Why and how did the T-64, T-72, T-80 tanks appear? Part of 1

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History Soviet tank building includes complex and controversial processes, where there were ups and serious falls. One of these pages is a very complicated history of development and development. tank T-64 and the creation on its base of the T-72 and T-80 tanks. Around this goes a lot of speculation, market statements and distortions of facts and circumstances.





At that stage, a truly revolutionary tank was born that determined the development of Soviet tank building for decades to come. Historical justice requires an objective consideration of the process of creating these tanks. Moreover, when only one of the three competing design bureaus in Russia remains, objectivity is sometimes sacrificed for the sake of the conjuncture.

The history of the creation of these tanks covers a huge period in Soviet tank building, it's terrible to think - more than 50 years! From the approval of tactical and technical requirements in 1955 year to the beginning of the development of the tank "Armata". The whole epoch through which thousands of the fate of designers, scientists, military, government and political figures of various levels passed.

I had to be a participant in these events in the period from 1972 to 1996 and go all the way to KMDB from a young specialist to one of the project managers of the last Soviet tanker Boxer. Something passed through me directly, I learned something from my colleagues, from the stories and memories of the designers, ministerial officials and the military, with whom I had worked for almost a quarter of a century. And something I learned decades later from my memoirs.

The history of these tanks cannot be viewed in isolation from their developers and the struggle of various schools of tank building, where there was both fair competition, and lobbying and using the levers of power structures. Whatever it was, tanks were born, and people in each KB struggled and defended not their own personal interests, but the ideas and concepts of tanks and sought to put them into practice.

When evaluating tanks, it is necessary to take into account the demands placed on them of that time, and not to look from the position of today. Moreover, the assessment of specialists, such as Kartsev or Kostenko, is not always objective and taken out of context, but objectively consider all the processes of creating these tanks, their advantages and disadvantages.

Soviet tank building originated in Leningrad. There, before the war, the first tank construction school appeared at the Kirovsky Leningrad Plant (LKZ). Then a second school was established in Kharkiv, in the Kharkov Engineering Design Bureau (KMDB) and after the war - the third, at the Ural Carriage Works (UVZ). For simplicity, hereinafter these names are saved.

In Leningrad, they started with a T-26 light tank, then relied on T-35 heavy tanks, the KV and IS series, and completed it with a T-10 heavy tank. In Kharkov, first went to the line of light tanks of the BT series, then Koshkin’s initiative on the medium T-34 tank was implemented and then, with the participation of UVZ, the T-44 and T-54 tanks.

There was no tank school before the war in Nizhny Tagil. Kharkiv Design Bureau in 1941 was evacuated there, and for almost 10 years (up to 1951), the design bureau staff headed by Morozov had to work there. At the beginning of 70, I had to talk with some of them and they told how hard they had to live apart from home. I still do not understand why they were so long kept in evacuation.

Kharkov Design Bureau on the territory of Nizhny Tagil continued to improve the T-34 and there appeared a modification of the T-34-85. No one has ever denied this, but the tank itself was created elsewhere and at another time.

After the departure of Morozov and the group of leading designers to Kharkov, the design bureau in Nizhny Tagil survived, continued to improve the T-54 tank and developed the following modifications: T-55 and T-62. Thus, its own tank building school began to take shape in the Urals.

That is how three tank building schools competing with each other, each of which put forward its own version of the creation of the T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks. One may ask the question: was it reasonable or not there were three powerful design bureaus in the country, developing practically the same machines? Probably, this was the point, they were formed in the development of tank building. At the same time there were costs and unreasonable expenses, but in the end it contributed to the creation of unique samples of military equipment.

Each design bureau defended its point of view on the concept of the tank and sought to make the tank better and naturally beat the competition. Now there is only one KB in Nizhny Tagil, which has no alternative. VNIITransmash, which we called the "anti-tank" institute, was also closed. He was an independent arbiter, although not always consistent with this. Still, competition should be, it stimulates the design idea.

I passed the KMDB school and at once I want to note that I have never defended and I am not going to defend the “Ukrainian tank construction”. In support of my words, I will quote a quote from my book, which I wrote in 2009: “For me, the Soviet Union and Russia have always been words with a capital letter, and Ukraine, for example, is an empty sound for me ... All my actions in subsequent years are directed were in the struggle to restore historical justice, in which the history of tank building in my native design bureau is not the history of Ukraine, but belongs to all of us working in different republics under the leadership of Moscow. ”

In this regard, the history of tank building, no matter how we argue and find out the relationship between us, is our common history, we created it and must objectively evaluate the facts and events that took place. Today, for many objective reasons, the KMDF cannot develop promising tanks, but its contribution to the common cause is undoubted.

Almost all the tanks were not born on orders from above, but from the initiative work of a particular design bureau. So it was with the T-34, and the T-64 was also created. In this case, a lot depended on the personality of the chief designer, it was he who determined how the future tank should be. I had to work with the three main designers and I can compare and evaluate their activities. Morozov was a genius, the creation of tanks was the meaning of his life. The same genius was Koshkin, who, by the way, came to Kharkov from Leningrad.

I can assume that if Morozov had not returned from evacuation, the T-64 tank would have been born not in Kharkov, but in Nizhny Tagil. Such people knew and were able to form teams capable of creating masterpieces of design ideas. You can also give an example of the Queen, thanks to the genius and organizational talent of which the Soviet space was born.

The tank creates not only a tank design bureau, under the guidance of the chief designer, dozens of design, research and production organizations of various profiles and purposes work on it, without which it is impossible to create a car. The engine, armor, weapons, ammunition, sighting systems, electronics and much more is being developed in specialized organizations. Head KB connects all this into a coherent whole and ensures the implementation of the inherent characteristics.

In the middle of the 50-s in the Soviet Union, the tendency to curtail work on light, medium and heavy tanks began to dominate and the concept of creating a single tank was adopted. The military are developing tactical and technical requirements for such a tank and its development is entrusted to the KMDB.

One may ask: why did you choose this very KB?

Leningrad KB engaged in heavy tanks, and it was not his profile. Development of a new medium tank, Morozov, proactively began, while still in Nizhny Tagil. Returning to Kharkov in 1951, he continued this work (430 object). In Nizhny Tagil, the unfinished project was continued by the new chief designer Kartsev (140 object).

Draft and technical projects were developed in two design offices, which were reviewed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. According to the results of consideration in June 55, TTTs were developed for a prospective tank, prototypes of tanks were made, and tests were carried out at 1958 in Kubinka.

The 430 object passed the tests successfully, and the 140 object did not stand them. Work on this tank was curtailed and UVZ focused its efforts on the creation of T-55 and T-62 tanks. Despite successful tests, the 430 object was not put into service, since it did not give a significant increase in TTX performance compared with the T-54 tank.

Proactively, the 430 object is fundamentally processed, a new smooth-bore 115-mm gun with separate loading shots is installed. Following the review of this project in February 1961, a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers on the development of a new tank weighing tons of 34, with a 115 mm caliber gun, a loading mechanism and an 3 crew of a person. This was the start of the development of the T-64 tank (432 object), the implementation of the project is entrusted to the KMDB.

The T-64 tank was revolutionary at that time and became the ancestor of a new generation of Soviet tanks. There were a lot of new things in it, but principled - the automatic loader and the crew of the 3 man, the chassis and the engine never used before. All these innovations were the problems of this tank and especially the engine that led to the appearance of the T-72 and T-80 tanks.

To reduce the internal volume and mass of the tank, Morozov used a low opposed two-stroke diesel 5TDF with horizontal cylinders specially designed for this tank. The use of this engine made it possible to create a low engine-transmission compartment with an ejection cooling system. Work on this engine was started back in 1946 year on the basis of the German aircraft engine Junkers Jumo 205.

The use of this engine entailed serious problems associated with its development in production. It was already known that the attempts of England and Japan to master this engine in production ended in failure. Nevertheless, the decision was made, and the development of such an engine was entrusted to Charomsky, a famous specialist in creating aviation engines.

At the Malyshev plant in 1955, a special diesel engine design bureau was created, Charomsky was appointed chief designer and a plant for the production of these engines was subsequently built.

To be continued ...
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  1. +7
    29 May 2018 06: 45
    Thank you and look forward to continuing.!
  2. +6
    29 May 2018 07: 05
    good
    I hope the continuation will not be long in coming hi
    1. +3
      29 May 2018 08: 26
      Quote: Rurikovich
      I hope the continuation will not be long in coming

      Actually - we are waiting, sir ... Thanks to the author, it is very interesting to know the events from the direct participant. hi
  3. +2
    29 May 2018 07: 17
    and never before used engine.
    Yes, really ... Never before used on TANKS. Since the German aircraft engine served as a prototype, even before the war, the Japanese put single-row and V-type two-stroke diesel engines on their tanks, and the OPPOSITION was on the T-26 ... But only on ob .430 it all came together
    1. +2
      29 May 2018 21: 22
      T - 64, of course rrryvolyutsionny, but only his children's sores and "climb out" in the Donbass today, with a lethal outcome for the crews.
      1. +3
        31 May 2018 18: 23
        Quote: TermNachTER
        but only his children's sores even today "get out" in the Donbass, with a lethal outcome for the crews.

        And here you should not confuse "childhood diseases" with "chronic diseases" that cannot be cured.
        1. +2
          31 May 2018 18: 26
          Well, if they didn’t even start from childhood, but from the moment when they started drawing it.
          1. +1
            1 June 2018 06: 58
            Quote: TermNachTER
            but from the moment when they started to draw it.

            And there is. Design miscalculations embedded in the design itself. T-72 and T-80 appeared not in vain. If Morozov was more flexible, many problems could be resolved along the way. But he decided NOT to CHANGE ANYTHING from the "ingenious"
          2. -1
            1 August 2018 02: 42
            Abrams is also far from an ideal gas turbine. It is extremely unreliable Iraq. About 70 tanks were damaged due to sand (it’s not for nothing that Iraq bought the T-90 by Abrams now), by the way, because of this very turbine, you don’t really blow it to anyone. The side armor of the hull is cardboard, even a 30mm cannon pierces, so far they have not been able to make an automatic loader (the South Koreans did the Black Panther, and even up to 15 rounds per minute! 1 shot every 4 seconds of a blunder!)
  4. +4
    29 May 2018 07: 45
    Only the Great Sverpower of the USSR could afford to have three (!) Different main battle tanks in its arsenal! But they all came out of the cradle of the T-64, this cannot be disputed!
  5. +4
    29 May 2018 08: 11
    I’m interested in something else: well, they held a competition, they found out who is the best .... and produce. Well, BO (tower, AZ, cannon and SLA) could be standardized in all three tanks ?!
    1. +11
      29 May 2018 15: 30
      Quote: Zaurbek
      Zaurbek (Zaur) Today, 08:11 am New
      I'm interested in something else: well, we had a competition

      Three tanks, with similar performance characteristics, in service with the SA are one of the illustrations of why the Soviet Union collapsed.
      Well, they did the T-64. the revolution there is in the use of an unsuccessful two-stroke engine, which is rather weak, although it provides high smoothness of movement, running gear and MZ.
      The military officials realized that the "revolution" was not successful; a reliable machine was needed. They began to make the T-72, where a 4-stroke proven diesel engine was used, and at the same time, the reinforced chassis and the AZ-it are simpler than the MZ, there are no hydraulics with its high pressures, vulnerable to military damage and fire hazard.
      But there it was, the party secretaries and Kharkov designers beat themselves in the chest: they say, we will bring everything to mind, they say the proletariat will suffer, etc. etc.
      Considering that they had serious ties in the Kremlin, L. Brezhnev himself was of Ukrainian origin, this lobbyism partially passed, T-64 production was preserved, God forbid, 1988. The designers also worked, brought their two-stroke to a satisfactory level (at least for peacetime conditions), they made the 6TD, more powerful and prone to the same diseases. And the soldiers, in particular Comrade Marshal of the armored forces Poluboyarov, did not want to conflict with the "party" chiefs, but understanding everything, did not abandon the release of the T-72 "for war." To justify this situation, they wrote a version that, they say, the T-64B (B1) is a "sniper rifle on the tracks", etc. On this tank began to put KURV (T-64B) and the advanced and expensive SUO 1A33, which the T-72 "did not get."
      But the motor was still ...
      Then, out of nowhere, the idea arose of crossing a snake and a hedgehog: i.e. put a helicopter gas turbine engine on the tank. The idea was supported by the elderly Stalinist People’s Commissar, Marshal Ustinov, no one dared to “oppose” him and the “St. Petersburg” secretaries and put it into practice at a fairly good level.
      So the T-80 appeared.
      But ... What is the consumption of kerosene, what is the price of a gas turbine engine! And huge money has been invested, serial production has been established, who admits their mistakes? moreover, Kharkov helpfully offers its 6TD to replace the gas turbine engine, they say it is almost as powerful and, they say, does not eat kerosene (DT) like a bull slop. As a result, the T-80UD Birch.
      Well, then the USSR collapsed request , including because of such decisions of our leaders.
      The tragedy of the situation is that for the implementation of all engineering solutions for the design and manufacture of three vehicles with the same gun and different MTOs, a lot of material costs and mental work were spent, really complicated technical problems were solved, but, as a result, the combat power of the tank troops did not increase in comparison with the fact that only tanks of the T-72 family of their modifications up to T-90 were adopted, the problems are starting from the high cost of production, the organization of the cap. repair and technical support, etc. mass is generated.
      We are waiting with interest for the second part of the article.
      1. +5
        29 May 2018 17: 37
        T-64 had a number of problems that could be solved only by a radical modernization.
        The T-72 was conceived as a cheap alternative and received a mobilization tank.
        T-80 tank for a professional army, only in the USSR there was a different army.
        And then there were the ambitions of the Design Bureau, although it was more logical to produce only the T-72 and T-80. By the way, they forget that in addition to the T-64 / 72 / 80, they continued to produce the T-62!
        1. +3
          29 May 2018 19: 51
          Quote: mkpda
          T-64 had a number of problems that could be solved only by a radical modernization.
          The T-72 was conceived as a cheap alternative and received a mobilization tank.
          T-80 tank for a professional army, only in the USSR there was a different army.
          And then there were the ambitions of the Design Bureau, although it was more logical to produce only the T-72 and T-80. By the way, they forget that in addition to the T-64 / 72 / 80, they continued to produce the T-62!


          Until 1979, the T-55 was also released.
          1. 0
            30 May 2018 07: 06
            and T-62 ...? And they did it.
            1. +1
              30 May 2018 15: 19
              Quote: Zaurbek
              and T-62 ...? And they did it.


              Yes. And the T-62 was also released. And also, as in the case of the T-55, it is not clear why.
              1. 0
                30 May 2018 15: 25
                To secure the T-64 and T72 .... 10mm stopped punching western tanks, and the 105mm English gun began to get and punch from a greater distance ... the answer is the 115mm gun.
                1. 0
                  30 May 2018 15: 47
                  Quote: Zaurbek
                  To secure the T-64 and T72 .... 10mm stopped punching western tanks, and the 105mm English gun began to get and punch from a greater distance ... the answer is the 115mm gun.


                  But it was not possible on a competitive basis to evaluate the prototypes presented by different design bureaus and to mass-produce one of the most successful MBT, as was done in the USA, Germany, France, England? Rather, the simultaneous production of T-64, T-72, T-80, T-55 and T-62 was "conceived" for squandering funds. Thanks to a similar attitude to the economy of the USSR, in the end, he ordered a long life. If the head of the USSR would be a real business executive, you see, and there wouldn’t be much of what was experienced in the 90-s on the territory of the USSR
                  1. 0
                    30 May 2018 15: 50
                    I asked the same question ... and the second - why it was impossible to make the T-64 / 72 / 80 platform with a backlog of up to 6tn (as it was done with M1 and Leo2). We wouldn’t have to do Armat now and just make a new BO with a new gun and increase our armor .... As we did in the west.
                    1. +1
                      30 May 2018 20: 16
                      Quote: Zaurbek
                      I asked the same question ... and the second - why it was impossible to make the T-64 / 72 / 80 platform with a backlog of up to 6tn (as it was done with M1 and Leo2). We wouldn’t have to do Armat now and just make a new BO with a new gun and increase our armor .... As we did in the west.


                      The fact of the matter is that everything could be done better and at the same time not create additional problems for ourselves.
                      1. 0
                        30 May 2018 20: 27
                        The USSR had certain technological and technical difficulties ... for example, there was no tank diesel more powerful, no machine tools. The Germans, for example, did the Messer halves at different plants and docked and their spare parts fit all combat aircraft ... In the USSR, when were they able to do this? On Mi-24 / 35, cabin lights, for example, are still unique for each side.
                  2. 0
                    31 May 2018 12: 27
                    Now the country is poorer and full of business executives, but 2 helicopters continue to be in service with front-line aviation (largely for the same reason of lobbying)
                    1. 0
                      1 June 2018 08: 37
                      That's right. But the brains were enough to make Mi28 the main one. There, and production capacity is higher.
          2. Alf
            +1
            30 May 2018 18: 50
            Quote: NF68
            Until 1979, the T-55 was also released.

            The last T-55 was released in 1968, then there were only upgrades previously released.

            The same applies to the T-62, the last tank of the conveyor’s tears in 1973.
          3. 0
            1 June 2018 18: 34
            It has been upgraded so many times that it becomes scary. The latest radical modernization is Oplot. The same is not too good
        2. +1
          30 May 2018 16: 38
          At the time of creation, the T-72 was not cheaper than the T-64. The SLA and sights (conditionally, because it has not yet grown to the SLA) were equivalent.
          But really, in case of war, the T-72 due to a simpler engine could be produced at several plants in significantly larger quantities. 5TDF could be produced only in Kharkov.
          A significant advantage in the form of the SLA and guided missile T-64 received closer to the end of the 70s on the version of the T-64B. But the price of the tank has increased markedly.
          1. 0
            30 May 2018 20: 29
            So it was necessary to do everywhere T-72 and put on it the best BO with the best AZ and ATGM ....
            1. +1
              31 May 2018 16: 23
              Now it is clear to most adequate people (but not to fans of the "Ukrainian" tank construction).
              At the time, sorting out all of this was more difficult.
              1. 0
                1 June 2018 08: 38
                At one time, the task was to stupidly rivet a maximum of tanks by any means at the time of production of the main tank had to stop.
        3. +1
          2 June 2018 04: 02
          Quote: mkpda
          And then there were the ambitions of the Design Bureau, although it was more logical to produce only the T-72 and T-80.

          It was more logical to produce a “single” tank, but with its own characteristics. It was such a decision that was already made; the T-80u was adopted for a single tank. It should have been let out by all plants, but with their own engines. By the way, Kharkov already managed to do this, but N. Tagil, who was always in no hurry, did it halfway and even then after the collapse of the USSR. Their T-90, it is largely a hybrid of T-72 and T-80U
          1. +2
            2 June 2018 10: 27
            Quote: svp67
            .... and here, N. Tagil, always not in a hurry, did it halfway and even then after the collapse of the USSR. Their T-90, it is largely a hybrid of the T-72 and T-80U ...

            And what does he have from the T-80?
            The T-90 tank was supposed to be the object 187, which had a different hull (30 cm longer than the T-72), an X-shaped engine of 1200 horses, a larger turret with another gun. But the Yeltsin-Grachev company chose a cheaper option (187 came out at a cost slightly cheaper than the T-80).
            1. +1
              2 June 2018 13: 14
              Quote: Bad_gr
              ... which had a different enclosure ...


            2. +2
              2 June 2018 16: 59
              Quote: Bad_gr
              And what does he have from the T-80?

              From the T-80U is enough, if you take the chassis, then this is a caterpillar. And then we need to climb inside, and it turns out that the sighting systems, ZPU, special equipment, the same "Hoarfrost", "Blind" all migrated to this with the T-80U
              1. +2
                3 June 2018 07: 33
                Object 187 is related to the T-80U, in fact, only the MSA and ZPU. Otherwise, this is a more advanced NEW tank:
                a new case with better protection and the absence of a "neckline", a new welded turret, a new 2A66 gun with a BOPS of greater elongation (more than Lead-1/2), KEPP "Shtora" (on the T-80U it is not, only on single T- 80UK), a new transmission with GOP (not BKP as on the T-64/72/80/90), a new DZ, TIUS, etc. The tank turned out great, but did not appear on time.
                1. +1
                  3 June 2018 08: 46
                  Quote: eburg1234
                  187 object

                  Listen, let's not talk about what has not come true, but about what is. And the T-90 today is not about 187, but about 188
                  Quote: eburg1234
                  new transmission with GOP (not BKP as on the T-64/72/80/90),

                  In fact, the GOP for the first time we just appeared on the T-80UM "Bars"
                  1. +3
                    3 June 2018 12: 17
                    Quote: svp67
                    Listen, let's not talk about what has not come true, but about what is. And the T-90 today is not about 187, but about 188

                    And, in my opinion, in the context of the article, it’s worth recalling the progressive developments of other factories that were in iron, but did not go into series due to reasons of a completely non-technical nature.
                    And then it seems that in the tank industry there was only one genius (Morozov), and all the rest were only capable of remaking his creations.
                    1. +1
                      3 June 2018 15: 53
                      Quote: Bad_gr
                      And then it seems that in the tank industry there was only one genius (Morozov), and all the rest were only capable of remaking his creations.

                      Well, after reading the memory of Kharkovites, then this impression may develop as opposed to reading the memory of Kartsev, so there will be an opposite opinion that he was a genius and only thanks to him Morozov’s mistakes were corrected. Although, personally, I believe that this is not so.
                  2. +1
                    3 June 2018 13: 41
                    Let's not pull an owl (type 187 - it's almost a T-80) on the globe.
                    T-80 fan, or what? GOPs have been tested for a long time (in the 70s there were good results, only the MOs were not interested), vol. 187 was far from the first tank with it, especially since it was not the T-80UM, of course, it appeared later than the 187th.
                    1. +1
                      3 June 2018 15: 56
                      Quote: eburg1234
                      Let us not pull the owl on the globe.

                      So drop this ignoble occupation, otherwise you look big special in this
                      Quote: eburg1234
                      T-80 fan, or what?

                      And I don’t hide it, considering it the best Soviet tank
                      1. +1
                        3 June 2018 20: 18
                        A fan is a diagnosis. No offense.
                        To argue with such is useless.
              2. +1
                3 June 2018 08: 06
                Yes, the running gear and the goose are also original, not the 80th or 72nd.
                Goose with slanting lugs, similar to the T-72B3 began to put 25 years later (those with improved protection).
                So past the box office.
                1. +1
                  3 June 2018 08: 53
                  Quote: eburg1234
                  Yes, the running gear and the goose are also original, not the 80th or 72nd.

                  What are you talking about? What is the originality there? Is there a caterpillar not parallel to the RMSh, like on the T-64 and T-80? Is there something new in the rollers and shock absorbers compared to the T-72? Have you ever seen the “live” T-90, vol. 188? And ride it?
                  1. +1
                    3 June 2018 13: 50
                    The goose is original, the RMSh type does not make it the same and interchangeable. See pictures, learn materiel.
                    Rollers with at least other rubber, the code of rollers is significantly increased.
                    1. +1
                      3 June 2018 15: 58
                      Quote: eburg1234
                      The goose is original, the RMSh type does not make it the same and interchangeable. See pictures, learn materiel.

                      Do not tell my horseshoes. Do you even know that the tank tracks are interchangeable, if necessary, you can use the T-64 or T-80 track on the T-72 and on the back, it's just not worth it ... for various reasons
                      By the way, can you tell where?

                      1. +1
                        3 June 2018 19: 15
                        The T-80 caterpillar has an internal rubber track. It (and the option that is now being put on the T-72, T-90) is faster than the old RMSh (T-72 and the first T-90), but inferior to it in cross-country ability and is much more expensive.
                        Interestingly, but this goose why didn’t go for modern tanks ?
                      2. +1
                        3 June 2018 20: 25
                        T-80, T-90A, respectively.
                        At a minimum, you need to change the leading sprocket. Do not you have a mess? Do not carry with you?
                        At 187, the original goose without gum. So all your sucked facts about the goose from the T-80 are sucked out of your finger. With great success, you can say that it is from the T-64, there, too, without rubber.
                        Fans, such fans. Though Kharkov, even Leningrad, even Tagil ...
                  2. +1
                    3 June 2018 13: 56
                    Here is a photo:
                    http://www.russianarms.ru/forum/index.php?topic=1
                    1033.0
    2. -1
      1 August 2018 02: 44
      on the contrary, each one has its own plus sign, and the plants are different (Kharkov, Nizhny Tagil, Omsk) so everything is correct
      1. 0
        1 August 2018 12: 08
        It’s right to hold a competition for the best chassis, and for the best BO, and then rivet massively at one BO plant, at another Chassis. And in the assembly plant, finally assemble.
  6. +6
    29 May 2018 08: 57
    There was a period of formation, when everyone sculpted, as he knows, there was a period of War, when everyone had full work. But there came a period of industry maturity and the beginning of widespread unification. In these conditions, someone inevitably had to lose, remaining without orders for decades. That is the reality. Someone doubt that in such conditions the competition will be super-fierce?

    Similarly, now in aviation the MiG Design Bureau will no longer have any breakthrough projects in the next 50 years, that is, during the entire adult life of a potential designer. Like it or not. And yes, when they created the Su-27 with the MiG-29, they had a competitor in the person of Yakovlev, who presented some kind of monster with engines on the wing. Yakovlev worked hard during the years of the Second World War, he was praised for this, but even geniuses at one point fall into insanity and it is better to remove them from active work, for their own good.

    Regarding the personality of Morozov, then maybe he was the person around whom the group could gather, but there is evidence that he did not care at T-34-85, the person did not understand the realities of the moment and was worn with his T-43, which in his eyes , apparently, solved a lot of problems. After the Second World War, Morozov successfully failed the launch of the T-54 series, in 3 of the year they collected only 300 tanks.

    To me, as a programmer and a fan of Pascal, all this reminds me of the story of Wirth, the creator of Pascal, who, having invented a promising language in the 1960th, instead of developing it, began to invent new languages, there he changed the functionality, there is the syntax, and Borland, which released its the well-known implementation of Pascal, went a completely different way, they did not release the finished Turbo Modula there, but focused on the development of Pascal, as a result, Pascal successfully received both support for modularity and OOP, then there was a Delphi legend with fundamentally but th object model. A simple language conceived for writing curricula with chalk on a blackboard has grown into a fully functional tool. And now, despite the pressure of competitors, it continues to live and live, new versions are coming out. Wirth’s new languages ​​are not needed by anyone except Wirth himself. But under them you can write articles and teach grants, over and over again inventing a slightly different, but absolutely the same hammer.

    In the same way, new tanks can be made and then defended with foam at the mouth that "I have tons less weight by 2!" And do not care that engineers from factories in tank units naturally live.

    T-64 - a revolutionary tank, this is a fact, no one argues with this, even those who can’t stand it. But after the development of this tank, I had to immediately make a "simplified T-72", well, it’s expensive and complicated for elite units, and the T-72 for everyone else. In practice, it should be understood that progress is progress, but something needs to be fought, and the T-55 and T-62 are not eternal in terms of competitiveness.

    At the same time, things such as advanced equipment, or an engine of the required power gradually became available without distortions like gas turbines, or engines of a strange overcomplicated design. As a result, they logically came to the T-90, putting a modern filling in the body of the reliable T-72 and pulling up the classic diesel engines. Now there is also a B-92 engine on 1000 l. with. as much as the turbine gave (and the turbines are not only voracious, but also prohibitively expensive) T-80. And even on 1130 l. with. Well, the Germans, under the heavier “Leo” -2, had long ago created an excellent 1500-powerful diesel engine, instead of suffering the Americans with the turbine on the “Abrams”, the Americans could simply license it like a gun was licensed. But, apparently, they also had their own Morozov.

    And with the development of the T-72, the T-64 became simply unnecessary and was discontinued in the 1987.
    1. +2
      29 May 2018 10: 48
      Quote: EvilLion
      After the Second World War, Morozov successfully failed the launch of the T-54 series, for 3 years only 300 tanks were assembled.

      In the process of setting up for production, the Chief Designer is just one of the co-contractors, and far from the most important one. It is also the responsibility of the director of the plant, chief engineer, chief technologist, relevant officials of the ministries, heads of related enterprises.
      Banal situation - they did not finance in time the purchase of any equipment or equipment. Or did not contract. Or something else. Well, it happens ... But the launch date for the series has not been adjusted - what because of any nonsense to violate orders and substitute? Launched in a series of "workarounds" (manufacturing "hammer on the knee"), with the expected result in quality ...
      Guess three times, who will answer, uncle / aunt from the ministry or the management of the plant?
      1. +3
        29 May 2018 11: 04
        You know, but the T-44 in a year or two gathered EMNIP 1700 pcs. Moreover, they were able to put into production then, as never before in the world. The war taught. If in the post-war USSR during the 3 of the year they cannot master production and release a couple of thousand tanks, then, apparently, something with the tank is not right at the level of technology.

        Guess three times, who will answer, uncle / aunt from the ministry or the management of the plant?


        The key feature of the regime is that in any accident there were full names, and these full names are higher than the krivorukovy master in the workshop, after all, for the curved-armed master, at least his direct boss is responsible.
        1. +1
          29 May 2018 15: 17
          Quote: EvilLion
          If in the post-war USSR they cannot master production and release a couple of thousand tanks in 3 years, then, apparently, something is wrong with the tank at the technology level.

          During the war, the quality of tanks, and other weapons, was ersatz-level. Example. When reserves were advanced to Prokhorovka, tanks traveled about 200 km on their own. During this march, more than 20% of the tanks failed. After the war, quality requirements became completely different. Again for an example. During the Gulf War, the Syrian Panzer Division on the T-62 made a march of 500 km without a single lagging tank.
          By the way, the post-war tests of the T-44 revealed a significant discrepancy with the declared resource, i.e. quality below baseboard.
        2. 0
          29 May 2018 22: 07
          Quote: EvilLion
          The key feature of the regime is that in any accident there were full names, and these full names are higher

          You seem to have very strange ideas about that mode. Tell, if not difficult, who was responsible for the four-step, filters, nasal beam, etc.
    2. +1
      29 May 2018 11: 01
      Quote: EvilLion
      T-64 - a revolutionary tank, it is a fact, no one argues with this, even those who can’t stand it. But after the development of this tank, I had to immediately make a “simplified T-72,” well, expensive and complex for our elite units, and the T-72 for everyone else.

      So initially it was assumed that the new MBT will be in two versions - the “elite” T-64 (Kharkov) and the “simplified” T-64 (Tagil). Moreover, the simplified tank was also to be made on the basis of the T-64. That is, the tanks of the first and second lines had to be unified. The reason for this decision is finances: re-equipping the entire army with the "elite" T-64 economy would not stand it.
      But Tagil could not in the simplified T-64, but instead rolled out the future T-72. As well as financial calculations for the conversion of production to the production of the simplified T-64 - in case the T-72 is not accepted. The final figure was comparable to the construction of half of the new plant, and even it took several years. In general, Tagil did everything so that the T-72 was chosen as a simplified tank.
      1. +2
        29 May 2018 12: 10
        The very idea of ​​an "elite" tank in those conditions when the cords were not already developed was schizoid.
        Nevertheless, the inability of Nizhny Tagil to produce the T-64 clearly indicates the overwhelming complexity of the machine. Although I know that the Tagil tower, yes, did not master, and the T-64 tower turned out to be more shell-resistant at 10-15 percent, at the cost of all these difficulties. I did not hear about the rest of the elements so that they could not be mastered. Or they didn’t even try to master them, in view of the obviousness, what can be done easier, albeit with some loss of characteristics. AZ, it seems, was not made from the inability to copy the MOH.
        1. 0
          29 May 2018 12: 42
          Quote: EvilLion
          Nevertheless, the inability of Nizhny Tagil to produce T-64 clearly indicates the prohibitive complexity of the machine.

          Not only this. The Kharkov plant, for the production of motors, could not provide all the factories with its completely cheap products. Therefore, in Tagil, they decided to put a fully developed V-shaped diesel. Chassis T-64, after the tank was driven to landfills, began to fall apart: cracks appeared in the tank bottom at the places of attachment of the torsion eyelets. Therefore, they decided to put the chassis of their object 167 on their tank. The autoloader is from it. By the way, the object 167 (a tank with a 6-roller chassis and a gun loader) was ready for production much earlier than the T-64.
          1. 0
            29 May 2018 13: 28
            Quote: Bad_gr
            with 6 roller chassis

            Sorry, sealed up :(.
            In other words, six rollers per side.
        2. +1
          29 May 2018 14: 27
          Quote: EvilLion
          The very idea of ​​an "elite" tank in those conditions when the cords were not already developed was schizoid.

          A normal idea: groups of troops and the western districts on full tanks penetrate the defenses and fight with the same elite enemy formations. And after them comes the second echelon on simplified machines - he will have to deal with already off-hooked connections of the first line of the vendor and reserves. Moreover, the enemy also has a budget and economy, so in the second echelon and reserves it will have the equipment of the previous generation.
          1. 0
            29 May 2018 22: 04
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Moreover, the enemy also has a budget and economy, so in the second echelon and reserves it will have the equipment of the previous generation.

            Excuse me, but what is meant in relation to the 70th? M60 and M48?
      2. 0
        29 May 2018 16: 25
        Quote: Alexey RA
        In general, Tagil did everything so that the T-72 was chosen as a simplified tank.

        Well, not only Tagil. Kharkov also tried, the combined armor technology was hidden more from its competitors than from NATO.
        1. 0
          29 May 2018 20: 07
          Quote: Snakebyte
          Quote: Alexey RA
          In general, Tagil did everything so that the T-72 was chosen as a simplified tank.

          Well, not only Tagil. Kharkov also tried, the combined armor technology was hidden more from its competitors than from NATO.

          I don’t know how true this is, but during intense battles in the Donbass, information was repeatedly repeated that the T-64 side armor could not withstand large fragments of shells. Those. didn’t the armor go on board at all? Or armor without heat treatment?
          1. 0
            30 May 2018 07: 55
            Combined armor only in the frontal projection. So with all tanks, except, perhaps, "Almaty". The sides and sterns of modern tanks are quite thin.
            1. 0
              30 May 2018 21: 29
              Quote: Snakebyte
              Combined armor only in the frontal projection. So with all tanks, except, perhaps, "Almaty". The sides and sterns of modern tanks are quite thin.

              40mm armor will not penetrate any fragments. Well, besides the fragments of a shell of a battleship or a super-duper bomb. Yes, and that is unlikely.
        2. +1
          30 May 2018 18: 02
          Quote: Snakebyte
          Combined armor technology was hidden more from fellow competitors than from NATO.

          The tanks were protected by the Steel Research Institute. For all tank factories one office.
          As well as electronic stuffing, one enterprise was engaged. True, before the collapse of the USSR, Kharkov electronically tried to work with Lviv enterprises, but there was no result. And how much advanced stuffing to put in tanks was decided not by the designers, but at the top.
          1. 0
            31 May 2018 07: 54
            Quote: Bad_gr
            The tanks were protected by the Steel Research Institute. For all tank factories one office.

            However, the combined armor of the T-64 and T-72 is different.
      3. 0
        30 May 2018 16: 41
        In addition to the absence of a remote ZPU on the T-72, there were practically no simplifications affecting combat effectiveness.
        More "advanced" T-64 became later.
    3. +1
      29 May 2018 11: 26
      5TDF is by no means an overcomplicated design, it is in every way simpler than 12N360, and also the descendants of B2 too. It seems that his main problem (as a two-stroke) is to start up, and a low resource and low profitability are exclusively peacetime problems.
      As for the attitude to T34 / 85, for the Designer, the "cool guy" to this hastily, somehow corrected car, is completely understandable
      1. 0
        29 May 2018 12: 04
        Hastily, not hastily, but it’s already working like a clock, and the “armor” is full of holes without any problems.
        1. +1
          29 May 2018 12: 09
          you better indicate that it was good for the 44th year (except for mass production), not to mention the prospect
          1. +1
            29 May 2018 12: 58
            Unification with the t-34 and a whole line of self-propelled guns for a number of nodes, reliability, relatively low cost, the ability to fight with the main enemy tanks. Manstein in meamura noted that he did not really need tigers and panthers, but the failure to meet the timing of the offensive played a very important role.
            1. 0
              29 May 2018 14: 19
              your argument, rather, in favor of mass production, but having in the same 44 and t-44, it looks pale
          2. 0
            29 May 2018 14: 24
            In the 1943 in the summer, tank units lost up to 100% of their materiel per week. So mass was the only thing that mattered.
            1. 0
              29 May 2018 14: 34
              I dare to note that if it were the T-44, or the normally modernized T-34/76, then there wouldn’t be such crushing accounts, even with our usual "guiding" incompetence and general disorder
              1. +3
                29 May 2018 15: 49
                If we have incompetence, I’m even afraid to ask what then the Germans had if they had purged the war with a devastating result.

                And it would have helped the tank forces a slightly lower probability of losing the tank when they hit it (and the T-44 tower has the same 80-90 mm as the T-34-85, only the forehead was very well armored) if these tanks were originally less by a very significant percentage? Rather, on the contrary, a decrease in the number of trunks and, as a result, fire impact on the enemy would increase losses.

                And what crushing accounts did you see? The Germans purged near Kursk, it is a fact. And from this fact it follows that they suffered such losses that the balance of power after the operation became much worse for them than before it.
                1. 0
                  29 May 2018 18: 43
                  until May 45, about 21000 t-34/85 and 6000 Pz-V were produced. Even if they came to the finish line in a 2000/0 ratio, then taking into account our advancing troops, when the battlefield remained with the winner, this looks like a Pyrrhic victory
                  1. Alf
                    +1
                    29 May 2018 19: 01
                    Quote: prodi
                    until May 45, about 21000 t-34/85 and 6000 Pz-V were produced. Even if they came to the finish line in a 2000/0 ratio, then taking into account our advancing troops, when the battlefield remained with the winner, this looks like a Pyrrhic victory

                    In fact, the main adversary of our tanks was not the Tigers, Panthers, Four Ferdinands, but the German anti-tank artillery, which was very good.
                    1. 0
                      29 May 2018 19: 22
                      I’m losing and comparing
                  2. 0
                    30 May 2018 09: 50
                    And what's the point of comparing Panther and T-34/85 losses? It gives nothing at all. The T-34 was not Panther's classmate; her classmate was an IS-2. The T-34 was a massive cheap tank, on which everyone was lazy, in fact - a consumable. According to the memoirs of veterans, this is a constant cycle - materiel is knocked out - the remnants are transferred to neighbors, and themselves - to receive new tanks from echelons. And this approach was justified.
                    1. 0
                      30 May 2018 12: 52
                      original position: from a definitely good tank (even surpassing all German ones) at the beginning of the war to evolve into a massive cheap consumable, and even justified. So the losses of t-34/85 are greater and the losses of t-4, and even more than t-4 and t-5 combined
          3. +2
            29 May 2018 22: 03
            Quote: prodi
            you better indicate that it was good for the 44th year (except for mass production)

            Excuse me, what can be good in a 44-year-old tank WITHOUT mass production if it is not an IS-2?
            1. 0
              30 May 2018 07: 05
              and what, the answer is not obvious? The Germans somehow cost 6000 thousand (although they didn’t have enough), it took us three times as much. But in them someone else was also burning
              1. +1
                30 May 2018 07: 24
                Quote: prodi
                the answer is not obvious?

                Not obvious.
                Quote: prodi
                although they didn’t have enough

                Exactly. The winners had tanks (relative to the Panther) bad, but massive. Paper, I note, Panthers, the Iron Panthers had their own questions.
                Quote: prodi
                But in them someone else was also burning

                This is a much more interesting topic. In Sherman, for example, it was like centimeters, and people were burned much less (it seems, four times less per one lost car).
                1. 0
                  30 May 2018 08: 30
                  If not obvious, then lay out the American and English Shermans on these 6000 panthers
                  1. 0
                    30 May 2018 09: 38
                    Quote: prodi
                    If not obvious, then lay out on these 6000 panthers

                    That is why it is not obvious. That there are 6000 of them.
      2. +1
        29 May 2018 13: 41
        hi Yes, not really, and "with coolness (???)" smile ! A.A. Morozov personally (from the memoirs of his associates) designed the first version of a fully synchronized 5-speed gearbox for him ?!
      3. +1
        31 May 2018 11: 52
        The problem is not in the design of the 5TDF itself, but in the implementation of its installation on the chassis. The vast majority of problems are the complete disregard for the specifics of the operation of the tank of drugs for urgent service.
      4. 0
        31 May 2018 18: 32
        Have you tried to adjust the timing on it? This is a job for a jeweler, who can be counted on the fingers of the whole Ukrainian army. Factory mechanics coped, but the army and now can not.
        1. 0
          31 May 2018 21: 56
          and what on a two-stroke timing belt - 2 holes and a nozzle driven by a crankshaft?
          1. 0
            31 May 2018 22: 12
            Did you mean a two-stroke motorcycle engine? This diesel engine is a little different.
        2. 0
          1 June 2018 12: 16
          So the fact of the matter is that qualified personnel are required for complex work and very neat, clearly complying with all the instructions for the rest of the work. Even the T-80 turned out easier in this sense.
    4. 0
      29 May 2018 20: 00
      Quote: EvilLion
      turbines are not only gluttonous, but also prohibitively expensive)

      For memory. In Soviet times, the diesel engine of the T-72 tank cost 9000 rubles, and the gas turbine for the T-80 cost about 200.000 rubles, almost like the entire T-72.
      1. +2
        29 May 2018 20: 24
        Quote: Captain Pushkin
        In Soviet times, the diesel engine of the T-72 tank cost 9000 rubles, and the gas turbine for the T-80 cost about 200.000 rubles, almost like the entire T-72.

        I have other data:
        Late 80s
        cost of tanks
        T-80U - 824 thousand rubles,
        T-72B - 280 thousand rubles.
        ---------- Engines,
        T-80U - 104 thousand rubles,
        T-72B - 14 thousand rubles.
        -------- when selling abroad
        T-80 - 4 million dollars,
        T-90 - 2.7 million dollars
        1. 0
          1 June 2018 08: 42
          The price of education on weapons is not the same as on conventional equipment ... Su-35S (taking into account the fallen ruble) for the VKS - $ 25 million, for "their" - $ 50 million, for outsiders (to China, for example) - 70- $ 80 million. And still, out of competition, the modern F-16 and the new Grippen cost $ 100 million.
      2. Alf
        +1
        29 May 2018 20: 35
        Quote: Captain Pushkin
        Quote: EvilLion
        turbines are not only gluttonous, but also prohibitively expensive)

        For memory. In Soviet times, the diesel engine of the T-72 tank cost 9000 rubles, and the gas turbine for the T-80 cost about 200.000 rubles, almost like the entire T-72.

        The last minus is the cost, which reached 167000 rubles at the time of the appearance of the GTD-1000T and decreased to 104000 during mass production. Source: https://tanksdb.ru/t-80/
  7. +1
    29 May 2018 09: 15
    The genius of the chief designer is necessary, but the machine is developed according to the technical specifications. And to link the previous designs of the design bureaus, the experience of competitors and world tank building - the task of the chief designer. Morozov, in particular, was skeptical of Koshkin’s bloated genius. Morozov worked at KHB before Koshkin for at least 5 years and knew all the promising developments of the design bureau. Koshkin became the main after the predecessors were repressed. But the composition of the design bureau and its achievements have remained!
    1. +1
      29 May 2018 11: 01
      Quote: John22
      The genius of the chief designer is necessary, but the machine is developed according to the technical specifications.

      T-34 - the logical development of the line: Christie's tank - BT-2 - BT-7.
      In my opinion, the main “genius” in the T-34 is a constructively modernized reserve for increasing the mass of the tank (chassis, engine). Without this, he would hardly have survived in production until the end of the war. I would have sunk into oblivion like HF.
      Koshkin’s merit is that he accepted, confirmed and defended it.
      1. 0
        29 May 2018 14: 25
        Is IP aware that he has "sunk into oblivion"?
        1. 0
          29 May 2018 15: 03
          And what does IP have to do with it? What does it have to do with the T-34 or KV?
      2. +1
        29 May 2018 14: 39
        The T-34 was originally overloaded two front pairs of rollers. At T-34-85, overload was further enhanced.
        1. 0
          29 May 2018 15: 38
          Quote: John22
          The T-34 was originally overloaded two front pairs of rollers. At T-34-85, overload was further enhanced.

          T-34 from 1940 to 1944 was heavier by 6 tons.
          The war did not allow bringing the T-34 to mind. If it had begun in 1942, we would have already had the T-44 in service.
          1. Alf
            0
            29 May 2018 19: 03
            Quote: Captain Pushkin
            If it had begun in 1942, we would have already had the T-44 in service.

            Rather, the T-34M.
            1. 0
              30 May 2018 18: 38
              Quote: Alf
              Quote: Captain Pushkin
              If it had begun in 1942, we would have already had the T-44 in service.

              Rather, the T-34M.

              The developments on the re-arrangement of the T-34 with a turn of the diesel engine across the course began even before the war. With the outbreak of war, it went a long way.
          2. 0
            29 May 2018 21: 58
            Quote: Captain Pushkin
            To bring the T-34 to mind, the war did not allow

            This tank was adopted 1.5 years before the war, in December 39th.
            1. 0
              30 May 2018 18: 54
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              Quote: Captain Pushkin
              To bring the T-34 to mind, the war did not allow

              This tank was adopted 1.5 years before the war, in December 39th.

              For example, the T-54 was put into service in 1947, was produced for some time, then the release was suspended due to quality problems and resumed only in 1950, after fine-tuning and completion of production preparation for the main technologies.
              And this is in a relatively calm environment. And before the war there was a race. Worked day and night. With the appropriate number of flaws, omissions and errors.
      3. 0
        1 June 2018 08: 43
        And its design allowed later, without revolution, to come to the T-44, and then to the T-54/55
  8. +1
    29 May 2018 12: 44

    We honor, honor ... Not tank building, but continuous initiatives ...
  9. 0
    29 May 2018 12: 55
    Quote: Zaurbek
    Well, BO (tower, AZ, cannon and SLA) could be standardized in all three tanks ?!

    They also ran into the cost of the car, and the T-72 began to produce in a cheaper and simplified version the so-called "mobilization" version
    1. 0
      30 May 2018 16: 44
      It is a myth. The T-64 became "complex" later, after a dozen years. Then, on the T-64B version, he received the LMS and missiles.
  10. m T
    0
    29 May 2018 12: 55
    Quote: andrewkor
    they all came out of the cradle of the T-64

    But what about the object 167?
  11. +2
    29 May 2018 12: 58
    In fact, the T-64 as well as the T-10 did not have a qualitative growth due to the lack of experience in combat use. There were upgrades and improvements, but they could not radically improve the machines. And the T-54/62/72 have been modernized and are still being modernized, adapting to new theater and customers.
    The fact that the "simple export" T-72 was exported and was familiar to half of the world went to him only in plus in the 90s. Russia was able to offer fresh modifications to this machine, which in fact were no longer inferior to the T-64 or T-80. But the T-64 was not familiar to anyone as a brand, no one knew how it would behave in the jungle or in the sands. And there was no reason for Iraq or India to take a pig in a bag in the form of sixty-fours, when there was positive experience in operating the T-72.
    1. +1
      29 May 2018 14: 28
      M-62Т2 with 13 MJ muzzle energy - this is so garbage, not growth. Rostik. Just by the 1970s, the issues of protecting even heavy tanks were considered failed, the ATGMs began to be addressed, and the T-10 would not do anything without a composite. And so he served 20 years, at that time it was normal.
  12. m T
    0
    29 May 2018 13: 00
    Quote: Captain Pushkin
    genius in the T-34

    The genius of the T-34 is that around the middle of the war it became simple and reliable like a hammer.
    And of course, excellent maneuverability for close combat
    1. +1
      29 May 2018 15: 38
      But with a weak reservation in the frontal projection.
      1. Alf
        +1
        29 May 2018 19: 07
        Quote: John22
        But with a weak reservation in the frontal projection.

        Compared to whom? The T-34 tank is MEDIUM and must be compared with the same MEDIUM panzerwaffe tank, i.e. T-4. And they pierced each other's forehead equally.
        1. 0
          29 May 2018 21: 53
          Quote: Alf
          Compared to whom?

          With the enemy’s PT.
          Quote: Alf
          it must be compared with the same MEDIUM panzerwaffe tank, i.e. T-4.

          Yeah. On the one hand, it was necessary to keep the ZiS-3 and 53-k, on the other hand, the Rak 40 / Kwk 40. This is not the same thing. For the same reason, for example, Sherman in 45 was a bulletproof booking tank in Europe, and a prototype anti-ballistic tank for maintenance.
          Quote: Alf
          And they pierced each other’s foreheads equally

          Late four with 80mm forehead and 48klb gun against T-34/76? No, not equivalent. Against T-34/85 yes, that's normal.
          Quote: m T
          around the middle of the war he became simple and reliable like a hammer.

          He was never simple; he became reliable in the Korean War. In 42 to 44 years, its reliability improved from catastrophic to acceptable.
    2. 0
      30 May 2018 09: 25
      "The genius of the T-34 is that around the middle of the war it became simple and reliable" ///

      Simple for mass production. He became reliable after the war, when
      there was time to debug it.
      The T-34-76 was very problematic in reliability, with a terrible gearbox
      and lack of filters. These shortcomings were eliminated in T-34-85 (plus, he became
      5-seater with a comfortable roomy tower).
      A serious drawback of the T-34-85 until the very end of his long career
      there was a weak reservation of the forehead of the case - 45 mm.
  13. m T
    0
    29 May 2018 13: 01
    Quote: andrewkor
    cradle T-64

    But what about the object 167?
  14. +3
    29 May 2018 17: 24
    Unfortunately, even the participant in the creation of Russian armored vehicles supports myths and makes factual errors.
    Firstly, the T-34 was created on the instructions of the Red Army. It was created on the basis of the Dick project. The version that the T-34 was created at the initiative of Koshkin is the MIF.
    Secondly, the Kirov Plant was engaged in the T-28 medium tank, the T-35 built the KhPZ. By the way, the T-28 at the time of its creation formally falls under the definition of the main tank.
    Thirdly, Kotin went to the idea of ​​a main tank by increasing the mobility of a heavy tank, which was largely achieved in the post-war experimental tanks.
  15. +1
    30 May 2018 09: 05
    In Israel, the Soviet tank school is estimated as follows:
    T-54 scolded for the complete lack of comfort for the crew
    and weak armor. English 105 mm Centurion gun pierced
    their cumm. projectile to any place.
    But the entire series of tanks from T-52 to T-72 is praised for its excellent strong chassis
    and reliable engine.
    The peak of Soviet tank construction is considered the T-62. 115 mm gun
    with OBPS made a strong impression. They were afraid that it would strengthen the armor,
    and then he will become truly dangerous.
    The T-72 disappointed: the armor was hardly reinforced. AZ did not make an impression.
    They were seriously afraid of deliveries to the Arab countries of the T-64 and especially the T-80.
    1. 0
      30 May 2018 15: 25
      They were seriously afraid of deliveries to the Arab countries of the T-64 and especially the T-80.


      As if the ubiquitous sand did not become a very big problem for the engines of these tanks. Especially for gas turbine engines T-80. And how high temperatures would affect engine reliability is another question.
    2. +1
      1 June 2018 08: 47
      T-72 was in the "export" version. And T-62 d - underestimated so, his career was knocked down by senior comrades. With a good SLA and BOPSOM 115 mm gun, and now it would be relevant.
  16. 0
    31 May 2018 15: 55
    Quote: Zaurbek
    The USSR had certain technological and technical difficulties ... for example, there was no tank diesel more powerful, no machine tools. The Germans, for example, did the Messer halves at different plants and docked and their spare parts fit all combat aircraft ... In the USSR, when were they able to do this? On Mi-24 / 35, cabin lights, for example, are still unique for each side.


    At the same time, immediately producing 3 type MBT of the USSR created even more difficulties.
    1. +1
      1 June 2018 08: 49
      Then each plant produced only what it could. And each one had Red Directors who fought for their project. From an economic point of view, it was cheaper to produce only the T-80 and it was easier to upgrade it later. Than 3 options do.
      1. +1
        3 June 2018 15: 37
        Quote: Zaurbek
        Then each plant produced only what it could. And each one had Red Directors who fought for their project. From an economic point of view, it was cheaper to produce only the T-80 and it was easier to upgrade it later. Than 3 options do.


        Rather, each plant produces what the local and Moscow mafia managed to push from the defense industry. Even in the most difficult initial period of the Second World War, T-34 tanks were produced simultaneously at several plants. The T-80 gas turbine engine was very expensive.
        1. 0
          3 June 2018 16: 36
          And here is the mafia and the defense industry of the social country? Believe me, one madele of the tank in service (even the T-80) was cheaper than the whole zoo. We still don’t touch the cars on which tank chassis were used (there is also a mess)
          1. 0
            3 June 2018 17: 17
            Quote: Zaurbek
            And here is the mafia and the defense industry of the social country? Believe me, one madele of the tank in service (even the T-80) was cheaper than the whole zoo. We still don’t touch the cars on which tank chassis were used (there is also a mess)


            This mafia squandered huge funds. Things were roughly the same in the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy with the Air Force. And at the expense of adopting one model of MBT, then I just completely agree.
  17. 0
    2 June 2018 05: 37
    Dear Yuri! 115 mm caliber unitary shots. Separate loading in caliber 125 mm.
    1. +2
      2 June 2018 07: 14
      The T-115 tank had unitary 62mm, and the T-64 tank of the first version had separate loading, and then the T-64 tank was rearmed with a 125mm caliber gun.
  18. +1
    20 June 2018 10: 19
    Read. Everything is entertaining. But .......... The most important thing was not said. So far, why? Because it ends in U. And in life, the main thing is that it was possible to displace the engine not longitudinally to the axis of the machine, but perpendicularly — reduce the dimensions of the engine compartment and shift the tower to the center of the structure .. Well, there side gearboxes, planetary gearboxes are clearly new. And then there was the development of new tools, which allowed the tower to fit in itself .. And off we go. The main thing is the location of the engine, which reduced the MTO to a minimum size.
    1. 0
      24 June 2018 07: 47
      Perpendicular to the axis of motion, the engine was put on the T-44.
      1. 0
        24 June 2018 11: 45
        Well, the gun and everything else ?? .Type itself came running and climbed into the tower. ?? Years and decades pass by. And so it happened. 55-62 and 64 Just instead of 115 mm smooth-bore, came up with 125 smooth-bore. and automatic loader. So the T-64 tank with their 5TDF diesel engine turned out. And then they realized - they froze the bullshit and at the Uralvagonzavod they stuck in a B-12, modernized with supercharging, and got another T72 automatic loader. Well, it’s clear, modernization is different. Running. Surveillance, aiming. and others. Vsezh quite davolno. From good to better.

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