Two minutes to the end of the world. Analytics from American scientists (h. 1)
There is a well-known non-governmental organization, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS, Federation of American Scientists). And there is such a Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists), known, in particular, for" hours with time until midnight "(before nuclear war). It is now midnight on their watch without two minutes - less than in 1984, when there were colossal army groups in Europe on both sides (especially from ATS), when units were saturated with tactical nuclear weapons. weapons (TNW), and not as it is now - in the arsenals of the “deaf-and-dumb” from the 12 of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (or on deployable forward bases, if needed). When groups of medium-range ballistic missiles and ground-based cruise missiles were deployed, from which the then Soviet air defenses did not save yet. And when most of the efforts of the USSR intelligence services were concentrated on the execution of the famous RYAN directive (nuclear missile attack), that is, the search for any signs of possible preparations for a surprise nuclear missile attack from the enemy. And then the intelligence officers commemorated at that time were usually obscene, although from their hearth this work seemed silly, but from the Kremlin it looked quite different and the meaning was most certainly. So, then the clock stood at three minutes without, and now without two. So, in general, these atomic scientists are quite unconvincing watchmakers.
And in their newsletter, the author came across a report by the notorious Mr. Hans Christensen, the director of the FAS Nuclear Information Project and another figure from the same place, Robert Norris.
Christensen is a figure who is quite well-known among those interested in nuclear issues, and there is a lot of valuable information from him, especially on the US nuclear weapons situation (very sad, as was shown in a number of materials on this resource). But this is when it comes to the United States, and with Russia everything is much more complicated, and you have to poke around in the nose and on the ceiling to come up with something. An example of such tinkering is the material "Russian nuclear forces 2018", available here. Russian Nuclear Forces 2018.
The document evokes a rather strange impression. It is clear that the general public knows exactly only the data on the number of deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear forces. At the beginning of 2018, for the Russian Federation, these are 527 deployed carriers and 252 non-deployed ones, that is, for repairs, modernization, used for training purposes, etc., those who wish can read the definitions of deployed and non-deployed carriers in the START-3 Treaty. Christensen, however, believes that 562 carriers have been deployed in the Russian Federation, and about non-deployed ones he writes that "most of them are in the process of disassembly and disposal" (I wonder what he is talking about?). 2 SSBNs of pr.667BDR planned for scrapping (in slang naval wits - "the prison of peoples") no one has yet begun to dispose of and has not started and was not going to, but in any case it is only 32 carriers, 16 mines per boat. And more we have, it seems, in noticeable quantities, so that there is a couple of hundred, nothing is disposed of.
General table on the nuclear arsenal of the Russian Federation from the document
But the table for the regiments and divisions of the ICBM
In this case, Christensen reality in every paragraph is adjacent to speculation. So, it has Tu-95MS bombers only in MC-6 and MC-16 modifications (carriers of the ALCOM X-55MS and X-555), and their total number is somewhat larger than that actually available in parts. Meanwhile, the Tu-95MSM are no longer so small, carrying up to 8 X-101 / X-102, but with Hans this is not reflected in any way, although such vehicles repeatedly participated in strikes against militants in the SAR. At the same time, he has Tu-160, apparently, X-55MS, and Tu-95MS - the old X-55, which have long been written off. Well, X-101 / 102 on Tu-160 (which, for some reason, is not 16, but 13, although in fact they are already 17) are not there either, although they were used in Syria from these bombers X-101 was a little less than 50 pcs. But the "White Swan" is still carrying the X-15 airballistic missile, which has long been written off.
We go further and see that everything is ambiguous with the ICBM and SLBM in the report. The fact that Christensen uses the “Russian” designations that we created for designation in international treaties is nonsense, although in 2018, it is possible to find the GRAU indices and factory designations for almost all types of missiles in 5 minutes. But why, indicating in the table the maximum combat load in the combat units (BB) for each type, he writes not her, but some kind of nonsense? If for the "Governor" P-36М2 (PC-20В) everything is correct for him - 10 BB, then why is there only 4 for "Yars"? Such a prominent researcher could not find a well-known photograph of the internals of a unified (for "Bulava" and "Yars", as well as for the temporarily deferred BZHRK "Barguzin") split head, with empty sockets for 6 BB on the breeding platform?
At the same time, he writes that “Yars” is on duty, in his opinion, in general with 3 BB - theoretically he and 4, and with 3 BB can be on duty, so that in time of peace in START-3, climb, but 6 is normal for him, and in the case of reducing the load, the empty spaces are filled with additional sets of elements of the missile defense system (PCB) components. “Barguzin” also has a four-headed one, by the way. And the MBR UR-100NUTTH (PC-18) he does write in the soon to be written off. Although this is not the case: as we already know, Christensen should have known, instead of the old ones that have been in the silo for the fourth decade, former “dry” missiles of the same type, upgraded to Avangard, will be installed in the silo. Christensen had also forgotten the Siren command missile division in Yuri, although it is considered to be “undeployed carriers” under the Treaty (there are no warheads on these missiles, they have a different task).
With the SLBM also everything is bad. 6 BB is indicated on the Bulava, everything is correct here (although it may not be on duty with the full BB set, but Christensen does not write about it), but with R-29RKU-02 "Station-2" on the SSBN 667BDR and R-29RMU-2.1 "Liner" on pr.667BDRM (they just called RSM-50 and PCM-54 "Sineva") - everything is bad. The first is how much 4 BB is indicated on “Blue”, when he himself writes that he developed the RCM on 10 BB, but then, for some reason, referring to “American intelligence”, he writes that this is not so. These scouts from those that are further reading the newspapers of the host country and "operational meetings" in restaurants did not leave? And just open literature to dig after the restaurant did not have enough intelligence or Christensen and Norris? Then they would have learned that, on the P-29RKU-02, judging by the available information, it is clearly the same RPM with the “Blue” or “Liner” (these are two different variants of the combat equipment of one rocket, denoted as P-29RMU-2 and 2.1) and not like theirs - 3 BB differing in power from those on the "Blue" / "Lineer". And they would know that no one “ten-headed” equipment option for SSBNs, 667BDRM did not cancel, but on the contrary, it was adopted for a long time. With what set of BB they, however, go on combat patrols to get into the START-3 limits to get in - an open question. The Americans know, we give them such information under the Treaty, but according to the gentlemen’s agreement they do not give detailed information to the public, and nobody even whispered to Christensen in his ear. He believes that with the 4 BB "Bulava" in the mines are on duty, and then I probably agree with him.
It is not a problem with Hans and with the power of missile warheads, and practically all of them. The fact is that we have not disclosed, as a rule, such data and most of the published data are estimates, and as a rule - incorrect. But why so much "lower" our nuclear engineers and their combat units? In general, it has long been no secret that not only 1 kilotons on 1 a kilogram of weight of a special warhead is not the limit, but also 1,5 and 2 kilotons. Why are the Bulava compact warblocks, according to Western data, supposedly weighing about 100 kg each (perhaps, the Bulava’s throwing weight to the maximum range of 1150 kg, however, there is not only BB, but also PCB PRO and something else) Are they rated at 100 kilotons? And not in 150, as most researchers believe, or in 200? With the author’s powers, everything is somehow incomprehensible. About 100 kilotonn Christensen said once again the other day, after the shocking specialists of the 4 salvo launch of the R-30 SLAVA Bulava from Yury Dolgoruky, he estimated the total 24 BB explosion power from these missiles in 2400 CT or 160 Hiroshim. This salvo that was shaken by its speed, the minimum pauses between launches, and, well, the high-speed acceleration of the Bulava in the active part of the trajectory during a volley launch are more impressive than in a single. And, by the way, when someone compares this salvo salvo with the well-known operation “Behemoth-2”, when in 1991 the whole load of 667 products was released from Novomoskovsk Ave. 16BRM, and compares not in favor of the recent launch, this is erroneous: in the "Behemoth" of these missiles there were only 2, the rest were mass-sized mock-ups with a minimum amount of fuel in the first stage, and here all 4 missiles were combat, of course, they were launched to Kamchatka with inert charges and without means of overcoming (not to give food for thought dear am Rican partners, launches with a full combat equipment are conducted only on unobservable opponent southern short test track KapYar - Sary Shagan).
But the above stated pales in comparison with the fact that the “American scientist” writes about the submarine missile carriers themselves. According to him, the “most part” of the SSBN is not in service, that is, in repairs, or rather, “two thirds are in repairs and do not carry nuclear weapons, that is, non-deployed,” although this is not at all the case. All three Boreas Ave 955 with Maces, 5 from 6 Ave 667 BDRM (one boat to repair and upgrade always), and 1 from 3 Ave 667BDR (2 others are scheduled for withdrawal from combat , they will soon be replaced by new SSBNs pr.955А). And these boats regularly shine somewhere in the media and the Internet, there are images, data on rocket launches, and the same "Ryazan" pr.667BDR shot relatively recently, why does Christensen write that, "maybe", she is in line? So you want something? Send in repairs more than half of the boats - this is a strong move analyst.
To be continued ...
- Ya. Vyatkin, especially for "Military Review"
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