Military Review

Battleship "Admiral Ushakov" in battles

129
"It was a victory of the spirit."
Emperor Nicholas II



Battleship "Admiral Ushakov" in battles


After the commissioning of the next, in 1898, the battleship of the coastal defense "Admiral Ushakov" was annually included for three weeks in the Training and artillery unit of the Baltic fleet to improve the training of gunners. Intensive training firing led to the end of the campaign in 1904, during which 10 shells were fired from only 140 '' guns of the battleship, the total number of shots fired by the ship from main guns reached 472 (total training and combat), which seriously affected the wear of the gun barrels. The 120-mm rapid-fire guns were in an even worse position, each of which already had about 400 shots.

The Special Meeting held a few days before the capitulation of Port Arthur was decided, and three days later, on December 14 1904, the highest order followed to send the first echelon of the 3 Pacific squadron as part of the 1 Separate detachment of ships to the Far East Under the flag of Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov, whose departure from Libava was assigned to 15 in January 1905. The preparation of ships for sailing was carried out in the port of Emperor Alexander III, where, to speed up the work, to which, at the request of the manager of the Maritime Ministry m. Admiral F. K. Avelan, Emperor Nicholas II allowed to allocate 2 000 000,00 rubles. More than a thousand and a half workers of state-owned and private factories were assembled.

"Ushakov" was introduced into the dock, where the underwater part was cleaned and reddened, the sides, pipes and superstructures were covered with black paint. In the course of partial modernization from Mars, who lost part of the structure, they dismantled ten 37-mm single-barreled Hotchkiss cannons, placing instead two Maxim machine guns with shields; on the spardek, instead of the six Hotchkis 37-mm five-barrel guns, Hotchkis installed four Hotchkis 47-mm guns without shields. They removed jewelry from the bow and stern, dismantled the bow and stern torpedo tubes, and also removed the throwing torpedo tubes from the steam boats. Thanks to these and a number of other activities, the construction overload of the battleship in 468 tons was reduced by about one hundred tons.

In addition to the GUKiS, the Obukhov Plant manufactured six new 120-mm guns, two of which were replaced by the most worn out ones at Admiral Ushakov.

Four rangefinders were delivered to the battleship: two that were withdrawn from the artillery class of the Baltic Fleet training and artillery detachment (presumably one FA 2 from Barr and Stroud and one from Carl Zeiss) and two companies “Barr and Stroud” of the last modification FA 3 (start of production in 1903), as well as the Belgian handheld optical rangefinders manufactured by the Fabrique Nationale Herstal Liège factory (fact not mentioned in domestic sources). The 120 mm and 10 caliber guns were obtained by the Perepyolkin’s Russian optical sights (Lieutenant Ya. N. Perepyolkin). Also, Admiral Ushakov installed the Slaby-Arco wireless system of the Telefunken Society, developed by Dr. A. Slaby (Adolf KH Slaby) and his collaborator Count G. von Arco (Georg Graf von Arco). Based on the 80 shells on the barrel, for the "Admiral Ushakov" 320 10 "shells were released (including 92 armor piercing, high explosive 198, 30 segment), of which only 300 fit on the ship. 840 120-mm cartridges were also loaded (on 210 per barrel), of which 200 was with armor-piercing projectiles, 480 with high-explosive and 160 with segment.



Due to delays caused by workers' strikes, incited by agitators funded from abroad, as well as by difficult weather conditions, the Separate Detachment took place only on February 3 1905.

In the course of the artillery study that continued during the march, both barreled and caliber shooting were carried out. 28 March 1905 in the Gulf of Aden was the first training squad shooting, from each gun of the main caliber four shots of high-explosive shells were made at once. Two weeks later, the training was continued, and the battleship's 10 guns fired four more shells, and three days later, during the loading of coal, the ammunition spent on training firing was replenished from the transport ships accompanying the detachment. Thus, as of the beginning of the Tsushima battle, the guns of the main caliber "Admiral Ushakov" fired around 504 shots. Looking ahead, we note that, as follows from the testimony of the senior navigator officer, Lieutenant E. A. Maximov, 4, 14, in May, 1905, the battleship fired another 200 operating time, up to 10. From the 704-mm guns, according to the same information, about 120 shells were fired during the battle. Consequently, "Admiral Ushakov" joined the battle with two armored cruisers, having an average of 400 shots per gun of the main caliber. At the same time, according to the standards of the ITC, the survivability of the barrel 176 "gun" was 10 combat shots on the barrel (which looks unreasonably optimistic against the background, for example, the rate of one hundred combat shots for the American 10 "/ 40 MkIII guns, mounted on Tennessee-type armored cruisers), and 120-mm - 1 000. This could not but affect the wear of the barrels, which led to a loss of speed of the projectile and a change in its ballistic characteristics.

Operating wear imposed on structural and manufacturing defects of guns. Back in 1900, on Admiral Ushakov, there were failures of hydraulic drives of tower installations. In the 1901 campaign, the wear of the 10 hydraulic drives of the Admiral Ushakov units became apparent, with the absence of servomotors for lifting mechanisms, this made it impossible to accurately target the guns. Unfortunately, excessively “lightweight” guns and their machines had insufficient strength, which forced them to reduce the powder charge from 65,5 to 56 kg of smokeless powder, as a result of which the initial velocity of the 225-kg projectile decreased from 778-792 to 695 m / s. In addition, the permitted angle of elevation was limited, which, coupled with a reduced powder charge, led to a decrease in the real firing range.

26 On April 1905, the ships of Nebogatov joined the squadron of Rozhestvensky, passing 83 of the day around 12 000 miles. In the 14 daytime battle of May 1905, the Admiral Ushakov walked to the end of the battleship in the wake of the battleships, closing the 3 armored squadronflag of the junior flagship of Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov).

During the Tsushima battle the battleship, bypassing the damaged "Emperor Alexander III", received an 8 "projectile" on the starboard side in the 15 area of ​​the frame near the waterline, as a result of which the entire nasal compartment of the residential deck was filled with water. The next projectile, caliber 6 '', hit the board at the waterline level, opposite the bow tower. As a result, three people were killed, one was mortally wounded, another four were seriously injured. If the first hole was managed to be sealed with a tree and sailors' bunks, then the second one, with a diameter of about 90, see, caused flooding of the entire nasal compartment to the 10 frame. It was not possible to close it up without locking the car and not stopping fire from the tower. The third projectile (of unknown caliber), hitting the aft tower, shook it pretty hard, leaving a deep dent in the vertical armor and sprinkling the deck and the wall of the spardek with shards. By fragments of one of the projectile exploded in the vicinity of the ship, the wireless telegraph was put out of operation and the gaff was shot down; during the day, the crew lost four dead and as many wounded.

Having flooded the nasal compartment, the battleship was heavily buried with its nose, so on the sea swell at maximum speed the Ushakov could give no more than 10 turn points, as a result of which he lagged behind the other ships led by Emperor Nicholas I and developed the speed 12-12,5 knots. At the meeting in the mess-room, it was unanimously decided to continue the journey to Vladivostok, trying to catch up with the departed connection.

On the morning of 15 on May 1905, the units of the United Fleet, drifting 26 miles south of Takeshima Island, performed the bonus tasks and controlled the ships that had surrendered to the Nebogatov detachment. In 14: 00, a smoke was observed from an observation post on the Iwate mast on the south side. An hour later, the ship was identified as a battleship of coastal defense of the Admiral Senyavin type, with clearly distinguishable pipes. In 15: 24 from the flagship of the 2 Fighting Division of the cruiser "Idzumo" to the cruiser "Iwate" (flag of rear admiral Shimamura Hayao) and "Yakumo" received an order to pursue the Russian battleship. Even before chasing him, Admiral Ushakov turned back and began to go south.

The Japanese cruisers developed eighteen knots and some time later the battleship was again discovered 60 miles west of Oka Island. While reducing the distance to eight miles, the Japanese, carrying out a telegraph order from “Mikasa”, tried to persuade the enemy's ship to surrender, raising to 17: 10 (time is hereafter japanese) signal in English "Your admiral surrended, I would advise you to surrender", which can be translated roughly as "Your admiral has surrendered, I advise you also to surrender." In 17: 30, when the distance between the opponents was about five miles, the Japanese, who were convinced that the Russian battleship was not going to capitulate, opened fire on him. Admiral Ushakov opened fire and returned fire.

After the first four shots, the hydraulic horizontal guidance of the bow turret failed, they tried to rotate it manually, but since the 180 ° tower was turning in 20 minutes, shooting from it became very rare. At the same time, the stern tower continued to fire. The battery fire had to be stopped periodically, since the combat distance exceeded the firing range of 120-mm guns. Ten minutes after the start of the battle, the 8 caliber projectile hit the side against the nose tower and made a big hole at the waterline, as a result of which the steady roll on the starboard began to increase, which negatively affected the maximum angle of the main caliber guns. The fatal role was played here by the fact that the Ushakov fight had to be fought with a right-wing board that was damaged in the Tsushima battle.

In 17: 45, the Japanese cruisers increased their turn, completing the “all suddenly” turn by two points to the left, reduced the distance to Ushakov in the bearing structure. An 6 '' projectile hit the battery and the right nasal 120-mm gun of the ship was disabled. In 17: The 59 towers were jammed due to the incessant roll, the guns of the battleship fell silent, and a minute later the Japanese, who were at that time at a distance of about four miles from the Russians, again made an "all of a sudden" turn two rumba to the right, lined up in a wake column and having moved in an arc, with the speed of 14-15, the nodes went towards rapprochement with the enemy, continuing to fire at it. Another one or two shells hit the battleship 6 caused a fire and an explosion of three pavilions with 120-mm cartridges. A fire started in the battery, the side paneling and lockers in the residential deck caught fire. The last to hit the ship was a 8 projectile, which had turned the mess around. Having exhausted all possibilities for resistance, at the beginning of the seventh, the Kingstones were opened on the battleship, the team received an order to "save". According to the observations of the Japanese, in 18: 07 the ship leaving the stern under the water sucked in smoke from explosions, and in 18: 10 it turned over to starboard and disappeared under water.

Approaching the place of death in half an hour, the Japanese began rescue work. For two days of fighting, the irreparable losses of the battleship were six officers, three conductors and 74 lower ranks.

According to the fragmentary testimony of crew members, on May 15 of 1905, two 8 projectiles and two or three 6 were hit by Admiral Ushakov. According to the Japanese observer, reflected in the scheme from the “Top Secret stories Russo-Japanese War at Sea in 37-38 Meiji, three 8 and three 6 shells hit the body of the battleship; in addition, both pipes received five to six hits of an unidentified caliber.


The distribution of hits received 15 May 1905 g. (reconstruction of the author)

According to available information, there is reason to believe that in total for two days of fighting, 3-4 8 '', 4 6 '' and six-seven 6 '-8' 'caliber hit the Admiral Ushakov (for comparison, after the rise of the Varyag 8 in August 1905, the Japanese, after examining the cruiser, found traces of 11 hits - 3 8 "and 8 6").

The battleship, as follows from the testimony of Lieutenant E. A. Maximov, 4, managed to launch at the enemy about 30 10 "and 60 120-mm projectiles against the total 89 8" and 278 6 "projectiles in the Japanese (armored cruiser «Iwate» spent 47 8 '' and the 160 6 '' explosive shells, «Yakumo» 21 21 high-explosive and armor-piercing shell 8 caliber '', as well as demolition and 59 59 6 armor-piercing '' shells).

It is unlikely that the top naval commanders, emanating from the pre-war ideas about the distances that were to be fought and driven into the corner of the current situation inside the country and on the front lines of the war with Japan, did not realize that the guns on the verge of wear 10 would bring little benefits in combat with the Japanese.

Obviously, sending three battleships of the Admiral Senyavin type to the theater of military operations was a measure designed to appease public opinion excited by the widely published articles of the captain 2 rank N. L. Klado about the insufficiency of forces of Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky and wearing frankly demagogic nature, and to a certain extent, strengthen the 2-th Pacific squadron, which lost the opportunity to get reinforcements at the expense of the port-Arthur ships.

Despite the presence on the armored ships of the coastal defense of improved optical sights and significant, even by English standards, the number of modern means of determining distances (for comparison, in the Tsushima battle on the battleship “Mikasa” the distance to the enemy was determined using only one FA 2 rangefinder, made in 1902, and served by Ensign K. Hasegawa), mainly due to the deterioration of the barrels of the main-caliber guns, the latter could not adequately prove themselves in battle, and the high-explosive projectile containing 10 kg of pyroxylin was the most powerful in the Russian naval artillery in terms of the quantity and quality of the explosiveRussian 12 "high-explosive projectile contained 6,631 kg of smokeless powder). About the accuracy of the fire of eleven 10 "guns, fired in total about five hundred shells (calculated on combat reports and testimony in the investigative commission), including “General-Admiral Apraksin” - 130, “Admiral Senyavin” - 170 and “Admiral Ushakov” - 200, can be judged by the absence in the main Japanese sources of explicit references to getting 10 'shells from the Japanese ships. For comparison, during the 28 battle on July 1904, the battleships Pobeda and Peresvet from eight 10 "shells fired 224 shells (69 armor-piercing and 155 high-explosive), from them to the Japanese ships ("Mikasa" and "Nisshin") got at least four.



Place of death of the battleship coastal defense "Admiral Ushakov" (marked by a cross) on the map of sentinel sites mentioned by Novikov-Surf in the novel “Tsushima”:

«We didn’t assume how the Japanese had foreseen everything, and didn’t know that even in the evening Admiral of Togo ordered all the combat ships to gather by the morning at the island of Dagelet, and that the whole Sea of ​​Japan was covered with a continuous and uninterrupted network of high-speed Japanese intelligence officers.

Subsequently, when after the death of “Ushakov” we were picked up by enemy cruisers, the Japanese officers showed a map of the Sea of ​​Japan with the designation of the areas of operation of each scout, and we really had to make sure that our Ushakov was out of control from the magic ring
».

By the way, judging by the place of death, "Ushakov" managed to pass unnoticed by the sentinel ships of the Japanese.

Used sources and literature
1. A number of memories of the crew of the battleship "Admiral Ushakov."
2. V. Yu. Gribovsky, I. I. Chernikov. Battleship "Admiral Ushakov."
3. Top Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War at Sea in 37 — 38 Meiji.
4. M. Moss and I. Russell. Range and vision. The first hundred years of Barr & Stroud.
Author:
129 comments
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  1. heavy division
    heavy division 12 May 2018 06: 00
    +4
    Nice ship, Mikluha-Maclay - hero
    1. avt
      avt 12 May 2018 07: 52
      +9
      Quote: Heavy Division
      Mikluha-Maclay - hero

      Undoubtedly.
      Quote: Heavy Division
      Good ship

      Not only were they kicked out with defects, but in general they did it as an armadillo of the COASTAL defense, who simply wasn’t adapted to take part in missiles with combat mission. And if, instead of chants, take it carefully to examine the materiel, this project was .... to put it mildly, not entirely successful.
      "It was a victory of the spirit."
      Emperor Nicholas II
      This is a "victory", but in fact the death of those sent to battle with useless weapons, entirely on Nikolashka and his mosquito.
      1. heavy division
        heavy division 12 May 2018 09: 52
        +5
        I read and not chants, believe me.
        There was a good ship for coastal defense in the 1890s. All is well in due time in its place. "Admiral Kuznetsov" is also far from new, and nothing. It is important - to the place and in strength.
      2. tred
        tred 12 May 2018 12: 11
        +1
        Quote: avt
        This is a "victory", but in fact the death of those sent to battle with useless weapons, entirely on Nikolashka and his mosquito.

        Actually, Ushakov’s participation in Tsushima was organized by Rozhdestvensky. Perhaps Nikolai was not even in the know.
        1. Comrade
          13 May 2018 04: 26
          +2
          Quote: tred
          Actually, Ushakov’s participation in Tsushima was organized by Rozhdestvensky. Perhaps Nikolai was not even in the know.

          You are wrong, we read Russian officialdom. Can you refute with documents on hand?
    2. Hole puncher
      Hole puncher 12 May 2018 10: 18
      +2
      Quote: heavy division
      Nice ship, Mikluha-Maclay - hero

      He’s just Mikluha, only his brother wore the prefix Maclay
    3. tred
      tred 12 May 2018 12: 09
      0
      Quote: Heavy Division
      Good ship

      That, yes. Very good.
      Quote: Heavy Division
      Mikluha-Maclay - hero

      For this "figure" one should choose a more correct term.
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 12 May 2018 06: 48
    +5
    Sailors and officers fought with dignity and to the end.
    Losing is not their fault.
    Everlasting memory...
    1. tred
      tred 12 May 2018 12: 15
      0
      Quote: Olgovich
      Sailors and officers fought with dignity and to the end.

      What is it like? Substituting a padded board and never hitting the Japanese?
  3. kvs207
    kvs207 12 May 2018 07: 05
    +3
    "Used sources and literature
    1. A number of memories of the crew of the battleship "Admiral Ushakov."
    2. V. Yu. Gribovsky, I.I. Chernikov. Battleship Admiral Ushakov. "

    I have in my library both Tsushima Novikov-Priboy and Armadillo Admiral Ushakov of Gribovsky and Chernikov and Kostenko (first edition) on the Eagle in Tsushima. I always admired the exploits of Russian sailors. I respect the author.
    1. tred
      tred 12 May 2018 12: 17
      +1
      Quote: kvs207
      I always admired the exploits of Russian sailors.

      Could you elaborate on this subject?
      For example, I would like to see a list of these exploits. Do not be difficult to lay out?
      1. shura7782
        shura7782 12 May 2018 14: 20
        +15
        .
        Quote: tred
        Quote: kvs207
        I always admired the exploits of Russian sailors.

        Could you elaborate on this subject?
        For example, I would like to see a list of these exploits. Do not be difficult to lay out?

        It would not go awry.
        But you are regularly banned from the forum. Here you are one-day - shit and disappear.
        So, I don’t advise others to talk with you about anything
        1. tred
          tred 12 May 2018 14: 28
          +1
          Quote: shura7782
          It would not go awry.

          Yes Yes. And I also know that you are shaking shoes and underpants.
          1. Golovan Jack
            Golovan Jack 12 May 2018 14: 40
            +11
            Quote: tred
            Yes

            The last time I won ice cream in a debate about the duration of your existence here.
            So I think - is it worth arguing on something more substantial, or not already?
            How about a week, this time? wink
  4. bionik
    bionik 12 May 2018 07: 06
    +4
    The battleship of the coastal defense "Admiral Ushakov" at sea.
  5. unknown
    unknown 12 May 2018 07: 13
    +3
    The battleship had serious problems not only in artillery, but also in the CMU.
    But this does not mean that BWOs of this type could not effectively resist the Asam.
    It was the fire of the BWO that disabled Tokivu.
    In addition, do not forget that the Nebogatov detachment was formed later than the main forces, and the shells of this detachment were not defective.
    Before the battle and in the battle, Nebogatov behaved treacherously. 1. Allegedly, the breakdown of Senyavin cars carried the passage of the strait from the night the next day 2. The unauthorized radio game Senyavina allowed the Japanese to clarify the location of the Russian squadron. 3. In the battle Nebogatov “could not hold on” to the main forces. And it is at a speed of 9 knots. Which, in fact, precluded the participation of his detachment in the battle of the main forces. 4. Passed ships to the enemy.
    1. tred
      tred 12 May 2018 12: 21
      0
      Quote: ignoto
      and the shells of this detachment were not defective.

      Quote: ignoto
      Before the battle and in the battle, Nebogatov behaved treacherously.

      Gee-gee-gee.
      Quote: ignoto
      Which, in fact, precluded the participation of his detachment in the battle of the main forces.

      And what was he to do next to them? Did he somehow help them?
      Quote: ignoto
      Passed ships to the enemy.

      I did it right.
      What else could he do? Die for old iron?
      Although the ships, of course, had to be lowered and escaped on boats and improvised means.
      1. saigon
        saigon 17 June 2018 07: 12
        0
        For some, there are concepts that are not accessible to the mind, for example, the conscience and honor of a soldier.
        Escaping at improvised means is theirs and your destiny.
  6. Amurets
    Amurets 12 May 2018 07: 44
    +3
    Due to delays caused by workers' strikes, incited by agitators funded from abroad, as well as by difficult weather conditions, the Separate Detachment took place only on February 3 1905.

    Where did the author get about the strikes financed from abroad? It would be necessary to give links. But Chernikov and Gribovsky wrote that there was enough of their own naval mess. Scandal added articles of the captain of the second rank Klado See BRBO "Admiral Ushakov". But NN Dmitriev, senior artillery officer, participant in the campaign and battle of Admiral Ushakov, writes about the artillery of the battleship:
    1. Comrade
      13 May 2018 04: 33
      +1
      Quote: Amurets
      Where did the author get about the strikes financed from abroad?

      Not strikes, but agitators. You can find out who paid them by scoring the following text on google: financing from abroad of the 1905 revolution
      There, the Japanese General Staff paid, and the American Russophobia bankers.

      Quote: Amurets
      But NN Dmitriev, senior artillery officer, participant in the campaign and battle of Admiral Ushakov, writes about the artillery of the battleship:

      There is no information in the text that NN Dmitriev checked the condition of the internal cavity of the guns of the main caliber. Wear is there.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 13 May 2018 19: 41
        +1
        Quote: Comrade
        There is no information in the text that NN Dmitriev checked the condition of the internal cavity of the guns of the main caliber. Wear is there.

        You think the factory did not guess to look inside the barrel, just painted? :)
  7. geniy
    geniy 12 May 2018 09: 04
    +3
    Unfortunately, the author of this article, Valentin Maltsev, like all other authors who write about the battles of the Russian-Japanese war. There are a significant number of errors in describing the places where the Japanese shells hit. Maltsev’s reconstruction of the places where the shells hit is especially erroneous, since the literary description of the places of the hits does not correspond to the graphic drawing. And besides, neither the author of this article, nor other readers are aware of the real ratio of booking and the impact of shells.
    Firstly: before the Russo-Japanese War, the axiom reigned in all fleets - that without piercing the armor of the main belt of any armored ship, it is allegedly impossible in principle to be sunk by any number of artillery shells that hit it, but only by torpedoes or ramming. And considering that in the first place: even armor-piercing 203 mm Japanese shells from long distances, in principle, could not penetrate the Admiral Ushakov’s armor, and even more so the Japanese high-explosive shells did not penetrate the armor, even if such a rule were fulfilled, then even such a small battleship would in comparison with two ten-thousand-cruisers, in principle, it could not be sunk by them, which means if you follow the formal rule, the battleship Admiral Ushakov was stronger than both armored cruisers together. But in reality, we see the exact opposite, and most importantly, that all ignoramuses - lovers of military history do not even think about this paradox!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 09: 40
      +9
      Quote: geniy
      Maltsev’s reconstruction of the places where the shells hit is especially erroneous, since the literary description of the places of the hits does not correspond to the graphic drawing.

      Again we will fantasize on the subject of hits in the "Eagle"? Last time wasn’t enough?
      Quote: geniy
      And besides, neither the author of this article, nor other readers are aware of the real ratio of booking and the impact of shells.

      Interesting
      Quote: geniy
      Firstly: before the Russo-Japanese War, the axiom reigned in all fleets - that without piercing the armor of the main belt of any armored ship, it is supposedly impossible to drown in principle by any number of artillery shells that hit it, but only by torpedoes or ramming

      First - the march to learn materiel. Just before the REV, the prevailing opinion was that medium-range rapid-firing guns (152-203 mm), firing with high-explosive shells, are capable of riddling the unarmored ends of armadillos so that they go to the bottom with an unbroken armored belt. That is why the most modern armadillos of the pre-Ryav era received a solid reservation from the stems to the stakes, which was supposed to protect them from rapid-firing artillery.
      Quote: geniy
      and most importantly, all ignoramuses are lovers of military history

      Baby, you, before you call someone ignoramuses first learn at least the basics of what you undertake to talk about
      1. tred
        tred 12 May 2018 12: 36
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Just before the REV, the prevailing opinion was that medium-range rapid-firing guns (152-203 mm), firing with high-explosive shells, were capable of riddling the unarmored ends of armadillos so that they would sink to the bottom with an unbroken armor belt.

        These are your inventions. Which you have repeatedly pointed out.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        That is why the most modern armadillos of the pre-Ryav era received a solid reservation from the stems to the stakes, which was supposed to protect them from rapid-firing artillery.

        You can tell this nonsense (and constantly tell) only to profane in RuNet. In fact, only the unsuccessful Russian battleships made on the basis of the FAILURE French Tsesarevich project carried a solid reservation during the REV.
        Moreover, it was the second "Russian mop." For the first time they stepped on it, building Nicholas I and Alexander II. But the lesson didn’t go for the future, then there was Tsesarevich.
        The Japanese did not have a single ship with a full reservation. Only citadel and traverse. And indeed, in the world at that time armadillos of continuous reservation were not mass-built. Only trial models. And even that, only those who understood little in the maritime industry.
        The days of ships with full armor came later, when coal and steam engines left. And free weight for the armor.
        In addition, the 8 "caliber was the main, not the average caliber. The average (anti-cruising) caliber was 120-152 mm guns.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        before you call someone ignoramus first learn at least the basics of what you undertake to talk about

        Do not remind you of this. You yourself are in the basics of maritime affairs, like in three pines.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 16: 21
          +7
          Quote: tred
          In fact, only the unsuccessful Russian battleships made on the basis of the FAILURE French Tsesarevich project carried a solid reservation during the REV.

          That is, neither the French nor the Germans did not build such? :)))))) Nikolai, you surpassed yourself.
          1. tred
            tred 12 May 2018 17: 02
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            That is, neither the French nor the Germans did not build one? :)

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            And indeed, in the world at that time armadillos of continuous reservation were not mass-built. Only trial models. And even that, only those who understood little in the maritime industry.

            What religion does not allow to read the written?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 19: 16
              +5
              Quote: tred
              What religion does not allow to read the written?

              Read from the beginning
              Quote: tred
              The Japanese did not have a single ship with a full reservation. Only citadel and traverse.


              Oh!

              oh her!
              And here is the German serial battleship Kaiser Friedrich 3 with an all-or-nothing booking scheme

              Oh! But further - worse - Wittelsbach-type armadillos

              Experimental series, Nikolai? Maybe the Germans understood little in maritime affairs?
              Okay. But armadillos like Charlemagne - how are they? Experimental? All three? Or did the French also understand nothing in naval affairs?
    2. tred
      tred 12 May 2018 12: 27
      +2
      Quote: geniy
      Before the Russo-Japanese War, the axiom reigned in all fleets - that without piercing the armor of the main belt of any armored ship, it is allegedly impossible, in principle, to drown by any number of artillery shells that hit it, but only by torpedoes or ramming.

      Here it is necessary to clarify an important contraption - IF THESE SHIPS WERE NOT OVERLOADED. But Ushakov was overloaded. Coal and sea water, which he has accumulated due to the initial coal overload.
      In addition, GP Ushakova could have been hit by Japanese 8 "guns already starting from 40 cabs.
      1. Nehist
        Nehist 12 May 2018 14: 46
        +8
        Respected! Really go mate part get !!! The Sino-Japanese war just proved that fast-firing guns even damage armored ships, as the battle at the mouth of the Yalu River showed on September 17, 1894
        1. tred
          tred 12 May 2018 15: 51
          0
          Quote: Nehist
          The Sino-Japanese war just proved that fast-firing guns even damage armored ships, as the battle at the mouth of the Yalu River showed on September 17, 1894

          Do not retell me runet tales. I know them by heart.
          And learn why armadillos needed an auxiliary caliber.
          1. Nehist
            Nehist 12 May 2018 16: 13
            +9
            Respected!!! This accessible information was long before the appearance of the Runet and the Internet in general! You at least read the journal Marine collection published in imperial Russia for a change and your own development
            1. avt
              avt 12 May 2018 17: 03
              +7
              Quote: Nehist
              This accessible information was long before the appearance of the Runet and the Internet in general!

              Anyway pah ..... that is
              Quote: tred
              Gee-gee-gee

              Well, the right word, as much as possible!? It’s said
              Do not give sanctuary to the dogs and do not throw your pearls before the pigs, so that they do not trample it under their feet and, turning, do not tear you to pieces
            2. tred
              tred 12 May 2018 17: 05
              +1
              Quote: Nehist
              This accessible information was long before the appearance of the Runet and the Internet in general!

              Distinguish information from idle chatter.
              Quote: Nehist
              You at least read the journal Marine collection published in imperial Russia for a change and your own development

              Yes Yes. In Russia, there have always been great masters of maritime affairs. Naval commanders, so to speak. Only somehow, they always had disastrous results. And so, very versed in everything. And the conclusions were always made right, guessing the future at 100%. One series of "Borodino" worth.
          2. Nehist
            Nehist 12 May 2018 16: 23
            +8
            Well, if the battle at Yalu is not enough for you, then here is another example for you. The battle of Santiago de Cuba where the American EDB only achieved two hits with the main caliber. All Spanish DBKs were sunk precisely by fire by medium-caliber artillery. And in general there is a mass of information that appeared before the Runet and the Internet. Read the magazine Marine collection published in imperial Russia. Maybe then you stop talking nonsense on some points
            1. tred
              tred 12 May 2018 17: 19
              +1
              Quote: Nehist
              All Spanish DBK

              And what does DBK have to do with the EDB? DBK do not participate in linear battles, only the EDB.
              Do you understand how DBK differs from the EDB?
              I clearly see that no, you don’t understand.
              In addition, somewhere around the beginning 20 in the EDB (and not only them) began to be densely covered with armor SURFACE. Just for protection against mines and artillery of medium caliber. Therefore, what is interesting for the late 19th century was not interesting for the beginning of the 20th century.
              The Japanese were weakly armored precisely from the top were Azuma (but went faster than all the other DBKs), Asama / Tokiva, Fuji / Yashima, Nissin / Kasuga. And that’s all.
        2. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 12 May 2018 23: 36
          +2
          Sorry, but it's exactly the opposite. The Chinese battleships successfully survived this battle and returned to the port pretty plucked but undefeated.
          1. Nehist
            Nehist 13 May 2018 01: 23
            0
            The eagle also survived Tsushima the whole question in what form ?! To disable a ship, it is not necessary to sink it
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 13 May 2018 19: 43
              +1
              However, the Chinese battleships were ready to continue the battle, but the Japanese cruisers were gone.
    3. mmaxx
      mmaxx 12 May 2018 13: 14
      0
      Yeah, damn it. A boat of 4600 tons with a displacement is fucking stronger than two armored cruisers of more than 10000 tons each. Compare the sizes. Although I would like to understand that 100-200 tons of water taken in relation to a displacement of more than two times more are completely different things.
      1. geniy
        geniy 12 May 2018 15: 09
        +1
        You see, in battles at sea, the size of the ship is far from a determining factor. That is, under certain conditions, a very small boat can defeat a large one, or at least get out of the battle.
        Suffice it to recall the success of torpedo boats that sank the dreadnought Viribus Unitis, or the U-9 submarine that sank three English armored cruisers. I don’t know if I can get to the comparison of the battle of the small Argentinean Guascar monitor (with a displacement of about 1200 tons) that withstood the artillery battle with two large English cruisers.
        1. tred
          tred 12 May 2018 15: 53
          +1
          Quote: geniy
          Suffice it to recall the success of torpedo boats that sank the dreadnought Viribus Unitis, or the U-9 submarine that sank three English armored cruisers.

          The shell from the torpedo should be distinguished.
    4. Comrade
      13 May 2018 04: 41
      +3
      Quote: geniy
      the author of this article, Valentina Maltseva, like all other authors writing about the battles of the Russo-Japanese war. There are a significant number of errors in describing the places where the Japanese shells hit.

      It is quite possible, therefore, saying "A", please be so kind as to say "B". Lay out your version of the distribution of hits in the “Admiral Ushakov”, of course, with the sources, where it came from.
      Quote: geniy
      Maltsev’s reconstruction of the places where the shells hit is especially erroneous, since the literary description of the places of the hits does not correspond to the graphic drawing.

      This does not matter, this often happens when a writer writes one thing (Stepanov, Novikov-Priboy, Pikul), but in life there was another.
      Nobody dived into the battleship, crew members left vague descriptions of what it was impossible to blame, of course.
      But thanks to the Japanese archive, we can see a diagram made by a Japanese observer. Special thanks to him for being so meticulous that he also made it possible to evaluate the roll angle of Ushakov.
      so, it remains for me to take the drawing of an armadillo and put on it, by small tricks, the hits brought by the Japanese.
      Quote: geniy
      And considering that in the first place: even the armor-piercing 203-mm Japanese shells from long distances, in principle, could not penetrate the Admiral Ushakov’s armor, and even more so the Japanese high-explosive shells did not penetrate the armor, if this rule were fulfilled, then even such a small battleship would compared with two ten thousand cruisers, in principle, could not be sunk by them

      You are breaking through the open door, where it is said to me that the Japanese sank Admiral Ushakov. Let me remind you that the ship went under water, like the valiant “Rurik”, due to the discovery of kingstones.
  8. geniy
    geniy 12 May 2018 09: 27
    +2
    The second paradox of the Tsushima battle is that most Russians (and some Japanese ships) greatly reduced their speed as a result of shells entering the unarmoured bow of the side, which had the usual thickness of the skin. The paradox is that before the war, all authorities certainly considered it very important to protect only the middle part of the ship’s side - that is, the system was used on most armored ships "all or nothing", that is, the thickest armor exclusively in the middle part, designed to withstand the largest shells that the alleged enemy can release. And at the same time, it was believed that since the boiler rooms and engine rooms were located in the middle part, then protecting them with thick armor, no armored ship would reduce its speed from enemy shells, since boilers and cars would still remain in good condition. But in reality, we see from the results of the Tsushima battle that a lot of Russian ships lost their course and were sunk even without a single penetration of the thick armor of the armor belt, and which did not have any shells entering the engine and boiler rooms.
    For example, the battleship "Oslyabya" immediately after the first hits in the bow reduced speed and almost completely stopped, while it had a huge trim on the nose. The battleship "Sisoy the Great" had a hit in the front and slowed down, the battleship Navarin also received shells in the bow, and the battleship Admiral Ushakov "received only 2 shells in the bow in the first battle, which immediately slowed down.
    The fact is that if a ship receives a large area hole in the bow from a high-explosive projectile, then there is not a simple flooding of the premises, but also the so-called high-speed water pressure, which presses on all underwater parts of the transverse bulkheads and threatens to break them, and from -for this it is necessary to reduce the course, despite the properly functioning boilers and machines. Amateurs, of course, do not know that water pressure increases and decreases in proportion to the speed of the water flow. That is, if you reduce the speed, for example, by 1,5 times, then the water pressure through the hole on the nasal bulkheads will immediately drop 2,25 times. And it was precisely the holes in the unarmored part of the nasal tip of the Russian battleships that made them slow down with intact boilers and vehicles. Therefore, the reservation system "all or nothing" is wrecking, and its use on most armored battleships and cruisers shows the stupidity of admirals. It is imperative to reserve at least thin armor and the fore and aft ends of the ships.
    1. tred
      tred 12 May 2018 13: 06
      +1
      Quote: geniy
      But in reality, we see from the results of the Tsushima battle that a lot of Russian ships lost their course and were sunk even without a single penetration of the thick armor of the armor belt, and which did not have any shells entering the engine and boiler rooms.

      Everything is simple - because of overloading, the volume of over-storage facilities increased, which was absolutely impossible to do. But Rozhdestvensky apparently was not aware of such details. He was generally not aware of a lot of things. Although it was considered almost the light of the naval affairs of the Republic of Ingushetia.
      As soon as the ship of the citadel type (this is a general rule) received a hole in the storage room, while being overloaded, it actually became not a tenant. And they were all overwhelmed before Tsushima. Therefore, any Japanese ship with its medium caliber could sink the Russian ship of the citadel reservation (except for Retvizan and Gromoboy).
      Solid booking ships have a slightly different story. At the same time, Alexander and Borodino were sunk by armor-piercing shells unambiguously.
      Quote: geniy
      but also the so-called high-speed water pressure

      Yes Yes. Water flowed "fast jack."
      1. Comrade
        13 May 2018 04: 43
        +2
        Quote: tred
        Alexander and Borodino were sunk by armor-piercing shells definitely.

        Then you forgot to attribute IMHO. You have no evidence.
    2. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 12 May 2018 23: 31
      +1
      If you forget, the battleship Oslyabya stopped as a result of Rozhestvensky’s “brilliant” maneuvering and yes, then he was shot dead.
  9. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 09: 44
    +7
    Greetings, dear colleague!
    I read it with great interest and pleasure, thanks! I must say that nevertheless the series of our BWOs was still ... a refuge. According to TK, the ship was supposed to support our EDB in the battle with the German fleet, that is, to fight in line. The ship sank from
    3-4 8 '', 4 6 '' and six to seven shells of 6 '' - 8 '' caliber

    despite the fact that he lost combat effectiveness even earlier
    1. Comrade
      13 May 2018 04: 48
      +3
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Greetings, dear colleague!

      Hello, Andrey, good to see you!
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      I read it with great interest and pleasure, thanks!

      I tried, it’s something like the cycle “The death of armadillos in the Tsushima battle”, part I :-)
      At the end of the month I will try to lay out the continuation.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      The ship sank from

      Not really, the kingstones were open there.
      By the way, you had an article about Blucher, what can you say about the fact that your humble servant revealed that the Germans had anticipated the Bismarck commander’s deed? The British were unable to "purely" drown the cruiser, on it were Kingstones.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 May 2018 16: 43
        +1
        Quote: Comrade
        Hello, Andrey, good to see you!

        Mutually, dear Valentine!
        Quote: Comrade
        At the end of the month I will try to lay out the continuation.

        We will wait with impatience :)
        Quote: Comrade
        Not really, the kingstones were open there.

        So yes, but by the time they were discovered the battleship had already lost its combat capability.
        Quote: Comrade
        By the way, you had an article about Blucher, what can you say about the fact that your humble servant revealed that the Germans had anticipated the Bismarck commander’s deed? The British were unable to "purely" drown the cruiser, on it were Kingstones.

        Yes, in general, nothing :)) The bottom line is that the commander, seeing the plight of the ship, can give the command "Everyone Upstairs," that is, "Save who can." However, in this case, in order to exclude any risk of the enemy capturing the ship, he should give the order to open the kingstones. Also, by the way, it was with Bismarck - it clearly follows from the description of Mullenheim-Rehberg that by the time the order to open the kingstones was given, the battleship was already drowning.
        In general, the presence of an order to open kingstons is not so much connected with the actual condition of the ship, but only with the decision of its commander to end the struggle for survivability and evacuation. To consider it from the perspective that “there was an order to open the kingstones means the enemy could not drown”, in my opinion, is wrong.
        1. Comrade
          13 May 2018 21: 46
          +2
          Dear Andrey!
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          We will wait with impatience :)

          I'll push it :-)

          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          To consider it from the perspective that “there was an order to open the kingstones means the enemy could not drown”, in my opinion, is wrong.

          Nevertheless, this is a considerable question of prestige for the British. I remember how much talk there was about the Bismarck open kingstones, a number of historians strongly rejected this. Ballard during a dive specifically Kingston tracked down and photographed, so that it was visible, they are open.
          With "Blucher" the same story, it is a matter of prestige primarily for the English side. They threshed so much, but could not sink, without opening the kingstones it could not have done.
          Here are the Americans, in some cases there is nothing to be ashamed of, even though they honestly sank the Japanese battleship with artillery fire. And maybe more, never really interested in this issue :-)
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 14 May 2018 09: 33
            +2
            Quote: Comrade
            Nevertheless, this is a considerable question of prestige for the British.

            Of course :)))) But this is a game for the public - formally, it turns out that Bismarck first feigned “The Mighty Hood”, shuganul Welsh, and then just drowned from contempt for the KVMF laughing
            At the same time, of course, the same Bismarck was already completely destroyed by the time Kingston was discovered. It’s just ... everything happens at sea. I remember the anecdotal case of the sinking of a half of a ship that broke during a storm and the EMNIP brought the stern to the US coast.
            The coast guard ship comes up. It places mines at the wreck that has turned upside down with a keel (it is necessary to heat it so that no one accidentally crashes). Undermining! Do not care for the wreckage. Post a second series of min. Undermining! Do not care for the wreckage. Third! It was useless, and the mines ran out :)))) The US ship opens fire from 127 mm guns. On the first hit .... the chip flips over again and stands on an even keel ... In general, they could not sink it, a day later it drowned itself - it slowly and proudly plunged into the abyss :))))
  10. Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 12 May 2018 10: 20
    +2
    + + +
    In vain, these little armadillos sent. And the second squadron did not really strengthen, and the ships lost. In WWI (with proper modernization, of course) there would be quite popular combat units. Say, shoot along the shore, especially in shallow water.
    1. Comrade
      13 May 2018 04: 49
      +3
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      + + +

      Thank you for your support and interest in the topic, colleague.
  11. geniy
    geniy 12 May 2018 10: 20
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Just before the REV, the prevailing opinion was that medium-range rapid-firing guns (152-203 mm), firing with high-explosive shells, were capable of riddling the unarmored ends of armadillos so that they would sink to the bottom with an unbroken armor belt.

    Tell me dear: for what reason should armored ships with an unbroken combat belt go to the bottom? (For other readers, I inform you that I personally know the secret of the flooding of armored ships, but no one except me knows it.)
    Indeed, in this way Andrei (along with me) actually accuses the stupid stupidity of all admirals who ordered to build ships according to the all-or-nothing booking scheme. And there were a huge number of such ships - more than according to another alternative scheme. For example, all American battleships such as Maryland, California, Idaho, Pennsylvania, Nevada and many others.
    Moreover, for example, the Chinese battleship "Chin Yen" in the battle of Yalu during the Sino-Japanese war did not sink, although it had several hundred shells hit. And although he was turned into a sieve, but he never had to break through the armor belt. So why didn't he drown? And Russian armadillos drowned in Tsushima, why?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 10: 43
      +3
      Quote: geniy
      Tell me dear: for what reason should armored ships with an unbroken combat belt go to the bottom?

      Due to the destruction of unarmored extremities, of course :)))
      Quote: geniy
      For the rest of the readers, I inform you that I personally know the secret of the flooding of armored ships, but no one except me knows it.

      To begin with, some "secrets" exist only in your mind - the whole world already knows about them :)))))
      Quote: geniy
      Indeed, in this way Andrei (along with me) actually accuses the stupid stupidity of all admirals who ordered to build ships according to the all-or-nothing booking scheme.

      No. I am only blaming you for stunning stupidity. And to say that - I do not blame, but simply stating a fact.
      Quote: geniy
      there were a huge number of such ships - more than in another alternative scheme

      Actually, of course, this is not so. The fact is that a lot of all-or-nothing ships were built BEFORE rapid-fire artillery appeared. In other words, it was like this - as long as the ships were not able to shower each other with a hail of shells (and this is necessary to destroy unarmored extremities), "all or nothing" worked perfectly. As soon as such an opportunity appeared, ALL countries took measures. For example, the French and Germans turned to the full protection of the side (from the bow to the bow). The British, although they kept the extremities uncovered by vertical armor, but protected them with carapace armored decks - in their opinion, such protection completely provided the extremities from flooding.
      So, the REV showed that the carp decks, in general, did not justify themselves and the ships did not protect themselves from flooding. But this does not make the British admirals fools - they saw the problem of hitting the extremities with land mines, they simply chose the wrong constructive solution to protect the ships from such fire.
      But then, with the advent of the all-big-gan concept and with the increase in battle distances, it was again unrealistic to fill a ship with a hail of shells. Therefore, they were born
      Quote: geniy
      battleships such as Maryland, California, Idaho, Pennsylvania, Nevada

      using all or nothing again. And I must say, as the practice of WWII showed, this was still the wrong decision.
      Generally speaking, these are the basics of Navy history
      Quote: geniy
      So why didn't he drown? And Russian armadillos drowned in Tsushima, why?

      It’s scary to even imagine what explanation will sound :))))))
      1. tred
        tred 12 May 2018 13: 10
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        So, the REV showed that the carp decks, in general, did not justify themselves and the ships did not protect themselves from flooding.

        Oh. And on what examples is this visible?
        Why are you inventing nonsense? Somehow, the Japanese did a great job with just such a reservation of their ships.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But this does not make the British admirals fools - they saw the problem of hitting the extremities with land mines, they simply chose the wrong constructive solution to protect the ships from such fire.

        Tell you who in this case is a fool?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 14: 46
          +4
          Quote: tred
          Oh. And on what examples is this visible?

          For example - Askold. And, of course, your beloved Retvisan, whom you with some happiness declared the ideal Russian EDB.
          Quote: tred
          Somehow, the Japanese did a great job with just such a reservation of their ships.

          For one simple reason - the Russians did not have normal high-explosive shells :)))
          Quote: tred
          Tell you who in this case is a fool?

          Do you seriously believe that I am interested in your opinion?
          1. tred
            tred 12 May 2018 16: 00
            +2
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            For example - Askold.

            Ah, Askold. Is Askold a squadron battleship?
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            And, of course, your beloved Retvisan, whom you with some happiness declared the ideal Russian EDB.

            And what is wrong with Retvisan?
            Yes, it was an EDB of a very good project. And even despite the fact that it was equipped with an EBR raider (smaller armor, more coal), it was still the strongest EDB RIF.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            For one simple reason - the Russians did not have normal high-explosive shells :)))

            What is the significance of high-explosive shells for the linear battle of normally built and loaded battleships?
            Exactly no. Your clucking around the mythical "furiosik", it is not worth a damn egg.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Do you seriously believe that I am interested in your opinion?

            You are more than interested in my opinion. This is how you draw information for yourself. In squabble mode. This is your style.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 16: 19
              +3
              Quote: tred
              Ah, Askold. Is Askold a squadron battleship?

              And what, in order to demonstrate the futility of the Karapas deck, an armadillo is necessary? As for me, any ship that has a ramp deck is enough :)))
              Quote: tred
              And what is wrong with Retvisan?

              Read what happened to him in LM when a shell damaged a 51 mm plate in the nasal extremity.
              Quote: tred
              What is the significance of high-explosive shells for the linear battle of normally built and loaded battleships?

              such that we are here, actually discussing the ability of the carp deck to prevent flooding caused by the destruction of the extremities under the impact of HE shells :))))
              Quote: tred
              You are more than interested in my opinion.

              Of course, of course :)))) You can no longer portray the felt dialogues with yourself from several accounts, well, at least so amuse your ego. Of course, Nikolai, everyone around you is really interested in your opinion, and that everyone is throwing rotten eggs at you - this is so, it’s not worth attention. But you have long become a little ignorant of facts that do not fit into your theories :)))
              1. tred
                tred 12 May 2018 17: 34
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And what, in order to demonstrate the futility of the Karapas deck, an armadillo is necessary? As for me, any ship that has a ramp deck is enough :)))

                In fact, for armored cruisers there was no alternative to Karapas. Therefore, do not get out, Askold you dragged in vain.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Read what happened to him in LM when a shell damaged a 51 mm plate in the nasal extremity.

                1. Exploded to a hairdryer.
                2. Drowned in terrible convulsions.
                3. There is nothing.
                I choose the third option, as historically true.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                we are here, actually discussing the ability of the carp deck to prevent flooding caused by the destruction of the extremities under the impact of high-explosive shells :))))

                So I ask you: What is the significance of linear battle normally built and loaded armadillos have high-explosive shells?
                The correct answer, absolutely none.
                In short:
                The success of the Japanese in the LM was a consequence of the death of Wittgeft and the outright cowardice of the gentlemen of the senior naval officers who were in that battle.
                The success of the Japanese under Tsushima was the result of an attempt to contrast the overloaded coal buckets with nuts with a normal EBR.
                The success of the CP in the Japanese was a consequence of the fact that Jessen valued himself, his beloved, more than anything else. While he covered himself with Thunderbolt, nothing significant happened. But as soon as he also covered himself with Rurik, the half-armored, in general, Rurik very quickly "did not make friends."
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                You can no longer portray self-felt dialogues with yourself from several accounts, at least so amuse your ego.

                As I understand it, you still have no arguments. So you decided to "write incriminating evidence" on me. Inventing one “fact” is more fantastic than another.
                Cheap.
                And uninteresting.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Of course, Nikolai, everyone around is actually interested

                Stop calling me Nicholas. Tired of it.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                and that all at the same time rotten eggs throw you

                Who are these mythical "all"? I personally do not see a single one.
                You are trying to squeeze something out of yourself. But you do not succeed, the qualifications are not enough. I don’t see anyone else. And I think I won’t see it.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 19: 25
                  +1
                  Quote: tred
                  In fact, for armored cruisers there was no alternative to Karapas. Therefore, do not get out, Askold you dragged in vain.

                  We have a ship with a ramp deck, which, alas, did not provide unsinkability not only against shells, but even against fallen shells next to the ship. If this is not proof, well, I don’t know what then is the proof
                  Quote: tred
                  I choose the third option, as historically true.

                  Write "as I like best", to be honest. And so, for those who are not in the know - it was really dangerous for the ship to go to Vladivostok
                  Quote: tred
                  So I ask you: What is the significance of high-explosive shells for the linear battle of normally built and loaded battleships?

                  And I answer - there is no need to feint and replace the subject of discussion.
                  Quote: tred
                  Stop calling me Nicholas. Tired of it.

                  Kolenka, don’t be nervous.
                  Quote: tred
                  Who are these mythical "all"? I personally do not see a single one.

                  Are you suddenly blinded? What a shame ... Or is it such a kind of humor that I’m on the Internet, and I don’t see those who write to me with my eyes?
    2. tred
      tred 12 May 2018 13: 08
      +1
      Quote: geniy
      For the rest of the readers, I inform you that personally I know the secret of the flooding of armored ships, but no one except me knows it.)

      This is about the "flowing rapid jack", I hope?)))
      Quote: geniy
      although he was turned into a sieve, but he never had to break through the armor belt. So why didn't he drown? And Russian armadillos drowned in Tsushima, why?

      Because the Russian battleships were overloaded.
    3. Comrade
      13 May 2018 04: 53
      +5
      Quote: geniy
      Tell me dear: for what reason should armored ships with an unbroken combat belt go to the bottom? (For other readers, I inform you that I personally know the secret of the flooding of armored ships, but no one except me knows it.)

      There is no secret, the battleship of the coastal defense "Admiral Ushakov" went under water because, that on it, by order of the commander, kingstones were discovered.
      Quote: geniy
      And Russian armadillos drowned in Tsushima, why?

      Each has its own reason.
  12. stafford41
    stafford41 12 May 2018 11: 43
    +1
    About the accuracy of the fire of eleven 10 "guns that fired a total of about five hundred shells (calculated from combat reports and testimony in the investigative commission), including" Admiral Apraksin "- 130," Admiral Senyavin "- 170 and" Admiral Ushakov "- 200, can be judged by the absence in the main Japanese sources of explicit references to the receipt of 10 '' shells by Japanese ships.


    But what about the second hit in the area of ​​Asama’s steering car with the destruction of the commander’s cabin and after it hit the starboard side in the area of ​​the command buffet, which the Japanese themselves refer to Meiji in 254 mm from Admiral General Apraksin?
    1. Comrade
      13 May 2018 04: 56
      +3
      Quote: Stafford41
      But what about the second hit in the area of ​​Asama’s steering car with the destruction of the commander’s cabin and after it hit the starboard side in the area of ​​the command buffet, which the Japanese themselves refer to Meiji in 254 mm from Admiral General Apraksin?

      Sorry, I don’t see where the caliber is indicated in Meiji?
    2. Comrade
      13 May 2018 05: 01
      +3
      Quote: Stafford41
      But what about the second hit in the area of ​​Asama’s steering car with the destruction of the commander’s cabin and after it hit the starboard side in the area of ​​the command buffet, which the Japanese themselves refer to Meiji in 254 mm from Admiral General Apraksin?

      Could you indicate the page where this is said? Just flipped through a book, but could not find.
  13. tred
    tred 12 May 2018 12: 08
    +4
    Quote: Valentin Maltsev
    Consequently, the "Admiral Ushakov" entered the battle with two armored cruisers, having an average of 176 rounds per one main-caliber gun. At the same time, according to the MTK standards, the 10 '' gun survivability amounted to 200 combat shots per barrel (which looks unjustifiably optimistic against the background, for example, the norm of one hundred combat shots for 10 "/ 40 MkIII American guns mounted on armored cruisers of the type "Tennessee"), and 120 mm - 1. This could not but affect the wear of the trunks, which led to a loss of projectile speed and a change in its ballistic characteristics.

    I will inform the author that the warranty shot on the barrel is set based on their accepted norms of deterioration of its ballistics during operation. And a million factors influence this. At the same time, firing tables are marked out on the entire warranty shot. Therefore, the real shot on the trunk, of course, it plays a role. And the ballistics of the guns along the way slightly deteriorates. But there is nothing critical in this and it is not necessary to draw attention to this by making round eyes.
    Moreover, even after the warranty number of shots was reached, the barrel can still be exploited for some time. it undesirableBut NOT prohibited.
    Quote: Valentin Maltsev
    Unfortunately, overly “lightened” guns and their machines had insufficient strength, which forced to reduce the powder charge from 65,5 to 56 kg of smokeless powder, as a result of which the initial velocity of 225 kg of the projectile decreased from 778-792 to 695 m / s. In addition, the permitted elevation angle was limited, which, coupled with a reduced powder charge, led to a decrease in the actual firing range.

    The author does not know what the “coastal defense battleship” (BBO) is. Otherwise, he would not have written SUCH.
    BBO, this is the pinnacle of the range of mobile guns on the offshore platform designed for impact on coastal targets. The antipode of land shore batteries. This lineup consisted of artillery platforms (self-propelled and non-self-propelled), gunboats (seaworthy and non-navigable, armored and non-armored) and BWO itself.
    BWOs were specially built and "senior citizens" of a higher class, whose tools (and performance characteristics in general) are outdated.
    3 TOE consisted entirely of BWO. At the same time, the “pensioner” Nicholas I traditionally continued to be called the “squadron battleship”, although the GK did not even have guns (even field). His main caliber guns had ballistics Field Howitzers.
    For full-fledged combat with naval objects, BWOs were not intended. Although fend off small marine targets auxiliary gauge they could. Here Ushakov is just 4x120 mm guns. Everyone can imagine the scale of Ushakov’s opponents at sea on his own.
    Guns mounted on Ushakov were excellent. In general, 10 "guns were from the GAU, and not from the GIMA. Therefore, the little hands of Makarov, who introduced" the latest artillery "in the Russian Navy (which turned out to be of little use during the war), did not reach.
    There were 10 "guns on the RIF of three types (there were 4 of them in total, as there was also a land one). All three were quite decent and fully consistent with the tasks that were set before their carriers initially, according to the project.
    Ushakov’s guns fired with a full charge of 52 kg. 56 kg were a full charge of guns GK Peresvet and Oslyaby.
    N / s Ushakov projectile was 693 m / s. The elevation angle has not been reduced. He was what he was supposed to be on the project. To ensure the required firing range.
    N / s shell 777 (and not 778) m / s had coastal 10 "guns.
    Yeah With the ballistics of guns, the author has a complete blockage.
    Quote: Valentin Maltsev
    April 26, 1905 ships Nebogatova joined the squadron of Christmas

    So it was the priest on the letter "w". The fact is that Nebogatov’s detachment was SPECIALLY deported later.
    After all, what did the "strategists from under the spire" plan? They planned that 2 TOE forces of the "latest armadillos such as Borodino" (actually buckets with nuts) and other buckets with nuts, will defeat the Japanese and gain dominance at sea. Such was the level of competence of the Russian naval commanders. After that, 3 TOE will deal with the “processing” of the enemy’s defense on land.
    But the "wise Rozhdestvensky" (you can write any name, they were all there, except perhaps Vitgeft) decided to wait for 3TOE and thus "sharply increase".
    Well, what can I say? - Uren, this is the most gentle that you can think of in this regard.
    Quote: Valentin Maltsev
    The fatal role here was played by the fact that the battle "Ushakov" had to lead the right, damaged in the battle of Tsushima.

    Captain Ushakova and / or his chief artilleryman were incompetent. They did not even realize that they should take the battle with an intact side with the enemy. But the board chooses the pursued.
    Because of the roll to this side, the gun barrels rose to a smaller angle relative to the horizon. And because of this, the firing range of such guns was less than the passport.
    In order to hide this incompetence of the officer corps, a story about Ushakov's "shot trunks" was later invented.
    Quote: Valentin Maltsev
    Having exhausted all the possibilities for resistance, at the beginning of the seventh on the armadillo the kingstones were opened, the team received an order to "escape."

    The competent captain had to give this order only when he saw that Izumo and Yakumo were pursuing him.
    And so, 79 people were in vain. And now, for some reason, some call him a hero, and not a more correct word.
    However, the education of suicidal tendencies in the USSR has a long tradition. More pre-Soviet.
    Quote: Valentin Maltsev
    Obviously, sending three battleships of the Admiral Senyavin type to the theater of military operations was a measure designed to appease public opinion excited by the widely published articles of the captain 2 rank N. L. Klado about the insufficiency of forces of Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky and wearing frankly demagogic nature, and to a certain extent, strengthen the 2-th Pacific squadron, which lost the opportunity to get reinforcements at the expense of the port-Arthur ships.

    Once again, according to the original plan, 2 and 3 TOEs were not to be connected. It was completely a Christmas initiative.

    PS. Maltsev has the same problem as Andrei Chelyabinsk. Both of them do not understand why this or that ship was built. And from this they do not understand the structure of the fleet. Those. don't know the basics. This, like a higher education without a secondary education, is no good. Knowledge must be mastered from the beginning. And not from the middle. Then there will be no blunders.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 12: 27
      +3
      Quote: tred
      PS. Maltsev has the same problem as Andrei Chelyabinsk. Both of them do not understand why this or that ship was built.

      Nikolay, your problem is that you replace the actual tasks for which one or another ship was built with your exuberant fantasies on this topic. At the same time, I give you my due, sometimes you manage to determine the tasks for a particular ship better than the admirals in RI did. But you have the aftertaste, but they didn’t. Therefore, ships need to be evaluated precisely from the point of view of the tasks that they were set by the creators, and by no means from the point of view of the tasks you invented that these ships should solve in some Ideal World of Spherical Vacuum.
      So
      Quote: tred
      BBO, this is the top of the range of mobile guns on the offshore platform, designed to impact on shore targets.

      this is perhaps even to some extent correct. But the fact is that the Russian Empire was building its BRBO for other purposes, such as opposing the Swedish BRBO and (attention!) Participating in a linear battle with the main forces of the German fleet, in which support from our squadron battleships was expected from the BRBO. That is, the RIF initially proposed, if necessary, to put ships of this type in line, and the TTX for them was selected taking into account this task.
      You, on the other hand, have an eternal logical mistake, on which all your mindsets lie. Instead of figuring out WHAT one or another ship was actually designed for, you are trying to come up with the most proper use of it and are starting from your own notion in the future. As a result, your “ideal” classifications have nothing to do with reality and do not cause anything but laughter among knowledgeable people.
      Well, and the reasoning that the shot guns are “within the acceptable range,” well ... This is your method. You take some facts that fit into your theory and ignore what doesn't fit into it
      1. tred
        tred 12 May 2018 12: 48
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But the fact is that the Russian Empire was building its BRBO for other purposes, such as opposing the Swedish BRBO and (attention!) Participating in a linear battle with the main forces of the German fleet, in which support from our squadron battleships was expected from the BRBO.

        Enchanting. Ships with virtually no armor, it turns out they were intended for linear combat.
        I will tell you only one thing, the GP of Ushakov in the lateral parts was only 115 mm of the reduced type 2 group (in Sinyavin 113 mm).
        And the cruiser Rurik (they heard about such an ancient trough), 114 mm of the same brought down group of type 2.
        And the cruiser Russia (they heard about such an old trough), 120 mm of the same reduced type 2 krupp.
        Rurik also built for a linear battle? What about Russia?
        Yes, and one more thing. The Garibaldians (budget armadillos they are armadillos for the poor) had 183 mm of the reduced type 2 krupp. However, they were considered suitable for linear combat only squadrons of underdeveloped countries. And the Japanese bought them as armored defenders. For an anti-rider, and not completely linear struggle.
        You don’t know the basics, and that’s it.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        That is, the RIF initially proposed, if necessary, to put ships of this type in line, and the TTX for them was selected taking into account this task.

        Gee-gee-gee.
        So I’m saying, you don’t know the basics, but "you affirm".
        You need to learn. At first.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        knowledgeable people do not cause.

        I’m embarrassed to ask, do you have this?
        You flatter yourself.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        This is your method. You take some facts that fit into your theory and ignore what doesn't fit into it

        What can I say, I'm generally not a good person.
        I have the audacity to argue with you, "a knowledgeable person."
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 13: 33
          +2
          Quote: tred
          You don’t know the basics, and that’s it.

          Well, let's figure out who knows the basics here. This will be a good demonstration of the fallacy of your approach.
          Quote: tred
          Enchanting. Ships with virtually no armor, it turns out they were intended for linear combat.
          I will tell you only one thing, the GP of Ushakov in the lateral parts was only 115 mm of the reduced type 2 group (in Sinyavin 113 mm).
          And the cruiser Rurik (they heard about such an ancient trough), 114 mm of the same brought down group of type 2.
          And the cruiser Russia (they heard about such an old trough), 120 mm of the same reduced type 2 krupp.
          Rurik also built for a linear battle? What about Russia?

          Here is your logic - you believe that since domestic BRBOs are protected at the level of our BRKRs, they cannot be used for linear combat. The fact that the Russian admirals built them for your concept just for this purpose does not fit - accordingly, you ignore this fact and that’s it.
          I KNOW that BRBO intended including and for squadron combat. Accordingly, when the question arises for me - why is it that our BRBOs were booked at the level of ocean raiders a la "Rurik", then I begin to look for the answer to this question. And, of course, I find him quickly.
          The thing is that the main enemy in the ocean for our DBKRs were British cruisers armed with very powerful 234 mm guns and this was taken into account when determining the protection for our DBKRs. But the Kaiser armadillos were armed mostly with 240 mm guns, which in their qualities were even inferior to the British 234 mm. Only a series of Wilhelm Fredericks received 280-mm guns, but, apparently, it was assumed that our squadron battleships would be engaged in them.
          Thus, the approximate equality of the armor of Rurik and Ushakov stems from the equality of threats to their protection (234 mm - English and 240th German guns) and does not refute what they intended to use Ushakov in the line
          Quote: tred
          Yes, and one more thing. The Garibaldians (budget armadillos they are armadillos for the poor) had 183 mm of the reduced type 2 krupp.

          It remains only to recall that armored cruisers of the Garibaldi type were built much later than Ushakov, and in those years even one year meant a lot.
          Quote: tred
          I’m embarrassed to ask, do you have this?

          Nikolay, over the years of presence on a heap of profile sites, not a single person was impressed with your mind-building :)))))
          Quote: tred
          What can I say, I'm generally not a good person.

          I know:))))
          1. tred
            tred 12 May 2018 14: 03
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I KNOW

            And you probably know everything about reptilians.
            We know the price of such "knowledge."
            About booking BWO I wrote to you.
            I recommend to pay attention to the fact that the 10 "BBO guns were even weaker than the Oslyaby and Peresvet guns. And these guns were far from the level of linear battle ships. Because Oslyabya and Peresvet were also not created for linear combat and are suitable for it were not.
            The only MARINE cannons suitable for linear combat were the guns of the 2nd Class Victory Group.
            You end up with complete nonsense:
            1. Booking BWO for a linear battle was not good.
            2. Armament BWO for linear combat was not suitable.
            But BWO itself was created for linear combat.

            Are you in yourself after that?
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But the Kaiser armadillos were armed mostly with 240 mm guns, which in their qualities were even inferior to the British 234 mm.

            Ale, the garage. Can you read? I already wrote above that even not very advanced Japanese 203/40 guns (there were also 203/45 guns) already pierced Ushakov’s GP with 40 cabs. What the hell could Kaiser armadillos be?
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Thus, the approximate equality of the armor of Rurik and Ushakov stems from the equality of threats to their protection (234 mm - English and 240th German guns) and does not refute what they intended to use Ushakov in the line

            Reinforced concrete ass. This is Dzhugashvili about Kaganovich.
            Particularly cool is the “threat comparison”. The man is clearly not in the subject, but does not want to admit it.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            It remains only to recall that armored cruisers of the Garibaldi type were built much later than Ushakov, and in those years even one year meant a lot.

            When the ships of the warring parties met at sea, did they first figure out the year of manufacture? And if he did not match, then no longer fought? Diverged in the world?
            And here is the year of release? There were general norms and criteria.
            For example, ships with armored armored vehicles with a reduced group of less than 8,5 inches were not suitable for linear battle during the REV.
            The same limitations were in armament.
            And for other categories of ships, too.
            But here you are past.
            Take a typical EDB of that time (90s of the 19th century) Navarin. And Ushakov.
            Navarin 1889, Ushakov 1892 Ushakov is even younger.
            The type of armor is approximately the same, with Navarin it is only 0,013% weaker.
            Ushakov has 203 mm in the citadel and 356 mm in Navarin.
            Where is the equality there?
            I hope you already understood your wrong. And the falsity of your "knowledge."
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 14: 41
              +3
              Quote: tred
              About booking BWO I wrote to you.

              And I answered. Objections are essentially unnoticed. AND! There is one
              Quote: tred
              I already wrote above that even not very advanced Japanese 203/40 guns (there were also 203/45 guns) already pierced Ushakov’s GP with 40 cabs. What the hell could Kaiser armadillos be?

              Alas, as usual, they wrote complete nonsense, because even a 100 mm Japanese krupp of 203 mm / 45 could penetrate somewhere cable by 25. What a 203 mm projectile with 40 cables could do, showed it perfectly in 152- mm Thunderbolt armor plate - several cracks + plate pressed 20 cm deep.
              Nicholas, are you indulging again with the calculator? So you don’t have to calculate the sea guns on it :))) Well, the Kaiser’s 240-mm guns with only 140 kg of shells and a speed of 690 m / s in general, in terms of armor penetration were much worse than the Japanese 203 mm / 45
              Quote: tred
              I recommend to pay attention to the fact that the 10 "BBO guns were even weaker than the Oslyaby and Peresvet guns

              And much stronger than any Kaiser, except for 280 mm, with which they were quite comparable :)))
              It’s just that in your spherical-conical vacuum world, the EBR is supposed to fight with 305 mm artillery, yes, 254 mm Ushakov isn’t especially dancing here. Well, in our, alas, imperfect universe, everything happened :)))))) There was such a nation of stupid Germans who built an EDB with 240 mm guns. And there were stupid Russian admirals who were preparing to fight not against the sphero-conical vacuum battleships named after Nikolai Passer-by, but with a specific fleet of a specific enemy :))))
              However, it will never reach you. Because if it does, then you will have to admit that for the past 10 years you have been fiercely delirious in all profile sites, and you are clearly incapable of this.
              Quote: tred
              When the ships of the warring parties met at sea, did they first figure out the year of manufacture? And if he did not match, then no longer fought? Diverged in the world?
              And here is the year of release?

              While progress was very rapid in those years. This meant only one thing - that the ships built to carry out the tasks defined by the admirals very quickly became obsolete in comparison with the latest technology, that's all.
              1. tred
                tred 12 May 2018 16: 33
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                because even a 100 mm reduced krupp Japanese 203 mm / 45 could break somewhere cable by 25.

                You traditionally do not understand anything in ballistics. Why climb to where you just roll out in a pancake?
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                What a 203-mm projectile with 40 cables can do, it was perfectly shown when it fell into the 152-mm Thunderbolt armor plate - several cracks + the plate was pressed 20 cm deep.

                Those. you do not see any difference between 136 mm and 113 mm of the reduced type 1 group. It’s sad.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Well, the Kaiser’s 240-mm guns with only 140 kg of shells and a speed of 690 m / s in general, in terms of armor penetration were much worse than the Japanese 203-mm / 45

                In fact, the German guns DE 3400 tm. And the Japanese (203/40), 3200 tm.
                The caliber is not much more.
                I think the armor penetration of German guns is slightly better than the Japanese 203/40. It was about them that we started the conversation, and not about 203/45. And they have DE only 3300 tm.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                It’s just that in your spherical-conical vacuum world, the EBR is supposed to fight with 305 mm artillery, here yes, 254 mm Ushakov is not particularly danced.

                Do not dance. And the guns of Peresvet, Oslyaby, Navarin and Nicholas 1, also do not dance. Because they are weak for linear combat. All right.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                There was such a nation of stupid Germans who built an EDB with 240 mm guns.

                You somehow still can not understand that the caliber, that's not all.
                For example, 10 "guns of Victory were suitable for a linear battle. And 12" guns of Navarin, no.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                then you will have to admit that for the last 10 years you have been carrying out fierce nonsense on all profile sites, and you are clearly incapable of this.

                Wow. It turns out I am very famous and famous in narrow circles. You didn’t confuse me with anyone?
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                This meant only one thing - that the ships built to carry out the tasks defined by the admirals very quickly became obsolete in comparison with the latest technology, that's all.

                Actually Navarin and Ushakov, ships of the same generation. Ushakov is even younger. And the armor is plywood.
                Your theory does not dance, dear.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 19: 30
                  +2
                  Quote: tred
                  You traditionally do not understand anything in ballistics. Why climb to where you just roll out in a pancake?

                  Nikolai, in ballistics you should roll up your lip and not imagine yourself a specialist.
                  Quote: tred
                  Those. you do not see any difference between 136 mm and 113 mm of the reduced type 1 group. It’s sad.

                  even without counting millimeters, I inform you that a projectile capable of penetrating 113 mm of armor into 136 mm armor plate does not leave cracks, but a pothole, oh expert in ballistics
                  Quote: tred
                  In fact, the German guns DE 3400 tm. And the Japanese (203/40), 3200 tm.

                  So what? In what place of de Marr’s formula should this “revelation” be thrust?
                  Quote: tred
                  Wow. It turns out I am very famous and famous in narrow circles

                  Yes, in a fairly wide - althistori, tsushima, topvar, where I have already lost count of your nicknames.
            2. Nehist
              Nehist 12 May 2018 15: 09
              +3
              Respected! Somewhere you write quite robust and logical things. But for the most part you carry such nonsense that your hair stand on end !!! On the same Navarino, the armor was Compound and on Ushakov Gravel, which is the reason for the difference in thickness, but apparently you do not know
              1. tred
                tred 12 May 2018 16: 11
                +2
                Quote: Nehist
                On the same Navarino, the armor was Compound and on Ushakov Gravel

                You know, Alexander, for some reason you like me. I don’t know why, maybe the photograph has. Therefore, I especially do not want to scold you, although sometimes it is necessary.
                On Navarino was Wilson’s armor (compound, steel, iron with a solid steel layer, two-layer).
                On Ushakov and Sinyavin was the Schneider-Creusot type I armor (steel armor, Creusot).
                Apraksin had Schneider-Creusot type II armor (steel-nickel armor, nickel armor, French armor, nickel steel, special Creusot).
                There were no guarque armor (both types) on these ships. For the first time such armor was used in Russia. And this is the end of the 90s. And cemented armor is not to the rank of such "battleships". These are cheap ships in their concept.
    2. Comrade
      13 May 2018 05: 17
      +3
      Quote: tred
      I will inform the author

      What for ? This "water" is what you wrote.
      Quote: tred
      Ushakov’s guns fired with a full charge of 52 kg. 56 kg were a full charge of guns GK Peresvet and Oslyaby. N / s of Ushakov’s projectile was 693 m / s. The elevation angle has not been reduced.

      These are "Runet tales", your IMHO, or you have documents on hand confirming that. what did you write ?

      Quote: tred
      Captain Ushakova and / or his chief artilleryman were incompetent. They did not even realize that they should take the battle with an intact side with the enemy. But the board chooses the pursued.

      Show your competence, tell us how you would act in such a situation and to whom to turn to which side?

      Or do you think that the Japanese wouldn’t have enough mind to take Ushakov in two lights, if he started spinning?
      Quote: tred
      The competent captain had to give this order only when he saw that Izumo and Yakumo were pursuing him. And now, for some reason, some call him a hero, and not a more correct word. However, the education of suicidal tendencies in the USSR has a long tradition. More pre-Soviet.

      What do you call the commander of the Bismarck, E. Lindeman? Well, what were his chances, with that stuck steering wheel, in the battle against HMS Rodney and HMS King George V?

      According to your logic, the Germans needed a little earlier than immediately to raise a white flag, or better English, taking an example from Nebogatov.
      Quote: tred
      Once again, according to the original plan, 2 and 3 TOEs were not to be connected. It was completely a Christmas initiative.

      This is the "Runet tales", and where did you read it?
  14. shura7782
    shura7782 12 May 2018 14: 57
    +3
    Valentine, thanks for the article and for your vision of the events. Someone in this event saw more, whose trunk is longer, but the caliber is thicker and they forget about people who performed their military duty to the end with what they had. Here the feat of the crew is the most important thing. What is the feat? The fact that they took the battle and did not surrender their battleship to the Japanese.
    1. Comrade
      13 May 2018 05: 23
      +2
      And thank you, Alexander, for your support and interest in the topic :-)
      1. shura7782
        shura7782 13 May 2018 07: 44
        +1
        I have a special interest in Ushakov. My great-grandfather served on it and was in that battle with Miklouho Maclay. He was also friends with Novikov.
        1. Comrade
          13 May 2018 15: 36
          +2
          Quote: shura7782
          I have a special interest in Ushakov. My great-grandfather served on it and was in that battle with Miklouho Maclay. He was also friends with Novikov.

          In this case, I have a couple of photos with the crew members of the armadillo, one in Libau was taken, on the second group of ship officers, already in Japanese captivity. Maybe you will be interested.

          1. shura7782
            shura7782 15 May 2018 23: 03
            0
            An interesting shot. Is there information (positions, surnames). I also have a photograph of my great-grandfather in captivity and the name of the Japanese city.
  15. geniy
    geniy 12 May 2018 15: 15
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Due to the destruction of unarmored extremities, of course :)))

    And what does this mean: destroyed unarmored extremities? Indeed, in fact, in all fleets of the world, most ships were built with unarmored ends. And these unarmored ends were thought to undergo complete shelling and destruction, but their volume was so small that even complete flooding was not supposed to cause the ship to die. That's just neither the sea-whitened gray-haired sea admirals, nor you - an absolutely land person, did not take into account one very important factor.
    1. Nehist
      Nehist 12 May 2018 15: 39
      +3
      And you there too? Before the advent of rapid-fire guns, armor-tip booking was not critical since the percentage of hits was very small. The concept was only big guns, by the way, and appeared only because their low rate of fire was compensated by the quantity. All the same, at that time the effectiveness of art fire was calculated exactly how much metal can be released per conventional unit of time, that is, the salvo weight was critical
      1. tred
        tred 12 May 2018 17: 38
        0
        Quote: Nehist
        that is, the salvo weight was critical

        For obsolete battleships.
  16. mmaxx
    mmaxx 12 May 2018 15: 31
    +1
    Quote: geniy
    You see, in battles at sea, the size of the ship is far from a determining factor. That is, under certain conditions, a very small boat can defeat a large one, or at least get out of the battle.
    Suffice it to recall the success of torpedo boats that sank the dreadnought Viribus Unitis, or the U-9 submarine that sank three English armored cruisers. I don’t know if I can get to the comparison of the battle of the small Argentinean Guascar monitor (with a displacement of about 1200 tons) that withstood the artillery battle with two large English cruisers.

    And I can cut Mike Tyson down. If the back of the club will crack.
    “Huascar” in shallow water left. The British did not get it.
    And after the death of Viribus Units, everyone immediately set up torpedo boats and handed over the remaining ships to scrap.
    Do you even understand that city?
    Two, understand? two strong cruisers, with superiority in speed and range of shooting. And this superiority was provided primarily by size.
    And, in general, the superiority of Japanese ships was ensured by size. On which they did not save.
    1. Nehist
      Nehist 12 May 2018 15: 59
      +2
      Let's put in the Sino-Japanese war in the battle of Yalu, the Japanese did not have armadillos at all, but the Chinese had two! Also, the Japanese did not have superiority in large-caliber guns, the Chinese squadron significantly surpassed the enemy in large-caliber artillery - 27 guns against 12. However, in the medium-caliber artillery the Japanese had a full advantage - 84 guns against 25. As a result, the Chinese squadron was beaten to a state in which the battle could no longer continue
      1. tred
        tred 12 May 2018 17: 36
        0
        Quote: Nehist
        As a result, the Chinese squadron was beaten to a state in which the battle could no longer continue

        No, well, who argues, the warriors are from the Chinese, as from a well-known natural material with the letter "g" bullet.
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 12 May 2018 18: 26
        0
        So there was no particular superiority among the Chinese.
        And the Japanese made the right conclusions: there is nothing to save on size. Because God is on the side of large battalions.
      3. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 12 May 2018 23: 40
        +2
        Quote: Nehist
        As a result, the Chinese squadron was beaten to a state in which the battle could no longer continue

        However, the Japanese were the first to leave the battle, the shells stupidly ended. They failed to do anything serious to the two Chinese armadillos, they had to go home.
        1. Nehist
          Nehist 13 May 2018 01: 27
          +2
          True, while drowning 5 cruisers and beating the Chinese battleships to a state of non-combat capability
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 13 May 2018 19: 51
            +1
            At the same time, some of the Chinese captains were shot for a cowardly flight from battle. The Chinese battleships were badly stripped but received no critical damage. The Japanese were forced to interrupt the battle after a couple of extremely dangerous hits in the flagship and the discovered excessive ammunition.
  17. geniy
    geniy 12 May 2018 17: 51
    +2
    Quote: mmaxx
    “Huascar” in shallow water left. The British did not get it.

    This is a fraud on your part. Huascar didn’t just go into shallow water, but before that he had to endure a terrible hours-long battle with two British big cruisers, which exceeded it in total displacement by about 8 times.
    And although Huaskar received a lot of shell hits, he himself didn’t get a bad shot from time to time, but all his injuries were only in the surface part, and not a single hole below the waterline. By the way, this Huascar has quite safely survived to the present day, and now stands as a museum ship.
    1. mmaxx
      mmaxx 12 May 2018 18: 36
      0
      What a hoax? Well, the British did not break it. But he, not only did not win, but did not even hit even once.
      As if then the British instead of the cruisers set up monitors. On the contrary, they made the cruiser even bigger and more powerful.
      With "Ushakov" everything is completely wrong. And there was a wounded animal and still got where necessary. And leave the chances of zero. As for the reversal of the other side. Was there such an opportunity? After all, he was leaving the Japanese. A U-turn meant going to them. In the sense of all Japanese people.
  18. geniy
    geniy 12 May 2018 17: 58
    +2
    Quote: Nehist
    And you there too? Before the advent of rapid-fire guns, armor-tip booking was not critical since the percentage of hits was very small.

    You see, the number of hits it depends heavily not only on the rate of fire of the guns, but also on the number of other ships shooting at one ship, and also on the firing distance - the smaller the distance, the greater the percentage of hits. And although artillery devices in the Sino-Japanese war were worse than in the Russo-Japanese war, but the shooting distances were also much smaller. And most importantly - not only the number of shells that hit the target affects the damage to ships, but also the size of the holes (that is, the total area of ​​the holes). And in the armor if the shell crashed against it, then there would be no hole at all. But in a thin skin shell explosion will create a hole in a certain area. And for example, the Chinese fired shells of very strange quality - either they were filled with coal, or even sand.
    1. Nehist
      Nehist 13 May 2018 00: 09
      +1
      You see, there is a law of large numbers, where quantity goes into quality.
  19. The comment was deleted.
  20. geniy
    geniy 12 May 2018 18: 10
    +2
    Quote: tred
    I will tell you only one thing, the GP of Ushakov in the lateral parts was only 115 mm of the reduced type 2 group (in Sinyavin 113 mm).
    And the cruiser Rurik (they heard about such an ancient trough), 114 mm of the same brought down group of type 2.
    And the cruiser Russia (they heard about such an old trough), 120 mm of the same reduced type 2 krupp.
    Rurik also built for a linear battle? What about Russia?

    You see - this is a general misconception measured by the thickness of the armor. The fact is that there is a huge fundamental difference in how a projectile pierces even thin armor from ordinary ship skin.
    The skin thickness of the battleships of that time was approximately 1 inch = 25 mm. But this is ordinary shipbuilding steel, the quality is about the same as modern steel 3! And firstly, it is not at all hardened (that is, it is actually soft, and secondly, it has almost no nickel, like real armored steel. This is about 3 times worse than the armored steel, that is, 25 mm of the skin thickness correspond to the strength of the armor is approximately 8 mm thick.
    And because of this, such an effect appears - that if the kurpnokaliberny shell exploded on the skin, then it unfolds a hole of a large area. But if an armor-piercing or even a high-explosive shell pierced even thin, but still armor, then it almost does not bend noticeably, and the diameter of such a hole is almost equal to the diameter of the shell. That is, either about 350 mm for a twelve-inch, or a 250 mm hole in the light for an eight-inch. But this is about the diameter of a soccer ball. And it is very easy to close such a hole with any board, or plug it in a pile of clothes or tarred canvas. .
    1. geniy
      geniy 12 May 2018 18: 18
      +2
      But the bottom line is that the Japanese shells penetrated the armor of the Russian ships very poorly, even though they used approximately equally high explosive and armor-piercing shells. Not a single case of penetration of thin 76-mm armor of the casemates of Russian armadillos by Japanese 305-mm shells was noted. This means that most likely the Japanese 305 mm shells in reality could not penetrate the 50 mm thickness of the armor - that is, 6! times thinner than its diameter !! And if this ratio of the caliber of the Japanese shell and the thickness of the Russian armor 6: 1 we apply to eight-inch shells, we get that 203 mm Japanese shells could not penetrate 35 mm of the armor of Russian ships. Of course there was no such thin armor at all. And although tred gives a fair figure of the real thickness of Admiral Ushakov’s armor reduced to Krupp = 114 mm, it’s still much more than the 35 mm of armor that the Japanese could actually penetrate. And this means that Russian armadillos of the Admiral Ushakov type were not penetrated into the main armor belt by Japanese armored cruisers.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 12 May 2018 19: 36
        +3
        Quote: geniy
        But if an armor-piercing or even a high-explosive shell pierced even thin, but still armor, then it almost does not bend noticeably, and the diameter of such a hole is almost equal to the diameter of the shell.

        If you hadn’t fantasized about the topic, but would have known it, then you would not have written such enchanting nonsense. Because, firstly, when a heavy projectile hits light armor, it is not a breakdown of the armor, but a breach that is much larger than the diameter of the projectile. no less often, getting a heavy outfit can split the armor plate, that is, it will lose its integrity for a considerable length and will not impede the penetration of water. But the most important thing in the other is that from the impact of a projectile the armor plate is very often pressed into the hull by several tens of centimeters, which violates the integrity of the side and causes flooding even with unbroken armor.
        1. geniy
          geniy 12 May 2018 19: 56
          +2
          Well, if you hadn’t written nonsense, but brought the real facts of breaking through Russian armor! On the one hand, of course, a break is possible, but then show us all a photo of at least one such break in Russian armor! And also show the flooding from the violation of the integrity of the side. You probably don’t know such a simple thing that the armor plates at that time were not attached directly to the steel sheathing of the side, and under them was a rather thick wooden shirt with a thickness of about a foot - that is, about 30 cm. And then the armor plate was pressed into it , unlike the method of fastening armor plates directly to the side skin, as they began to do on ships of the First World War.
          1. 27091965
            27091965 12 May 2018 21: 19
            0
            Quote: geniy
            On the one hand, of course, a break is possible, but then show us all a photo of at least one such break in Russian armor!


            This is certainly not Russian armor, but the photo shows what a projectile can do without even breaking through the armor.
            1. geniy
              geniy 12 May 2018 23: 07
              +2
              I am losing weight, dear editorial staff, from such experts in military equipment and history. I recently read somewhere that most people have the habit of answering a completely different question that they were asked. That is, I offered to provide me with at least one (or rather several) photographs of Russian armor pierced by Japanese shells from the time of the REV.
              Why do you think I need this? Maybe you think that I’ve never seen photos of broken armor in my life? But the fact is that I asked my question to backfill the local "experts" in military history. The bottom line is that during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese used a picric acid explosive filling, which was very unstable to impact on armor, which exploded spontaneously at the moment the shell touched the armor and never penetrated Russian armor. And you should not confuse the times of the REV with other wars - for example, from the First World War, when trotyl was used as the filling, or Japanese-Chinese - when either coal or sand was laid inside the shells. That is, any link to the photo of the broken armor should not be anonymous - but should contain accurate information: the exact date when this photo was taken and in what specific conditions - when shooting at a firing range or in a real naval battle.
              The fact is that Japanese gunners met this fact of not piercing their armor with shells, and then they falsified - instead of picric acid, during testing of shells and piercing armor, ordinary sand was apparently poured into the shells, and under such fictitious conditions, Japanese shells pierced armor.
              And there is another fact: when shooting at Russian ships, many Japanese shells flew tumbling. But when firing at the firing range, artillerymen not only in Japan, but also in all other countries, used fictitious tests: they simply reduced the weight of the powder in the charges and fired at very close range, and in these fictitious firing ranges, the shells pierced the armor. But in reality - during the time of the REV - they did not break through. And such experts as you, tred, Andrey from Chelyabinsk, stupidly looking at the tabular data of the field tests of armor penetration, are trying to fool me and all other readers, if only Japanese shells would perfectly penetrate the armor. But I know that this is a lie, and during the entire Russo-Japanese war, not once did Japanese shells penetrate Russian armor. And so, in order to expose your lies, I modestly and ask you to show me and everyone else at least a few holes from the Japanese shells in Russian armor. But here the cunning Andrei from Chelyabinsk, along with tred, hissed in a dark corner and are silent, and you, without understanding, leaned out with your pseudo-knowledge.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 May 2018 01: 45
                +2
                Quote: geniy
                But here the cunning Andrey from Chelyabinsk, along with tred, hissed in a dark corner and are silent

                Genius, you are it .... I understand that the gap in the template, the world collapsed, gold turned into shards and everything that you believed in, having read Surf with Kostenko begins to fall apart uncontrollably. Well, be a man, do not make hysteria.
              2. 27091965
                27091965 13 May 2018 08: 41
                0
                Quote: geniy
                and you didn’t figure it out leaning out with your pseudo-knowledge.


                Just in case, I will repeat my comment by highlighting semantic words.

                " Of course not russian armor, but in the photo it is seen that can make a shell without even breaking through the armor. "
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 May 2018 01: 37
              +2
              Quote: geniy
              Well, if you hadn’t written nonsense, but brought the real facts of breaking through Russian armor!

              Yes please. Fight in the yellow sea, the battleship Peresvet.
              1) At about 16.45 a 12 "armor-piercing projectile hit the armor belt along the waterline in the region of 39 bp under the bow casemate. The hit fell into the angle of the 229-mm armor plate, and the shell gave a long gap. At the site of the impact, the wood paneling was split, a hole was made with a depth of 4" . The slab corner was pressed 6,6 cm, the hardened part of the armor cracked, and the chipped piece of steel came out at one corner. The shirt behind the armor is wrinkled and torn. Damage to the plate on the outside in the form of a triangle (base 0,8 m, height about 1 m, point down). The hole was flooded on the move with water, and the upper compartments No. 33 and 37 were flooded. The lower compartments under the armored deck were flooded through loosely closing necks. In total, 160 tons of water were taken (60 tons into the lower and 20 tons into the upper compartments), a significant roll formed, eliminated by flooding of the corresponding left-side compartments
              2) a 12 "HE shell hit a 102 mm belt under a No. 75 15 mm gun, burst, and the armor cracked
              Armadillo Sevastopol
              1) From 12.15 to 12.30 a 12 "high-explosive shell hit a 368-mm plate of the armored belt at the waterline in the middle of the battleship on the starboard side. The shell exploded, pressed the plate and damaged the shirt behind the armor. Two side corridors were flooded. As a result of a strong the ship’s tremor opened to leak in the compartment at a place previously damaged in a collision with the battleship “Peresvet”.

              2) a 12 "armor-piercing projectile fired from a distance of about 30 kb hit a 127-mm plate of the upper armor belt on the starboard side under the bow of the 152-mm turret. The shell did not penetrate the armor, but deepened by 102 mm (according to N. N. Kuteinikov 51 mm) and broke off a piece of the plate.
              Armadillo Retvisan
              1) A 10-12 "high-explosive shell hit the starboard side of the infirmary in the upper left edge of the 51 mm non-hardened steel plate, exploded, dented the plate, breaking the mounting bolts. The plate cracked in the dent and the crack went to the porthole. Small fragments scratched the side, deformed the half-port of the overlying 75-mm gun. The network fence lying on the shelf was not damaged, as well as the lapport for loading torpedoes (to the right of impact). The hole was heavily flooded.
              Armadillo Victory
              1) 12 "HE shell hit a 229-mm plate of an armored belt along the waterline under
              nasal casemate of 152-mm guns (region 33-34 sp). The shell hit the slab, exploded, pushed the slab out of place and knocked out a cork measuring 356 mm by 406 mm, weighing about 120 kg. The cork flew in, pierced the side bulkhead and stuck in the corner near the inner bulkhead of the upper coal pit. In the coal pit, a piece was also found, apparently, of the head of the shell. The armor shirt and the double inner side are broken, in addition, minor multiple damage to the skin and set of the hull. Water flooded the lower coal pit and three side compartments

              Enough for you, or is it still necessary? :)))))))))
              1. geniy
                geniy 14 May 2018 10: 50
                +1
                It turns out that this topic has received a lot of new posts about which I did not know, in any case, it takes a lot of time to answer everything. And specifically in this post of Andrey there are 6 points, and I will not answer immediately, but sequentially. I ask you not to interrupt and wait for the end of the answer.
                I used to consider mainly the Tsushima battle according to the descriptions of the damage of the battleship “Oryol” on which although there are cases of weakening of the armor plate mounts, no penetration of the armor was detected at all, and in the battle in the Yellow Sea, damage to the armor plates is present. In my opinion, this is reliable evidence that the Japanese used in the battle in the Yellow Sea and in the Tsushima battle fundamentally different shells. And although one of the authors above correctly says that the Japanese at that time did not know how to make 12-inch shells, and I agree with that, but in my opinion, they took ready-made large-caliber shells, and either threw old explosives out of them, and invested in them new (pretty sweating at the same time). Either they turned out the old fuses, then made new ones or adjusted the old ones (reducing the stiffness of the spring), that is, they changed the properties of the fuses very much. Thus: Japanese shells in battle in the Yellow Sea and Tsushima operated with completely different power.
                And so, Andrei cited 6 cases in his opinion of penetration of armor received in battle in the Yellow Sea, but not a single one in Tsushima. But neither Andrei himself nor anyone else knows what is considered to be penetration of armor in military science. That is, it is not just a hole in the armor, but it is required that the shell leaves the back of the armor and only explodes behind it. AND the explosion on the front side of the armor is not considered a penetration. The fact is that a shell when it hits an armor often causes an internal spall from the back of the armor. There are two cases: just back spall without piercing - that is, the outside of the front side of the armor in this case is almost not damaged. This is typical mainly for tanks of the second world war. And fragments of the back of the armor often injure and kill tankers, and even set fire to the shells with gunpowder and cause an explosion of the tank.
                There is another option: when the shell knocks out the so-called cork from the armor, while it explodes (or just bounces off the front of the armor). AND both of these cases, if we consider them strictly from a scientific point of view, are also not the correct penetration of armor. After all, the projectile in these cases did not explode in the armored volume! The fact is that any tank in its design is fundamentally different from an armored ship. That is, tankers and tank equipment (engine, radio station, gunpowder shells) in the tank are located immediately behind the armor and let the enemy shell not pierce the armor through, but only knocked out fragments of armor that wounded or killed the tankers and set fire to the gunpowder shells or smashed motor - tank despite the lack of a puncture-correct case from the point of view of science, it still gets damaged or even explodes.
                But the ships are the opposite. Directly behind the side armor of any ship, as a rule, there are no important objects, but there are empty compartments (often not empty at all, but filled either with coal or oil, but sometimes empty as well as the slopes of the armored deck) designed specifically to absorb residual factors from the action of the shell: fragments of the armor itself, fragments from the shell. That is, if the piercing of the ship’s side armor, correct from the point of view of science, did not happen, and the enemy shell exploded from the outside, then even if the fragments of the rear armor flew further into the ship, then they would not cause any significant damage - they would be stopped either by coal, or oil, or bevel armored deck.
                But at the same time, the waterproof casing (the so-called "shirt") can often be damaged, which allows leakage and allows sea water to flow into the ship. This for many non-professionals gives a false sign of penetration of the armor - after all, the compartment behind the armor is then flooded! But this is your general misconception. The fact is that these side compartments behind the armor are implicitly designed by designers for flooding in case of combat damage to the ship. That is, despite the fact that any such onboard compartment in the event of a projectile hitting the armor in this place and gradual flooding can be filled with water. But as a rule, it is separated from the rest of the ship, and reduces the buoyancy margin very little. And the fight against the negative effect of this flooding is very simple - either the compartment on the opposite side is deliberately flooded (counter-flooding), or water is pumped out of this compartment with a powerful pump (even without closing the shirt breaks), or the hole in the shirt is sealed behind the armor, and then the water is pumped out.
                Here it must be understood that if in a relatively thin surface skin
                If a ship breaks down from a projectile explosion, it will have an area in the light from one square meter (for a 152 mm projectile) to 6 square meters for a 12-inch projectile. And just a huge amount of water poured into the holes of such an area, as he wrote tred "swiftly jacking" with a scumbag. But it’s close to the truth - it’s almost impossible to catch up with such a hole with significant sea waves, and flooding lasts a matter of seconds.
                In contrast, if an enemy shell did not penetrate the armor correctly, but only created small cracks in the shirt behind the armor, then the flow of water is gradual, and relatively slow. Of course, if the sailors of the shelled ship do not have time to close up such small holes, then slowly penetrating water will sooner or later fill the weight of the ship - if the sailors open all the doors in all the watertight bulkheads. But if the sailors are struggling with the flow of water, closing up such small holes: for example, tarred rags, pouring concrete - just a shovel of cement (from Moonsund) with wooden plugs - the so-called "chips", or pre-prepared wooden shields - as the Japanese did in tsushima, and Nowadays, sliding screw stops are used. So - if you close up these small holes, then the flow of water can easily be stopped. Probably no one among you knows that on all the ships of that time (and even now) pumps are mainly used only with a capacity of not more than 500 tons per hour - this is only enough to pump water through a hole the size of a soccer ball approximately - that is, a diameter of about 305 mm - just the diameter of a twelve-inch shell. So the Japanese used pre-stocked wooden shields to close up holes of this size. The only question is: were there any cases of proper penetration of the armor, so that the shell pierced the armor and exploded from its back? The fact is that in this case, a projectile explosion destroys the bulkheads of these armored compartments — in fact, turns them into a complete sieve with hundreds of holes that are physically impossible to fix in a combat situation, and then there follows an immediate flooding of not one compartment, but many compartments, and roll, and possibly quick tipping. the ship. Thus, history buffs should distinguish between cases of the penetration of armor that are correct from the point of view of science, from external damage to the armor without exploding an enemy shell behind the armor. .
                This is just an introduction.
              2. geniy
                geniy 14 May 2018 16: 01
                +1
                So, an analysis of the hit of Japanese shells in the armor of Russian ships.
                I'll start with the last, brightest, when from a thick armor plate knocked out the armor plug superior in diameter to the caliber of the projectile.
                1) 12 "HE shell hit a 229-mm plate of an armored belt along the waterline under
                nasal casemate of 152-mm guns (region 33-34 sp). The shell hit the slab, exploded, pushed the slab out of place and knocked out a cork measuring 356 mm by 406 mm, weighing about 120 kg. The cork flew in, pierced the side bulkhead and stuck in the corner near the inner bulkhead of the upper coal pit. In the coal pit, a piece was also found, apparently, of the head of the shell. Armor shirt and double inner side pierced, multiple minor damage inflicted
                casing and housing kit. Water flooded the lower coal pit and three side compartments.
                It would seem - everything is clear at first glance: here it is there is a big hole in the armor, here is the flooding of several small compartments. (A compartment is generally a separation from one transverse bulkhead to another, including all the small rooms that are in it), but only coal pits are flooded here, and boiler rooms are not. But here, ordinary history buffs have a big misunderstanding of the question: where exactly did this shell explode: outside - on
                front side of the armor
                - or behind her back? It would seem - to us, people separated from this event by more than a hundred-plus years, not to answer this question. And here I am very easy to determine simply by description. The fact is that if the shell exploded on the front side of the armor, then almost all of its fragments will remain outside the side ship, and uselessly fly back and fall into the sea. But if a shell pierced through the armor and exploded inside the ship’s hull, then almost all of its fragments would first pierce all surrounding bulkheads, bulge them and tear them apart with a high-explosive explosion, and in addition, a shell explosion would instantly raise a cloud of coal dust and it would instantly mixed with the oxygen of the surrounding air will repeatedly increase the high-explosive explosion of the actual projectile.
                But after all, as you know, there was no explosive explosion in the coal pit of the battleship Victory, just as there was no explosion of coal dust, right? And that means that a Japanese shell exploded outside the armor.
                This, by the way, is also evident from the fragments. In the explosion of a heavy 386 kilogram shell, a much larger number of fragments of the most diverse shape and weight is formed - probably about a thousand fragments. The exact number is now completely uninteresting to us, it is important that there are a lot of them. For example, when some new high-explosive or fragmentation shell is adopted, then in order to find out the total number and weight of the fragments, they dig a deep hole in the ground, and then put the tested shell into it and blow it up. And then they dig up the earth from this pit and carefully collect all the fragments - they are counted and weighed. So the approximate number of fragments from each shell should be
                known, and it is quite large. Moreover, some fragments are very large and long. So, for example, after shelling a coastal battery on Dickson with a German raider, Admiral Scheer, fragments the size of knives were picked up. So: where did all these fragments from the shell that made the hole in the armor of the "Victory" go? Indeed, in Andrei’s description it is all about a single fragment, and there should be about a thousand of them. But the answer is very simple: this shell obviously exploded on the front side of the armor, and all of its fragments, with the exception of the only one, flew off the side armor of the Russian ship and fell into the sea. That is, in this case, the enemy shell did not correctly penetrate the side armor - he could not penetrate it, but spontaneously detonated earlier than it should, although he could knock out the armor plug from the armor by the kinetic impact of the head of the shell. Which was only able to break through a thin side bulkhead separating the coal pits - I think that the thickness of this bulkhead is only 5 mm, and stuck in the corner, that is, the breakdown force and hence the kinetic energy of this armored cork weighing as much as 120 kilograms - was very small . Thus, Andrei and all other experts in history are greatly mistaken in the fact that if there is a hole in the light more than even the caliber of a shell, then supposedly there was penetration of armor by this shell. No, he was able to knock out the armor plug, but to get inside the ship and inflict terrible destruction there - no!
                And if the Russian sailors were smart, then they would have made wooden shields in advance and would easily have plugged this hole with such a shield, as the Japanese did in the Tsushima battle.
                To be continued.
              3. geniy
                geniy 14 May 2018 16: 50
                +1
                battleship Peresvet.
                1) At about 16.45 a 12 "armor-piercing projectile hit the armor belt along the waterline in the region of 39 bp under the bow casemate. The blow hit the corner of the 229-mm armor plate and the shell gave a long gap. At the place of the impact, the wood paneling was split, a hole was made with a depth of 4" . The slab corner was pressed 6,6 cm, the hardened part of the armor cracked, and the chipped piece of steel came out at one corner. The shirt behind the armor is wrinkled and torn. Damage to the plate on the outside in the form of a triangle (base 0,8 m, height about 1 m, point down). The hole was flooded on the move with water, and the upper compartments No. 33 and 37 were flooded. The lower compartments under the armored deck were flooded through loosely closing necks. In total, 160 tons of water were taken (60 tons into the lower and 20 tons into the upper compartments), a significant roll was formed, eliminated by flooding of the corresponding left-side compartments. "

                Here's what an ordinary ordinary history buff understands when reading a description of this hit? Apparently the same as Andrew
                amateurs and connoisseurs of history have no doubt at all that in this case the Japanese shell pierced the Russian armor, even breaking a piece of armor about a meter in size, and the premises were flooded with water, so that the ship received 160 tons of sea water.
                But I will explain to you what really happened. Although the plate is considered to be 229 mm thick, in fact, the lower part of the side armor plate of the main belt is always cut to a thickness equal to half its upper part, that is, instead of 229 mm, it was only 115 mm below, and not Krupp's, but some Harvey reservation - I am lazy to check. So in reality, if we take the equivalent of Krupp armor in this place, the thickness could be about 100 mm
                in terms of resistance to Krupp armor, this is not a great merit for piercing a 305 mm caliber projectile. That is, damaged armor with a thickness of about one third of the caliber of a Japanese shell.
                But the most important thing is that despite the fact that the thick iron cladding behind the armor from ordinary mild non-hardened steel, although it was torn, and this began to pass water relatively slowly, but the Japanese shell
                really didn’t penetrate this armor! That is, he did not make a round hole in it and did not penetrate the body
                Russian armadillo and did not explode there! This Japanese shell surely exploded outside the armor! I.e
                actually there was no penetration of the armor!
                And the fact that from the concussion they began to let the mouth water into the coal pits is so little trouble. And if Russian sailors
                If they wanted to continue their trip to Vladivostok, then they could easily eliminate this flow of water through a torn armor plating, it was enough to pour a bag there - another cement. Yes, by the way: most history buffs probably did not realize the true meaning of the words: "the front of the armor cracked". So I will explain. Armor in those days, as now, was divided into two main types homogeneous и heterogeneous (I’m not talking about the varieties of armor: iron-steel there, or steel-nickel, or Krupp). So - heterogeneous: This is armor which is very hard on the outside - because it is hardened on this side. And on the back - relatively soft. To give an example, it is similar to hard, but very fragile glass
                would put on a layer of soft plasticine. And if you hit the glass with a hammer or other object, then the glass will crack, but soft plasticine - no! And this means that the armor heterogeneous - that is, it has different thickness properties. And when you read that the hardened part of this “Peresvet” armor plate cracked, you should understand that the crack only in the front - hardened layerbut the back soft, non-hardened layer of the crack apparently did not have, although it underwent some bending from the force of impact. So our contradiction is that I do not consider this case
                penetrating armor, and Andrei - and all the other "experts" naively think that a Japanese shell pierced the armor. And by the way, 160 tons of water - this is about a little more than 1% of the displacement of the battleship "Peresvet".
                And besides, I very often have to read in modern literature that the penetration of any munition was checked by homogeneous
                (i.e. uniform in thickness)
                armor. But the word homogeneous can mean two directly opposite conditions of armor: it is homogeneous - that is, extra-soft nickel armor, from which sheets of armor were laid
                decks, and sometimes homogeneous - solid and durable thick vertical armor of gun turrets. Due to the fact that she
                had a curvilinear shape it was very difficult to harden only the outer layer like a flat armor. So at Poltava during construction it was required to cut off the top layer of hardened armor of a round barbet. But it turned out that they set the defective armor - completely soft, non-hardened.
                And now, when I read about the tests of modern ammunition that they break through “homogeneous” armor, I’m always in terrible doubts: what kind of armor did they actually try to break through? Either very soft, completely non-hardened armor, or vice versa - extremely hard, hardened to the entire thickness, very fragile armor? Profane around ...
              4. geniy
                geniy 15 May 2018 12: 29
                +1
                Battleship Peresvet
                2) A 12 "HE shell hit a 102 mm belt under a No. 75 15 mm gun, burst, and the armor cracked.

                Please note - firstly, the battleship "Peresvet" had Harvey armor, which is worse in strength than Krupp's. I am lazy now to look for the exact coefficients for recalculation, so I roughly estimate the strength of 102 mm of Harvey’s armor as approximately equal in strength to 75-mm Krupp armor. And what do we see in this case?
                And the fact that the Japanese 305 - mm shell could not penetrate the steel in strength equivalent to 75 - mm Krupp -
                there is penetration of the Japanese high-explosive shell was not so great that he could not penetrate through and
                explode behind the back of this armor with a difference in thickness and caliber as much as 4 times !!
                Yes, there is a crack, but after all, the penetration of the Japanese shell for the armor did not happen - it means the armor is not broken! And the fact that she cracked - so do not care. Indeed, in a battle at long distances, hitting a second shell exactly in the same crack is an absolutely incredible event. And so this damage could easily wait until returning to the port, where
                if there were normal conditions, they could either replace this plate, or leave it without any correction, as it was done at Eustache after the battle with Goeben, judging that the shell didn’t get to the same place twice twice.
                So, pay attention that Andrey from Chelyabinsk brought us this case as evidence of penetration by Japanese
                shells of armor, but on the contrary, I say that in this case there was no actual penetration of the armor.
              5. geniy
                geniy 15 May 2018 12: 34
                +1
                Armadillo Sevastopol
                1) From 12.15 to 12.30 a 12 "high-explosive shell hit a 368-mm plate of the armored belt at the waterline in the middle of the battleship on the starboard side. The shell exploded, pressed the plate and damaged the shirt behind the armor. Flooded
                two side corridors. As a result of a strong concussion of the ship, a leak opened in the compartment in a place previously damaged in a collision with the battleship Peresvet.

                Damage analysis. The battleship Sevastopol had real Krupp armor of the main belt, with a very large thickness of 368, while even armadillos of the Borodino type had the main belt thinner than 200 mm. And there is nothing surprising
                in that the Japanese shell could not penetrate the armor plate of Sevastopol, but only pressed it. After all, in those days
                did not invent mount dovetail armor plates. And each plate hung essentially separately from the others on
                their bolts. As soon as a large-caliber projectile hit a bit harder on an armored plate, these bolts were crushed from one edge, and the plate was pressed slightly into a wooden shirt, and often the seams on the steel cladding under the armor also diverged, which (steel cladding) actually provided strength and waterproofness the ship. But
                Do not worry about strength - any ship can easily take local damage. And here is a small loss
                waterproofing led to flooding of two corridors. But is this not evidence of the power of a Japanese shell over Russian armor?
                No, in no way. And the fact that the leak in the compartment opened in a place previously damaged in a collision with the battleship “Peresvet” is evident from the fact that repairs in the besieged Port Arthur were made in haste - poorly, without replacing the crumpled sheathing sheets with new ones (which there was simply nowhere to take). The fact is, to reconnect the torn sheets of the ship's cladding, you need to either put new smooth sheets, or try to straighten the old ones. It was impossible to bring new sheets of cladding in Port Arthur from Petersburg. It only remained to try to straighten the old. But it is very difficult, and it was not possible to straighten the wrinkled sheets correctly. Therefore, these sheets, in principle, could not be joined together so that their rivet holes coincided. And apparently the master ordered to connect the sheets at least somehow - on a living thread. Probably thinner rivets. And water resistance provided
                in a simple way: putting oiled fabric between the joined sheets - in principle, this was done when building any ship connected with rivets. Such a hacky connection could withstand ordinary swimming, but from the impact of a large-caliber enemy shell this connection, of course, diverged a little and caused a small leak. If any of
                you remember the movie "Afonya" where that plumber says that a trickle of water the thickness of a finger gives a huge loss
                water, so Athos spoke the truth. Even one knocked out rivet an inch thick gives a very large influx of water, and
                if there were several knocked out rivets, and a gap had also formed from the diverging sheets of cladding, then water could arrive in tons. And only bulkheads limit the distribution of water. However, this damage does matter.
                only during a battle, when there is no time to close it. But if the ship is a normal senior assistant, then how
                only ends the battle, then he is obliged to order to eliminate this leak. It’s enough just to build a wooden
                formwork around the opened seam, and pour one or two bags of cement there. And for a long time until the next repair, water will not come.
                Thus: Andrei and I have a fundamentally different view of this case. Andrew believes that the armor was
                pierced, and I say that Andrey is lying - there was no penetration of the armor, but the fact that a small shock was formed
                watercourse - so little trouble: if there were smart people, they could easily eliminate it.
              6. geniy
                geniy 15 May 2018 12: 38
                +1
                2) a 12 "armor-piercing projectile fired from a distance of about 30 kb hit a 127-mm plate of the upper armor belt on the starboard side under the bow of the 152-mm turret. The shell did not penetrate the armor, but deepened by 102 mm (according to N. N. Kuteinikov 51 mm) and broke off a piece of the plate.


                That’s why the experts on military history are inattentive! Well, they are not surprised at anything. But if you think about it,
                then striking proportions are clearly visible. Look at the 127 mm armor plate of the battleship Sevastopol. However by
                According to Sergey Suliga’s calculations, this armadillo had only a thick main belt made of armor approaching Krupp, but the upper belt of 127 mm plates, in his opinion, was made of steel-nickel armor, which is certainly weaker than Krupp. I don’t have to worry about accurate calculations of the strength ratio of these two types of armor now, so I will very roughly estimate the real thickness of the 127 mm steel-nickel plate as approximately equivalent to
                impact strength 100 mm Kruppovskoy armor. And what do we see?
                The large-caliber 305-mm shell was virtually unable to penetrate through the armor equivalent to only 100 mm
                kruppovskoy! That is, the caliber of the Japanese shell is three times the thickness of the Russian armor - but could not penetrate! And in this case, Andrei from Chelyabinsk sees evidence that the Japanese shells pierced the armor, but I vice versa: I think that they did not penetrate! Never. Although many of you will say that this plate cracked from a shell, but it still remained in its place! And despite the fact that the crack divided it into two parts, but after all, to fall to others
                a projectile exactly in the same crack with a thickness of only a few millimeters - from the point of view of probability theory, it’s
                absolutely impossible! And the rest of the board that this plate covers - she continued to defend against the hit of other shells. And the fact that this shell went deep to a certain depth - from 100 to 50 mm, that is, it simply left a small hole in the place of its hit, so this hole has no more significance for an armadillo than a scratch on a warrior's body.
              7. geniy
                geniy 15 May 2018 12: 41
                +1
                Armadillo Retvisan
                1) A 10-12 "high-explosive shell hit the starboard side of the infirmary in the upper left edge of the 51 mm non-hardened steel plate, exploded, dented the plate, breaking the mounting bolts. The plate cracked in the dent and the crack went to the porthole. Small fragments scratched the side, deformed the half-port of the overlying 75 mm gun.
                The network fence lying on the shelf was not damaged, as well as the lapport for loading torpedoes (to the right of the hit). The hole was heavily flooded.

                In this case, just a striking ratio of the thickness of the armor and the caliber of the Japanese shell that hit it:
                the thickness of the armor is 2 inches, and the caliber of the projectile is either 10 inches or 12 inches. That is, the Japanese shell exceeds the armor in this case by 5-6 times. And there would be nothing surprising if an enemy shell pierced through this paper-thin "armor" and exploded in a protected room. But this did not happen - probably because the shell hit at an oblique angle. But it is clear that he exploded outside the armor, that is, again, there was no proper penetration, as science considers. And the fact that the non-hardened (which means very soft) armor was wrinkled and cracked - so nothing surprising - it is very thin - 5-6 times thinner than the caliber of the projectile that got into it. But for Andrei and other history buffs like him, the main phrase is that a lot of water was supposedly poured into the “hole”. But was there really a hole there? After all, it is clearly written: that the crack in the armor reached the porthole. And as everyone knows -
                any porthole has glass, so it was bound to break from a close explosion of a twelve-inch shell. And of course it crashed, forming a hole in the light of at least 38 centimeters, in which water poured. That is, there may have been no breach at all, or either the seams of the ship's casing parted, or the glass of the porthole broke. And it was hardly a great difficulty after the battle to eliminate this water leakage, covering it with simply tarred canvas.

                So you see that all 6 cases cited by Andrei are not at all evidence of the correct

                piercing armor with Japanese shells.
          2. Comrade
            13 May 2018 05: 33
            +4
            Quote: geniy
            Well, if you hadn’t written nonsense, but brought the real facts of breaking through Russian armor! On the one hand, of course, a break is possible, but then show us all a photo of at least one such break in Russian armor!

            There are no pictures, but there is a scheme. This is a thick 8 '' slab, the battleship Pobeda, July 28, 1904, 12 projectile caliber, pay attention to the diameters of the inlet and outlet.

            This historical fact disproves your claim that
            if an armor-piercing or even a high-explosive shell pierced the armor, then it almost does not bend noticeably, and the diameter of such a hole is almost equal to the diameter of the shell. That is, either about 350 mm for a twelve inch
  21. geniy
    geniy 12 May 2018 20: 38
    +1
    Quote: mmaxx
    What a hoax? Well, the British did not break it. But he, not only did not win, but did not even hit even once.

    You apparently love to dump everything in one heap: you have not won, and you haven’t gotten even once. A proper discussion suggests that each factor must be considered separately. That is, the booking factor and high survivability is another, the factor of the required number of artillery barrels is the third, the ability to shoot is the fourth, the team’s courage factor is the fifth. So - in this case, we only consider the reservation factor of Guascard, and from such a position as if it was a target ship without a command or artillery. That is, this is me in relation to why the Admiral Ushakov sank without breaking through the armor. And the ratio of Ushakov's displacement to the total displacement of two Japanese cruisers, compared with Huaskar (2000 tons) and the displacement of two British cruisers (total 8 tons).

    The following ships went into battle against this monitor:
    The Shah (displacement of 6250 tons) had a composite hull (iron kit, wood paneling), 24 guns of 7 "and 9" caliber, as well as two 16-inch torpedo tubes.
    The wooden Amethyst (1970 tons) was armed with 14 guns and had a crew of 225 people. In addition, the Peruvian government sent a squadron against Huascar under the command of Juan Guillermo Moore. The squadron included the battleship Independencia (3556 tons, 14 guns), the Union corvette (2016 tons, 16 guns), the Atahualpa monitor (2100 tons, 2 guns, and the Pilcomayo gunboat (600 tons, 5 guns) )
    On May 28, a landing party from Huascar, with the support of guns, knocked out a garrison from the port of Pisagua. On the evening of the same day, a battle took place between the approaching Moore squadron and the Huascar.
    On May 29, the British already discovered the Huascar leaving for Ilo. With a significant speed advantage, the British surrounded a rebellious monitor near Punta Rut.
    Maneuvering, for almost two hours (before nightfall), the opponents exchanged shots (5 from the Haskar, 40 from the Independence) from a distance of about a mile. The damage was minimal, the loss of the parties - two wounded on the Independence.

    The British maneuvered, trying to hit the Huascar from the side of the unprotected armor of the stern, the monitor tried to get closer for ramming,
    During the battle, a total of 427 shots were fired from Her Majesty’s ships, the monitor answered no more than ten times.
    He looked scary: both masts, rigging, boats were swept away, but the ship did not have serious damage threatening its buoyancy. The armor of the Huascar was pierced only once. One died (the signalman Ruperto Bejar [3]), and five crew members were injured. The British made tactical conclusions from these events: on December 2, 1878, the Shah was replaced on duty by the battleship Triemph.
    In 1879, the so-called Niter War broke out between Peru and Bolivia, on the one hand, and Chile, on the other, over the territory of Antofagasta.

    During it, the Huascar, under the command of Rear Admiral Miguel Grau, terrorized the Chilean coast for six months, attacking transports and bombarding ports.

    During this time, "Huascar":

    shelled and caused destruction to the ports of Cobiha, Tocopilla, Patillos, Mejillones, Vanillos, Punta de Lobo, Chanyaral, Huasco, Caldera, Coquimbo and Taltal;
    sunk 16 Chilean transports;
    damaged the Chilean warships Blanco Encalada, Abtao, Magallanes and Matías Cousiño;
    captured the ships Emilia, Adelaida Rojas, and E. as trophies. Saucy Jack "," Adriana Lucía "," Rímac "and" Coquimbo ";
    captured 260 cavalrymen with horses, weapons and equipment at the Rímac;
    returned the ships Clorinda and Caquetá captured earlier by Chileans;
    shot an artillery battery in Antofagast.
    So the monitor became a serious obstacle to the successful development of the Chilean offensive on land.

    Miguel Grau became the full admiral.

    On May 21, 1879, Huascar, along with the battleship Independencia, arrived at Iquique, then owned by Peru, to lift the blockade carried out by the ships of Chile on April 5, 1879. The port was blocked by the Chilean flotilla as part of the Esmeralda corvette, the Covadong schooner "And transport" Lamar "with 2500 soldiers on board.
    In the course of the battle, the Huascar became close to the Esmeralda and rammed it three times.
    On October 8, 1879, a naval battle took place near Punta de Angamos, in which the Huascar confronted six Chilean ships, including the casemate battleships Blanco Encalada and Almirante Cochrane (Almirante Cochrane).
    The last campaign of the warlike monitor was his actions under the command of Captain José María Santa Cruz on the side of Congress during the civil war of 1891 in Chile.

    So: a simple question: what is the main difference between the Huaskar monitor and the Admiral Ushakov Bronenska? If the so-called amateurs and “experts” in military history understood at least something, then the main difference is immediately noticeable: the Huaskar monitor had a full-length armor belt - from bow and post, and Admiral Ushakov did not have a full armor belt.
    1. Comrade
      13 May 2018 05: 50
      +3
      Quote: geniy
      about this is me in relation to why the "Admiral Ushakov" sank without breaking through the armor.

      This was because the Kingstones discovered.
      Quote: geniy
      A proper discussion suggests that each factor must be considered separately.

      It is impossible to disagree, so it would be nice to know:
      a) The number of hits in the "Haskar"
      b) The weight and type of explosive with which the shells were fired.
      Only then can we conduct a correct comparison of the qualities of “Ushakov” and the “Huaskar” monitor.
    2. mmaxx
      mmaxx 13 May 2018 06: 33
      0
      Why was all this writing? Show what you need? In both cases, the battle was accepted, despite the superiority. “Hauscar” was not sunk, “Ushakov” was actually sunk. what am I writing about? Here about it:
      "even such a small battleship compared to two ten-thousand-cruiser cruisers, in principle, could not be sunk by them, which means if you follow the formal rule, the battleship Admiral Ushakov was stronger than both armored cruisers together"
      Neither on paper nor in life has it been confirmed that the coastal defense battleship with a displacement of 4600 tons, with its weapons and armor, can surpass two armored cruisers with a displacement of more than 10000 tons. There would be a full belt - they would be burned and smashed by HEs. You can’t leave, you can’t get too close. For example, the Bismarck was not sunk by artillery fire, but turned into ruins.
      And enough to prove it is not clear that, examples from another life. All life has shown that coastal defense battleships are only good as gunboats. Dead end concept. And it is good that in Russia they were built the least.
  22. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 12 May 2018 23: 44
    +1
    Of course, I apologize, but the quality of the published article is simply below the plinth. Just a haphazard set of paragraphs logically unrelated to each other. In addition, very poorly read.

    The very topic of coastal defense battleships is very interesting, but uploading material in this form is a clear disrespect for readers.
    1. Comrade
      13 May 2018 05: 52
      +5
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Of course, I apologize, but the quality of the published article is simply below the plinth.

      "Criticizing someone else's, offer your own. Offering - do it."
      S. Korolev.
      Quote: Saxahorse
      In addition, very poorly read.

      What do you mean ? Can you "logically" explain a couple of specific examples?
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 13 May 2018 20: 03
        +2
        You really don’t understand! ??

        What connection do you see between the sudden:
        “After entering service with the following, 1898, an armadillo” at the beginning of the first paragraph and in the same sudden second paragraph:

        "At the Special Meeting held a few days before the surrender of Port Arthur, a decision was made, and three days later, on December 14, 1904."
        What really had nothing to write and explain?

        The text of the article is a rough copy-paste from sources scattered very roughly in chronological order. You can teach pebbles in size and a monkey .. The article has no independent informational value. Information is presented in torn pieces, connectivity is not motivated in any way.

        With the same result, the author could limit himself to one phrase: “About Ushakov, read it there” - and list the same sources. It would be more honest since he was so lazy to write a normal, full-fledged article.
        1. Comrade
          13 May 2018 21: 21
          +2
          Quote: Saxahorse
          What really had nothing to write and explain?

          This is not an educational program or a "murzilka", the article is intended for people in the subject.
          Quote: Saxahorse
          The text of the article is a rough copy-paste from sources.

          "Copy-paste" - this is copied there and put in here.
          I give you a thousand dollars for indicating specific places where the copy-paste comes from. I warn you, an article from the Alternative History website, where partially there is similar material, is also written by me. There are at least two people who know this, and who discussed the topic six years ago.
          ATTENTION ! If you find a source on the Internet from where it was copied, which rangefinders were on Ushakov, I’ll give two thousand dollars. If you indicate the source where you can copy the text with the year of issue of the range finder from Mikasa and its model, I’ll give three thousand dollars. Or maybe you can show with your finger where the figure of one hundred tons was taken, by which the construction load of Ushakov decreased as a result of the undertaken partial modernization?
          Any normal person would grab hold of such offers, and quickly posted a link. Since you blame, it means that you know her, right? But you will not be able to do this, because you simply troll from powerlessness, or lie.
          Well, see how easy it is for liars and trolls to silence? You just need to offer them money so that they confirm their false words. They shut up, hehe ..
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 13 May 2018 21: 28
            +1
            What nafig range finders !?

            I strongly recommend that you google it and find at least some sort of, the most overwhelming, manual for beginner graphomaniacs. What is the plot, the climax, the epilogue there, the prologue, the plot, denouement ... At least some basic materials explaining to the engineers of which components any literary work should consist.

            Someone intuitively understands this, someone, as I see it, needs a persistent reminder. Ask at least “Andrei from Chelyabinsk”, who is also clearly an engineer, but you can read his articles without swearing every minute.
            1. Comrade
              13 May 2018 21: 56
              +2
              We’ll write that down, you are not able to confirm your words, even for a lot of money. And who are you after that, huh?
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 13 May 2018 23: 05
                +1
                Let's do without going to the individual :)
                This article is unreadable and needs a radical alteration. The method of presenting information in incoherent pieces is vicious and does not cause confidence in the information presented.

                Try to draw conclusions.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 14 May 2018 13: 49
                  +1
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  This article is unreadable and needs a radical alteration.

                  I am afraid you do not understand. You write
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  Ask at least “Andrei from Chelyabinsk”, who is also clearly an engineer, but you can read his articles without swearing every minute.

                  I am not an engineer, I am an economist by education, but this is not the main thing. And the fact that I am engaged in nothing more than the popularization of known data - it usually gives interest to them that I give interpretations to well-known and generally accessible facts, which are often very different from generally accepted ones. But my level is popularization. Accordingly, I write about everything in detail, forming a holistic picture. Valentine, however, wrote a research article that contained information never previously published and unknown, so its value is immeasurably higher.
                  His article is for people like me, for example. I don’t need to tell the well-known facts about Ushakov, I myself know them very well, and what I don’t know, I can always re-read the sources in my memory. But what Valentine wrote ... In publicly available sources this is not and was not.
                  1. Saxahorse
                    Saxahorse 14 May 2018 21: 53
                    0
                    Any article, as well as in principle any kind of product, differs from the table of logarithms by the presence of meaning. The author previously takes the trouble to understand what he wants to convey to the reader and builds his work from this. Even a technical reference makes sense because it is thought out and structured in advance for the convenience of the reader.

                    Here, I apologize again, but the meaning is not visible. It turned out what is called "elderberry garden and uncle in Kiev." At the wheelhouse, rangefinders and the pipe is yellow. So what?
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 May 2018 14: 02
                      0
                      Quote: Saxahorse
                      At the wheelhouse, rangefinders and the pipe is yellow. So what?

                      I received ahichrenitically important (from my point of view, of course) information
                      1. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 16 May 2018 22: 11
                        0
                        The value of the information received is by definition an extremely subjective concept. However, the society still developed some minimum standards and rules for presenting information. They are studied at school and checked on exams in the Russian language and literature.

                        I must admit, I have never had an excellent rating. :(
  23. arturpraetor
    arturpraetor 14 May 2018 15: 18
    0
    And I kept thinking that I missed the 12 numbers ... wassat
    Great article, dear colleague! If you "cheat" on all armadillos, as you hinted at in the comments, it will be epic! good
    PS And I added to the list of nicknames of the Passer-by, yes. Already 13 nicknames laughing It's time to bet whether by the end of the year there will be 50 or not.
  24. Bouncer
    Bouncer 15 May 2018 06: 55
    +15
    Just this battleship had to fight in skerries with German or Swedish counterparts.
    Because such a draft.
    Speed ​​implied actions in conjunction with the EDB of the 90s.
    I had to solve unusual problems, that's all. But the ship is good.