Military Review

On the day of the Great Victory. About Baltic submariners. W-408

Submarines of the "Pike" type. It is unlikely that there will be at least one person interested in the domestic naval fleetwho would not hear about these ships. "Pike" were the most numerous type of submarines of the pre-war Navy of the USSR, and a total of 86 units were built. Since a significant number of them at the beginning of the war were in the Pacific Ocean, and a number of submarines went into operation after the war, only 44 boats of this type were able to take part in the battles of the Great Patriotic War. According to the latest data, in the period 1941-1945. submariners who fought on the Pike recorded 27 transports and tankers with a total displacement of 79 gross registered tons (the Vilpas and Reinbek steamers that were destroyed by Shch boats during the Soviet-Finnish War are not included here) , as well as 855 transports and schooners of neutral states, which had a total displacement of about 20 brt.

But from the 44 U-type submarines that entered the battle with the enemy, we lost 31.

No matter how sad it is to state it, but in recent years, among many fans stories navy took root a certain "look down" on the actions of the Soviet submariners during the Second World War. They say that the tonnage was sent to the bottom of everything, which is especially noticeable on the background of the dizzying successes of the German U-bots in the battle for the Atlantic, while the losses were monstrous. Let's try to figure out why this happened, using the example of the Baltic “pike”.

The history of the creation of boats of this type originates in the 1928 year, when, under the guidance of B.M. Malinin's specialists from the NK and the Baltic Shipyard began the conceptual design of the submarine "for performing positional service in closed theaters." In those years, the once mighty Russian fleet was reduced almost to its nominal values; even our ability to protect Sevastopol or the Gulf of Finland in the Baltic was a big question. The country needed new ships, but there was practically no money, which made it necessary to give priority to light forces.

During the First World War, submarines demonstrated their combat power. No, no matter how powerful squadron could feel safe in the area where the submarines operated, and at the same time, the latter remained a relatively inexpensive means of naval warfare. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Navy of the Red Army paid close attention to the submarine fleet. And you need to understand that the "Pikes", in general, were not created by fighting ships on enemy communications, but by means of defense of their own shores - it was assumed that boats of this type would be able to manifest themselves as an underwater component of mine-artillery positions. And this entailed, for example, the fact that a long range for ships of this type was not considered a key characteristic.

The original concept of use was complemented by the desire to create the most simple and cheap submarine. This was understandable - the possibilities of Soviet industry and the financing of the USSR naval forces at the end of the 20s left much to be desired. The situation was complicated by the fact that the national school of submarine shipbuilding of tsarist times, alas, turned out to be very far from the world level. The most numerous submarines of the type “Bars” (single-hull, without compartments) turned out to be very unsuccessful ships. Against the background of the achievements of the British E-type submarines that fought in the Baltic, the successes of domestic submariners during the First World War looked extremely modest. In many ways, it is the fault of low combat and operational qualities of domestic boats.

However, during the Civil War, the Royal Navy lost one of its newest submarines in our waters - the L-55. Boats of this type were built as a development of the previous, extremely successful type E (so well-proven in the fight against the Kaiserlmarine), and a significant part of them went into service after the First World War. Subsequently, L-55 was raised and even introduced into the Red Army Navy - of course, it would be foolish not to take the opportunity to implement advanced foreign experience on the newest boat of the USSR.

British type "L" boats

As a result, the Pike, like the L-55, became a half-hull boat that had boolean ballast tanks, but, of course, the domestic boats were not traces from an English submarine ship. However, a long break in the design and creation of warships (and submarines in particular), together with the desire to make the ship as cheap as possible, could not have a positive effect on the combat qualities of the first Soviet medium submarines.

The first four “Pikes” (series III) were overloaded, their speed was lower than the design speed due to incorrectly chosen screws and not very successful hull shape, at the depth of 40-50 and horizontal steering wheels jammed, the time for draining tanks was absolutely unacceptable 20 minutes. It took 10 minutes to switch from economic to full underwater. Submarines of this type were distinguished by the constraint of internal location (even by the standards of the sub-alloy), the mechanisms turned out to be excessively noisy. Maintenance of the mechanisms was extremely difficult - in order to inspect some of them, it was necessary to spend several hours disassembling other mechanisms that impede inspection. Diesels were capricious and did not give out full power. But even if they had given out, it was impossible to develop the full course anyway due to the fact that, at a power close to the maximum, dangerous oscillations of the shafts occurred - this disadvantage, alas, could not be eradicated in the later series “Schuk”. The discrepancy between the capacities of electric motors and the battery led to the fact that at full speed the latter heated up to 50 hail. The lack of fresh water to fill up the batteries limited the autonomy of the 8 Schuk for days against the design twenty, and there were no desalination plants.

Series V and V-bis (built 12 and 13 submarines, respectively) became “work on the bugs”, but it was clear that the fleet needed a different, more advanced type of average submarine. It must be said that even in 1932 g (and it is possible that even before the tests of the head Pike of the III series), the development of the Pike B project began, which should have significantly higher TTX than expected when designing the " U.

Thus, the full stroke speed of the Pike B should have been 17 or even 18 knots (surface) and 10-11 knots (underwater) against 14 and 8,5 knots of the Pikes, respectively. Instead of two 45-mm semi-automatic 21-K "Pike B" should have received two 76,2-mm guns (later stopped on 100-mm and 45-mm), while the number of spare torpedoes increased from 4 to 6, and also increased the range . Autonomy should be brought to 30 days. At the same time, there was a great continuity between the “Pike B” and the old “Pike”, since the new boat was to receive the main mechanisms and part of the “Pike” systems in an unchanged form. For example, the engines remained the same, but to achieve greater power, the new boat was made three-shaft.

The operational and tactical mission for the new boat was approved by the Chief of the Naval Forces on 6 in January 1932, and a little more than a year later (25 in January on 1933 g), its draft, which reached the stage of working drawings, approved the Revolutionary Military Council. But nevertheless, ultimately, it was decided to go another way - to continue to improve the “Pike” mastered by the industry and at the same time to get the draft of the new middle boat abroad (in the end, this is how the C type submarine appeared)

Many of the drawbacks of the "U" type boats were eliminated in the V-bis-2 series (14 boats), which can be considered the first full-fledged warships of the series. At the same time, the identified problems (where it was possible) were also eliminated on the boats of the early series, which improved their fighting qualities. Following the V-bis-2, the 32 submarines of the X-series and 11-X-bis series were built, but they did not have any fundamental differences from the ships of the V-bis-2 project. Unless the boats of the X series differed in a special, easily recognizable and, as it was then called, “limousine” form of the superstructure - it was supposed that it would reduce the resistance of the ship when moving under water.

But these calculations were not justified, and the superstructure was not very user-friendly, so in the X-bis series, the shipbuilders returned to more traditional forms.

On the whole, the following can be stated: submarines of the "U" type are by no means a great success for domestic shipbuilding. They did not fully comply with the design TTX, and even the “paper” characteristics already in 1932 g were not considered sufficient. By the beginning of the Second World War, boats of type "Sh" obviously outdated. But at the same time, in no case can one underestimate the role played by submarines of this type in the development of the domestic submarine fleet. On the day of the laying of the first three “Pikes” of the III series, present at this event, namorsi R.A. Muklevic said:

“We have the opportunity with this submarine to start a new era in our shipbuilding. This will provide an opportunity to acquire the necessary skills and prepare the necessary personnel for the deployment of production. ”

And this, no doubt, was absolutely true, and besides, a large series of the first domestic medium-sized submarines became a real “forge of cadres” - a school for many, many submariners.

Thus, to the Great Patriotic War, we had, though not the best in the world and already outdated, but still combat-ready and rather menacing ships, which, in theory, could put a lot of blood to the enemy. However, this did not happen - the tonnage of the enemy vessels sunk by the "pikes" is relatively small, and the ratio of success and losses drives melancholy - in fact, we paid for one enemy ship destroyed by this type of submarine. Why did this happen?

Since today we are writing specifically about the Baltic submariners, let us consider the reasons for the relative failure of the “pike” in relation to this theater, although some of the reasons below, of course, also apply to the submarine forces of our other fleets. So, the first of these is the explosive growth of the Red Army Navy in the mid-to-late 30-s, when a small before-naval force literally fell upon a stream of dozens of warships, in many respects fundamentally different from the techniques of the First World War, which, for the most part, our fleet was armed. There was no reserve of highly qualified naval officers in the country, it was of course impossible to quickly prepare them, so we had to upgrade those who had not yet mastered the previous position. In other words, the Navy of the Red Army experienced the same growth illness as the Red Army itself, only the fleet suffered from it even more, because the warship is not even a tank, but much more complex and specific equipment, the effective operation of which requires the coordinated efforts of many highly qualified officers and sailors.

The second reason is that the Baltic Fleet was in a situation that could not be predicted, and which no one had expected before the war. The main task was considered to be the defense of the Gulf of Finland, in the model and likeness of how the Russian Imperial Fleet did it in the First World War. But who could have imagined that already at the very beginning of the war both Finnish shores would be captured by enemy troops? Of course, the Germans and Finns immediately blocked the exit from the Gulf of Finland with mines, aviation and light forces. According to some reports, already in 1942, enemy minefields totaled more than 20 thousand mines and mine defenders, this is an enormous amount. As a result, instead of defending a strong mine-artillery position in accordance with pre-war plans and exercises (and even the Hochsefleft, which at that time was the second fleet of the world), the Baltic Fleet had to break through it in the Gulf of Finland throughout the First World War to enter the operational space.

The third reason is, alas, the reduction of intensive combat training soon after the start of World War II. But if in the same Port Arthur we can “thank” Governor Alekseev and Rear Admiral Vitgeft for the lack of regular exercises, then blaming the lack of proper training during the Great Patriotic War would be wrong for the command of the Baltic Fleet - I wonder where would take the necessary resources for it in besieged Leningrad? But, for example, the first Baltic "Pikes" of the latest and most advanced series of X-bis were in operation since 7 June 1941 of the year ...

And finally, the fourth reason: in the current situation, neither the fleet, nor the army, nor the Air Force had enough funds to support the activities of submarines. The Germans and the Finns had built the Baltic defense echelon, and the fleet locked in Kronstadt with a minimum of resources had no way to hack it.

Assessing the actions of one kind or another or type of troops, we, alas, often forget that no Tanks, artillery, aircraft or warships do not operate in a vacuum. War is always a complex interaction of diverse forces, and therefore, for example, it makes no sense to compare the successes of Soviet and German submariners “head-on”. Undoubtedly, the German sailors received better training than the Soviet, and the submarines that Germany fought had much better performance characteristics than the Pike (in fact, they were designed much later). But you need to understand that if the brave guys from the kriegsmarines were in the conditions in which the Soviet Baltic submariners had to fight, the enchanting millions of tons of tonnage sunk in the Atlantic would have only dreamed of them, and not for long. Because the conditions of the underwater war in the Baltic did not have a longer life.

The first, and perhaps most important, which, alas, the Baltic Fleet did not have was aviation of sufficient strength capable of establishing at least temporary air supremacy in water areas. This, of course, is not about aircraft carriers, but without a sufficient amount of aircraft capable of “working” on the waters of the Gulf of Finland, the withdrawal of minesweepers and cover ships for breaking through minefields became excessively risky. Our aircraft could not crush the light forces of the Finns and Germans, freely operating in Finnish. At the same time, the fleet was unable to conduct regular air reconnaissance of the Baltic Sea, and, accordingly, had the most vague idea of ​​both the German transport routes and the minefields covering them. In essence, our submariners were forced to go blindly to the full power of the German antisubmarine defense. And what did it lead to?

The boat Shch-304 received an order to patrol the throat of the Gulf of Finland, and then - to move to a position in the area of ​​Memel Vindava. On the night of 5 in November 1941, the commander U-304 reported on the arrival to the position and more than the boat did not contact. Much later, it turned out that the position of U-304 was assigned to the northern section of the German Apolda minefield. And this, alas, is not an isolated case.

In general, it was the mines that became the most terrible enemy of our Baltic submariners. And the Germans and Finns mined everything that is possible and what is impossible - in two layers. The Gulf of Finland and exits from it, the possible routes of our submarines along the island of Gotland, but not only there - the approaches to its transport routes were covered with minefields. And here's the result - from the 22 submarines of the type “U”, which the Baltic Fleet had (including those that entered service after the start of the war), 16 died during the hostilities, 13 or even 14 “mined” them. Four dead in the mines "Pikes" simply did not have time to go into combat positions, that is, they never attacked the enemy.

The German submariners, raiding in the ocean, had a good idea of ​​the routes of the transatlantic convoys. They were almost not threatened by mines (except, perhaps, in some sections of the routes, if they were near the British coast), and former airliners that became Focke-Wulf 200 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft found convoys and directed them to wolf packs.

German boats pursued convoys on the surface, taking advantage of the fact that the speed of the transports was relatively low, and when it grew dark they approached and attacked. All this was risky, and, of course, the German submariners suffered losses, but they also delivered terrible blows to the enemy’s shipping. Then, radar and escort aircraft carriers put an end to surface attacks (now moving for the caravan "wolf pack" could be detected long before it could get close to the convoy), and the combined efforts of the base and deck aircraft put an end to the raids of German heavy aircraft in the Atlantic. Then the Germans were forced to go to the actions "blindly" - only submarines against the entire PLO system of the trans-Atlantic convoys. Effects? Enchanting successes are gone, and the Germans began to pay one submarine for each sunk transport. Of course, it can be said that the defense of the Allied convoys has become many times more powerful than the Baltic shipping guard that the Germans and Finns deployed in the Baltic, but it should be borne in mind that the German submariners did not fight on Shchuks, but on much more perfect ships. In addition, the Atlantic Ocean did not have many shoals, shallow water areas and mines.

Yes, the Pikes were not the best submarines in the world, and their crews lacked training. But with all this, boats of this type entered service since the 1933 year, so that the fleet has accumulated considerable experience in their operation. It is difficult to say for sure, but it is possible that with all the above-mentioned problems and shortcomings of all our submarines at the beginning of the war, it was the “Pikes” that were the most combat-capable. And the people who served on them were ready to fight the enemy to the end.

Usually, on the eve of 9 in May, we remember the heroes, whose actions inflicted heavy damage on the enemy, thwarted his plans in one way or another, or ensured successful actions of our troops, or saved someone. But in this article we will risk moving away from the template. We will recall the first combat campaign of the submarine U-408. Which, alas, was the last for our "pike".

At one o'clock in the morning 19 in May 1943 Shch-408, accompanied by five patrol boats and seven minesweepers, went to the diving area (East Gogland reach, 180 km west of Leningrad). Then the boat had to act independently - it had to force the enemy areas of the PLO and go to the position in Norrköping Bay - this is the area of ​​the coast of Sweden, south of Stockholm.

What happened next? Alas, we can only guess with some degree of certainty. Usually, in publications it is indicated that the boat was attacked by an aircraft that damaged it, and then light German forces “swooped in” on the oil trail on U-408. But most likely (and taking into account the German and Finnish data) the events developed as follows: two days later, on May 21, 13.24 U-408 was attacked by a German seaplane, which discovered it on an oil trail and dropped two depth charges on U-408. Where did the oil trace come from U-408? It is possible that the boat received some kind of malfunction, or some kind of breakdown occurred, although it cannot be ruled out that the German plane attacked something that had nothing to do with U-408. On the other hand, already after an hour and a quarter of 2 (15.35) our boat was attacked by a Finnish aircraft, which also dropped depth charges on it, and the oil mark was again indicated as a unmasking attribute. This suggests the presence of some kind of breakdown on U-408.

Perhaps it was like that. U-408 was fatally unlucky from the very beginning of combat service. Four days after the end of the test, 26 September 1941 g, the boat collided with the networker “Onega”, receiving damage that required factory repair. The ship was repaired, but 22 of June 1942, when U-408 was in the Admiralty plant's bucket, two German projectiles fell into it, again causing heavy damage to the ship. One compartment was flooded, and W-408 rested stern into the ground, having a roll in 21 hail. It was repaired again, and by October 1943, the ship was ready to go to sea, but then again the heavy projectile exploded next to Shch-408 and the fragments pierced the durable hull ... The boat again got in for repair.

One of the few photos U-408

What was the quality of this repair? Recall that it happened in besieged Leningrad. Of course, in the 1943, the worst thing is the blockade winter 1941-1942. was already behind. Mortality sharply declined: while in March 1942 100 people died in the city, in May 000 50 people already died, and in July, when U-000 was repaired again, 408 people.

Just for a second, imagine what is behind these “optimistic” numbers ...

But back to U-408. Exhausted, exhausted, starving to death workers could easily make some kind of mistake, and the post-repair tests, if they were, were clearly being whipped up and unlikely in full. So it is likely that during a long underwater transition something went out of order and a leak of oil appeared, which became the cause of the finding of U-408.

However, this is only guesswork. Be that as it may, but less than an hour after the attack of the Finnish aircraft, in 16.20, three German high-speed German barges - BDB-188; 189 and 191 - approached the location of the boat. They dropped 408 depth charges on the U-16. Our Pike did not receive any damage, but ... The fact is that after a two-day transfer, the batteries were discharged, they had to be recharged. To do this in the presence of enemy ships and aircraft, of course, was not possible, but with empty batteries, the boat could not tear itself away from the forces pursuing it.

German BDB

Thus, the crew was in a stalemate. U-408 tried to escape from prosecution, but - unsuccessfully, the Germans continued to search for the boat and dropped 21.30 depth charges on it in 5. It became clear that the Germans from the area of ​​the location of U-408 will not leave.

Then the commander of Shch-408, Pavel Semenovich Kuzmin, made the decision: to surface, and to give artillery battle. It was brave, but at the same time and reasonable - being in the surface position the boat was able to use the radio station and call for help. At the same time, at night there were more chances to break away from the forces pursuing the boat. Therefore, at about two o'clock in the morning tentatively (perhaps later, but not later than 02.40-02.50) Shch-408 surfaced and engaged in battle with the German BDB, as well as, apparently, by the Swedish patrol boat “VMV-17”.

The forces were far from equal. Each BDB was armed with a very powerful 75-mm gun, as well as one or three Oerlikon 20-mm automata, and a Swedish patrol boat with one Orelikon. At the same time, U-408 had only two 45-mm 21-K semi-automatic. However, the word "semi-automatic" should not be misleading, the whole X-NUMX-K semi-automatic was that the shutter after the shot opened automatically.

Further descriptions of the battle vary greatly. According to the generally accepted version, "Schuku" in the artillery battle destroyed two enemy patrols and died with the whole crew, without lowering the flag. However, after the war, no proof of the death of at least one ship was found in the Finnish and German documents, and, frankly, it is doubtful that U-408 could achieve such success. Unfortunately, the fighting qualities of 45-mm 21-K "semi-automatic" shells were frankly small. Thus, the high-explosive OF-85 contained a total of 74 grams of explosive. Accordingly, in order to destroy even a small ship, it was necessary to provide a huge number of hits. For example, during the Soviet-Finnish war, to sink the Estonian vessel Kassari (379 brt) W-323, the 152 projectile had to be spent — the exact number of hits is unknown, but probably the vast majority fell, as the ship was shot almost in polygon conditions . By the way, the high-explosive projectile of the German 7,5 cm Pak. 40, which was armed with BDB, contained 680 grams of explosive.

According to others, the gunners U-408 did not sink, but damaged the enemy's 2 ship, but there may have been some confusion. The fact is that after the battle, the German BDB did not understand, fired at the Finnish patrol boat “VMV-6” coming to support them, and the splinter of one projectile boat was damaged - perhaps later, these damages were attributed to 408.

Most likely, this was the case - W-408 surfaced and entered into battle with the enemy ships. It is known that in 02.55 and 02.58 in the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet were obtained radiograms:

"Attacked by the forces of the PLO, I have damage. The enemy does not allow to charge. Please send the aircraft. My place is Vindlo"

Vayndlo is a very small, barely noticeable island on the map, located about 26 miles from Gogland, and the distance from Leningrad (in a straight line) is about 215 kilometers.

In the artillery battle that ensued, the Germans (in their opinion) achieved four hits of 75-mm shells and a large number - 20-mm. The boat responded with several hits in the BDB-188, one of them struck the German ship in the wheelhouse. In any case, it is reliably known that the battle of the German ships against U-408 was not a game with only one goal - the submarine gunners managed to cause damage to the enemy.

And then ...

Fortunately, among us there are not indifferent people who are ready to waste time and energy on solving the mysteries of the not-so-distant past. There is a project “Bowing to the ships of the Great Victory”, in which a group of divers searches for dead ships and dives to them. And so, on April 22, an underwater search expedition in which, in addition to our compatriots, a group of Finnish divers SubZone took part, discovered the remains of the submarine U-2016, and then performed descents to it. This expedition allowed to shed light on the circumstances of the last battle and the death of our "Pike". The fact that the divers saw, told one of the project participants, Ivan Borovikov:

“During the inspection of the“ U-408 ”numerous traces of shells hit were found, which indicates that the submarine did conduct an intensive artillery battle. Near the guns are still boxes from the shells, and it is clear that they are clearly not the first, the battle was fierce and fired a lot. The PPSh machine gun was also detected, which most likely was a personal weapons submarine commander Pavel Kuzmin. According to the statute, he had to go to the bridge with a personal weapon during a surface battle. Judging by the fact that the machine gun stayed outside the "U-408", the commander of the "pike", most likely, died during shelling.

The Finns who participated in the battle said they saw artillery hits in the boat, saw how the Shch-408 artillery crews died and were replaced by other people. The picture that we saw at the bottom corresponds to the battle description given by the Finnish side.

In this case, we did not see serious damage to the hull of the boat. Apparently, strikes on the "U-408" using depth charges did not cause her serious damage. All hatches were closed, and the crew, apparently, until recently fought for the survivability of the boat. "

As far as I understood the author - computer reconstruction U-408, made on the basis of video filming

Real photos U-408

On the question of whether the boat sank as a result of enemy artillery fire, or whether the survivors dive, Ivan Borovikov replied:

"Most likely," U-408 "went to the dive. Apparently, due to the damage, the Pike lost buoyancy and was unable to surface. The crew remained on board and died a few days after the artillery battle. ”

We will never know what 23 really happened on May 1943. But most likely, this is what happened: after a fierce battle, the crew of Shch-408 suffered heavy losses. Most likely, the commander of the boat, Pavel Semenovich Kuzmin died in battle - PPSh, which he was obliged to take with him, leaving the bridge, and today lies on him, and near the place where the commander should be - a hole from an 75-mm projectile. Alas, it was impossible to break away from the enemy, but there was no help.

Those who remained alive faced a difficult choice. It was possible to fight to the last, as long as the ship still maintains buoyancy. Yes, in this case, many would have died, but the death from an enemy projectile or splinter in battle is a quick death, and besides, part of the crew probably would have survived. In this case, UH-408 was guaranteed to die, prisoners who escaped from it were expected to be captured, but at the same time those who survived the battle would have survived. They have absolutely nothing to reproach themselves for, because they fought to the extreme. Descendants would have admired their heroic deed.

But there was a second option - to dive. In this case, there was some chance that the command of the Baltic Fleet, having received a radiogram-call for help, would take appropriate measures and drive away enemy ships. And if you can wait for help, if the boat is (despite numerous hits) capable of ascent, then U-408 can be saved. Moreover, during the battle it was impossible to assess the damage of U-408, it was impossible to understand whether the submarine would be able to resurface after a dive or not. It was clear only one thing - if help does not come, or even comes, but fails to emerge, then each of those who survived the artillery battle will face a dreadful, painful death from suffocation.

The third option - to lower the flag and surrender to the enemy, for these people simply did not exist.

We will never know which of the submarine officers commanded at that moment when it was necessary to make a terrible decision, but it was made. U-408 went under water. Forever and ever.

The Germans and the Finns were afraid to miss the prey. BDB, patrol boats, a Finnish minelayer approaching continued to patrol the Pike dive area, periodically dropping depth charges. Meanwhile, her crew strained their last forces in an attempt to repair the damaged boat. Already in the late afternoon on May 23, enemy hydroacoustics recorded sounds that were regarded as an attempt to blow through the cisterns, and it probably was in fact the case. It is known that the boat was submerged with a stern trim, but at the same time the participants of the 2016 expedition of the year found that the Pike stern (at the waterline gone into the ground) was raised. This indicates an attempt to blow the feed ballast tanks - alas, the damage of the Shch-408 turned out to be too great for the boat to float.

From about 17.00 on May 24, noises from W-408 were no longer heard. It was all over. “Pike” forever rested at the depth of the 72 meter, becoming a mass grave for the 41 member of her crew. But the Finnish and German ships remained in place and even dropped several depth charges. Only the next day, May 25, finally making sure that the Soviet submarine did not emerge, they left the area of ​​her death.

And what about the command of the Baltic Fleet? Upon receiving the Shch-408 radiogram, eight I-16 and I-153 planes flew to Waindlo with Lavensari, but they were intercepted by the enemy and, having lost two cars, returned back without completing their combat mission. The next attempt was made only after 8 hours - this time the La 5 took to the aid of the dying "Pike", but they, having lost two cars, failed to get through to the place of the tragedy.

U-408 died in the first combat campaign. The boat never went into a torpedo attack, could not destroy a single enemy ship. But does this mean that we, admiring the achievements of the German submariners, should shamefully forget how our crew fought and died? How did the crews of our other submarines die?

Photos of several crew members U-408. Upstairs - the commander of the ship, Pavel Semenovich Kuzmin

PS From the findings of the expedition "Bow 2016":

“The fact that all three manholes through which it was possible to leave the sunken submarine, have no visible damage, but are closed, says that the submariners made a conscious decision to the enemy not to surrender.”

On the day of the Great Victory. About Baltic submariners. W-408
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  1. Vard
    Vard 9 May 2018 05: 37
    Congratulations to all on a holiday ... To all those who got out of the trench ...
    ANCIENT 9 May 2018 06: 29
    Andrei, I constantly read your articles, I learn a lot of interesting things! hi Thank you for your work, and I congratulate you, like the whole site, on the 9th of May Holiday - HAPPY VICTORY! !!! drinks soldier soldier drinks hi
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      9 May 2018 12: 11
      Quote: ANCIENT
      Andrei, I constantly read your articles, I learn a lot of interesting things!

      Thank you very much, dear Sergey, for your kind words! And you too - with a holiday, with Victory Day! hi drinks
  3. Mefodi5124
    Mefodi5124 9 May 2018 07: 47
    Congratulations to all on the Great Holiday! Congratulations and remember!
  4. san4es
    san4es 9 May 2018 08: 49
    hi Happy Victory Day!
    "Attacked by the forces of the PLO, I have damage. The enemy does not allow to charge. Please send the aircraft. My place is Vindlo" soldier
    Sep 9 2016 year hi
    1. beeper
      beeper 9 May 2018 10: 28
      Thank you, comrade Sanchez, for the video !!! good
      HAPPY VICTORY HOLIDAY !!! Health to you and your loved ones !!!
  5. beeper
    beeper 9 May 2018 09: 17
    I thank the distinguished author for an interesting story! good
    It so happened that my father read me the first stories about our submariners, the Severomors, he was very interested in military history, spared no money on travel books and the Great Patriotic War, and among others, the book “Heroes of the Deep Sea” was my love, a lot once read and re-read ... since then and for all my life I have loved submarines, and submariners have become for me a measure of military courage.
    I remember how, after many, many years, when I saw, in the courtyard of the Sevastopol Naval Museum, the Pike propellers (removed from the Shch-204 and Shch-211 sunken from Varna), I was greatly amazed at their real "miniature "...
    All-HAPPY VICTORY !!! Memory, Peace and Health !!! drinks
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      9 May 2018 12: 13
      Quote: pishchak
      I thank the distinguished author for an interesting story!

      And thank you! Happy Victory Day! hi drinks
  6. alstr
    alstr 9 May 2018 12: 41
    My grandfather was lucky to sail on the Sch-307. One of the few that remained intact.
    Regarding combat training, it was different. For example, my grandfather at the beginning of the war served on the boat for 8 years (he did not manage to demobilize after urgent).
    But on new boats the level was not always high. Plus we don’t forget that there’s simply nowhere to train in the besieged Leningrad - we trained in the Okhta Sea (this is at Liteiny Bridge). And only after breaking the blockade already went to Ladoga.

    Well, about the mines - you just have to remind that the Baltics have been cleared for 10 years and then only the main fairways. The rest was left, because it was decided that the remaining ones had expired. And still they are caught.

  7. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 9 May 2018 13: 16
    Thank you for the article. If you don’t mind, then I’ll try to cite statistics on the submarine of the “UH” BF (especially since there will be no continuation of this series of articles ... or will it?)
    U-type submarines of the Baltic Fleet. Statistics.
    Щ-301 "Pike" (BF), t. "Щ" III series, 11.10.33/XNUMX/XNUMX
    Killed on 28.08.41 (commander cap.-l-t. I.V. Grachev). A mine blast during a breakthrough from Tallinn to Kronstadt in the Uminda metro station. Sank after removing part of the crew. Mines exhibited by Vesihisi submarines or Riilahti and Ruotsinsalmi minzags; according to the Soviet side, it was blown up by a floating mine, (+36)

    Щ-302 "Perch" (BF), t. "Щ" III series, 11.10.33/XNUMX/XNUMX
    11-13.10.42, (commander cap.-l-t. V. D. Nechkin). It was blown up by a mine of the Seeigel fence north of Suur Tutrsaari Island. Presumably, she stayed afloat and on 14.10.42 was finished off by Finnish aviation, (+37)

    Щ-303 "Ruff" (BF), t. "Щ" III series, 15.11.33/XNUMX/XNUMX
    Damaged 1 enemy ship:
    1. Transport “Aldebaran” (Germany) 20.07.42/7891/1 (XNUMX gross vehicles) (damaged) (+ XNUMX)

    Щ-304 “Komsomolets” (BF), t. “Щ” III series, 15.08.34/XNUMX/XNUMX
    After 5.11.42, (commander of cap. 3 r. Ya. P. Afanasyev), she died in the mine of the Nashorn barrage, (+40)

    Щ-305 "Lin" (BF), t. "Щ" V-bis series, 3.12.34
    05.11.42/3/39, (commander of cap. XNUMX r. D.M. Sazonov). Taranena of the Finnish submarine "Vetehinen" (commander cap.-l-t. O. Leiko) north-east. Simpnasa in the Åland Sea, (+XNUMX)

    Щ-306 "Haddock" (BF), t. "Щ" V-bis-2 series, 4.08.35
    Sank 1 ship of the enemy (467 gross ???):
    1. Transport "Elbing 9" (Germany, 1891) 6.11.42 (467 gross vehicles, 48,5x7,3x3,4 m, 8 knots) ???
    12-16.11.42 (commander cap.-l-t N.I. Smolyar). Missing. It was blown up by a mine of the Noshorn mine barrier in the Finnish ze-ve, (+39)

    Щ-307 “Cod” (BF), t. “Щ” V-bis-2 series, 4.08.35
    Sank 1 ship (364 tons) and 2 enemy ships (4400 gross) (+ 40):
    1. U-144 submarine (Germany 10.01.40) 10.08.41 (314/364 t, 44x4,92x3,93 m, 700/420 hp, 12,7 / 7,9 knots, 3x533 mm TA, 1x1 - 20 mm) (+ 28)
    2. Transport “Betty X” (Finland, 1902) 26.10.42 (2477 brt, 92x13,4x6 m, 9 knots) (cargo-sulfur pyrites) (+ 12)
    3. Transport "Henrietta Schulze" (Germany, 1943) 16.01.45/1923/XNUMX (XNUMX gross)

    Щ-308 "Salmon" (BF), t. "Щ" V-bis series, 14.11.35/XNUMX/XNUMX
    10.1942 (commander of cap. 3 r. L.N. Kostylev). Missing. It is possible that the Finnish submarine Iku Turso was sunk (Capt. Commander Capt. E. Pakkola) at the passage to the Sirda-Kvarken Strait near Ute Island on 27.10.42, or it was sunk by the strike of the Shiff-47 Submarine 19.10.42. 2 in the district of Utyo. Could perish on the way home from injuries resulting from this blow. Perhaps destroyed at Taikesaari Island Ch. bombs and artillery fire of the Finnish SKA "VMV-20.10.42" 40. It is possible that the submarine is undermined by a mine of the Nashorn, Yuminda, or Seeigel, (+XNUMX)

    Щ-309 "Dolphin" (BF), t. "Щ" V-bis-2 series, 20.08.36/XNUMX/XNUMX
    Sank 4 enemy ships (12434 gross):
    1. Transport-timber carrier “Bonden” (Finland, 1891) 12.09.42/672/56,5 (9,2 gbt, 0x2 m) (cargo-timber) (+ XNUMX/XNUMX)
    2. Transport “Karl Corts” (Germany, 1910) 10.11.44 (903 gross vehicles, 70,5 × 10,3 × 3,7 m, 8,5 knots) (+ 0)
    3. Transport "Nordenham" (Germany, 1915) 7.12.44 (4592 brt, 124,5x15x9,1 m, 14,5 knots) (+ 9)
    4. Transport "Göttingen" (Germany, 1944) 23.02.45/6267/145,2 (18,5 brt, 8,4x14x130 m, 500 knots) (from +XNUMX to XNUMX)

    Щ-310 “Belukha” (BF), t. “Щ” V-bis-2 series, 20.08.36
    Sank 4 enemy ships:
    1. Transport "Franz Rudolph" (Germany, 1906) 29.09.42/1419/73,5 (11 brt, 5,1 x 8,5 x XNUMX m, XNUMX knots)
    2. Excavator "Bagger-3" (Germany, 1905) 9.10.44 (587 gt)
    3. Military transport RO-24 Zonneviyk (Germany, 1928) 9.10.44/4499/117 (16,12 brt, 7,68x10,5x448, 10 knots) (+ XNUMX according to other data +XNUMX)
    4. Training rangefinder ship "Karl Zeiss" (Germany, 1939) 14.10.44/1320/78,5 (12,1 brt, 12 x XNUMX m, XNUMX knots) ???

    Щ-311 “Kumzha” (BF), t. “Щ” V-bis-2 series, 21.08.36
    Sank 2 enemy ships (1259 gross):
    1. Steamboat “Vilpas” (Finland, 1909) 29.12.39 (775 brt, 64х9,6х4 m) (sunk by artillery and a torpedo. Consumption - 140x45 mm of shells and 1 torpedo) (Cargo weight)
    2. Steamboat “Fenris” (Sweden, 1909) 5.01.40 (484 gt, 41,1 x 7,8 x 3,3 m, 10 knots) (Sunk by artillery. 127-45 mm of shells and 1 torpedo were spent) (+ 0)
    15.10.42 (commander of cap. 3 r. A.S. Pudyakov). Fire of the Finnish SKA “VMV-13” and “VMV-15” at Porkkala, or by them 12.10.42 south of the island of Taikersaari, (+40)

    Щ-317 (BF), t. "Щ" X series, 1.11.36
    I sunk 3 and damaged 1 enemy ship (5824 gt) (+ 26):
    1. Transport "Argo" (Finland, 1892) 16.06.42/2513/98,5 (13,47 brt, 6,22x8,5x9 m, XNUMX knots) (cargo-potassium salt) (+ XNUMX)
    2. Transport “Orion” (Denmark) 18.06.42/2405/3 (XNUMX gross vehicles) (in ballast) (badly damaged) (+ XNUMX)
    3. Transport “Ada Gorton” (Sweden, 1917) 22.06.42/2405/89 (13,4 brt, 6,1x9x14 m, 2 knots) (cargo - iron ore) (+ XNUMX/XNUMX)
    4. Transport “Otto Cords” (Germany, 1910) 8.07.42/906/70,6 (10,3 gross vehicles, 3,7 x 13 x XNUMX m, XNUMX knots)
    12.07.42/57/52 (commander cap.-lt N.K. Mokhov). Sunk Ch. bombs of the Swedish destroyer Stockholm north of Eland. Found on the ground at a point with coordinates 16 ° 55 'N / 1999 ° 6' E in 16. It was believed that the submarine was blown up by a mine and was finished off by hl. bombs of the minorsag “Ruotsinsalmi”, SKA “VMV-15.07.4” (according to other data of “VMV-42”) and the Finnish aircraft in the Kalbodengrund region XNUMX, (+XNUMX)

    Щ-318 (BF), t. "Щ" X series, 30.08.36
    Sank 1 ship of the enemy (643 gt):
    1. Tanker "Hiddensee" (Germany, 1935) 4.02.45/643/XNUMX (XNUMX gross vehicles)

    Щ-319 (BF), t. "Щ" X series, 11.12.36
    09.1941 (commander cap.-lt N.S. Agashin). Missing. On September 19, she went on a military campaign to a position towards Libau, but did not report a breakthrough to the Baltic. Probably died in a mine in the Gulf of Finland or in the Libava region at the end of September 1941, (+38)

    Щ-320 (BF), t. "Щ" X series, 11.12.36
    Sank 1 ship of the enemy (676 gt):
    1. Tanker Anna-Catherine Fritzen (Germany, 1911) 5.07.42 (676 gb, 50,6x9,8x4,3 m, 9 knots)
    03-06.10.42 (commander of cap. 3 r. I.M. Vishnevsky). Missing. Possibly bombed by a mine in the Gulf of Finland, (+40)

    Щ-322 (BF), t. "Щ" X series, 4.11.36
    Sank 1 ship of the enemy (2804 gt):
    1. Steamboat “Rainback” (Germany, 1938) 10.12.39 (2804 gross vehicles, 105x14,7x6,1 m, 11 knots) (died with the whole team)
    12.10.41 (commander cap.-l-t V. A. Ermilov). Died in a mine west of Gogland Island in the Gulf of Finland, (+37)

    Щ-323 (BF), t. "Щ" X series, 3.11.36
    Drowned 2 enemy ships (4163 gt) (+ 1/2):
    1. Transport "Kassari" (Estonia, 1888) 10.12.39 (379 gross vehicles, 37,1 x 6,7 x 5,5 m) (sunk by artillery, consumption - 160 x 45 mm of shells) (+ 1/2)
    2. Transport "Baltenland" (Germany, 1915) 16.10.41 (3784 gross vehicles, 105,9x15x7,7 m, 9 knots) (cargo - wooden mounts for mines)
    01.05.43/2/5 (commander of cap. 1944 r. A. G. Andronov). It was blown up on a bottom mine in the Sea channel of Leningrad. 39 people saved In XNUMX it was picked up and scrapped, (+XNUMX)

    Щ-324 (BF), t. "Щ" X series, 31.10.36
    Sank 1 enemy ship (466 gb) (+ 26):
    1. Aux. SKR "Aura-2" (Finland, 1888) 13.01.40/466/51,5 (7,8 brt, 3,2x1x1 m, 75x1- 1 mm, 20x1-26 mm, XNUMX bullet.) (He died from the explosion of his own main bomb when submarine attack) (+ XNUMX)
    November 06-10.11.41, 39 (commander cap.-lt G.I. Tarkhnishvili). Missing. Probably died in a mine in the western part of the Gulf of Finland, (+XNUMX)

    Щ-405 (БФ), t. "Щ" X-bis series, 7.06.41
    13.06.42/3/36 (commander cap. XNUMX r. I.V. Grachev). It was blown up by a mine in the region of Feskr Island during the transition in the surface position from Kronstadt to Lavensaari, (+XNUMX)

    Щ-406 (БФ), t. "Щ" X-bis series, 7.06.41
    I sunk 3 and damaged 1 enemy ship (4062 gt) (+ 12):
    1. Sailing-motor schooner (timber truck) “Fides” (Germany) 8.07.42 (545 gb) (Damaged) (cargo-timber)
    2. The trawler "Mercator" (Germany) 26.10.42 (119 gt)
    3. Transport “Bengt Sture” (Sweden, 1917) 29.10.42/872/64,7 (9,63 brt, 4,02 x 9 x 8 m, 7 knots) (cargo coal) (+ XNUMX, captured XNUMX)
    4. Transport “Agness” (Finland, 1912) 1.11.42 (3071 gross vehicles, 102,96x14,44x7,4 m, 8 knots) (cargo-coal) (+ 4)
    01.06.43/3/39 (commander of cap. XNUMX r. E.A. Osipov). Missing. Perhaps it was blown up by a mine, (+XNUMX)

    Щ-407 (БФ), t. "Щ" X-bis series, 10.09.41
    Sank 2 enemy ships:
    1. Transport (training and navigation vessel) “Nordstern” (Germany, 1939) 6.10.44 (1127 gross vehicles, 71,6 x 10,6 x 4,1 m, 12 knots) (+ 531)
    2. Transport “Seeburg” (Germany, 1940) 4.12.44 (12181 gross vehicles, 160,9x21,3x13,2 m, 17,5 knots) (+ 0)

    Щ-408 (БФ), t. "Щ" X-bis series, 10.09.41
    23.05.43/5/41 (commander cap.-l-P. P. Kuzmin). After a long pursuit, sunk by a group of Finnish ships, incl. Riilahti and Ruotsinsalmi minzags and aircraft in the Vindlo lighthouse area. According to the official Soviet version, she was forced to come up and engage in artillery battle with XNUMX enemy BDB and SKA, (+XNUMX)

    Щ-411 (БФ), t. "Щ" X-bis series, 21.07.45
    24.04.42 (unfinished). Sank in the Neva in Leningrad as a result of injuries from enemy artillery fire. Raised. After the war was put into operation.
  8. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 9 May 2018 13: 17
    The data is incomplete and constantly updated by me. If there is anything to add, I will not mind.
  9. Gepard
    Gepard 9 May 2018 14: 27
    Everlasting memory!!! sad
  10. Gepard
    Gepard 9 May 2018 14: 30
    Thank you, dear Andrew. I learn a lot of new and interesting from your articles.
  11. senima56
    senima56 9 May 2018 14: 58
    You read such stories and think: how stupidly did our naval commanders manage the forces and human lives ?! They send submarines to break through (!!!) anti-submarine minefields and nets! The submarine is fighting, asking for help, sending 8 planes to help, two are shot down, but the 6 (!!!) remaining are turned back !!!
    6 fighters didn’t make it !? Turned away! Yes, one would be enough to two scoops, if not sink, then disperse and damage properly! During this time, the submarine could leave! Someone is preparing each operation, which means that the "guilty" are and must be punished!
    1. Salomet
      Salomet 14 May 2018 08: 13
      If the fighters still did not require fuel and ammunition Wow !!! Then the Gramati would have definitely torn everyone.
      I think it was no longer tearing. Or do you think pilots are cowards? stop
      Many thanks to the author. A worthy article about a worthy feat. hi
  12. Vedzmin
    Vedzmin 9 May 2018 18: 05
    The blessed memory of the fallen sailors and all Soviet military personnel who died in that war. Such examples once again show how cruel the war was, how difficult it was to succeed.
  13. Dooplet11
    Dooplet11 9 May 2018 19: 35
    Author! Thanks for posting!
  14. Curious
    Curious 9 May 2018 21: 45
    As far as I understood the author - computer reconstruction U-408, made on the basis of video filming
    In 20014, Finnish research divers said they discovered the remains of a German submarine U-26 that had sunk a hundred years ago at the bottom of the western Gulf of Finland. The hull is immersed in silt in such a way that only the upper part with the command cabin is visible.

    This is a photograph of a boat that has been under water for almost a hundred years. So in some cases, the safety is amazing.
  15. geniy
    geniy 9 May 2018 23: 35
    Great article! Many thanks to the author.
    But still there are a few comments, since most readers are not versed in the design issues of the buoyancy of submarines. The fact is that they essentially have two surface positions: positional and cruising. This second one is essentially a real surface situation in which submarines are always photographed. But positional - this is the position of the submarine in which during the war, diesel submarines spend most of the time, and it is in fact classified from amateurs. And according to some signs, this Pike was leading its last battle being in a positional position.
    The difference is that in the fully surface position of the submarine all the external tanks of the main ballast are blown out. But in the positional position of the submarine, the tanks of the main ballast are not blown away at all, but only one small equalization tank in the middle part of the solid body. And because of this, any submarine pops up only to the point that the upper part of the durable body barely touches the surface of the water (literally only 1-2 centimeters). But at the same time, the so-called deck superstructure rises about 70 centimeters above the solid hull of the submarine. Moreover, in this superstructure many holes have been specially made so that it would not interfere with the submersion of the boat. And accordingly, this deck superstructure of a submarine can be perforated and shot from heavy machine guns - it will still not be harmed in terms of loss of buoyancy. In addition, there is another paradoxical phenomenon that no one knows about. There are almost always waves at sea, and even in the most extreme case they can be of meager height - for example, 20-30 centimeters, but considering that there are a lot of these wave crests between ships shooting at each other, then at low shooting distances all low-flying shells cling to these wave crests cannot penetrate the upper part of the skin of a strong submarine hull, therefore it does not lose buoyancy. And in those shells that fly just above the others - they just leak a permeable superstructure and there is no harm from this submarine either. On this principle, the Dzhevetsky’s water-armored destroyers were conceived - in which only an insignificant part of the hull (several centimeters) was above the water. Yes, actually, very many nineteenth-century battleships were built on this principle (for example, Peter the Great battleship and many others) The height of the armored hull above the waterline was negligible, and the rest of the freeboard was made of thin iron - that is, intended for easy penetration by the enemy , but so that buoyancy is not lost.
    And only one drawback - Shchuki had her Achilles heel: it was a torpedo-loading hatch rising above the solid hull to the level of the superstructure deck - that’s what enemy shells could get into it and create a condition for water to enter the hull. It is very easy to guess from the fact that Pike No. 408 lies on the ground with a raised aft end. This means that she has flooded the second compartment. Because if the middle — the third compartment — were flooded, it would lie flat, and if the bow was flooded — the first compartment — then it would stand upright in the water. But the flooded second compartment - just gives such an intermediate picture of the situation on the ground.
    And it is clear that submariners 408 Pike did not dive of their own free will, and this boat sank to the bottom only as a result of flooding. All Russian submarines have such a constructive condition - that if one compartment is flooded, but if you blow all the external tanks of the main ballast, then the submarine will emerge and remain on the surface. But in this case this did not happen. The fact is that enemy shells with their fragments clearly pierced the upper part of the thin lining of the outer ballast tanks - which has a thickness of about 6 mm. This means that most of the external tanks were broken and did not create buoyancy, and only one in the stern - two stern tanks remained intact. Until one of the compartments of the sturdy hull (second) was flooded, these small tanks did not give a damn about breaking through - the boat was simply in a position in which the tanks of the main ballast were still filled with water. But when one of the compartments of the solid hull was flooded and at the same time, almost all of the external tanks were already broken in a long battle, then disaster struck and the Pike 408 sank to the bottom. And despite the fact that after a long time they tried to emerge and purged the outer tanks of the main ballast, but they could no longer help - through numerous small holes they simply poisoned the precious air. And then the whole crew died from suffocation. But still they are all heroes!
    1. beeper
      beeper 10 May 2018 13: 41
      "And it is clear that the submariners 408 Pike did not dive of their own free will, and this boat sank to the bottom only as a result of flooding .... And then the whole crew died from asphyxiation. But still, they are all heroes!" - Wow, " condescended "to" accidental victims of suffocation "... ???
      Well, you and Genius! It’s just “congenial”, in the best traditions of Josefgebbels’s traditions, that they even managed to “professionally” (you’re not an “amateur” ?! yes ) ", with equivocations on his own kind of" sacred knowledge ", toss the easily soiled" odorous product "onto the fan ?! negative
      "For some reasons" (and constructive measures to increase the overall stability, taken as a result of the operation of these submarines) and the photo, the bow "magpie" of this modification "Pike" was located directly on the deck of the superstructure (not to be confused with the conning tower), and therefore the position of the fenders of the first shots and the hatch for supplying ammunition for the bow gun would be guaranteed to be under water, and artillery calculation would also have to work knee-deep in water, constantly risking being washed away (as if they were washed overboard would have settled down or Red-navy men wounded in battle in a battle) by a stream of incident waves during the course of the submarine ?! yes
      In addition, submarines of the "Pike" type were typical representatives of "diving boats", that is, they could develop their most complete course (for quick maneuver in an artillery duel and for fast "retreat-evasion") only in a surface cruising position (in "secretive" positional position, with absolutely no progress or at the very minimum speed, with a meager buoyancy and constant readiness for "urgent immersion" diesel boats usually ONLY "hunted caravans" on duty at a constant fighting position, and spent most of the time in repair ah and combat training, in preparation for going to sea, on the way to a position (as an option, in an inter-position transition), or returning from there, in regular continuous charging of batteries, in a submerged position during combat maneuvering when launching an attack and when evading the persecution? winked )!
      And it is unlikely that a competent submarine commander could ignore the possibility of giving a full turn (as well as providing an additional buoyancy margin in case water enters through the inevitable holes of a strong hull in the battle), even if he entered the artillery battle even before the ballast was completely “purged”!
      After all, the purpose of the ascent was precisely a breakthrough and withdrawal, albeit with a fight, in the hope of the speedy support of Soviet aviation ... IMHO
  16. The Siberian barber
    The Siberian barber 10 May 2018 00: 28
    SW The author, thank you very much, for your next, your work!) Always, with great interest, I read) Happy Holidays!
  17. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 10 May 2018 13: 34
    Under the same conditions, in 1944-45 on the Baltic Sea, Soviet boats acted better than German boats despite the fact that, in technical terms, German boats hit better.
    A variant of a mine layer was developed for the Shch boat, but it was too late to participate in the war. Using these boats as miners could give even better results in 1944-45.
  18. geniy
    geniy 10 May 2018 15: 49
    Quote: pishchak
    in the positional position, the fenders of the first shots and the hatch for supplying ammunition for the bow gun would be guaranteed to be under water,

    Any hatch is guaranteed to be located not lower on the decks of the superstructure, i.e. at a height of about 70 centimeters above waterso there was no danger of flooding inside the boat. You probably don’t know that in the last century the so-called “Dutch” type of trawlers was widespread, in which even the upper deck was fully loaded below the water level, that is, sailors worked knee-deep in the water, and buoyancy was ensured by the bow and stern add-ons and water inside the hull (where fish were loaded into the hold) was not flooded only due to the high coaming of the cargo hatch.
    And the fact that the wounded fell on the deck of the boat and could be washed away by the wave - so it is not known whether the waves were at all - because the Baltic Sea is one of
    the quietest seas. And besides, the leer was outstretched so that the sailors would not fall overboard.

    they could develop their most complete course (for quick maneuver in an artillery duel and for quick "retreat-evasion") only in a surface cruising position

    You probably don’t know the laws of shipbuilding, that from an increase in displacement speed decreases quite a bit. Although you are right that in a positional position the displacement of Shchuka increases by 22%, that is, it becomes 1,22 of the surface, but according to the so-called Admiralty speed of dependence on displacement, you need to take a third-degree root from this number, and you will see that the speed decreases approximately in the proportion of 1,09. That is, the percent speed drop is less than 105, and this is in full swing, when the submarine begins to swing on a keel pitch as on a swing. In reality, warships have never been used at full speed. So these are your lamentations designed only for illiterate people.
  19. Servisinzhener
    Servisinzhener 17 May 2018 13: 40
    Sorry for the stupid question. But why didn’t they use torpedoes?
  20. Egorov Oleg
    Egorov Oleg 3 February 2021 12: 55
    Well written, but I have some amendments, you give the conditions in which the Baltic Fleet found itself in 1941, but the revival of the Baltic Fleet after the civil war took place not in better conditions than in 1941, the only base is Kronstadt, water area, the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and it will be until 1940. The mistake was in the very doctrine of the Baltic Fleet development. As for the boats of the Sh type, the same Muklevich, the idea that foreign models cannot be acquired, the bourgeois will deliberately slip in an unfit model, and it is necessary to rely in the design only on their own strength, while not having any experience in the design and construction of submarines (experience Russian Empire, was negative, dead-end back in 1914), everything had to start from scratch, this determined the lag in the quality of our submarines (Muklevich, by the way, in the same year will be removed from the post of Chief of the Naval Forces, and Malinin and all of him KB will be arrested based on the results of tests of a type D boat). The hull of the Shch III series boat was copied from the L-55 boat with a linear decrease in proportions, the placement of mechanisms and equipment and the principles of their operation were the same as on the L-55 (not the best boat of its time). The statement that the German boats were designed later Shchuk is not true, the German boat of the IA series, designed in 1928, on the basis of the ocean boat of the First World War of the U-93 type (1916), the boat of the IIA series (1928) was designed as an improved design of the boat UB-II (1914-1915), series VIIA boat (1928), designed as an improved project of the UB-III boat (1916), it’s not about that sooner or later it was designed, but about experience, continuity, and high engineering -technical culture.