Military Review

Catastrophe of the Crimean Front. To the 70 anniversary of the Kerch defensive operation

The defeat of the Crimean Front and its subsequent elimination of 8 — 19 in May of 1942 — became one of the links in the 1942 military disaster chain of the year. The action scenario during the operation of the Wehrmacht 11 Army under the command of Colonel-General Erich von Manstein against the Crimean Front was similar to other German operations of this period. German troops, having received reinforcements and accumulating forces and resources, went over to the counteroffensive against the deadlock reached position and suffered considerable losses of the Soviet forces.

On October 18, 1941, the 11th German Army began an operation to capture the Crimea. By November 16, the entire peninsula, except the base of the Black Sea fleet - Sevastopol, was captured. In December-January 1941-1942, as a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, the Red Army returned the Kerch Peninsula and advanced 8-100 km in 110 days. But already on January 18 the Wehrmacht repulsed Theodosius. In February – April 1942, the Crimean Front made three attempts to turn the tide of events on the peninsula in its favor, but as a result could not achieve significant success and suffered heavy losses.

Catastrophe of the Crimean Front. To the 70 anniversary of the Kerch defensive operation

Erich von Manstein.

German Command Plans

As in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the fighting on the Crimean peninsula by the spring of 1942 went into the phase of positional warfare. The Wehrmacht made its first attempts to launch a decisive counterattack in March 1942. The 11th Army received reinforcements - the 28th Jäger and the 22nd tank divisions. In addition, the Romanian corps received the 4th Mountain Division. The task of defeating Soviet forces in the Crimea for the first time was assigned to the command of the 11th Army on February 12 in the "Order on the conduct of hostilities on the Eastern Front after the end of the winter period" of the High Command of the Third Reich. German troops were supposed to seize Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula. The German command wanted to free the large forces of the 11th Army for further operations.

With the end of the period of mudslides, the German armed forces began to move towards the implementation of this plan. The main guiding document for the three German army groups was directive No. 41 of April 5 of 1942. The main objectives of the 1942 campaign of the year were the Caucasus and Leningrad. The 11 of the German army, which had been bogged down in positional battles on an isolated section of the Soviet-German front, set the task of "clearing the Kerch Peninsula from Crimea and seizing Sevastopol."

In April, 1942, at a meeting with Adolf Hitler, Georg von Sonderstern and Manstein presented a plan for the operation of the Soviet forces on the Kerch Peninsula. The forces of the Crimean front were rather densely built on the Parpach isthmus (on the so-called Ak-Monai positions). But the density of building troops was not the same. The flank of the Crimean Front adjoining the Black Sea was weaker, and the breakthrough of its positions allowed the Germans to go to the rear of a stronger group of 47 and 51 armies. The task of breaking through the Soviet positions 44-th Soviet army laid on reinforced XXX Corps (AK), Lieutenant-General Maximilian Fretter-Pico composed 28-th Jaeger, 50-th Infantry, 132-th Infantry, 170-th Infantry, 22 th tank divisions. In addition, the German command was going to use the open-sea flank of the Crimean front and drop troops into the rear of the attacked Soviet troops as part of the reinforced battalion of the 426 regiment. XXXXII AK as part of the 46 Infantry Division, under the command of General Infantry Franz Mattenklott and VII Romanian Corps as part of the 10 Infantry Division, 19 Infantry Division, 8 Cavalry Brigade had to conduct a distraction against strong rights forces. The operation was protected from the air by the VIII Luftwaffe air corps under the command of Baron Wolfram von Richthofen. The operation received the code name "Hunt for bustard" (it. Trappenjagd).

The 11th Army was inferior to the Crimean Front (CF): 1,6: 1 times in personnel (250 thousand Red Army soldiers versus 150 thousand Germans), 1,4: 1 in guns and mortars (3577 in the CF and 2472 for the Germans), 1,9: 1 in tanks and self-propelled gun mounts (347 for the CF and 180 for the Germans). Only in aviation there was parity: 1: 1, 175 fighters and 225 bombers from the CF, the Germans - 400 units. The most powerful tool in Manstein’s hands was the VIII Luftwaffe von Richthofen air corps, it was the strongest connection of the German Air Force. Richtofen had great combat experience - he won eight air victories in the First World War and was awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st degree, fought in Spain (chief of staff, and then commander of the Condor legion), participant in the Polish and French campaigns, Cretan operation, participated in operations "Barbarossa" and "Typhoon" (attack on Moscow). In addition, the German commander had a fresh 22nd Panzer Division under the command of Major General Wilhelm von Apel. The division was formed at the end of 1941 in the occupied part of France, and it was "full-blooded." The tank division was armed with Czech light tanks PzKpfw 38 (t). By the beginning of the offensive, the division was strengthened by 3 tank battalions (52 tanks), in addition, in April, the unit received 15-20 T-3 and T-4. The division had 4 motorized infantry battalions, two of them were equipped with Ganomag armored personnel carriers and an anti-tank battalion (there were also self-propelled guns in it).

Manstein had the tools to break into the defense of the Crimean front and develop success in the form of an air corps and the 22 Panzer Division. After the breakthrough of the front, a tank division could move forward quickly and destroy Soviet reserves, rear services, intercept communications. The breakthrough development troops were reinforced by the Grodek motorized brigade, made up of motorized formations that participated in the offensive operation of the units. Command of the Crimean Front - Commander of the CF, Lieutenant-General Dmitry Timofeevich Kozlov, members of the Military Council (divisional commissar F. A. Shamanin and secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the CPSU (B) BC Bulatov, chief of staff, Major General P. P. Vechny, representative of the General Headquarters VGK L Z. Mehlis), had only tank units of direct infantry support (tank brigades and battalions) and did not create means of countering the Germans' deep breakthrough — army mobile groups consisting of tank, anti-tank, mechanized, cavalier Iyi connections. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the front line was completely open for aerial reconnaissance, it was an open steppe. The Germans easily opened the positions of the Soviet troops.

Plans of the Soviet command, the forces of the Crimean Front

The Soviet command, despite the fact that the tasks of the winter offensive were not met, did not want to miss the initiative, and did not lose hope of changing the situation in their favor. 21 April 1942 was established by the High Command of the North Caucasus Direction headed by Marshal Semyon Budyonny. The Crimean Front, the Sevastopol Defensive Area, the North Caucasus Military District, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla were subordinated to Budyonny.

The Crimean front occupied defensive positions on a fairly narrow Ak-Monai isthmus, 18-20 km wide. The front consisted of three armies: 44-I under the command of Lieutenant-General Stepan Ivanovich Chernyak, 47-I major general Konstantin Stepanovich Kolganov, 51-I army Lieutenant-General Vladimir Nikolaevich. By the beginning of May, 16 rifle divisions and 1 cavalry divisions, 3 rifle divisions, 4 tank divisions, 1 naval brigades, 4 separate tank battalions, 9 artillery regiments of the RGK and other formations were under the command of the KF headquarters. The front in February - April 1942 suffered serious losses, was largely drained of blood, exhausted, had no fresh and powerful impact connections. As a result, the KF, although it had a numerical advantage in people, tanks, guns and mortars, was inferior in terms of quality.

Even more equalized the capabilities of the Soviet and German command, the asymmetrical formation of the KF troops. The positions of the CFs were divided into two non-uniformly filled with troops. The southern section from Koy-Aysan to the Black Sea coast with a length of about 8 km represented Soviet defensive positions prepared as early as January 1942. They were defended by the 276 Infantry, 63 th Mountain Division 44 Army (A). 396, 404, 157 infantry divisions, 13 th motorized rifle regiment, 56 Tank Brigade (8 KV, 7 T-20, 26 T-20 in May) stood in the second echelon and reserve (60 KV, 39 T-2, 1 T-34 in May); 18 Tank Brigade (60 KV, 126 T-51, 26 T-124), 20-th Separate Tank Battalion (26 T-16), 51-th Separate Tank Battalion (47 T-271). The northern sector from Koy-Aysan to Kieta (approximately 320 km) was curving to the west, overhanging Theodosia, which, according to the plans of the Soviet command, was the first target of the offensive. The main forces of the 77 and 47 troops of the KF, reinforced by the troops subordinated to the front headquarters, were assembled in this ledge and its close proximity to it. In the first echelon, there were 400-I, 398-I rifle divisions, 302-I mountain division rifle 51-A, 55-I, 10-I, 20-I division 26 A, 16-I tank squad (60 KV, 40 KV, I T-11, 6 T-34), 25-I tank brigade (60 KV, 224 T-236, 47 T-138). In the second echelon and reserve: 390-I, 51-I infantry divisions 229-A, 11-I, XNUMX-I infantry divisions XNUMX-A, XNUMX-th separate tank battalion (XNUMX KV) and other parts.

As a result of the commander’s front, Dmitry Kozlov gathered the main KF forces on his right flank, but they got bogged down in positional battles and lost mobility. In addition, the Germans were able to take advantage of the pause between the previous and the upcoming new Soviet offensive. The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. XXUMX to the KF command on the transition to defense was late, there was no time to regroup, dismantle the strike force on the right flank in favor of strengthening the positions of the left flank. The German command, collecting a strike force on its right flank opposite the positions of 170357 A, did not hesitate.

According to the original plan of command of Army Group South, Operation Hunt for Bustard was to begin on May 5. But because of the delay in the transfer of aviation, the beginning of the offensive operation was postponed to May 8. It cannot be said that the German strike was a complete surprise for the command of the KF. Shortly before the start of the German attack on the Soviet side, a Croatian pilot flew over and reported on the impending strike. By the end of May 7, an order was issued on the forces of the front, which reported that the German offensive was awaiting the 8-15 of May 1942. But there was no time for the right reaction.


7 May. The Luftwaffe VIII air corps was soon to return to the Kharkiv region to participate in the operation to eliminate the Barvenk bulge. Therefore, air strikes began a day before the onset of the 11 of the German army. All day the German Air Force attacked headquarters and communications centers. It must be said that the actions of German aviation during this operation were very successful, for example, during a raid on the headquarters of the 51 Army 9 in May, Lieutenant-General, Commander Vladimir Lvov was killed. Soviet command posts were previously reconnoitered and suffered heavy losses. Troop control was partially disrupted.

8 May. Aviation and artillery training began at 4.45. In 7.00, they launched an offensive unit of the 28 th Jäger, 132 th Infantry Division 30 AK on the right German flank. The main blow fell on the 63-th mountain rifle and partly 276-th rifle divisions of the 44-th A. In addition, the Germans landed troops with forces to the battalion in the rear of the 63-th Georgian mountain rifle division, causing panic. By the end of the day, the German units broke through the defenses at the front in 5 km and to a depth of 8 km.

In the 20.00 commander, Kozlov ordered flank counterattack inflicted on the enemy units that had broken through. The forces of 51 th in the morning of May 9 were due from the point of Parpach - Syuruk-Both to strike in the direction of the Peschanaya gully. The strike grouping included 4 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades and 2 separate tank battalions: 302, 138 and 390 rifle divisions from 51-A, 236-rifle division from 47-A, 83, naval rifle brigade, 40-I and 55-I tank brigades, 229-i and 124-i separate tank battalions. They received the task of restoring the position of the front and developing the offensive, cutting off the German units that had broken through into the depths of the Kerch Peninsula. The 44 Army was supposed to restrain the German onslaught at this time. On retreat to the rear defensive lines on the first day of the battle, no one has yet thought. There were no orders for their occupation. Moreover, the 72-I cavalry division and 54-th motorized rifle regiment, which were subordinate to the front headquarters and located at the Turkish shaft, received an order to advance to the 44-A strip to strengthen its defense.

9 May. The German command introduced the 22 Tank Division into the breakthrough, but the rains that began began to slow down its progress. Only by 10-th tank division was able to break into the depths of the defense of the CF and turn to the north, leaving the communications 47 th and 51 th Soviet armies. The 28-Iger Division and the 132-Infantry Division followed the tank division. In a breakthrough, Grodek's motorized rifle brigade was also thrown - it had already reached the Turkish shaft on 10 and crossed it.

10 May. On the night of May 10, in the course of negotiations between the Kozlov and Stalin comfronts, it was decided to withdraw the army to the Turkish (in other Tatar sources) shaft and organize a new line of defense. But 51-I army was no longer able to execute this order. As a result of an air strike against the headquarters, the commander of the Lviv was killed and his deputy K. Baranov was wounded. The army convulsively tried to avoid a catastrophe. Part of the 47 th and 51 th armies of 9 May went to the planned counterattack, there was a fierce oncoming battle. The Soviet tank brigades and individual tank battalions, infantry units fought against the formations of the 22-th tank division and the 28-th jäger division. The fact that if on the 9 of May in the 55-th tank brigade there were 46 tanks, then after the battle of 10-May was left alone, the heat of the battles witnesses. The Soviet armored infantry support units could not hold back the onslaught of the German forces.

11-12 May. In the afternoon of May 11, units of the 22 Tank Division reached the Sea of ​​Azov, cutting off significant forces of the 47 and 51 armies from the withdrawal route to the Turkish shaft. Several Soviet divisions were surrounded in a narrow coastal strip. In the evening of 11, the Soviet high command still hoped to restore the situation on the peninsula by creating a defensive line on the Turkish shaft. Stalin and Vasilevsky ordered Budyonny to personally organize the defense of the KF troops, bring order to the front's Military Council and go to Kerch to do this. The left-flank divisions of the 51-th Soviet army spent another day on unsuccessful attempts to prevent the encirclement of other troops, lost time and lost the race to the rear line of defense.

The Germans did not lose time and did everything to prevent the Soviet troops from withdrawing to a new line of defense. By the end of the 10, the advanced parts of the 30 of the AK went to the Turkish shaft. On May 12, the Germans landed troops in the rear of the 44 Army. This allowed them to begin a successful struggle for the Turkish shaft before approaching the shaft of the reserve 156 th rifle division.

13 May and the following days. 13 May the Germans broke through the defenses in the center of the Turkish shaft. On the night of 14, the Supreme Command Headquarters admitted defeat on the Kerch Peninsula. In 3.40, Budyonny, with the consent of the Headquarters, ordered the withdrawal of KF troops to the Taman Peninsula. Vasilevsky orders the 2 and 3 airborne corps and the airborne brigade to be put at the disposal of Budyonny. Apparently, it was supposed by the landing party to organize the defense on the approaches to Kerch and stop the German offensive in order to withdraw the troops of the defeated KF. Moreover, they did not intend to hand over Kerch - it meant to bury all the results of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation. May 15 in 1.10 A. M. Vasilevsky orders: "Do not surrender Kerch, organize defense of the type of Sevastopol."

The advanced German units, apparently, it was Grodek’s motorized brigade, reached the outskirts of Kerch on May 14. The city was defended by parts of the 72 Cavalry Division. This was reported in 18.10 by the representative of the Headquarters on the Crimean Front, Lev Z. Mehlis: “Fights are going on the outskirts of Kerch, from the north the city is being managed by the enemy ... We have dishonored the country and should be cursed. We will fight to the last. Enemy aviation decided the outcome of the battle. ”

But the measures to turn Kerch into a fortress city, the withdrawal of most of the forces from the peninsula were late. At first, the Germans cut off a significant part of the KF troops by turning to the north of the 22 armored divisions. True, they wanted to send it to Kharkiv on May 15, but the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops on the peninsula delayed its dispatch. Part of the 28 th Jäger and 132 Infantry Divisions turned to the northeast after the breakthrough of the Turkish shaft and also reached the Sea of ​​Azov. Thus, a barrier was built by the Soviet troops, who were retreating from the Turkish Wall. May 16 to Kerch out entered into the breakthrough 170-I German infantry division. But the battle for the city continued until May 20. The Red Army fought in the area of ​​Mount Mithridates, the railway station, the plant them. Voykova. After the defenders had exhausted all the possibilities for resistance in the city, they retreated to Adzhimushkay quarries. About 13 of thousands of people retreated to them - the compound of the 83 th brigade of the marines, the 95 of the frontier detachment, several hundred cadets of the Yaroslavl Aviation School, the Voronezh School of Radio Specialists, and fighters from other parts, townspeople. Colonel P. M. Yagunov led the defense in Central quarries, I. P. Parakhin, senior battalion commissar and G. Burmin, lieutenant colonel GM Burmin, led the defense, and Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Yermakov served in Minor quarries, senior lieutenant M. G. Pazhny, battalion commissioner M. N. Karpehin. The Germans, through continuous attacks, were able to drive the Red Army men deep into the quarries. But they could not take them, all the storms failed. Despite the acute shortage of water, food, medicine, ammunition, weapons The fighters kept the 170 defense for days. There was no water in the quarries. She had to mine outside, according to the memories of the surviving fighters, "they paid for a bucket of water with a bucket of blood." The last defenders of Kerch Brest, completely exhausted, were captured on October 30 1942. A total of 48 people fell into the hands of the Germans. The rest, about 13 thousand people, died.

Evacuation from the peninsula continued from 15 to May 20. By order of Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky, all possible ships and vessels were driven into the Kerch area. All managed to evacuate to 140 thousand people. Commissioner Lev Mehlis was evacuated one of the last in the evening on May 19. In the last days of the catastrophe, as a man of undoubted personal courage, he rushed along the front lines, it seemed that he was looking for death, trying to organize a defense, to stop the retreating units. On the night of May 20, the last units covering the departure of their comrades plunged into the ships under enemy fire.


- By the Directive of the Headquarters, the Crimean Front and the North Caucasus direction were eliminated. The remnants of the KF troops were sent to form a new North Caucasus Front. His commander was appointed Marshal Budyonny.

- The front lost more than 160 thousand people. Lost most of the aircraft, armored vehicles, guns, vehicles, tractors and other military equipment. The Soviet troops suffered a heavy defeat, the results of previous actions in this direction were lost. The situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front was seriously complicated. The Germans were able to threaten invasion of the North Caucasus through the Kerch Strait and the Taman Peninsula. The position of the Soviet troops in Sevastopol sharply deteriorated, the German command was able to concentrate more forces against the fortified city.

- 4 June 1942 of the year issued a directive for the Stake No. 155452 “On the reasons for the defeat of the Crimean front in the Kerch operation”. The main reason was called the error command KF. The front commander, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, was demoted to major general and removed from the commander’s post. The commander of the 44 Army, Lieutenant-General S. I. Chernyak was removed from the post of commander, demoted to a colonel and sent to the troops with the aim of "checking on other, less difficult work." The commander of the 47 Army, Major-General K. S. Kolganov, was removed from the position of commander, demoted to colonel. Mehlis was removed from his post as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Department of the Red Army, lowered his rank by two levels - to the corps commissioner. Divisional Commissar F. A. Shamanin, a member of the Military Council of the KF, was demoted to brigadier commissioner. The Chief of Staff of the CF, Major General P. P. Vechny, was removed from the post of the Chief of Staff of the Front. The commander of the CF Air Force of the Major General E. M. Nikolaenko was removed from his post and lowered to a colonel.

- The disaster of the Crimean front is a classic example of the weakness of the defensive strategy, even in conditions of a small, fairly comfortable for defense (the Germans could not conduct wide circumvent maneuvers) of the front and a smaller amount of manpower, tanks and guns from the enemy. The German command found a weak spot and ripped up the Soviet defense, the presence of mobile, strike formations (22-I tank division and Grodek's motorized brigade) allowed to develop the first success, surround the Soviet infantry, destroy the rear, separate formations, cut communications. A major role was played by air superiority. The command of the KF did not have time to rebuild the troops of the front into more correct defensive orders (without bias in favor of the right flank), to create mobile strike groups that could stop the German offensive by striking the flanks of the German group that had broken through and even turn the situation in their favor. I could not prepare in advance a new line of defense, to devote forces and means to it. German generals during this period of war still replayed the Soviet generals.

Adzhimushkay_kamenolomni - the entrance to the museum.
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  1. Dobrokhod Sergey
    Dobrokhod Sergey 8 May 2012 09: 22
    And yet, our fathers and grandfathers became the winners. Glory to them and words of gratitude.
    Happy Victory Day!
  2. ward
    ward 8 May 2012 09: 26
    In my opinion, according to the results, one-man management was introduced ... Mehlis, of course, did a great job ... the problem was the lack of anti-tank weapons in the infantry ... there weren’t even bottles ... well, aviation ... plus article ...
    1. ZHORA
      ZHORA 8 May 2012 11: 54
      The superiority of the Red Army in tanks and self-propelled artillery systems by 1,9 times is the lack of anti-tank weapons?!? In aviation, by the way, there was parity, the Germans simply fought better, given the fact that they had a powerful Sevastopol grouping of the Red Army in the rear ...
      1. Zynaps
        Zynaps 8 May 2012 19: 51
        Zhora, smart people have known for a long time that tanks and self-propelled guns themselves do not fight - units are fighting. and with this at the beginning of the war, things were bad. the trouble with the tanks was that they were mostly outdated. There were only 34 thousand T-1.5s in the army, and they were smeared across parts and schools. The KV-1 was even smaller, and all these new tanks suffered from childhood illnesses. and also, in the units there was a catastrophic shortage of vehicles (which the national economy also badly needed), and a shortage of repair bases, and an unsettled logistics and logistics service (which is now called the fashionable word "logistics").

        the same trouble with the planes, which is a surprise! - did not have radio stations. do you know why for a long time they couldn’t land a gunner on the IL-2?

        and then, here's another, from the documentary:

        When assessing the technical readiness of the tank fleet (over 23 thousand units), it should be noted that over 70% of the old tanks needed major and medium repairs. Serviceable tanks made up no more than 27%. This situation was caused by an underestimation of the development of repair facilities.
        In February 1941, it was decided to form another 20 mechanized corps. To staff them, more than 30 thousand tanks were required. To equip all the hulls with tanks of new designs, it would not take
        less than five years. The organization of the mechanized corps was based on the idea of ​​its great operational independence, which should have been provided with significant shock and firepower of the compound. In practice, this could not be achieved, since the hull lacked field artillery, air defense systems, and engineer and engineer units and units.

        Thus, on the eve of the war, gross miscalculations were made both in determining the number of tanks in the corps and in the number of corps. Their average staffing at the beginning of the war was within 50% (Table 3).

        There was an acute shortage of vehicles, tractors, motorcycles. Even the corps of the western districts, which were supplied first of all, had manning on vehicles and tractors of not more than 35% and special vehicles - 15-20%.

        You can easily find the source on Militer. so the Germans had superiority in manpower and in technology.

        and, Zhora, the "Sevastopol group" - aka the Primorskaya army, was not in the rear, but cut off from other forces. The PA was bound by heavy fighting and could not go to the rescue of the Kerch people. otherwise there would be no need for the first Kerch-Feodosia landing.
        1. ZHORA
          ZHORA 8 May 2012 20: 40
          Of course, I understand that it hurts .. But the Germans did not have superiority in manpower and equipment, I can’t even say how without tanks they took the whole Crimea and blocked Sevastopol (before the Kerch operation)
          1. Zynaps
            Zynaps 8 May 2012 20: 48
            Zhora, than to rattle the fifth point and say "painful", give the numbers of the units better by stages from the beginning of the defense of the Crimea to the fall of Sevastopol.

            kill me with a dance! (c) and then tryndet stupidly, you know ...
  3. Rodver
    Rodver 8 May 2012 09: 30
    Not by number, but by reduction, or courage, the city takes. Plus luck.
  4. Colonel
    Colonel 8 May 2012 10: 12
    Why not a word about the "outstanding role" of Mehlis in the defeat of the KF ???
    Attention! You do not have permission to view hidden text.

    And let the front commander say for the author of the article
    "11.2.66 g.
    Hello, Alexander Ivanovich!
    Thank you so much for not forgetting the old disgraced general. My opal has been going on for almost 25 years.
    The events of those days often arise in my memory. It is hard to recall them, especially because the blame for the death of all our regiments lies not only with us, the direct participants in these battles, but also with the leadership that was carried out over us. I do not mean the layman in the operational art of the Mehlis, but the commander of the North Caucasus direction and the Headquarters. I also mean Oktyabrsky, who, in fact, did not fight, but prevented Petrov from fighting and built tricks on the Crimean Front. And now he has become a hero! Even his member [military council of the Black Sea Fleet] was given a Hero [rank Hero of the Soviet Union, Vice Admiral N.M. Kulakov was assigned on 7.05.1965/1/10]. They crawled out on the neck of the Crimean front. There wouldn’t be this - there wouldn’t be Sevastopol. Back in December, he would leave it to the enemy. Everything went towards this, and his arrival at the Tunnel [the location of the Crimean Front command] was aimed at obtaining permission to leave Sevastopol. Now the cry “Glory to the Black Sea sailors for Sevastopol and Crimea!” Is booming everywhere. As if they had done everything, and the Ground Forces had nothing to do with it. Although in reality it was the opposite. They were the largest part - hardly XNUMX/XNUMX of the total composition of the troops that attacked and defended the Crimea.
    For some reason, everyone forgot, even the General Staff, that, as we left Crimea, Sevastopol lasted only about a month. Sailors climb out of their skin, proving that they held Crimea and Sevastopol, and inspired it by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and in all speeches and in print this is advertised very widely. This offends the honor, merit and dignity of those who laid down their heads for the Crimea.
    I am very sorry that I did not put my head there. I would not hear injustices and insults, because the dead do not have shame. But I did not succeed, despite the fact that he left Yenikale with the rear guard units of Volkov. Then there was already no bosses, neither small nor large, was there, everything passed into the power of Budyonny and his deputy Cherevichenko.
    Your data on the arrival of October at the Tunnel is accurate. I demanded his departure to Sevastopol. With his slander at Stavka, he only delayed the start of the Kerch operation, snatching the 1st infantry regiment and the 1st naval brigade, which had been sent to Sevastopol, from the 1st landing echelon to Stavka.
    Here are the things going on ...

    D. KOZLOV. "
    1. Zynaps
      Zynaps 8 May 2012 20: 03
      not everything is so linear, comrade.

      it’s difficult to judge the big picture by several reports. moreover, the aforementioned D. Kozlov received a zvizdyulin from Comrade. Stalin for the fact that he showed co-operation in matters of principle, while he was the only authorized representative of the Stavka in the Crimea.

      I propose to read the discussion on the topic that took place between the journalist D. Zakharov (bald bespectacled man from the program "Vzglyad") and the historian Meltyukhov. the spirit of Alexei Isaev, who studied the collapse of the Crimean Front together with Meltyukhov, is invisibly hovering in the discussion:
      1. Colonel
        Colonel 8 May 2012 20: 14
        Thank you, I will read it now, but, previously, for myself, I have long ago put together a picture of these events on the basis of V. Karpov's book "The Commander" about General Petrov. I do not presume to argue about the advantages and disadvantages of this source, but he convinced me.
        1. Zynaps
          Zynaps 8 May 2012 20: 46
          Karpov is not a historian, but a good writer. writers with facts usually have a tense situation — the huddle has a slightly different purpose.
          1. Colonel
            Colonel 8 May 2012 20: 57
            I agree - a good writer, not a science fiction. In combination - an officer of the General Staff who had access to archives, incl. through the Ministry of Defense of the USSR D.T. Yazova.
            Well, all the same, he began to argue. I remain in my opinion, respecting yours. Happy Victory Day!
  5. Kars
    Kars 8 May 2012 10: 27
    What can I say .. Lost victories .. Manshtein is a landmark book for me, the first of the enemy’s memoirs, was the discovery for me and the name of Sergei Pereslegin who commented on it, and pointed to inaccuracy.

    And on the topic of 1942, this is a catastrophe of precisely the SOVIET military commanders, the lack of initiative, confidence, looking back at higher bosses - who did not know how to coordinate actions, and when they did something they were late.
    After a counter-strike near Moscow - by the way LOBOVO, failure after failure, and the veterans could have destroyed the Germans from our territory by the fall of 1942, but ended up on the Volga. But here I already fall under the saying ----... Everyone imagines himself a strategist , seeing the battle from the side ... and here also retrospectively.
    1. Tirpitz
      Tirpitz 8 May 2012 11: 07
      Also read this book. So Manstein was simply wondering why the command of the USSR in Crimea was so illiterate using its forces.
      1. Zynaps
        Zynaps 8 May 2012 20: 10
        memoirs in source studies are not considered a reliable source, for they are only the subjective opinion of the author.

        all military memoirs are divided into three groups:

        a) memoirs of the victorious army general: "how I won the war"

        b) memoirs of an army general with a bat: "how I was not allowed to win the war"

        c) a soldier's memoirs: "and you all went to ... !!!"

        of Germans, without disgust, one can read only the memoirs of Mellentin and Goth. I would be surprised at Manstein’s place, especially if I had the 4th Air Army, superiority in tanks and manpower.
        1. Kars
          Kars 8 May 2012 23: 31
          Quote: Zynaps
          a) memoirs of the victorious army general: "how I won the war"

          b) memoirs of an army general with a bat: "how I was not allowed to win the war"

          c) a soldier's memoirs: "and you all went to ... !!!"

          So the whole business is to read and form your opinion.
          And still, Crimea is a pure loss of the Red Army, if not a twirl.
        2. prispek
          prispek 9 May 2012 00: 36
          So after all, the Germans did not have superiority. Neither in tanks nor in manpower
  6. Svetoyar
    Svetoyar 8 May 2012 10: 44
    We must pay tribute to the enemy. The competent and skillful actions of the German troops in the number of times inferior to the Soviet units. War is war.
    1. ZHORA
      ZHORA 8 May 2012 12: 02
      Taking into account the Sevastopol grouping, the Germans had 3 times less forces on the Crimean peninsula. They didn’t succeed in taking Sevastopol offense, then the Kerch landing landed, Manstein was lent a tank division and an air corps (during the Kerch operation) he moved away from Sevastopol and defeated the Kerch group and then returned and took Sevastopol, and contrary to the generally accepted concept, he took 3 times superiority in Sevastopol equal forces defending. It would be regrettable for some to admit it was German glory.
      1. Charon
        Charon 8 May 2012 18: 57
        It would be regrettable for some to admit it was German glory.

        You, Zhora, are clearly not regrettable. The better tomorrow will be for you when we celebrate Victory.
      2. Zynaps
        Zynaps 8 May 2012 20: 37
        Zhora, you rotten nonsense. in the decisive battles at Perekop, Manstein had 3 army corps, 3 infantry and 2 mountain rifle divisions, and 3 motorized SS divisions - Adolf Hitler and Viking. against our 7 rifle divisions, a handful of marines, the RGK artillery battalion. with complete superiority of the Germans in the air.

        I will also remind you of the mass desertion of the Crimean Tatars from the 51st Army - almost 20 thousand conscripts. 19 thousand Tatars immediately enrolled in the battalions of the SD security police and "noise".

        Manstein had no problems supplying his troops. our ability to supply troops pressed against the sea was limited. if there was a possibility of a normal supply of Sevastopol, he would be kept. and the troops of Manstein with the Romanians lost far more than 300 thousand soldiers and officers.

        so no need for dirt, sickly.
        1. Cadet787
          Cadet787 8 May 2012 23: 37
          What, you toss in front of pigs beads, Zhora fascist provocateur. The front commander in this battle was Mr. L.D. Kozlov, a competent, but limp man, who was crushed by a not-so-famous polit fighter, Mehlis, demoted after the well-known events, to Major General. The general management was carried out by Oktyabrsky, com. Black Sea Fleet. It’s just a fateful combination of circumstances, a wrestler and a sailor are watered commanding a combined arms commander, that’s the result. After this and other cases, the institute of commissioners was canceled and a deputy was introduced. on the political side without a decisive vote, which really strengthened unity of command in the Red Army.
        2. Kars
          Kars 8 May 2012 23: 39
          Quote: Zynaps
          "Adolf Hitler" and "Viking"

          In the Crimea, exactly?

          In September of the 1941 of the year, the Leibstandart SS became part of the 11 Army aimed at capturing the Crimea, and was its only motorized formation. Army Commander Colonel-General Erich von Manstein planned to use the standard for a breakthrough to Sevastopol after capturing the fortified positions of Soviet troops on the Perekop Isthmus. However, as a result of the blow inflicted by the formations of the Southern Front (9 Army and 18 Army) on the flank of the German Army, the SS brigade had to be transferred to eliminate the threat of a breakthrough [33]. Reflecting the offensive, the command of Army Group South carried out an operation to encircle the Soviet armies with the forces of the 1 Tank Group and units of the 11 Army. During the operation “Leibstandart”, advancing along the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov, on October 7 of October 1941, Osipenko occupied and closed the encirclement. However, after a few days a significant part of the Soviet troops managed to break through to the main forces

          The combat units of the 11 Army consisted of three corps: the 30 Army consisting of the 22 Army, the 72 Army and the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (German: Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler), LIX Mountain Rifle Corps, consisting of the 170th Infantry Division, the 1th and 4th Mountain Rifle Divisions, the LIVth Corps, consisting of the 46th, 73th and 50th Infantry Divisions. In early September, the LIVth Corps took an active part in the offensive on the Crimean Peninsula. During this period, under the command of Manstein, there were also the 3 I Romanian army, three mountain rifle brigades and three cavalry brigades.

        3. Kostyan
          Kostyan 9 May 2012 21: 43
          you flatter yourself ... why are you like a cockerel clawing around .... snot noticed ... erase them quickly and you hang ... you just yap and a ram .... read what Kars writes to you .... .. and why grind nonsense here .. it’s better to go to the brewery and take your chatter in the bulldo .. there the hucksters will listen to you ... and finally ... you would bring it out of here .. otherwise your rotten bazaar was pulled up. or just get crazy jerk .. and don’t moan here ..
  7. Brother Sarych
    Brother Sarych 8 May 2012 11: 49
    The bitter page of our history, striking all heroism, coupled with no less stunning disorder and disorganization!
  8. loc.bejenari
    loc.bejenari 8 May 2012 13: 33
    in the comments on Manstein’s LOST VICTORIES -Pereslegin wrote-that the blame for the incident lies with the inactive fleet
    it was enough to approach the cruiser Red October in the Feodosia Gulf, and he would simply have dared German units advancing along the coast with his guns
    instead, the fleet sat in Novorossiysk motivating the danger of German aviation
    moreover, even in the event of the defeat of the cruiser, he could simply land on the ground in the bay and remain in the form of a battery
    all the same, the loss of the cruiser would not be comparable with the catastrophe of the entire front and, as a result, the loss of Sevastopol
    and the most ridiculous, of course, as the Mehlis and the Gantry escaped, they lowered them in rank, although for what they did out of their stupidity, one sentence to the wall
  9. Greyfox
    Greyfox 8 May 2012 14: 56
    Something in the article is really nothing about the "heroic" Mehlis. But this representative of the tribe of "engineers of human souls" played the most sinister role in the events in Crimea (he burned it out in other places, of course, but Crimea became the pinnacle of his "career")
    The representative of the Headquarters brought extraordinary optimism and self-confidence to the Kerch Peninsula. He publicly boastfully stated that in Crimea "we will roll the Germans great music." Among the command of the fronts and armies, Mehlis was already known as a lover of speedy executions and executions, so some generals and senior officers were simply afraid of him. “Unfortunately, the front commander D. Kozlov could not stand this. The representative of the Headquarters quickly crushed the front commander and took over many of his functions. A kind of dual power appeared on the Crimean Front, which was completely unacceptable in the army and especially during the conduct of hostilities. Why was the front commander so weak and could not stand the pressure of the self-confident and arrogant commissar? The explanation for this must be sought not only in character, but also in the biography of Kozlov. Dmitry Timofeevich Kozlov (1896 – 1967) was drafted into the tsarist army in 1915. By 1917 he graduated from the school of ensigns, participated in the First World War, in 1918 he joined the Bolshevik party. In the Civil War in 1920 – 21. He fought the battalion and regiment commander on the Eastern Front and in Turkestan. In Soviet times, he completed the courses "Shot" and the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. In 1939, he taught tactics at this academy. During the Soviet-Finnish War 1939 – 1940. commanded the rifle corps, and then in 1940 – 1941, he was deputy commander of the Odessa and then Transcaucasian districts. It is not clear from the track record that the military repressions that took place in 1937 – 1939, [4] touched him, but it is clear that Kozlov was so frightened by them that he saw a dangerous informant of the highest party bodies in every military commissioner. This was especially true of the Mehlis L.Z., after which from the beginning of the war a long train of rumors about his unseemly affairs in relation to military commanders has been drawn.

    Vsevolod Valentinovich Abramov Kerch disaster 1942
    Yes, and the commander of the Black Sea Fleet with the pseudonym Oktyabrsky also showed himself to be that "military leader".
  10. viruskvartirus
    viruskvartirus 8 May 2012 16: 53
    "The catastrophe of the Crimean Front is a classic example of the weakness of the defensive strategy, even in the conditions of a small, quite convenient for defense (the Germans could not carry out wide outflanking maneuvers) section of the front and a smaller number of manpower, tanks and guns at the enemy" is absolutely true today .. ..
  11. Yarbay
    Yarbay 8 May 2012 20: 37
    77 Mountain Division. my uncle and great-grandfather were serving there !!
    uncle died in Kerch !!
  12. Tyumen
    Tyumen 8 May 2012 21: 07
    I was in these quarries on an excursion from the pioneer camp in 83g.
    Was there anyone in the pioneer camp * Tyumenets * near Anapa, the village
    Veselovka, in 82 - 88g.g. ?
  13. 8 company
    8 company 8 May 2012 22: 19
    Generals Mehlis and Kozlov should have shot themselves after such a disaster.

    Portrait of the “hero” of the Crimean disaster:

    Mehlis Lev Zakharovich (1889-1953). He worked as a clerk, teacher. In 1907-1910 he was a member of the Jewish Social-Democratic Labor Party "Poalei-Zion". Member of the 1st World War. In March 1918 he joined the RCP (b). In 1919 he joined the Red Army, commissar of a brigade, division, and the Right Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine. In 1921-22 - in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection of the RSFSR, in 1922-26 - in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1924-30 assistant to the General Secretary I.V. Stalin, with his truly slavish devotion earned his full confidence and enjoyed his patronage for many years. Since 1930 editor of the newspaper "Pravda" and at the same time head. department of press and publishing houses of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). From Feb 1934 candidate for membership, since Oct. 1939 Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). In January 1938, Mekhlis became the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army and the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Often leaving for military districts, he personally made decisions on the ground on mass arrests of the command and political personnel of the Red Army. His words: "We will destroy enemies and traitors like mad dogs", thrown from the rostrum of the XVIII Congress, characterize his position most fully. Lev Zakharovich organized a real personnel pogrom in the Far East in the summer of 1938. Mehlis was personally involved in the tragedy of Marshal Blucher. It was Mekhlis who turned political workers into informers: with a directive marked "top secret", the head of the RKKA PU ordered the chiefs of political agencies and commissars to provide him with detailed characteristics of the commanders of units and formations twice a year without notifying the latter. Among his "merits" was the reprisal against the command of the Western Front, headed by Pavlov. In September 1941, as a commissioner of the Supreme Command Headquarters, he was sent to the North-Western Front, where, in front of the formation of the commanders of the 34th Army headquarters, without trial, he shot the chief of the army's artillery, Major General of Artillery V.S. Goncharov. The army commander, Kachanov, was also shot. In 1942. Stalin sent Mehlis to the Crimean Front, where Lev Zakharovich incompetently intervened in the command and control of the troops. The war correspondent of Krasnaya Zvezda, Konstantin Simonov, wrote: 'A blizzard along with the rain, everything was incredible, everything literally stood up, the tanks did not go, and the density of troops driven by Mehlis, who led this offensive, replacing the actual front commander, the weak-willed General Kozlov, was monstrous. Everything was pushed close to the front line, and every German shell, every mine, every bomb, exploding, inflicted enormous losses on us ... A kilometer - two - three - five - seven from the front line, everything was in corpses ... In a word, it was a picture of a mediocre military leadership and complete, monstrous disorder. Plus to this - a complete neglect of people, a complete lack of concern about preserving manpower, about protecting people from unnecessary losses ... '
    The result was a grand catastrophe that led to the complete loss of Crimea. Stalin demoted his pet to the rank of corps commissar and removed from the posts of the head of the Red Army PU and the deputy commissar of defense. However, even at lower positions, Mehlis continued to interfere in the decisions of the commanders, demanding "to be guided by the decisions of the party" regardless of the strategic and tactical tasks of the troops, constantly wrote denunciations to the Central Committee and personally to Stalin on the commanders, demanding that they be brought to justice. After the war, he was the Minister of State Control of the USSR. He died in February 1953.
  14. Kostyan
    Kostyan 9 May 2012 21: 44
    in short, we managed as always ... corpses are always corpses and corpses ........ that we are advancing, that in a dead supereleaded defense ..... sad ......