Military Review

Field Marshal Kutuzov in 1812. Ending

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After the bloody battle of Borodino, the Russian army did not receive the promised reinforcements (instead of the soldiers, Kutuzov received the wand of field marshal and 100 000 rubles), and therefore a retreat was inevitable. However, the circumstances of the evacuation of Moscow will forever remain a shameful stain on the reputation of the highest military and civilian leadership of the country. The enemy was left 156 guns, 74 974 guns, 39 846 sabers, 27 119 gun shells - and this despite the fact that weapons not enough, and in the Russian army at the end of 1812, it was officially prescribed to have 776 guns per battalion (1 000 people) - 200 privates and 24 noncommissioned officers were unarmed. Only in 1815, the number of guns was brought to the battalion 900. In addition, 608 old Russian banners and more 1 000 standards were left in Moscow. Russians have never left such a quantity of weapons and banners to anyone. At the same time, Mikhail I. Kutuzov, in his letter of September 4, solemnly assured the emperor: "All the treasures, the arsenal, and almost all the property, both official and private, were taken out of Moscow." But the worst thing was that thousands of wounded were left to 22,5 to die in the deserted city, who were "entrusted to the philanthropy of the French troops" (even from 10 to 17 thousands were left on the way from Borodino to Moscow). "My soul was torn apart by the moans of the wounded, left in the grip of the enemy," wrote Yermolov. It is not surprising that all this made a very difficult impression on the soldiers of the Russian army:


"The troops are in low spirits," reports N.N. Raevsky.

“Many people took off their uniforms and didn’t want to serve after Moscow’s vicious concessions,” recalls S. I. Maevsky, the head of the Kantuzov office.

"The escapes of the soldiers ... greatly increased after the surrender of Moscow ... In one day, four thousand of them were overfished," this is the testimony of the adjutant Kutuzov A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky.

FV Rostopchin and his secretary A. Ya. Bulgakov write in their memoirs that after the surrender of Moscow many in the army began to call Kutuzov the "darkest prince". Kutuzov himself left Moscow "so that, as much as possible, not to meet with anyone" (A. B. Golitsin). 2 (14) of September (the day of Moscow’s evacuation) the commander essentially stopped performing his functions and Barclay de Tolly, who "stayed 18 hours without departing from the horse," followed the order of the troops.

Field Marshal Kutuzov in 1812. Ending


At the council in Fili, Kutuzov ordered "to retreat along the Ryazan road." September followed the order from 2 to 5 (14-17), but on the night of 6 (18) September a new order was received by the commander in chief, according to which one Cossack regiment continued to move in the same direction, while the rest of the army turned to Podolsk and further on the Kaluga road to the south. Clausewitz wrote that "the Russian army (maneuver) perfectly fulfilled .... with enormous benefit for itself." Napoleon himself on St. Helena recognized that the "old fox Kutuzov" then "deceived him greatly" and called this maneuver the Russian army "beautiful." The honor of the “flank march” designation is attributed to Bagration, Barclay de Tolly, Bennigsen, Toll and many others, which speaks only of the naturalness of movement in this direction: the idea was “in the air”. In the novel "War and Peace" Leo Tolstoy wrote with some irony: "If we imagined ... just one army without chiefs, then this army could not do anything else but a return movement to Moscow, describing the arc on the side from which there was more food and the region was more abundant. The movement was ... it was so natural that the marauders of the Russian army ran off in this very direction. " The "flank march" near the village of Tarutino ended, where Kutuzov brought about 87 thousands of soldiers, 14 thousands of Cossacks and 622 guns. Alas, as Bagration had predicted, the top leadership of the Russian army was divided here into parties and groups that spent time in fruitless and harmful intrigues.

"Where is this fool? Redhead? Coward?" - shouted Kutuzov, pretending to have forgotten how to deliberately need the last name and trying to remember. When they decided to tell him whether Bennigsen meant it, the field marshal replied: "Yes, yes, yes!" So it was just the day of the Battle of Tarutino. Repeated before the eyes of the whole army история Bagration with Barclay ", - complained about E.Terle.

"Barclay ... saw the discord between Kutuzov and Bennigsen, but did not support either one or the other, and condemned both - the two weak old men, one of whom (Kutuzov) was in his eyes a" slacker "and the other ".

“Barclay and Bennigsen were at enmity from the very beginning of the war, all the time. Kutuzov also took the position of the“ third rejoicing ”towards them,” wrote N. A. Troitsky.

“I almost don’t go to the Main Apartment ... there is the intrigues of parties, envy, anger, and even more ... egoism, despite the circumstances of Russia that nobody cares about,” wrote N.N. Raevsky.

“Intrigues were endless,” recalled A.P.Ermolov.

"Everything that I see (in the Tarutinsky camp) inspires me with utter disgust," DS Dokhturov agrees with them. Recognized by his contemporaries as a great master of intrigue, Kutuzov remained a winner here, forcing Barclay de Tolly and then Bennigsen to leave the army. Barclay left 22 September (4 October) 1812 d. He had every right to say Lowenstern: "I gave the field marshal an army that was well-dressed, armed and not demoralized ... The field marshal did not want to share the glory of expelling the enemy from the sacred land of our Fatherland with anyone .... I brought the carriage up the mountain, and it will roll itself down from the mountain with a little guidance. "

Nevertheless, the mobilization services of the Russian army were working properly, and by mid-October Kutuzov had under his command about 130 thousands of soldiers and Cossacks, approximately 120 thousand militiamen and 622 guns. Napoleon, who was in Moscow, had an army of thousands of people in 116. The Russian army felt strong enough to push for an offensive. The first test of strength was the battle at the River Chernishny (Battle of Tarutino).

From 12 (24) of September 1812, the avant-garde of the Great Army (approximately 20-22 thousands of people) under the leadership of Murat stood idle at the Chernishna River in idleness. 4 (16) of October Kutuzov signed the dispositional attack on Murat’s squad, composed by Quarter General-General Tol, but Ermolov, wishing to “substitute” Konovnitsyn, who was the favorite of the commander-in-chief, left for an unknown destination. As a result, the next day there was not a single Russian division in the designated places. Kutuzov was furious, cruelly insulting two innocent officers. One of them (Lieutenant Colonel Eichen) then left the Kutuzov army. Yermolov, the commander-in-chief ordered “to be expelled from the service,” but he quickly reversed his decision. With a delay of 1 day, the Russian army still attacked the enemy. The infantry units were late (“You have everything in the language to attack, but you do not see that we are not able to do difficult maneuvers,” Kutuzov told Miloradovich about this). But the sudden attack of the Cossacks Orlov-Denisov was a success: "One desperate, frightened cry of the first Frenchman who saw the Cossacks, and everything that was in the camp, naked, wake up, threw guns, guns, horses, and ran anywhere. If the Cossacks were chasing the French without paying attention to what was behind and around them, they would have taken Murat and all that was there. The bosses wanted it. But it was impossible to move from the place of the Cossacks when they got to the booty and prisoners "(L. Tolstoy).

As a result of the loss of the tempo of the attack, the French came to their senses, lined up for battle and met the Russian regiments of Chasseurs who had come up with such close fire that, having lost several hundred people, including General Baggovut, the infantry turned back. Murat slowly and with dignity withdrew his troops beyond the Chernishna River to the Spas-Kupla. Believing that the massive attack of the retreating enemy would lead to its complete destruction, Bennigsen asked Kutuzov to provide troops for the pursuit. However, the commander-in-chief refused: “We did not know how to take Murat in the morning and arrive at the place on time, now there’s nothing to do,” he said. In this situation, Kutuzov was absolutely right.

The battle of Tarutino is traditionally highly valued in Russian historical literature. OV Orlik in the monograph "The Thunderstorm of the Twelfth Year" went, perhaps, the farthest, equating it in meaning to the battle on the Kulikovo field (1380). However, the insignificance of success was recognized even in the headquarters of the commander-in-chief. So PP Kononnitsyn believed that since Murat "was given the opportunity to retreat in order with little loss ... no one deserves an award for this cause."

In Moscow, Napoleon spent 36 days (from September 2 to October 7 old style). Marshals advised to leave the city immediately after the start of the fires, and from a military point of view, they were certainly right. However, there were also reasons for Napoleon, who claimed: "Moscow is not a military position, it is a political position." Just making sure that the Russians did not follow the peace proposals, Napoleon returned to the two-stage war plan he had previously rejected: spend the winter in the western Russian provinces or in Poland so that 1813 could start all over again in the spring. Still the Great Army numbered more than 89 000 infantrymen, some 14 000 cavalrymen and roughly 12 000 non-combatant (sick and wounded) warriors. The army leaving Moscow was escorted from 10 to 15 to thousands of wagons, into which "haphazardly crammed, furs, sugar, tea, books, paintings, actresses of the Moscow Theater" (A. Pastore). According to Segur, it all seemed like "a Tatar horde after a successful invasion."

Where did Napoleon lead his army? Soviet post-war historiography confirmed the opinion that Napoleon was going "through Kaluga to Ukraine", but Kutuzov, having guessed the plan of the enemy commander, saved Ukraine from the enemy invasion. However, Napoleon’s orders from October 11 (Marshal Victor and Generals Junot and Evers) are known to move to Smolensk. A.Kolenkur, F.-P.Segur and A.Zhomini report in their memoirs on the campaign of the French army to Smolensk. And, it should be recognized that this decision of Napoleon was quite logical and reasonable: after all, it was Smolensk who appointed the emperor to be the main base of the Great Army, it was in this city that the strategic stocks of food and fodder were to be created. Napoleon did not go to the Kaluga direction because he did not like the road he came to Moscow: with his movement the emperor intended only to cover Smolensk from Kutuzov. Reaching this goal under Maloyaroslavets, Napoleon did not go "through Kaluga to Ukraine", and, in accordance with his plan, he continued moving to Smolensk.

It is well known that after entering Napoleon in Moscow for 9 days he lost sight of the Russian army. Not everyone knows that Kutuzov found himself in a similar situation after Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow: the French left the city of October 7 (old style), but only the October Cossacks from Major General I.D. Ilovaisky brought this sensational news to the Russian camp in Tarutino. Due to the ignorance of the location of the French army, the corps of General Dokhturov almost died. Partisans of the Seslavin detachment saved him from defeat. On October 9, the commander of one of the partisan detachments, Major-General I.S. Dorokhov, told Kutuzov that the Ornano cavalry and the Brusy infantry had entered Fominskoe. Not suspecting that the whole "Great Army" was following them, Dorokhov asked for help in attacking the enemy. The commander-in-chief dispatched Dokhturov to the Fominsky Corps, who, having done an exhausting many-kilometer march, arrived in the village of Aristovo the next day. At dawn 11 October, the Russians were to attack the superior forces of the French, but at midnight in Aristovo, captain A.N. Seslavin delivered a captive noncommissioned officer, who said that the whole "Great Army" was moving to Maloyaroslavets. Upon receipt of this news, Kutuzov, who lost the enemy army, "shed tears of joy" and can be understood: if Napoleon had moved his troops not to Smolensk, but to Petersburg, the Russian commander-in-chief would have waited for the disgraceful resignation.

"Your responsibility will remain if the enemy is able to send a significant corps to Petersburg ... for with the army entrusted to you ... you have all the means to avert this misfortune," Alexander warned him in a letter from October 2 (October October 14 new style).

Dokhturov, who did not have time to rest, arrived at Maloyaroslavets on time. 12 (24) October, he joined the battle with the division of Delzona, which had the honor of the first to start the battle of Borodino. In this battle, Delzon died, and the famous partisan, Major General I. S. Dorokhov, was severely wounded (from the consequences of which he died). In the afternoon, the corps of General Rajewski and two divisions from Davout Corps approached Maloyaroslavets and immediately fought. The main forces of the opponents did not enter the battle: both Napoleon and Kutuzov watched from the side of a fierce battle in which about 30 thousands of Russians and 20 thousands of French participated. The city passed from hand to hand, according to various sources, from 8 to 13 times, only 200 survived from 40 houses, the streets were filled up with corpses. The battlefield was left for the French, Kutuzov withdrew his troops to 2, 7 km to the south and took a new position there (but in the report to the king from 13 in October 1812, he said that Maloyaroslavets remained with the Russians). October 14 and the Russian and French armies almost simultaneously retreated from Maloyaroslavets. Kutuzov withdrew his troops to the village of Detchino and the Linen Factory, and, according to the memoirs of his contemporaries, was ready to continue the retreat even beyond Kaluga (“Kaluga is waiting for the fate of Moscow,” Kutuzov told his entourage). Napoleon issued an order: "We went to attack the enemy ... But Kutuzov retreated before us ... and the emperor decided to turn back." Then he led his army to Smolensk.

It should be recognized that from a tactical point of view, the battle for Maloyaroslavets, which Kutuzov put on a par with the Battle of Borodino, was lost by the Russian army. But it is about him that Segur will later tell the veterans of the Great Army: "Do you remember this ill-fated battlefield, where the conquest of the world stopped, where 20 years of continuous victories crumbled into dust, where the great collapse of our happiness began?" Under Maloyaroslavets, Napoleon for the first time in his life abandoned the general battle and for the first time voluntarily turned his back on the enemy. Academician Tarle believed that it was from Maloyaroslavets, not Moscow, that the true retreat of the Great Army began.

Meanwhile, because of Kutuzov’s unexpected retreat, the Russian army lost contact with Napoleon’s army and overtook it only at Vyazma. Napoleon himself 20 October said A. Kolenkuru, that "he can not understand the tactics of Kutuzov, who left us in complete peace". However, on October 21, a detachment of Miloradovich reached the old Smolensk road earlier than troops of Beauharnais, Poniatowski and Davout passed through it. He missed the first of them in order to be able to attack Davout's corps with superior forces. However, the “Great Army” was still great at that time, Beogharna and Poniatowski turned his troops back, while Kutuzov once again refused to send reinforcements: “he heard the cannonade as clearly as if it was held in his front, but despite on the insistence of all the significant persons of the Main Apartment, he remained an indifferent spectator of this battle ... He did not want to risk and chose to undergo the censure of the whole army, ”recalled General V. I. Levenshtern.

“It is better to build the enemy to build a golden bridge, rather than letting him break the chain,” so Kutuzov explained his tactics to the English Commissioner R. Wilson.

Nevertheless, near Vyazma, the French losses were several times greater than the losses of the Russians. Thus began the famous parallel march: "This maneuver was very well calculated by him (Kutuzov)," wrote Jomini, "he kept the French army under constant threat to overtake it and cut off the retreat path. Due to the latter circumstance, the French army was forced to force the march and move without the slightest recreation".

After the battle of Vyazma, frosts began, and "the vanguard of our most powerful ally, General Frost, appeared" (R. Wilson). Kutuzov’s auxiliary army "called the frost and the Russian memoirist S.N. Glinka. However, the General Frost ally was very doubtful, because he didn’t make out where they were, and where others were. The case was complicated by the theft of quartermasters and abusive suppliers:" that it is impossible to repel the enemy with bare hands, and shamelessly used this opportunity to enrich themselves, "- A.D. Bestuzhev-Ryumin recalled.

Even Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich did not consider it shameful to cash in on the Russian army: in the fall of 1812, he sold horses to the Yekaterinoslav regiment 126, 45 of which turned out to be “slapped” and “shot immediately, so as not to infect others”, “unfavorable 55 was ordered sell for anything, "and only 26 horses were" ranked as regiments. " As a result, even the soldiers of the privileged Life Guards Semenov regiment did not receive coats and boots.

"I protected my feet from frost, thrusting them into the fur hats of the French grenadiers, with which the road was littered. My hussars suffered terribly ... Our infantry was terribly upset. Nothing makes a person so craven as cold: if the soldiers managed to climb somewhere something under the roof, then there was no way to drive them out of there ... we were no less hostile to the enemy, "recalled General Levenshtern.

The situation with the army’s food supply was also extremely bad. On November 28, Lieutenant A.V. Chicherin wrote in his diary that "the guards are already 12 days, and the army has not received bread for a whole month." Hundreds of Russian soldiers every day were out of action, not because of injuries, but because of hypothermia, malnutrition and elementary overwork. Not inclined to grieve the king with the truth Kutuzov in a letter to Alexander from 7 in December 1812 writes that soon the army will be able to catch up with at least 20 000 recovered. About how many people will never be able to catch up with the army, the field marshal chose not to report. It is estimated that Napoleon’s losses on the way from Moscow to Vilna amounted to approximately 132,7 thousand people, the losses of the Russian army were not less than 120 thousand people. Thus, F. Stendal had the full right to write that "the Russian army arrived in Vilna not in the best shape than the French." Moving against the enemy army, Russian troops reached the village of Krasnoe, where 3-6 (15-18) November, a number of clashes with the enemy occurred. November 15 A young guard led by General Horn knocked out a fairly strong Russian detachment of Russian General Ozhanovsky from Red (22-23 thousands of soldiers with 120 guns). 16 November Napoleon continued to maneuver in an offensive spirit. Here is how the sergeant of the French army of Bourgogne describes the events of those days: "While we were standing in Krasnoe and its environs, the army in 80 000 people surrounded us ... there were Russians everywhere, obviously expecting to overpower us without difficulty ... The Emperor, bored by this the hordes decided to get rid of it. After going through the Russian camp and attacking the village, we forced the enemy to throw part of the artillery into the lake, after which most of their infantry sat in houses, some of which were on fire, and there we fought with hand-to-hand fighting. at of bloody battle was that the Russian retreated from their positions, but not removed. "

For two days under the Red, the emperor expected to hear from the "bravest of the brave" - ​​Marshal Ney, who marched in the rearguard of the Great Army. On November 17, making sure that Ney's troops were blocked and had no chance of salvation, Napoleon began to withdraw his troops. All the battles under Krasny were approximately the same: Russian troops alternately attacked on the march three corps of the Great Army (Beaugarne, Davout and Nei) as they advanced towards Red. Each of these corps was surrounded for some time, but all of them came out of the encirclement, losing mainly completely decomposed and incompetent soldiers. This is how one of the episodes of this battle was described by L. N. Tolstoy in the novel War and Peace: “I give you guys this column,” he said (Miloradovich), approaching the troops and pointing the cavalry to the French. And the cavalry barely moving horses, driving them with spurs and sabers, trotting after strong tensions, drove up to the donated convoy, that is, to the crowd of frostbitten, stiff and hungry French; and the donated convoy threw weapons and surrendered, which she has long wanted. " Denis Davydov also draws a similar picture in his memoirs: “The Battle of Red, bearing the magnificent name of a three-day battle for some military writers, may be called just a three-day search for the hungry, half-naked French; by all means, trophies like my own could be proud of it, but not the main army. Entire crowds of the French hurriedly threw their weapons at the mere appearance of our small detachments on the high road. " But how, according to the descriptions of the same D. Davydov, the famous Old Guard looked under Red: "The Old Guard finally arrived, in the midst of which Napoleon himself was ... The enemy, seeing our noisy crowds, took the gun on the trigger and proudly continued on, not adding not a single step ... I will never forget the free walking and terrible posture of death of threatened warriors by all births ... The Guard with Napoleon passed in the middle of the crowd of our Cossacks like a stop-iron ship between fishing boats. "

And again, almost all memoirists paint pictures of the weakness and lack of initiative of the leadership of the Russian army, whose commander-in-chief, by all accounts, clearly sought to avoid meeting Napoleon and his guard:

“Kutuzov, for his part, avoiding meeting Napoleon and his guard, not only did not persecute the enemy persistently, but remaining almost in place, was all the time significantly behind” (D. Davydov).

Kutuzov under Red "acted indecisively mainly out of fear of meeting face to face with a genius commander" (M.N. Pokrovsky).

Georges de Chombre, a French historian and participant in a campaign to Russia, believed that under the Red the French had survived only because of Kutuzov’s slowness.

“This old man accomplished only half and badly what he so wisely conceived,” wrote F.-P. Segur.

The Russian commander-in-chief hardly deserved so many reproaches: a mortally tired, sick man did more than his strength allowed. We have already told you how much suffering young men experienced on the way from Maloyaroslavets to Vilna, for the old man this path became a godfather, in a few months he died.

"Kutuzov believed that the French troops, in the event of a perfect cut off of the path of retreat, could sell the success dearly, which, in the opinion of the old field marshal, without any efforts on our part is beyond doubt," explained the tactics of the commander-in-chief, AP Ermolov. A captured French general, M.-L.Plyuibisk, recalled that before Berezina, Kutuzov said in a conversation with him: "I, confident of your death, did not want to sacrifice for this not a single soldier." However, it is hardly worth taking these words of Kutuzov seriously: the commander-in-chief saw perfectly well that the winter way was killing Russian soldiers rather than enemy bullets. Everyone demanded rapid maneuvers and brilliant results from Kutuzov, and he had to somehow explain his “inaction”. The truth was that the majority of Russian troops were unable to move faster than the French, and therefore could not “cut off” or surround them. The main forces of the Russian army struggled to keep up with the pace set by the retreating French, giving the right to attack the remnants of the "Great Army" to light cavalry detachments, which were easily captured by the "non-combatants" but could not cope with the combat forces of the French army.

Nevertheless, in the words of A.Z. Manfred, after the Red "Great Army" "ceased to be not only great, it ceased to be an army." There were no more than 35 thousand men in combat-ready soldiers, tens of thousands of unarmed and sick people stretched for this core, stretching for many kilometers.

And what about Her? On November 18, not yet knowing that Napoleon had already left Red, the marshal tried to break through the troops of Miloradovich, Paskevich and Dolgoruky. He had 7-8 thousands of combat-ready soldiers, as many sick and wounded, and 12 guns. He was surrounded on all sides, his guns were hit, the main forces of the Russian army stood in front, and the Dnieper, barely covered with ice, was behind. She was offered to surrender: "Field Marshal Kutuzov would not have dared to make such a cruel offer to such a famous warrior if he had at least one chance of salvation. But 80 thousands of Russians are standing before him, and if he doubts this, Kutuzov invites him to send someone walk along the Russian ranks and count their strengths, "it was written in a letter delivered by an envoy.

“Have you ever heard, sir, that the imperial marshals surrendered to captivity?” She answered.

“To advance through the forest!” He ordered his troops, “There are no roads? To advance without roads! Go to the Dnieper and cross the Dnieper! The river is not completely frozen yet? It will freeze! March!”

On the night of November 19, 3 000 soldiers and officers approached the Dnieper, 2 200 of them fell through the ice. The rest, led by Neh, came to the emperor. "She fought like a lion ... he had to die, he had no other chance of salvation, except for his strength of will and a firm desire to save Napoleon his army ... this feat will be forever memorable in the annals of military history," he wrote in his memoirs V. I. Levenshtern.

"If the goal of the Russians was to cut off Napoleon and the marshals and capture them, and this goal was not only not achieved, and all attempts to achieve this goal were destroyed every time in the most shameful way, then the last campaign period is quite rightly presented by the French near victories and completely unfairly Russian seems victorious, "- wrote L. Tolstoy.

"Napoleon ruined what he decided to wage a victorious war with the Russians. Most surprisingly, it happened: Napoleon did wage a victorious war with the Russians. Everywhere the Russians retreated, Napoleon defeated, the Russians left Moscow, Napoleon entered Moscow, the Russians tolerated defeat, Napoleon suffered victories. It ended with Napoleon who suffered his last victory at Berezina and galloped off to Paris, "one of the authors of World History, processed by Satyricon A. Averchenko, ironically. So what happened on Berezina?

September 8 (old style) Aide-Adjutant A.I. Chernyshov brought to Kutuzov a plan drawn up in St. Petersburg to defeat the French troops on Berezin. It consisted in the following: the army of Chichagov (from the south) and Wittgenstein (from the north) were in the area of ​​Borisov to block the path of the French troops pursued by the Main Army of Kutuzov. Until mid-November, it really seemed that Napoleon would not be able to leave Russia: 4 (16) in November, the vanguard of Admiral P.V. Chichagov captured Minsk, where huge stocks of food, fodder and military equipment were waiting for the French army. The Cossack regiment of Chernyshov, already familiar to us, was sent to Wittgenstein’s army with a message about victory, and Chichagov had no doubt that his movement towards Berezina would be supported from the north. On the way, this detachment intercepted the 4's couriers, sent by Napoleon to Paris and freed the captured General Vincengorod (F.F. Winzengorod was the commander of the first partisan detachment of the war 1812, created by order of Barclay de Tolly. He was taken prisoner in October in Moscow captured by the French). 9 (21) November, Chichagov’s army defeated the Polish units of Bronikovsky and Dombrowski and captured the city of Borisov. The admiral was so sure of the success of the operation that he sent Napoleon omens to the surrounding villages. For "greater reliability," he ordered to catch and bring to him all the little ones. However, on November, 11 (23) troops of Udine broke into Borisov and almost captured Chichagov himself, who fled to the right bank, leaving "his lunch with silverware." However, the admiral burned the bridge over the Berezina, so the position of the French was still critical - the width of the river at that place was 107 meters. Murat even advised Napoleon to "save himself before it is too late" and to secretly flee with a detachment of Poles, which caused the emperor's wrath. While 300 soldiers were south of Borisov, they were guided across the bridge in full view of the Russian troops, Napoleon personally supervised the construction of bridges near the village north of this city. Studenki. French sappers led by military engineer J.-B. Ebla coped with the task: standing up to the throat in icy water, they built two bridges - for infantry and cavalry and for carts and artillery. 14 (26) in November, the first to cross the coast was the Udino corps, which entered the battle on the move and, rejecting the small barrage of Russians, allowed the rest of the army to start crossing. As early as the morning of November 15 (27), Chichagov assumed that the events at Studenka were only a demonstration with the aim of deceiving him, and Wittgenstein managed to pass by Studenki to Borisov on the same day without finding the crossing of the French troops. On this day, the troops of Wittgenstein and the vanguard of Platov were surrounded and the captive division of General Partuno was surrendered (about 7 000 people). 16 (28) of November was supported by the main forces of Platov and the vanguard of Miloradovich to Borisov, and Chichagov and Wittgenstein finally understood what was happening in Studenka, but it was already too late: Napoleon with the Old Guard and other combat-ready units crossed the Berezina a day earlier. On this day, the army of Witggenstein attacked Victor's corps on the left bank of the Berezina, and Chichagov's army on the right bank struck Udino's troops, and so powerful that Napoleon brought Ney's corps into battle and even the guard. 17 (29) November Napoleon ordered Victor to go to the right bank, after which the bridges across the Berezina were set on fire. On the left bank, 10 000 remained sick and practically unarmed people, who were soon destroyed or taken prisoner. For Napoleon, they not only did not represent any value, but were even harmful: every state and every government needs dead heroes, but absolutely no need for living people with disabilities who tell the war differently than they should and require all sorts of benefits. In the twentieth century, the leaders of North Vietnam understood this very well, who sincerely hated the Americans who had fought with them, but ordered their snipers not to kill, but to cripple US soldiers.

Contemporaries did not consider the crossing of the Berezina as a defeat of Napoleon. Z.de Mestre called the Berezinsky operation "just a few loud strikes on the tail of the tiger." A. Zhomini, A. Kolenkur, A. Tier, K. Klauzevits and many others considered it a strategic victory for Napoleon.

“Napoleon gave us the bloodiest battle ... The greatest commander achieved his goal. Praise him!”, Said engineer Chichagov’s army officer Martos, who responded to the events of the last day of the Berezinsky epic.

"The eyewitnesses and participants in the case had forever united with Berezina: the strategic victory of Napoleon over the Russians when, it seemed, he was threatened with complete destruction, and at the same time a terrible picture of the massacre after the Emperor's transfer to the western bank of the river," 1938, academician E.V. Tarle. The blame for the failure of the Berezinsky operation was assigned to Admiral Chichagov. “Wittgenstein saved Petersburg, my husband –Russia, and Chichagov - Napoleon” - even Byron knew about these words of E. I. Kutuzov. Langeron called the admiral "Napoleon's guardian angel", Zhukovsky "threw out" all the text about Chichagov from his poem "The Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors", Derzhavin ridiculed him in the epigram, and Krylov in the Pike and the Cat fable. However, the documents show that it was Chichagov’s troops that caused the greatest damage to Napoleon’s army: “Except for laying down arms, the entire loss of the enemy belongs more to the action of Admiral Chichagov’s troops,” AP Yermolov reported. The English Commissioner Wilson reported: “I did not hear from anyone that Admiral Chichagov deserved disapproval. The local situation was such that it did not allow to go to the enemy. We (ie, Kutuzov and his headquarters at which Wilson was) were to blame because that two days were in Red, two days in Kopys, why the enemy was free to cross the river. " However, society needed a scapegoat, but since Kutuzov at that time was already perceived by all as the “savior of Russia,” and Wittgenstein, who reflected the advance of Udino’s avant-garde on Petersburg, was called the savior of Petropol and the second Suvorov, the public Chichagov was brought.

Conditions for the retreat of the Napoleonic army from Berezina to Vilna became even more destructive. It was after the crossing of Napoleon that the most severe frosts struck. The most amazing thing is that under these conditions the French continued to carry along Russian captives, a number of which they brought to Paris. Among them were V.A. Perovsky (great-uncle of the famous Sophia Perovskaya) and private soldier Semenov, who remained in France, the ancestor of the no less famous Georges Simenon. 21 November 1812 (old style) Napoleon wrote the last ("funeral") 29 bulletin in which he admitted defeat, explaining it to the vicissitudes of the Russian winter. On November 23, the emperor left his army, leaving command of the remnants of the troops to Murat (who in January 1813, in turn, left the army on E. Beauharnais and left for Naples). It should immediately be said that the departure of Napoleon was not fleeing from the army: he did everything he could, the remnants of the army moved to the border without stopping, and after 8 days after the emperor left, Marshal Ney was the last of the French to cross the Neman. "Emperor Napoleon left the army to go to Paris, where his presence became necessary. Political considerations prevailed over those considerations that could make him stay at the head of his troops. More importantly, even in the interests of our army, it seemed alive and terrible, despite the failure. It was necessary to appear before Germany, already hesitating in its intentions ... It was necessary to let France know, anxious and deafly worried, doubtful friends and secret enemies that Napoleon did not die in terrible mischief tvii, befell his legions, "- wrote Bourgogne (not only the marshals, but the sergeants of the French army turns out to be an expert in strategy).

“In these 8 days, Napoleon himself wasn’t at risk anymore, and his presence could not change anything for the better. The departure of the emperor was, from a military-political point of view, necessary for the speedy creation of a new army,” E. Tarle admitted. And it was necessary to create an army: according to Georges de Chombre in December 1812, Napoleon had 58, 2 thousands of soldiers, of whom only 14 266 people belonged to the central grouping of the "Great Army", the rest were part of the flank groupings J.- E. Macdonald and J.-L. Rainier. Kutuzov brought the entire 27,5 to thousands of people to the Neman. At the same time, according to the testimony of all the memoirists, the Russian army "lost sight" and looked more like a peasant militia than a regular army. Seeing this crowd, mistrustfully and not keeping pace with the parade in Vilna, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich indignantly exclaimed: “They can only fight!”.

"The war spoils the army," Alexander I agreed with him, referring to the deterioration of the personnel structure due to losses and recruiting by untrained recruits.

Kutuzov was showered with awards, including the Order of St. George I, the portrait of Alexander I, studded with diamonds, a golden sword with diamonds and much more. The emperor everywhere emphasized his respect for the commander-in-chief, walked with him "hand in hand", hugged him, but, strangely enough, still did not trust him: "I know that the field marshal did not do anything of what he had to do. He avoided, as far as this was in his power, any actions against the enemy. All his successes were forced by external force ... But the Moscow nobility is behind him and want him to lead the nation to the glorious end of this war ... However, now I I will not leave my army and will not allow inconsistencies in the order and Field Marshal, "- said Alexander in conversation with Wilson.

With awards in general, there were a lot of insults and misunderstandings.

"Many awards are handed out, but only a few are not given by chance," Lieutenant-General N. N. Raevsky wrote to his wife.

“Intrigue is an abyss, others were rewarded with rewards, and the other was not domesticated,” General A.Rimsky-Korsakov complained to the Minister of the Interior.

"For one decent, five trashy are produced, to which all the witnesses are," the Life Guards rebelled Colonel S.N. Marin.

This is not surprising. According to the classification of L.N.Gumilev (proposed in the work "Ethnogenesis and Earth's Biosphere"), the Patriotic War of 1812 should be referred to the most terrible and dangerous for the nation type of wars in which the most active (passionate) part of the population of the country dies, sacrificing themselves in the name of saving the Motherland and the places of fallen heroes, they inevitably engage in prudent and cynical selfish subpassionaries (a typical example of a subpassional personality is Boris Drubetskaya from L. Tolstoy’s novel War and Peace).

Kutuzov did not want to continue the war in Europe. First, the field marshal rightly assumed that the destruction of Napoleon and his empire would be beneficial only to Great Britain and the results of the victory over Napoleonic France would not be taken by Russia, but by England: “I’m not at all convinced whether the complete destruction of Napoleon and his army would be a great blessing for the Universe His legacy will not be gained by Russia or any other of the mainland powers, but by that power that now dominates the seas, and then its predominance will be unbearable ", - even under Maloyaroslavets l Kutuzov Wilson. Secondly, he understood that with the expulsion of the enemy from the territory of Russia, the people's war ended. The attitude to the foreign campaign in Russian society was generally negative. In the Russian provinces they said loudly that "Russia has already done a miracle and that now that the Fatherland has been saved, it has no need to sacrifice for the good of Prussia and Austria, whose union is worse than outright hostility" (N.K.Shilder), and the Penza province even recalled her militia. However, Alexander I already imagined himself as a new Agamemnon, leader and leader of kings: "God sent me power and victory, so that I could bring peace and tranquility to the universe," he declared absolutely earnestly in 1813. Therefore, in the name of peace, war began again.

24 December 1812 was the Russian army under the formal command of Kutuzov, but in the presence of Alexander I, who was in command of everything, came out of Vilna. 1 January 1813 Russian troops crossed the Neman, but that's another story.

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Field Marshal Kutuzov in 1812
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  1. andrewkor
    andrewkor 29 May 2018 07: 47
    0
    Already an entire hour article and not a single comment, strange!
    1. seti
      seti 29 May 2018 08: 41
      +4
      Because the article is coldly accepted by the community.
    2. akunin
      akunin 29 May 2018 09: 14
      +3
      Duc sediment after reading. God’s business won, and the dignity and sharing of awards upset.
  2. Nikitin
    Nikitin 29 May 2018 07: 50
    +9
    Napoleon entered the Kaluga direction not at all because he did not like the road on which he came to Moscow: with his movement the emperor intended only to cover Smolensk from Kutuzov. Reaching this goal pod Maloyaroslavets, Napoleon did not go "through Kaluga to Ukraine", but, in accordance with his plan, continued to move to Smolensk.

    A. The alternative story has gone!
    According to the author, Napoleon went south from Borovsk, attacked him to Maloyaroslavets, but specially DO NOT go any further. Then, along the SAME road, I went back to Borovsk. Going back and forth of a huge army with huge convoys during the day and it turns out to be his goal.belay fool The author would take a look at the map: who in the HEALTHY mind will make such movements? If Napoleon wanted to go to Smolensk, then he would go along the Smolensk road, covering the south, for example, in Vereya. And not the whole army
    1. Nikitin
      Nikitin 29 May 2018 08: 40
      +9
      В Soviet historiography post-war years, the opinion was firmly established that Napoleon went "through Kaluga to Ukraine", while Kutuzov, having unraveled the plan of the enemy commander, saved Ukraine from the enemy invasion

      Nonsense: in Soviet historiography, the majority opinion was that Napoleon was going to SMOLENSK (see map above), but through the undigested Kaluga. He was forced to walk along the devastated Smolensk road, where his army was starving (and not at all from frost) and began to dry out.
      Kutuzov, who had lost the enemy’s army, “burst into tears of joy” and can be understood: if Napoleon had moved his troops not to Smolensk, but to Petersburg, the Russian commander-in-chief would have been awaited by a shameful resignation.

      Did the author give him a handkerchief? The author would remember, why did Napoleon leave Moscow in the winter? A-he did not have the strength and time and supplies for the winter, especially for the offensive on Petersburg .. His salvation is south and immediately! And Kutuzov, unlike the author, knew this very well, and therefore stood in the south.
      It should be recognizedthat from a tactical point of view, the battle for Maloyaroslavets, which Kutuzov put on a par with the battle of Borodino, was lost the Russian army.

      Nothing follows: with what fright? The enemy is stopped, went back, what else is needed?
      Contemporaries did not consider the crossing of the Berezina as a defeat of Napoleon. Z.de Mestre called the Berezinsky operation "just a few loud strikes on the tail of the tiger." A. Zhomini, A. Kolenkur, A. Tier, K. Klauzevits and many others considered it a strategic victory for Napoleon.
      “Napoleon gave us the bloodiest battle ... The greatest commander achieved his goal. Praise him!”, Said engineer Chichagov’s army officer Martos, who responded to the events of the last day of the Berezinsky epic.

      Yes, yes, but the author knows that in French there is such an expression “C'est la bérézina” - “This is the Berezina.” and what does it mean in Russian- "full c (end)"?
      Foolishly, probably, has appeared.

      The author of libel can notice the following: Kutuzov completed the task of liberating Russia and completed it with losses less than the French.
      A trip abroad was already the level of the Emperor
    2. Severomor
      Severomor 29 May 2018 12: 15
      +2
      Quote: Nikitin-
      If Napoleon wanted to go to Smolensk, then he would go along the Smolensk road, covering the south, for example, in Vereya. And not the whole army


      “We could never understand those who so stubbornly uphold the idea that Napoleon should have chosen a different path for his return trip, and not the one along which he came.
      Where could he have been content with the army besides stockpiled warehouses? What could give the undeveloped terrain of the army, which could not lose time and was forced to constantly settle bivouacs in large masses?
      Which food commissioner would agree to go ahead of this army to requisition food, and which Russian institution would follow his orders?
      After all, in a week the whole army would starve to death. ”

      Carl von Clausewitz “1812 Year”
      1. Nikitin
        Nikitin 29 May 2018 13: 30
        +2
        Quote: Severomor
        Where could he have been content with the army besides stockpiled warehouses? What could give undeveloped terrain of the army, which could not lose time and was forced to constantly settle bivouacs in large masses?

        Thatthat gave an undeveloped area on the way to Moscow. For Napoleon went on a light hike, practically WITHOUT supplies, even medical carts were abandoned in Gomel. All supplies (except for military) for the army, he took in Russia
        Quote: Severomor
        Where could he have been content with the army besides stockpiled warehouses?

        He took supplies in Vyazma, Dorogobuzh, Moscow. On the way back, I wanted to take the same in Kaluga and around
        Quote: Severomor
        in a week the whole army would die of starvation. ”

        Without Kaluga, she began to die out
        1. Severomor
          Severomor 29 May 2018 15: 42
          +1
          Seems to me Carl von Clausewitz is wrong
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 30 May 2018 09: 20
            0
            Quote: Severomor
            Seems to me Carl von Clausewitz is wrong

            He is also a man yes
  3. Korsar4
    Korsar4 29 May 2018 08: 24
    +3
    A good selection of quotes.
  4. Boris55
    Boris55 29 May 2018 08: 30
    0
    The goal of any war is to seize the resources of another country. Did Napoleon attack Russia for two junk carts? All researchers writing with admiration for the shameful defeat of the Russian army near Borodino, skillfully blabbering the discussion of this issue, switching our attention to various "trifles" that really happened.
    Napoleon helped the Russian Tsar to destroy the rebellious Moscow merchants, who stood like a bone in the throat of foreign capital settled in St. Petersburg and did not allow them to buy up the Russian "cream". In part, he managed to do it. That is why Napoleon did not go to war in the capital - St. Petersburg.
    Do not forget that all the reigning persons of Europe were tied by kinship, including the Russian tsar. To help your "brother" is a holy cause.
    1. bober1982
      bober1982 29 May 2018 08: 42
      +5
      Quote: Boris55
      To help your "brother" is a holy cause.

      Napoleon was not reigning special, it was an impostor on the throne (a monster in treads), about the rebellious merchants, like a bone in the throat of foreign capital, you certainly catch fear.
      Kutuzov was the savior of Russia, all kinds of modern research on this subject should be regarded with suspicion and mistrust.
      1. Boris55
        Boris55 29 May 2018 09: 08
        0
        Quote: bober1982
        Napoleon was not reigning special, it was an impostor on the throne

        This is so, but he himself did not come to power. Those who promoted it knew exactly why they were doing it. I mean bankers.
        Quote: bober1982
        about rebellious merchants like a bone in the throat of foreign capital

        Western capital is always criminal and individual capital. Merchants - this, according to modern standards, managers are put on the management of certain affairs created on public capital. At any competitive events for the implementation of certain projects, our social capital interrupted Western.
        Quote: bober1982
        Kutuzov was the savior of Russia

        Kutuzov was the savior of Western capital. At least I tried.
        1. bober1982
          bober1982 29 May 2018 09: 23
          +1
          Quote: Boris55
          Those who promoted it knew exactly why they were doing it. I mean bankers.

          I totally agree.
          1. Boris55
            Boris55 29 May 2018 09: 48
            0
            Quote: bober1982
            I totally agree.

            In addition to the article: Evgeny Spitsyn. "History of Russia. Issue No. 45. World War 1812 of the Year: Known and Unknown"
    2. Trilobite Master
      Trilobite Master 29 May 2018 12: 16
      +6
      Boris55 as always wrong.
      Let's start with the fact that Moscow was the center of the Jewish-Masonic conspiracy against Russia. Ivan Kalita also secretly resettled six hundred and sixty-six Jewish families to Moscow, with whose money he bought Russian cities and regions from the Russian Golden Horde tsar in order to give them away to these same Jewish families. He also forbade the construction of straight streets in Moscow. As a result, from a bird's eye view, Moscow has become similar to the interweaving of kabalistic symbols, some of which were decoded by Professor Chudinov. This is especially clearly seen if you look at the plans of Moscow in the early 18th century. In fact, in the XIV century. Moscow has become a Judeo-Masonic press, set in the center of Russia and accumulating all the negative energy of the West.
      Next.
      In order to oppose at least something to this black energy, the great truly Russian ruler Peter Alekseevich, having analyzed the energy flows of the universe, on the site of the ancient Arkona founded a counterweight to the black Moscow energy - a new light energy center capable of accumulating the creative energy of the Russian people. It was built according to the traditions of ancient Russian architecture - with wide straight streets directing energy to the most important points of the Russian world. The main rays were and remain the Nevsky Prospect, which is responsible for the energy connection with the Urals, Siberia and the Russian Far East and passing through Arkaim, ul. Pea, directed as a sword in the direction of Moscow and Voznesensky Avenue, connecting the Russian center of power with Constantinople and the ancient Egyptian energy resonators. Such an energy triangle: Arkona - Thebes - Arkaim, which encloses the Masonic seal - Moscow.
      If Peter succeeded in completing the project of building the Russian center of power in full, we would live in a completely different, cleaner and brighter world, but Moscow Jews managed to distort one of the main rays - Nevsky Prospect and the system could not work at full power.
      In addition, the evil energy of the Masonic Moscow gave a serious disturbance, whirling in a black whirlwind in the center of Russia and throwing its tentacles in all directions.
      The main successor to the cause of Peter the Great was Paul the First. He realized very early all his responsibility, for the world and the light forces of Russia. As a fourteen-year-old teenager, he made a secret journey to Malta, where in one of the ancient cave temples he combined a Russian Vedic ceremony by marriage with the heir to the Roman emperors. The bride was soon stolen by Moscow masons and hid, but in due time her son was born, who was to play a great historical role. Inconsolable Paul returned to Russia and began to prepare himself for the kingdom. Later he had another son.
      Contrary to popular belief, Paul was not killed by a conspiracy. Those who believe in this version know nothing about the true story. The death of Paul was a voluntary sacred sacrifice, which released tremendous energy, allowing his son Alexander to confront the black energy of the West.
      In 1807, Alexander and Napoleon meet in Tilsit, get to know each other by a characteristic mole behind the left ear, understand that they are siblings and agree on a joint fight against world evil. Napoleon had to eliminate the Masonic press in the center of Russia — Moscow, and Alexander, meanwhile, using the sacral knowledge and energy received from his father, had to reconfigure the energy center in Arkon accordingly.
      Everything went perfectly. The Jewish-Masonic center was destroyed, the light forces triumphed over the next hundred years. Angry masons will raise their heads and re-transfer the capital of Russia to Moscow, but this will be a completely different story ...
      wassat wassat wassat
      PS
      Dear Muscovites! On the poor, whom I currently pretended not to be offended. Moscow is the capital of our Motherland and I personally have nothing against this beautiful city. If anyone offended - please excuse me. Creative fuse ... request smile
      1. Boris55
        Boris55 29 May 2018 12: 50
        0
        Quote: Trilobite Master
        The evil Masons will still raise their heads and again transfer the capital of Russia to Moscow, but this will be a completely different story ...

        There are much more Masons in St. Petersburg than in Moscow. Some sculptures of lions (symbols of England) can not be counted. The Romanovs and slavery, which we call serfdom, are not separable.
        Putin's inauguration under the watchful eye of the one-eyed.

        Nevertheless, in the 1917, the ideas of communism laid on fertile ground. The Old Believers actively supported the revolution.
        1. Boris55
          Boris55 29 May 2018 13: 13
          0
          Another video about the confrontation: Doctor of Historical Sciences, professor of Moscow State Pedagogical University Alexander Pyzhikov talks about the deep underestimation by the tsarist officials and scholars of the role of representatives of the "old faith" in the demographic and economic spheres of the Russian Empire.
        2. Trilobite Master
          Trilobite Master 29 May 2018 13: 18
          +3
          Quote: Boris55
          Putin's inauguration under the watchful eye of the one-eyed.

          In Moscow smile
          Quote: Boris55
          There are more symbols of masons in St. Petersburg than in Moscow.

          Did not count. Are there specific numbers?
          Quote: Boris55
          Some sculptures of lions (symbols of England) can not be counted.

          England's bullhead is a leopard, not a lion, in heraldry it matters. Leo is the coat of arms of a great many states, cities and regions all over the world. You are not that an owl, you are trying to pull a canary onto a globe. laughing
          1. Boris55
            Boris55 29 May 2018 13: 51
            0
            Quote: Trilobite Master
            England’s symbol is a leopard, not a lion; in heraldry it matters.

            The symbol of Russia is a bear, and in heraldry - a Chernobyl rooster. I'm not talking about heraldry.

            And by the way. Question to you. Why did Napoleon come to us? Behind two junk carts?
            1. The centurion
              The centurion 29 May 2018 16: 10
              +1
              Quote: Boris55
              Why did Napoleon come to us? Behind two carts junk?

              In an effort to inflict a mortal blow to the power of the British Empire, Napoleon rushed to India obsessively. They did not give him peace and laurels of Alexander the Great. On the way to India, Bonaparte, in 1798, attempted to wrest Egypt from the Ottoman Empire and break through to the Red Sea, but failed. In 1801, in alliance with the Russian Emperor Paul I, Napoleon made a second attempt to land a breakthrough to India through Astrakhan, Central Asia and Afghanistan. But this insane plan did not come true, and he fell at the very beginning. In 1812, Napoleon, at the head of a united Europe, made a third attempt to land breakthrough to India already through Russia, by forcefully coercing her to faithfully fulfill the conditions of the Tilsit world and the obligations of the continental alliance against the British Empire. But Russia steadfastly withstood this blow of colossal power, and the empire of Napoleon was crushed, to the great joy of the Anglo-Saxons.
              https://topwar.ru/36475-kazaki-v-otechestvennoy-v
              oyne-1812-goda-chast-i-dovoennaya.html
              https://topwar.ru/63616-kazaki-i-pervaya-mirovaya
              -voyna-chast-i-dovoennaya.html
              1. Boris55
                Boris55 29 May 2018 16: 46
                0
                Quote: Centurion
                Napoleon at the head of a united Europe made the third attempt to break through India to Russia through Russia, by force forcing it to faithfully fulfill the conditions of the Tilsit Peace and the obligations of the continental alliance against the British Empire

                Sorry, but something reminds me of NATO's fairy tales about air defense in Poland for protection against North Korea. laughing I would like to force - I would go to Peter.
                1. Olgovich
                  Olgovich 30 May 2018 09: 24
                  0
                  Quote: Boris55
                  I would like to force - I would go to Peter.

                  And leave the huge Russian army in the rear?
                  1. Boris55
                    Boris55 30 May 2018 10: 07
                    0
                    Quote: Olgovich
                    And leave the huge Russian army in the rear?

                    The Russian army was forced to stand in its way.
                    If Napoleon had taken the capital, St. Petersburg, it would absolutely not matter where and in what condition the army of the country that signed the capitulation is.
                    The Soviet army was one of the strongest in the world, and what happened to it when power surrendered?
                    1. The centurion
                      The centurion 3 June 2018 10: 58
                      0
                      Quote: Boris55
                      If Napoleon had taken the capital, St. Petersburg, it would absolutely not matter where and in what condition the army of the country that signed the capitulation is.

                      Not the fact that surrender would take place. Emperor Alexander firmly stood on the position of continuing the war with Napoleon. Some courtiers advised him to make peace with the adversary, to give him some "unnecessary" part of Russia. Well, for example, Poland, from which "one hemorrhoids." But Alexander Pavlovich answered then: “Better I will be the king of Kamchatka.”
              2. Mikhail Matyugin
                Mikhail Matyugin 1 July 2018 21: 38
                0
                Quote: Centurion
                In an effort to inflict a mortal blow to the power of the British Empire, Napoleon rushed to India obsessively. They did not give him peace and laurels of Alexander the Great. On the way to India, Bonaparte, in 1798, attempted to wrest Egypt from the Ottoman Empire and break through to the Red Sea, but failed. In 1801, in alliance with the Russian Emperor Paul I, Napoleon made a second attempt to land a breakthrough to India through Astrakhan, Central Asia and Afghanistan. But this insane plan did not come true, and he fell at the very beginning. In 1812, Napoleon, at the head of a united Europe, made a third attempt to land breakthrough to India already through Russia, by forcefully coercing her to faithfully fulfill the conditions of the Tilsit world and the obligations of the continental alliance against the British Empire. But Russia steadfastly withstood this blow of colossal power, and the empire of Napoleon was crushed, to the great joy of the Anglo-Saxons.

                1. Napoleon didn’t tear, especially manic, to India. I’ll tell you the secret of Open Door - there have already been French colonies since the 17 century. Are you surprised ?!?
                2. From the laurels of Sashka of Macedon, he quite so refused even under the walls of Acre in Palestine.
                3. "Campaign in India of the Cossacks" - nothing more than a myth - there was a certain attempt, no more (especially without the participation of French troops). For that historical period, a physically impossible project (which was proved earlier by the campaigns of the 18 century, and the middle of the 19 century). Sea communications rule, excuse me. By the way, still!
                4. In 1812, there was no talk of going to India. But there was a very dangerous plan for Russia to conquer it and force it to execute the Continental System more faithfully (which meant the collapse of its economy, which is why Alexander I was building up the army and also developing plans to attack the French allies in Eastern Europe).
            2. Trilobite Master
              Trilobite Master 29 May 2018 17: 57
              +2
              Quote: Boris55
              Why did Napoleon come to us?

              I wrote to you, so that Moscow, the hotbed of Freemasonry and Jewry, should be destroyed. Not convinced? Okay. I will add arguments. If we take the Arkona triangle (St. Petersburg) - Arkaim - Alexandria (Egyptian), then the center of the circumcircle around it falls on the Donbass. Coincidence? I do not think. It is there that the forces of light are fighting now with the forces of western darkness. The point of application of forces was not chosen in vain ... Think about it ... wassat
              But seriously, should you explain the causes and objectives of Napoleon’s invasion, if everything is clear to you? Okay, I'll try.
              The main goal of Napoleon in 1812 was not the territory, but the Russian army itself, defeating and destroying that, he hoped to lead Russia out of the coalition and get to grips with England. It was the Russian army that he pursued resolutely and persistently, and not any other goals. Is it clear?
              Quote: Boris55
              Symbol of Russia - the bear

              And why not a matryoshka with a balalaika, not a birch tree, not a rocket or a ballerina in a tutu? The bear, by the way, is the symbol of the graphs of Warwick in the same England, the symbol of Berlin. In Russia - Yaroslavl, but Yaroslavl is only Yaroslavl, not more.
              I sometimes get touched by the vinaigrette that is in your head. You are ready to mix the warm and the red with such desire and simple-heartedness, and, moreover, the conclusion that is far-reaching from this to be made, that I sometimes get lost. Do you really not understand that you are throwing completely different things into one pile? request
              1. Boris55
                Boris55 29 May 2018 18: 50
                0
                Quote: Trilobite Master
                The main goal of Napoleon in 1812 was not the territory, but the Russian army itself, defeating and destroying which, he hoped to withdraw Russia from the coalition and closely engage in England.

                Did Hitler work on his own script? wassat
                Again. The purpose of any war is to seize the resources of another country. Was it worth it to destroy so many people because of two convoys, or was the goal completely different? I expressed my point of view.
                Quote: Trilobite Master
                Do not you understand that bring together completely different things

                Not. It only seems to blind wise men that the elephant is so different, and he is alone.
                1. Trilobite Master
                  Trilobite Master 29 May 2018 19: 29
                  +1
                  Quote: Boris55
                  Did Hitler work on his own script?

                  What about Hitler? wassat Tell me, what is common between Hitler and Napoleon? Although it seems to guess. These are different sides of one elephant - the world behind the scenes, the masters of the west, the masons, right?
                  If so, then I pass.
                  Quote: Boris55
                  Again. The goal of any war is to seize the resources of another country.

                  Stupidity. And it is bad that you repeat it "once again".
                  What does "take possession" mean? So here come and grab? Give me your resources, I take them away for myself, so what? Or is there economics, politics, international treaties, trade, duties, embargo, and finally, just money?
                  War is the continuation of politics by other means. Politics is a concentrated expression of economics. I hope you know these postulates? The goal of the war is to impose its political will on the enemy in order to improve its own economic conditions. Resources - just a special case, and even then, not the most common.
                  Napoleon did not plan to cultivate Russian fields, cut down Russian forests. He wanted only to crush the Russian army and agree with Alexander on peace and joint blockade of England, which he rightly considered his true enemy.
                  However, you do not need it. You have your own story that the Masons make.
                  1. Boris55
                    Boris55 30 May 2018 08: 00
                    0
                    Quote: Trilobite Master
                    What does it mean to “take possession”? So come and grab it? ... War is a continuation of politics by other means. Politics is a concentrated expression of the economy.

                    To seize resources, to enslave and force to work for oneself is an economy. However, you yourself wrote about the same thing, only your formatted brain refuses to admit it. Tune in, you're not alone. laughing
                    Quote: Trilobite Master
                    He only wanted to defeat the Russian army and agree with Alexander

                    If he wanted to come to an agreement with Alexander, then he would have come to Alexander, and not fuss, hell knows where he is looking for his fifth point of adventure. The Russian army was forced to confront on its way - on the way to Moscow. Would go to Peter - would fight under Peter.
                    It's elementary. hi
                    1. Trilobite Master
                      Trilobite Master 30 May 2018 13: 13
                      0
                      Quote: Boris55
                      The Russian army was forced to confront on its way - on the way to Moscow. Would go to Peter - would fight under Peter.
                      It's elementary.

                      Yeah, the Russian army just stood on the way to Moscow to death. Not a single step back, literally. You yourself are not funny such utter nonsense to write? That's really the brain formatted - yours. How is it possible to see something different in the whole course of the company up to the Borodino battle than Napoleon's constant attempts to impose a general battle on the Russians, who constantly retreated, giving only rearguard battles?
                      No, the Masons apparently exist. Now I begin to believe it. They are perfectly able to remotely influence the brain of a human being unburdened by excessive formation and convincing it of its own genius and exclusivity, at the same time stitching fear and awe in the power of the masonic lodge.
                      Save yourself, Boris, urgently start reading the scientific literature on history, only it acts as an antidote to such an effect. From the Internet - only the Federal Portal History on Yu-Tyube. At first it will be difficult, hard, uncategorized judgments and the appearance of links will annoy, even enrage, but it is called breaking, it will pass. And after the onset of remission, the masons will no longer seem so terrible and omnipotent. As well as reptiloids, the appearance of which in your brain, weakened by freemasons, is also possible.
                      1. Boris55
                        Boris55 30 May 2018 13: 43
                        0
                        Quote: Trilobite Master
                        Save yourself, Boris, urgently start reading the scientific literature on history,

                        Which was written by the Masons? laughing
  5. Trilobite Master
    Trilobite Master 29 May 2018 10: 00
    +9
    Yesterday I did not comment on the article itself, I wanted to cover the whole “canvas” as a whole.
    I will say this - I expected more. The article is biased and biased. The author first formed a task for himself - debunking Kutuzov as the main creator of the victory over Napoleon, and then he began to look for the facts, carefully selecting those that fit his concept and just as carefully ignoring the rest. So do publicists, journalists, lawyers, finally politicians, but not researchers. The author, among other things, reproaches Kutuzov for not reporting to the whole king, although he suffers from absolutely the same ailment. For this - a minus.
    A lot of references to L.N. Tolstoy. It is impossible to study forensic science according to A. Conan-Doyle, pischiatry according to F. Dostoevsky, geography according to J. Verne, the life story of Christ according to M. Bulgakov, and the history of the Patriotic War X. NUMX according to L. Tolstoy. Another minus.
    It was unpleasantly struck by the savory champing with which the author chews on intrigues and disagreements in the leadership of the Russian army. One gets the impression that through the efforts of Kutuzov, the Russian army was simply some kind of spider in a bank, where everyone only does what it tries to devour the neighbor. Ingriga were - where without them? - but they were always and everywhere and in the army of Kutuzov no more than in the army of Napoleon, and in all other armies, starting from prehistoric times. The third minus.
    And finally, the author constantly reproaches Kutuzov for inaction, for repeatedly missing the opportunity to finally defeat and finish off Napoleon without releasing him from Russia. It was necessary to capture a Corsican and take him to Petersburg. And only at the end of the article is the clear idea that Kutuzov simply did NOT WANT Napoleon’s final and irrevocable defeat, that
    the field marshal quite rightly assumed that the destruction of Napoleon and his empire would be beneficial only to Britain and the results of the victory over Napoleonic France would not be taken by Russia, but by England
    A completely fair statement explaining Kutuzov’s "passivity" and his unwillingness to impose a decisive battle on the French. That is why the Russian army did not try to inflict a decisive defeat on the French, but only "escorted" them to the border, harshly, but not fatally "kicking", say, get out, let's go quickly ... This could be said at the beginning of the article, but then it would be inconvenient to blame Kutuzov for “passivity” and “indecision”. Again, a minus.
    Unfortunately, Alexander I did not think so deeply and instead of leaving Europe to deal with Napoleon further, as Kutuzov wanted, he took an overseas campaign, reached Paris. And it was possible to try under the guise of continental war to solve their problems, for example, with Turkey and the straits. But this is already my personal fantasies. feel
    In short, the article is not very. The author lacks the depth of understanding of events and objectivity.
    1. Snail N9
      Snail N9 29 May 2018 10: 37
      +4
      Well, so the article in the current trend is "debunking." They already “debunked” the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in the sense that the top generals and leadership were: “butchers”, did not know how to control, were engaged in intrigues and the faceless and uncontrollable “people” won the war, “overwhelmed the enemy with corpses” ... Now we get to the Patriotic War and the Overseas campaign. 1812-1814 ... Everything is fine.
    2. alebor
      alebor 29 May 2018 11: 22
      +1
      And in my amateurish opinion, the argument that the Russian army should only have escorted the French outside of Russia, and there, let Europe itself understand, is akin to reasoning like: during the Second World War, the red army only had to drive Hitler’s troops outside the USSR, and there Let Europe itself understand ... I'm afraid that in both cases the consequences for our country could be catastrophic - leaving all of Europe under Napoleon or under Hitler is like leaving a mine next to a smoldering wick.
      Our country reached the heights of its power and influence in the world 2 times: the first time after the capture of Paris, the second after the capture of Berlin.
      1. Boris55
        Boris55 29 May 2018 12: 10
        0
        Quote: alebor
        Our country reached the heights of its power and influence in the world 2 times: the first time after the capture of Paris, the second after the capture of Berlin.

        Tell me, do you know why we celebrate Borodino Day, the day of the defeat of the Russian army - the day of shame, and do not celebrate the day of victory over the French?
        On 30 of August 1814 of the year, Emperor Alexander the First issued a manifesto on the day of the celebration of the deliverance of Russia from the invasion of the French army. The holiday was ordered to be held on January 7 on Christmas Day, and it was widely celebrated in the country until the 1914 year.
        1. Nikitin
          Nikitin 29 May 2018 14: 20
          +3
          Quote: Boris55
          Tell me, do you know why we celebrate Borodino Day, the day of the defeat of the Russian army is a day of shame, and do not celebrate the day of victory over the French?

          We Russians celebrate this Victory Day “over twenty languages” -every Christmas as announced by Emperor Alexander I.
          Borodin Day is a disgrace only for dislocated fool
          1. Boris55
            Boris55 29 May 2018 15: 28
            0
            Quote: Nikitin-
            Borodin Day is a disgrace only for dislocated

            Speaking of the date of the celebration: "The 19 (31) of March 1814 at 2 at one o'clock in the morning the capitulation of Paris was signed and by morning the French troops with arms and banners left the city."

            The appointment of the celebration of this victory for Christmas actually nullified this victory.
            Well, about vivih. With the same success, one can mark the day of surrender to the Second World War of Minsk, Kiev, Smolensk, Rzhev, etc. ... Before they were surrendered, there were no less bloody battles.
            ps Doesn’t it seem strange to anyone that we took the capital of France - Paris, and Napoleon - a city of "local significance"?
            1. Olgovich
              Olgovich 30 May 2018 09: 40
              0
              Quote: Boris55
              The appointment of the celebration of this victory for Christmas actually nullified this victory.

              No way
              Quote: Boris55
              With the same success you can celebrate the day of delivery in the Second World War of Minsk, Kiev, Smolensk, Rzhev

              Cities military glory of Russia : Belgorod, Rzhev, Luga, etc., became famous precisely for their defense, Smolensk, Kiev, in general, hero-cities.
              According to your logic, in vain, for "there is nothing to celebrate"
      2. Nikitin
        Nikitin 29 May 2018 14: 15
        0
        Quote: alebor
        And in my amateurish opinion, the argument that the Russian army should only have escorted the French outside of Russia, and there, let Europe itself understand, is akin to reasoning like: during the Second World War, the red army only had to drive Hitler’s troops outside the USSR, and there Let Europe itself understand ... I'm afraid that in both cases the consequences for our country could be catastrophic - leaving all of Europe under Napoleon or under Hitler is like leaving a mine next to a smoldering wick.

        You are absolutely right.
        He would gain strength and go back — the enemy was strong and dangerous — how much more blood had to be shed in Europe to calm him down!
      3. Weyland
        Weyland 29 May 2018 16: 20
        +1
        Quote: alebor
        I am afraid that in both cases the consequences for our country could be catastrophic - leaving Europe all under Napoleon or Hitler is like leaving a mine next to a smoldering wick.

        The Romans said: "Every comparison is lame." Your limps on both legs! Hitler's goal was to enslave Russia and turn it into a colony. Napoleon's goal was to omit England - and it was vitally important for him to force Russia to fulfill the Tilsit treaty!
    3. VLR
      29 May 2018 11: 34
      0
      Let me make a few comments on some reviews:
      1. Apology Kutuzov, who deliberately misled Alexander, the fact that I "mislead the readers"?
      Sorry, first of all, I am not Kutuzov, and the readers are not a collective emperor, in this case even the life of one person does not depend on me or on the readers; there is no need to compare and compare. It's just ridiculous, agree. Secondly, I tried to be as objective as possible, therefore I entered into the text so many quotations of authoritative contemporaries. If these “witnesses” do not suit you, let's “listen” to others. Give the laudatory quotes of modern Kutuzov commanders, politicians. But not later historians.
      2. Intrigue in the headquarters of Napoleon and Kutuzov. In the headquarters of Kutuzov all "gnawed", this is an indisputable fact. There were no intrigues at Napoleon’s headquarters. Because the authority of Napoleon was indisputable. And Kutuzov had no special authority. It is now perceived as great and almost the greatest. And in 1812 - alas, read the reviews of his contemporaries from the first part, and try to challenge them.
      3. Kutuzov "did the right thing," over and over again losing out on Napoleon. And there is something about kicks. Following the retreating French was no less disastrous for the Russian army than for the French — also an indisputable fact. Both the French and the Russians on the way to Vilna practically lost their armies. Cold, disease and hunger have claimed more lives than any battle. From which Kutuzov declined - no matter for what reasons. If Kutuzov had succeeded in resolving the issue with Napoleon right after Smolensk, even at the cost of high casualties, he would have saved tens of thousands of lives of his soldiers for Russia.
      4. Errors Kutuzov at Borodino, too, will deny? Absolutely unsuitable position, absolutely wrong distribution of troops, terrifying loss of reserve troops from artillery fire ...

      As for the foreign campaign - yes, he was not needed, and harmful. And Alexander 1 for him must be damned descendants.
      1. Trilobite Master
        Trilobite Master 29 May 2018 12: 50
        +7
        Quote: VlR
        Let me make a few comments on some reviews:

        Come on, dear.
        You know perfectly well that there are a lot of positive feedback from contemporaries about Kutuzov, including from those people who, in moments of annoyance or discontent, spoke about him impartially. Search for such examples is the task of the researcher. Your own objectivity causes me personally serious doubts, at least in this matter.
        Next.
        Quote: VlR
        There were no intrigues at Napoleon’s headquarters.

        At Napoleon’s headquarters, everyone loved and respected each other, thought as one, no disagreement or contradiction. If you really think so, then what should we argue with you?
        Quote: VlR
        Following the retreating French was no less disastrous for the Russian army than for the French.

        Of course. Non-combat losses in large armies at that time were still very high. So what - not to go hiking? Perhaps, it seems to you that someone else, instead of Kutuzov, would have organized Napoleon’s complete environment, after which he would also defeat the winter apartments? Or is it a hard victory and then the same pursuit of the missing army to the border? I think the second is more likely. So that
        Quote: VlR
        he would save tens of thousands of lives of her soldiers for Russia.
        It seems to me very doubtful.
        Quote: VlR
        Errors Kutuzov at Borodino, too, will deny?

        Errors ... Rather, passivity ... Perhaps, I agree. The battle, probably, could be carried out more energetically and with great success. Although, we can see it now, from our bell tower. Kutuzov was much more complicated. So I would not condemn him even here.
        Well, about the foreign campaign, we thank God, we can not argue ...
      2. Nikitin
        Nikitin 29 May 2018 14: 43
        +3
        Quote: VlR
        Secondly, I tried to be as much as possible aboutbiased, therefore, introduced so many quotes of authoritative contemporaries into the text. If these "witnesses" do not suit you, let's "listen" to others. Bring laudatory quotes of modern Kutuzov commanders, politicians.

        And you yourself are not able to? Ahhh-does not fit into the outline of libel ...
        D.M. Volkonsky (August 19, 1812): “Kutuzov has already arrived and accepted the team. Everyone blames Barclay and despair ... Everyone hopes a single hope on the order of Kutuzov and courage of troops ”[3, p. 140].

        The sub-lieutenant of the battery company G. S. Meshetich (1818) recalls how “the hero who glorified himself with his valor in the distant countries of Europe — Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov and took the main command in the army” arrived in the Russian troops [10, p. 45]. “Finally, already at the camp under Tsarev-Zaimishch,” writes I. Dreiling (1820), “there was news of the arrival of Kutuzov, a veteran of the Russian army, appointed commander in chief. Noisy fun took possession of everyone, everything came to life, hope came to life again: the whole army saw in this hoary warrior its own savior angel [10, p. thirteen].

        Similar emotions are reflected in the text of N. Durova (1836): “We have a new commander-in-chief: Kutuzov! .. I heard this, standing in a circle of orderlies, adjutants and many other officers, crowding around the light of fire. Hussar general Dorokhov said, stroking his gray mustache: “God grant that Mikhail Larionovich come as soon as possible and stop us; we fled like downhill ". Kutuzov has arrived! .. soldiers, officers, generals - all in admiration; calm and confidence have replaced fear; our entire camp is in full swing and breathing courage! .. ”[5, p. 481].

        D.P. Buturlin, a participant in World War II and overseas campaigns, one of the first to write several historical works, including the 1812 war (1837), calls Kutuzov “a famous old man” who was “wise as Fabius” and “insightful as the first Philip of Macedon ”[2, p. 245]; his appointment as commander-in-chief “was approved by all benevolent Russians, and a small number of those who, by personal enmity were opponents of the great husband, did not dare to find their opinion at this solemn hour,” and his arrival in the army “made the most favorable impression that the continuous retreats, hitherto produced, partly reduced the power of attorney of the army to its commanders. Kutuzov’s name alone seemed a sure guarantee of victory. ” [2, p. 244-245]. We also confirm these words in the memoirs of the retired Major General I. S. Zhirkevich (1874): “Upon arrival to the army - Kutuzov, the spirit of the soldier came to life and we began to positively prepare for battle” [6, p. 653].

        A .. Chicherin, dated May 4, 1813, died in the same 1813):
        “... The prudence of the Most Holy, which you called timidity, saved the life of our glorious soldiers; what you called indecision was wisdom; your spirit was apparently too weak to understand the full scope of its policy. All his actions had a carefully considered goal. All the extensive operations that he directed were directed to one; giving orders for the placement of guns, which should have ensured victory over the French, he at the same time considered complex political combinations, which should have provided us with the favor of all European offices. AT armies adored him and for his name, and for his familiar and beloved face; it was enough for him to seem so that everyone would rejoice ”

        Few?
        Quote: VlR
        2.. AT Napoleon’s headquarters had no intrigue. Because the authority of Napoleon was indisputable.

        No one intrigued against each other, yes. What nonsense ....
        Quote: VlR
        And in 1812 - alas, read the reviews of his contemporaries from the first part, and try to challenge them.

        The same advice is for you (see above opinions of contemporaries)
        Quote: VlR
        . Will Kutuzov's mistakes at Borodino also be denied? Absolutely unfit position, absolutely incorrect troop distribution, terrifying loss of reserve troops from artillery fire ...

        Tell the right strategist lol
        Quote: VlR
        As for the foreign campaign - yes, he was not needed, and harmful. And Alexander 1 for him must be damned descendants.

        It was necessary to crush the beast in the den, as in 1945. The Holy Union ensured the absence of wars for many decades, which was unthinkable for Europe.
        And who did not finish the beast in 1918, received the 41st.
        1. VLR
          29 May 2018 18: 04
          0
          Regarding the rave reviews of second lieutenants and a certain person with a sexual orientation disorder:
          Yes, I wrote about this in the 1 part - and about "the greatest commander of all times and peoples," and about "the lightning Perun of the North," and about how Kutuzov "accomplished in a short time the famous acts of Caesar, Hannibal and Scipio." And Pushkin: "Go, save!" You stood up and saved. "Indicating that such reviews were characteristic of a short post-war period of patriotic frenzy. Then Kutuzov was pushed aside and Alexander 1 was announced as the Fatherland savior. Including your Buturlin in the air, pereobulsya: he became the founder of the concept that Alexander was super. And then Soloviev and Klyuchevsky and Alexander, and Kutuzov were lowered from the sky to the ground, and at the beginning of the 20 century Mikhail Illarionovich was not considered a great commander from the word at all. And again the great became 7 November 1941 of the year - after Io Cif Vissarionovich from the podium of the mausoleum named him among "our great ancestors", and then also established the Order.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 30 May 2018 10: 28
            0
            Quote: VlR
            Regarding Enthusiastic Enthusiastic Reviews

            The lieutenants fought directly on the battlefield, died and have the right to vote: the same Alexander Chicherin, who heroically went through the whole war, died already in the overseas campaign.
            Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov - Lieutenant General of the Russian Imperial Army, [/ b] hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, NOT a lieutenant ..
            Quote: VlR
            a certain person with a violation of sexual orientation:

            Gossip is your everything
            Quote: VlR
            And then Soloviev and Klyuchevsky and Alexander, and Kutuzov were lowered from heaven to earth,

            Give their conclusions about the "omission". It's just a lie
            Quote: VlR
            and at the beginning of the 20th century, Mikhail Illarionovich was not considered a great commander from the word at all

            Give monographs of the beginning of the 20th century, where it is indicated directly.
        2. VLR
          29 May 2018 18: 10
          +1
          Regarding the foreign campaign: 2 fatal mistakes were committed by Russian emperors in the 19 century:
          1-th made in the course of this campaign, Alexander 1 - the revival of Prussia. The bottom line is 2 World Wars, from which Russia suffered the most,
          2 th made Nicholas 1 - Salvation of the Habsburg Empire. Bottom line: 1 World War, which led to the destruction of the Russian Empire.
          The alliance with faraway France against close Austria and the omnipresent England was what Russia needed.
          1. bober1982
            bober1982 29 May 2018 18: 34
            0
            We can add that the result of such a campaign was the corruption of the army itself, which had been in Europe for a long time, officers and generals "grabbed" Jacobin ideas, the result is known - freethinking, Decembrists, and so on.
            For an alliance with France, both Alexander I and Nicholas I could not go for ethical reasons, in my opinion, they still considered Napoleon as a usurper of monarchy in Europe, and the English influence at the royal court was very great.
          2. Trilobite Master
            Trilobite Master 29 May 2018 18: 58
            +2
            Quote: VlR
            2 fatal mistakes were committed by Russian emperors in the 19 century:

            And here I will not argue, except with the epithet "fatal", but, in general, I agree. However, these errors, again, can be ascertained only after many years. Nicholas I’s miscalculation is especially sad when, as a result of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, Russia not only gained the reputation of “European gendarme”, but also saved the monarchy, whose interests were always in conflict with the interests of Russia and in the future these contradictions could only deepen (Turkey and Balkans). But all this can be clearly seen only from today's bell tower. At that time, they still remembered the French Revolution and what it led to. And in general, Europe was in a fever that was going on in France, in Germany (the Dresden uprising). Nobody wanted to repeat the Napoleonic wars, but to understand the situation more subtly using the modern scientific approach ... Alas.
            You can regret such decisions of our kings, but you can blame them ... I would not.
          3. Olgovich
            Olgovich 30 May 2018 10: 37
            -1
            Quote: VlR
            1-th made in the course of this campaign, Alexander 1 - the revival of Prussia. The bottom line is 2 World Wars, from which Russia suffered the most,

            The result is the first experience of maintaining peace by an alliance of the strongest powers and the world for many decades
            Quote: VlR
            The second was completed by Nicholas 2 - Salvation of the Habsburg Empire. Bottom line: 1 World War, which led to the destruction of the Russian Empire

            Fulfilled the contract. Maybe it wasn’t worth it. Again, it is not known what would happen in the other case and what would independent Hungary be better: subsequent experience of the 2 World Wars shows that there’s NOTHING
            Quote: VlR
            The alliance with faraway France against close Austria and the omnipresent England was what Russia needed.

            Did you ask France? And the unions were different: both "s" and against
        3. The comment was deleted.
    4. andrew42
      andrew42 29 May 2018 11: 49
      0
      Yes, everything is simple: since the assassination of Paul I, the influence of the Misty Albion on the imperial court has not gone away, but only strengthened qualitatively. So welcome, Overseas trip! Come on Sasha Palych, drive the soldiers to Paris - you will get the "laurels of the liberator of Europe" ... for a year or two. A foreign campaign was needed only in an extremely limited way: 1) the restoration of the forces of Prussia (a natural adversary of France), 2) the liquidation of the power of the Polish gentry (permanent mob. Reserve of any anti-Russian aggressor). Further Leipzig did not have to go. Not my goodness. In vain went to Paris.
    5. Cartalon
      Cartalon 29 May 2018 13: 33
      +3
      The owner of Trilobite subscribes to every word, the author actually did not even dare to draw conclusions from his description.
  6. VLR
    29 May 2018 11: 48
    +1
    Yes, and let's not forget that any personality cult is accompanied by terrifying injustice towards other people. An example is an attempt to attribute to Peter 1 the transformations that his father and older brother began. About the same - and with Kutuzov. When Barclay de Tolly, the real hero and leader of 1812, is unceremoniously pushed aside. And other generals, whose role in the same battle of Borodino is much higher than that of Kutuzov who had slept there, move into the second row in the number of "others." We are not talking about defamation of anyone. But maybe try to be objective?
  7. gorenina91
    gorenina91 29 May 2018 11: 57
    +1
    -Vivat to the author ... -Pretty convincing narrative dissertation ... -Of course ...- it’s much easier to watch patriotic vaudeville ... like “Hussar ballad” ... and so on ... -But, personally, I am more inclined to "version" of the author ... -Yes .., he put everything in place quite clearly ...
    -No .., well, all the same ...- how good the French are.!. - Well, it’s necessary ...- in thousands of leagues from his France and so to maintain stability in the disastrous open spaces of Russia ...
    -Unfortunately ... -Russian army (both soldiers and command personnel) .., as professionals left much to be desired ... -An absurd conclusion ... -Well, if both armies (Russian and French) would not fight in Russia .. and, say ... -in the prairies of America at that time .., it is unlikely that our troops would have a winning chance ...
    1. Nikitin
      Nikitin 29 May 2018 13: 19
      +2
      Quote: gorenina91
      Unfortunately ... -Russian army (both soldiers and command personnel) .., as professionals left much to be desired ... -An absurd conclusion ... -Well, if both armies (Russian and French) would not be at war Russia .. and, say ... -in the prairies of America at that time .., it is unlikely that our troops would have a winning chance ...

      You would have to learn a story: Suvorov, a teacher of Kutuzov, beat the same Frenchmen in Europe.
      Quote: gorenina91
      Viva author ...

      The author of libel? No.
      1. gorenina91
        gorenina91 29 May 2018 14: 21
        +1
        -And here Suvorov, Mr. "expert" ..?
        -Kutuzov himself quite successfully fought against the Turks ...
        -What are you talking about..? -What kind of "arguments" ..?
    2. Cartalon
      Cartalon 29 May 2018 13: 38
      +3
      Why are you, only all the victories of the French have been achieved with Napoleon’s personal driver’s, there is no emperor and the three marshals don’t know what to do with Wittgenstein’s corps.
      1. Snail N9
        Snail N9 29 May 2018 14: 23
        +4
        It amazes me that all these "experts" on how to command troops on the battlefield and reproaching generals for "inaction" or "wrong actions" did not bother to delve into the descriptions of the battles themselves, how they took place at that time and how, by what methods the commander could influence the battle itself. Therefore, they do not know that the battlefield in the era of smoky gunpowder and cavalry was instantly drawn in by powder smoke and dust, through which it was impossible to make out anything in those primitive telescopes with unenlightened optics and the commander had to rely on hearing and on reports of adjutants, messengers and etc. For this reason, whole packs of adjutants were held in order to transmit orders. The messengers often transmitted at the wrong time, getting lost, injured, etc. often they died. In addition, they introduced their emotional component into the reports, which did not always correspond to the true state of things. Therefore, the commander had to have intuition and excellent hearing so as not to miss the phases of the battle. But the rumor did not show the true state of the troops, which could be depressing.
  8. Weyland
    Weyland 29 May 2018 16: 30
    +1
    Kutuzov did not want to continue the war in Europe. First, the field marshal rightly assumed that the destruction of Napoleon and his empire would be beneficial only to Great Britain and the results of the victory over Napoleonic France would not be taken by Russia, but by England: “I’m not at all convinced whether the complete destruction of Napoleon and his army would be a great blessing for the Universe His legacy will not be gained by Russia or any other of the mainland powers, but by that power that now dominates the seas, and then its predominance will be unbearable ", - even under Maloyaroslavets l Kutuzov Wilson. Secondly, he understood that with the expulsion of the enemy from the territory of Russia, the people's war ended. The attitude to the foreign campaign in Russian society was generally negative. In the Russian provinces they said loudly that "Russia has already done a miracle and that now that the Fatherland has been saved, it has no need to sacrifice for the good of Prussia and Austria, whose union is worse than outright hostility" (N.K.Shilder), and the Penza province even recalled her militia. However, Alexander I already imagined himself as a new Agamemnon, leader and leader of kings: "God sent me power and victory, so that I could bring peace and tranquility to the universe," he declared absolutely earnestly in 1813. Therefore, in the name of peace, war began again.
    Yes, what kind of Agamemnon ... The crowned father-killer, his entire reign was on the hook at the brazen, who could at any time disclose the information about his participation in the murder of his father - that is why he started a war that destroyed the Russian economy!
    In a nutshell: after Trafalgar Napoleon realized that he had no chance against the brazen men at sea, and decided to strangle them economically: he forced the whole of Europe to declare an embargo on trade with the brazen men. Only Russia allowed itself to break the embargo on a large scale - it is painfully profitable to be a monopoly supplier! laughing And after the liberation of Europe from Napoleon, a huge stream of European goods, once made for England and due to the embargo dusting in warehouses, poured into England - the prices of our main exports fell almost 5 times, the economy collapsed, the cloud of noblemen went bankrupt and mortgaged the estates. By the way, many of these nobles went to the Decembrists - simply hoping that after a successful coup, it would be possible to secure a cancellation of debts! In general, they shot themselves in the leg!
  9. VLR
    29 May 2018 17: 48
    0
    Quote: Nikitin-
    Quote: VlR

    В Napoleon’s headquarters had no intrigue. Because the authority of Napoleon was indisputable.

    No one intrigued against each other, yes. What nonsense ....


    It is one thing to intrigue against each other, trying to show off to the commander-in-chief, whom intriguers worship, and another to intrigue against each other and against the commander-in-chief, who is not respected, is not considered a person in his place, and is trying to suspend.
    And Bonaparte stopped intrigues against himself even during the 1796-1797 campaign, saying to Augereau: “General, you are one head taller than me, but if you are rude to me, I will immediately eliminate this difference.” it was calm, but in such a way that Augereau later admitted that he had never experienced such fear in his life, even under bullets.
    And in 1812, Bonaparte was no longer afraid, but they idolized, including in enemy countries. Therefore, in the headquarters of Napoleon was order and a clear subordination, in the headquarters of Kutuzov - bickering and mess.
  10. zav
    zav 29 May 2018 21: 29
    +4
    “Where did Napoleon lead his army? In the Soviet historiography of the post-war years, the opinion was firmly established that Napoleon went "through Kaluga to Ukraine", while Kutuzov, having unraveled the plan of the enemy commander, saved Ukraine from an enemy invasion. However, Napoleon’s orders of October 11 (to Marshal Victor and Generals Junot and Evers) about the movement to Smolensk are known. The campaign of the French army to Smolensk is reported in his memoirs by A. Kolenkur, F.-P. Segur and A. Zhomini. And, it should be recognized that this decision of Napoleon was quite logical and reasonable: after all, it was Smolensk who appointed the emperor as the main base of the Great Army, it was in this city that strategic reserves of food and fodder were to be created. Napoleon entered the Kaluga direction not at all because he did not like the road on which he came to Moscow: with his movement the emperor intended only to cover Smolensk from Kutuzov. Having achieved this goal near Maloyaroslavets, Napoleon did not go "through Kaluga to Ukraine", but, in accordance with his plan, continued to move to Smolensk. "


    “At dawn on October 11, the Russians were supposed to attack the superior French forces, but at midnight in Captain Aristovo, Captain A.N. Seslavin delivered a captured non-commissioned officer who said that the entire“ Great Army ”was moving to Maloyaroslavets.”


    After “it was Smolensk who appointed the emperor to be the main base of the Great Army, it was in this city that strategic reserves of food and fodder were to be created” enough time had already passed for the emperor to make sure that the main base for some reason had not been created. If strategic reserves had been created in Smolensk, then, having reached it, the Napoleonic army would have remained for the winter. But this, as subsequent events show, did not happen. Before the start of the retreat, Napoleon could not help but know what was going on behind him and therefore quite consciously turned to Kaluga.
    If “the emperor intended only to cover Smolensk from Kutuzov”, one could sacrifice one or two corps for this purpose, and move the entire “Great Army” to Smolensk at a pace, by which movement he would be covered. But when "the whole" Great Army "moves to Maloyaroslavets" - this is from another opera.
    Napoleon’s orders of October 11 on the movement to Smolensk say little, since it was on the night of October 10-11 that the captured non-commissioned officer, “reported that the entire Great Army was moving to Maloyaroslavets.” Orders are written, and in an hour others are canceled and written, but the fact of the arrival of the entire Napoleonic army at Maloyaroslavets cannot be canceled.
    For what purpose?
    Completely clean the feed base, eat half-dead horses and, turning your back on the enemy, on foot, in the winter, move to the "strategic reserves" in Smolensk?
    Or, nevertheless, to impose a general battle, and then act according to circumstances? But counting on victory in the general battle would be reckless, since the Russian army had already regained its strength and was in a better position, which, of course, the scouts told Napoleon.
    The goal is the one and only: through Kaluga to open the road to the breadlands. But this goal could not be achieved, because in full measure Napoleon no longer controlled his army. No, the army, of course, obeyed orders, but not with the same zeal and with due diligence. It is difficult to go through the Moscow fire, looting, drunkenness, robbery and the famine that has begun and to avoid decay. Moreover, the knapsacks of soldiers and convoys of generals kept that part of the Moscow wealth that Kutuzov could not (perhaps knowingly) evacuate. Psychologists often intervene in commanders' plans. The Cossacks did not capture Murat near Tarutin, because they were carried away by the robbery of the French camp. And Napoleonic soldiers and generals without due pressure and selflessness attacked Maloyaroslavets, because they were concerned about the preservation of their satchels. From their point of view, the goal of the war has already been achieved.
  11. Trilobite Master
    Trilobite Master 30 May 2018 13: 56
    +1
    Boris55,
    On this topic I recommend, since you prefer to draw information from u-tyuba, such an author as Oleg V. Sokolov. Very interesting character, sometimes found in Puchkov-Goblin, but there is a series of independent lectures. Specialist for Napoleon and his era, very informed, original, emotionally states. I myself am not very keen on this period, but periodically I listen to his lectures with interest.
  12. Loess
    Loess 30 May 2018 14: 56
    0
    From these two articles I realized that the French smashed crowds of wild Asian barbarians wherever they saw it and if it weren’t for the Russian winter (if you think only in Russia, it turns out that it’s winter, they’ve probably been surprised), then Napoleon would have gone through Russia without problems end to end. It reminds me of something ... And they won again not because of, but against everything and everyone, but again, if I hadn’t taught history, I would surely be sure after these articles that the French won ...
  13. ivanovanov88
    ivanovanov88 20 August 2018 23: 38
    0
    it must be reminded that Moscow was burned, which means that many things were probably destroyed in the fire