Surprise is worse than C-300. What did Mr. Netanyahu not take into account?
The working visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Moscow, scheduled for 9 on May 2018, became known early in the month. As it turned out later, together with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Serbian leader Alexander Vucic, Netanyahu took part in events to mark the 73 anniversary of the Great Victory, including the military parade on Red Square, as well as the action "Immortal Regiment". But if A.Vucic’s arrival is very easily explained by the Serbian’s desire to build decent military-technical and economic cooperation with fraternal Russia, as well as to enlist military-diplomatic support for a possible resolution of the “Kosovo issue”), then the hypocrisy of the key person on the Middle East agenda is Netanyahu has long been no limit. Presentation of the Jewish state as a “reliable and trusted” partner of the Russian Federation, a firm handshake with Vladimir Putin, assurances of the deepest respect of our state, and then another “knife in the back” - this is the most colorful characteristic of the behavior of the majority of Israeli leaders towards Russia. And Bibi Netanyahu is no exception.
Initially, it was clear that his visit to the events in honor of Victory Day was only a forced formality, while the real goal was to obtain guarantees for the complete "freezing" of the delivery of anti-aircraft missile systems C-300PMU-2 "Favorite" to Syrian air defense forces, and also non-interference of the Russian military contingent in the next stage of the high-intensity Israeli-Iranian military conflict in the Golan Heights region, in which Al-Quds troops participate. Considering the fact that, at first glance, a mutually beneficial "deal" took place again, Netanyahu, for his part, could only offer the refusal of support from the an-Nusra terrorist formations and Free Syrian Army militants in the largest southern opposition springboard Dar'a - Essaouida - Quneitra, which is considered by military experts and political scientists as the main offensive "fist" on the fortifications of Syrian government forces.
The results of this visit were not long in coming. On Friday, May 11, a day after the massive Israeli air strike on the strongholds of the main ally of the Syrian army, the special forces of the IRGC Al-Quds, as well as the facilities of the Syrian air defense, Vladimir Kozhin, an assistant to the president of Russia for military-technical cooperation -or negotiations on the possible supply of C-300 complexes to the Syrian side, after which the press secretary of the head of state Dmitry Peskov summed up that the transfer of “three hundred” to Damascus had never been announced. Such an abrupt change of position, literally a couple of weeks later, after statements by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, as well as the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Sergey Rudsky about “removing Moscow’s moral obligations that previously prevented the transfer of C-300 to the Syrian army”, as well as “considering the possibility of resuming the supply of these complexes to Damascus, from a boldly patriotic point of view, may seem like another “drain” of our Middle Eastern allies in favor of the imperial ideas of Tel Aviv and Washington. Quite a large number of observers have already managed to link this situation with the military-political immaturity of the Russian leadership and inconsistency in making major decisions.
But let's evaluate what is happening not from the bell tower of the patriotic hurray-patriot, but from the point of view of the Kremlin’s foreign policy pragmatism and strategic defense of the Russian Federation’s defense department, after all, people who can predict the actions of the same Israel a dozen steps ahead lead and direct them. From this it follows that at this stage, the conditions proposed by the Israeli Prime Minister for some unofficial deal are in Russia's national and regional interests. It is also worth remembering that the current position of Moscow on C-300PMU-2 is very fragile and can quickly change in the event of an uncoordinated "movement" of the Jewish state. If the Israeli side really assured the leadership of the Russian Federation in dismissing FSA militants in the southern “semi-webs” at the Golan Heights in exchange for “freezing” the “Favorites” program (and there is no other formula visible here), this is a very winning combination.
It consists in the fact that after the final mopping up of ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation) Yarmouk (in the southern regions of Damascus), as well as the liberation from the FSA fighters of the "Rastan Cauldron" (in the Homs governorate), which are noticeably weakened in the battles by pro-government forces, including The Tiger Forces and Hezbollah units will make it much easier to break through the defensive lines of the Syrian Free Army militants if the military-technical support of the latter from the IDF finally ceases. Subsequently, the southern regions of Syria (Essaouida and Al Quneitra) can be returned to Damascus’s control several times faster than with the direct participation of Israel on the enemy’s side. Of course, the Syrian-Jordanian section of the border where the Dzharash-Dara and El-Mafraq-Dara highways can act as a “strategic loophole” for supporting the opposition-terrorist “backbone” in southern Syria. Military cargo from Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States, delivered by military transport, can be transported along them. aviation and amphibious assault ship groups of the U.S. Navy. But there’s a catch: the border sections of these highways can be taken under fire control of the Syrian army’s rocket artillery much easier than the sections of the Golan Heights covered by Iron Dome complexes.
As for the support of the anti-government group FSA, as well as the terrorist units of Dzhebhat al-Nusra in the south of the Syrian Arab Republic from Israel, this has been known since the fall of 2014, when Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem told in an interview with the television channel “ Russia Today. These data were confirmed by the statements of the then Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, who classified "al-Nusra" as a "moderate group", despite the fact that it is included in the international list of terrorist groups. However, against the background of the continuing threat of the transfer of the Russian C-300 complexes to Damascus, the Israeli military leadership decided not to play with fire, which resulted in the absence of visible attempts to reach the rebels during the night of May 10, immediately after the attacks of Israeli tactical aviation and MLRS MLRS on the positions of the CAA and elite Iranian special forces "Quds", members of the IRGC. Only small skirmishes and artillery duels between the FSA and the CAA were recorded in the area of the village of Chadder near the Golan Heights.
As you can see, the use of the C-300 anti-aircraft missile system as an instrument of military-political pressure has served an excellent service in manipulating the Israeli side, whose ultimate goal is to accelerate the restoration of Syrian sovereignty over the territories seized by the opposition. It is noteworthy that Sergey Markov, director of the NP Institute for Political Studies, also declares the existence of such a “deal” between Russia and Israel. His opinion is that "Russia as a great nation will not give Tehran; but its dominant influence in Syria is also not included in the spectrum of Russian interests. ” Agree, the idea is very strange and contradictory (especially from the position of an ally), but it can also be partially understood.
Most likely, with such statements by Sergey Alexandrovich, Moscow gently, at the media information level, gives Iran a little significant signal about the inadmissibility of playing “its own anti-Israel card” in the Syrian theater of operations, bypassing Russia's interests at this stage. As you know, the list of these interests includes the speedy destruction of the “southwestern half-coaster”, and then the slow progress on the eastern bank of the Euphrates (starting with the “Hushama pocket”), involving “Quds” and Syrian militia against the pro-American group “Army north of Syria "emerging today from the SDF soldiers and former rebels LIH. It is easy to understand that the clash between pro-Iranian forces and the IDF against the background of such a strategy only weakens the potential of the Syrian Arab Army, "pulling" its most efficient units to a new focus of tension in the Golan Heights.
Nevertheless, the existence of a tacit agreement between Russia and Israel does not in the least lessen the urgency of protecting the Syrian airspace from future massive missile strikes by the US Navy on the most important strongholds of the Syrian government forces in the Euphrates and the southern "de-escalation zone". Indeed, despite the Israeli-Russian “reconciliation of hours” on the situation in the southern part of the ATS, the ambitions of the White House and the Pentagon are much more ambitious here and are still focused at least on the seizure of large territories on the west coast of the Euphrates and in the southern outskirts of Damascus and at most the overthrow of the government of Bashar al-Assad, or his ousting from Damascus to Homs, Lattakia or Tartus.
As we have previously considered, based on information from the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia and numerous eyewitnesses, for this purpose, military training camps have been deployed in the Hasek provinces, the 55-kilometer “security zone”, as well as the “southern de-escalation zone”, which instructors of the Marine Corps and US MTR teach Kurdish fighters "Syrian Democratic Forces", "Army of the North of Syria", as well as the "Free Syrian Army" tactics of attack on the units of the Syrian army, disorganized by numerous missile E missile and air strikes US fleet and the air force. To be able to carry out such attacks, the American aircraft carrier group led by the nuclear carrier CVN-75 USS “Harry S. Trumen” is represented by a reinforced strike, anti-submarine and anti-air component of 6 destroyers of the “Arleigh Burke” class (instead of 3-4 EM with a standard warrant) , missile cruiser URO CG-60 "Normandy" class "Ticonderoga", as well as additional German frigate F221 "Hessen" class "Saxony". On seven American Aegis rocket control ships weapons can be placed from 200 to 450 of strategic Tomahawk cruise missiles in various variants (RGM-109E, TLAM-C and TLAM-D).
And therefore, already now the Russian Defense Ministry has been tasked with finding a worthy alternative to C-300PS / PMU-2, which is able to protect the CAA from the merciless blows of coalition forces. It has long been known that an indisputable technical advantage of C-300PS / PM1 / 2, in view of the program of the first of the first edition of the program, is the installation of the ФХNUMXС container with the radar 1ХХ30 / Е6 radar complex on the 2ВXNMXMXMXMXM / 40 / 6 / 25 radar complex of the 40C with the radar complex of the illumination and guided missile systems on the 6 / 39 radar If we calculate the range of the radio horizon with the refractive index 3,57 (for DM / SM waves), we get the possibility of intercepting "Tomahawks" at distances around 45 — 47 km, because their flight altitude usually reaches 45 - 50. If it’s about AGM-158B JASSM-ER tactical long-range tactical long-range missile air attack missile (mid-flight altitude in the enemy’s air defense positions near 20-25 m), then this range is reduced to 38 - 40 km, which is quite enough to fill the gaps at low altitude chastke airspace of an area of the Syrian Arab Republic.
In particular, two 3 divisional regiments C-300PS, combined into a single missile defense system with the aid of the Baikal-1МЭ automated control system and located at a distance 35 km from each other, plus for each shelf from 4 to 6 "Armor-С1" to protect the "dead zone". In sum, we have 288 ZUR 5В55Р and 144 57Э6Е. Given the presence of the Pechora-2M and Osa-AKM sets, this number would be enough for protection against the most unpredictable rocket attacks. But how to replace C-300, not stipulated by the agreements?
One of the most suitable options is the transfer of additional battalions of Buk-M2E military anti-aircraft missile systems to the Syrian air defense forces. These complexes have never been the subject of military-political "bargaining" between Tel Aviv and Moscow. In the same turn, the extended range to 45 km and the height of the targets hit for the improved 25M9 anti-aircraft missile gives Buk-M317 practically the same combat potential as the S-2PS. Yes, there is no possibility of hitting the Israeli F-300I "Ra'am" and F-15I "Sufa" fighters long before the launch of guided bombs and tactical missiles from their pods, as well as American carrier-based aircraft, but there are excellent abilities to defeat those already flying at Syrian targets for precision weapons. For example, the 16S9M18-1 all-round radar detector, 3S9 illumination and guidance radars, as well as the 36S9 combat control point are equipped with an updated element base, which allows working on small targets with an EPR of about 510 - 0,05 sq. m. Therefore, the list of targets includes anti-radar missiles AGM-0,08HARM, AGM-88E AARGM, missiles of the JASSM-ER, Shtorm Shadow and Delilah families, as well as 88-mm unguided / guided missiles of the M227 / M26 family, included in ammunition MLRS MLRS and HIMARS (not to mention the larger "Tomahawks").
The maximum speed of targets hit for the Buk-M2 is 4320 km / h, which makes it possible to destroy numerous types of operational-tactical ballistic, including the promising Israeli 306-mm EXTRA missile, commercially produced by Israel Military Industries Ltd. . It is worth mentioning that back in February of this year, the head of the Israeli defense ministry Avigdor Lieberman decided to form in the AOI separate units of tactical missiles that are part of the Israeli armed forces structure along with regular artillery troops. It is these offices will adopt «EXTRA» long-range tactical missiles. Virtually all domestic and foreign media have missed this newswhile this rocket is already successfully passing the baptism of fire in the southern part of the Syrian theater of operations. The destruction of these products on the approach to the strategically important facilities of the Syrian army is of paramount importance, since the damage they cause is very high. First, the 450-kilogram OTBR of the EXTRA (the analogue of the Belarusian-Chinese Polonaise) has a range of 150 km, which allows shelling all weapons depots and command posts in the province of Damascus up to Homs.
Tactical missile "EXTRA"
Due to such possibilities are virtually no longer need to harness the impact of aviation Hel Haavir. An even more unpleasant moment can be considered a powerful 125-kilogram warhead and a small circular probable deviation in 10 m, achieved by using a GPS guidance module, as well as a control system based on small aerodynamic rudders installed in the nose of the rocket. This means that even highly protected military infrastructure can be disabled. Given the fact that the flight speed of this missile can go beyond the speed limit of the targets hit by the Artillery-C1 (more than 1000 m / s), the Buk-2E remains the only reliable means of air defense of the Syrian army that can be opposed to the high-precision jet artillery of the IDF long range. For your information, even an informed source “The Weapon of the Fatherland” with reference to the developer mentions that the Buk -M2E complex is intended for the destruction of operational-tactical ballistic missiles with a range within 150 — 200 km.
We turn to the fire performance and survivability of Buk-M2E anti-aircraft missile systems. And here the main spectrum of “surprises” begins to be seen both for the IDF with hundreds of “smart” missiles in service, and for deck tactical aircraft of the US Navy. We know that "Trohsotki / Chetyrohsotki" have quite a significant technical disadvantage. It consists in the presence of only one radar of illumination and 30H6Е / 92Н6Е radar as part of each division. Only one 155-mm “Excalibur” launched from the M109A5 ACS on the Golan with several dozens of different NURSs (targeting from the same “Rivet Joint”) and the “shovel” (the so-called 30H6E in the air defense) are destroyed, and this means , the whole complex will cease to function. Conclusion: it will be extremely difficult to work on air targets in the immediate vicinity of the Syrian-Israeli border of the Three Hundred; or you will have to act “short sorties”, with the interception of several targets and an immediate change of position. Only here the effectiveness of such combat duty leaves much to be desired.
One Buk-М2Е complex can boast the possibility of using 6 self-propelled 9А317Е self-propelled guns at once, each of which has an integrated 9CX36 radar for illumination and targeting, capable of “tying routes” simultaneously for 10 air objects in the tracking mode on the aisle and capturing airborne objects in the tracking mode on the aisle and capturing airborne objects at the same time with 4 air objects in the tracking mode on the aisle and capturing airborne objects simultaneously with 6 while tracking the airway objects auto tracking (backlight) simultaneously for 300 targets. Therefore, one complex is not 24-channel (as C-9), but 317-channel. To completely disable it, it is necessary to destroy all without exception 569А2Э self-propelled fire installations (SOW) placed on the GM-9 tracked chassis. This will be extremely difficult to implement, since (unlike the “Three Hundreds”) radars on the Buk SOU can operate according to the so-called “garland” principle. For example, having spent 317 SAM 6М20 on the target (s) in just a few seconds, one of the 2 self-propelled firing units can turn off the radiation and in 9 seconds change position; During this time, the most priority targets moving from different directions will work out more 316 SOU, and then turn off the radiation and change positions. And so without interruption, until the ammunition is finished both on the SOW and on the XNUMXAXNUMXE start-up installations.
To track down every 9А317Е self-propelled fire installation, especially under the cover of EW facilities generating response / noise and barrage interference in the X / Ku wavebands, will be almost unrealistic even to such radar reconnaissance radars as the Global Hawk RQ-4B. The target allocation to the firing units of the complex (SOU / ROM) can be received online even at the moment of changing positions, which is possible due to the system linking of the 9С510Е command post at the same time with the 9X18ХX1-3E command radar “Kupol-M1-3E”, a survey radar 4XNNXXX1-1E “Kupol-МХNUMX-50Е” -D300М30 ”and“ Baikal-6МЭ ”, which receive data on the air situation from other ground-based radar and airborne aircraft A-14U. As for the C-64, one of its anti-aircraft missile division cannot realize a full-blown reflection of a massive missile strike, since the only 300НХNUMXЕ RPN during fire work can cover only a limited sector of airspace 1X2 degrees. In terms of mobility, another C-5PS / PM / 55 / 48 disadvantage in terms of mobility is the vertical launch type of 6В2Р / 5Н85Е / XNUMX missiles: the fast change of positions of the XNUMXПXNUMXС / CE launchers is impossible for the unit to be able to change the position of XNUMXПXNUMXС / CE launchers is not possible for the unit to be able to change the 4-D, XNUMX / XNUMX / XNUMX / XNUMX XNUMXPXNUMXC / CE missile launchers is not possible in the mobility system; position (lowered onto the platform of the tractor).
Low-altitude radar illumination 9C36
If we talk about the ability to intercept low-altitude strategic and tactical cruise missiles at considerable distances, then here “V.V. Tikhomirov "did not disappoint. For the Buk-M2E complex, a specialized self-propelled radar for illumination 9С36 has been developed, the antenna post of which rises to a height of 22,5 m by means of a specialized universal telescopic mast installation. In this case, the range of action on the cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 20 and m is increased from 20 to 35 km. The capabilities of the "300" to work with "Tomahawks" have been achieved. The conclusion from the entire situation described above is this: having made serious concessions in terms of supporting the southern opposition Syrian gaddies in exchange for freezing Damascus C-300PMU-2 complexes, Israel earned a much more serious headache in the form of intensifying the supply of others, at times more dangerous air defense, as stated by our military and diplomatic source 25 April. Among them is our main military masterpiece - “Buk-М2Е”, and there is not so far to the modular “Tor-М2КМ”, which can be placed on almost any cargo platform ... Here Tel Aviv jumped around with its eternal bargaining.
Information sources:
https://bmpd.livejournal.com/1075044.html
https://rueconomics.ru/324859-netanyakhu-raskryl-podrobnosti-razgovora-s-vladimirom-putinym-v-moskve
http://www.rusarmy.com/pvo/pvo_vvs/zrs_s-300pmu2.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/buk-2m/buk-2m.shtml
Information