Military Review

Reflections on the effectiveness of the Japanese mid-caliber artillery in Tsushima. H. 2

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In the previous article we talked about the effectiveness of the impact of medium-caliber artillery on Russian warships in the Tsushima battle. To do this, using the statistics of the January 27 and 28 July 1904 battles, we attempted to calculate the number of hits on the ships of the Russian squadron in Tsushima. Unfortunately, without a description of the damage caused by 152-203-mm caliber shells in cases known to us, the article was not complete.


But first, it is necessary to determine the criteria for the effectiveness of artillery impact: we say “serious damage”, or “crucial damage”, “drop in combat capability”, but what is it? We will proceed from the fact that seriously reduces the combat capability of the ship:

1. The destruction or disabling (difficulty of action) of guns caliber 152-mm and more. It is well known that artillery caliber 75 mm and less did not play any significant role in the sea battles of the Russian-Japanese war, unless it is a question of fights of very small ships, like the 350-ton destroyers, but also there to achieve a noticeable effect many hits were required;

2. Disabling the fire control system;

3. Damage that leads to the ingress of water into the ship and caused a strong roll or trim;

4. Damage that reduces the speed of the ship or disables its steering, or otherwise impedes the control of the ship.

As for fires, the fire itself does not, however, give a significant decrease in the ship’s combat capability, and we will take them into account only if it led to the consequences listed above — that is, disabled artillery, reduced speed, and .d

The total number of shells of medium-caliber artillery that hit Russian battleships during the 27 battle of January 1904 g is relatively small (only four hits, the rest went to the cruisers), which does not give us a representative sample. Another thing is the battle in the Yellow Sea, which took place on July 28 1904. The statistics on hitting the Russian ships here is good because it can be considered very reliable - as is known, not a single battleship V.K. Witgefta was not killed in the battle and was not captured, so our sailors and engineers had enough time to study the damage to their ships upon their return to Port Arthur.

Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich"



A total of Tsesarevich received 26 hits, of which 14 - heavy shells (11-305-mm, 2-254-305-mm and one - 254 mm) and 12 - medium and small-caliber artillery (1-203-mm, 6-mm, 152-5-152-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX mm -XNUMX-mm, and XNUMX - an unspecified caliber, which we decided to take for XNUMX-mm). What damage did they do?

Neither artillery nor fire control devices received significant damage. One 305-mm and one 305-mm projectile hit the nose turret of the 254-mm guns. The tower did not receive any significant damage and remained in service. The bow and stern 152-mm turret of the starboard received one projectile of unknown caliber (152-mm?). Serious damage was not, except in the nose tower from the blow tore the mount of the horizontal resistor.

The fire control system was not disabled.

The battleship received 9 hull hit with shells of various sizes. The most significant was the strike of an 305-mm projectile in an armored belt into the bow of the battleship (starboard, in front of the nose tower of the main caliber). The armor did not pierce the shell, but it slid down along it and exploded in front of the unarmoured skin. The holes did not form, but the seams of the casing were separated, as a result of which the ship took 153 tons of water, a roll formed in 3 degrees, which later had to be corrected by counter-flooding. The remaining hits did not cause significant damage.

An 305-mm armor-piercing projectile hit the conning tower, though not all. He fell short, ricocheted from the surface of the water, and then the fuse (bottom) worked, so that only the head part flew to the conning tower, but even that was enough to destroy the machine telegraph, intercom pipes, steering wheel, compass - as a result the ship at the time lost controllability. A 305-mm shell hit the navigational wheelhouse and destroyed the command personnel of the Russian squadron. Another projectile of the same caliber, which landed in the foremast, led to the fact that it held “on parole” and could collapse at any moment (one of the most important reasons that the battleship did not go to Vladivostok).

Three hits of the ship’s 305-mm projectiles, although they didn’t cause any problems in battle, seriously reduced the thrust, increasing coal consumption to such an extent that a breakthrough into Vladivostok without replenishing its reserves became impossible.

Thus, serious damage caused 7 large-caliber shells from 14-ing. At the same time, a dozen mid-caliber hits (2 - to medium-caliber towers, one - to the fore-mast, the rest - to the hull and superstructure of the battleship) did not cause the ship significant damage. The only serious damage that could be attributed to the impact of medium-caliber projectiles was that the fire tank was damaged by fragments, causing water to leak into the bow of the ship, which caused management difficulties as the battleship became worse at the helm. But the problem is that no source indicates a projectile, the fragments of which caused this damage.

Squadron battleship Retvizan



Got 23 hits, including 6 large-caliber projectiles (5-305-mm, 1-254-305-mm), four - srednekalibernymi (1-203-mm and 3-152-mm) and 13 shells of unknown caliber ( hereinafter referred to as caliber artillery).

An 305-mm projectile hit the nose tower caused a fire in it (due to impeccable calculation actions, it was immediately extinguished), but the electrical actuators did not act anymore, and the tower itself was stuck. Another projectile of the same caliber landed in the lower aft casemate of 152-mm guns - the guns did not receive damage, but the control devices for its firing were out of order.
Large-caliber (305-mm, according to other data - 254-305-mm) projectile landed in 51 mm armor plates in the bow, in the area of ​​the hospital. The armor was not pierced, but lost its integrity (cracks) and pressed into the hull. As a result, water began to flow into the battleship (which was aggravated by the lack of drainage facilities in the affected compartment), the battleship received a trim on the nose.

Thus, of the six large-caliber projectiles caught in the ship, significant damage was caused by three. Seventeen medium- and small-caliber projectiles, which fell predominantly into the superstructures (but also into the pipes, masts, one 203-mm into the hull) of the battleship, did not cause Retvisan significant damage.

Squadron battleship "Victory"



Received 11 hits, including 4-305-mm, 4-152-mm and 3 of an unidentified caliber.

The only hit that had a significant effect on the ship’s combat capability happened in the first phase of the battle, when the 305-mm projectile hit the 229-mm armor plate under the nose casemates of the 152-mm guns. The projectile knocked out a cork in armor approximately the size of 356 on 406 mm, but in general it did not pass inside (only the head part was found in the ship), however, as a result of this impact the lower coal pit was flooded and three more compartments.

I must say that another 305-mm projectile landed in the starboard, destroyed the cabins of the conductors, and the hole was flooded with water. However, the constant pumping of water by pumps led to the fact that the water in the hull "did not linger" and did not entail any consequences for the ship - accordingly, we have no reason to consider this damage serious.

Of the seven hits of small and medium-caliber artillery, five fell into the corps, one into the chimney, and one more — no description. Four 152-mm projectiles knocked out 3 75-mm guns, but we agreed not to consider such damage significant. From the statements of eyewitnesses, we can assume that there were other hits of projectiles of various calibers in the onboard armor of the Pobeda (that is, more shells hit the ship than the 11), but they did not cause any damage to the ship.

Thus, one of the four 305-mm projectiles hit the ship was damaged by one, out of seven small and medium caliber ones - not one.

Squadron battleship Peresvet



The Japanese have 35 hit the ship. In armadillo got 13 large-caliber projectiles, including 11-305-mm 1-254-305-mm 1-254-mm and 22 shells of smaller caliber (1-203-mm 10-152-mm 1 -76-m and 10-uninstalled caliber).

Two projectiles (305-mm and 254-305-mm) hit the main-caliber nose turret, causing heavy damage to it and jamming it. The tower retained limited combat capability — the guns retained the ability to occasionally shoot, but the tower itself was practically unable to rotate. Another 305-mm projectile got into 102 mm armor, did not pierce it, but the lifting mechanisms of the 152-mm gun in the 3 casemay failed due to shaking. One 305-mm projectile fell under the average dungeon, causing the 152-mm gun to be jammed (two more 75-mm guns were disabled).

The 305-mm caliber projectile hit the foremast above the navigator's felling, and apart from other (not very significant) damage, the Barr and Stroude range finder was damaged.

Two 305-mm projectiles hit the bow of the battleship on either side of the bulkhead. Fortunately, the bulkhead itself miraculously remained undamaged, and kept the flow of water from the closest entrance to the stem (so we will not consider it significant). However, the second projectile led to serious flooding of the residential deck, as well as water ingress into the turret section, the nose mine devices and the dynamo machines. From more serious consequences the ship was saved by an intensive struggle for survivability. Another 305-mm projectile (apparently - armor-piercing), landed an armor plate in 229 mm, chipped off its part, pressed inside 6,6 cm, while the shirt behind the armor was crushed and destroyed, the edge of the armor plate was broken off. Through this hole, Peresvet received 160 tons of water, which had to be “straightened” by counter-flooding. In addition, two unspecified projectile (178-152-mm) caliber hit the 254 mm section of the armored belt, did not pierce the armor, but caused damage to the shirt and plating behind the stove - however, this did not cause significant flooding, so we ignore these hits.

2 305-mm projectile and three projectile caliber 120-152 mm got into the pipes of the battleship. In general, the Peresvet pipes were seriously damaged, causing an increased consumption of coal, and the reason for this was damage caused by 305-mm projectiles of the ship’s second and third pipes. However, modern researchers (V. Polomoshnov) suggest that they were still hit by 203-mm projectiles, because the nature of the damage (heavily damaged outer casing with a much less affected internal) is characteristic of 203-mm projectiles. Such injuries were inflicted by 203-mm shells of the armored cruisers of Kamimura to the pipes of the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment, but for the Tsesarevich pipes it was typical of the opposite - high-explosive 305-mm shells made huge holes, approximately equal in area, in both the outer and inner shells.

With all the weight of such an argument, we still cannot accept it - yet Russian sailors, who had the opportunity after the battle to get acquainted with the nature of the damage, came to the conclusion that this is exactly 305-mm caliber. In addition, the author of this article may provide a logical explanation for such an incident. The fact is that the Japanese in large quantities in their shells of large-caliber guns changed the English fuses to "instantaneous" fuses of their own design (Ichjuin), which ensured the explosion of the projectile at the moment of contact with the armor, without any slowdown. Including this innovation has touched and armor-piercing shells (probably not all, but still). That is, theoretically, 305-mm armor-piercing projectiles with reduced explosive content (which, by the way, did not differ much in the mass of explosives from high-explosive 203-mm projectiles), but with "instantaneous" fuses, could theoretically get into the pipes, but caused known similarity of damage.

The mid-caliber artillery, again, has not achieved success. One projectile of unknown caliber fell into the aft tower, and another one - in the dungeon, but it did not damage the artillery. The bulk of the shells hit the hull (12 hits), but the only noticeable damage to the battleship was the massive failure of 75-mm guns not protected by armor - and that was all. Three more medium-caliber projectile hit the pipe (without causing serious damage), two - in the mast and three (of unknown caliber) - in bridges.

Thus, from 13 large-caliber shells 7 caused significant damage to the ship, and from 22 small-and medium-caliber shells did not cause serious damage to any.

I would especially like to note that we consider only hits during the day battle with X. Togo’s squadron, therefore damage to one 254-mm Peresvet gun with a direct hit by a Japanese destroyer’s 57-mm projectile during the night attack is not taken into account - and in any case case, it would refer to the effectiveness of small-caliber, rather than medium-caliber artillery.

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol"



Twenty-one hits, including 10 - 305 mm, one - 152-mm and 10 - an unidentified caliber.

One 305-mm projectile hit the 127 mm armor belt and did not pierce it, but the electric equipment of the right aft tower failed due to shaking, as a result of which the ammunition had to be supplied manually. A shell of unknown caliber shot down the range finder from the bridge.

One 305-mm projectile, hitting an 368 mm armor belt, pressed the slab inside, causing two corridors to be flooded and opened to flow in a place previously damaged by the Peresvet ram. Another high-explosive projectile of unknown caliber, having fallen into the casing of the aft pipe, interrupted the vapor pipes in the aft stoker, which caused the squadron battleship to drop to 8 nodes for some time.

Thus, from 10 305-mm shells, 2 and 2 from 11 other hits seriously damaged the ship. The remaining 7 shells of unknown caliber fell into the ship's hull, one into the mast and one 152-mm shell was found unexploded in the boat, they did not cause any special damage to the ship's combat capability.

Squadron battleship "Poltava"



The ship had 24 hits, including 16 large-caliber projectiles (15-305-mm and 1-254-mm), as well as 4-152-mm projectile and 8 projectiles of unknown caliber.

Two 305-mm rounds hit the unarmored side of the 152-mm guns under the right nose turret and stuck it. The range finder was damaged by splinters, but, unfortunately, it is not indicated what fragments of the projectile caused this damage, and judging by the description of the hits, both 305-mm and medium-caliber shells can claim this.

An 305-mm round projectile hit the stern, an unarmored side below the waterline. The premises of dry provisions were flooded, water also flowed into the steering compartment. The latter’s drains were drained by the crew’s labor, but they still had to use counter-flooding, taking water into one of the bow compartments. Two 305-mm shells struck an unarmored side just above the waterline, almost at the same place (aft lower officers' office), as a result of which a huge hole of approximately 6,5 per 2 meter was formed on board the ship and it began to overwhelm with water. Battleship received trim aft.

The fragment from the projectile hit through the light hatch of the engine room directly into the bearing of the left-side machine, which led to a drop in the speed of the battleship. However, it is not known where this fragment came from - the description of the corresponding hit of the projectile in the sources does not contain. In other words, it is completely unknown where this fragment could have come from - it could be from both large caliber and medium caliber shells.

Thus, from 16 large-caliber shells 5 caused serious damage, in addition, perhaps one of them was removed range finder. Twelve hits of medium-and small-caliber shells did not lead to anything, although perhaps the range finder still brought out the fragments of one of them. Plus to this, one fragment of the projectile unaccounted for in these calculations damaged the bearing in the car.

Summing up, we can state the following. Of the 63 large-caliber shells hit the squadron battleships of the 1 th Pacific Squadron, significant, significant damage inflicted 25 shells. Of the 81 projectile which fell into them with a caliber of 203 and below, only 2 inflicted similar damage. In addition, there are two serious damage (breaking by fire tank fragments on the "Cesarevich" and failure of the range finder on the "Poltava") caused by fragments of projectiles, the caliber of which we do not know. And there is still no one from who took the fragment, which damaged the car of "Poltava".

Thus, the true effectiveness of large-caliber and medium-caliber Japanese shells in the 28 June 1904 day battle, depending on where to distribute the controversial and unknown damage, is in between:

1. From 64 large-caliber shells, 28 from 81 small and medium-caliber - 2 caused significant damage;

2. From 63 large-caliber projectile significant damage inflicted 25 from 82 small and medium caliber - 5.

Thus, we see that even with the most favorable assumptions in favor of medium caliber artillery, its impact on large warships in the battle in the Yellow Sea is very small - from 30 hits that caused serious damage, the average caliber accounts for all 5 or less 17%. The probability of causing serious damage to the 254-305-mm projectile hit was 39,7-43,8%, and the average caliber projectile - only 2,5-6,1%.

“But what about the fires? After all, there was no mention of them, ”the respected reader will ask. Unfortunately, we have nothing to answer, because there is no description of at least one fire, which would have serious consequences for the squadron battleship. You do not need to think that the battleships of the 1 Pacific Pacific Squadron did not burn - for example, the squadron battleship Sevastopol recorded the presence of 7 fires during the battle. However, none of them produced any significant drop in combat capability.

We now turn to the squadron battleship "Eagle".



Perhaps the most difficult thing is determining the number of hits to the ship. There are quite a few sources in which they are cited, but the reliability of any of them inspires certain doubts.

Let's start with Vladimir Polievktovich Kostenko, who reported 42-305-mm and 100 152-203-mm hits, not counting the fragments and shells of small-caliber artillery. The numbers are obviously very high. Official Japanese historiography reports hit 12-305-mm projectiles, 7-203-mm and 20-152-mm, but the text clearly indicates that only part of the hits is indicated, not the total number of hits. Of great interest are the data of N. J. Campbell, who, based on the information of the British and German attaches, as well as on the many photographs available to him, came to the conclusion that 5-305-mm, 2-254-mm were in the "Eagle" , 9-203-mm, 39-152-mm shells. But still his data is incomplete - in his work he could not rely on Russian sources, and this is also very valuable information.

According to the author of this article, A. Danilov did an excellent analytical work in his article “Damage to the battleship Eagle in the Tsushima battle”. He brought together the data of known sources and concluded that horrible 11 projectiles caliber 254-305-mm Russian battleship, 3 203-305-mm, 10-203-m, 7 152-203-mm, 20-152-m and 12 - 76-152-mm. However, it should be understood that this is not the final result and other data can be obtained later. At the same time, it is impossible not to note the peculiarities of Japanese historiography, which managed to unleash fog even in such a relatively simple matter.

Well, now consider the most interesting - damage squadron battleship "Eagle". We will analyze them on the basis of descriptions of an eyewitness of the Tsushima battle of the captain 2 rank K.L. Shwede (Report to the Main Marine Headquarters of the Senior Officer of the squadron battleship Orel, February 1 1906, No. 195), comparing them with the “The battle of Tsu-Shima” data by NJ Campbell. Let's start with the artillery.

The bow of the 305-mm tower - serious damage caused by the projectile 203-305-mm.

From the report of K.L. Schwede: “12 inch. projectile trapped in the barrel of the left nasal 12 inch. guns, beat off a piece of the barrel foot on the 8 from the muzzle and threw it on the upper nasal bridge, where they killed three people lower. ranks and jammed him upright ... ... When hit 12 inch. projectile in the muzzle of the left 12 inch. nose gun - right 12 inches. the nose gun remained intact, only the right gun charger failed. They began to give charges to the surviving left charger. and shells thaw. "

According to NJ Campbell, the projectile was 203-mm, not 305-mm.

The aft 305-mm turret - severe damage caused by an 203-mm projectile or more.

From the report of K.L. Shwede: “A large-caliber projectile that has fallen into the stern of armor over the embrasure of the left 12 inches. the stern gun distorted the embrasure frame and, pushing the armor over the gun, limited the angle of elevation of the gun, so that the gun could only act on the 30 cable. ”

According to N. J. Campbell: “Part of the roof of the aft 12" turret above the left gun port was pushed inside by the 8 "projectile, limiting the angle of elevation of the gun."

Left 152-mm Nasal Tower - 203-305-mm projectile is disabled.

From the report of K.L. Schwede: "In the left nasal 6 inch. the tower was 3 falling 6 inches. shells; the tower continued to operate properly, "but then:" 6 inches. the left nose tower was completely destroyed, in it the left gun frame burst. At the bottom was dented serrated shoulder strap and broken gear; in the propellant supply compartment, the rollers of the tower pressed on one side, a coherent ring burst on the left side, and a plate of armor of the vertical table went off on the same side. Almost all bolts were torn off the thread. The upper part of the plates was supported by two bolts, the roof of the tower was raised above the embrasures, the caps were torn off the bolts. The main destruction was caused by an 12 inch. shell, trapped in the lower part of the armor rotating part of the tower. Total was in the tower 4 or 5 hits. 12 inch. the shell that destroyed the 6 inch. Nasal left turret, destroyed the paramedic's cabin in the upper deck and broke through the upper armored deck with a thickness of 1 1 / 16 inch. ”

According to NJ Campbell, the projectile that hit the turret failed 203-mm, not 305-mm.

The left middle 152-mm turret is serious damage caused by a 203-305-mm projectile.

From the report of K.L. Schwede: “Into the average 6 inch. The left turret hit two 6 inches. projectile; the first hit the vertical armor, but did not pierce it, exploded without harm to the tower; the second burst on the roof of the tower. Splinters that flew through the neck for throwing out the sleeves and through the commander's cap, seriously wounded the turret sergeant and 2's lower. chips - one deadly. The shatters smashed the mechanism for opening the door of the tower from the inside. Projectile 8 inch. or a large caliber, caught in the vertical armor of the table, ricocheted into a light board, at break it turned it, thus limiting the angle of fire of the tower in the stern of the beam. "

N. J. Campbell does not describe this damage (this does not mean that it did not exist, it’s just that the author described only a few, which seemed to him the most important damage).

The left aft 152-mm turret - serious damage caused by a projectile of unknown caliber, most likely, 203-305-mm.

From the report of K.L. Schwede: “guidance correctly, one gun is wedged with a segmental projectile due to a fragment that hit the barrel. Another weapon was completely dug up with fragments, which made it afraid to shoot from it. ”

N. J. Campbell does not describe this damage.

In principle, the projectile could be of any caliber, but there is a nuance - K.L. Shwede talks about a segmented projectile, and this is most likely 305-mm. At the same time, an 203-mm projectile exploded near the left stern tower - perhaps it was his fragments that damaged the guns.

The right nasal 152-mm tower could act only manually, the wires and motor windings were burned out. Serious damage caused by fragments of projectile of unknown caliber.

From the report of K.L. Schwede: “At this time, at the beginning of the starboard fire, there was a fire in the right nasal 6 inch. the tower commanded by leith. Girs The fire was caused by the ignition of cartridges in the fenders, which were ignited by a hot splinter that flew into the tower through the opening in the roof for throwing out the sleeves. All the servants of the tower out of order. "

According to NJ Campbell, the damage is caused by splinters, the caliber of the projectile is not specified.

The right middle 152-mm turret - serious damage caused by a caliber projectile - 203-305-mm.

From the report of K.L. Schwede: “it fixed vertical manual guidance, since the wires and motor windings were burned out, the elevators were fixed and cleaned, the broken chains were connected. The tower could not rotate, because a large-caliber projectile jammed it on the traverse and did not have time to chop off the mamerinets ”.

According to NJ Campbell, the projectile was 203-mm.

The right aft 152-mm turret - the guns are intact, but the turret itself is wedged. Serious damage caused by 305-mm projectile.

From the report of K.L. Shwede: “In mamerinets and in vertical armor of the right aft 6-inch. turret, horrible two 6 inch. projectile. The second projectile of the tower was wedged outside in the mamerinets, but the tower commander - Michman Bubnov with the servant of the tower, came out of it, cleared the mamerine, which was stuck with a stuck shell fragment. "

At the same time, K.L. The Swede does not describe the impact, finally jammed the tower, only confirms the fact of its failure.

According to NJ Campbell, the projectile was 305-mm.

Fire control system - disabled, serious damage caused by an 203-mm projectile.

From the report of K.L. Shwede: “There were three hits of 6 inch in the conning tower. shells below the slot, without causing harm. Splinters fell down the cabin continuously from the torn shells nearby. A lot of fragments flew through the slot, especially small ones that fell down standing in the wheelhouse. The 8-inch projectile, ricocheting from the water, hit the left side of the shell in the slot of the wheelhouse. The rupture of the Barr and Stroude ruptured, ruptured the combat signposts and crushed many negotiation tubes, damaged the compass and steering wheel with a rupture of the projectile and its fragments. ”

N. J. Campbell does not describe this damage.

In terms of other damage sustained by the battleship "Eagle", as a serious matter, one hit of an 305-mm projectile into the lower armor of the left side in the aft 305-mm turret can be distinguished. The 145-mm armored sheet was not pierced, but it shifted and water began to flow into the ship's hull. Shortly after this hit, the ship received a roll of 6 degrees, which had to be straightened by counter-flooding. There were other hits that displaced the armor plates or made a hole not too high from the waterline, but there is no information that either led to serious flooding and roll or trim, so they are not counted as serious damage.

On the "Eagle" 30 fires were recorded, two of them - in the towers of medium caliber were considered by us as serious damage. The rest: two - in the battery 75-mm guns, one each in the fore and aft ends, the rest - in the superstructures and on the deck, they did not cause a significant reduction in combat capability.

In general, we see that the statistics on the "Eagle" is very confused. We counted all 10 damage, which significantly affected the combat capability of the squadron battleship. But the caliber of the projectiles that caused them was more or less reliably determined in only three cases out of ten - two 305-mm (damage to the hull and the right aft 152-mm turret) and one 203-mm (disabled by the FCM). Of the remaining 7, 6 damage was caused by 203-305-mm projectiles, and one (fire in the right nose tower) was caused by a projectile, in general, of any caliber.

According to the author of this article, it is impossible to draw any reliable conclusions based on such vague data. And all the more it makes no sense to analyze hits in the dead ships of the 2 Pacific Pacific Squadron - we know even less about them than about the Eagle.

At the same time, some conclusions can still be made. It is noteworthy that in a battle in the Yellow Sea absolutely all the essential damage that was caused, or could have caused the shells of medium caliber artillery, relate exclusively to unarmored units. On the squadron battleship Sevastopol, the range finder was damaged and one fragment fell into the car through a pipe. Another disabled rangefinder, a shrapnel hit the car through the skylight on the battleship "Poltava") and splinter damage to the fresh water tank on the Revizan may be the result of medium-caliber missile hits (but it is possible that large-caliber missiles). At the same time, only one case (fragments that caused a fire in the right nasal 152-mm turret) on the Orel could cause 152-mm projectile to cause serious damage (at least theoretically) - all other damages are caused by at least 203- mm artillery. Also noteworthy are the numerous hits of 152 shells into the armored parts of the Eagle (three direct hits on the left nasal 152-mm turret and conning tower), which caused absolutely no damage, and the same was observed on the 1 ships Pacific Squadron.

In accordance with the foregoing, we can state that in battles of squadron battleships of the Russo-Japanese War, weapons of caliber 152-mm and less were practically useless, and the 203-mm guns may have had limited utility. But the final verdict in their respect can be made only after the appearance of reliable descriptions of damage squadron battleship "Eagle".
Author:
Articles from this series:
Reflections on the effectiveness of Japanese mid-caliber artillery in Tsushima
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  1. Cat
    Cat 3 June 2018 05: 59 New
    +8
    Dear Andrey, I take off my hat, for the sequel I’m ready to give my head !!!!!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      3 June 2018 14: 36 New
      +2
      Thank you, dear Vladislav!
  2. Comrade
    Comrade 3 June 2018 06: 33 New
    +6
    The only serious damage that can be attributed to the impact of medium-caliber shells is that the fire tank was damaged by fragments, which caused water to leak into the bow of the ship

    The fragments that damaged the fire tank were from one of the three 12 '' shells that fell into the chimneys.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      3 June 2018 14: 17 New
      +3
      Thank you, dear Valentine!
  3. Romario_Argo
    Romario_Argo 3 June 2018 07: 05 New
    +5
    in childhood, the book "Tsushima" by Novikov-Priboy, was re-read three times in a choke ...
    - treacherous war
    1. Cat
      Cat 3 June 2018 07: 26 New
      +6
      Many of our generation began to experience the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. from Novikov-Priboy and his Tsushima! Next was V. Pikul with the Cruisers and .........
      I remember there was a series of matches where the ships of the Russian Imperial Navy were printed on the boxes. Moreover, I recall all this happened in the 80s of the last century!
      I still regret that I did not keep my collections of match stickers. I close my eyes and recall black and white drawings on a blue background: Oslyabya, Retvisan, Peresvet, Borodino.
      1. Moore
        Moore 3 June 2018 09: 08 New
        +4
        Quote: Kotischa
        Many of our generation began to experience the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. from Novikov-Priboy and his Tsushima! Next was V. Pikul with the Cruisers and .........
        .

        Next came A. Stepanov with “Port Arthur” and A. Sergeev with “The Guardian” ... Pikul is much later.hi
        1. unknown
          unknown 3 June 2018 11: 22 New
          +1
          And it all started with Port Arthur. In the home library was a book published in 1947. Thanks to grandfather and grandmother, a teacher of Russian language and literature.
      2. avt
        avt 3 June 2018 16: 06 New
        +3
        Quote: Kotischa
        Then went V. Pikul with the Cruisers and.

        In general, it’s like someone, but followed by ,, On the "Eagle" in Tsushima "Kostenko 1955 year of publication.
        1. grandson of a sailor.
          grandson of a sailor. 3 June 2018 20: 28 New
          0
          A beautiful book equipped with diagrams and photos of hits and written by a PROFESSIONAL. It’s a pity it’s not possible to find it now, but in the early 60s it was in all libraries. Grandfather's favorite songs were "VARIAG" and "Cold waves are splashing." grandfather was a sailor in 1908 drafted. He served in HELSINGFORS as his grandmother’s brother also drafted in 1908. He died in the civilian war on the Southern Front in 1920. The Baltics !.
        2. Comrade
          Comrade 4 June 2018 05: 00 New
          +1
          Quote: avt
          In general, it’s like someone, but followed by ,, On the "Eagle" in Tsushima "Kostenko 1955 year of publication.

          The book was well published, not like later, in 1968. I remember how perplexed my friend and I were looking at these photos from the book.

          They took “Retvisan”, retouched the middle pipe and signed “Eagle”, “Svetlana” painted a tower, and “Nakhimov” and Navarin got it without comment.
      3. Normal ok
        Normal ok 3 June 2018 21: 03 New
        +1
        Quote: Kotischa
        Many of our generation began to experience the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. from Novikov-Priboy and his Tsushima! Next was V. Pikul with the Cruisers and .........

        Exactly. But despite the actual superficiality of these works, they educated us to serve the motherland.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      3 June 2018 14: 20 New
      +3
      Quote: Romario_Argo
      in childhood, the book "Tsushima" by Novikov-Priboy, was re-read three times in a choke ...

      Wow, probably everyone started with it :))) I actually had this handbook.
      1. Snakebyte
        Snakebyte 4 June 2018 09: 06 New
        +2
        I guess I'm the one who started with Melnikov ("Rurik" was the first ").
  4. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 3 June 2018 09: 00 New
    +8
    A definite plus! hi
    The realization that 152mm artillery in the main forces battle is virtually useless came with an increase in battle distances. If, at the end of the 19th century, the probability of the battleship’s failure by taking into account its unprotected extremities with 6 "shells at the expense of rate of fire was taken into account, and even then at probable predicted distances of 20-25 kabeltovy, when accuracy depends almost exclusively on gunners (German types Kaiser Barbarossa and Wittelsbach as a typical example of this approach), with increasing combat distances the number of SK hits decreases due to the lack of acceptable fire control, therefore the mass destruction of unarmored extremities is already excluded. It would be easy to get into the ship. Americans from their SK 203mm (“Iowa”, “Indiana”, “Kirsaji”) is considered an exception due to the lack of acceptable artillery systems of the Civil Code at that time. This is a kind of necessity for them.
    You have perfectly shown on the analysis of damage to ships in the REV that capital artillery is also necessary to disable a capital ship. Therefore, the appearance of the latter before the dreadnought of the EDB “Radetzky”, “Lord Nelson”, Satsuma, “Danton” (and our “imperials” can also be attributed there) is already an example of a revision of the concepts of using weapons of linear ships after analyzing the RPE
    The frequent mention of the 254 mm caliber among the likely shells in the Yellow Sea battle in all Russian battleships suggests the gunner from the bow of the bow of the cruiser "Kasuga", which was the only carrier of one gun of this caliber in the main forces of the Japanese fleet. It’s clear that these are only assumptions, but it would be interesting to know who the cruiser was shooting in in that battle (and under Tsushima), so that the percentage of hits of one gun at the enemy does not differ from the generally accepted on the basis of analyzes of the entire Japanese fleet.
    Article again chic plus hi
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 3 June 2018 09: 35 New
      +2
      This damned ten-inch does not give me rest either. One single weapon, gave about the same number of hits as eight of ours on “Relight” with “Victory”.
      1. anzar
        anzar 3 June 2018 10: 54 New
        0
        ..this damned ten-inch rest does not.

        laughing But uv. Andrew (here) wrote:
        At the same time, one cannot fail to note the peculiarities of Japanese historiography, which managed to blow fog even in such a relatively simple matter.

        Our freaks are no less. As you can see the definition of the caliber of the projectile is not always reliable
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 3 June 2018 11: 14 New
          +1
          Quote: anzar
          But uv. Andrew (here) wrote:
          At the same time, one cannot fail to note the peculiarities of Japanese historiography, which managed to blow fog even in such a relatively simple matter.

          I know wink Therefore, if ours, for any of our battleships, allow 254mm rounds to hit, then the only answer to these tolerances is the ship’s logbook of the cruiser "Kasuga" with instructions on the time according to which the fire was fired ...
          I think the Japanese with magazines will not be tricky hi
          It is necessary to ask Valentin (Comrade) - maybe he knows what? what
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            3 June 2018 14: 22 New
            +2
            Quote: Rurikovich
            It is necessary to ask Valentin (Comrade) - maybe he knows what?

            Yes, only respected Valentine can answer this question. hi
          2. Comrade
            Comrade 3 June 2018 16: 53 New
            +5
            Quote: Rurikovich
            if ours, for any of their battleships, allow 254mm shells to hit, then the only answer to these tolerances is the ship’s magazine Kasuga cruiser with instructions on the time according to which the fire was fired ... I think the Japanese will not be tricky with magazines

            They will not, dear Andrei, but they will simply keep it secret. For example, the diary of Mikas, what was before Tsushima is on the Internet, and later it is no longer there. What they still hide there, I can’t imagine.
            Similarly, the consumption of shells in Tsushima. Everything is according to Tsushima but Togo squad.
            As for the 10 '' Kassugi’s guns, that is, the report of the cruiser’s commander, and there’s the Chronicle, there may be indications of the purposes for which the ship fired. The report most likely shows the time of hits and the target that received the projectile.
            Alas, the reports are not easy to read, because it is not printed in the printing house, but written by hand, and the recognition program does not always understand.
            By the way, here is a fragment of the report of the commander of the "Mikasa", on the drawing on top of the 1-th fighting detachment, followed by "Yakumo" at a decent distance. Bottom ours rise. Four battleships, “Sevastopol” and “Poltava” lagged behind strongly, they are not on the diagram.
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 3 June 2018 19: 10 New
              +2
              Quote: Comrade
              Alas, the reports are not easy to read, because it is not printed in the printing house, but written by hand, and the recognition program does not always understand.

              Sorry, of course !!!!!!!! belay
              It would be nice to have someone with knowledge of Japanese attract what
              The information is awesome. The targets that Kasuga shot would have removed some of the issues in terms of identifying the hits of 254mm shells ...
              And it’s strange to secret data over a century ago request
              Thank you, Valentine, for the answer hi
              1. yehat
                yehat 3 June 2018 22: 37 New
                +1
                strange to secret data more than a century ago

                but don’t tell
                the peace concluded between Japan and RI was fraudulent, because the neutral party that served the negotiations was not at all neutral and there was a direct conspiracy with Japan. Thus, the Russian side was misled and the results of this agreement can be challenged as fraudulent. But it is precisely on the basis of this treaty that the Japanese of the island are now demanding.

                With the sale of Alaska, too, everything is far from clean.
                And the history of 3 purely Russian cities in the USA, Australia and Africa - this was the territory of Russia. Why isn’t it right now?

                The opening of archives is a huge base for revisionism, which could lead to what Germany did after the FDA. This is not just reading - it is the most powerful motivational sources that can turn society around more than once.
                And there are a lot of such things in history, that's why they are secret.
                1. Rurikovich
                  Rurikovich 4 June 2018 06: 26 New
                  +1
                  Quote: yehat
                  And there are a lot of such things in history, that's why they are secret.

                  Well, in our case, the matter concerns ship's magazines, and specifically a certain period of time in them. Because how they can influence revenge - request hi
                  1. yehat
                    yehat 4 June 2018 09: 25 New
                    +1
                    I, too, for radically removing the vultures of secrecy
                    not all of course, but much more than now.
                    maybe not immediately, but gradually, but we have too much of a secret.
                    This process is painful, but otherwise only worse.
                    What kind of society is this that is afraid of its history?
                2. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 4 June 2018 09: 59 New
                  +1
                  3 purely Russian cities in the USA, Australia and Africa

                  And more?
                  1. yehat
                    yehat 4 June 2018 12: 18 New
                    +1
                    I talked about Fort Ross in America, Sagalla in Africa and 2 small towns on the northern coast of Avsralia, one of which Queensland, was formed spontaneously after the defeat of the Republic of Ingushetia in the war with Japan and the associated mass emigration.

                    And also Port Arthur, Dalniy, Kenai, Sitka, Tartu, left-bank Ukraine
                    1. Senior seaman
                      Senior seaman 4 June 2018 15: 44 New
                      +1
                      Four Ross is actually a small village, probably even a farm, and I'll see the rest.
                      Thank you.
                      P.S. if you remember China, then Harbin was the most Russian ...
                  2. Artem Popov
                    Artem Popov 4 June 2018 18: 07 New
                    0
                    the cuckoo at the uncle goes.
                    in the Western world there is no revisionism for a long time, radicals do not count .. CrimeaNash is 100% revisionism.
                    1. yehat
                      yehat 4 June 2018 18: 51 New
                      +3
                      you yourself are a cuckoo or just a provocateur
                      revisionism has not gone anywhere. The United States has been doing just that for 20 years now - destroying what Stalin created after the war in Europe.
                      But the great Baltic empires are not revisionism now carried away?
                      And a recent question about the status of Catalonia - is it not revisionism?
                      But raising the question of Gibraltar's ownership of England is not revisionism?
                      And the constant Japanese raids on the islands - not revisionism?
                      And the claims of Poland and not only to the Russian Federation, but also to Germany-not revisionism?
                      And the attempts of the French to regain Libya - not revisionism?
                      1. Artem Popov
                        Artem Popov 7 June 2018 12: 57 New
                        +1
                        None of them are engaged in the "return of the lost old."

                        The Baltic States are completely satisfied with the current borders.

                        Catalonia is separatism, we have rolled Chechnya into rubble for this, compare how it is decided in Spain

                        Gibraltar was captured by England FOR ONE HUNDRED FIFTY YEARS before Russia captured Crimea, all of Russia at that time (1704) was only a handful of the current central regions. Maybe we need to return to those borders?

                        The Kuril Islands, Stalin captured in contravention with all previous agreements. Later, Stalin occupied Poland, putting a pocket government there instead of the legitimate one being evacuated, then terminated the peace treaty with Turkey (!) And demanded from it western Armenia and control over the straits. This was precisely the beginning of the Cold War — the aggressive policy of the USSR.

                        Poland cannot have any claims against Germany - the present western Poland is actually German lands.

                        France, Libya fuck did not give up. You are simply used to projecting your imperial mentality on everyone else. Cool off, most of the world has long had different values. Of course, there are countries with revisionist sentiments in power: Turkey, Greece, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and judging the same Poland for the statements of some small-town patriotic nationalists who dream of oriental armchairs and RP of the 0th century is how to judge Russian politics by saying Note Duma clowns Fedorov and Zhirinovsky.
      2. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 5 June 2018 13: 31 New
        0
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        This damned ten-inch does not give me rest either. One single weapon, gave about the same number of hits as eight of ours on “Relight” with “Victory”.


        This is only an assumption - it is very difficult to distinguish the results of the hit of 10 and 8 shells.

        In addition, inspection after the battle was considered in + shells of a larger caliber, if it was reliably impossible to establish the caliber. It is much more “pleasant” to indicate in the report that the ship withstood a greater number of 12 "hits.
        Already wrote:
        began to describe the circles under Arthur’s batteries, until the “Sevastopol” drove into the side of the “Poltava”. Only the happiness of the battleship saved from death. “Sevastopol” indirectly crushed the scoop of the right underwater vehicle, where a mine was planted. The drummer bent, and there would have been a few capsules — it would have been blown up, followed by a mine, there would be little left of our stern. Nevertheless, the ram of Sevastopol crushed our side, a crack formed, and two sections of the side corridors were filled with water. The deputy wrote in his report that Poltava received a 12-dm shell in the underwater part, we didn’t receive the shell, it was the work of Sevastopol. So the history of war is written.


        Historical archives sometimes convey inaccurate information - for various reasons.
        Including reckoning an "unidentified" projectile as a larger one.
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 5 June 2018 14: 29 New
          +1
          This is only an assumption - it is very difficult to distinguish the results of the hit of 10 and 8 shells.

          Hmm ... the first two times heavier than the second. Rather, 10 is "mixed up with 12" (there is an assumption that it was with the Russians).
          And as for the case of Sevastopol and Poltava, why not write to Evgeny Ivanovich that the fleet has forgotten how to maneuver under his command?
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 14: 08 New
            0
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            And as for the case of Sevastopol and Poltava, why not write to Evgeny Ivanovich that the fleet has forgotten how to maneuver under his command?


            But rather, he never knew how to maneuver
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 6 June 2018 15: 06 New
              0
              Well, according to Lutonin, under Skrydlov he knew how to ...
            2. AK64
              AK64 1 July 2018 13: 22 New
              0
              Quote: DimerVladimer
              Quote: Senior Sailor
              And as for the case of Sevastopol and Poltava, why not write to Evgeny Ivanovich that the fleet has forgotten how to maneuver under his command?


              But rather, he never knew how to maneuver

              He could. He knew how to do it.
              In essence, Witte (the half-Sakhalin count) is guilty, for a long time he persuaded the tsar to reduce funding for the military and naval ministries. Persuaded for a long time, and still cut funding just before the war.

              PS: IMHO, Witte was a British agent. The Porsmus Peace Treaty was the last straw after which it was finally kicked out.
    2. Nehist
      Nehist 3 June 2018 10: 41 New
      +3
      Greetings !!! So no one thought then about increasing the distance of the battle! After all, just 6 years before the REV at Santiago de Cuba, the medium-caliber artillery exhausted the Spanish Armored cruisers, and 10 years before the Yala, the Japanese cruiser seriously damaged the Chinese squadron. It is possible to talk about the effectiveness of the medium-caliber artillery on the EDB; it makes sense if the combat distance was 15-20 cable ...
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 3 June 2018 11: 05 New
        +3
        Quote: Nehist
        Greetings !!!

        Mutually hi
        Quote: Nehist
        After all, just 6 years before the REV at Santiago de Cuba, the medium-caliber artillery mopped up the Spanish Armored Cruisers

        In fact of the matter! The battlefield at Santiago averaged 2,5 miles (20-25 cable), decreasing to a kilometer. as I said, the artillery of American armadillos in unbalanced towers was more like ballast (only 2 shells in 12 "from Aova" hit the Spanish ships), because all the relatively large shells were 203mm - and this is like the medium caliber of the American armadillos and the main one “Brooklyn.” It was they who destroyed the Spanish cruisers, because at these distances of almost direct shot - 2-3 km - the average artillery is quite effective.
        Quote: Nehist
        It is possible to talk about the effectiveness of the medium-caliber artillery on the EDB; it makes sense if the combat distance was 15-20 cable ...

        Based on the experience of these two battles, then yes. I absolutely agree with you. yes It is due to the relatively small combat distances due to the rate of fire that medium-caliber EDB damage is possible.
        1. Alexandra
          Alexandra 4 June 2018 02: 25 New
          +1
          The artillery battle at Tsushima and differed from the battle in the Yellow Sea (in addition to the actual results) in that the average distance of "fire contact" was less.

          However, the author set himself the task of proving that under Tsushima only big guns won, which he tried to do in two parts.

          For this, the author, in particular, wrote down all 8 "guns of Japanese armored cruisers in the" big guns ", and in two parts of his story tried to prove that the hits of 6" Japanese high-explosive shells did not cause significant damage ... even if, for example, they fell into a 25 mm armored roof 6 "towers of the Russian battleship.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            4 June 2018 10: 47 New
            +2
            Quote: AlexanderA
            For this, the author, in particular, recorded in the "big guns" all 8 "guns of Japanese armored cruisers

            Alexander, be careful - 203 mm are taken into account in my average caliber.
            Quote: AlexanderA
            even if, for example, a 25 "turret of a Russian armadillo’s tower fell into a 6 mm armored roof.

            No question, bring a specific ship and a specific hit :)))
            Quote: AlexanderA
            The artillery battle at Tsushima and differed from the battle in the Yellow Sea (in addition to the actual results) in that the average distance of "fire contact" was less.

            It is sad.
            Alexander, what does the distance influence? The first is the number of shells fired. But here the author does not need to fantasize, because there is data on the consumption of shells. The second is accuracy. And here the author increases the accuracy of the shooting of Japanese commandos by 25% relative to the one that was - not in the battle during the BM, but in the battle on January 27!
            But this is not enough for you either :)))))) But you should not forget that if the distances in Tsushima were less, then the excitement is much stronger, which could not but affect the accuracy
            1. Alexandra
              Alexandra 5 June 2018 02: 20 New
              +2
              Alexander, be careful - 203 mm are taken into account in my average caliber.


              Then you probably agree that according to Campbell the overwhelming part of the tower artillery and devices in the conning tower of the "Eagle" were disabled by medium-caliber shells? Or not?

              No question, bring a specific ship and a specific hit :)))


              So the “Eagle” is the same, middle 6 “left-side tower.” Two 6-inch shells hit the left middle 6-inch tower. The first shell hit the vertical armor of the table without causing harm, the second exploded on the roof. His fragments through the neck for ejecting cartridges penetrated the inside of the tower, wounded the tower foreman and two people on the pitch. Shards broke the door opening mechanism inside the tower. The exit to the roof remained through the neck or into the cellar through the elevator.

              A shell of at least 10-inch caliber ricocheted from the turret’s armor to a thin side behind the turret and turned the casing so that it turned outward, making it impossible for the turret to turn into the stern from the beam. "

              Speaking of the left aft 6 "turret, segment shell, and your thoughts on:

              "... The Swede is talking about a segmented projectile, and that is most likely 305 mm."

              In fact, it was a splinter flown into the bore and its own 6 "segment projectile.

              “A reflected fragment, which was not seen when loading, flew into the barrel of a 6-inch left turret aft gun. The gun was loaded with a 6-inch segmented projectile at the time of the reflection of the mine attack on the Suvorov. The projectile did not reach the spot and jammed so "that the shutter couldn’t be closed. It was not possible to discharge the gun, and as a result it failed."

              As you know, such inattention on your part greatly depreciates your reasoning about how large-caliber shells the "Orla" tower artillery was disabled.

              Alexander, what does the distance influence? The first is the number of shells fired. But here the author does not need to fantasize, because there is data on the consumption of shells. The second is accuracy. And here the author increases the accuracy of the shooting of Japanese commandos by 25% relative to the one that was - not in the battle during the BM, but in the battle on January 27! But this is not enough for you :))))))


              I actually talked about the fact that the distances at which most of the time an artillery battle was fought in the Yellow Sea and under Tsushima. Under Tsushima, Togo chose the battle distance that would make the most use of the capabilities of the medium-caliber artillery of his ships. By the way, he chose the distance at which the accuracy of the range finders “Barra and Stroda” FA3 was sufficient that would not particularly bother shooting. Of large-caliber guns, the Japanese under Tsushima continued to fire “rarely and accurately,” and medium-caliber guns created a density of fire previously unseen by our sailors and the frequency of hits per unit time.

              From this there is such a striking difference in the scale of fires and the scale of failure due to combat artillery damage on Russian battleships at Tsushima and in the battle on July 28, 1904.

              However, of course, there may be other explanations for the fact that in the battle on July 28, 1904, even the most damaged Russian battleships continued to operate most of the artillery, while the "Prince Suvorov" was fired from the Japanese destroyers drowned from a single 75 mm gun, and on " Orel "after the Tsushima battle:

              “The right gun could still operate in the 12-inch bow tower using the left-hand charger and manual feed. On the starboard side, the bow 6-inch Girs tower remained in service, into which personnel were transferred from the left destroyed Slavinsky tower. The middle 6-inch tower left out of order, the noriya was clogged with shells, the wiring burned out, the turret jammed in the mamerinets. The aft 6-inch tower of Bubnov could fire using vertical guidance manually. The aft 12-inch tower, despite several hits in it, worked correctly, but the left gun had limited elevation angle (not more than 30 cable) due to the roof concave above the cannon. Conductor Rastorguev controlled the tower ... Of the twenty-47-millimeter cannons, by replacing parts taken from broken cannons, five cannons were prepared for action on the nose bridge, by four of them with aft ... Of the twenty 75-mm guns, 10 were destroyed: the fore and aft casemates, four guns in total, and in a battery of twelve two guns were knocked out on the port side. "

              For example, such an explanation that only large-caliber 10 "and 12" shells of four Japanese armadillos and the cruiser "Kasuga" did all this, and the numerous hits of medium-caliber Japanese shells had little effect on the outcome of the Tsushima battle.

              And apparently, someone would even believe in this explanation, not knowing that in the battle on July 28, 1904, about the same 10 "and 12" shells hit the Russian battleships as during the Tsushima battle.
        2. Oleg Fudin
          Oleg Fudin 19 August 2018 18: 28 New
          0
          And how does the distance of the battle affect the damage caused by a HE shell (which the Japanese fired)?
      2. yehat
        yehat 4 June 2018 13: 00 New
        +1
        They thought about increasing the distance, only even the English had to put the average caliber on the dreadnoughts, because he was in demand.
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 4 June 2018 15: 47 New
          +1
          In fact, the average caliber on the dreadnoughts was carried away not by the Angles, but by the Germans. The former simply grew PMK from 76 on the Dreadnought to 102 on subsequent ones and so on. And the sausages set and 88 and 152.
    3. avt
      avt 3 June 2018 11: 46 New
      +2
      Quote: Rurikovich
      A definite plus!

      goodEven if only illustrations would remain! bully
      But the final verdict in their regard can be made only after the appearance of reliable descriptions of the damage to the squadron battleship "Eagle".
      what Kostenko is not an authority?
      In accordance with the foregoing, we can state that in battles of squadron battleships of the Russian-Japanese war, guns with a caliber of 152 mm or less were practically useless,
      Well, something like, “elephant on an elephant” - yes. Otherwise, the Dreadnought just didn’t appear. Actually, to simplify, the medium caliber was somewhat compensated by the loading mechanisms of the main caliber. in Russia on ,, CatherineSecond "- ,, Sinope", another thing - neither technically, nor actually engineering thought then to "Dreadnought" did not reach. request
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        3 June 2018 14: 23 New
        +5
        Quote: avt
        Kostenko is not an authority?

        Nope :)))))
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 3 June 2018 19: 15 New
        +1
        Quote: avt
        And so, well, the bigger guns are important, we understood back in Russia at ,, EkaterinaSekunda "- ,, Sinope",

        EMNIP, enta series of armadillos was built for operations in the Bosphorus in order to have maximum fire in the bow sector in the narrowness of the strait. With the same success, the forerunner of the “Dreadnought” can be considered the German “Brandenburg” with its albeit multi-caliber, but still six guns of the Civil Code.
        1. anzar
          anzar 4 June 2018 11: 17 New
          0
          With the same success, the forerunner of the Dreadnought can be considered the German Brandenburg ...

          Why not count? SK no, GK 280mm, full belt ... bully Eto then the Germans were carried away by fashion trends about the "rapid-fire SK as the main" (240mm and a lot of 150mm)
  5. Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 3 June 2018 09: 33 New
    +1
    Wonderful analysis.
  6. anzar
    anzar 3 June 2018 09: 57 New
    +4
    Very good analysis, dear Andrei, ***. According to the controversial hit calibers (203-305mm) in Orel, there is probably an opportunity to clarify this by examining who is currently shooting at the ship. After all, most of the time the battleships of the 1st combat detachment fired at the flagship (Suvorov, then A3 and Borodino). For most of the time, the brig. cruisers.
    Conclusions on the worthlessness of the SK in the Yellow Sea are somewhat unnecessary, because there the distances are beyond his control, and the prerequisite for his effectiveness (even for unarmored ships) is the mass of hits.
    In accordance with the foregoing, we can state that in battles of squadron battleships of the Russian-Japanese war, guns with a caliber of 152 mm or less were almost useless.

    Of course, because these armadillos were created with the idea of ​​counteracting the IC (high-explosive reservation). But there are exceptions, Tsushima :))), as a rare combination of circumstances and errors bully
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 3 June 2018 10: 51 New
      +1
      Quote: anzar
      Of course, because these armadillos were created with the idea of ​​counteracting the IC (high-explosive reservation).

      ? what
      Um ... Ships against obviously high-explosive shells will have as much as possible reserved area of ​​minimum permissible armor. Typical examples are our EDB type “Emperor Paul I” and the cruiser “Rurik”, which is the second, plus booking “Sevastopol” also basically met these requirements.
      And the battleships that were designed before the REV were supposed to be able to protect the vital parts of the ship — machine-boiler rooms and the ammunition cellar — from shells of the probable enemy’s civilian shells. because they were overwhelmingly citadel armadillos with the most thick armor in the central part. Already closer to the REV, they began to armor the hull closer to the extremities, albeit with thinner armor, trying to somehow minimize the possible damage from at least part of the missiles hit. We will not forget that the ship is a balanced thing, and in any case, in the allotted framework, you will have to sacrifice certain qualities for the sake of others based on the concept of using this ship and its probable opponents
      Therefore, to say that the battleships defended themselves exclusively from high-explosive shells - No.
      1. anzar
        anzar 3 June 2018 11: 17 New
        0
        Because argue that armadillos defended themselves only from high-explosive shells

        Where did you see such a word? Nothing of this "claimed." This is what you added. Just the progress of the armor made it possible, while protecting the "vital parts", to allocate weight for the thin high-explosive armoring of the extremities, since it was the fast-firing SK that aimed at them. And here is why doing this, the same caliber on the new EBRs was saved, probably the inertia of thinking.
        ... plus booking Sevastopol also basically met these requirements.

        Yeah, "Tsushima syndrome" (only in Russia), but they did not think that their "vital parts" were not sufficiently protected, and then they installed it with new shells. The Japanese also continued with 9 "belts. But the French had previously increased the thickness (due to the concept of short distances) - Cesarevich - 250mm, his contemporaries of the Republic - 280mm!
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 3 June 2018 11: 23 New
          +1
          Quote: anzar
          Where did you see such a word? Nothing of this "claimed."

          Sorry - yesterday's beer still affects hi
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      3 June 2018 14: 27 New
      +1
      Quote: anzar
      According to the controversial hit calibers (203-305mm) in Orel, there is probably an opportunity to clarify this by examining who is currently shooting at the ship.

      This is to be firmly convinced that the time of hits is given exactly crying
      Quote: anzar
      Conclusions on the worthlessness of the SC in the Yellow Sea are somewhat superfluous, because there are extraordinary distances for him

      In general, no, not beyond. The second phase all went at distances from 17-40 kbt, in the first phase they also often converged at the distances available for the average caliber. The number of shells fired confirms
  7. prodi
    prodi 3 June 2018 12: 01 New
    +1
    Nevertheless, I would like to understand: why it was impossible to use the medium caliber to adjust the main fire? The main problem, it seems, is in the downward trajectory of the projectile (unfortunately, and the most important at long distances). To shift the speed and mass of a smaller caliber into the mass and drag of a larger one seems to be not a simple but possible task, because the speed will not matter
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      3 June 2018 14: 28 New
      +2
      Quote: prodi
      Nevertheless, I would like to understand: why it was impossible to use the medium caliber to adjust the main fire?

      Actually, they were shooting just from the middle, shooting mainly when the cover began
      1. prodi
        prodi 3 June 2018 14: 30 New
        0
        why was everything so bad?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          3 June 2018 14: 37 New
          +1
          Quote: prodi
          why was everything so bad?

          What is wrong?:)))
          1. prodi
            prodi 3 June 2018 14: 38 New
            0
            Yes, there were few!
            1. Navigator_50
              Navigator_50 4 June 2018 15: 23 New
              +1
              Do you answer briefly or in detail?
              Briefly: the area of ​​the dispersion ellipse of shells of Russian guns was approximately three times greater than the area of ​​dispersion of shells of Japanese guns ...
              Moreover, during the Tsushima battle, this value changed upward (worse)
              1. Senior seaman
                Senior seaman 4 June 2018 15: 48 New
                +1
                I apologize, but the question is really interesting ... where did the firewood come from, that is, the data?
                1. Navigator_50
                  Navigator_50 4 June 2018 17: 07 New
                  +1
                  This data is based on a study of the materials of the commission of inquiry ...
                  only outlined in modern language.
                  Calculations are carried out evaluatively according to modern rules (late 20th century).
                  Therefore, the tragedy of Tsushima occurred and still hurts.
                  1. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 4 June 2018 17: 34 New
                    0
                    Is there a link?
                    1. Navigator_50
                      Navigator_50 5 June 2018 04: 15 New
                      0
                      Excuse me...
                      Do you think that there is a short document, by reading which and assuring the competence of the persons who approved it, you can finish the topic?
                      There are enough links to the testimony of the commission of inquiry ..
                      It is necessary to understand and be able to appreciate what is read.
                      Simply, the level of applied sciences in stability, seaworthiness and unsinkability and survivability was in its infancy in 1900.
                      On modern ships are complexes that allow you to assess the condition of the vessel (ship) in real time .. however, like the true coordinates of the place, which does not surprise anyone.
                      The question is complex and requires knowledge and experience in several areas, including the calculation of static and dynamic stability, methods of struggle for survivability on a ship (ship or submarine), the theory of errors and probability ...
                      If you consistently expound what was and is required now .. then there will be a treatise of several volumes.
                      My interest was personal - two grandfathers participated in the REV, one naval, the other land ...
                      Both were captured. Well, something like this.
                      Best regards
                      1. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 5 June 2018 14: 36 New
                        0
                        Colleague, I'm sorry, but I did not ask you for a short document there, or a folio the size of a house.
                        I wonder where such information comes from, that
                        the area of ​​the dispersion ellipse of shells of Russian guns was approximately three times greater than the area of ​​dispersion of shells of Japanese guns ...

                        because this statement seems doubtful. If our shots were fired from the weapons of the 1867 mod ... and then not three times!
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                4 June 2018 19: 59 New
                +3
                Quote: Shturman_50
                Briefly: the area of ​​the dispersion ellipse of shells of Russian guns was approximately three times greater than the area of ​​dispersion of shells of Japanese guns ..

                Sorry, but this is basically impossible. Technically.
                1. Navigator_50
                  Navigator_50 5 June 2018 03: 57 New
                  +1
                  It is not.
                  "Tsushima" looks at you in bewilderment ...
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    5 June 2018 15: 17 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Shturman_50
                    It is not.

                    I apologize, but it is so. I am silent at the same time that a larger ellipse of dispersion at a distance of the EWE era can occur only with high munition stability and that in this case (no matter how absurd it may sound at first glance) a gun with a longer dispersion ellipse shoots more accurately. In other words, your claim that an increased dispersion ellipse leads to less accuracy is initially incorrect
              3. Nehist
                Nehist 5 June 2018 04: 44 New
                +1
                Quote: Shturman_50
                Briefly: the area of ​​the dispersion ellipse of shells of Russian guns was approximately three times greater than the area of ​​dispersion of shells of Japanese guns ...

                What is it like? With similar ballistic characteristics, it’s like not three, and considering the initial speed of Russians 6 "is almost 100m / s more, the dispersion ellipse in Japanese 6" is more
                1. DimerVladimer
                  DimerVladimer 5 June 2018 13: 54 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Nehist
                  What is it like? With similar ballistic characteristics, it’s like not three, and considering the initial speed of Russians 6 "is almost 100m / s more, the dispersion ellipse in Japanese 6" is more


                  There were problems with the quality of 6 "shells in Port Arthur:

                  During these same days a new, very sad and alarming circumstance became clear.
                  During the usual night shooting at the Japanese destroyers, one of the 6 inches suddenly fell silent.
                  -- What? Didn’t look again? Again the charge disintegrated? the commander shouted angrily, seeing that the gun was being unloaded from the muzzle.
                  - No, not a charge! - the plutong commander responded irritably from the deck. -- Much worse! The shell does not climb into place! ..
                  It turns out that when hastily sending ammunition to Port Arthur, which was in danger of being cut off from the north, some consignments of shells were sent either not calibrated at all, or only partly calibrated (a certain percentage of the total).
                  Of course, senders could refer to Art. 527. Maritime Regulations, according to which an artillery officer, "in case of disagreement of the items with the approved samples, suspends reception and reports to the commander"; of course, an artillery officer could indicate physical impossibility, the absence of any means, and most importantly, time, for a thorough verification of the military stocks taken from port warehouses to replenish the expended ones; Of course, the head of the Arthurian warehouses could rightly point out that he didn’t take shells from the factory, but from the central departments, that he also had neither time nor means to calibrate them ... In a word, as always, all were guilty, that is, no one, but the fact remained a fact.
                  Our artillery officer was extremely concerned about this discovery. The shells were taken by us as they were consumed and placed in the cellars on empty seats. It now turned out to be impossible to make out exactly which ones remained from the receptions before the war, which ones were adopted again. It was impossible to check the entire contents of the cellars under wartime conditions immediately, but only gradually, unloading shells in small batches ... It took time, but did we know how much time was at our disposal? - It depended on the intentions of the enemy ...
                  I don’t know whether due to careless calibration or simply due to the bad quality of the metal, it turned out that our cast-iron shells (the cheapest, and therefore very numerous in the combat kit) often crack when they take off from the gun’s barrel ... When the fire is fired at the Japanese destroyers Since the Gilyak had to be sent close past our place (the cruiser on duty), then in the mornings we often found fragments of his cast-iron shells on the deck.
                  In addition to the danger to the neighbors, such a projectile, having split in the muzzle itself, could put the gun out of action, and therefore the order followed: "Use practical (that is, half) charges when firing with cast-iron shells."
                  A sad decision in the sense of using all the power of their artillery, but alas! - inevitable ...
                  Semenov Payback.
                  1. Navigator_50
                    Navigator_50 5 June 2018 18: 15 New
                    0
                    Since several participants are at a loss at once, I propose to evaluate the following model:
                    - two identical guns fire with the same parameters of the sight ...
                    it is clear that the result will be the same (ellipse area).
                    - What if one of the guns has a base that is unstable? Will the site have periodic vibrations around the longitudinal and transverse axis?
                    ....
                    On the persistence of the trajectory of the shells can be discussed when shooting "direct fire - 10-15 kbt. For long distances you need a larger rear sight and the angle of elevation of the barrel to 12-15 degrees.
                    ....
                    If there are additional fluctuations in the platform of the gun, then neither the commandos nor the flagart in 1905 can see them and take them into account ...
                    Best regards
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      5 June 2018 21: 17 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Shturman_50
                      and if at one of the guns the base is unstable?

                      Excuse me, but what happened to the second gun? You will not deny that the pitching influenced Japanese ships too?
                      Quote: Shturman_50
                      On the persistence of the trajectory of the shells can be discussed when shooting "direct fire - 10-15 kbt. For long distances you need a larger rear sight and the angle of elevation of the barrel to 12-15 degrees.

                      Excuse me, dear Navigator, but the ship is not a circle on the ellipse of dispersion, it is a silhouette that you must fall into. A projectile in flight has not only a probable deviation along the normal, but also vertical — in other words, it can fly above or below the ideal path, and this difference can be measured in meters.
                      and so, taking the waterline as the aiming point, a vertical deviation down will give a short flight, and up if the side of the ship is low, the projectile can fly above the ship.
                      And the farther the shooting, the less the vertical deviation, the more chances to hit the silhouette, despite the fact that the dispersion ellipse is greater. And this is true not for a certain, but for any distance
                      1. Nehist
                        Nehist 5 June 2018 22: 31 New
                        +1
                        As a matter of fact, he pointed out that with similar ballistics at an initial speed of almost 100 m / s, Russian guns cannot have a dispersion ellipse higher than that of the Japanese
                      2. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 7 June 2018 06: 07 New
                        0
                        Sorry, but this is not the case.
                        Ballistics of an artillery shell is another physics.
                        Aiming at the enemy’s optical sight and channeling the gun’s barrel above the axis of the optical sight means that the projectile will fly out of the gun only in the indicated direction, then it will rise to a height exceeding the “silhouette” and starting to lose speed will fall to the point of impact already along the ballistic trajectory. .
                        This is where the scattering ellipse arises.
                        The adversary’s ship can maneuver and avoid defeat. But this is another topic ...
                        The probability of hitting a target with artillery fire is determined by the size of the areas - the ellipse of dispersion of shells and the area of ​​the target itself, this is true. But there is one more shooting parameter (even missile, it’s clear without homing, artillery or even sniper) - this is the accuracy of the hit — the deviation of the projectile (bullet, missile) from the aiming point of the aim ...
                        Relatively speaking, you aim at one point, and the shells scatter around, although some can fall into the top ten ..
                        Talking about shooting at the silhouette - this is from the era of Ushakov and Senyavin - go up to the "pistol shot" and smash it point-blank .. adversary.
                        Well, in computer toys, this also happens. In reality, both rocket launchers, and artillery, etc., shoot at an “invisible” closed target when the axis of the barrel channel is not directed at the aiming point.
                        Well, except when shooting from the PM at 25 meters ... and Stechkin already has a rear sight that changes the height of the sight depending on the distance.
                        Of course, there was a buckshot and direct-fire IPTAP, but these are exceptions to the general rules of firing.
                  2. Nehist
                    Nehist 5 June 2018 22: 35 New
                    0
                    Dear DimerVladimer! How does the quality of the shells affect the dispersion ellipse?
                    1. prodi
                      prodi 6 June 2018 09: 17 New
                      0
                      Thanks to everyone, I am inclined to believe that the most probable cause of misses of heavy shells at long distances is the shell (geometry and weight in volume - charge), then the "shaky" barrel
                    2. DimerVladimer
                      DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 09: 51 New
                      0
                      Quote: Nehist
                      Dear DimerVladimer! How does the quality of the shells affect the dispersion ellipse?


                      When firing with a half charge - the initial velocity of the projectile decreases - the trajectory becomes steeper. The whole thing must be calculated for long-range shooting using a different formula. When shooting at speed targets like a destroyer - the effectiveness of shooting is reduced.
                      The cracking of a cast-iron shell during firing leads to an increase in the ellipse of falling shells. The quality of the shells affects the wear of the trunks (accelerated wear and deterioration) - a very negative impact on the accuracy of the guns.
                      1. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 7 June 2018 06: 19 New
                        0
                        Of course, you’re right, with a half charge, the projectile will not fly far away and will lose speed faster and fall, therefore, with such charges and shells they fire as much as possible at the gun’s barrel to achieve a satisfactory range, but the scattering ellipse of such shells (due to their low mass ) will be noticeably larger (with the same firing range when compared with conventional shells.
                        Due to the smaller momentum mv, they will lose horizontal speed faster and fall faster down, as Newton's law.
                        But I wanted to say something else ... a little later.
  8. vindigo
    vindigo 3 June 2018 14: 51 New
    +2
    I like the line of ships Weakening-Victory-Relight. Beautiful ships.
  9. Kuroneko
    Kuroneko 3 June 2018 17: 18 New
    0
    In short ...
    I made up my post with quotes, examples from the article (we were talking about typos, but there were surprisingly many of them here). I almost finished it, but then Simon (one of the representatives of my cat tribe) crashed onto the keyboard from the shelf, ran his paws and everything typed was pooped. So now I don’t want to do it all over again, but simply propose something that I didn’t have time to finish (before Simon’s landing): I can do proofreading (and, say, minor editing) of your articles. I have rich experience in this business, as and he himself is a long-standing “pyrevotchek” -lover, desu (but good, also a gram-Nazi).
    By the way, as a connoisseur of Navy history, does the name Simon say something to you? Especially with cats? Well, without the help of Google. ^ _ ^ I didn’t just call that kitty Simon.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      3 June 2018 17: 29 New
      +1
      Quote: Kuroneko
      By the way, as a connoisseur of Navy history, does the name Simon say something to you?

      Are you talking about him? :))))

      Quote: Kuroneko
      I can do proofreading (and, say, small editing) of your articles.

      Thank! Articles certainly need this. True, they are usually ready right in front of me, but ... if I can finish early, then why not?
      1. Kuroneko
        Kuroneko 3 June 2018 17: 34 New
        0
        Yes, he is the most. I’ll add that Simon is a real cat, not a naval one myth, like Unsinkable Sam (by the way, it’s quite possible to write a research article on Sam’s topic).
        Thank! Articles certainly need this. True, they are usually ready right in front of me, but ... if I can finish early, then why not?

        I will throw off my soap in a personal. The only request for timely proofreading is to notify in PM and through VO (I do not go to the soap every day).
  10. sevtrash
    sevtrash 3 June 2018 17: 33 New
    +2
    What is the point of the article, interestingly? More than 100 years ago, they decided on the concept of all-big-gun - artillery weapons of the same type of large-caliber guns. "Reflections on the effectiveness of Japanese medium-caliber artillery ..." are out of date for a century lol
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      3 June 2018 17: 42 New
      +4
      Quote: sevtrash
      What is the point of the article, interestingly?

      laughing good
      Quote: sevtrash
      More than 100 years ago, they decided on the concept of all-big-gun - artillery weapons of the same type of large-caliber guns.

      Who would have thought!
      Quote: sevtrash
      Reflections on the effectiveness of Japanese medium-caliber artillery ... "are out of date for a century

      Sergei, I admire your ability not to see the obvious. The fact that large-caliber artillery was more effective was known 100 years ago, nevertheless, the question was “how much more effective?” The sources are usually not disclosed. Well, so I opened it a little :)))
      1. Kuroneko
        Kuroneko 3 June 2018 17: 51 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The fact that large-caliber artillery was more effective was known 100 years ago, nevertheless, the question was “how much more effective?” The sources are usually not disclosed. Well, so I opened it a little :)))

        I only note that with the creation of rocket weapons, everyone abruptly stopped bothering with the topic of large calibers and thick armor. However, this is rather the favorite horse of Oleg Kaptsov. He is still nostalgic for battleships and 400+ mm (well, or at least cruisers and 203 mm) guns.
        What is now in service with absolutely all the Navy of the world is precisely the medium-caliber artillery (or even small-caliber). These 100 years have somehow changed the military paradigm, right? ^ _ ^ But it's me rather to sevtrash.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          3 June 2018 18: 09 New
          +1
          Quote: Kuroneko
          What is now in service with absolutely all the Navy of the world is precisely the medium-caliber artillery (or even small-caliber)

          Aghas :)))) But generally speaking, its main purpose is to shoot at coastal or air targets and shot through undeveloped ships
          1. Kuroneko
            Kuroneko 3 June 2018 18: 15 New
            +1
            That's why I talked about changing the military paradigm over these 100 years. All-big-guns have sunk into oblivion. Like the thick armored belts of all large surface ships.
            1. Navigator_50
              Navigator_50 4 June 2018 15: 27 New
              +1
              Let me support ...
              I agree completely with your remarks on the article.
            2. sevtrash
              sevtrash 4 June 2018 17: 13 New
              0
              Quote: Kuroneko
              That's why I talked about changing the military paradigm over these 100 years. All-big-guns have sunk into oblivion. Like the thick armored belts of all large surface ships.

              The fact of the matter is that evidence of the need for large guns of the same type was needed then, 100 years ago, and not at all now. Why try to prove what has long been clear and a thing of the past. request
      2. sevtrash
        sevtrash 4 June 2018 17: 17 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        that large-caliber artillery was more effective was known 100 years ago, however, the question “how much more effective?” The sources are usually not disclosed. Well, so I opened it a little :)))

        What does it mean now? You can understand the narrative, and this is a type of proof of the effectiveness of large-caliber artillery for equipping battleships of the last century - for whom and for what is it? Who are you proving to? Myself, or what? request
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          4 June 2018 20: 00 New
          +1
          Quote: sevtrash
          What does it mean now? You can understand the narrative, and this is a type of proof of the effectiveness of large-caliber artillery for equipping battleships of the last century - for whom and for what is it?

          It is a continuation of the discussion that arose in the comments - that is, someone is interested :)
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 5 June 2018 14: 50 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            It is a continuation of the discussion that arose in the comments - that is, someone is interested :)


            I confirm - it was interesting to me.
            And although with your conclusion: about 6 "I’ll completely disagree in the battle of Tsusima in the battle of the Ebras, but still I don’t agree, but in the Battle in the Yellow Sea I will rather partially agree.
            That is 8 ", as the GK of armored cruisers, which had the ability to adjust the fire and a very high explosive content - therefore should have done more substantial damage than 6" and had a% hit slightly below 12 "of GK eb.
            Due to the higher rate of fire 8 "shells should have shown more frequent hits than 12" -
            data of N.J. Campbell, who, based on the information of the British and German attaches, as well as on the many photos available to him, came to the conclusion that 5-305 mm, 2-254 mm, 9-203 were in the Eagle mm, 39-152 mm shells.

            In the probability distribution, Campbell's data is closer to the truth.

            Now to the reports on the battle in the Yellow Sea: take for example the source

            Damage to the squadron battleship “Tsesarevich” in battle on July 28, 1904 *
            Compiled in Qingdao in August 1904 by ship’s officers under the leadership of a senior officer of Captain 2nd Rank Maximov


            Further quote:
            1. The projectile that hit the yacht on the left side of the left towing bollard pierced the left bulwark 1/3 "thick [ie, 8,5 mm here and hereinafter. Ed.] And exploded when it hit flat on the deck in Utah as a result of which, over 11 m, the iron sheets of bulwarks vomited it and slightly curved the sheets of armor, in addition, it pushed the wooden and iron decks, making a hole 4 feet 2 1/2 inches long [ie, approx. 1,3 m] and a width of 2 feet 3 inches [ie, about 0,7 m], but did not break the beams and stringers, limiting themselves to a strong memory of them. This shell, apparently, was a 6 "high-explosive caliber. Having penetrated into the room of the wardroom by the force of gases and fragments, he completely broke the iron desk and broke through the waterproof bulkhead with fragments, which is between the rooms of the officer’s cabins in the battery deck and the wardroom (the thickness of the waterproof bulkhead is 1/4 "[ie 6 mm]. When this projectile burst, 60 conductors laid under a wooden ledge in the cabin room were interrupted.

            That is, the senior officer cannot determine exactly which caliber of the projectile was damaged. And then - interrupt 60 conductors - is it to de-energize a significant number of energy consumers - dynamos, lighting, is this serious damage or did it have little effect on the combat capability of the ship at that moment? One can only speculate, not knowing the exact purpose of 60 conductors.

            7. A hole in the bed nets at the left gangway, from a projectile of caliber about 8 "or 12". The time of entry was approximately around 6 pm, when the enemy ships went to the left side and opened fire on the “Tsarevich”. The distance at that time was not determined and it was impossible to determine approximately by the hole, because after breaking one side, the shell immediately burst and, breaking the frame of the upper platform of the ramp, gave a lot of fragments.
            It is impossible to determine the caliber of the projectile from 8-12 "- a very large spread.

            Next:
            12. During the battle on July 28 at about 6 p.m. from a distance of about 45 cable (probably from the armored squad of the Japanese squadron) a shell hit the 12 "gun’s bow on the right side. The shell was high-explosive and exploded when it hit the tower’s armor. The tower time was on the port side. Judging by the force of the blow felt inside the tower, we can conclude that the shell was 12 "caliber. The destruction was as follows: on the tower there was a trace no more than 1,5 cm deep and looked like an irregular ellipse. In the center was the largest depression (1,5 cm).

            I doubt that the 12 "shell, even a high-explosive one, could leave only a 1,5 cm dent, albeit in armor and without shell-shocking the gunners inside the tower.

            Next:
            13. During the first battle on July 28, at about 1 pm from a distance of 50 cable, a shell hit the pillow of the right anchor. Judging by the thickness of the walls of the fragments found, one might think that it was an 8 "or 12" shell. The walls of the fragment were much thicker than the Russian 6 "shell, and the fragment itself is quite long.

            Again, the officer cannot determine the caliber of the projectile, even with fragments - which says a lot about the technical competence of the compiler of the report.
            Well, as always - according to tradition, if it is impossible to determine the caliber - the shells are recorded in a maximum caliber of 8-12 ".
            That is, you based your analysis on your data, dear Andrei?
            1. DimerVladimer
              DimerVladimer 5 June 2018 15: 19 New
              0
              Further analysis according to Cesarevich based on the same report

              Soon after the shell hit the anchor pillow from a distance of 50 cables, another shell hit the spardeck. He hit on the right side against the 31st frame. Hitting the side, it exploded; most of the fragments flew over to the armor tube, blocking the supply of the 12 ”bow and leaving a lot of small holes on it, did not cause significant harm. The remaining fragments scattered somewhat to the sides and slightly spoiled the superstructures. Some of the fragments scattered along the side. The dimensions of the hole are as follows: width 2 meters, height 2 meters. Volume of total destruction from a projectile explosion: 2x2x0,25 = 1 cubic meter. The projectile was a high-explosive, about 8 "(or 6") caliber.


              Before this, a hole in a deck with a similar area was perceived in the report as a larger caliber:
              5. The first projectile that hit the battleship was apparently a 12 "high-explosive projectile fired by the enemy at the beginning of the first battle from a distance of 70 cable. This projectile, having pierced a bulwark with a thickness of an inch [8 mm], when hitting the upper deck it exploded at the very six-inch armored pipe supplying the left aft 6 "turret, and with gases and fragments of this shell in the admiral’s room, the buffet was destroyed and the porthole half-porthole was torn off its hinges. On the armor of the 6 "turret, embrasure half-bays and on the guns there were traces and dents from fragments, of which the greatest depth in inches [3 mm], and one embrasure half-porch was torn from the hinges. The hole from this projectile obtained on board, of the following sizes, length 9 feet and a width of 6 feet [2,9x2 m]. Three people were injured by fragments of this projectile: two of them, being removed from the bridges, were on the upper deck, and one was wounded in the left aft 6 "tower, through the opening of the dome.

              That is, the senior officer counted the hole of 2,9x2 m from the 12 "shell, and for some reason the hole of 2x2 m from the 8 or 6" (!) Shell.

              In this case, without seeing the hole, not knowing the thickness of the material in which the hole was formed, it is impossible to perform any analysis of the hit.
              But something does not agree in the report — either the senior officer in vain considers the 2x2m hole involved in 8 “6” or this is a question for his competence, as a specialist, which is difficult to blame him.

              Next:
              At about 6 pm on the same day, a (6 "?) High-explosive shell hit the deck on the tank on its right. When it hit the deck, it exploded and made a round hole about 1,5 meters in diameter. Gases and fragments of an exploding shell met a cast they smashed the pipe and then hit the pillers, which bent and separated from the beams to which it was attached with a strap. In the deck of the spardeck there was a recess of about 5 cm depth. The total destruction is about 1,5 cubic meters. having hit the pillers, they scattered in two directions and reached the sides, the distance between which in this place reaches 8,5 meters.

              So I can believe that 6 "shells leave a hole of 1,5x1,5m, 8" 2x2 m and 12 "2,9x2 m in the deck - seems to be a regularity for a structure with such a thickness?
              1. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 5 June 2018 15: 38 New
                0
                Further interesting: the source (report of the senior officer of the captain of the 2nd rank Maximov) reads:
                During the first battle, about 12,5–1 hours. a high-explosive shell hit the underwater part on the right side against 28–31 frames below the armor. The shell didn’t make holes, but only sank the frame and pulled out part of the rivets, which resulted in leakage and filling of two side corridors (upper and lower) with water. Total water got 153 tons. The roll turned out to be no more than 3 °. Ala, the vessel was flooded with compartments on the opposite side and slightly closer to the stern to avoid trim on the bow.

                The same thing with the author of the article sounds like this:
                The battleship received 9 hull hit with shells of various sizes. The most significant was the strike of an 305-mm projectile in an armored belt into the bow of the battleship (starboard, in front of the nose tower of the main caliber). The armor did not pierce the shell, but it slid down along it and exploded in front of the unarmoured skin. The holes did not form, but the seams of the casing were separated, as a result of which the ship took 153 tons of water, a roll formed in 3 degrees, which later had to be corrected by counter-flooding. The remaining hits did not cause significant damage.


                I apologize Andrey - where did you get the 12 "shell?

                I suppose that an underwater explosion of a 12 "shell near the armor from the rebound would cause damage similar to Derflinger in the Jutland battle - that is, the dynamics of an explosion in water - in an incompressible medium (shock wave in a liquid), would definitely break the board - forming an extensive underwater In this case, even the compiler of the report does not undertake to determine the caliber of the projectile - by damage. Where did you get such accuracy with the caliber from? Do you reveal your sources?


                And this photo clearly demonstrates what constituted 70% of the Tsesarevich’s unarmored surface and what happens when an “unidentified caliber” shell hits an unarmored side - despite the fact that this is not critical damage.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  5 June 2018 19: 00 New
                  0
                  Dear Dmitry, let's answer immediately everything. You take the data (as I understand it) from Melnikov -
                  Quote: DimerVladimer
                  Compiled in Qingdao in August 1904 by ship’s officers under the leadership of a senior officer of Captain 2nd Rank Maximov

                  And it is right. But I strongly recommend that you also familiarize yourself with the "Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Fleet Operations", specifically - Sep. 3. 1st Pacific Squadron. Prince 1. Actions at the South Maritime Theater of War. Vol. 6 (and issue 7). Fight July 28, 1904
                  There are official reports of the ship’s commander and senior officer “Tsesarevich” (which is actually Shumov, not Maximov), as well as other officers and their testimony of the Investigation Commission.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    5 June 2018 21: 06 New
                    0
                    Oh, completely forgot! Links to these and other documents can be found here.
                    http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=7502
                    1. DimerVladimer
                      DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 09: 36 New
                      0
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Oh, completely forgot! Links to these and other documents can be found here.
                      http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=7502


                      Thank you - I visit this resource periodically, a very motley "hodgepodge".
                  2. DimerVladimer
                    DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 09: 35 New
                    0
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    There are official reports of the ship’s commander and senior officer “Tsesarevich” (which is actually Shumov, not Maximov), as well as other officers and their testimony of the Investigation Commission.


                    Thank you - I will get acquainted.
                    At the time of the damage assessment, Qingdao is the earliest report in hot pursuit.
                    The commission of inquiry - took place much later. And this event is serious - in fact it depended on how the crew’s actions will be regarded - it will end for them with a tribunal or an excuse. Hence the overstatement of calibers as a plus. Uncertain hits - turned into large-caliber hits - what appears in Russian reports as 12 "- in English as 8" - it leads to certain thoughts that need confirmation - but was there an exaggeration of hits 12 "- I’ll deal with this weeks on vacation.
  11. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 4 June 2018 00: 17 New
    +3
    Having carefully read the article, I did not notice the main thing, but where are the arguments themselves? :)
    In the case of the Yellow Sea, there is no description of damage from the UK at all. It’s just that all of them have been declared insignificant by choch. In the case of Oryol, too, everything is clumsy. The fact that a large projectile makes holes no one else bothered. The question is what exactly and how the shells of the IC broke down which were also many.

    I don’t quite understand why our respected author considers the task solved. The role of the SK remained incomprehensible, there is practically no comparison of SK hits with a large caliber, only 12 "shells are listed, and this is a big question. It is known that the shell flying at you always seems bigger and the caliber’s score is almost always overrated.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      4 June 2018 00: 42 New
      +2
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Having carefully read the article, I did not notice the main thing, but where are the arguments themselves? :)

      And why am I not surprised? :))))
      Quote: Saxahorse
      In the case of the Yellow Sea, there is no description of damage from the UK at all. It’s just that all of them have been declared insignificant by choch.

      The first thing I did in the article was to introduce a definition of significant damage.
      1. The destruction or disabling (difficulty of action) of guns caliber 152-mm and more. It is well known that artillery caliber 75 mm and less did not play any significant role in the sea battles of the Russian-Japanese war, unless it is a question of fights of very small ships, like the 350-ton destroyers, but also there to achieve a noticeable effect many hits were required;
      2. Disabling the fire control system;
      3. Damage that leads to the ingress of water into the ship and caused a strong roll or trim;
      4. Damage that reduces the speed of the ship or disables its steering, or otherwise impedes the control of the ship.
      As for fires, the fire itself does not, however, give a significant decrease in the ship’s combat capability, and we will take them into account only if it led to the consequences listed above — that is, disabled artillery, reduced speed, and .d

      Is there something incomprehensible here? I think not, if there is - ask
      And then I gave descriptions of only those hits that caused the above consequences. Alas, the impact of the SC did not cause these consequences (with the exception of the two that I mentioned), so there is nothing to describe here.
      Quote: Saxahorse
      It is known that the projectile flying at you always seems bigger and the caliber rating is almost always overstated.

      the assessment was not done in battle, but later, when the shells were no longer flying :)))
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 4 June 2018 01: 06 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        3. Damage that leads to the ingress of water into the ship and caused a strong roll or trim;

        However, one of the hits of a 12 "shell in Peresvet that caused flooding, you, too, in passing declared inconsequential.

        I repeat. There is no description of damage from SK hits, there is no comparison and there are no arguments. It was possible not to write anything, but to immediately declare that they rule only "big guns". What, however, you have already done before :)
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          4 June 2018 11: 05 New
          +4
          Quote: Saxahorse
          However, one of the hits of a 12 "shell in Peresvet that caused flooding, you, too, in passing declared inconsequential.

          Yes, and explained why.
          Quote: Saxahorse
          I repeat. There is no description of damage from SK hits

          I repeat. There is nothing to describe :))) The medium-caliber guns did not cause significant damage, and that’s the point. And to paint all 82 medium-caliber hits just because you are too lazy to take a source and read about them - I thank me obediently
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 4 June 2018 23: 51 New
            +2
            However, you were not too lazy to simply list almost all the hits of 12 "shells. Although the question was still about medium calibers.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            The medium-caliber guns did not cause significant damage, and that’s the point.

            You probably have already been reminded of Oslyab ten times, and in previous articles too.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              5 June 2018 15: 10 New
              +1
              Quote: Saxahorse
              However, you were not too lazy to simply list almost all the hits of 12 "shells

              Saxahorse, learn to troll thinner :))) I listed only those 305 mm hits that caused significant damage, and not all of them.
              Quote: Saxahorse
              You probably have already been reminded of Oslyab ten times, and in previous articles too.

              I answered you below. The reason for the death of Oslyaby is 305 mm shells :)))
      2. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 5 June 2018 15: 56 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And then I gave descriptions of only those hits that caused the above consequences. Alas, the impact of the SC did not cause these consequences (with the exception of the two that I mentioned), so there is nothing to describe here.


        I believe that the hits referred to in your sources to 12 "are at least exaggerated - using the example of Cesarevich’s injuries (above) it can be seen that they are still not accurate and not correctly interpreted (for example, as with a leak below the armored belt that you assigned to 12" and in the original source it is not defined, and by the nature of the damage I would not attribute it to 12 "- the compiler of the report on ebres Tsesarevich - Maximov’s cautorang could not do this, respectively, I assume that your sources are very inaccurate and are based on assessment reports with different the degree of competence of the authors.
  12. Alexandra
    Alexandra 4 June 2018 00: 36 New
    +2
    I won’t spread my thoughts on the tree (I don’t have time), I will turn to the injuries sustained on July 28, 1904 by “Relight” (since they were described in relatively detail by the artillery officer Lieutenant V. Cherkasov 1st).

    You indicate that:

    "The medium-caliber artillery, again, did not succeed. One shell of an undetermined caliber hit the stern tower, and another into the casemate, but this did not hurt the artillery. Most of the shells hit the hull (12 hits), but the only noticeable damage to the battleship there was a massive failure of 75 mm guns not protected by armor - and only three more medium-caliber shells fell into the pipes (without causing serious damage), two - into the masts and three (of an unknown caliber) - into the bridges.
    Thus, out of 13 large-caliber shells, 7 were caused significant damage to the ship, and of 22 small- and medium-caliber shells, not a single one caused serious damage."


    My selection.

    A copy from a clipping from the artillery form of the battleship squadron "Peresvet" delivered by senior artillery officer Lieutenant V. Cherkasov 1st indicates:

    "10) The projectile, when passing counter-hulls, fell into the armor under the stern casemates; its fragments flew into the III casemate, where they damaged the gun"

    "24) The shell hit the front beam of the cabin, exploded, crashed and turned the engine hatch and fell into the car with all the fragments. He pulled out the middle car."

    If a spoiled 6 "gun (apparently this is the gun number VIII that made only 9 shots in battle), and the average machine disabled, this is not serious damage, then of course yes.

    By the way, 75 mm artillery of the battleship "Peresvet" shot 313 shells in battle. Another 169 75 mm unitary cartridges for these guns burned out.

    Not a serious fire like that.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      4 June 2018 10: 56 New
      +1
      Quote: AlexanderA
      "10) The projectile, when passing counter-hulls, fell into the armor under the stern casemates; its fragments flew into the III casemate, where they damaged the gun"

      Only now did this 305 mm shell. I have described this hit
      One 305-mm shell fell under the middle casemate, making the 152-mm gun jammed (two more 75-mm guns were disabled).

      Quote: AlexanderA
      The shell hit the front beam of the cabin, exploded, broke and turned the engine hatch and fell into the car with all the fragments. He brought out the middle car. "

      And this was also a large-caliber projectile, but he disabled the car only for half an hour, which did not lead to a drop in the combat effectiveness of the ship - he continued to follow in service and did not lag behind. Therefore, I decided not to record this damage as serious, and in any case, it does not apply to medium-caliber shells
      Quote: AlexanderA
      By the way, 75 mm artillery of the battleship "Peresvet" shot 313 shells in battle. Another 169 75 mm unitary cartridges for these guns burned out.
      Not a serious fire like that.

      And what is serious about it? 75 artillery was useless, and all the losses that it suffered did not affect the combat effectiveness of the ship
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 10: 10 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And what is serious about it? 75 artillery was useless, and all the losses that it suffered did not affect the combat effectiveness of the ship


        Let's clarify - 75 mm are useless in a squad battle at medium distances.

        Well, all the same, since it was set to repel mine attacks, then it was not considered useless in principle?
        If mine artillery is destroyed, then it will be difficult for surviving ebras to repulse torpedo attacks after a general battle? When you need fast-firing artillery with unitary loading. That is, as if 75 mm are not completely useless?

        For it sounds like this from your words - the designers did not understand anything in naval combat and therefore put the useless anti-mine caliber on the ebras.
        Nevertheless, naval combat, this is a clash with the EBR and with the BRKR and destroyers and balanced artillery is not an unimportant factor in equipment.
      2. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 11: 27 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And what is serious about it? 75 artillery was useless, and all the losses that it suffered did not affect the combat effectiveness of the ship


        So did not affect? Your categorization is in vain.
        Here is the opinion of Admiral Nebogatov about the "useless" 75 mm artillery:

        The night battle consisted of continuous attacks of destroyers, the number of which reached 50. The ships of my division successfully escaped damage. In my opinion, this was due to the fact that long before the battle we practiced maneuvering during torpedo attacks in the dark. An example of the "Nicholas I" can serve as an illustration of the successful application of this technique. The destroyer of the enemy attacked him from a distance in cables. He fired a torpedo through the ship, but since the ship was completely darkened, and in time, according to my personal order, a U-turn was made, the torpedo passed behind the stern of the battleship without hitting it. During this attack, destroyers also fired on ships from their guns. One of the shots injured two of my sailors. It seems to me that if the battleships Navarin, Sisoy the Great and Nakhimov had adhered to my tactics, they could have avoided hitting torpedoes.

        It was very difficult to repel the destroyer attack because the Eagle artillery was disabled, and the obsolete guns of Nicholas I, Sisoy the Great, Navarin and Nakhimov fired only one shot per minute, whereas newer - from 4 to 6 rounds per minute. In addition to everything else, the cruisers under the command of Admiral Enquist left us and headed to Manila, and the cruiser Almaz to Vladivostok. In other words, the entire cruiser division, with the exception of the Emerald, escaped. From our destroyers I also did not wait for any help.

        An article in the reference "Jane's Fighting Ships 1906/07" (Edited by Fred T.Jane) Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov. (Translation from English by Pavel SOLOMONOV)
        1. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 11: 49 New
          0
          By the way, in the same place, Nebogatov also has an opinion on the effect of fire on artillery:
          6. Fires. Examining the fires, I found that I was right in saying that the fleet commander had not taken precautions to prevent fires. I argued that before the start of the battle, it was necessary to remove all the wooden parts of the interior decoration of the ships, superstructures, leaving only those necessary for plugging holes. All other wooden products had to be disassembled and handed over to transports. Did Admiral Rozhdestvensky do this? No! Only the ships of my squadron performed this work, in accordance with my order, and from other battleships only on the "Eagle" removed all flammable materials by order of the captain.
          Shortly after the start of the battle, “Prince Suvorov”, “Sisoy the Great”, “Borodino” and “Alexander lit” were engulfed in fire. The fire was especially strong at "Prince Suvorov." I personally saw this fire. It began with the bow of the navigator, flared up like a hut. Tongues of flame knocked out of the windows. Soon, the fire began to spread to the stern, wooden boats, aft cabins and wooden products gave the fire plenty of food. A little more time passed and the ship burned all. It is hard to imagine what damage the fire caused to the battleship. How many people died in the flame? Because of the fire, all of the ship’s artillery failed.

          Well, this is the admiral’s opinion - we know from other sources why the artillery of the Civil Code and the Army failed - partly from the fire too.

          On flooding I quote the opinion of Nebogatov:
          7. Tipping of the ships. I already described how, during the battle, the ships heeled one by one and went under the water, turning upside down. Thousands of people died, not having time to take revenge on the enemy. I am sure that the death of our ships was caused by overloading them with coal and also, in accordance with the orders of the fleet commander, there were too many cars on them, which made the ships unstable.

          In addition, water was used to extinguish the fires, and the absence of scuppers on them led to the fact that the water had nowhere to go. Gradually, a large mass accumulated over the waterline and the ships turned over.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          6 June 2018 12: 58 New
          +1
          Dmitry, with all due respect, the admiral’s private opinion, which contradicts the entire experience of the RNE, can hardly be considered a reasonable point of view.
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 14: 05 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Dmitry, with all due respect, the admiral’s private opinion, which contradicts the entire experience of the RNE, can hardly be considered a reasonable point of view.


            Andrey - do not deny the old admiral his point of view :)
            Very beautiful arguments, calculations made with a delay of 100 years, can not be compared with the experience of the admiral, who was instructed to command the "samotop" and became an eyewitness and participant.
            Therefore, historical science is based on a set of eyewitness accounts and documents, and not on the opinion of modern researchers with no experience - well, contemporaries cannot understand what it means to go into battle in an iron vessel armored with less than 30% for 6 8 10 12 "artillery shots.
            In hindsight, we are all connoisseurs, while not even commanding a port tug.
            Have a reverence for the old admiral - do not disappoint.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              6 June 2018 14: 52 New
              +1
              Quote: DimerVladimer
              Very beautiful arguments, calculations made with a delay of 100 years, can not be compared with the experience of the admiral, who was instructed to command the "samotop" and became an eyewitness and participant.

              If everything had been limited in this experiment, then there is no doubt about it. Nevertheless, the point of view that the 75-mm artillery was insignificantly strengthened according to the opinion of a huge number of officers participating in the strategic nuclear forces
              In other words, we do not have “the opinion of Andrei from Chelyabinsk against Admiral Nebogatov,” but “Opinions of 100500 veteran officers of the RJV against Admiral Nebogatov.” And this, you know, is already a completely different calico :))))
              1. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 9 June 2018 12: 34 New
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                If everything had been limited in this experiment, then there is no doubt about it. Nevertheless, the point of view that the 75-mm artillery was insignificantly strengthened according to the opinion of a huge number of officers participating in the strategic nuclear forces
                In other words, we do not have “the opinion of Andrei from Chelyabinsk against Admiral Nebogatov,” but “Opinions of 100500 veteran officers of the RJV against Admiral Nebogatov.” And this, you know, is already a completely different calico :))))


                I do not agree. This is not a deep look at the weapon - it caused the most meager harm.

                Weapons have such a factor - as a deterrent.
                The rapid-fire mine caliber was precisely that factor - which made the destroyers attacks on the line of battleships suicidal in the afternoon.
                And if he did not cause damage - this does not mean that the effect of it was absent :)

                The fact that we do not use nuclear weapons does not mean that it is not at all effective - it has a colossal deterrent effect.

                Rapid-fire unitary loading guns are needed to repel a mine attack - it was precisely for the restraining effect that they remained on the ships for the following years :)
                With the further increase in the displacement of destroyers / destroyers in the future, the anti-mine caliber also grew: 88 mm, 105 mm, 120, 130 and became equal to the average caliber, which assumed the functions of both the medium and anti-mine. And in WWII ships, the universal caliber combined the functions of anti-aircraft and anti-mine.
                On the same German battlecruisers that you wrote an interesting study about, the 88 mm anti-mine caliber was present - so talking about the futility of the anti-mine mm caliber on board is premature.
                Say - surprised by your perception of this class of artillery.

                Well, if we talk about the need for an anti-mine caliber in a linear battle of the strategic nuclear forces, these are questions of tactics of the use of destroyers.
                They would have been used if the anti-mine caliber hadn’t made these attempts suicidal.

                The presence of anti-mine caliber on ships - was a huge deterrent to daylight destroyer attacks - do not you think?
  13. Alexandra
    Alexandra 4 June 2018 01: 54 New
    +3
    Now the damage to the artillery and the fire control system according to Campbell, which, as you write, does not describe much.

    I will quote a piece from a famous Russian translation of Campbell's article:

    "Eagle" most likely received 5 12 ", 2 10", 9 8 ", 39 6" and 21 small-caliber or fragmentation hits ... About 7 feet (2 m) of the barrel of the left 12 "gun was torn off as a result of 8 "projectile. Part of the roof of the aft 12" turret above the left gun port was pressed inward by hitting an 8 "projectile, limiting the elevation angle of the gun, and on the side armor of the turret there are traces of a 10" projectile that exploded or, more likely, crashed when hit in armor . The left bow and right middle 6 "towers are jammed as a result of hits of 8" shells in their armor, with significant damage to the adjacent portions of the deck. An ammunition explosion occurred in the right middle tower, resulting in significant damage. The right stern 6 "turret is damaged by a 12" projectile, which hit the barbet at an acute angle. Shards of two 6 "shells, one of which hit the side wall, and the other into the roof of the conning tower, penetrated the cabin."

    As you can see half of the 12 "guns" Eagle "in full or in part on Campbell was disabled by 8" shells.

    Similarly, according to Campbell, two 8 "towers (left bow and right middle) were put out of action with 6" shells, and only one (right aft) SK Campbell tower was disabled by a 12 "shell.

    The fragments of what shells caused a fire in the right bow and jammed the left middle tower could not be installed either Campbell or anyone else.

    Regarding the right stern 6 "turret, the same Swede writes that it was jammed with a 6" shell. There is a serious discrepancy between them and Campbell (12 "or 6").

    But the fact that the conning tower equipment was disabled by medium-sized (6-8 ") shells, the Swede and Campbell agree, disagreeing only in that 6" or 8 "it was a caliber.

    You write: "In the opinion of the author of this article, based on such uncertain data, there are no reliable conclusions to be drawn."

    And in my opinion, the radical increase in the role of SK (6-8 ") artillery of Japanese ships in the disabling of the Eagle artillery and fire control system (compared to the artillery and fire control system of the same" Relight ") is visible, as they say, to the naked eye .

    And it’s clear why. If the numbers of 10-12 "hits in Peresvet and Orel are comparable, then the number of hits in the Orel of medium-sized shells (6-8") has increased several times in comparison with what was observed on July 28, 1904.

    And yes, if you think the most plausible estimate of A. Danilov is that 11 shells with a caliber of 10-12 "and ten 10" (and that’s 21) hit the Orel. then the failure of these artillery shells of the seven towers of the battleship and the equipment of the conning tower is the probability of getting into the zone of the tower or conning tower 8/21 = 0,38 (or 38%).

    As you know, the criterion of a modern high-precision weapon is the probability of this weapon falling into a typical lesion at a level of 0,5 or higher.

    If the Japanese from the 21th shell that hit the "Orel" 8-12 "at least eight hit the towers and the conning tower (and according to Campbell, there were two hits in the aft 12" tower - 8 "and 10", i.e. at least 9 out of 21 hit the towers and the conning tower), it remains only to be surprised that the shells that hit the Orel 8-12 only did not reach the record-breaking effectiveness of high-precision weapons.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      4 June 2018 11: 00 New
      +1
      Quote: AlexanderA
      Now the damage to the artillery and the fire control system according to Campbell, which, as you write, does not describe much.

      Count the shots described by Campbell and the total number of hits indicated by him. Compare and compare with the descriptions of the Swede
      Quote: AlexanderA
      Similarly, according to Campbell, two 8 "towers (left bow and right middle) were put out of action with 6" shells, and only one (right aft) SK Campbell tower was disabled by a 12 "shell.

      Well, the Swede does not agree, and what can I do? I understand that you like the version about 203 mm more, but you still need to observe objectivity
  14. Comrade
    Comrade 4 June 2018 04: 42 New
    +2
    12 inch a shell hit the barrel of the left nasal 12 inch. guns, hit a piece of barrel foot on 8 from the muzzle

    Famous photo of the gun "Eagle" with a broken part.

    However, our shells were no worse than Japanese pieces of guns. It’s a pity, the caliber of the injured Japanese gun is not the same.
    1. ser56
      ser56 4 June 2018 13: 25 New
      0
      Quote: Comrade
      however, our shells were no worse than Japanese pieces of guns.
      or maybe wire guns could not withstand the rate of fire?
    2. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 10: 18 New
      +1
      Quote: Comrade
      12 inch a shell hit the barrel of the left nasal 12 inch. guns, hit a piece of barrel foot on 8 from the muzzle

      Famous photo of the gun "Eagle" with a broken part.

      However, our shells were no worse than Japanese pieces of guns. It’s a pity, the caliber of the injured Japanese gun is not the same.


      If this is a hit in the trunk - why the rest of the fragments were not marked on board?
      This is clearly damage to the barrel when fired - there may have been damage to the barrel or a fragment fell into the channel ...
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 7 June 2018 00: 10 New
        0
        This is by the way an interesting point. For instance:
        [media = https: //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/com
        mons / 5/55 / ​​SMS_Seydlitz_battle_damage.jpg]
        Here in the photo is a damaged barrel of a 280 mm Seidlitz gun. It can be seen that the large shell left a deep dent. Since they tried to make the trunks of relatively mild and viscous steel, such a dent or even bending of the barrel from an impact is more likely than a perpendicular cut or chip. I suspect that most of the torn trunks are the result of exposure to fragments that have penetrated deep into the barrel casing. With the subsequent shot from the damaged gun in this place, the barrel will tear.
  15. ser56
    ser56 4 June 2018 13: 23 New
    +1
    The photos are beautiful, the damage descriptions are quite complete, although they have been described earlier - there is no special merit, but the author is not guilty ... laughing Another thing is that briefly, because it is accessible to a wide circle of readers, which is good.
    The author’s conclusion that “guns with a caliber of 152 mm and less were practically useless” is strong, the argument for the battle in the FM is serious ... The author’s controversy about fires is controversial - if the smoke simply covers the target with the commandor or causes poisoning - how does it affect? bully In addition, they must be put out, and this distracts the crew and leads to losses ...
    Of the inaccuracies, I’ll note the phrase “so that our sailors and engineers had enough time to study the damage to their ships upon returning to Port Arthur.” Is Cesarevich also returned to PA after the battle? bully
  16. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 4 June 2018 15: 25 New
    +1
    In accordance with the foregoing, we can state that in battles of squadron battleships of the Russian-Japanese war, guns with a caliber of 152 mm or less were practically useless, and 203 mm guns might have limited usefulness.

    It can be stated that Russian sailors have poorly distinguished between the explosive and fragmentation effect of 152-203 HE shells from 305 mm armor-piercing shells. They tried to blame all the damage on the shells of the main caliber of the Japanese. They still did not understand that 203, 152, and even 75 mm HE shells could inflict very dangerous damage and direct hit or splinters damage the towers, superstructures, fire control equipment, passageways, fires and floods.
    Based on such a very misconception (that high-explosive medium-caliber shells are useless) and the fatal underestimation of the impact of high-explosive medium-caliber shells, Russian ships used only armor-piercing shells and the result is known.
    Japanese ships came closer, used high-explosive shells and achieved less hit of a large caliber and much more than an average caliber in Russian ships than in the previous battle. The result is also well known, although not a single shell hit the main armor of Russian ships.
    If the decisive role of medium-caliber artillery explains as much as possible that the Tsushima battle was hit less by large-caliber shells hit in Russian ships, and the damage was much greater.
    Oslyabya fired and almost only the cruiser Kamimur with their 152 and 203 mm guns fell. And after half an hour Oslyabya turned into a ruin, lost the artillery of the Civil Code, lost its course due to the destruction of dimikhods and flooding, and so on.
  17. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 4 June 2018 16: 52 New
    +1
    Seventeen medium- and small-caliber shells that hit mainly superstructures (but also pipes, masts, one 203 mm into the hull) of the battleship did not cause significant damage to the Retvisan.

    Or rather, what kind of damage did the амет invisible ’beat? Medium-caliber high-explosive shells entering the ship’s passage made "invisible" damage?
    At the same time, a dozen medium-caliber hits (2 in medium-caliber towers, one in the foremast and the rest in the hull and superstructure of the battleship) did not cause significant damage to the ship.

    The same thing - what kind of damage does this "non-existence" beat? And what he beat less than the damage from large-caliber shells.
    2 305-mm projectile and three projectile caliber 120-152 mm got into the pipes of the battleship. In general, the Peresvet pipes were seriously damaged, causing an increased consumption of coal, and the reason for this was damage caused by 305-mm projectiles of the ship’s second and third pipes. However, modern researchers (V. Polomoshnov) suggest that they were still hit by 203-mm projectiles, because the nature of the damage (heavily damaged outer casing with a much less affected internal) is characteristic of 203-mm projectiles. Such injuries were inflicted by 203-mm shells of the armored cruisers of Kamimura to the pipes of the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment, but for the Tsesarevich pipes it was typical of the opposite - high-explosive 305-mm shells made huge holes, approximately equal in area, in both the outer and inner shells.

    With all the weight of such an argument, we still cannot accept it - yet Russian sailors, who had the opportunity after the battle to get acquainted with the nature of the damage, came to the conclusion that this is exactly 305-mm caliber. In addition, the author of this article may provide a logical explanation for such an incident. The fact is that the Japanese in large quantities in their shells of large-caliber guns changed the English fuses to "instantaneous" fuses of their own design (Ichjuin), which ensured the explosion of the projectile at the moment of contact with the armor, without any slowdown. Including this innovation has touched and armor-piercing shells (probably not all, but still). That is, theoretically, 305-mm armor-piercing projectiles with reduced explosive content (which, by the way, did not differ much in the mass of explosives from high-explosive 203-mm projectiles), but with "instantaneous" fuses, could theoretically get into the pipes, but caused known similarity of damage.

    Here is direct evidence that it is impossible to beat could distinguish 305 hits of armor-piercing shells with a fuse in a flash action (if such were hit) from a 203 mm high explosive hit, and also that the impact of a 203 mm high-explosive shell hit like a 305 mm armor-piercing shell with a fuse in a flash action.
  18. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 4 June 2018 17: 15 New
    +1
    Another high-explosive shell of an unknown caliber, hitting the stern pipe cover, interrupted the steam exhaust pipes in the stern stoker, causing the speed of the squadron battleship to drop to 8 knots for a while.

    This is about Sevastopol. "Unsettling Caliber"? I think that if you beat even 203 mm it was recorded immediately as 12 inches.
    I would especially like to note that we consider only hits during the day battle with X. Togo’s squadron, therefore damage to one 254-mm Peresvet gun with a direct hit by a Japanese destroyer’s 57-mm projectile during the night attack is not taken into account - and in any case case, it would refer to the effectiveness of small-caliber, rather than medium-caliber artillery.

    If 57 mm (or 75 mm?) The shell could do this!
    From the report of K.L. Shwede: “There were three hits of 6 inch in the conning tower. shells below the slot, without causing harm. Splinters fell down the cabin continuously from the torn shells nearby. A lot of fragments flew through the slot, especially small ones that fell down standing in the wheelhouse. The 8-inch projectile, ricocheting from the water, hit the left side of the shell in the slot of the wheelhouse. The rupture of the Barr and Stroude ruptured, ruptured the combat signposts and crushed many negotiation tubes, damaged the compass and steering wheel with a rupture of the projectile and its fragments. ”

    No comments.
  19. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 5 June 2018 00: 21 New
    +2
    For some reason, the dear author decided that proving the uselessness of medium caliber is easy and simple. For this, it’s supposed that it’s enough to list the hits of 12 “shells and declare that there were no serious SK hits at all. And why don’t we give a directly opposite example? The battleship Oslyabya who died in battle solely from fire of a" useless "medium caliber.

    Let me remind you if someone forgot. At the time of the opening fire Oslyabya stood, at 13:52 the Japanese opened fire on the Russian squadron. The first 4 EBs opened fire on Suvorov, Nissin, Kasuga and the first 4 BrKR opened fire on Oslyab, the last two BrKR Kamimura opened fire on Nikolai. A few minutes later, Nissin and Kasuga transferred the fire to Suvorov, and Kamilura’s detachment concentrated fire on Oslyab. Already at 14:32 Oslyabya simultaneously with Suvorov rolled out of order and capsized, opening the account of Russian losses.

    Let me remind you again that of the listed ships, only a single copy of Kasuga’s gun was available, and after several shots it transferred fire to the Russian flagship. Meanwhile, Oslyabya didn’t just drown, during the 8 minutes the Japanese inflicted huge damage on the battleship. Two or three hits near water lines in the nose, getting into the bridge, losses among the command staff, getting into the pipes turning them into a sieve, extensive penetration of the armor belt in the area of ​​the first stoker also with flooding, a strong fire in the stern, a fire on the port side, 43-10 large holes in the bow - continuous hits prevent flooding, the bow of the main gun is destroyed, both 15 mm bow are destroyed along with the servant, both 75 "left bow casemates are destroyed, the middle 6" - all the servants are destroyed and finally the last blow to the steering sent the battleship to its last circulation. And all this horror without a single 6 "shell. Only and exclusively hits of medium caliber.

    It is amazing how long our esteemed author has been trying not to notice such a large argument completely refuting his point of view. It turns out that the SK is quite able to disable artillery including the main gun and break through the armor belt and simply drown a large, armored ship.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      5 June 2018 11: 07 New
      +1
      Quote: Saxahorse
      The battleship Oslyabya killed in battle solely from the fire "useless" medium caliber.

      In fact, the ESB Oslyabya died as a result of 2 or 3 hits of 305 mm shells :)))) Received by him at the moment when “Sikishima” and “Fuji” were shooting at him :))))
      Saxahorse, well, it’s a shame not to know such basics :)))))
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 5 June 2018 23: 52 New
        +1
        And I already thought that you, too, would habitually recall the beloved by all authors, ten-inch Kasuga. Where only the authors did not find her shells. The whole Russian squadron is just in the sieve. But you found another option :)

        You definitely need to try yourself in an alternative story. With fellow villagers. Your bright, indefatigable fantasy will definitely be in demand in this genre. :)
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          6 June 2018 00: 53 New
          +1
          Quote: Saxahorse
          You definitely need to try yourself in an alternative story.

          :)))) Yes, I can say, it comes from there :)))))
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Your bright, indefatigable fantasy will definitely be in demand in this genre. :)

          Saxahorse, have you ever heard of such a person - Campbell - ever? :))) N.J.M. Campbell "The battle of Tsu-Shima" from the Warship International magazine, 1978?
          So read at your leisure, discover a lot of new things. For example, the fact that Sikishima and Fuji shot Oslyab from the very beginning of the battle :)))))))
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 10: 48 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Saxahorse, have you ever heard of such a person - Campbell - ever? :))) N.J.M. Campbell "The battle of Tsu-Shima" from the Warship International magazine, 1978?


            Well then, according to Campbell:
            Mikasa opened fire on Suvorov at 13.50 from a distance of cabin 35, and as the turn ended, the rest of the Japanese ships joined it, so that by 14.00 the battle went all along the line. Iwate, and possibly Kasuga and Nissin, opened fire before turning. Initially, Mikasa, Asahi, and Azuma fired at Suvorov, and the rest of the ships fired at Oslyab. Then there was a redistribution of goals; so, shortly after 14.00:XNUMX pm, Fuji transferred the fire to Suvorov.
            Ie Fuji shot Oslyab 10 minutes - maximum 15?
            At about 13.58 Oslyabya got a hit large shell (the author does not determine the caliber of the projectile but Fuji could shoot at that moment) he took a lot of water at or below the waterline in his nose and through a large hole. Another shell pierced the armor in the middle of the ship and penetrated into a coal pit, which led to serious flooding. The ship received a strong roll to the port side and donkey with its nose, counter-flooding and attempts to close up holes were unsuccessful. In addition, the bow tower was disabled, and the ship burned so much that at 14.20 Sikishima lost its target due to smoke. At 14.30, Oslyabya rolled out to the right and almost at the same time got hit on the waterline two large shells (where is about 12 "? in English and 10 and 8" is also a "big shell"), one of which made a second huge hole next to the first dangerous hole.


            Well, since you are referring to Campbell, I recall his final conclusion on the battle:

            Neither the Japanese, the so-called “armor-piercing” projectile containing a bursting charge of picric acid (liddite) with a relative weight of 5%, nor the “high-explosive” (NOT) projectile with a 10% charge of the same explosive they didn’t have any effect when they hit the front-hardened armor, except when they hit the thinnest plates, however, large-caliber shells led to catastrophic destruction in unarmored places. The success of the Japanese can be largely attributed to their success, expressed in the explosion of the cellar at Borodino and the hit of large shells near the waterline in the unarmored side at the bow ends of Oslyaby and Alexander. Both of these ships were as vulnerable to such hits as could be desired, especially given the state of the sea during the battle and the poor preparation of emergency parties.


            Campbell’s article does not attempt to determine the caliber of the projectile that hit the ship that fired.
            According to Campbell, a "big shell" can be either 12 "10" or 8 ".
            The article is quite superficial - many generalizations.

            At the same time, the unarmored parts of the ebras suffered from both 12 "and shells of other calibers.

            Maybe you came across Japanese sources that ascribe specific hits to a particular ship?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              6 June 2018 11: 49 New
              +1
              Quote: DimerVladimer
              Well then, according to Campbell:

              I read again what you do not like, I definitely could not understand :))))
              Quote: DimerVladimer
              Ie Fuji shot Oslyab 10 minutes - maximum 15?

              That's right. Russian EDBs in the first quarter of an hour reached 5 hits in Mikasu 305 mm, and EMNIP with another 305 mm hit someone else (tsushima fell off something) why should two Japanese EDBs not get 2-3 times in Oslyabyu? :) )))
              Quote: DimerVladimer
              Campbell’s article does not attempt to determine the caliber of the projectile that hit the ship that fired.

              Nevertheless, the nature of Alexander’s injuries obviously indicates a 305 mm shell - 203 mm didn’t inflict such damage. The same with Oslyaby. In Borodino, eyewitnesses observed the rupture of a large shell and the fact that this is Fuji, in general, is not in doubt
              1. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 6 June 2018 14: 32 New
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                In Borodino, eyewitnesses observed the rupture of a large shell and the fact that this is Fuji, in general, is not in doubt


                According to Alexander III and Borodino - perhaps there is enough data to determine the hit 12 ".
                According to Oslyab, I have not yet seen reliable sources that accurately confirm whose second hit was.

                I don’t understand why you refuse the 8 "caliber in accuracy and in the possibility of causing significant damage.
                In recent days, I re-examined some reports on damage to ebras, where the data do not allow to determine the caliber of the projectile, but they are assigned to 12 "in the sources that you used in your study. Unfortunately, I need time to confirm or refute this data According to Tsesarevich I already wrote - I have doubts in 3 cases (out of 11) assigned to the 12 "caliber. I’ll study the reports in more detail to understand the basis on which principle the hit was attributed to 12 "
  20. mkpda
    mkpda 5 June 2018 17: 19 New
    0
    It is interesting, but it proceeds from the erroneous message that the conditions were identical in the battles in the Yellow Sea and at Tsushima. In the Yellow Sea, the First Pacific Squadron had warships that they prepared for battle (they removed extra cargo, dismantled the finish, wooden structures and partially repelled paint). The second Pacific squadron went into battle at dormitories with guns (sorry for being rude) - the ships were ugly prepared for battle, so any hit of a high-explosive shell in superstructures and the surface of the side led to the formation of strong fires. Fires are a deterioration in visibility, water in the upper compartments, large losses of emergency parties and the moral suppression of crews.
    Due to overload, unarmoured parts of the side (above the armored belt) were in the water or swam in the waves, which sharply increased the effectiveness of the average caliber of the Japanese and influenced the death of Russian battleships (primarily of the Borodino type).
    For ships prepared for battle, medium-caliber hits did minimal damage. Otherwise (Tsushima), they had a strong influence on the final result, even without causing serious damage.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      5 June 2018 18: 28 New
      +1
      Michael, with all due respect, but why are you retelling the stories 100 years ago?
      Quote: mkpda
      The second Pacific squadron went into battle at the dormitories with guns

      Apparently that's why 4-5 armadillos of Rozhestvensky shot into the Japanese during the first 15 minutes of the battle about the same amount of shells as the entire Witgeft squadron for the entire battle in the ZhM
      Quote: mkpda
      Due to overload, unarmoured parts of the side (above the armored belt) were in the water or swam in the waves, which sharply increased the effectiveness of the average caliber of the Japanese and influenced the death of Russian battleships (primarily of the Borodino type).

      This was not close. With a probability of 99%, even the main 194-mm belt was slightly above the water, and even the second - and even more so. In addition, the causes of the death of 3 EBRs are well known, in that Suvorov was sunk by torpedoes, Borodino turned over after a strong explosion (most likely there was a detonation of the ammunition) Alexander had a big hole in his nose (which obviously didn’t come from medium-caliber shells) and, having received the roll turned over, apparently because it did not tear up the ports of the low 75 mm artillery
      1. mkpda
        mkpda 6 June 2018 13: 15 New
        0
        I became interested in the topic in the 90s thanks to the publication of Gangut. They published a number of monographs on the subject of Tsushima in their issues. Now these magazines are not at hand, so I write from memory.

        If we analyze the actions of Rozhestvensky from the point of view of controlling the battle, then he squeezed out the maximum possible from his ships at the beginning of the battle and was able to maintain its controllability after losing the ability to own command. But this is a completely different question from preparing ships for battle. She (centralized) was completely absent. The ships went into battle in the form in which they made the transition - with all the goods, with all the boats and boats, with all the decoration of the rooms and cabins, unlike the battle in the Yellow Sea. Only the commanders of individual ships prepared them for battle at their discretion.
        As for the large number of hits in the initial phase of the battle, it is associated with the forced maneuver of Togo. Still, Rozhdestvensky was able to outwit Togo and impose the beginning of the battle on his own terms.

        You forget about the quite strong excitement during the battle, so the height of the second armored belt was small and the waves swept over its unarmored part. The main belt of ships of the Borodino type either completely went under water, or slightly rose above the water. In addition, the battery of 75 mm guns on the battery deck had large ports (2,1 meters above the waterline, as far as I remember from the project), which were closed by shutters in the campaign, but in battle they were open or were easily destroyed even from close explosions of high explosive shells. At least the death of one battleship occurred after these ports were filled with water.
        Ship combat always has feedback. Therefore, all factors must be taken into account. Therefore, without taking into account the preparation of ships for battle, their loading - you can get an erroneous result, counting only shells.
        1. pacific
          pacific 7 June 2018 07: 42 New
          +1
          Quote: mkpda
          I became interested in the topic in the 90s thanks to the publication of Gangut.
          ohm
          So the “Gangut” began with this. The first five issues were almost entirely devoted to the Tsushima battle.
          In one of these issues there was an excellent article devoted to the accuracy of shooting of Russian sailors. I don’t remember all the calculations, but the general conclusion is that ours shot no worse than the Japanese.
      2. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 7 June 2018 12: 15 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        and, having received a roll, turned over, apparently because it did not tear up the ports of the low 75 mm artillery


        The coup indicates a low stability of the vessel - probably due to structural overload (metacentric height decreased to 2,5 feet against the design 4 feet), possibly due to overloading on the upper decks - for example, from water when fighting a fire.
        1. Navigator_50
          Navigator_50 8 June 2018 08: 15 New
          +1
          Just the accumulated water, having gained volume and mass, created a heeling additional moment, there was no recovery moment, because the edge of the side entered the water. this is why liquid cargo in tanks is dangerous. if the tank is not pressed in well, almost to the full, then with a roll, the center of this mass moves and the moment changes. a full tank does not have a CT change.
          Therefore, tanks are not made across the entire width of the vessel, but a hold - from side to side.
  21. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 5 June 2018 17: 32 New
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Saxahorse
    The battleship Oslyabya killed in battle solely from the fire "useless" medium caliber.

    In fact, the ESB Oslyabya died as a result of 2 or 3 hits of 305 mm shells :)))) Received by him at the moment when “Sikishima” and “Fuji” were shooting at him :))))
    Saxahorse, well, it’s a shame not to know such basics :)))))

    Why Oslyabya died no one knows for sure. But what is lost firepower and the course after the shelling of the cruisers Kamimura is definitely known.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      5 June 2018 18: 31 New
      0
      Quote: Kostadinov
      Why Oslyabya died no one knows for sure.

      There are descriptions of the survivors.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      But what is lost firepower and the course after the shelling of the cruisers Kamimura is definitely known.

      And how exactly is this known? Campbell, I don’t really agree with you
  22. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 6 June 2018 23: 37 New
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    N.J.M. Campbell "The battle of Tsu-Shima" from the Warship International magazine, 1978?

    No, I have not read Campbell. I’m not a historian :) But the information you provided contradicts other, long-known facts.
    First to the witnesses. For example, Russian:

    Demonstrating the excellent organization of fire control, several Japanese ships fired at Oslyabya at once: one or two trailer armadillos and most of them (according to some information, six out of eight) followed them into the wake of armored cruisers.

    or even official Japanese:

    At 1 hour 51 minutes, “Mikasa” from a distance of 6,4 thousand meters (34,6 kb) launched the first shell into the lead ship of the Suvorov right column. Subsequent vessels, embarking on a new course, also gradually opened fire, namely:
    “Sikishima” at 1 hour 51 minutes from a distance of 6800 meters (37 kb) opened fire on “Prince Suvorov”;
    3rd ship "Fuji", at 1 hour 52 minutes - also according to "Prince Suvorov" from 6200 meters (33,5 kb);
    4th ship, “Asahi” at 1 hour 53 minutes according to “Prince Suvorov” from 7 thousand meters (38 kb);
    5th ship, “Kassuga” at 1 hours 53 minutes from 5800 meters (31,4 kb) to “Oslyabya” and
    6th ship, “Nissin” from 1 hour 56 minutes also along the “Oslyabya” from 7 thousand meters (38 kb).


    Secondly, it is worth taking a look at the maneuvering scheme at the beginning of the battle. The Japanese squadron was in front of the Russian and was approaching with a small angle. As you know, already at 14 o’clock the Eagle could not shoot at Mikasa, he went beyond the corners of the guidance of the stern towers. But Sikishima who went second also had an Eagle, and especially Oslyabyu at the very limit of his corners. Why would he shoot far back?

    Thirdly, it is worth remembering about fire control. All witnesses emphasize the orderliness and good organization of fire by the Japanese, in contrast to the Russian squadron. Typically, the flagship starts shooting, gives the distance signals and the entire squad begins to hit in series at a specified target. How could Sikishima walking the second start shooting far back while Asahi, walking the fourth, supposedly one supported the flagship. In the transfer of fire by the Japanese to another ship, as necessary, I believe. But in a random shot and a random choice of goals - I'm sorry but it's hard to believe.

    The reference you made to Campbell is more like some kind of confusion or mistake in his materials. Well, or obviously needs a detailed explanation of the strange behavior of Sikishimi and Fuji.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 June 2018 11: 25 New
      +1
      Quote: Saxahorse
      First to the witnesses. For example, Russian:

      Saxahorse, I like that the conversation has for some time entered into a constructive channel, so let's get a handle on what it says. What does the Russian source quoted by you write?
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Demonstrating the excellent organization of fire control, several Japanese ships fired at Oslyabya at once: one or two trailer armadillos and a large part (according to some sources, six out of eight) followed them into the wake of armored cruisers.

      Let’s once again and together we read the phrase highlighted by me. It follows from this that 6 armored cruisers and one or two armadillos fired at Oslyab.
      Quote: Saxahorse
      or even official Japanese:

      There is one problem here - the official Meiji is completely unworthy of trust. And this is not my conclusion - for example, one of the German historians spoke about it (I completely forgot where I got this link, I will find it - I will definitely). As a matter of fact, it’s enough to read the description of the battle on January 27 to see for yourself
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Secondly, it is worth taking a look at the maneuvering scheme at the beginning of the battle.

      Sorry, but that doesn’t exist. The fact is that between our and Japanese sources there is a fundamental difference - some write that the angle to the mikasa at the time of the Japanese reversal was almost 45 degrees, the other - which is much sharper. Who is right can only show the time machine
      Two Japanese battleships could start firing at Oslyab before, or during a U-turn. That at 14.00 the Eagle didn’t hit Mikasa and didn’t say anything, since Mikasa had advanced a lot, given the distance between the ships and Fuji, he could be in much better conditions.
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Thirdly, it is worth remembering about fire control. All witnesses emphasize the orderliness and good organization of fire by the Japanese, in contrast to the Russian squadron. Typically, the flagship starts shooting, gives the distance signals and the entire squad begins to hit in series at a specified target.

      Packinham emphasizes the very good shooting of the Russians :))) There was no centralized fire control of several ships for one target in the AIF :)))) The flagship could indicate the target, then someone shot at what :)
      Quote: Saxahorse
      How could that Sikishima going second start shooting far back while Asahi going fourth

      Quote: Saxahorse
      In the transfer of fire by the Japanese to another ship, as necessary, I believe. But in a random shot and a random choice of goals - I'm sorry but it's hard to believe.

      I will explain - according to Corbett, who studied the reports of Japanese commanders, something like the following happened. Togo was going to attack first the left convoy of Russian ships and ordered to concentrate the fire on the Oslyab, this signal was clearly seen on the ships of the 1st detachment. However, then he unexpectedly turned (Togo loop) and ordered to hit Suvorov - but not all ships saw this order. Therefore, according to Corbett, at the beginning of the battle, only Mikas, Asahi and Azuma (those who saw the signal) opened fire on Suvorov, and the rest shot at the target they had previously indicated.
      I will not say that infa is 100%, since I have not read the reports myself, but ...
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 7 June 2018 23: 19 New
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Let’s once again and together we read the phrase highlighted by me. It follows from this that 6 armored cruisers and one or two armadillos fired at Oslyab.

        However, Sikishima was not included in the number of these battleships, and vice versa there was Pekingham on Asahi, which Campbell looks like mostly refers to, but Asahi turns out to have shot at Suvorov.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        There is one problem here - the official Meiji is completely unworthy of trust. And this is not my conclusion, for example, one of the German historians spoke about it

        The Japanese have their own cockroaches, but this does not mean that you need to reject each of their words. The given list of goals is quite official and it is not clear that they win by distorting it. Again, for example, they indicated in their Meiji that Azumo shot Suvorov, i.e. some inconsistency did not bother them.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The fact is that between our and Japanese sources there is a fundamental difference - some write that the angle to the mikasa at the time of the Japanese reversal was almost 45 degrees, the other - which is much sharper.

        As far as I understand the essence of the disagreement is that Japanese NO67 and Russian NO23 lead to boarding literally in 15-18 minutes. Judging by the fact that in real life they didn’t get closer than 22kb, either the same ZPR was still following the NO34 and not NO23 course, or Togo immediately turned north. In both cases, Oslyabya immediately turns into an uncomfortable target.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Two Japanese battleships could start firing at Oslyab before, or during a U-turn. That at 14.00 the Eagle didn’t hit Mikasa and doesn’t say anything, since Mikasa went forward a lot,

        The Japanese could not shoot at the circulation; corny speed of horizontal aiming is not enough. In addition, it is known that Togo did not immediately open fire after the turn. The Russians claim that the first shot was after 3-4 minutes, when all four EBs were already on a combat course. This means that all these four EB Oslyabya was far behind.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I will explain - according to Corbett, who studied the reports of Japanese commanders, something like the following happened. Togo was going to attack first the left convoy of Russian ships and ordered to concentrate the fire on the Oslyab, this signal was clearly seen on the ships of the 1st detachment. However, then he unexpectedly turned (Togo loop) and ordered to hit Suvorov - but not all ships saw this order.

        I came across such a version. But here it is worth noting that Asami and Iwate, for example, immediately began to hit Nikolai. This confirms that the original goal was to fire at all the flagships. Only after the turn, having seen that Nikolai was hopelessly behind, did they transfer the fire to Oslyabya. And all the time the Japanese were in front, even Kamimura’s detachment fired back on Oslyab. By the way, the Japanese did not hesitate to admit that they sometimes suffered a fire, for example, when Suvorov completely disappeared into smoke, EB transferred the fire to Alexander and Borodino, since it is fast with longitudinal fire.

        I suspect that Campbell’s and Meiji’s disagreements are precisely the search for that first projectile which, from the outside, was "seen" in Oslyabyu. “As Sablin defined at least 12’. ”Since a large one means exactly 12’, they came up with who could send him. I believe that 12 "in Oslyab there was not one.
  23. pacific
    pacific 7 June 2018 06: 51 New
    +1
    Thanks a lot, Andrey, for the most interesting analysis!
    But here’s what “scratched”: the GK for the first combat combat unit of Togo will be very different in caliber from the GK of the second combat detachment of Kammimura. Both combat units have in common 6 "medium-caliber artillery.
    10 "and 8" guns - were GK for BrKr. And Togo included in the first combat detachment “Nissin” and “Kassugu” only because he only had 4 EDBs left, and therefore he “put in line” the second Brkr detachment of Kammimura, creating a “high-speed wing”.
    And, as it seems to me, we all constantly deviate from the topic of the article that you asked and again return to the discussion, according to your article on the LCR “Invincible”: how effective are, let's call them “non-linear”, ships in a combat collision of linear fleets.
    By the way, it would be great if you could take the time and please us with an analysis about the effectiveness of using the second armored detachment of Kammimura in squadron battles of the strategic nuclear forces.
  24. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 7 June 2018 06: 57 New
    +1
    During military service and studies (VVMU), the question of Tsushima "tormented" me at times ..
    At the IWMI department (the history of naval art) - they could not clearly explain - they chewed chewing gum ..
    Then I had to participate in various accident investigation commissions.
    Here puzzles began to take shape.
    Specialization is cursed.
    Just military sailors and civilian sailors have different approaches to navigation, which is generally correct.
    Consider Tsushima.
    1TOE shot accurately and to some extent played on equal terms with the Japanese, with certain amendments to the "stories" about the war ..
    2TOE showed the worst results and was actually "shot" by the Japanese.
    Although the arrived ships 2TOE, well, could not be worse than the ships 1TOE.
    All analysts and war historians believe that during battles the natural conditions are usually the same - wind, hail, snow, etc. Well, did the sun maneuver in the eyes ...
    Only one thing slipped away ... Stability of 2TOE ships.
    For contemporaries, this was not clear. Understanding came later - after 30-40 years, but then it was not up to Tsushima.
    The naval corps was preparing a caste of officers-commanders and the main specialty of training was artillery.
    And Ushakov F.F. and Nakhimov P.S. and other admirals of the Russian fleet laid down traditions, and traditions are a terrible force .. - English - lawmakers of maritime traditions confirm ..
    Actually to Z.P. Rozhestvensky I have no complaints.
    He led the squadron and set it up for battle by virtue of the existing charters and rules.
    And according to the rules, they would line up, shoot at each other, God would give and would go to Vladivostok.
    The forces were almost equal ...
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 7 June 2018 09: 11 New
      +2
      1TOE shot accurately and to some extent played on equal terms with the Japanese, with certain amendments to the "stories" about the war ..
      2TOE showed the worst results and was actually "shot" by the Japanese.

      colleague, I'm sorry, but statistics show exactly the opposite. The second squadron shot better than the first.
      1. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 8 June 2018 07: 56 New
        0
        Then we would have won the Japanese ...
        Well something like that.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          8 June 2018 09: 52 New
          +2
          Quote: Shturman_50
          Then we would have won the Japanese ...

          The fact is that 1TOE achieved about 40 hits. 2TOE - about 230
    2. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 7 June 2018 14: 14 New
      +3
      Quote: Shturman_50
      Only one thing slipped away ... Stability of 2TOE ships.


      Why slipped away? Many sources indicated the metacentric height of the battleships of the Borodino type at 2,5 feet against the design about 4 feet.
      That is, a very low stability margin, which could easily be aggravated by overloading by vehicles and parts that were taken aboard from transports - this is also mentioned in several sources. It remains to add a little water to the upper decks when extinguishing fires - minor flooding due to damage, water intake through the ports of anti-mine caliber - so that the ships would lose stability and capsize.
      1. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 8 June 2018 07: 55 New
        0
        The ships swayed as if wound up ... what accuracy is there ..
        Not all turned over .. This is an extreme option. If the rules of firing were established 15-20 kbt, then H. Togo shot at 30-40 kbt. And had an advantage.
  25. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 7 June 2018 07: 18 New
    +2
    I continue ...
    Naval officers of that time did not deal with technical issues ..
    For this, mechanics and navigators were introduced on the ships, who represented the auxiliary personnel of the ship's crew.
    They did not prepare them in the Marine Corps and the commanders closed the road .. not the nobles, but the courtyards.
    The sailors themselves didn’t really want to get into the holds, greases, boiler rooms - we have towers, guns, shells ...
    And the pipes and all kinds of mechanisms are mechanics ... from the stoker.
    It was the responsibility of the mechanics to be responsible for unsinkability, buoyancy, roll, trim, etc. (well, for water, steam, electricity, heat, etc.)
    According to the rules adopted then, mechanics calculated coal in the pits, its acceptance and placement in the pits, consumption, etc.
    Having construction drawings of the ship mechanics and calculated metacentric height, residual buoyancy, flow rate and residual coal, water and reported daily to the bridge.
    This was the end of their function. Barin himself knows what to do next ...
    I recalled the expression attributed to Tsar Peter 1, allegedly, "navigators, even though they are of cattle origin, should be allowed into the ward-house, because they are zealous in the naval sciences of svodomy."
    I decided for myself the mystery of Tsushima, I don’t want to impose it on anyone.
    I will write a couple of comments and hand over the topic to the archive.
    Ockham approves.
    1. pacific
      pacific 7 June 2018 07: 55 New
      +1
      It was the responsibility of the mechanics to be responsible for unsinkability, buoyancy, roll, trim, etc. (well, for water, steam, electricity, heat, etc.)
      ........
      Having construction drawings of the ship mechanics and calculated metacentric height, residual buoyancy, flow rate and residual coal, water and reported daily to the bridge.

      It was like that in the Soviet Navy, only liquid fuel instead of coal. In any case, in the 80s - 90s.
      Is that the attitude has changed - the mechanics have become full-fledged combat officers, as well as the navigator. The place of pariahs was taken by various political leaders. But they themselves were to blame.
      And in the civilian fleet without deep knowledge of the theory of stability and unsinkability, you will not become a navigator.
      After discharge to the reserve, I had to end the sailor in order to climb the bridge as the officer in charge of the captain.
      It would be interesting to know your thoughts, dear Shturman_50, regarding the events of the RPE.
      Moreover, I happened to walk in those places.
      PS They didn’t enter Port Arthur and Chemulpo, but saw the remnants of the Emerald cruiser set in Vladimir’s Bay with their own eyes.
      1. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 8 June 2018 07: 51 New
        0
        It's good! only you can’t load fuel oil onto the deck, and the tank (tank) has clear dimensions to allow for mass, volume, moments of inertia, etc.
        What did you do at 2TOE?
        1. pacific
          pacific 10 June 2018 23: 15 New
          0
          I agree. Excessive coal loading not only increased sludge, but also reduced MPE.
          But really, no one in 2TOE did the calculations of the permissible MCV?
          It never occurred to me to look at the overload of ships from this angle. More and more lamented that the armored belt had gone under water.
          1. Navigator_50
            Navigator_50 11 June 2018 05: 44 New
            0
            Calculations were made at 2TOE, only they were not involved in dynamic stability.
            The impact of construction overloading with materials and spare parts is crazy.
            there is a check before leaving Liba ..
            Mechanics calculated stability from the point of view of unsinkability.
            The remaining buoyancy volume was calculated and decided where to take water (ballast), from where to roll overboard so that the ship would not capsize.
            The main danger was considered to be a roll until the edge of the side entered the water, or open holes (ports, etc.), since in this case the recovery moment disappeared and the ship capsized.
            They thought about the effect of pitching on shooting, but not mechanics. It was believed that the pitching and the enemy is the same.
            It is interesting that several hundred tons of water were taken on the EDB before the battle - for example, in the bow on the right, and in the stern - on the left. The goal is to straighten the ship by pumping out water if there is a hole and flooding of another compartment. The main thing is to prevent a dangerous roll. And the white bone is engaged in shooting - they know better.
      2. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 8 June 2018 08: 06 New
        0
        assistant - experience is important ..
        This is all over time ..
  26. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    7 June 2018 12: 02 New
    +1
    Navigator_50,
    Quote: Shturman_50
    Talking about silhouette shooting is from the era of Ushakov and Senyavin.

    I repeat again - you are wrong, the size of the silhouette must be taken into account when shooting. I can explain this with a simple example

    It is clear that the picture is simplified and the proportions are somewhat distorted, but the essence is just that. If I did not convince you, then I highly recommend reading the “Marine Tactics Course. Artillery and Armor” L.G. Goncharova 1932 (this textbook on artillery, author - professor of the Naval Academy)
    1. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 8 June 2018 07: 46 New
      0
      I apologize, but I'm not interested ..
      I have enough professional knowledge, especially since artillery has come a long time ago ..
      1. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 8 June 2018 08: 04 New
        +1
        Do not be offended. already in the 68 bis project there were stabilized towers (universal not GK).
        The development of gyroscopes also led to the stabilization of tank guns ..
        And firing radars were also on stabilizers.
        By the way, on the 58th project, there was stabilization during the launch of the anti-ship missiles with the help of the onboard retractable rudders - the on-board pitching was zero - suddenly the anti-ship missiles with the SSC will not exit the launcher (pipe) ..
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        8 June 2018 09: 54 New
        +1
        Quote: Shturman_50
        I apologize, but I'm not interested ..

        Well, if the fact that your constructions are based on a misunderstanding of the artillery action is welcome.
        You put forward some speculative postulate related to the REV. I am referring to a specific textbook of artillery 30s, explain your mistake. You are not interested.
        All the best! hi
    2. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 8 June 2018 13: 23 New
      0
      I do not like conflicts ...
      But you asked for it.
      Shell dispersion ellipse - determined at the firing range when the gun is mounted on the machine and begins to shoot a series of shells and charges .... at different distances.
      And after the acceptance of this type of weapons - the data is checked by control shots and deviations from the aiming point.
      Your drawing is an anachronism when you shot at a canvas shield and evaluated the effectiveness ...
      The dispersion ellipse depends on the gun, distance, quality of shells and powder charges, but not on the aiming point ...
      Roughly - a shell flew out and fell ..
      The second should fall nearby, the third also nearby.
      All falls are determined by range and projectiles. the scattering ellipse form a fall near the aiming point.
      The aiming point is determined by the flagart libr senior artilleryman (fire control) based on the range to the target and corrections for relative movement ..
      the height of the target here is completely inappropriate .. It does not participate in the aiming and shooting ..
      Someone misled you.
      But the battery of the Electric cliff also took into account the height of the Japanese cruisers and armadillos? ..
      In short.
      The dispersion ellipse is determined by the quality of the gun, projectile, powder charge and air pressure and humidity and its temperature.
      If the parameters of the sight are unchanged, the base is motionless - the dispersion ellipse is close to the dimensions recorded in the instrument’s form during acceptance.
      As for insults, then your business ..
      Understand only that time is the most expensive resource and wasting in vain on repeated explanations is WRONG.
      Actually, there are readers besides you.
      And let everyone draw conclusions of the SAM.
      Bow out

      .
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        8 June 2018 17: 51 New
        +1
        Quote: Shturman_50
        I do not like conflicts ...
        But you asked for it.

        Quote: Shturman_50
        As for insults, then your business ..

        And I didn’t know that conflicts and grievances had already begun, thanks for bringing us up to date! hi
        Quote: Shturman_50
        the height of the target here is completely inappropriate .. It does not participate in the aiming and shooting ..
        Someone misled you.

        I already told you who - L.G. Goncharov, professor of the naval academy, author of textbooks on artillery. But, alas, this didn’t alert you. I can also recommend Ustaf artillery service on the ships of the RKKF (1927).
        And in words I explain briefly, since the above figures you did not understand.
        The aiming point is always issued FOR an enemy ship. This, generally speaking, is obvious already because by setting the aiming point directly on board the ship, we get half the dispersion ellipse under-flying

        That is, combining the aiming point with the side of the ship, we automatically refuse half of the possible hits.
        Therefore, they only aim like this at the shooting stage - as soon as the cover is reached, a correction is immediately introduced into the VIR machine, which shifts the aiming point FOR the target

        Thus, the maximum probability of hitting the target is achieved.
        We do not need the aiming point to coincide with the target ship. We need to shoot so that the maximum number of probable trajectories passes THROUGH the target ship :)))
        What does it depend on? From the size of the ellipse? No! Exclusively from a vertical deviation from the ideal path and from the geometric dimensions of the target.
        And so, in case of persistent shooting, the vertical deviation tends to a minimum (although the dispersion ellipse tends to a maximum), which is why violently firing guns are more accurate
        If everything is still incomprehensible, and do not want to read textbooks - contact your colleagues, are there certainly gunners? They will explain the reason for your mistake.
        1. prodi
          prodi 8 June 2018 22: 02 New
          0
          maybe your misunderstandings due to the firing range? At 2-3 kilometers, the trajectory is relatively flat and the transfer of the aiming point beyond the target is justified. At 5-10, the trajectory is hinged (and with 10 you can clearly see the target?) And the conditional aiming point
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            9 June 2018 13: 31 New
            +1
            Quote: prodi
            At 5-10, the trajectory is hinged (and with 10 you can clearly see the target?) And the conditional aiming point

            Let me note that the angle of incidence of the 305 mm / 40 projectile installed on the EDB from the time of Russian-Japanese varied from 7,5 degrees per 7 m to about 300 degrees per 18 m.
            1. prodi
              prodi 10 June 2018 17: 11 New
              0
              then again I do not understand, 18 degrees. clearly better than 7 for a total hit both on board and on deck
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                11 June 2018 16: 12 New
                0
                Quote: prodi
                then again I do not understand, 18 degrees. clearly better than 7 for a total hit both on board and on deck

                The better? :))))))
                1. prodi
                  prodi 11 June 2018 20: 46 New
                  0
                  more "area" goals and meeting angles are pretty good
          2. Navigator_50
            Navigator_50 11 June 2018 05: 58 New
            0
            The projectile falls into the water at an angle of 35 to 45 degrees. if the axis of the barrel channel is directed above the target at a distance of 6-7 km (40 kbt).
            OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE SHOOTING ON FLASHES .. flight, shortage, cover ..
            Do not correct the projectile span above the target, below the target into the water ..
            Who will see him .. flight ..
            Only in the picture of the game monitor.
            But if you shoot at a short distance, as was customary for a pair of cloth panels, then to train the aiming and evaluate the accuracy of the gunner’s aiming, the bullet of a cannon or rifle had to go through the cloth.
            The idea was simple - without firing shells to check the gunners-gunners.
            Such a reduced model of a cannon, a projectile in the form of a bullet, a short distance and a canvas cloth. you will not see bursts from a bullet, holes in a tarpaulin - yes.
            This model had flaws that, with an increase in the firing range of over 10 kbt, led to crappy combat training and abandoned it .. after Tsushima!
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 11 June 2018 07: 39 New
              +2
              and they refused it ... after Tsushima!

              Abandoned stem shooting?

              Do not tell me what kind of adapt on the left trunk :)))
              1. Navigator_50
                Navigator_50 12 June 2018 10: 58 New
                0
                Thanks for the question ...
                Shook up .. I started the service in these places.
                I’ll write in detail .. but this is not at all what you think.
                Best regards
              2. Navigator_50
                Navigator_50 12 June 2018 11: 02 New
                0
                They refused to simulate firing with the help of Berdan and Mosin rifles.
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 12 June 2018 12: 13 New
                  0
                  Uh ... yes, as it were, for 12 “reeds and mosins weren’t used. 37mm inserts were inserted into large-caliber barrels and fired with small-caliber but shells. Later these inserts went to the trench of Rosenberg’s trench guns
                  1. Navigator_50
                    Navigator_50 13 June 2018 07: 27 New
                    0
                    You never know what they did out of wit
                    1. Navigator_50
                      Navigator_50 13 June 2018 07: 41 New
                      +1
                      I continue ..
                      In the photo, the famous Voroshilov battery on the island of Russky. Three and a half km from the DOF on the Crew, right along the road. It is impossible to go along the shore of Novik Bay only if on a boat or boat (in some places it is shallow). And there are the best scallops ...

                      The 45-mm gun has nothing to do with sighting, well, and the extension barrels ..
                      Insert barrel - was inserted into the barrel of the gun (like a mock shell), so that the rifle barrel in this model was exactly along the axis of the barrel (!). The bullet flew exactly along the path of the projectile, only because of the small mass flew a smaller distance and fell.
                      The barrels were used as a model of the shot (scaled down) and allowed us to evaluate the accuracy of the aiming of the barrels by the commandors .. and that’s all ..

                      Beginning in 1910, and by 1914, everything had changed radically .. There appeared PUAO and SUAO. Optical guidance by the commandants of the Civil Code and the Criminal Code is a thing of the past. Small caliber continued to shoot direct fire, but for him the trunks were not relevant ..
                      The fire manager supplied the shooting parameters, and in the tower these settings were set and a volley was fired at howler .. (this is on the fingers). The tower commander had his own optical sight and a machine gun .. but this is a completely different topic.

                      Already in 1906, the British put on a new “Rurik” their own SUAO, which was not in the Russian fleet. Sperry's gyrocompass was also purchased there for testing, although it was already a serial model of the gyrocompass.

                      The battleship Poltava, two towers of which were installed in Russian, is a phenomenal thing.
                      The transportation of equipment, barrels, armor, shells, etc. from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok - a feat, since the dimensions and weight of individual parts reached 180 tons.
                      On Art. The first river in Vladivostok (railroad runs along the coast ..) was unloading equipment on ice, sledding was made of logs, a company of Red Navy sailors harnessed and dragged across the Bosphorus Vostochny into ice to Novik to the very tip. There were built gates (manual spiers) and dragged ashore on the decks .. there was a battery engine ... we blew it up later.
                      This is somewhere in 1935-36. I talked with the participant - the castle commissar .. The classmate got married, and the father-in-law participated ..told on the spot. We knew the places there by heart and the practice took place on training boats.
                      Distracted, something to the side.
                      The battery was deployed at the top of the hill (there are detailed photos on the Internet). The general scheme was preserved - the shipboard and control devices, its own power plant, etc. (even low-gun artillery from aircraft). One tower shot through the entrance and approaches to the Amursky Gulf, and the second to the Ussuri Gulf. The accuracy of the shooting in the afternoon was such (they shot with one barrel for 20 km - the first shell hit a square of 25x25 meters). Zeroing was not needed. We needed data on the coordinates of the target and course and speed, well, wind, pressure, humidity. What was the trick: The base of the rangefinders was several hundred meters long, and there were several posts. The distance was measured with such accuracy that no radar was "pulled". And without active activity (radiation, lasers, etc.).
                      The battery fired extremely close to almost 40 km and reached the Chinese-Korean-Soviet border - the mouth of the Tyumen-Ula River.
                      And in gulp, any aircraft carrier of those times, she would be launched immediately. Around and underground there were defensive structures for protection from land .. (mindful of Sevastopol).

                      Then came the arena. I decided to cut everything. Preserved. Personnel cropped up to 60 people. - which was enough only for protection. And the furry animal came in silence.

                      After 1969, the Chinese pranks on the border began and it turned out that the army would not defend the main base - Vladivostok, but would deploy the front at the latitude of Khabarovsk. Vladivostok was invited to prepare the Defensive Region - they called VLOR, an analogue of the SoR.

                      It was proposed to staff at the expense of the personnel of the fleet and the mobile reserve. Practically all front-line combat officers were painted on regiments and battalions, batteries. Everyone, before the platoon, was allowed to go through the training grounds where they were taught to shoot from land weapons ... mortars, weapons, LNG, RPGs ... machine guns, etc. Trenches and trenches in the rocky ground of Primorye. The backbone of the defense is the marine division. Cadets TOVVMU practice in the Marine Corps (two months). For several years, defensive lines, bunkers, bunkers, warehouses, rockades were prepared .. all on their own. Concrete, mortar, slabs ... scrap and pickaxe. Special vehicles did not take the rock ..

                      The idea “restored” someone to restore the fortification of Russky Island and Voroshilov Battery .. But how? There is no one, only security .. And they even decided to bring an old specialist in these tools from St. Petersburg. He was not taken to the island .. very old. He said on the phone what to do in order to check the suitability .. Then he made a conclusion - only one or two shots would survive the breech parts, and then gas could break through the shutter into the tower. It is necessary to restore the breech in St. Petersburg ..

                      And to check the state of the pickup, they decided to put a 45 mm gun on the barrel - the platform and mount were aligned and tried to assess the accuracy of the aim. A target rock was chosen. The tip was determined on the tablet and the tower was deployed, after that they shot from forty-five ... as far as I know, the embarrassment came out. The evaluation of the experiment was classified, and the work was curtailed. I think that the role played by the fire in the tower of the Civil Code of one of the cruisers ... 37 people died. Exactly June 13 ... 1978

                      Then they unloaded shells on barges and drowned more than 2500 shells of ammunition at sea (ammunition dump). Here, brother, what kind of beast is it on the trunk .. By the way, we didn’t have time to put mounts on the second tower ..
                      Something like that. From a great mind and sorrow is great ...
                      1. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 13 June 2018 10: 24 New
                        0
                        Dear colleague, you have a happy gift to chatter any problem so that by the end of the comment you begin to forget how it all began. hi
                        I understand you, as for me, there are no fundamental differences from what you described from stem shooting. The principle is the same - to check the work of the gunner without wasting the resource of the KK guns and expensive shell.
                        By the way, I read that in modern times, tourists are allowed to pay a little money for forty dollars :)))
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              11 June 2018 13: 39 New
              +2
              Quote: Shturman_50
              The projectile falls into the water at an angle of 35 to 45 degrees.

              Two for your materiel. You should at least look at the shooting tables, because a military man, it’s easier for you than for me. The angle of incidence is 35 degrees, for example, the 180 mm gun of our Kirov has a place to be when firing at 144 cable. That is, similar angles can be found in guns only at a range close to the limiting one, but this does not apply to the artillery of the nuclear explosives, since their elevation angle is artificially limited
              Quote: Shturman_50
              This model had flaws that, with an increase in the firing range of over 10 kbt, led to crappy combat training and abandoned it .. after Tsushima!

              For reference - barrel shooting was used by all countries until the complete withdrawal of large-caliber naval guns from circulation
              1. Navigator_50
                Navigator_50 12 June 2018 11: 00 New
                0
                Nonsense ...
                Large-caliber naval artillery still exists.
              2. Navigator_50
                Navigator_50 13 June 2018 07: 28 New
                0
                yes. yes on american battleships ..
          3. Andrey152
            Andrey152 25 August 2020 08: 12 New
            0
            Look at the reasons why light shells were preferred over heavy ones in 1895. The main argument was the great flatness of the trajectory of light projectiles. At the then predicted battle distances of 10-30 cabs and in the absence of accurate instruments for measuring the distance, this made it possible to get into the silhouette of the ship even with an error in determining the distance of 15-30% (depending on the distance)! Rear Admiral Makarov then rightly noted that a heavier projectile can realize its advantage only if it hits the target ...
  27. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 8 June 2018 07: 42 New
    +1
    As promised..
    Now back to our merchant (commercial) fleet.
    In one of the ports, tugboats took the timber carrier to the raid from the pier. Caravan - the forest on the deck has not yet been fixed by the harbor brigade of the port. It was necessary to free the pier.
    Suddenly, the ship lay aboard and several thousand cubic meters of forest (2,5, it seems) went into the water.
    During the trial, I had to closely and thoroughly study the stability of the timber truck. According to the rules of the seaport, in order to obtain permission to enter the sea, the second assistant provided stability calculations to the port captain's office. Clearly signed, and the captain of the ship too. Port Inspector inspected the factual side.
    So, to reach the sea, the metacentric height in summer should be at least 9 cm, and in winter - 12 cm. In addition, the weather forecast should be good, otherwise stand on the roads and wait for the weather near the sea ..
    Before loading, all tanks are “pressed in”, ballast tanks are drained, and bilges, too.
    Consumption only from end tanks: forepeak, afterpeak, fuel consumable in the car ..
    It turns out that a timber carrier in this state of stability could follow a speed of 5-9 knots, and avoid steering overboard. To evade dangerous proximity with other vessels, make a maneuver in advance. If the weather worsens over 3 points of the wave and wind, take refuge in a protected place ...
    It turns out that at such a metacentric height, a ship like a vanka-stand can lie aboard, while the deck cargo breaks the fasteners (wooden racks) goes into the water. The vessel is straightened and has a metacentric height of 30 centimeters (!). It will no longer lie aboard.
    The second case is also related to the forest. The BBS "Bolsheretsk" left the Nakhodka settlement and after 6 hours was found toppled. During the rescue operation, the last remaining alive died - the watchman 3rd mechanic.
    The reason is that in winter, when loading at the port, water is taken in from the tanks, the barge sits lower and cranes load the forest. Water is pumped out of the tanks as the volume of cargo increases. But the water tends to freeze in winter and the pumps "breaks". Before leaving, the senior assistant personally climbed the neck of the largest tank (anti-rolling) and looked for the presence of water - it was not there, but there was ice.
    After 6 hours of travel (10 knots), the BBS entered the warm current of Kurosivo, the ice became water and there was a complete loss of stability.
    How is metacentric height determined to centimeters? According to the ship's drawings (pantokarens) for draft by bow, stern, midship from both sides. A liquid rollometer is installed on the vessel with a base for the entire width of the vessel (glass measuring tubes are connected by a hose. There is a special reference load on the berth - it is put on board by a crane in a specific place and the metacentric height is determined by the roll value.
    And then, according to a special formula, the rolling period is determined - it turns out big - the pitching is very smooth and slow, “thoughtful”. At the transition to the port of discharge, the old-timer is periodically checked by a stopwatch by shifting the steering wheel by 5 degrees. and going back .. The ship makes several hesitations. The results are recorded in the logbook. It is clear that in such conditions no one will be lousy. Live a hotz and live longer and better. Non-understanding - write off to the shore.
    However, we still have a surprise ahead ... the dynamic stability of the vessel (ship) may decrease from the wave ... There is a Remez diagram, sometimes called a storm.
    Very unpleasant thing if the speed of the ship and the waves coincide. On passing waves, the vessel may lose stability and tip over if its length along the waterline coincides closely with the wavelength. You need to choose a course at an angle to the direction of travel (running) of the wave.
    In our case with 2TOE, courses and speeds were all sorts during the battle, respectively, and the stability of ships and pitching was variable. For the Sea of ​​Japan, a bad wave for ships 90-100 meters long.
  28. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 8 June 2018 07: 44 New
    +1
    I continue ..
    Not everyone, of course, has experience in shooting, but the longer the barrel, the longer the process of dispersing the projectile in the barrel and when it leaves the muzzle, only then it receives the vector that will lead the projectile to the target. If the end of your gun’s barrel on a periodically oscillating platform constantly describes “Lissajous figures” in the air, then no matter how you aim at the enemy, the projectile will fly slightly to the side (increasing the dispersion ellipse).
    Even keel pitching takes the projectile away from the aiming point, this is called "fling the fly." The long-range shooter’s task is to keep the barrel motionless until the projectile leaves him. This is very clearly seen in biathlon competitions when, when fired with the last shot, the shooter starts raising the rifle to leave the start. The bullet goes into the "milk".
    This is characteristic of our team ... because they train on electronic simulators and the light signal instantly (the light) hits the target, and the bullet would still fly. Why? - So it’s cheaper .. the rifles are imported and they are kept safe for competitions .. you can’t go into battle with the shot barrels. Domestic rifles do not meet the requirements, and imported ones are very expensive - more than a million apiece. Doesn’t resemble anything ??
    Let's get back to our sailors. On the bridge, the stability does not particularly bother .. The stability margin is large. There is a PEZH - post of energy and vitality, where mechanics and the commander of the warhead-5 sit. From the bridge, the commander gives the order and execute it in the page. The ship should remain afloat when two compartments are flooded. And the struggle for survivability will be waged according to the developed emergency plans ..
    There are three displacements for a ship: full (combat), standard, and special for docking.
    This is where the “dog rummaged” according to one very famous person ..
    Khaikhetiro Togo went into battle in full combat displacement. Ships were loaded on the design waterline with stability and reserves according to the norm. No coal on the decks and in the rooms ... compartments for straightening were not flooded with water in the future, etc.
    And Z.P. Rozhestvensky believed that he would fight with an equal enemy, because in the directories the forces were approximately equal, and 1TOE damaged part of the Japanese ships.

    The stability of Japanese ships was two times higher than the stability of 2TOE ships, somewhere from 1,2 m to 1,5 m (i.e., about 4 feet).
    Our ships had only two feet of metacentric height (60-75 cm), although I believe it was a little worse .. This is from the testimony of the commission of inquiry .. On the ships they didn’t know for sure, and they didn’t bother with “metacentres”. I was “finished off” by the memories of V. Semenov - barkases and boats were dragged onto the superstructure, put together a pyramid and filled them with water (at the bottom of the longboats, whaleboats, above the boat). Like, if they burn, then the water resulting from the damage will flood the fire ..
    Water was everywhere, whipped from the broken hoses and highways, seeping from the flooded compartments. The decks did not have sewage scuppers to drain surpluses into the holds (bilges) and from there overboard.
    Cherry on the cake .. I had to serve some period on the cruiser 68-bis project. Participated in the firing of the Civil Code. Its metacentric height is about 2 meters. There was no pitching almost up to 4-5 points of excitement. The crew laughed that it didn’t swing in the sea, and when it was already rocking, it still rocked for another day after mooring.
    Marine Dictionary:
    “Metacentric height. The established limits of permissible values ​​of MV: for battleships and battle cruisers from 0,9 to 2,0 m, for cruisers from 0,8 to 1,5 m, for destroyers from 0,6 to 0,8 m. For commercial ships are allowed lower values ​​M. "
    Thus, our 2TOE battleships had stability at the level of destroyers.
    Well, and appendage. In English maritime law there is this: if you have been at sea for more than 2 months, then the court should not accept his testimony as a witness .. And what about the terms of the 2TO expedition?
    It was a gamble of pure water.
    I tried to calculate the period of oscillation of the side rolling of the EBR, but only approximately, since there are no exact drawings with pantokarens and weight loads. It turns out about 20 seconds. Well, the influence of the waves must be taken into account. If the pitch was 5 degrees, then it’s clear that after the shot the projectile will leave the muzzle end along a different path.

    Draw your own conclusions.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      8 June 2018 19: 23 New
      +2
      Quote: Shturman_50
      Draw your own conclusions.

      Given what you write
      Quote: Shturman_50
      Khaikhetiro Togo went into battle in full combat displacement. Ships were loaded on the design waterline with stability and reserves according to the norm. No coal on the decks or in the rooms ...

      That implies that, in your opinion, we had such. I hasten to disappoint - on the day of the battle, coal reserves at the EDB did not reach full, i.e. there were no "coals in closets"
      Conclusions about your level of ownership of the topic made
      1. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 11 June 2018 06: 01 New
        0
        And do not read the testimony of the commission of inquiry?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          11 June 2018 14: 18 New
          +1
          Quote: Shturman_50
          And do not read the testimony of the commission of inquiry?

          Here is the signal book of the cruiser Diamond

          On this cruiser, squadron ships daily reported the remaining supply of coal. Look, take away the daily consumption, (most ships last reported the day before the battle) and get coal reserves at the beginning of the battle. As I wrote above
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          on the day of the battle, coal reserves at the EDB did not reach full, i.e. there were no "coals in closets"

          And about the testimony - of course I read, and, surprisingly, there are practically no contradictions, if you do not take into account the lie-Kostenko
          1. Navigator_50
            Navigator_50 12 June 2018 11: 24 New
            +1
            Read about construction overloads and excess stocks ..
            Kostenko is a competent shipbuilder .. only you need to understand what he writes about ..
            After going through Tsushima, many would write ...
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              12 June 2018 15: 12 New
              +1
              Quote: Shturman_50
              Read about construction overloads and excess stocks ..

              Yes, I read it. And I know that Kostenko is corny in the numbers - for example, in his testimony of the commission of inquiry he says one thing, in the report about the battle - another, and in the book "On the Eagle in Tsushima" - the third. And this applies not only to reserves and coal - the same applies to the speed of ships, etc. In other words, Kostenko constantly contradicts himself.
              Quote: Shturman_50
              Kostenko is a competent shipbuilder .. only you need to understand what he writes about ..

              He may be a competent shipbuilder (he later became one since he had barely graduated before Tsushima), but this does not make him a reliable source.
              We take Kostenko
              Having collected with the utmost care the information about the loads on the battleship, I received the following results regarding the composition of the reload:
              Coal 450 tons

              Perfectly! Now read the Swede (senior officer, after all)
              On May 14, the battleship Orel entered the battle with a coal reserve of 1090 tons, that is, with as much coal as was considered on the ship, with almost the full capacity of the coal pits, although coal was not located exclusively in the coal pits.

              That is, the Swede directly indicates that the coal reserve was less than full. But he is also mistaken, because from memory he gives the latest information about the angle - 1090 tons, (actually - 1095 tons), he simply simply had the last report in his memory, and that more than 100 tons of the average daily consumption of the ship should be taken away from it, he forgot.
              Kostenko indicates "overload" from NORMAL displacement :)))) That is, in his opinion, everything that was taken in excess of half the coal supply (this was part of the normal displacement) is overload :))))))
              1. Navigator_50
                Navigator_50 13 June 2018 07: 30 New
                0
                Report of the Marine Technical Committee for Shipbuilding - to the Manager of the Ministry of the Sea. September 28, 1904, No. 1047.

                Armadillos, such as Borodino, which are leaving for the first voyage as part of the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Ocean, although they are not an independent new type, but a modification of the Cesarevich type, however, they are so different in details from their prototype that the Marine Technical Committee He considered it necessary to conduct an experimental verification of the position of the center of gravity of these battleships before they went swimming. As a result, on September 27, 1903, Lieutenant Colonel Krylov carried out, on behalf of the Baltic Shipyard, an experiment to determine the position of the center of gravity of the battleship “Emperor Alexander III”.
                A detailed calculation made on the basis of this experience for both normal and full coal reserves on an armadillo was submitted to the Committee with regard to the head of the Baltic Shipyard dated May 26 of this year, No. 8398.
                Upon consideration by the Committee of this calculation, it turned out that the above experience was carried out in the far incomplete load of the battleship; 1646 tons of various cargoes and coal were not delivered on it, with a displacement with a normal fuel supply, or 1969 tons - with a full fuel supply.
                Since among the missing goods there were many that should be in the upper parts of the battleship, for example steam and rowing vessels, Temperley arrows with their winches, Spencer-Miller device for loading coal into the sea, etc., the position of the center of gravity, the experiment found and then corrected according to the drawings by calculation may not coincide with its actual position on the ship, in particular, if we take into account that during the production of the said experiment there were about 180 tons of water on the battleship to test the water tightness of the upper and lower side corridors, which could adversely affect the determination of the center of gravity.
                Therefore, by the relation dated June 27 of this year under No. 1745, the Committee asked the Fleet and Port Commander of the Baltic Sea to make an order to repeat the determination of the center of gravity on the named battleship, in its full load, if possible before leaving for the Far East and to inform the Committee of the calculations of such definitions, with a detailed indication of the state of the load during the experiment.
                Since the Committee had no information on the production of the indicated repetitive experience until August 10, the following telegram was sent by the Maritime Technical Committee on August 10 following the order of Your Excellency following the report of the Committee from Your Excellency, by the Maritime Technical Committee:
                “By order of the Manager of the Ministry of the Sea, the Committee asks to inform whether the determination of the stability of the battleship“ Emperor Alexander III ”has been completed.
                On August 18, the Committee requested, by telegram, a response to the above telegraphic request.
                On August 19, the following response was received: "Your dispatch was transferred to the Commander of the 2nd Squadron, which is in charge of the ships."
                Then, on the basis of the request of the chief ship engineer of the St. Petersburg port, the Technical Committee again asked the Chief Fleet and Port Commander of the Baltic Sea, on August 23, this year under No. 1888, to provide the Kronstadt port with means for determining, by experience, the center of gravity, at possibly the shortest time, on the cruiser "Oleg", and especially on one of the battleships, such as "Borodino", and on transport "Kamchatka".
                Despite this, to date, such an experiment on armadillos, such as the Borodino, has not been made.
                On October 20 this year, the Maritime Technical Committee sent a shipbuilding inspector Dolgorukov to Revel to attend the Borodino battleship when he was 8 ° to test the tower devices of this battleship.
                Returning from a business trip on September 22, the shipbuilding inspector Dolgorukov reported that the named battleship was overloaded with various supplies and other cargoes, at present, according to the observation of the ship's ship engineer Shangin, to 29 f. 1½ d .; other data on heeling made in Revel gave random and only material on the basis of which the Committee can judge the current stability of armadillos, such as Borodino, in their present condition.
                Based on this material of the Drawing Committee on Shipbuilding, an approximate calculation of the stability measure of the battleship in its current state was made.
                This calculation yielded a metacentric height, with a displacement of 15275 tons, about 2½ feet.
                The following table shows the difference between the specified data from the normal, designed and defined by Lieutenant Colonel Krylov.

                The Committee’s shipbuilding department finds such an insignificant metacentric height safe for the battleship to navigate in the ocean and under combat conditions, only with an extremely careful attitude to the condition of the vessel.
                To improve stability, the following precautions would be necessary on all battleships, such as the Borodino type:
                1) Do not accept new cargo on armadillos. If there are no serious obstacles, then unload from the battleships on transports the largest possible part of the supplies and other cargoes, except coal, which do not constitute their normal load.
                2) Avoid the presence in the hold of battleships of liquid cargo capable of overflowing during rolling, for which, for example, to consume a supply of fresh water from the double bottom tanks in turn, i.e., do not start to expend water from the new tank until the previous one is empty.
                3) Keep all significant free loads in place secured.
                4) Consume coal in such a way that, as the lower pits are emptied, pour coal from the upper pits into them.
                5) When sailing on a major wave, keep all ports and other openings of the battery deck closed up.
                The foregoing shipbuilding department of the Committee is at the discretion of Your Excellency *).

                Chairman, Vice Admiral Dubasov.
                Chief Inspector of Shipbuilding, Lieutenant General I. Kuteynikov.
                I. D. Senior Clerk K. Tennyson.
                -
                *) Resolution of the Manager of the Ministry of the Sea:
                “Forward a copy of this report to the Chief of the 2nd Squadron.
                It must be sent without fail today, so that he could catch the admiral in Libau.
                To propose to the Baltic Fleet Commander-in-Chief to bring “Oleg” into the harbor and determine its stability there, using the time taken to correct the vehicle. ”

                Adjutant General Avelan.
                September 29, 1904.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  15 June 2018 11: 36 New
                  0
                  In general, on the issue of coal overload, as I understand it, you have nothing more to say, but you cannot admit your wrong :)))
              2. Navigator_50
                Navigator_50 13 June 2018 07: 39 New
                0
                overload is determined by sedimentation with the bow, stern and mid-section ..
                And compared with the constructive, that is, what should be
                1. Navigator_50
                  Navigator_50 13 June 2018 07: 45 New
                  0
                  Not only coal is taken into account .. (by the way, the stability consumption lowers and lowers the flow rate from the pits.
                  Water, ballast, pyramids from raft boats with water .. on rosters ..
                  It’s not beer that ruins people ...
  29. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 11 June 2018 05: 28 New
    +1
    Little Supplement:
    To understand the processes ...
    Defeat of the target is damage or complete destruction of the object ..
    How the probability of defeat is calculated. The projection on the plane of the object is taken - the plan (in this case, the section of the ship along the waterline). The aiming point is applied to the most important part in this case - the center of the ship (let’s not shoot, in order to get directly into the artillery cell of the bow or stern).
    The aiming point also represents a circle with the probability of error in determining the distance and direction (determined by the accuracy of the rangefinders, the errors of rangefinders, etc.).
    When firing shots at the selected shooting parameters, we must understand that the projectile will arrive at the point of impact with an aiming error + a dispersion error of the projectile + with an additional error due to the swing of the 16-meter barrel due to low stability.
    Summary: the probability of a projectile hitting a target is small, since the dispersion ellipse (circle) is significant.
    In this case, for a reliable hit on the target, you just need to increase the number of projectiles fired three times, that is, not at random, but a mathematical calculation ..
    And now from getting to the move to defeat. Each shell has a radius of destruction, in which it produces destruction upon rupture, and it is with this radius on the dispersion ellipse (circle) that the area of ​​damage can be displayed. If your defeat ellipse “covers” the target area, then you win, and if the dispersion of shells is large, they fall at a considerable distance from each other in the dispersion circle and have a small radius of destruction, then you will not have an effective defeat of the target.
    Japanese shells produced damage in a radius larger than Russian shells, probably almost an order of magnitude (ours pierced a hole and almost everything - if it didn’t get into the room with hazardous materials). I mean, the Japanese shell did destruction on the area 6-8 sq. Feet, and ours - 1 foot = 305 mm).
    Thus, the area of ​​destruction by Japanese shells - with a smaller dispersion ellipse was an order of magnitude higher (yes, perhaps a little higher than 10 times).

    Therefore, the Japanese squadron secured a guaranteed victory for itself, choosing an EFFECTIVE SHOOTING RANGE of 35-40 kbt, ensuring the maximum defeat of the enemy (us, then) with optimal costs.
    For the Russian squadron, it was necessary to reduce the distance to the enemy, OUR EFFECTIVE FIRING RANGE, to at least 15-20 kbt, but Kh. Togo did not allow this to be done in the course of this - war, so war ..

    At a distance of about 10-15 kbt. we could inflict a lot of hits and damage on the Japanese, because the projectile dispersion ellipse would decrease, but they took this into account ... and we were not allowed to. True, in this case, the factor of smallness of the destructive ability of our shells would play a bad joke with us.

    Regarding direct-fire shooting at the target’s profile for 6-7 km (?), And I WILL NOT comment on the SHOOTTER TO KEEP AT FALLING AREA AROUND THE GOAL.
    The gunner’s commandor will not see anything at all .. for him, the target is at the limit of visibility and beyond the horizon. Here is shooting at a half-closed target. A horizontal tip is visually, and a vertical one according to the shooting tables for closed positions.

    The whole "children's cry on the lawn" is only because the sailors after Tsushima were silent and walked like spat upon ..
    However, conclusions were made and by 1914, the equipment and rules and instruments of the PAO and the training of specialists had completely changed. And the shells became different.
    It must be understood that it was Tsushima who stirred up the empire.
    And then, you understand, they moved the steering wheel to the steering wheel on the EDB, because the wheelhouse was broken, and the steering wheel does not have a compass, it was taken to the wheelhouse before the fight, because the local one stopped showing the course during the shooting. Well, how later this EDB was "maneuvered" is known from the descriptions of the Tsushima battle. We have to learn not only from the mistakes of others, but also from our own (our national treasure is ours - two “D”).

    Specially I write as simplified as possible, I do not use formulas and mathematical statistics.
    Regards to the readers.
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 11 June 2018 11: 50 New
      +2
      Specially I write as simplified as possible, I do not use formulas and mathematical statistics.
      Regards to the readers.

      alas, with respect to the readers, this would have looked a little different.
      If you claimed that the Russian guns had three times the scattering ellipse, then your arguments should have looked something like this: In connection with this and that, the English scattering ellipse 12 "(8",: 6 "underline necessary) 40 the caliber gun on the 40 cable (or any other distance, better than a few) was, say, X meters, due to the same reasons, the corresponding Russian gun, at the same distance, was equal to 3X meters.
      This would be a proof with “respect for the readers,” but what you wrote is, excuse me, a stream of thoughts.
      Japanese shells produced damage in a radius larger than Russian shells, probably almost an order of magnitude (ours pierced a hole and almost everything - if it didn’t get into the room with hazardous materials). I mean, the Japanese shell did destruction on the area 6-8 sq. Feet, and ours - 1 foot = 305 mm).

      the fact that the Japanese shell had greater power (simply because of its greater weight and explosive content) was not disputed by anyone, but what side is the length of the scattering ellipse?
      1. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 12 June 2018 11: 21 New
        +1
        Well .. you probably messed up with arithmetic ..
        The area of ​​the ellipse three times larger means that the radii of the scattering ellipse are approximately 1,7 times different ...
        Because areas are referred to as squares of radii, and radii as 1: 1,75 times ..
        The dispersion area of ​​the shells is one value - it reflects the probability of them hitting the target - the accuracy of the fire.
        If the radii of destruction of shells are reflected on the dispersion ellipse, then an ellipse of the hit of the target will be obtained.
        When the ellipse of the defeat with the aiming error covers the target, then we can talk about the defeat of the target.
        If this is a vigorous loaf, then covering the target with an ellipse of defeat speaks of the guaranteed destruction of the target.
        If we shoot with ordinary charges, then we need a time interval for which the target will be completely defeated .. There are two ways - the effective shooting distance and the additional concentration of shooting several ships - this will reduce the time interval for hitting the target ...
        The Japanese used every opportunity ...

        With regard to stability, you still do not understand ..
        There are no stupid comparisons of meter and gram ...
        Otherwise, we won ..
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 12 June 2018 14: 07 New
          +2
          The area of ​​the ellipse three times larger means that the radii of the scattering ellipse are approximately 1,7 times different ...

          yes not a question, give values ​​in 1.7X.
          And by the way, this is not arithmetic, but even the geometry and area of ​​the ellipses are not calculated as well as in a circle. But not the point.
          You see, I asked you about specific numbers, and you answer ... but do not answer. you are having a conversation with yourself. For example
          The Japanese used every opportunity ...
          With regard to stability, you still do not understand ..
          There are no stupid comparisons of meter and gram ...

          ??
          Quote: Shturman_50
          Well .. you probably messed up with arithmetic ..
          The area of ​​the ellipse three times larger means that the radii of the scattering ellipse are approximately 1,7 times different ...
          Because areas are referred to as squares of radii, and radii as 1: 1,75 times ..
          The dispersion area of ​​the shells is one value - it reflects the probability of them hitting the target - the accuracy of the fire.
          If the radii of destruction of shells are reflected on the dispersion ellipse, then an ellipse of the hit of the target will be obtained.
          When the ellipse of the defeat with the aiming error covers the target, then we can talk about the defeat of the target.
          If this is a vigorous loaf, then covering the target with an ellipse of defeat speaks of the guaranteed destruction of the target.
          If we shoot with ordinary charges, then we need a time interval for which the target will be completely defeated .. There are two ways - the effective shooting distance and the additional concentration of shooting several ships - this will reduce the time interval for hitting the target ...
          The Japanese used every opportunity ...

          With regard to stability, you still do not understand ..
          There are no stupid comparisons of meter and gram ...
          Otherwise, we won ..

          ??
          Otherwise, we won ..

          As if in 1907, they took new shells of steel of normal quality and with sufficient explosive content. And if we had them in Tsushima, then the result would very likely have been different. But for the sake of all Russian sufferers and Japanese demons, what does ballistics have to do with it? She didn’t change ...
          1. Navigator_50
            Navigator_50 13 June 2018 07: 47 New
            0
            The projectile still has to hit the target and this is with the help of ballistics ..
            Well, or on a boat to the target to deliver and detonate ...
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 13 June 2018 10: 26 New
              +1
              Colleague, do not work. The fact that you do not have numbers, I already understood.
              Thank you.
              1. Navigator_50
                Navigator_50 15 June 2018 10: 24 New
                0
                Here you are specifically:
                (The range finders of Barr and Stroda gave a distance of 60 cab. Error up to 3 cab. (They also, with increasing distance, the error grew exponentially.) So with the rangefinders you can only start shooting, but the distance is determined by the fall of the shells.)
                The Japanese rangefinders had a larger base than the 2TOE, compare the accuracy yourself! Did you go to school?
                Calculate the accuracy of the pickup yourself ..
                1. Navigator_50
                  Navigator_50 15 June 2018 10: 27 New
                  0
                  It is clear that the bags are harder to roll .. (this is a colleague)!
                  If you do not understand that the area of ​​the ellipse and the circle are calculated according to the same formula S = (pi p square), then for the ellipse S = (pi * a * b), which is the same if a = b = R (This is class 7 - geometry .. also with squares and rectangles, etc.
                  1. Navigator_50
                    Navigator_50 15 June 2018 10: 31 New
                    0
                    That is, about the gun on the barrel and the extra barrel, you “moved out” ...
                    As well as moved out of overload .. stability, rolling period ..
                    Just as we moved out with the persistence of shooting ...

                    Good luck ...
                    1. Senior seaman
                      Senior seaman 15 June 2018 10: 52 New
                      +2
                      No, it’s you who have moved on all this, trying to talk the statement that the dispersion ellipse in Russian guns was three times larger than in Japanese.
                2. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 15 June 2018 10: 49 New
                  +2
                  Stumble! And what about the ballistic data of the guns for the rangefinders?
  30. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 15 June 2018 10: 25 New
    +1
    It was a "macaque versus koekak" war.
    Under the leadership of the English officers and English loans, the re-equipment of the Japanese squadron and preparation for Tsushima took place ..
    These are not Japanese - there is serious training here.

    The article itself is erroneous on the basis of - THE DEFEAT OF THE 2TH TOE NANESLA EXACTLY THE MID-CALIBER JAPANESE ARTILLERY.
    It was she who delivered the bulk of the explosives to the Russian flagships - disabled communications, destroyed control (and fire too), the ramp superstructures, deck mechanisms and devices, interrupted mains and hoses, control cables and command personnel ...

    Japanese heavy artillery fired four times less often - it was not the main factor in the tragedy. She destroyed the dilapidated floating casemates (sadly).

    It’s ridiculous to count hits - when armor doesn’t break through (!) If 4-5 shells exploded on the waist, then this is one local explosion, extended over time .... AND THE MAJOR IMPACT hit the FLAGMAN SHIPS ..
    In half an hour, the Eagle EDB would have gone to the bottom as a flagship.
    1. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 15 June 2018 10: 29 New
      0
      I explain the last time!

      - H. Togo was preparing for an operation against 2TOE. This is indicated by the battle plan (!).
      It would be better to ask how the Japanese squadron was preparing - what was the plan for preparing for the battle .. (new shells, new guns and new tactics) ..
      - The Russian squadron did not have a battle plan (!).
      As the Russian squadron was preparing, it is also known that they loaded what was ahead ..
  31. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 15 June 2018 10: 45 New
    0
    Senior sailor,
    If you are serious ... then I do not approve ..
    NEVER allow a tourist to shoot a projectile from a cannon.
    Have you seen the map of Father Russky?
    This is the Frunze district of Vladivostok ..
    Shoot from a gun - they will take you in half an hour ...

    No, for the money, fireworks are still in the yard ..

    Well, about the gun, I wrote that the idea failed completely,
    That is, we read here, we don’t read here. and fantasize?
    Do not fly into the astral plane. an hour? ...
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 15 June 2018 10: 57 New
      +1
      Do not fly into the astral plane. an hour?

      Not. I'm afraid to meet you there.
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 15 June 2018 11: 19 New
        0
        Regarding the shooting by tourists
        Russian Island

        + Museum "Voroshilov Battery"

        Military historical excursion. Route: the central square - Golden Bridge - Russian Bridge - Russky Island - driving past the FEFU campus (without arrival) - Museum of the Pacific Fleet “Voroshilov Battery” - Grand Duke Battery of the Vladivostok Fortress (1913) - the central square of Vladivostok.

        A shot from the gun is possible for an additional fee!

        http://riakon.ru/atr/travel/
        From which particular gun they don’t write, but for what I bought it, I’m selling it for that request
  32. Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 30 July 2018 07: 57 New
    0
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    Regarding the shooting by tourists
    Russian Island

    + Museum "Voroshilov Battery"

    Military historical excursion. Route: the central square - Golden Bridge - Russian Bridge - Russky Island - driving past the FEFU campus (without arrival) - Museum of the Pacific Fleet “Voroshilov Battery” - Grand Duke Battery of the Vladivostok Fortress (1913) - the central square of Vladivostok.

    A shot from the gun is possible for an additional fee!

    http://riakon.ru/atr/travel/
    From which particular gun they don’t write, but for what I bought it, I’m selling it for that request


    I read with amazement ...
    For me, a shot from a gun is a complex: target, projectile selection, aiming taking into account the EDC, shot and damage assessment. (entering amendments, switching to defeat, etc.)
    And you have a shot - thunder, smoke, stink and fire ..
    Moreover, there is gunfire.
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 1 August 2018 08: 51 New
      +1
      I read with amazement ...

      Colleague, no offense, but I, too, am sometimes completely perfect from you :)))
      For me, a shot from a gun is a complex: target, projectile selection, aiming taking into account the EDC, shot and damage assessment. (entering amendments, switching to defeat, etc.)

      Here and what for to the tourist all this crap? He pays money, he is allowed to pull the rope. The gun is bang bang. This is called "single shot"as a result of which, as you absolutely correctly deigned to notice
      thunder, smoke, stink and fire

      And you

      Not with me. At a travel company :))))
  33. Fox
    Fox 31 July 2018 20: 10 New
    +1
    Well this is how much you need to shovel literature! ... Respect to the author.