been preserved. Most likely (considering that the machines were part of the 32-th tank brigade), before the battle it did not come.

But in the first period of the Patriotic War, SU-5-2 fought, but did not make any special weather. In total, western districts had 17 machines, 9 in the Kiev district and 8 in the Western special. It is clear that by the autumn of 1941, most of them were destroyed, or taken as trophies by the Wehrmacht.

And how did the "classic" howitzers fight? It is clear that any weapon is best tested in combat.

In 1939, upgraded 122-mm howitzers were used during the events at Khalkhin Gol. Moreover, the number of guns is constantly increasing. This is due in many respects to the excellent results of the work of the Soviet gunners. According to estimates by Japanese officers, Soviet howitzers exceeded everything they had met before.

Naturally, the new Soviet system became the subject of "hunting" of the Japanese. The barrage of Soviet howitzers completely discouraged Japanese soldiers from attacking. The result of such a "hunt" became quite noticeable losses of the Red Army. The 31 gun was damaged or lost forever. Moreover, the Japanese managed to capture a fairly large number of trophies.

So, during the night attack positions 149 rifle regiment, in the night from 7 to 8 in July, the Japanese seized the battery of Lieutenant Aleshkin (6-I battery 175 artillery regiment). While trying to recapture the battery, the battery commander died, and the personnel suffered significant losses. In the future, the Japanese used this battery in their own army.

The Soviet-Finnish war was the high point of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910 / 30 model. For various reasons, it was these weapons that showed howitzer artillery of the Red Army. According to some information, the number of howitzers only in the 7 Army (first echelon) then reached almost 700 (in other 624) units.

Just as it happened at Khalkhin Gol, howitzers became a "tidbit" for the Finnish army. Losses of the Red Army in Karelia, according to various estimates, ranged from 44 to 56 guns. Some of these howitzers also became part of the Finnish army and later were used by the Finns rather effectively.

By the beginning of World War II, the guns we described were the most common howitzers in the Red Army. According to various estimates, the total number of such systems reached 5900 (5578) guns. And the completeness of the parts and connections was from 90 to 100%!

At the beginning of the war, 2752 122-mm howitzer of the 1910 / 30 type was located only in the western districts. But at the beginning of 1942, they were fewer than 2000 pieces (by some estimates, 1900; no exact data).

Such monstrous losses played a negative role in the fate of these honored veterans. Naturally, the new production created a more sophisticated tools. Such systems were M-30. They became the main howitzers already in 1942 year.

But all the same, at the beginning of 1943, howitzers of the 1910 / 30 model made up more than 20% (1400 pieces) of the total number of such weapons and continued their combat path. And they came to Berlin! Outdated, broken by shrapnel, repaired many times, but reached! Although to see them on the winning chronicle is difficult. And then they lit up on the Soviet-Japanese front.

Many authors claim that the 122-mm howitzer model 1910 / 30's outdated by the year 1941. And used the Red Army "poverty". But a simple, but logical question arises: what criteria are used to determine old age?

Yes, these howitzers could not compete with the same M-30, which will be our next story. But the gun performed the tasks well enough. There is such a term - the necessary sufficiency.

So, these howitzers had exactly the necessary efficiency. And in many ways the heroic work of these old but powerful howitzers contributed to the possibility of increasing the M-30 park in the Red Army.

TTX 122-mm howitzer sample 1910 / 30's:

Caliber, mm: 122 (121,92)

Maximum range of fire with grenade OF-462, m: 8 875

Mass of gun
in the stowed position, kg: 2510 (with front end)
in a combat position, kg: 1466

Time of transfer to the firing position, sec: 30-40

Angles of fire, hail.
- elevations (max): 45
- reductions (min): -3
- horizontal: 4,74

Calculation persons: 8

Rate of fire, rds / min: 5-6

We express our gratitude to the Museum of Russian Military History in Padikovo for the information provided.

Comments

[hohol95]

122 mm howitzer arr. 1910/30 In the shadow of the "obelisks of glory" of Soviet artillery
Author (s): Anatoly Sorokin, Ivan Pliva
prepared for publication by S. Fedoseev
Source: “Equipment and weapons”, Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9 for 2014

[hohol95]

122 mm howitzer arr. 1910/30 In the shadow of the "obelisks of glory" of Soviet artillery
Author (s): Anatoly Sorokin, Ivan Pliva
prepared for publication by S. Fedoseev
Source: “Equipment and weapons”, Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9 for 2014

Trophy use
During the Winter War, the Finnish army captured 35 howitzers arr. 1910/30 and arr. 1909/37 They received the designations 122 H / 10-30 and 122 H / 09-30, respectively. In the “continuation war” (the name used in Finnish historiography for the military operations between the USSR and Finland from 1941 to 1944), the 122 H / 10-30 fleet was replenished with 145 captured and 72 guns bought from the Germans in 1944. Then they joined the battle. These howitzers were armed with 13 regiments of field artillery, two light artillery battalions (divisions - in Russian terminology), one heavy artillery battalion and two fortress batteries. The Finnish military gave a generally good rating of 122 H / 10-30 and considered it better than 122 H / 09-30. Losses amounted to four howitzers in 1941 and 16 units in the summer of 1944, and 12 of them were lost on June 10, 1944, by the 9th Field Artillery Regiment (all howitzer material part of this formation) in the Valkesaari area. For 1941-1944 122 H / 10-30 and 122 H / 09-30 spent 369744 shots in battle. After the war, these guns were in the reserve of the Finnish army for quite some time.
A considerable number of 122-mm howitzers arr. 1910/30 became Wehrmacht trophies at the initial stage of World War II. Despite the obsolescence of the design and a loss in range of fire of their own 10,5 cm le.FH.16 (not to mention 10,5 cm le.FH.18), the Germans adopted them as a "limited standard" under the designation 12,2 cm leichte Feldhaubitze 388 (r) and participated in battles on the Eastern Front, the Balkan theater of operations and in the fortification system of the Atlantic Wall. When the Soviet captured ammunition ended for 122 mm howitzers of all types, their production was launched in Germany. In 1943, it amounted to 424 thousand shots, in 1944 and 1945. - 696,7 thousand and 133 thousand rounds, respectively.
Some of the material part of the artillery of the Red Army fell to the Romanian ally of the Third Reich.

[bubalik]

,,, oh, I did not find which howitzers were put into service ,,, maybe such a grandfather served the whole war ,,
387 GAP RGK
The 387 Howitzer Artillery Regiment was formed in the spring of 1941 in the city of Kuibyshev.
He participated in battles near the town of Rogachev, Gomel region.
September 1 1941 came out of the environment.
From December 1941 to March 1942 was reformed in the Vereshchaginsky district of the Molotov / Perm region.
In March, 1942 arrived on the North-Western Front and participated in battles in the area of ​​Demyansk.
In December, the 1942 regiment was turned to the formation of the 76 st separate cannon artillery brigade.
,, the entire war has passed, from 24 June (called up) until the victorious May ,,

[Alf]

This howitzer had one "small" plus, which is often forgotten by "experts." She was EASY, 1,5 tons in the field. Like it or not, one and a half tons is easier to roll than 3 tons of M-30.
In addition, it was mastered by industry and the army.

[stalkerwalker]

Suspension, metal wheels instead of wooden, sliding beds ... You have to pay for modernization ...
The bitter paradox was that in the Red Army there were no tractors to tow the M-30 at the required speed.

[Kot_Kuzya]

The 122 mm F-25 howitzer, created by the team under the guidance of Grabin, weighed 400 kg lighter than the M-30. But since the M-30 had already successfully passed military tests by that time, and according to Petrov, it had been practically mastered in production and the gross production of these howitzers was about to begin, it was decided to adopt the M-30, and not wait for the tests and improvements to the F-25, as the army had to urgently be armed with modern howitzers. But another six months mastered the production of howitzers. It is a pity that Petrov was not shot for wrecking. Indeed, for half a year it was quite possible to conduct military tests of the F-25. And Grabin was a brilliant designer and organizer, so he would have brought the F-25 to mind.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kot_Kuzya

After all, for half a year it was quite possible to conduct military tests of the F-25. And Grabin was a brilliant designer and organizer, so he would have brought the F-25 to mind.

But GAU already had the experience of accepting the weapons of the Grabin’s weapon that had not passed the test, followed by three years of bringing it to mind - as a result, I had to adopt a new artillery system.
F-25 was good in the composition of the duplex. But the country would not have pulled a 95-mm F-28 cannon because of the impossibility of producing a mobile stock of shells for it. The capabilities of the then NKBP are well shown by the situation with ammunition for the 85 mm anti-aircraft gun: in just over a year, only 1 ammunition was produced per barrel. Or 10% of the required reserves.

[Kot_Kuzya]

But GAU already had the experience of accepting the weapons of the Grabin’s weapon that had not passed the test, followed by three years of bringing it to mind

Do you mean the F-22? So after all, Tukhach is to blame for this, with his idiotic demand for a universal divisional weapon, so that the divisional cannon can successfully shoot at both ground targets and air targets. That's why, in trying to cross the hedgehog with the hedgehog, they failed for 3 years, and had to be replaced with the SPM, and later with the even lighter ZIS-3, which in addition, needed only one gunner, since the barrel control sticks were mounted on one side of the gun.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kot_Kuzya

Do you mean the F-22? So after all, Tukhach is to blame for this, with his idiotic demand for a universal divisional weapon, so that the divisional cannon can successfully shoot at both ground targets and air targets.

Is it really that Tukhachevsky forced the designers to apply the extraction mechanism, which did not provide work with military-grade cartridges?
As for the demand of Tukhachevsky, at the beginning of the 30s it was not idiotic at all. Because the basis of the air defense of the ground forces in those days was precisely the divisional guns - "three-inch" on Ivanov’s machine tool.

Adaptation - Ivanov’s installation was widely used not only during the years of the Great War. Even a decade later, it was in service with the Red Army. In 1930, the cabinet was modernized, which led to some relief; the gun began to be equipped with a special anti-aircraft sight arr. 1929, for such "adapted batteries" they even delivered special POISOs (a post for controlling anti-aircraft artillery fire), and tables for firing from a gun’s gun stand were developed. 1902 and 1902/30 In 1936, Ivanov’s installations began to be removed from the Red Army, leaving them only in training units, but until 1941 they were in storage for use as anti-aircraft barrage means of the second line of defense.
Almost all the artillery commanders of the Red Army took a short course of anti-aircraft fire from Ivanov’s machine gun at schools and therefore, if necessary, could fulfill the duties of anti-aircraft gunners. Although in fairness it should be noted that this situation was most likely explained by a catastrophic lack of normal anti-aircraft artillery systems.

The new “German” 3K anti-aircraft gun was heavy, expensive and difficult to manufacture. And there was no hope of saturating the army air defense with these systems. So I had to fence the ersatz.

[Kot_Kuzya]

As for the demand of Tukhachevsky, at the beginning of the 30s it was not idiotic at all. Because the basis of the air defense of the ground forces in those days was precisely the divisional guns - "three-inch" on Ivanov’s machine tool.

It is not necessary to have seven spans in the forehead in order to understand that these Ivanov’s machines were hopelessly out of date in the First World War, they were used because there weren’t enough Lender guns. Well, just like that, you have to be stupid in order not to understand that the speeds and heights of planes are constantly increasing, and these universal guns are useless, firing from them on planes is a waste of shells and wear on the barrel of a gun. And that for the anti-aircraft gun, a round fire is needed. This was understood back in WWI, and Lender created his own cannon on a pedestal, firing 360 degrees horizontally. And only one clever man with Marshall stars, who had fought for three months in the WWI and had experience in suppressing peasant uprisings, decided that a round fire was not needed for the anti-aircraft gun.

The new “German” 3K anti-aircraft gun was heavy, expensive and difficult to manufacture. And there was no hope of saturating the army air defense with these systems. So I had to fence the ersatz.

And instead of these universal guns, did this “genius” come up with an order to develop a 12,7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns? Moreover, the 76-mm 3-K is difficult for the divisional level, will the front-line bombers and attack aircraft still bombard the position of the division, against which fast-firing large-caliber machine guns and anti-aircraft guns will be effective? How can a cannon with non-automatic loading and with two beds keep up with these aircraft? Near the rules should stand two dozen well done to turn the gun after the aircraft? Anyway, 3-K is not an army anti-aircraft gun at all, it is needed to protect important objects in the rear: bridges, stations, factories, cities, etc.

Is it really that Tukhachevsky forced the designers to apply the extraction mechanism, which did not provide work with military-grade cartridges?

I read Grabin’s memoirs “Weapons of Victory”. The problem was with the French shells of the WWI. Well, to dispose of this junk, and all things!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kot_Kuzya

It is not necessary to have seven spans in the forehead in order to understand that these Ivanov’s machines were hopelessly out of date in the First World War, they were used because there weren’t enough Lender guns. Well, just like that, one has to be stupid in order not to understand that the speeds and heights of planes are constantly increasing, and these universal guns are useless, firing from them on planes is a waste of shells and wear on the gun barrel.

So there is no other option for the beginning of the 30s. Either a divisional universal gun, or ... or nothing. Industry can give nothing more - specialized anti-aircraft guns are produced per hour on a teaspoon and go to the country's air defense.
At the time of the start of work on a universal cannon, the USSR did not have plants of the late 30s. There is only an early version of the factory number 8, which with great difficulty put into production a "budget" version of the anti-aircraft gun and could not do anything else in terms of anti-aircraft artillery.

Quote: Kot_Kuzya

And instead of these universal guns, did this “genius” come up with an order to develop a 12,7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns?

Mwa ha ha ... the order for the development of 12,7 mm machine guns was given by the army back in the mid-20s.

The question of creating a domestic heavy machine gun was raised by the USSR Revolutionary Military Council on October 27, 1925.

© Bolotin
A machine gun for this task was made in 1931 - the notorious DC. And the miracle that turned out to be the best weapon of our best design bureau ... I had to bring my mind to mind for 7 years, and then it turned out that the machine gun for the factory was too complicated (release for the war - only 9000 pieces).
At MHA, assignments were also regularly issued. But here our industry was already warning in advance, which at first solemnly overwhelmed the production of the German 20-mm MZA, and then in the same way merged the production of the 37-mm Shpitalny automatic machine.
Understand one simple thing: the armament of the army in the 30s was determined not by military technical requirements, but by the capabilities of industry. On the same 14,5-mm machine gun, Shaposhnikov and Kulik issued the task back in 1928.

machine gun for battalions, artillery divisions, etc., weighing no more than 100 kg, without a shield, power - a metal tape of 50 rounds, armor penetration per kilometer - up to 15 mm at an angle of 30 degrees, or 20-22 mm normal. Caliber - about 14 mm.

The first working iteration of this machine gun KB could only be issued in 1939. And he went into the series only in 1944 - and then the industry thwarted all the time, despite the fact that the curator himself was LPS.

Quote: Kot_Kuzya

The problem was with the French shells of the WWI.

Comrade Grabin is not always accurate in his memoirs - and his recollections do not coincide even with the documents signed by him (for example, in his memoirs he writes about 600 107-mm guns launched for re-melting, and in his 1941 report, about 5 completion of production).
In fact, the so-called "French shells" is the common name for all military-grade shells fired using French technology (french shells) And in the event of the outbreak of war, these shells would reappear in the troops - for to increase production would have to return to this technology. And then what do the F-22 calculation do?

[Kot_Kuzya]

A machine gun for this task was made in 1931 - the notorious DC. And the miracle that turned out to be the best weapon of our best design bureau ... I had to bring my mind to mind for 7 years, and then it turned out that the machine gun for the factory was too complicated (release for the war - only 9000 pieces).

And it didn’t occur to you that it was Tukhach that slowed down the production of recreation centers? And in general, as soon as the “genius” was removed, the DC was immediately modernized, it was made with tape power and it became a DShK, and it began to expand its mass production, only before the war there was little time left. And in general, for your information, the production of DCs was neither shaky nor sweeping, and in 1935 they stopped production of DCs in general. And how Tukhach was ousted, and the “stupid horseman” Voroshilov sat in his place, immediately, as if by magic, orders for large-caliber machine guns and small-caliber automatic machines fell in? And most importantly, they began to be mass-produced? As for the myth about the alleged complexity of the production of DShK, then UB for example, produced 130 thousand during the war, ShVAK almost 100 thousand. Moreover, these samples were much more difficult to manufacture than DShK.

[domokl]

F-25 is good. I understand your admiration for this tool. But, Grabin Pushkar. And he treated the howitzer as a by-product. Therefore, the "abandoned" a few.
And then, on TTX they are comparable with M-30. And the weight ... There is still a grandmother said in two. Is it good or bad. Well, the muzzle brake-dust lift ...
Although, for example, I still do not understand the reasons for adopting M-30. In my opinion, the reason is that M-30 was a symbiosis of existing and established solutions and some innovations. less production costs ...

[Kot_Kuzya]

Well, the muzzle brake dust

The D-1 howitzer was adopted with a muzzle brake. And now all modern howitzers have muzzle brakes, that is, Grabin is ahead of his time. Even the Rapier’s PT cannon has a muzzle brake, although to whom, the PT needs stealth. But the howitzer shoots from closed positions, in addition, the barrel is raised steeply upwards, as a result of which powder gases do not hit the ground so much, raising dust.

[Kot_Kuzya]

This with the front end of the M-30 weighed 3 tons, without the front end, it weighed 2,4 tons.

[zxc15682]

Put it on KAMAZ. Terrarian persecution .. Shoot the windows.

[domokl]

The difference was in 450 kg. This is when comparing the experimental F-25 and serial M-30. Experimental M-30 differed on 200 more than a kilo ...

[Alexey RA]

By the beginning of World War II, the guns we described were the most common howitzers in the Red Army. According to various estimates, the total number of such systems reached 5900 (5578) guns. And the completeness of the parts and connections was from 90 to 100%!

According to the book "Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45.", On 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX the troops had:
122 mm howitzer sample 1909/37 - 881 pcs.
122 mm howitzer sample 1910/30 - 5680 pcs.
122 mm howitzer M-30 model 1938 - 1563 pcs.
By September 01.09.1941, 3512, 122 31.12.1941 mm howitzers were lost; by December 5952, 122, 30 XNUMX mm howitzers were lost. And since the replenishment of guns of this caliber went only due to the M-XNUMX (the production of modernized "old men" was discontinued), the old howitzers were quickly washed out.

[domokl]

The number of trunks in different sources is different. The article outlines the number limits. From more to less. With such volumes of guns in the army, various methods of counting are quite possible. This happens with almost all the tools of those years. Even a few Br-2 differ by one stem-37-38 ... According to different sources

[ser56]

but how reasonable was it to spend energy on boring chambers and stuff, with an increase in range of 1 km? Was it tactically justified?

[Alf]

Quote: ser56

but how reasonable was it to spend energy on boring chambers and stuff, with an increase in range of 1 km? Was it tactically justified?

And you read carefully, for which the camera was enlarged.

[domokl]

Quote: ser56

Was this tactically justified?

That tactically it is justified. The difference in the 2-3 kilometer in range is significant.

[ser56]

Quote: domokl

The difference of 2-3 kilometers in range is significant.

as far as I understood from the article: there was 7,7 became 8 875 ... I got a difference of 1,175 km .. the spread of shells probably also increased ...
weight in combat position, kg: was 1330, became 1466 ... i.e. + 10%