TKR "Kuznetsov". History of construction and service
As we said earlier, the heavy aircraft carrying cruiser Admiral fleet Soviet Union Kuznetsov ”(hereinafter referred to as“ Kuznetsov ”) turned out to be too large for one article in the cycle. Therefore, before taking up his description, we examined in three separate articles history creation of aircraft carriers of the USSR and their carrier-based aircraft - Yak-141, MiG-29K and Su-33.
Further, we should talk about the design features and capabilities of our only ship capable of supporting horizontal take-off and landing aircraft, but ... Knowing what disputes can cause controversy in the comments, the author of this article chose to first talk about the service of the Kuznetsov TAKR, without anything his current state, no features of combat use in Syria will not be clear.
Recall (briefly) the basic tactical and technical characteristics of the only aircraft carrier in Russia.
The standard displacement (according to various sources) is 45 900 - 46 540 t, full - 58 500 - 59 100 t. The “greatest” displacement of TAKR - 61 390 t is also mentioned. Machine power (four-shaft boiler-turbine installation) 200 000NNXX 29 t. 18 8. , speed - 000 nodes. The course range at a speed of 45 knots should have been 50 12 miles. The autonomy of stocks, provisions and drinking water - 192 days. Armament - airplanes and helicopters (the total number can reach 8 aircraft), as well as 8 PKR "Granit", 30 Zur "Dagger", 630 ZRAK "Kortik" and 76 2-mm installations AK-100М, jet anti-torpedo protection complex "Udav "(Based on RBU). It was believed that this complex is capable of destroying a self-guided torpedo with a probability of 500%. Crew (actual) up to XNUMX XNUMX people aircraft carrier personnel and XNUMX people. air group.
The TAKR, which at that time bore the name "Riga", was laid on the "0" slipway of Nikolaevsky CSY in the solemn atmosphere of September 1 1982 in 15.00. Present at the ceremony commander in chief Navy S.G. Gorshkov personally attached a silver mortgage board to the bottom section of the case.
The start of construction was preceded by a large preparation, including a serious modernization of the stocks, as well as the installation of two KONE 900-ton gantry cranes purchased in Finland. These huge facilities (height - 110 m, portal size - 150 m) allowed to move loads up to 1 500 tons. As a result, Nikolaevsky ChSZ received a slipway complex, which allows to build and launch ships up to 40 000 tons.
Interestingly, one of the advantages of the deal with the French on the acquisition of Mistral-type helicopter carriers is the transfer by the French side of large-tonnage block assembly technology, which we allegedly did not possess. In fact, the future Kuznetsov’s hull was assembled from an 21 block of 32 length, m and 13 height, m and a width corresponding to the ship’s hull. Each of these blocks weighed to 1 400 t, the add-in was the 22-th block.
The construction of the first block started a little later than the official bookmark, in December 1982, and on the slipway it was installed 22 February 1983. It is interesting that during the construction of the ship, the designer’s computers, Nevsky PKB, were linked to the computing center of ChSZ in a single electronic-computing system , which greatly simplified access to the necessary documentation. New design methods have greatly accelerated the course of construction work. New (including electronic) ones were introduced everywhere, for example, they managed to abandon the traditional marking on the plaza. Cable work, for the first time in the history of domestic shipbuilding, was carried out immediately on the stocks.
Renamed “Leonid Brezhnev” TAKR was launched on December 4 1985 g, having a mass of 32 000 (of which the ship itself weighed 28 000 t, the rest is ballast and other cargo), the 8 of June 1989 g began mooring trials. Of course, this year the ship was not yet ready to sail, but the need for practical experience of taking off and landing on deck led to the fact that on October 21 TAKR (now “Tbilisi”) departed from the factory pier for the first time and headed for Sevastopol . There, at the test site near Cape Margopulo, the first tests were conducted, as well as overflights of the ship by Su-27K and MiG-29K fighters. On November 1, 1989 r took place the first in the history of the Russian Navy's landing of an aircraft of horizontal takeoff and landing on a ship's deck: in 13.46 VG Pugachev landed on the Su-27K with the tail number 39. At the same time, the readiness of the ship even to the beginning of 1990 was 86%. State tests were launched on 1 on August 1990 and were very intensive on the 2 month and 4 of the day (the ship returned to the plant to eliminate 4 comments on October 1990 on October) XRNXX 16 miles passed, the aircraft and helicopters 200 flew from its deck . For the first time were tested night start and landing aircraft.
The acceptance certificate was signed on December 25 1990, and on January 20 1991 TAKR (now - “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov”) was enrolled in the Northern Fleet. After 9 days (January 29), a naval flag was hoisted over the ship for the first time.
It was assumed that the Kuznetsov 1991 g would lead to the Black Sea, it was even included in the 30 division of the Black Sea Fleet's surface ships, and then, in 1992, the TAKR would enter first combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, after which it would leave for the Northern Fleet . However, in November 1991 r it became clear that the collapse of the USSR became irreversible, and the situation became ... let's say, unstable. As you know, in a certain period of time, Ukraine claimed nothing less than the entire Black Sea Fleet of the USSR. The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Chernavin, decided to transfer the Kuznetsov to the north, and on December 1 1991 the ship went out to sea.
The first TAKR campaign took place without any special excesses, although, of course, it could not do without nuances. Already in the Aegean Sea the vibration of the third machine was discovered, as it turned out later - a fishing net was wound around the screw. She didn’t particularly “stick”, so they went with her to Gibraltar, and there, during a two-day stay (primarily related to the reception of fuel), it was cut off by the efforts of divers on board the ship. During this campaign, “Kuznetsov” first met with the forces of the US Navy - an aircraft carrier strike group led by aircraft carrier George Washington. Americans immediately raised Aviation and began to fly around and photograph the latest TAKR, and also tried to explore its physical fields. In response, we transmitted the signal “I am doing exercises”, increased the speed to 24 knots and lifted both rescue helicopters into the air (unfortunately, there were no aircraft on board the Kuznetsov during this transition). The patrol ship Zadorny caught a sonar buoy from the water. There was nothing worthy of mention in that campaign, and on December 21, 1991, the TAKR arrived at its destination. Here Kuznetsov was included in the 43rd division of missile cruisers based in Vidyaevo.
In order to understand what happened to our TAKR further, it is necessary to stop and figure out the situation in which our only heavy aircraft carrier turned out to be.
The first is the largest and most complex ship of all built in the USSR. It was implemented fundamentally new technologies necessary for the basing of aircraft horizontal takeoff and landing. Without a doubt, it was a huge step forward, but usually in such cases, ships with so many new technologies suffer from many "childhood diseases" that need to be identified and "treated."
Second, we can say that we received the Kuznetsov as a legacy from the USSR, but this cannot be said about its air group. Su-33 has not yet completed the test. Yes, it was developed in the USSR, but the fine-tuning of such a complex object as a carrier-based combat aircraft is extremely complex, and it was necessary to organize mass production.
The third is the question of training deck pilots. No doubt, there were many professional pilots in the USSR, there were also those who piloted the VTOL, but no one, except literally a few test pilots, knew the specifics of taking off from the springboard and landing with an aero-finisher.
In other words, the state tests were passed, the acceptance certificate was signed, the flag was raised, and the Kuznetsov 21 December 1991 g arrived at the place of permanent deployment. But at the same time, we still didn’t have a combat aircraft-carrying cruiser with a fully equipped and trained air group in the fleet, and in order to get it, the Russian Federation required a lot of effort. The problem was that the country entered the era of political chaos and financial crises, notorious under the name of the “wild nineties”, which, of course, did not at all contribute to gaining the combat capability of such a complex armament system, which was the Kuznetsov TAKR.
Organizationally, the Kuznetsov air wing designed the 1992 in February to form the 57-th Smolensk Red Banner Mixed Naval Aviation Division (57-th Scad), which included:
1. 279-th shipboard fighter air regiment (279 kiap). Two squadrons of the Su-33 and, probably, a squadron of Su-25UTG training aircraft were to be included in its composition;
2. 830-th ship anti-submarine helicopter regiment (830 kplvp), equipped with helicopters Ka-27, Ka-27PS and Ka-29.
In turn, 279 kiap was formed on the basis of two compounds. On the one hand, the 279 Kiap became the successor of 279 Okshap (a separate shipboard assault air regiment), which dates back to 1 December 1973, when the formation of the first USSR regiment of deck aircraft Yak-36М (Yak-38) for TAKR began. Kiev". This regiment was a pioneer in every respect: he was the first to master a completely new technique, such as the VTOLP, his pilots were the first pilots of deck aircraft, they were the first to gain experience of sea and ocean voyages ... It was all for them, so who else, Was it to master the newest Su-33?
However, besides them, many officers and other formations, the 279 research and instructor fighter air regiment (100-iup), with whom ... turned out to be an interesting story, also entered the 100-s Kyap.
This regiment was created by 24 December 1985 (based at the airfield of Saki, Crimea) just to study the possibilities of deck aircraft, testing of tactics of its use, as well as training of pilots of deck aircraft. That is, the regiment was staffed with extra-class pilots who just had to figure out what the Su-33, MiG-29K are and how all this could be applied most effectively in battle - and then teach it to others. But the USSR collapsed, and 100-iyap was on the territory of Ukraine's sovereign now ...
Certainly, many readers of the site "Military Review" watched the film "72 Meter" in due time. It has an episode in which the crew of the Black Sea submarine must choose - the Ukrainian oath and service in sunny Crimea or the Polar hills, where the boat should go. With few exceptions, the crew chooses loyalty to duty, and to the sounds of “Farewell Slav” leaves the pier, which was planned “solemn event”.
This episode immediately became, as is now fashionable to say, an Internet meme and, by the way, the reason that the rental of the 72 meter in Ukraine was banned. But ... this episode is not at all fictional. Many people, including, of course, the personnel of the research and instructor air regiment, faced a similar dilemma. So, there are about a hundred officers of 100-iap, including 16 pilots headed by Lieutenant Colonel Timur Avtandilovich Apakidze (by the way, the commander of 100-iiap), following not the letter, but the oath of the oath they chose to leave the hospitable Crimea, relocating with families in polar Severomorsk.
Nails would make of these people ...
Without a doubt, these officers were carriers of the unique, at that time, experience in operating deck aircraft, without which the development of the Su-33 would be extremely difficult. However, even with them, work on the adoption of the Su-33 and the preparation of the wing for the Kuznetsov could not be resumed where they were completed in the Crimea. The fact is that in Ukraine there remained the 3-th control of the Air Force Research Institute, engaged in the testing of naval aviation. As a result, all materials and documents on the stages of flight design and state tests of the Su-33 performed in the Crimea were unavailable - “fraternal” Ukraine categorically refused to transfer them to the Russian Federation. One of the Su-27K (Т10К-7), which remained at the Kirovskoye airfield in the Crimea, was also “clamped down”.
But that was not all. NITKA remained in the Crimea - a unique training complex for the training of pilots of deck aviation, even capable of simulating rocking when boarding an aircraft-carrying cruiser. Subsequently, it was possible to nevertheless agree with Ukraine on the operation of this complex, and, starting in July of 1994, it resumed the training of aviation personnel of the Russian Navy, but for two years after the appearance of Kuznetsov in the north (1992-1993) it turned out to be for us is unavailable. And later ... for example, in 1994, Ukraine let our pilots on the thread for as much as a whole month. But it was not only in the complex, of course. During Soviet times in Crimea, the most complex infrastructure was created for the development of carrier-based aircraft, and NITKA, in essence, was part of it. And in Severomorsk, except for military airfields, by and large, there was nothing.
In other words, after the collapse of the USSR, we lost the infrastructure for research and training of deck pilots, as well as a lot of materials on previously performed tests. Of course, the country didn’t have the means to restore all this to at least some extent. The only “training ground” at which the state tests of the Su-33 could be resumed was, in fact, the TAKR itself. But here, not everything was in order.
It is well known that a huge problem of our aircraft carriers (and not only them) was the lack of equipped basing sites. And, it must be said that some decommissioning of the TAKR of previous projects in the USSR were nevertheless made. So, Kuznetsova in the village of Vidyayevo was waiting for a pontoon spacer specially made at ChSZ - a very complex engineering structure, created specifically to provide for the base of the newest TAKR in the north. To do this, special mooring devices were mounted on the pontoon, communications to supply power to the ship, and even living quarters for attendants. But, of course, the Black Sea shipbuilders could not supply their creation with a powerful boiler room along with a power station - it was assumed that the pontoon would serve only as a link between the ship and the corresponding land infrastructure. But they didn’t have time to build it, as a result of which steam and electric power for Kuznetsov were categorically not enough. As a result, like on other TAKR-ahs before him, the crew of the Kuznetsov is constantly forced to keep one of its machine-boiler compartments in working condition. That, of course, the most negative impact on the resource mechanisms.
Now it will be extremely difficult to say what the cause of the first breakdowns of the Kuznetsov power plant is - someone thinks that the question is about the initial “capriciousness” of the boiler-turbine plant, on the other hand, it should listen to those who say that despite the known difficulty exploitation, the fleet could easily cope with this, if it were not for the chronic underfunding and low qualifications of recruits who simply did not have time to train to work with such mechanisms, as well as the difficulties encountered in obtaining spare parts and components for boilers. In any case, certain difficulties arose from the very first days of operation - warranty specialists worked on the ship, including because of the vibration of the third machine that seized the network in the Mediterranean. During the next outing, one of the ship’s main turbines crashed, which required very thorough and expensive repairs.
All of the above, without any doubt, in many respects predetermined the use of the Kuznetsov TAKR in subsequent years. For three years, in the period of 1992-1994, the ship spent at sea on the 3-4 of the month, the crew was trained, flight design and state tests of the Su-33 were conducted. It seems to be full of banal lines, but what was behind this? In fact, it was necessary to revise the entire program of training pilots-deckers, eliminating from it training at the NITKA training complex, it was necessary in some way to teach people to "change" from an unusual airfield directly to the deck. And this is in the conditions when the technique on the ship, responsible for the take-off and landing operations, went awry. As V. Zablotsky writes in his monograph devoted to the Kuznetsov SACR:
In the spring of 1993 r, the first four Su-279 serials arrived at the disposal of the 33, and the 1994 r became a milestone for our carrier-based aircraft. First, the state tests of the aircraft were completed, and the final chord was the successful interception of the Su-33 pair and the destruction of the La-17 target aircraft against the background of the sea. Secondly, at the same time, the fleet received the 24 Su-33, which allowed us to maneuver our sole deck regiment. Nevertheless, the above-described difficulties with the training of personnel led to the fact that only the leader group consisting of 1994 pilots who were allowed to fly from a ship and ... the difficulties still remained, were ready for 10 r. The inability to use the NITKA simulator, for example, led to the fact that the pilots could not work out the night take-off and landing, although previously such flights were conducted from a TAKR board in the Crimea. As a result, it was necessary to be content with flights only during the daytime and at dusk. A number of faults in the control systems did not allow our aviation to work out the group use of fighters and their joint actions with the anti-submarine group.
The 1994 crediting doctrine demonstrated the potential of our carrier-based aircraft. The flights were carried out by six Su-33, divided into three deuces. The first of them was piloted by test pilots of the Sukhoi Design Bureau VG Sukhoi. Pugachev and S.N. Melnikov, who were supposed to depict enemy aircraft, striking a TAKR-y from a distance of about 800 km. The second pair of aircraft (T.A. Apakidze and V.V. Dubovaya) and the third (I.S. Kozhin and K. B. Kochkarev) were supposed to provide the air defense of the formation, which included the TAKR outside the ship’s air defense assets.
The most interesting thing in these exercises was that NATO aircraft took an active part in them. When entering the designated area of patrol of steam TA Apakidze - V.V. Oak means of onboard equipment Su-33 discovered an unidentified target in 280 km from the cruiser and were immediately refocused on its interception. The target turned out to be the Norwegian patrol Orion, after its interception Su-33 returned to the fulfillment of the assigned task - the planes piloted by VG Pugachev and S.N. Melnikov, were detected and "destroyed" by air-to-air missiles.
The same thing happened with the second pair of Su-33, which was piloted by I.S. Kozhin and K.B. Kochkarev - during the departure to the patrol area, planes were discovered that were launched from Norwegian airfields. According to the decision of the ship control station and guidance, the pilots first intercepted the descendants of the ancient Vikings, and then continued the training task, which was also carried out.
Of course, if we compare the test exercises of the Northern Fleet carrier-based aviation in 1994 to the training process of US aircraft carriers, then the incompatibility of scales is striking - well, what are just six aircraft ... However, you need to understand that our naval pilots took the first steps, and in the most difficult conditions. At the same time, these exercises have already demonstrated the unconditional usefulness of the carrier-based carrier group, which consisted of airplanes of horizontal take-off and landing - even the most limited number.
Theoretically, the large ships of the Northern Fleet were able to detect air targets in 280 km from themselves, but on condition that the plane was flying high enough so that the radio horizon would not interfere with its detection. And even after finding such an aircraft, not a single ship of the fleet, including heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers, had weaponswhich could destroy it at a similar range. Also attracted the attention of the duration of the aircraft in the air. Unlike the Yak-38 "mast defense aircraft," the newest Su-33 could be deployed to patrol in remote areas. Both pairs Su-33, having received one task, were redirected to another, unplanned (interception of NATO planes), successfully solved it, and then returned to the original task without landing and refueling.
In the winter of 1994-995. Kuznetsov underwent the first more or less serious repair of the main boilers, including the replacement of pipes, but judging by further events, it was not performed very well - in 1995, the ship lost its course during going to sea. The reasons stated earlier - operation in the conditions of the far north, the complexity of the boiler-turbine installation, general underfunding and the continuing collapse of the armed forces led to the fact that the ship already in 1991 g was in need of major overhaul of the power plant. Of course, this is an abnormal situation for a modern warship, but in the 1995-1991 period. The situation in the fleet and in the country as a whole was infinitely far from the concept of “normal.” And instead of repairing the TAKR, the Kuznetsov went to its first combat service in the Mediterranean.
The release took place on December 23 1995, while “Kuznetsov” became the basis of the carrier-multipurpose group (AMG), which in addition to the TAKR included the multi-purpose submarine “Wolf” (project 971 “Pike-B”), the squadron destroyer “Fearless” (project 956), CRP "Pylky" (project 11352). They were provided by the SB-406 tugboat and the Olekma tanker of the Northern Fleet, en route from AMG to the Bay of Biscay, and later on by the Shakhtar tugboat and the Ivan Bubnov tanker. As far as the author understood, the Dniester tanker accompanied AMG constantly.
Without a doubt, and despite the presence of the newest TAKR in AMG, such a squadron was only a shadow of the USSR naval power, capable of permanently keeping dozens of warships and submarines in the Mediterranean. Alas, the times of the 5 OPESK were a thing of the past, and most likely forever. Nevertheless, our AMG was quite suitable for demonstrating the military presence, and its composition allowed us to work out the actions of the Kuznetsov carrier-based aviation "in conditions close to combat".
Unfortunately, by 1995 of r, the 57 scooter was not ready for combat work in full force. So, the 279-s Kyap received the 24 Su-33, so both its squadrons were fully equipped with the hardware, but “for the march and the finished battle” there was only the first one, the aircraft of which could be distinguished by the image of the eagle on the keels (the second squadron’s cars had a head tiger in the same place). As a result, Kuznetsov launched his first combat service with an air group of 13 fighters, that is, a dozen Su-33 first squadrons, as well as one aircraft of the installation party (Т10К-9, which was assigned the number 109), two training aircraft Su-25УТГ and X-NUMX Ka-11, Ka-27PS and Ka-27 helicopters from the 29-th Kplvp. At the same time, on board the Kuznetsov there were 830 combatant fighter pilots who were allowed to fly the Su-15 from the deck of the ship, not counting TA Apakidze (commanded by the air division) and his deputy, Colonel Vlasov (with them, respectively, 33), as well as 17 helicopter crews. Naturally, the ship pilots were distinguished by the highest qualifications; suffice it to say that 11 fighter pilots from 15 were sniper pilots or 14-class pilots. The engineering and technical staff managed to find the right fit for them - almost all had experience in servicing flight vehicles in combat services. In addition to the 1 th pilots, the TAKR was also attended by test pilots, whose task was to conduct a series of Su-57 tests in the conditions of the Mediterranean.
The trip lasted for 110 days — starting 23 on December 1995, it ended on 22 in March 1996. 14 passed 000 miles over two oceans and five seas, during this time 30 flight shifts (i.e. days during which the aircraft flew) Su-33 made 400 (according to other data - 524) sorties, helicopters - 700 (according to other data - 996), including 250 on search and tracking of submarines.
The first combat service "Kuznetsova" had the following consequences. First, it turned out that the ship was fully capable of performing the role of a “floating aerodrome” for aircraft based on it. For example, in the period from 19 to 23 in January 1996 (that is, not for 5 days in a row) 5 flight shifts were carried out and Su-33 took off 67 times. It seems to be small, especially against the background of the capabilities of the American "Nimitz", designed to perform more than a hundred flights a day. But remember that the Kuznetsov Air Division had only 13 airplanes at its disposal, and the average number of sorties was 13,4 per day — that is, each aircraft took off once every five days in a row. In fact, during these five days, flights were carried out from 8 to 20 per day, that is, part of the aircraft carried out 2 departures for one day. Or, for example, the 26-27 flights of January - the first day of the Su-33 made the 21 departure, the second - more 12, and not the fact that all the 13 aircraft that were in the air. All this is quite comparable with the figures of the American carrier-based aviation, and one should understand that no one set before the Kuznetsov air group the task of ensuring the maximum number of sorties. For the first time, the TAKR went on combat service with the Su-33 on board, and there was a lot to be tested and worked out in practice - accordingly, it can be said that the actual number of sorties per day was not the maximum for the aircraft, but if you can put it that way, " comfortable working. "
The interaction of disparate forces — surface and submarine ships — with deck aircraft was tested. The TAKR Air Group successfully carried out interceptions of numerous reconnaissance and patrol aircraft of the NATO countries, tracking US AUG, helicopters detected and escorted foreign submarines, “working” together with the Volk submarine. When Kuznetsov returned home, in the second half of March, he took part in large exercises of the Northern Fleet, in which, besides him, up to 40 warships and submarines, as well as 50 naval aircraft and helicopters were involved. During these exercises, the destroyer "Fearless" was launched as a ship of the distant radar patrol on 200 km from the order, which was followed by the Kuznetsov TAKR. Having received information from him, Su-33, acting at a distance of 500 km from TAKR, intercepted and “destroyed” the four Tu-22М3, which were never able to reach the line of launching missiles for TAKR-y. It should also be noted that the "air umbrella" of the TAKR-a was built in two echelons - the long-range one was focused on intercepting enemy aircraft, the closest one - on the destruction of anti-ship missiles. In other words, of course, it is possible and necessary to say that the absence of long-range radar weapons significantly reduces the capabilities of the Kuznetsov air group, but in no case should we forget that even in the existing Kuznetsov form, our fleet providing him with opportunities that the fleet never had before. The experience of the first combat service of Kuznetsov testified that the presence of TAKR-a increases the combat stability of the naval unit operating in the far sea or ocean zone 1,5-2 times.
Secondly ... alas, but the first combat service showed the extreme weakness of the power plant of the ship. At the very beginning of the campaign, when TAKR was just leaving the Kola Bay, a seven-point storm began, during which two of the eight boilers failed, and at the time of returning to the base, only two boilers operated on the ship. Accordingly, in April 1996 of “Kuznetsov” was put up for repair, from which it came out only by the summer of 1998. I must say that if it were not for the chronic underfunding of repairs, the ship would not have to spend two whole years at the quay wall. And the quality of the repair was probably limping, and besides, “wild 90-e”, underfinancing and a drop in the qualifications of the personnel had a strong effect. In the period of 1998-1999, the Kuznetsov continued to serve in the fleet, but in 1999, one boiler and one (out of four) GTZA completely failed.
Despite this, the Kuznetsov was supposed to go to the second military service in 2000, but it was canceled due to the tragic death of the Kursk submarine. As a result, instead of the BS, the ship embarked on a three-year average repair. Then, during the 2004-2007, the ship again plunged into military service, while going to the North Atlantic in 2004 g, and from February 5 2007 g to 3 in February, 2008 g made another BS - march into the Mediterranean Sea. Then - 7 months of repair on the "Zvezdochka" and service until May 2014 g, when the ship that just returned from the march to the shores of Syria, embarked on a short three-month repair. Service again, and from January to 15 June 2016 d - restoration of technical readiness for a new long-distance campaign and - participation in military operations in Syria.
In general, we can say the following - for the period from January 29 1991, when the naval flag first flew over Kuznetsov, and until October 2017, when the overhaul of the TAKR began, 26 years and 8 months passed. During this time, the ship was under repair for approximately 6 years and 5 months, that is, only 24% of the total presence in the fleet. It should be borne in mind that under normal conditions and with timely funding, two years of repairs in 1996-98 and three years in the period of 2001-2004 could be carried out much faster, or a much larger amount could be produced during the same period. repair work.
In other words, the ingrained opinion that the Kuznetsov does not come out of repairs is unfounded. The problem lies elsewhere - a huge ship that has been in the fleet for years, 27, has still not received a single major overhaul ...
Продолжение следует ...
Further, we should talk about the design features and capabilities of our only ship capable of supporting horizontal take-off and landing aircraft, but ... Knowing what disputes can cause controversy in the comments, the author of this article chose to first talk about the service of the Kuznetsov TAKR, without anything his current state, no features of combat use in Syria will not be clear.
Recall (briefly) the basic tactical and technical characteristics of the only aircraft carrier in Russia.
The standard displacement (according to various sources) is 45 900 - 46 540 t, full - 58 500 - 59 100 t. The “greatest” displacement of TAKR - 61 390 t is also mentioned. Machine power (four-shaft boiler-turbine installation) 200 000NNXX 29 t. 18 8. , speed - 000 nodes. The course range at a speed of 45 knots should have been 50 12 miles. The autonomy of stocks, provisions and drinking water - 192 days. Armament - airplanes and helicopters (the total number can reach 8 aircraft), as well as 8 PKR "Granit", 30 Zur "Dagger", 630 ZRAK "Kortik" and 76 2-mm installations AK-100М, jet anti-torpedo protection complex "Udav "(Based on RBU). It was believed that this complex is capable of destroying a self-guided torpedo with a probability of 500%. Crew (actual) up to XNUMX XNUMX people aircraft carrier personnel and XNUMX people. air group.
The TAKR, which at that time bore the name "Riga", was laid on the "0" slipway of Nikolaevsky CSY in the solemn atmosphere of September 1 1982 in 15.00. Present at the ceremony commander in chief Navy S.G. Gorshkov personally attached a silver mortgage board to the bottom section of the case.
The start of construction was preceded by a large preparation, including a serious modernization of the stocks, as well as the installation of two KONE 900-ton gantry cranes purchased in Finland. These huge facilities (height - 110 m, portal size - 150 m) allowed to move loads up to 1 500 tons. As a result, Nikolaevsky ChSZ received a slipway complex, which allows to build and launch ships up to 40 000 tons.
Interestingly, one of the advantages of the deal with the French on the acquisition of Mistral-type helicopter carriers is the transfer by the French side of large-tonnage block assembly technology, which we allegedly did not possess. In fact, the future Kuznetsov’s hull was assembled from an 21 block of 32 length, m and 13 height, m and a width corresponding to the ship’s hull. Each of these blocks weighed to 1 400 t, the add-in was the 22-th block.
Installation of the add-on to the second ship of the series - at that time, "Riga", and later - "Varyag"
The construction of the first block started a little later than the official bookmark, in December 1982, and on the slipway it was installed 22 February 1983. It is interesting that during the construction of the ship, the designer’s computers, Nevsky PKB, were linked to the computing center of ChSZ in a single electronic-computing system , which greatly simplified access to the necessary documentation. New design methods have greatly accelerated the course of construction work. New (including electronic) ones were introduced everywhere, for example, they managed to abandon the traditional marking on the plaza. Cable work, for the first time in the history of domestic shipbuilding, was carried out immediately on the stocks.
Renamed “Leonid Brezhnev” TAKR was launched on December 4 1985 g, having a mass of 32 000 (of which the ship itself weighed 28 000 t, the rest is ballast and other cargo), the 8 of June 1989 g began mooring trials. Of course, this year the ship was not yet ready to sail, but the need for practical experience of taking off and landing on deck led to the fact that on October 21 TAKR (now “Tbilisi”) departed from the factory pier for the first time and headed for Sevastopol . There, at the test site near Cape Margopulo, the first tests were conducted, as well as overflights of the ship by Su-27K and MiG-29K fighters. On November 1, 1989 r took place the first in the history of the Russian Navy's landing of an aircraft of horizontal takeoff and landing on a ship's deck: in 13.46 VG Pugachev landed on the Su-27K with the tail number 39. At the same time, the readiness of the ship even to the beginning of 1990 was 86%. State tests were launched on 1 on August 1990 and were very intensive on the 2 month and 4 of the day (the ship returned to the plant to eliminate 4 comments on October 1990 on October) XRNXX 16 miles passed, the aircraft and helicopters 200 flew from its deck . For the first time were tested night start and landing aircraft.
The acceptance certificate was signed on December 25 1990, and on January 20 1991 TAKR (now - “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov”) was enrolled in the Northern Fleet. After 9 days (January 29), a naval flag was hoisted over the ship for the first time.
It was assumed that the Kuznetsov 1991 g would lead to the Black Sea, it was even included in the 30 division of the Black Sea Fleet's surface ships, and then, in 1992, the TAKR would enter first combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, after which it would leave for the Northern Fleet . However, in November 1991 r it became clear that the collapse of the USSR became irreversible, and the situation became ... let's say, unstable. As you know, in a certain period of time, Ukraine claimed nothing less than the entire Black Sea Fleet of the USSR. The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Chernavin, decided to transfer the Kuznetsov to the north, and on December 1 1991 the ship went out to sea.
The first TAKR campaign took place without any special excesses, although, of course, it could not do without nuances. Already in the Aegean Sea the vibration of the third machine was discovered, as it turned out later - a fishing net was wound around the screw. She didn’t particularly “stick”, so they went with her to Gibraltar, and there, during a two-day stay (primarily related to the reception of fuel), it was cut off by the efforts of divers on board the ship. During this campaign, “Kuznetsov” first met with the forces of the US Navy - an aircraft carrier strike group led by aircraft carrier George Washington. Americans immediately raised Aviation and began to fly around and photograph the latest TAKR, and also tried to explore its physical fields. In response, we transmitted the signal “I am doing exercises”, increased the speed to 24 knots and lifted both rescue helicopters into the air (unfortunately, there were no aircraft on board the Kuznetsov during this transition). The patrol ship Zadorny caught a sonar buoy from the water. There was nothing worthy of mention in that campaign, and on December 21, 1991, the TAKR arrived at its destination. Here Kuznetsov was included in the 43rd division of missile cruisers based in Vidyaevo.
In order to understand what happened to our TAKR further, it is necessary to stop and figure out the situation in which our only heavy aircraft carrier turned out to be.
The first is the largest and most complex ship of all built in the USSR. It was implemented fundamentally new technologies necessary for the basing of aircraft horizontal takeoff and landing. Without a doubt, it was a huge step forward, but usually in such cases, ships with so many new technologies suffer from many "childhood diseases" that need to be identified and "treated."
Second, we can say that we received the Kuznetsov as a legacy from the USSR, but this cannot be said about its air group. Su-33 has not yet completed the test. Yes, it was developed in the USSR, but the fine-tuning of such a complex object as a carrier-based combat aircraft is extremely complex, and it was necessary to organize mass production.
The third is the question of training deck pilots. No doubt, there were many professional pilots in the USSR, there were also those who piloted the VTOL, but no one, except literally a few test pilots, knew the specifics of taking off from the springboard and landing with an aero-finisher.
In other words, the state tests were passed, the acceptance certificate was signed, the flag was raised, and the Kuznetsov 21 December 1991 g arrived at the place of permanent deployment. But at the same time, we still didn’t have a combat aircraft-carrying cruiser with a fully equipped and trained air group in the fleet, and in order to get it, the Russian Federation required a lot of effort. The problem was that the country entered the era of political chaos and financial crises, notorious under the name of the “wild nineties”, which, of course, did not at all contribute to gaining the combat capability of such a complex armament system, which was the Kuznetsov TAKR.
Organizationally, the Kuznetsov air wing designed the 1992 in February to form the 57-th Smolensk Red Banner Mixed Naval Aviation Division (57-th Scad), which included:
1. 279-th shipboard fighter air regiment (279 kiap). Two squadrons of the Su-33 and, probably, a squadron of Su-25UTG training aircraft were to be included in its composition;
2. 830-th ship anti-submarine helicopter regiment (830 kplvp), equipped with helicopters Ka-27, Ka-27PS and Ka-29.
In turn, 279 kiap was formed on the basis of two compounds. On the one hand, the 279 Kiap became the successor of 279 Okshap (a separate shipboard assault air regiment), which dates back to 1 December 1973, when the formation of the first USSR regiment of deck aircraft Yak-36М (Yak-38) for TAKR began. Kiev". This regiment was a pioneer in every respect: he was the first to master a completely new technique, such as the VTOLP, his pilots were the first pilots of deck aircraft, they were the first to gain experience of sea and ocean voyages ... It was all for them, so who else, Was it to master the newest Su-33?
However, besides them, many officers and other formations, the 279 research and instructor fighter air regiment (100-iup), with whom ... turned out to be an interesting story, also entered the 100-s Kyap.
This regiment was created by 24 December 1985 (based at the airfield of Saki, Crimea) just to study the possibilities of deck aircraft, testing of tactics of its use, as well as training of pilots of deck aircraft. That is, the regiment was staffed with extra-class pilots who just had to figure out what the Su-33, MiG-29K are and how all this could be applied most effectively in battle - and then teach it to others. But the USSR collapsed, and 100-iyap was on the territory of Ukraine's sovereign now ...
Certainly, many readers of the site "Military Review" watched the film "72 Meter" in due time. It has an episode in which the crew of the Black Sea submarine must choose - the Ukrainian oath and service in sunny Crimea or the Polar hills, where the boat should go. With few exceptions, the crew chooses loyalty to duty, and to the sounds of “Farewell Slav” leaves the pier, which was planned “solemn event”.
This episode immediately became, as is now fashionable to say, an Internet meme and, by the way, the reason that the rental of the 72 meter in Ukraine was banned. But ... this episode is not at all fictional. Many people, including, of course, the personnel of the research and instructor air regiment, faced a similar dilemma. So, there are about a hundred officers of 100-iap, including 16 pilots headed by Lieutenant Colonel Timur Avtandilovich Apakidze (by the way, the commander of 100-iiap), following not the letter, but the oath of the oath they chose to leave the hospitable Crimea, relocating with families in polar Severomorsk.
Nails would make of these people ...
Timur Avtandilovich Apakidze in the cockpit of the Su-33
Without a doubt, these officers were carriers of the unique, at that time, experience in operating deck aircraft, without which the development of the Su-33 would be extremely difficult. However, even with them, work on the adoption of the Su-33 and the preparation of the wing for the Kuznetsov could not be resumed where they were completed in the Crimea. The fact is that in Ukraine there remained the 3-th control of the Air Force Research Institute, engaged in the testing of naval aviation. As a result, all materials and documents on the stages of flight design and state tests of the Su-33 performed in the Crimea were unavailable - “fraternal” Ukraine categorically refused to transfer them to the Russian Federation. One of the Su-27K (Т10К-7), which remained at the Kirovskoye airfield in the Crimea, was also “clamped down”.
But that was not all. NITKA remained in the Crimea - a unique training complex for the training of pilots of deck aviation, even capable of simulating rocking when boarding an aircraft-carrying cruiser. Subsequently, it was possible to nevertheless agree with Ukraine on the operation of this complex, and, starting in July of 1994, it resumed the training of aviation personnel of the Russian Navy, but for two years after the appearance of Kuznetsov in the north (1992-1993) it turned out to be for us is unavailable. And later ... for example, in 1994, Ukraine let our pilots on the thread for as much as a whole month. But it was not only in the complex, of course. During Soviet times in Crimea, the most complex infrastructure was created for the development of carrier-based aircraft, and NITKA, in essence, was part of it. And in Severomorsk, except for military airfields, by and large, there was nothing.
In other words, after the collapse of the USSR, we lost the infrastructure for research and training of deck pilots, as well as a lot of materials on previously performed tests. Of course, the country didn’t have the means to restore all this to at least some extent. The only “training ground” at which the state tests of the Su-33 could be resumed was, in fact, the TAKR itself. But here, not everything was in order.
It is well known that a huge problem of our aircraft carriers (and not only them) was the lack of equipped basing sites. And, it must be said that some decommissioning of the TAKR of previous projects in the USSR were nevertheless made. So, Kuznetsova in the village of Vidyayevo was waiting for a pontoon spacer specially made at ChSZ - a very complex engineering structure, created specifically to provide for the base of the newest TAKR in the north. To do this, special mooring devices were mounted on the pontoon, communications to supply power to the ship, and even living quarters for attendants. But, of course, the Black Sea shipbuilders could not supply their creation with a powerful boiler room along with a power station - it was assumed that the pontoon would serve only as a link between the ship and the corresponding land infrastructure. But they didn’t have time to build it, as a result of which steam and electric power for Kuznetsov were categorically not enough. As a result, like on other TAKR-ahs before him, the crew of the Kuznetsov is constantly forced to keep one of its machine-boiler compartments in working condition. That, of course, the most negative impact on the resource mechanisms.
Now it will be extremely difficult to say what the cause of the first breakdowns of the Kuznetsov power plant is - someone thinks that the question is about the initial “capriciousness” of the boiler-turbine plant, on the other hand, it should listen to those who say that despite the known difficulty exploitation, the fleet could easily cope with this, if it were not for the chronic underfunding and low qualifications of recruits who simply did not have time to train to work with such mechanisms, as well as the difficulties encountered in obtaining spare parts and components for boilers. In any case, certain difficulties arose from the very first days of operation - warranty specialists worked on the ship, including because of the vibration of the third machine that seized the network in the Mediterranean. During the next outing, one of the ship’s main turbines crashed, which required very thorough and expensive repairs.
All of the above, without any doubt, in many respects predetermined the use of the Kuznetsov TAKR in subsequent years. For three years, in the period of 1992-1994, the ship spent at sea on the 3-4 of the month, the crew was trained, flight design and state tests of the Su-33 were conducted. It seems to be full of banal lines, but what was behind this? In fact, it was necessary to revise the entire program of training pilots-deckers, eliminating from it training at the NITKA training complex, it was necessary in some way to teach people to "change" from an unusual airfield directly to the deck. And this is in the conditions when the technique on the ship, responsible for the take-off and landing operations, went awry. As V. Zablotsky writes in his monograph devoted to the Kuznetsov SACR:
“The most serious shortcoming was the mismatch of the light zones of the Luna-3 OSB and the“ Otvodok-Emancipation ”landing monitoring and control system with the onboard equipment of the radio system (K-42 Resistor))
In the spring of 1993 r, the first four Su-279 serials arrived at the disposal of the 33, and the 1994 r became a milestone for our carrier-based aircraft. First, the state tests of the aircraft were completed, and the final chord was the successful interception of the Su-33 pair and the destruction of the La-17 target aircraft against the background of the sea. Secondly, at the same time, the fleet received the 24 Su-33, which allowed us to maneuver our sole deck regiment. Nevertheless, the above-described difficulties with the training of personnel led to the fact that only the leader group consisting of 1994 pilots who were allowed to fly from a ship and ... the difficulties still remained, were ready for 10 r. The inability to use the NITKA simulator, for example, led to the fact that the pilots could not work out the night take-off and landing, although previously such flights were conducted from a TAKR board in the Crimea. As a result, it was necessary to be content with flights only during the daytime and at dusk. A number of faults in the control systems did not allow our aviation to work out the group use of fighters and their joint actions with the anti-submarine group.
The 1994 crediting doctrine demonstrated the potential of our carrier-based aircraft. The flights were carried out by six Su-33, divided into three deuces. The first of them was piloted by test pilots of the Sukhoi Design Bureau VG Sukhoi. Pugachev and S.N. Melnikov, who were supposed to depict enemy aircraft, striking a TAKR-y from a distance of about 800 km. The second pair of aircraft (T.A. Apakidze and V.V. Dubovaya) and the third (I.S. Kozhin and K. B. Kochkarev) were supposed to provide the air defense of the formation, which included the TAKR outside the ship’s air defense assets.
The most interesting thing in these exercises was that NATO aircraft took an active part in them. When entering the designated area of patrol of steam TA Apakidze - V.V. Oak means of onboard equipment Su-33 discovered an unidentified target in 280 km from the cruiser and were immediately refocused on its interception. The target turned out to be the Norwegian patrol Orion, after its interception Su-33 returned to the fulfillment of the assigned task - the planes piloted by VG Pugachev and S.N. Melnikov, were detected and "destroyed" by air-to-air missiles.
The same thing happened with the second pair of Su-33, which was piloted by I.S. Kozhin and K.B. Kochkarev - during the departure to the patrol area, planes were discovered that were launched from Norwegian airfields. According to the decision of the ship control station and guidance, the pilots first intercepted the descendants of the ancient Vikings, and then continued the training task, which was also carried out.
Of course, if we compare the test exercises of the Northern Fleet carrier-based aviation in 1994 to the training process of US aircraft carriers, then the incompatibility of scales is striking - well, what are just six aircraft ... However, you need to understand that our naval pilots took the first steps, and in the most difficult conditions. At the same time, these exercises have already demonstrated the unconditional usefulness of the carrier-based carrier group, which consisted of airplanes of horizontal take-off and landing - even the most limited number.
Theoretically, the large ships of the Northern Fleet were able to detect air targets in 280 km from themselves, but on condition that the plane was flying high enough so that the radio horizon would not interfere with its detection. And even after finding such an aircraft, not a single ship of the fleet, including heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers, had weaponswhich could destroy it at a similar range. Also attracted the attention of the duration of the aircraft in the air. Unlike the Yak-38 "mast defense aircraft," the newest Su-33 could be deployed to patrol in remote areas. Both pairs Su-33, having received one task, were redirected to another, unplanned (interception of NATO planes), successfully solved it, and then returned to the original task without landing and refueling.
In the winter of 1994-995. Kuznetsov underwent the first more or less serious repair of the main boilers, including the replacement of pipes, but judging by further events, it was not performed very well - in 1995, the ship lost its course during going to sea. The reasons stated earlier - operation in the conditions of the far north, the complexity of the boiler-turbine installation, general underfunding and the continuing collapse of the armed forces led to the fact that the ship already in 1991 g was in need of major overhaul of the power plant. Of course, this is an abnormal situation for a modern warship, but in the 1995-1991 period. The situation in the fleet and in the country as a whole was infinitely far from the concept of “normal.” And instead of repairing the TAKR, the Kuznetsov went to its first combat service in the Mediterranean.
The release took place on December 23 1995, while “Kuznetsov” became the basis of the carrier-multipurpose group (AMG), which in addition to the TAKR included the multi-purpose submarine “Wolf” (project 971 “Pike-B”), the squadron destroyer “Fearless” (project 956), CRP "Pylky" (project 11352). They were provided by the SB-406 tugboat and the Olekma tanker of the Northern Fleet, en route from AMG to the Bay of Biscay, and later on by the Shakhtar tugboat and the Ivan Bubnov tanker. As far as the author understood, the Dniester tanker accompanied AMG constantly.
Without a doubt, and despite the presence of the newest TAKR in AMG, such a squadron was only a shadow of the USSR naval power, capable of permanently keeping dozens of warships and submarines in the Mediterranean. Alas, the times of the 5 OPESK were a thing of the past, and most likely forever. Nevertheless, our AMG was quite suitable for demonstrating the military presence, and its composition allowed us to work out the actions of the Kuznetsov carrier-based aviation "in conditions close to combat".
Unfortunately, by 1995 of r, the 57 scooter was not ready for combat work in full force. So, the 279-s Kyap received the 24 Su-33, so both its squadrons were fully equipped with the hardware, but “for the march and the finished battle” there was only the first one, the aircraft of which could be distinguished by the image of the eagle on the keels (the second squadron’s cars had a head tiger in the same place). As a result, Kuznetsov launched his first combat service with an air group of 13 fighters, that is, a dozen Su-33 first squadrons, as well as one aircraft of the installation party (Т10К-9, which was assigned the number 109), two training aircraft Su-25УТГ and X-NUMX Ka-11, Ka-27PS and Ka-27 helicopters from the 29-th Kplvp. At the same time, on board the Kuznetsov there were 830 combatant fighter pilots who were allowed to fly the Su-15 from the deck of the ship, not counting TA Apakidze (commanded by the air division) and his deputy, Colonel Vlasov (with them, respectively, 33), as well as 17 helicopter crews. Naturally, the ship pilots were distinguished by the highest qualifications; suffice it to say that 11 fighter pilots from 15 were sniper pilots or 14-class pilots. The engineering and technical staff managed to find the right fit for them - almost all had experience in servicing flight vehicles in combat services. In addition to the 1 th pilots, the TAKR was also attended by test pilots, whose task was to conduct a series of Su-57 tests in the conditions of the Mediterranean.
The trip lasted for 110 days — starting 23 on December 1995, it ended on 22 in March 1996. 14 passed 000 miles over two oceans and five seas, during this time 30 flight shifts (i.e. days during which the aircraft flew) Su-33 made 400 (according to other data - 524) sorties, helicopters - 700 (according to other data - 996), including 250 on search and tracking of submarines.
The first combat service "Kuznetsova" had the following consequences. First, it turned out that the ship was fully capable of performing the role of a “floating aerodrome” for aircraft based on it. For example, in the period from 19 to 23 in January 1996 (that is, not for 5 days in a row) 5 flight shifts were carried out and Su-33 took off 67 times. It seems to be small, especially against the background of the capabilities of the American "Nimitz", designed to perform more than a hundred flights a day. But remember that the Kuznetsov Air Division had only 13 airplanes at its disposal, and the average number of sorties was 13,4 per day — that is, each aircraft took off once every five days in a row. In fact, during these five days, flights were carried out from 8 to 20 per day, that is, part of the aircraft carried out 2 departures for one day. Or, for example, the 26-27 flights of January - the first day of the Su-33 made the 21 departure, the second - more 12, and not the fact that all the 13 aircraft that were in the air. All this is quite comparable with the figures of the American carrier-based aviation, and one should understand that no one set before the Kuznetsov air group the task of ensuring the maximum number of sorties. For the first time, the TAKR went on combat service with the Su-33 on board, and there was a lot to be tested and worked out in practice - accordingly, it can be said that the actual number of sorties per day was not the maximum for the aircraft, but if you can put it that way, " comfortable working. "
The interaction of disparate forces — surface and submarine ships — with deck aircraft was tested. The TAKR Air Group successfully carried out interceptions of numerous reconnaissance and patrol aircraft of the NATO countries, tracking US AUG, helicopters detected and escorted foreign submarines, “working” together with the Volk submarine. When Kuznetsov returned home, in the second half of March, he took part in large exercises of the Northern Fleet, in which, besides him, up to 40 warships and submarines, as well as 50 naval aircraft and helicopters were involved. During these exercises, the destroyer "Fearless" was launched as a ship of the distant radar patrol on 200 km from the order, which was followed by the Kuznetsov TAKR. Having received information from him, Su-33, acting at a distance of 500 km from TAKR, intercepted and “destroyed” the four Tu-22М3, which were never able to reach the line of launching missiles for TAKR-y. It should also be noted that the "air umbrella" of the TAKR-a was built in two echelons - the long-range one was focused on intercepting enemy aircraft, the closest one - on the destruction of anti-ship missiles. In other words, of course, it is possible and necessary to say that the absence of long-range radar weapons significantly reduces the capabilities of the Kuznetsov air group, but in no case should we forget that even in the existing Kuznetsov form, our fleet providing him with opportunities that the fleet never had before. The experience of the first combat service of Kuznetsov testified that the presence of TAKR-a increases the combat stability of the naval unit operating in the far sea or ocean zone 1,5-2 times.
Secondly ... alas, but the first combat service showed the extreme weakness of the power plant of the ship. At the very beginning of the campaign, when TAKR was just leaving the Kola Bay, a seven-point storm began, during which two of the eight boilers failed, and at the time of returning to the base, only two boilers operated on the ship. Accordingly, in April 1996 of “Kuznetsov” was put up for repair, from which it came out only by the summer of 1998. I must say that if it were not for the chronic underfunding of repairs, the ship would not have to spend two whole years at the quay wall. And the quality of the repair was probably limping, and besides, “wild 90-e”, underfinancing and a drop in the qualifications of the personnel had a strong effect. In the period of 1998-1999, the Kuznetsov continued to serve in the fleet, but in 1999, one boiler and one (out of four) GTZA completely failed.
Despite this, the Kuznetsov was supposed to go to the second military service in 2000, but it was canceled due to the tragic death of the Kursk submarine. As a result, instead of the BS, the ship embarked on a three-year average repair. Then, during the 2004-2007, the ship again plunged into military service, while going to the North Atlantic in 2004 g, and from February 5 2007 g to 3 in February, 2008 g made another BS - march into the Mediterranean Sea. Then - 7 months of repair on the "Zvezdochka" and service until May 2014 g, when the ship that just returned from the march to the shores of Syria, embarked on a short three-month repair. Service again, and from January to 15 June 2016 d - restoration of technical readiness for a new long-distance campaign and - participation in military operations in Syria.
In general, we can say the following - for the period from January 29 1991, when the naval flag first flew over Kuznetsov, and until October 2017, when the overhaul of the TAKR began, 26 years and 8 months passed. During this time, the ship was under repair for approximately 6 years and 5 months, that is, only 24% of the total presence in the fleet. It should be borne in mind that under normal conditions and with timely funding, two years of repairs in 1996-98 and three years in the period of 2001-2004 could be carried out much faster, or a much larger amount could be produced during the same period. repair work.
In other words, the ingrained opinion that the Kuznetsov does not come out of repairs is unfounded. The problem lies elsewhere - a huge ship that has been in the fleet for years, 27, has still not received a single major overhaul ...
Продолжение следует ...
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