Military Review

Vasily Sokolovsky. Victory Commander

32
Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky is a clear example of how the talent of a military theoretician and the talent of practical implementation of their ideas in practice, excellent organizational skills could fit in one person. During the Great Patriotic War, Vasily Sokolovsky took part in a large number of operations, led several fronts, he is rightfully one of the most famous Soviet generals and marshals - commanders of Victory. He was the author of the militaryhistorical and military theoretical works, including "Military Strategy" and "The Defeat of the German-Fascist Troops near Moscow." Vasily Danilovich passed away exactly 50 years ago - on May 10, 1968.


Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky was born on July 9 of the year 1897 in the small village of Kozliki of the Belostok district of the Grodno province, currently in Poland. The future marshal was born in an ordinary peasant family. Then nothing suggested that he would connect his life with the army. Vasily Sokolovsky wanted and could become a teacher. After graduating from a three-year Zemstvo school, he was happy to teach village children himself. And in 1914, at 17, I entered the Nevelskoy Teachers' Seminary, which was intended to train elementary school teachers, earning excellent grades in the entrance examinations for the right to a scholarship. At the end of the seminary in 1917, he was ready to teach, but life decided otherwise.

Future 50 years of his life, he gave the army, passing a very difficult, but respectable way from a simple Red Army man to a marshal. Choosing the path of professional military, he passed it with honor, becoming an example to follow for many Soviet officers. For Vasily Sokolovsky, the defense of the Fatherland has become not just a profession, but the cause and meaning of his life.

Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky joined the ranks of the Red Army in February 1918. In the same year he graduated from 1-e Moscow military instructor courses. He took an active part in the Civil War, fought on three fronts. On the Eastern Front, he commanded the first company, then headed the battalion headquarters, was an assistant commander and commander of the regiment. From June 1918 of the year - senior assistant to the chief of staff of the rifle division, commander of the brigade of the 39 th rifle division on the southern front, from June 1920 of the year - head of the headquarters of the 32 th rifle division of the Caucasian Front. In 1921, literally in between fights, he graduated from the Red Army Military Academy in the first recruitment of its students. After graduating from the Academy, he was appointed Assistant Chief of the Operational Directorate of the Turkestan Front, then commanded a group of troops in the Fergana and Samarkand regions. He took an active part in the fight against Basmachis.

Vasily Sokolovsky. Victory Commander

After the end of the Civil War, Sokolovsky remained in the army and made an excellent career. From October 1924, he was Chief of Staff of the 14 Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District. From October 1926 of the year - Chief of Staff of the 9 Infantry Corps of the North Caucasus Military District. In 1928, he successfully graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the Red Army named after MV Frunze, after which he headed the headquarters of the 5 rifle corps of the Belarusian Military District. In July, 1930 was appointed commander of the 43 Infantry Division in the same district.

In January, 1935, Vasily Sokolovsky was transferred to the deputy head of the Volga Military District, and in May he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Urals Military District. In November of the same year, Sokolovsky was given the military rank of division commander. Since April, 1938 was the chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, in January of the following year, he became a bomber, and in June 1940 of the year - lieutenant-general. In February, 1941 was appointed to the position of Deputy Chief of the General Staff for organizational and mobilization issues.

The knowledge gained during his studies, and the actual combat experience of the Civil War allowed Sokolovsky to become at first noticeable, and then a great staff officer, sometimes even called the genius of staff art. He consistently went through all staff positions - in the regiments, divisions, corps, districts - and all several times. Led the headquarters of two divisions, two corps, three military districts. In this case, his staff experience combined with the commander. At various times, he commanded three divisions (the 2 th rifle division of the Turkestan Front, the 14 th rifle division of the Moscow Military District, the 43 th rifle division of the Belarusian Military District). Moreover, all of the listed compounds under his command necessarily became exemplary.

It is clear that the appointment to the General Staff in February 1941 was not accidental; only the most intelligent, the most talented and the most intelligent officers with extensive experience in staff work were recruited here. The Great Patriotic War Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky met with the first deputy Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who was the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.


Already in July, 1941, Lieutenant-General Sokolovsky was appointed chief of staff of the Western Front, he was entrusted with planning operations in one of the most crucial sections of the ensuing battles with the Nazis. Vasily Danilovich stayed at this position with small interruptions until February of the 1943 year. The headquarters of the front under his leadership during the Smolensk battle and the Moscow battle, despite the mistakes and miscalculations in the work, was able to organize reconnaissance, organize large-scale engineering and construction work on the advanced lines and in the depth of the defense. The headquarters of the Western Front took an active part in the planning, preparation and conduct of the Moscow offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941-42, as well as the Rzhev-Vyazma operation 1942 of the year. In June 1942, Vasily Sokolovsky was promoted to the rank of colonel general.

From February 1943, Sokolovsky was appointed commander of the Western Fronts, whose troops, in close cooperation with other fronts, conducted the Rzhev-Vyazemsky, Oryol and Smolensk operations of 1943, in August 1943 he was given the next military rank - Army General. At the same time, he led the front a little over a year, for the failures in Orsha and Vitebsk offensive operations in April 1944, Sokolovsky was removed from his post as commander of the front and transferred by the chief of staff of the 1 of the Ukrainian Front. Since April, 1945 has been the Deputy Commander of the 1 Belorussian Front. Being in these positions, the commander made a great contribution to the development, preparation and implementation of the Lviv-Sandamir, Vistula-Oder and Berlin offensive operations of the Soviet troops.

The main milestones in the military fate of Vasily Sokolovsky were associated with the names of two famous marshals - Zhukov and Konev, and the main successes of the Great Patriotic War were the victory near Moscow and the capture of Berlin. His fate was closely intertwined with the fate of the commander of the first magnitude Georgy Zhukov. At one time, he also received the Western Front from Zhukov. And in March, 1946, after the end of the war, it was Georgiy Konstantinovich who blessed Sokolovsky for the post of commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. The military fate of Sokolovsky was inseparable from Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev - on joint work on the Western and 1-th Ukrainian fronts. Both marshals knew very well the capabilities of Vasily Danilovich, valued his work and noted the awards of his chief of staff. Among all the Soviet marshals, only Sokolovsky was awarded three orders of Suvorov I degree and three orders of Kutuzov I degree - special awards for the generals of his level.


A very important stroke to his military portrait is the fact that, being in April 1945, Deputy Commander of the 1 Belorussian Front, he, by order of Zhukov, led the fighting directly in Berlin. This is a very remarkable and important touch to the portrait of the commander. It was the Sokolovsky 1 of May 1945 that was the first of the Soviet military leaders to enter into negotiations for a surrender with the head of the German ground forces, General Krebs, becoming one of those Soviet commanders who put the last victory point in the Great Patriotic War. And on May 29, 1945, for the skillful leadership of the combat operations of the entrusted troops, personal courage and bravery, Army General Sokolovsky was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The end of the war did not stop the military career of the commander. Since March 1946, he was not only the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, but also the head of the Soviet military administration, at the same time being a member of the Control Council in Germany from the USSR. In June 1946, Vasily Sokolovsky became Marshal of the Soviet Union. From March 1949 of the year - he served as First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR (from February 1950 of the year - Military Minister of the USSR).

16 June 1952, the Marshal was appointed Chief of General Staff - First Deputy Military Minister of the country (since March 1953, the Minister of Defense). Since 1954, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union have entered a new stage of their development - the stage of large-scale technical re-equipment and radical reorganization, the introduction of nuclear missile weapons. The scientific and technical progress, which was pushed forward, seriously expanded, but at the same time, complicated the activities of the military and political leadership of the country, especially in the field of military construction. At the same time, the activities of the General Staff in this difficult time proceeded against the background of a sharp aggravation of international relations. It was precisely the workers of the General Staff in this difficult period that were given the task of ensuring reliable defense of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist bloc. To solve this problem, Marshal Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky used all his accumulated combat and practical experience in command and staff work during the war years, while conducting work on the further development of military science and improving the construction of the country's Armed Forces.


In April 1960, Sokolovsky was relieved of his post as Chief of the General Staff, and in the same year he became Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Throughout the postwar years, the marshal was actively working to preserve the memory and perpetuate the feat of the participants of the Great Patriotic War. It is known that he was one of the initiators of assigning Moscow the honorary title of hero-city, the initiator and active participant in the creation of the monument to the “Soldier-Liberator” in Treptow Park in Berlin. He also actively supported the idea of ​​creating the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in the capital. In the second half of 1960, he also did a lot for the appearance of the famous Motherland memorial in Volgograd.

Marshal Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky died 10 in May 1968, at the age of 70, of which he dedicated 50 to military service. The urn with the ashes of the marshal was buried in the Kremlin wall on Red Square in Moscow. To perpetuate the memory of the commander, much has been done both in Russia and in Belarus. In particular, Grodno immortalized the memory of a fellow countryman, calling one of the city’s streets in his honor, and in the Grodno State Historical and Archeological Museum a part of the exhibition is dedicated to the marshal. Also, the streets named after him are in Smolensk and Moscow. His name was given to the Novocherkassk Higher Military Command School of Communications, which existed until the 2011 year.

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  1. Olgovich
    Olgovich 10 May 2018 06: 43
    +2
    Vasily Danilovich was in this position with short interruptions until February 1943. Front headquarters under his leadership during Smolensk battle and the Moscow battle

    But Pochkma did not mention that he was in this position even during the terrible defeat of the Western Front in October 1941 (Yukhnov, etc.)?
    And Sokolovsky, being the chief of staff, was one of the main culprits of this tragedy.
    And after all, there was already experience of 4 months of fighting, and a stabilized front, and forces and means ....
    1. rkkasa xnumx
      rkkasa xnumx 10 May 2018 08: 09
      +8
      Quote: Olgovich
      And after all, there was already experience of 4 months of fighting, and a stabilized front, and forces and means ....

      The defense of the Soviet troops was shallow (15–20 km), poorly trained in engineering, and had a focal character. The readiness of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky defensive line by the beginning of October did not exceed 40-50% of the planned amount of work.
      By the beginning of the offensive, the enemy had replenished his troops with people, weapons and equipment, bringing the staffing of infantry formations with personnel to 90% of the nominal strength. The number of tanks in German tank and motorized divisions reached 80-100%. At the same time, the staffing of Soviet divisions was low, numbering an average of 5–7 thousand people with a staffing of 10 people. As a result, the enemy had a total numerical superiority of 859 - 1,4 times. In the areas of main strikes, he surpassed the Soviet troops in people by 2, in tanks - by 3,2, in guns and mortars - by 8,5 times.
      And although the Vyazemsky operation, this is of course a serious defeat, but:
      Surrounded by Soviet troops fought stubbornly west of Vyazma until October 13. By active actions they fettered about 28 enemy divisions, 14 of which until mid-October were unable to continue the attack on Moscow. The stubborn resistance of the surrounded Soviet troops west of Vyazma allowed to gain time to restore the violated strategic front, restore the combat effectiveness of the Western Front, organize defense on the Mozhaisk line and the near approaches to Moscow.
      As a result, the offensive of the German Army Group Center in the second half of October - early December 1941 failed.
      You would not go into topics about Soviet military commanders. Better go to kapchaks-wrangels fapayte.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 10 May 2018 08: 52
        +1
        Quote: rkkasa 81
        people with a staff number of 10 859 people. As a result, the enemy had a total numerical superiority of 1,4 - 2 times.

        You when Steal strangers articles, although they would not have written them from his name ..
        Quote: rkkasa 81
        about the Soviet military leaders

        By the beginning of the operation, the enemy misled the command of the Soviet fronts regarding the direction of the main blows.
        although the Soviet command fairly accurately determined the time of the strike, made a mistake in the striking forces of the enemy, the directions of the main blows
        https://topwar.ru/9859-chernyy-oktyabr-1941-goda-
        razgrom-bryanskogo-fronta-i-vyazemskiy-kotel.html
        .

        So who managed to deceive? Remind me? About the ALSO, the article must also be indicated in the article, IMHO.
        Quote: rkkasa 81
        The defense of the Soviet troops was shallow (15–20 km), poorly trained in engineering, and had a focal character. The readiness of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky defensive line by the beginning of October did not exceed 40-50% of the planned amount of work.
        By the beginning of the offensive, the enemy had replenished his troops with people, weapons and equipment, bringing the manning of infantry formations to 90%

        What I’m talking about: the enemy, in an offensive, on a foreign land, thousands of kilometers from bases, was able to fully prepare for the offensive, unlike ours, acting on their own land and in defense. And the defeat was, alas, terrible and lightning-fast from October 2 to 13.
        Read at least VO articles: "Black October" of 1941 of the year: rout of the Bryansk Front and Vyazemsky "boiler"
        Quote: rkkasa 81
        You would not climb topics about Soviet military commanders.

        You would push your advice - yes, yes, there! lol
        Quote: rkkasa 81
        Better go to kapchaks-wrangels fapayte.

        Bother to speak in Russian, according to the rules, not on yours fine jargon. hi
        1. rkkasa xnumx
          rkkasa xnumx 10 May 2018 09: 36
          +8
          Quote: Olgovich
          You when you steal

          Mr. yap, bother to provide evidence that I attributed to my authorship publicly available data that is easily google. Which by the way, I specifically highlighted in a different font.
          As for the errors, let me remind you - you fool deigned to smear our commander with the fact that he allowed a tragedy, despite the presence of:
          Quote: Olgovich
          And after all, there was already experience of 4 months of fighting, and a stabilized front, and forces and means ....

          I have dispelled this next nonsense of yours.
          Quote: Olgovich
          the enemy, in an offensive, on a foreign land, thousands of kilometers from bases, was able to fully prepare for the offensive, unlike ours, acting on their own land and in defense.

          What nonsense ... stop The bases here still remembered lol To the card mr fool take a look and estimate for example the distance from the Urals, Siberia and the Far East to the western part of the USSR.
          By itself, this is your writing, it is about nothing. Many factors must be taken into account, for example, the availability of certain resources that need to be delivered; the amount of transport, road network, etc. And in their own land, or in a stranger, this is not so important. For example, in 1944-1945, ours quite successfully beat Germans on foreign territory.
          PS I take this opportunity to express my condolences to you on the occasion of the May 9 holiday. I am sure that the great victory of the Red Army is a great tragedy for you. hi
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 10 May 2018 10: 57
            +1
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            Mr. yap, bother to provide evidence that I attributed to my authorship publicly available data that is easily google. Which by the way, I specifically highlighted in a different font.

            The thief always says that he didn’t steal: You printed an ALIEN article under YOUR nickname. In Russian, this is called theft.
            If the material of other authors (resources) is used, a LINK to the author or resource is made.
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            Quote: Olgovich
            And after all, there was already experience of 4 months of fighting, and a stabilized front, and forces and means ....
            I dispelled your next nonsense

            fool lol Those. there was neither the experience of 4 months of fighting, nor the stabilized front, nor the strength and means? ....
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            The bases here still remembered. Take a look at the map, and estimate for example the distances from the Urals, Siberia and Far East to the western part of the USSR.

            Don't you have to figure out from Washington? lol
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            By itself, this is your writing, it is about nothing. Many factors must be taken into account, for example, the availability of certain resources that need to be delivered; the amount of transport, road network, etc. And in their own land, or in a stranger, this is not so important. For example, in 1944-1945, ours quite successfully beat Germans on foreign territory.

            Why is this stream of consciousness?
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            I take this opportunity to express to you self-esteem in connection with the past May 9th Holiday. I am sure that the great victory of the Red Army is a great tragedy for you.

            And I, on the contrary, congratulations-from Great Victory Day of our people. This is one of his best victories, along with OB 1812.
            And condolences to you - for another reason: about the depressing state of your one-sided worldview yes
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 10 May 2018 13: 59
              +8
              Quote: Olgovich
              Those. there was neither the experience of 4 months of fighting, nor the stabilized front, nor the strength and means? ....

              So the experience of the first four months of the war in this case speaks only about one thing - for defense against the enemy’s mechanical units, they need their own similar mechanical units. And the infantry defense against tanks leads either to the boiler while holding positions, or to rout on the march when retreating.
              Our command had a cat crying about its mechanical units - only freshly formed tank brigades. Therefore, according to the experience of the first 4 months, they decided to maximize the defense on the alleged panzerstrasse - so that the enemy's bursting mechanical units would be exhausted and deprived of normal supplies. And there, you look. and the reserve front infantry will catch up - and the Germans will get bogged down. We still had no other options.
              Quote: Olgovich
              Don't you have to figure out from Washington?

              Why is this jerking? In the fall of 1941, the main manufacturer of the T-34 went to the Urals. The main producer of HF is in the same region. Izhora plant in blockade. Mariupol - evacuated. Diesel production is being evacuated. Only STZ remained in its place.
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 11 May 2018 06: 09
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                As the experience of the first four months of the war in this case speaks only about one thing - for defense against the enemy’s mechanical units, their own mechanical units are needed. And the infantry defense against tanks leads either to the boiler while holding positions, or to rout on the march when retreating.

                belay
                What the hell is that bullshit? Tanks fight with tanks much less often than with artillery, which, first of all, is necessary for successful defense. It is she who destroys the bulk of the tanks, not tanks.
                And it was in sufficient quantity and quality, it was necessary to place it in the directions of attacks, but the Germans were able to deceive ours. And there is a share of guilt and Sokolovsky.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Quote: Olgovich
                Don't you have to figure out from Washington?
                Why is this jerking? In the fall of 1941, the main manufacturer of the T-34 went to the Urals.

                Those. You also claim that the Germans in a foreign land, through 2 occupied countries, in a hostile environment, on strangers w / roads, on the roads blown up by us, was it much easier to supply troops than ours on our land?
                Try to prove. hi
                Quote: Alexey RA
                In the fall of 1941, the main manufacturer of the T-34 went to the Urals. The main producer of HF is in the same region. Izhora plant in blockade. Mariupol - evacuated. Diesel production is being evacuated. Only STZ remained in its place.

                Remember the reason? This is a defeat in the Baltic states and a catastrophe near Kiev. One of the main reasons for this is inept leadership.
                Therefore, he noted that when indicating the successful operations of military leaders, their failures should also be indicated.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 11 May 2018 10: 31
                  +1
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  What the hell is that bullshit? Tanks fight with tanks much less often than with artillery, which, first of all, is necessary for successful defense. It is she who destroys the bulk of the tanks, not tanks.

                  You confuse the tactical level and operational. At the tactical level, the PTA fights with tanks. But building a PTA front in all threatened areas is unrealistic - and the "tanks will find a hole", leaning in the weakest point of defense. And at this stage of the defense it is extremely important to have mobile mechanized formations that could reach the throat of the breakthrough in time and seal it with blows from the flanks, cutting off the bursting mechanical units from the infantry and supplies. “Fire brigades”, counter-strikes from “corner posts” - all this we experienced on ourselves.
                  Ours tried to inflict a flank counterattack by the forces of the Boldin group (152 SD, 101 Moscow road, 126 and 128 TBR) - but the forces to stop the 7 panzerdivis were not enough, and the German infantry came to the aid of their tankers.
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  And it was in sufficient quantity and quality, it was necessary to place it in the directions of attacks, but the Germans were able to deceive ours.

                  Then we would have formed other holes in the defense - and the Germans would hit them. We select the PTA from the 38th and 112th divisions and put in the direction of real attacks - the Germans hit the highway Smolensk - Yartsevo - Vyazma. And we have nothing to repulse this blow with: our PTA cannot keep up with German tanks.
                  In addition, do you not know what the fifth point was from the PTA in the Red Army somewhere until the middle of 1942. The 45-mm anti-tank guns do not show tabular armor penetration - a maximum of 30 mm from 200-250 m. For 76-mm divisional guns, the BR-350A is available in unit quantities, and the main BBS is the USh with its 30 mm to 300 m.
                  1. Olgovich
                    Olgovich 11 May 2018 10: 45
                    0
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    You confuse the tactical level and operational. At the tactical level, the PTA fights with tanks.

                    The main battle losses of tanks, namely from artillery. At any level.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    Then we would have formed other holes in the defense - and the Germans would hit them.

                    The Germans immediately hit the "holes", without samples and "would" .. Their intelligence worked, ours is not.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    In addition, do you not know what the fifth point was from the PTA in the Red Army somewhere until the middle of 1942. The 45-mm anti-tank guns do not show tabular armor penetration - a maximum of 30 mm from 200-250 m. For 76-mm divisional guns, the BR-350A is available in unit quantities, and the main BBS is the USh with its 30 mm to 300 m.

                    In German tanks, the 41m armor was penetrated by our artillery.
                    1. Olgovich
                      Olgovich 11 May 2018 13: 59
                      0
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      The Germans immediately hit the "holes", without samples and "would" .. Their intelligence worked, ours is not.

                      Blame: not intelligence, but the manual didn’t work:
                      M. Lukin in the article "In the Vyazemsky operation" noted that the Soviet command in the middle of September knew: "The enemy is pulling a large number of tanks and artillery into the area Clergy, Smolensk, Roslavl... At the end of September, scouts reported on the concentration of a large number of troops, tanks and artillery in the area Spiritual ". Vasilevsky in his article “The Beginning of a Radical Turn during the War” wrote: “Concentration of the main enemy groupings for delivering attacks in the areae Dorogobuzh, and in the region of Roslavl it was established "but we "had insufficient defense depth, plans for withdrawing troops were not worked out in the event that our defense broke through to the Rzhev-Vyazma defense line, and if the environment was threatened, then further east."
                      multivolume "The Great Patriotic War": "Headquarters of the Western Front disposed of fairly accurate information about enemy groupings: it was found that against 8 divisions of the 30th and 19th armies the Germans deployed 17 of their divisions; in the band of other armies, the ratio was approximately equal. Intelligence directly indicated the probable direction of the enemy’s strike.
                      Everyone knew everything, but did NOT really do anything.
                      A separate topic is the battles in the environment, which lasted only .... 5 days!
                    2. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 11 May 2018 15: 24
                      +1
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      The main combat losses of tanks, namely from artillery. At any level.

                      Combat - yes. But don't forget about "destroyed by crews due to lack of fuel / shells / inability to repair". But these losses are on the conscience of those formations that cut off the tank wedge from the rear.
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      The Germans immediately hit the "holes", without samples and "would" .. Their intelligence worked, ours is not.

                      That's it. Therefore, you should not fall into the first mistake of an alternativeist when one side will alternatively, and the rest will stupidly follow the canon. If we strengthen the anti-tank missile in the directions of the strike from real, then the Germans will strike in those places. which we weakened for this strengthening. Near Kiev, it took them less than a week to redeploy the tank group.
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      In German tanks, the 41m armor was penetrated by our artillery.

                      In theory, if you hit with an ideal shell on medium hard armor.
                      In practice, the only Soviet anti-tank missile system, German KC armor with a thickness of 40 mm made its way only from 150 m and less, and a thickness of 30 mm from 200-250 m. And the 76 mm guns, due to the absence of BR-350A troops, used shrapnel to strike with it is 30 mm by 300 m (Dr. D. Shein, who dug up the docks along Katukov near Mtsensk, wrote that in the “armor-piercing” column of 4 battalion guns, even then, USh were indicated).
                      1. Olgovich
                        Olgovich 12 May 2018 05: 41
                        0
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Combat - yes. But do not forget about "destroyed by crews due to lack of fuel / shells / impossibility of repair." But these losses are on the conscience of those formations that cut off the tank wedge from the rear.

                        In theory. But in practice, in the 41st there were no cut-off German wedges. And the reason is not the lack of tanks, but the lack of competent leadership and communications. By the way, the Germans reported on 1477 destroyed and captured tanks, ours about 830 of ours lost (Vyazma, Bryansk).
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        That's it. Therefore, you should not fall into the first mistake of an alternativeist when one side will alternatively, and the rest will stupidly follow the canon. If we strengthen the anti-tank missile in the directions of the strike from real, then the Germans will strike in those places. which we weakened for this strengthening. Near Kiev, it took them less than a week to redeploy the tank group.

                        Where is the "alternative"? Practically NOTHING was undertaken against the Nazi concentration known from MID-September. Is this normal, in your opinion?
                        These are the facts. But the alternative is, in this case, precisely your assumption, of course, logical and existing, but in other cases.
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        In practice, the only Soviet anti-tank missile system, German KC armor with a thickness of 40 mm made its way only from 150 m and less, and a thickness of 30 mm from 200-250 m. And the 76 mm guns, due to the absence of BR-350A troops, used shrapnel to strike with it is 30 mm by 300 m (Dr. D. Shein, who dug up the docks along Katukov near Mtsensk, wrote that in the “armor-piercing” column of 4 battalion guns, even then, USh were indicated).

                        Nowhere in the memoirs do they recall the low penetration of armor by our shells in the 41st year
                        They write about a catastrophic shortage of shells, the artillery itself
                        due to the clumsy control of it) and the rapid destruction of its aviation and artillery of the enemy
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 11 May 2018 10: 32
                  +1
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  Those. You also claim that it was much easier for the Germans to supply troops than ours on their own land in Germans in a foreign land, through 2 occupied countries, in a hostile environment, on foreign railways, on roads we blown up.

                  On the other hand, for the Germans, industry worked in greenhouse conditions - practically without enemy influence. No evacuation. no breaks in production chains. The border railroads of the USSR were captured practically intact, with traction, wagons and station equipment - the railways mobilized and began to operate only in August. Moreover, despite all the assurances of Kaganovich:
                  I report that the change of railway tracks from the Western European gauge (1435 mm) to the 1524 mm gauge on the yellow roads: Latvian, Lithuanian, Białystok, Brest-Litovsk, Kovel and Lviv was completed on May 19 this year.
                  From April 18 to May 19, 1941, these roads were altered: 2099 km of main tracks and 505 km of station tracks.
                  Thus, all roads of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic States have the same track with other roads of the network.
                  The railway rearrangement was not completed even on the main tracks (of which there were more than 2099 km on the border railway). And local railways were not completely changed, which greatly facilitated the supply.
                  And the third - the Germans greatly exceeded us in terms of supply vehicles. In addition to the army grossstransportraum (supply column - 1 pc. For GA, the total g / p of each - 20 tons), do not forget about the non-registered combat personnel, but actively working in the interests of the NSKK front and all kinds of RAD and Todt's organization there.
                  1. Olgovich
                    Olgovich 11 May 2018 14: 06
                    0
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    On the other hand, for the Germans, industry worked in greenhouse conditions - practically without enemy influence. No evacuation. no breaks in production chains.

                    What does this have to do with logistics?
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    The border railway stations of the USSR were captured practically intact, with traction, wagons and station equipment

                    And on our part it was all.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    The railway rearrangement was not completed even on the main tracks (of which there were more than 2099 km on the border railway). And local railways were not completely changed, which greatly facilitated the supply.

                    For our part, there were no such problems.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    And the third - the Germans significantly exceeded us in terms of supply vehicles

                    This is yes.
                    But the Germans were far away, and we were at home.
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 11 May 2018 15: 42
                      +1
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      What does this have to do with logistics?

                      Because the supply is not limited to one logistics. If there is nothing to transport, then even with perfect logistics there will still be a shortage.
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      And on our part it was all.

                      I'll be brief:
                      The Germans had no problems with production, but there were problems with logistics. In part, they decided them by eliminating things that were unnecessary at that time from the transport. These included winter uniforms that settled "temporarily" in Warsaw and reached the front only in 1942.
                      We had no problems with logistics: the militarized NKPS, crushing all railway logistics, including army transportation, worked like a clock (the Bolsheviks learned the lesson of the WWII). But there was a problem with production - due to the evacuation and production development at the backup sites, the output volume sharply decreased and often there was simply nothing to carry.
                      As of September 1941, the army applied for 2027213 rifles. Industry and warehouses planned to supply only 378000 units. According to machine guns, the picture was even worse: 110315 pieces were required. - planned 10670. On mortars: required 29090 - planned 8366. On guns: required 26586 - planned 5003.
                      1. Olgovich
                        Olgovich 12 May 2018 09: 24
                        0
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Because the supply is not limited to one logistics. If there is nothing to transport, then even with perfect logistics there will still be a shortage.

                        Judging by the number of troops and weapons, ours had what to transport.
                        The Germans had more forces and armaments, which meant there should have been more problems with logistics. But they did better.
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        We have problems with logistics did not have: the militarized NKPS, crushing under itself all railway logistics, including army transportation, worked like a clock (the Bolsheviks learned the lesson of WWI)

                        There are other, very convincing ones: https://polit-ec.livejournal.com/10620.html ,. "Like a clock" was not even a trace
      2. Vladimir 5
        Vladimir 5 10 May 2018 12: 37
        +1
        You really do not go to lawyers to those whose fault was the defeat and millions of losses of the Red Army. A worthy couple to G. Zhukov - one drives to slaughter, the other makes this slaughter more bloody. Only the Rzhev-Vyazemsky direction is worth what for a year, take an interest, Mr. Comrade Attorney ... There is nothing to protect those whose fault the ratio of combat losses in the whole war is one to nine, this is one of their main merits. Why wasn’t he affected by the repressions in the Red Army of 37-38, perhaps the leader was by the number of denunciations, they didn’t touch such a Stakhanovite!? ...
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 10 May 2018 13: 30
          +8
          Quote: Vladimir 5
          A worthy couple to G. Zhukov - one drives to slaughter, the other makes this slaughter more bloody. Only the Rzhev-Vyazemsky direction during the year is worth what, take an interest, Mr. Comrade Lawyer ...

          Yeah ... one Zhukov is to blame. Not otherwise, Zhukov personally forbade the Red Army from firing rifles - so the consumption of cartridges in an attack on 1 rifle was 2-3 pieces a day. And personally, Zhukov forbade battalion commanders to use battalion artillery and mortars. And he also laid down the infantry following the tanks and sent them back to the trenches. And how Zhukov insisted that his orders should not be respected in any way — for example, that infantry commanders should in no way create success consolidation groups that should be fixed in captured trenches. By the way, is it that Zhukov is to blame for the fact that the commanders drove their subordinates head-on to fortified enemy posts in violation of the orders of the com-front?
        2. Colonel
          Colonel 10 May 2018 16: 43
          +5
          Quote: Vladimir 5
          the ratio of combat losses in the whole war is one to nine,

          Can you justify this pearl, or is it still failing that the war in Berlin is over, and not beyond the Urals?
          1. Vladimir 5
            Vladimir 5 10 May 2018 18: 17
            0
            Alekhey RA Quote: “Or, personally, Zhukov forbade combatants to use battalion artillery and mortars?” After such sayings the answer is: only the grave heals the hunchbacked and stupid. I explain: G. Zhukov, being an NS, according to the experience of the Khalkhingol battles, he placed the army and front depots prohibitively close to the borders. and in the first week of the war they found themselves with the Germans. Border cover troops were almost disarmed. and soon it was no longer possible to shoot than, with all the wishes of the battalion commanders .. Because so many tanks, artillery, cars without fuel and ammunition were thrown and burned. This is the personal fault of NS Zh G. Zhukov, which they are trying to wipe, because I. Stalin needs a picture created by the marshal-winner ... Go deep into memories and other factual material ... G. Zhukov only required to step on, and he took pictures of the impossibility and disastrousness and he straightened out, handed over to the tribunal and shot the officers by personal order, - G. Zhukov was an unrivaled record holder ... And the commanders of the armies and divisions (Zhukov was not even considered with regiments) sent the armies and divisions to death, knowing the result, it was assertive and ruthless, and therefore Stalin’s favorite, About the losses in the Second World War, so if you yourself are not able to compare statistics (not Soviet, but objective) and certainly from more than three sources, then I can’t help ...
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 10 May 2018 19: 29
              +4
              Quote: Vladimir 5
              After such sayings the answer is: only the grave heals the hunchbacked and stupid. I explain: G. Zhukov, being an NS, according to the experience of the Khalkhingol battles, he placed the army and front depots prohibitively close to the borders. and in the first week of the war they found themselves with the Germans.

              Read the docks - they rulez! ©
              Of the total number of district warehouses, 10 were built in the pre-Soviet period, 20 were organized in 1941 in the Baltic republics, Western Belarus and Ukraine on the basis of military warehouses already existing there, 13 were equipped in the open air, and the remaining 68 warehouses were created during the Soviet era in mainly in 1930-1940
              © "Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45.", Moscow-Tula, GAU publishing house, 1977.
              Attention, the question is: at what distance from the new border could the warehouses built in the 30s be located? wink
              And more:
              The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of 3-nd and partially of the 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (of the 1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.

              Quote: Vladimir 5
              Border cover troops were almost disarmed. and soon it was no longer possible to shoot than, with all the wishes of the battalion commanders ..

              This statement goes very well with the previous statement about moving warehouses to the borders. smile
              Quote: Vladimir 5
              G. Zhukov demanded only to advance, and those explaining about impossibility and fatality removed and straightened out, handed over to the tribunal and shot officers by personal order, - G. Zhukov was an unrivaled record holder ...

              Well, Kirponos was on the defensive - and how did it end? In the absence of mechanical connections, the only way not to get into the boiler is to attack the adversary, forcing him to respond to the reflection of blows with his mechanical parts. It is worth giving these mechanical units at least a couple of weeks - and they will strike at the weakest point. And there will be nothing to parry him - for the speed of the march of our infantry was even inferior to the enemy infantry (which 5A Potapova felt on herself).
              1. Vladimir 5
                Vladimir 5 10 May 2018 21: 13
                -1
                It is difficult to discuss with everyone, because you rely on information smoothed and worked out by Glavpur. Yes, you quote standards, but the actual nominations and movements, in connection with the accession of new regions in 1940-41, lead to new frontiers, and here the genius of “G. Zhukov” with all its consequences appeared. Regarding Kirponos, Zhukov was sitting next to him at the beginning of the war. and brainless "Zhukovsky" live orders ditched FIVE fur corps of the Red Army against;
                4 tank divisions of the Wehrmacht from the Kleist group. Even the French did not know such a blatant defeat with such a superior force ... The Germans wrote about this greatest defeat of the Red Army, if the command were more literate, the war would have turned west, but the Zhukovs had commanded ... Yes, and I. Stalin removed Zhukov from the NGS immediately after this defeat near Dubno-Brody, where the main tank forces of the Red Army were concentrated for a critical general offensive ... What can be discussed if the military-historical education was created on biased basis with prepared conclusions and definitions, and you were not taught to think independently ...
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 11 May 2018 11: 08
                  +1
                  Quote: Vladimir 5
                  It is difficult to discuss with everyone, because you rely on information smoothed and worked out by Glavpur. Yes, you quote standards, but the actual nominations and movements, in connection with the accession of new regions in 1940-41, lead to new frontiers, and here the genius of “G. Zhukov” with all its consequences appeared.

                  What can be the movements of stationary warehouse buildings? You should at least look at the table for the location of district warehouses - 1 and 2 digits in the same ZOV were located outside Minsk and Gomel.
                  Quote: Vladimir 5
                  Regarding Kirponos, Zhukov was sitting next to him at the beginning of the war. and brainless "Zhukovsky" live orders ditched FIVE fur corps of the Red Army against;

                  It was an answer in the style of Bader - very weighty and half a meter past. ©
                  Just Kirponos and the command of the SWF, immediately after Zhukov’s departure to Moscow, with their orders actually canceled the initial order of the National High School for the concentration of mechanized corps and delivering attacks on the flanks of a German tank wedge. Moreover, it was the command of the South-Western Front with its orders to reassign MK and change the direction of strikes that made MK crazy marches, during which they lost a large amount of equipment. And when they came to their senses in the SWF, it was already too late: the southern MK group was thoroughly plundered by Muzychenko, and instead of the rear of the 1st TGR, German infantry appeared in front of the advancing tanks.
                  Actually, total disobedience to orders and their unauthorized creative interpretation and was one of the reasons for the failure of the Red Army of the first period of the war. For example, 1 tank division had to be torn out of Karelia for 2 weeks - the army commander simply ignored the orders of the NSS, and in parting, he pulled out two full-blooded tank battalions from the departing TD.
                  Quote: Vladimir 5
                  Yes, and I. Stalin removed Zhukov from the NGS immediately after such a rout near Dubno-Brody, where the main tank forces of the Red Army were concentrated for an overwhelming general offensive ...

                  You do not confuse July with June? Zhukov was removed from the post of the National High School on July 29, 1941 - immediately after the battle of Smolensk.
                  Quote: Vladimir 5
                  But what is there to discuss if a military-historical education is created on biased basis with prepared conclusions and definitions, and you are not taught to think independently ...

                  Read the primary. For example, the reports of the commanders of the mechanized corps of April-May 1941 on the combat readiness of the units entrusted to them. You know, it helps to understand what kind of semi-disassembled condition the BKV Red Army had in a couple of months before the war: the MK of the first wave had one officially sky-ready division, the MK of the second wave had 1-2, in other and combat-ready formations of the MK - most often communications and rear. The dashes in the columns "tractors" and "PARM" in the rembats, for example, make it clear that we have before us a connection for one battle.
              2. Olgovich
                Olgovich 11 May 2018 08: 19
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Attention, question: at what distance from the new border could the warehouses built in the 30s be located?

                At a distance of those HOURS that the Nazis needed to reach the old border: already 25 June they were already on the approaches to Minsk.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 11 May 2018 10: 35
                  +1
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  At a distance of those HOURS that the Nazis needed to reach the old border: on June 25 they were already on the outskirts of Minsk.

                  Warehouse of the 1st category ZOV was located 40 km from Gomel. Is that too? prohibitively close to the border? smile
            2. Colonel
              Colonel 10 May 2018 19: 59
              +3
              Yes, aplomb does not correspond to knowledge of history. For starters, Zhukov was not NSH, he was NGS. He was appointed to this post after KShVI, in the winter of 1940-41. And with all his desire, he could not
              Quote: Vladimir 5
              based on the experience of the Khalkhingol battles, place army and front-line warehousesthe prohibitively close to borders

              Having gone deep into “memories and other factual material”, one can find facts when Zhukov demanded an offensive in controversial situations and sought, if not victory, then stabilized the situation (September 1941 near Leningrad), so it was a survival war, not a “strange war” "with football and booze .. I especially liked your" ... statistics (not Soviet, but objective). " Objective, whose is this? German, British, American? (these three sources?)
        3. rkkasa xnumx
          rkkasa xnumx 10 May 2018 19: 36
          +2
          Quote: Vladimir 5
          You really do not go to lawyers to those whose fault was the defeat and millions of losses of the Red Army. A worthy couple to G. Zhukov - one drives to slaughter, the other makes this slaughter more bloody.

          Do you have complaints about the data that I cited regarding the Vyazemsky defensive operation?
          Quote: Vladimir 5
          There is nothing to protect those whose fault the ratio of combat losses in the whole war is one to nine

          I’m wondering, what was the balance of power so that, with a loss of 1 to 9, ours won anyway? 1 to 20, 1 to 30? And tell us where this correlation of forces came from, if the population in the USSR was about 200 million, and in Germany about 80.
          Plus, do not forget to consider that:
          1 - on the side of Germany in the East still fought - allies (Hungarians, Romanians, Finns, Italians); various volunteers from Europe; Well, our citizens also existed.
          2 - for the German economy, almost all of Europe worked, so it had the opportunity to put a larger percentage of its citizens under arms. The Soviet Union did not have such an opportunity.
          3 - a significant number of the population of the USSR turned out to be in the occupied territories, which means it could not be called up to our armed forces.
          Quote: Vladimir 5
          Why wasn’t he affected by the repressions in the Red Army of 37-38 years, maybe the leader was by the number of denunciations, they didn’t touch such a Stakhanovite!? ...

          You yourself personally calculated for Zhukov how many denunciations he wrote?
        4. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 11 May 2018 16: 08
          +1
          Quote: Vladimir 5
          Why wasn’t he affected by the repressions in the Red Army of 37-38 years, maybe the leader was by the number of denunciations, they didn’t touch such a Stakhanovite!? ...

          Ignatiev, Karbyshev, Lev Julius Alexander Philipp von Galler, Ozarovsky and Meshchersky were also leaders in the number of denunciations - since they, too, were not touched in 37-38? wink
  2. Dashing
    Dashing 10 May 2018 12: 25
    +6
    Yesterday was a great day - Victory Day. Happy holiday, dear colleagues. V.D. Sokolovsky, by its qualities, is a strong middle peasant. There weren’t enough stars from the sky, he did his work, he pulled the strap. In the army and in life, it’s always like that, someone is a star, someone is carrying a piano. In a large independent post of commander of the Western Front, he did not win laurels, but he was in place at the post of chief of staff under a large-scale commander. A typical background person, support for a bright leader. Another confirmation of the old truth at ChTZ is that each leader has his own ceiling, no need to jump over it.
    1. rkkasa xnumx
      rkkasa xnumx 10 May 2018 19: 51
      +2
      Quote: DARK
      Yesterday was a great day - Victory Day.

      Oh, not for everyone this day is great, oh not for everyone ... There, the characters above are already contorted by our Victory.
      1. Dashing
        Dashing 11 May 2018 11: 20
        0
        Yes, and to hell with them, rkkasa 81. My father took Berlin at 20 years old. Senior sergeant, PTR company commander, twice wounded. Why should we be afraid of someone’s teeth grinding. With us our people, dear rkkasa 81, are behind us great people, giants - our grandfathers, fathers, mothers and grandmothers. Glory to them, our memory to them and eternal gratitude. For victory!
        "Let's drink for the Motherland, drink for Stalin!
        Let's drink it and pour it again! "
  3. user
    user 20 May 2021 14: 41
    0
    On April 11, 1944, a commission of the State Defense Committee submitted to the Headquarters report No. M-715 entitled "Unsatisfactory military operations of the Western Front over the past six months." What did it say, and why was this commission created?
    At that time, the Western Front was commanded by General of the Army V.D. Sokolovsky, the chief of staff was Lieutenant General A.P. Pokrovsky. From October 12, 1943 to April 1, 1944, the front conducted eleven offensive operations, during which it advanced 1-4 km towards the enemy on average. The maximum success was achieved in the Vitebsk direction in December 1943 - January 1944. As a result of the enemy's retreat to a previously prepared line, the advance here ranged from 8 to 12 km.

    As a result, in five and a half months of fighting, the troops of the Western Front lost 530 people in killed and wounded. 537 wagons of ammunition were used up. In all battles, the troops of the Western Front had some superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment, and in the March operation they were quite significant.
    By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the reasons for the failure in the actions of the command of the Western Front were clarified by the Extraordinary Commission consisting of G. Malenkov and three generals. The commission concluded:

    "The unsuccessful actions of the Western Front over the past six months, large losses and a large expenditure of ammunition are explained not by the presence of a strong enemy and an insurmountable defense in front of the front, but exclusively by unsatisfactory leadership from the front command."
    The text of the report repeatedly concluded that "the main reason for the failure of operations on the Western Front is the unsatisfactory leadership of the troops by the front command." General Sokolovsky was accused of distorting information and outright deceiving Headquarters.

    The Commission decided:

    "In the interests of the cause, it is necessary:
    a) remove General of the Army Sokolovsky from the post of commander of the Western Front as having failed to cope with the command of the front and appoint him chief of staff of one of the fronts;
    b) to reprimand Lieutenant-General Bulganin for the fact that he, being ... a member of the Military Council of the Western Front, did not report to the Headquarters about the presence of major shortcomings at the front;
    c) ... warn the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant-General Pokrovsky, that if he does not correct his mistakes, he will be demoted in rank and position. "

    These are the commanders who make heroes today.