Military Review

The difficult fate of special power tools

During the storming of fortresses and in street battles, she could not even compete with them aviation

The difficult fate of special power tools

On the frames of photographic and film films that captured the battles of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet large-caliber guns and howitzers, which hit the enemy, are very often seen. That is why an ignorant person may get the impression that with what, with what, and with heavy artillery the Red Army had no problems throughout the confrontation with the Wehrmacht. This, however, is far from the case.

I have already repeatedly talked about a number of negative moments in the work of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. But nothing can be done, it will be necessary to recall once more about one of the “innovations” supported by it, which had very sad consequences for the Red Army.


In my opinion, if Finnish historians were objective in assessing the 1939-1940 Winter War, then a monument to Tukhachevsky would stand in the center of Helsinki with the inscription: “Savior of Finland”. But Suomi is still confident that the “Stalin's empire” could not defeat its north-western neighbor thanks to the genius of the great commander Marshal Carl-Gustav Mannerheim and the exceptional courage of Finnish soldiers.

But how then to explain two phenomena? First, three months before the outbreak of the Winter War, the Red Army defeated Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River. The losses of our and Japanese troops amounted to 6515 and 25 people, respectively. But in the Winter War, the Red Army lost only 000 people killed, and the Finns - 71 people. I note that in the battles on Khalkhin Gol participated Japanese aircraft and tanks one and a half times more than there were in the entire Finnish army in 1939-1940.

Moreover, the training and arming of the Finnish infantry were much worse than the Japanese. There is no need to talk about readiness for self-sacrifice and ability to conduct hand-to-hand combat. Finally, the Finns have not fought with anyone for 20 for years and most of the soldiers have called up from the reserve, while units that had fought in China for many years fought in Khalkhin Gol.

Other numbers are even more paradoxical: in 1939-1940, the Soviet divisions managed to advance from the border to Vyborg in the 2,5 month, and in June the 1944 in the 11 days! That is, our troops in 44-m moved seven times faster. At the same time, during the Winter War, Finland and the USSR fought one on one, and in June 1944, the Red Army fought on the 3000-kilometer front from Barents to the Black Sea. And almost simultaneously with the attack on the Karelian Isthmus, the grand operation "Bagration" began in Belarus.

How to explain these paradoxes? No doubt, the command of the Red Army in the Winter War made a lot of mistakes. But, of course, the main reason for the Red Army failures was the lack of artillery systems capable of coping with Finnish do-millionaires (one million Finnish marks left to build one) on the Mannerheim Line.

The X-NUMX-mm howitzer B-203 — the most powerful Soviet artillery system adopted at the beginning of the war between the USSR and Finland — could penetrate the wall of such a fort only if two of its shells hit the same point. True, the Red Army also had an 4-mm gun model 305 of the year. The weight of its projectile was 1915 kg versus 377 kg in B-100. However, for completely incomprehensible reasons, the 4 completely combat-ready 30-mm howitzers stood idle during the entire war in the Belarusian Military District.

Why in the USSR in the 20-30-ies did not manage to create a single instrument of special power (OM)? To begin with, by January 1, the first batch of four 1918-mm howitzers with 406 projectile weight, kg, was produced at the Obukhov plant by 883 of the year. Their readiness ranged from 75 to 35 percent.

In the National Economy Archive, I studied the plump volume of the correspondence of the beginning of the 20-s, devoted to one question: to finish howitzers or not. In the end, someone ordered them to be scrapped ...

In the 1931 year, the Directorate issued two tasks: KB-2, where German engineers from Rheinmetall worked, to design an 305-mm howitzer on a conventional carriage, and to the Bolshevik plant - triplex (400-mm mortars, 305-mm howitzers and Collapsible type 203-mm guns carried on tracked vehicles). In addition, the engineer of the Bolshevik plant, Chernyavsky, on his own initiative, prepared a project for triplex (400-mm mortar, 305-mm howitzer and 203-mm gun on a conventional gun carriage). In the 1932 year, the Department of Management reviewed all the projects and at the Plenary Session of the AU a resolution was adopted “to approve the project of the 400 / 305 / 203-mm Bolshevik combined system for further development and production of a prototype, and two other projects of the KB-2 and the engineer Chernyavsky to reject” .

Needless to say, if in 1931-1932, full-scale work had begun on the project of Art-management or Chernyavsky, by the 1939, the Red Army would have received several dozen special-power implements. The new 305-mm howitzers and 400-mm mortars for the week would have smashed Finnish millionaires into smithereens, the outcome of the Winter War would be completely different both militarily and politically.


However, due to his incompetence, Tukhachevsky and Co. completely thwarted all plans to create special-power artillery. At first, these figures demanded that the new guns be fired with projectiles, that is, polygonal, rifled or sub-caliber. Dozens of the most exotic ammunition of all three types of caliber from 203 to 368 mm were tested.

It is easy to argue: the development of science and technology is impossible without errors and delusions. Holy truth! But most of these mistakes and delusions are revealed at the stage of preliminary design, at various technical meetings and councils. However, M. N. Tukhachevsky, deputy people's secretary of armaments (education - infantry school), heavy industry deputy people's secretary and I. P. Pavlunovsky, head of the Main Mobilization Directorate (three classes of parochial school), technical commissar S. Ordzhonikidze (underequired medical assistant) patronized technical adventurers such as Kurchevsky and Bekauri.

If at the councils and meetings honest specialists pointed out the unreality and absurdity of the projects, they were immediately labeled “the enemy of the people”. The test results of prototypes of weapons were falsified, often tests were not carried out at all. So, no less than 20 of Kurchevsky’s dynamo-active cannon samples were launched into the series without carrying out a complete set of tests - factory, field and military.

A typical example: all types of off-fire projectiles that were continuously tested in the USSR from 1920 to 1938 a year passed tests on the Volkov field near Petersburg as early as 1865-1875. I personally read hundreds of reports of such trials as the XIX and XX centuries. And if we discard fraud, the result is completely identical. Why was it necessary to spend hundreds of millions of people's rubles without eliminating in advance a single incurable disease of polygonal, subcaliber, rifled, and other antifouling shells?

By the way, the sabot projectiles were intended for ultra-long range shooting, and nobody even thought of anti-tank sabotage shells until the Germans at the end of 1941 had applied them at the front. And one more interesting fact: first, the 1920-1938 and 1865-1875 tests Identity was discovered not by me, but by one smart gunner who sent a detailed report on these striking coincidences to the People's Commissar for Defense, but a copy to the NKVD.

In 1934, Tukhachevsky and Co. demanded that all new tools of special power be mounted on one self-propelled gun. Shooting also had to be done from him. The very same self-propelled device existed only in the inflamed heads of the designers.

At the conference of the Department of Management in December 1934, the projects of the 203-mm cannon and the 305-mm howitzer on a self-propelled machine were considered. Two independent projects of the latter were developed by the Bolshevik plant and the Pilot Plant. Kirov.

In the end, it turned out that the weight of the system reached 106 tons, and the length exceeded 12 meters. Dimensions did not allow to transport self-propelled by rail, the vast majority of bridges did not withstand its mass. If he were stuck off the road, there would be nothing to pull him out ...

It was only after the removal of Tukhachevsky’s work on the creation of weapons of OM that they were in full swing, and in order to frighten bureaucrats and hack-workers, they were given the name “Stalin’s Order”.

In the summer of 1937, a commission of prominent Soviet gunners visited the Skoda plant in Czechoslovakia. There she presented samples of 210-mm guns and 305-mm howitzers. The barrel of the gun was lined, and howitzers - bonded. The gates of both systems are wedge horizontal, loading is separate-sleeve. I will not restrain myself from the author's remark: on the report of the commission, some idiot from the Armed Management Department stressed “separate-case loading” and wrote boldly: “This is a minus - you need a cap”.

The fact is that all German artillery systems, including special power, even the Dora 800-mm cannon, had cartridge loading.

Because of these rags, the production of Soviet counterparts - X-NUMX-mm cannon Br-210 and X-NUMX-mm howitzer Br-17 lasted almost a year. The wedge gates had to be replaced with piston ones, etc. I note that if the cards gave some cheap savings, then the OM tools were obviously piecewise - well, 305, well, 18 units and the money spent on reworking tools did not pay off with savings in the production of cards .

At the end of 1939 - 1940, the design of purely domestic systems began: 450-mm howitzers Br-23 and 500-mm howitzers with the weight of 1060-1500 shells. Both systems were collapsible: vehicles weighing 20-26 t were transported behind tractors at speeds of 25-30 km / h.


But alas war wait did not want to. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the special artillery of the RVGK consisted of the 281 th howitzer artillery regiment of the OM (30 305-mm howitzer of the model 1915 of the year) deployed in Orlovskiy VO, 15 of separate divisions and two separate batteries (305-mm of gauze ki-leashes). mortars), as well as one (280-y) heavy cannon artillery regiment (524 24-mm cannon Br-152), 2-i and 1-i separate heavy gun batteries (two 6-mm cannon Br-152). There was at the disposal of RVGK and artillery of high power - 2 regiment, armed with 33 792-mm B-203 howitzers.

On 22 June 1941 of the Year, the Red Army had 25 280-mm Schneider mortars of model 1915 of the year and 47 280-mm Br-5 mortars. 280-mm 48 mortars were in service with eight separate artillery battalions of special power. Another 24 mortars and four 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model of the year were in warehouses, factories and landfills.

It should be noted that the projectiles for 280-mm Schneider mortars and Br-5 were the same, and the charges were different. The shells were only old-fashioned, that is, of short length. By June 1941, there were about 7 thousands of 280-mm projectiles and 7,5 thousands of 305-mm projectiles for howitzers of the 1915 model of the year.

By June 1941, almost all the combat-ready parts of artillery of large and special power were concentrated in our western districts. There were a total of 517 203-mm B-4 howitzers, 17 280-mm Schneider mortars and 39 280-mm B-5 XNUMX mm in these parts.

Interestingly, 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model of the year were also available in the Navy. They were armed with a four-gun battery number 911 near Vladivostok. For her, the fleet had 1788 high-explosive 305-mm howitzer shells.

It is impossible not to mention such a curious fact. In the 20-30-ies, the army command carried out experienced firing of 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model of the year with 305-mm ship cannons. As a result, the Shells firing tables for the 1907 model of the year and the 1911 model of the year from the 305-mm howitzer were created. A special reduced charge was selected for it: 1907 kg for the 28,46 model projectile, and 1911 kg of gunpowder for the 24,3 model projectile.


The author does not accidentally give boring data on shells. Unfortunately, in the domestic militaryhistorical literature has long spoken about a shortage of ammunition both in the Red Army and in the USSR Navy. In fact, during the whole war, the fleet did not shoot a third of the shells from 130 mm to 406 mm caliber from the total resource, and even in the artillery of the OM there was always an excess of ammunition. Another thing is that they were not delivered on time to the units due to the sloppiness of individual military leaders.

And let's say the truth - we had an excess of incompetent generals. Thus, in the Finnish war, orders were given to lead along the roads "disturbing fire" from Schneider's 280-mm mortars, and to fire into the Great Patriotic War from long-range guns: "Firing in the direction of the enemy until the projectiles are fully expended." And this is a quotation not from Suvorov-Rezun, but from top secret documents.

The volume of the article does not allow us to talk about the lack of artillery tractors and their poor technical condition. As a result, it was precisely due to the lack of vehicles and only in rare cases due to the impact of the enemy during the summer-autumn campaign of the 1941, was 75 203-mm and nine 280-mm howitzers lost. In this regard, in August 1941-th decision is made to send all weapons OM to the deep rear. The production of special-power weapons was practically ceased, and the ammunition for them was significantly reduced.


Information on the availability and release of tanks, airplanes and field guns was no longer a secret even in Brezhnev times, but data on the OM artillery has not yet been published. Therefore, I would venture to tire the reader with a table.

In August, the 1944, as part of the RVGK artillery, two artillery divisions of special power were formed. Each of them was armed with four 211-mm trophy mortars (21 cm Mrs.18). Unlike our 203-mm howitzers, they had not a crawler, but a wheel drive and were much more mobile. However, the best estimate of 21-cm mortars is that our generals attributed it to special power systems, and B-4 to high power systems. In addition, Mrs.18 in the combat position was much lighter than the B-4.

In December, 1944 of the year on the basis of four separate divisions of 152-mm cannons Br-2 and four separate batteries of 210-mm cannons Br-17 were formed by three separate regiments of special power (18-th Guards, 1-th and 2-th). Each of them consisted of three two-gun batteries, Br-2 and one two-gun battery, 210-mm cannons. By the end of 1944, these regiments had gone to the front.

In all, by the 1944, the Red Army had nine X-NUMX-mm cannons, Br-210. They were brought to combat readiness precisely in 17. Shooting tables were first published for them and 1944 thousands of 4,2-mm projectiles were made 210. Curiously, in the first half of 1945, the 210-mm projectiles were not released.

The 305-mm howitzer model 1939 of the year (Br-18) was made only three pieces. They went to the formation of the 233-th separate artillery division of special power, located at the end of the war in Moscow IN. Apparently, these tools were not capable.

In the 1944-1945, the 16 X.UMX X.UMX K.211 captured 38 cannons were included in the special power artillery. (Perhaps this is how our generals called other types of 21-cm German cannons.) These guns fired 120-kg shells at a range of 33,9 km. Weight K.38 in the stowed position - 25,3 tons. The system in the stowed position was transported on three wagons.

The 211-mm K.38 cannons armed four separate OM artillery battalions. In each of them there were four guns. And two OAD OM did not hit the front.


The intensity of the use of special power tools in combat conditions is best indicated by the consumption of projectiles. Thus, for the entire war, thousands of shells were sent to the guns of Br-39,4 (including lost) 2. Of these, 8,1 is a thousand in 1943, and 9,9 is thousands in 1944 and 6,4 is thousands in 1945.

The first thousand 280-mm shells were spent in 1943 year, another 4,7 thousand - in 1944-m and 8,45 thousand - in 1945-m.

For the first time since 305, 1917-mm howitzers were used in battles on the Karelian Isthmus in June of 1944. Five OM divisions, armed with 280-mm mortars Br-5 and 305-mm howitzers, were deployed there. In June, about five hundred 1944-mm howitzer shells were spent on the 305 of the year on the Karelian Isthmus.

As a result, it took only 11 days to break through the Mannerheim line and exit to Vyborg. The case was decided by 305 mm howitzers and Baltic gun fire fleet, as well as heavy tanks KV and Churchill.

OM artillery proved extremely effective in the assault of cities turned by fascists into a fortress — Berlin, Poznan. Particularly distinguished our super cannons in the capture of Koenigsberg, who in World War I was the most powerful fortress of the German Empire.

I note that the fortifications of the capital of East Prussia turned out to be so powerful that it was not always possible to penetrate even 280-mm and 305-mm shells. Thus, the OM division of Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Maltsev (six 280-mm mortars Br-5) fired at fort number V. It hit 73 280-mm concrete-shell, but there were only two holes. Nevertheless, by 12 hours of the day 6 April, the fort had returned fire.

The action of X-NUMX-mm howitzers B-203 and 4-mm A-122 cannons on the forts turned out to be ineffective. Thus, 19 120-mm shells and 203 240-mm shells were fired at Fort No. IV. The result is potholes in the brick and concrete walls.

For more than 24 hours, the 329 Artillery Division OM (six 305-mm howitzers) was firing at Fort No. VIII. 78 hits recorded. However, through holes were only five. At the same time, only the right reinforcement caponier was completely destroyed.

The facts from the reports of the capture of Königsberg may raise doubts in someone about the effectiveness of the Soviet OM artillery. But here it is worth recalling that the same German artillery in 1941-1943 years showed similar results.

So, for the entire siege of Leningrad, the 305-mm tower installations of the fort "Krasnaya Gorka" never failed, although the Germans fired hundreds of heavy projectiles on them. In Sevastopol, the tower installations of batteries No. 30 and No. 35 for eight months withstood the fire of German guns of all calibers and the blows of the Luftwaffe. The Germans managed to destroy the towers with the help of two-ton shells 615-mm mortars.

Needless to say, the very first shells of Soviet 450-500-mm howitzers would have destroyed the Konigsberg forts. But alas, as already mentioned, all these howitzers remained in the project or in prototypes. Nevertheless, the OM’s artillery made a huge contribution to the capture of Koenigsberg and saved the lives of thousands of Soviet soldiers.

In the course of the Berlin operation at the breakthrough sites, again, weapons of a large and special power of the RVGK were successfully used. So, for example, in the 8-th Guards Army of the 1 of the Belarusian Front there was an 1-th OM cannon regiment (two 210-mm cannon Br-17 and six 152-mm cannon Br-5), 34-OAD OM (six 280-mm mortars Br-5) and 322-th OAD OM (six 305-mm howitzers).

The Second World War confirmed that howitzers and mortars of special power - the most effective weapon during the storming of reinforced concrete fortifications, as well as in street battles in cities with large stone houses. Even aircraft could not compete with them, at least until the use of guided bombs.
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  1. krpmlws
    krpmlws April 27 2013 09: 06 New
    And how are things with high-power artillery (200mm and higher) now? Probably the military believes that it is no longer needed.
    1. Kars
      Kars April 27 2013 09: 49 New
      Quote: krpmlws
      then it is no longer needed.

      There is a little bit more.
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov April 27 2013 12: 04 New
        These have already outlived themselves. Special ammunition has become more compact, there are no more fortified areas in the Soviet-Chinese.
        Here "Tulips" - yes. An excellent weapon for war in highly urbanized areas. Especially in combination with corrected ammunition.
        1. Kars
          Kars April 27 2013 12: 17 New
          Quote: Spade
          Ammunition has become more compact

          on figs on special ammunition.
          Quote: Spade
          These have already outlived themselves.

          still live
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov April 27 2013 13: 19 New
            There are no programs for their modernization and informatization. They will cut it as the resource is developed.
            1. Kars
              Kars April 27 2013 15: 00 New
              Quote: Spade
              There are no programs for their modernization and informatization

              Maybe you don’t have, our still 30-40 years old bututes will stand on armament.
      2. Vadivak
        Vadivak April 27 2013 21: 28 New
        Quote: Kars
        There is a little bit more.

        I wonder what those 4 post-war "Condensers" 460-mm self-propelled guns of special power are still alive?
        1. Kars
          Kars April 27 2013 21: 40 New
          only one that I know of. in Leningrad mine.
      3. xetai9977
        xetai9977 11 May 2013 14: 53 New
        it seems "peony"
  2. Kars
    Kars April 27 2013 09: 47 New
    What do not say, but the power in them is feeling.
  3. berg
    berg April 27 2013 11: 15 New
    But how then to explain two phenomena? probably you need to compare the conditions where two events were held !!! the snowy territory of Finland with snowdrifts and with a temperature of -20 \ -30 in the afternoon and Khalkhin-Gol ... and then you can not look at the number of tanks, and if you remember how they pass through deep snow in the forest, we will look at the number of infantry differently. ..
    1. Pushkin
      Pushkin April 28 2013 23: 26 New
      Well then, explain 2 other phenomena - 2,5 months in 40 years, and 11 days in 44 years. The second time in the summer they stormed, but the terrain still remained "non-assault". And there was enough time to restore the Manergeif line and the Finns. As well as improving it with real experience
      In general, for the last couple of years, it seems to me that artillery has been abandoned in vain. Oh, nothing. Amer and Israelis dictate modern weapons to the super-duper fashion. And all are underway. Soon there will be tenders for level 86 combat magicians
      Weapons should be effective, but simple enough and cheap to quickly replenish during the fighting, otherwise the economy will be gone. Especially for the defending side
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov April 28 2013 23: 28 New
        Who told you that they abandoned? It is developing. Not as fast as I wanted, but there is progress.
        1. Pushkin
          Pushkin April 28 2013 23: 35 New
          I only heard about the "coalition". If there are other topics, please tell me, within reasonable limits, of course)))
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov April 28 2013 23: 52 New
            2S19 brought to mind. Included in the automated control system, global positioning, automatic aiming not only in elevation, as before, but also in direction. Automatic recovery of aiming vertically and horizontally, which allowed to increase the rate of fire from 8 to 10 per minute.
            Vienna is a great car. True, they do not supply the troops, they decided that it was painfully expensive for the battalion artillery. Replaced with "Host". But I think they will return to her.
            Tornado G Induction data input in fuses, in-flight RS correction system.
            We began to deal with artillery reconnaissance. New portable stations, including "Aistenok" - an ARSOM station of the artillery level of motorized rifle brigades. For local wars, an irreplaceable thing, the "Zoo" in such conditions is redundant.
            New systems of control vehicles Falcet-M and Mashina-M for self-propelled and Kapustnik-B for towed and rocket artillery.

            This is what is already in the metal and is being tested in the troops. So the process is going on.
            1. Pushkin
              Pushkin April 28 2013 23: 57 New
              Thanks for the info hi
              I urgently served in 96g in the control battery and art intelligence. So I understand and appreciate such details.
              1. Lopatov
                Lopatov April 29 2013 00: 05 New
                At the end of March, the paratroopers fired back on exercises guided by the Kitolov-2.

                It's just that the news agencies are not in favor of artillery. New aircraft or tanks are cool, of course. And about the God of War - tiny little notes in the "basement"
  4. Bongo
    Bongo April 27 2013 11: 28 New
    Self-propelled 240-mm heavy mortar 2C4 Tulip »
    This is not equal:
    mines weighing 130,7 kg, about 40 kg of explosive (phlegmatized trinitrotoluene + hexogen in the ratio 1 to 1) can be fired with an active-reactive mine with a range of up to 19 500 meters, atomic ammunition, as well as corrected mines "Smeltman"
    1. albai
      albai April 28 2013 12: 36 New
      Cool Mortars !!! In the winter of 88, there was a battery of such giants at Salang. When they began to nail in the villages with spirits it was something! I was on the mountain and at first did not understand, I thought of air bombs, but there are no planes, a couple of mines and spirits ran, already the mountain was dancing!
    APASUS April 27 2013 14: 19 New
    I think the history of the guns of special power is not over yet. After the appearance of the missiles, they thought that the age of the guns was over and began to be massively reduced. But at the moment, not all tasks can be solved only by missiles!
  6. krpmlws
    krpmlws April 27 2013 16: 06 New
    Once I saw in one military unit two self-propelled gun mounts with an immense barrel (the barrel was of a huge diameter, a meter somewhere. Maybe I confuse it 20 years ago). Unfortunately, I don’t remember the officer’s comment, he said that it was mortar. Maybe someone knows what kind of hero it was?
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov April 27 2013 18: 07 New
      Our largest mortar was the 420-mm 2B1 "Oka". But you hardly saw it, only 4 of them were built.

      Most likely 240-mm 2S4 "Tulip", photo two posts above
  7. barbiturate
    barbiturate April 27 2013 17: 20 New
    according to French data, in the First World War, 75% of the losses fell on the share of artillery, this became the real scourge of the Russian army and the cause of the revolution, huge losses and the absence of shells for guns and the absence of guns themselves. Germany fired only howitzer shells (150mm and higher) more than all sorts of Russia - the result is known (statistics are stubborn)
    1. Azzzwer
      Azzzwer April 27 2013 22: 02 New
      Quote: barbiturate
      the lack of shells for guns and the absence of guns themselves.

      interesting, but what then fought on both sides in the civilian, if all the guns and shells in the WWII were wasted?
  8. barbiturate
    barbiturate April 27 2013 17: 24 New
    German observers in the Russo-Japanese War, made the right conclusions
    The outcome of the Second World War is logical, up to 430 guns (guns) and rocket artillery per kilometer of the front during the breakthrough, the Bolsheviks understood how it should and what ensures victory. I am proud of my country, we recouped and showed that not only the Russian infantry could run in terror in their trenches, but also enlightened Europeans)) The tsar and the military did not understand this in 1914, and when they understood, he ordered the guns wherever they could, but there were already only tens, not hundreds and thousands, it was worth the throne and troubles of Russia for 30 years
  9. Gahprom
    Gahprom April 27 2013 20: 01 New
    In the National Economy Archive, I studied the plump volume of the correspondence of the beginning of the 20-s, devoted to one question: to finish howitzers or not. In the end, someone ordered them to be scrapped ...

    what about "I'm not a boy to go to the archives!" © A.B. Shirokorad.
  10. Denis
    Denis April 27 2013 20: 09 New
    the lack of artillery systems that can cope with Finnish pillboxes - "millionaires" (one million Finnish marks took one to build) on the Mannerheim line.
    KV-2 with a 152-mm tank howitzer mod. 1938/40 (M-10T) coped
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov April 27 2013 20: 46 New
      It was impossible to use it against bunkers. And therefore, it was not used for this.
      1. Denis
        Denis April 27 2013 22: 01 New
        Quote: Spade
        It was impossible to use it against bunkers
        And what was its inapplicability?
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov April 27 2013 22: 09 New
          The design of bunkers did not allow this. Reinforced concrete, in any case, almost all of them were designed for flanking fire, and a blank floor wall with dirt back was facing the front.

          They fought with them this way: at first they opened the floor wall with high-explosive small calibers, then they punched it with a 152 mm concrete slaughter. It was a long affair, and towed guns were usually used for this.
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov April 27 2013 22: 13 New
            I'll try to duplicate
        2. Pushkin
          Pushkin April 28 2013 23: 33 New
          Quote: Denis
          And what was its inapplicability?

          The fact that it was then an experimental tank. He was there, like two other "competitors", but the piece copies of the weather did not make
    2. REZMovec
      REZMovec April 27 2013 20: 47 New
      This tank did not participate in the Winter War - it simply did not exist yet. Learn the story, Denis.
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov April 27 2013 21: 23 New
        Two experienced participated.
      2. Denis
        Denis April 27 2013 21: 58 New
        I admit, I am not right:
        This machine was developed by the design bureau of the Leningrad Kirov Plant (LKZ) in January 1940 due to the urgent need of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) in a well-protected tank with powerful weapons to combat the fortifications of the Mannerheim line during the Soviet-Finnish War 1939— 1940 years
        A month later, the KV-2 was officially adopted by the Red Army and was mass-produced at the LKZ until July 1941. The reason for the withdrawal from production was the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. In total, LKZ built 204 KV-2 tanks, which were actively used in the hostilities of 1941 and at that time almost all were lost.
  11. Snoop
    Snoop April 27 2013 20: 17 New
    Interesting article. Again Tukhachevsky and Co.
    Although, on the other hand, if we read the Germans, then all of them unanimously assure the superiority of the Red Army in heavy artillery, or is it again the excuses of the loser?
    1. Pushkin
      Pushkin April 28 2013 23: 45 New
      Quote: Snoop
      if you read the Germans

      the superiority of the Red Army in everything - in artillery, and the Katyusha MLRS, T-34, IL-2 .. And also the Panfilovs, Matrosovs, Rokosovskys, snow-steppe-swamps, and of course Comrade Stalin
      Only b *** ts so far no one has clearly explained why they could reach the Volga and Moscow. 2013 is already coming
  12. barbiturate
    barbiturate April 27 2013 20: 22 New
    75 mm caliber about 163 rounds,
    155 mm caliber about 28 million shots
    All calibers about 271 533 000 shots.
    Including: approximately 156 000-mm, 000 77 cm, 67 000-cm and 000 10,5-cm. caliber.
    All calibers are about 170 386 000 rounds.
    Including: approximately 99 000 mm cannon, 000 76 mm howitzer, 25 000 mm howitzer, etc.
    All calibers about 70 million shots. "

    the results of the First World War, but for the Second World War, the results are more interesting, why is it asked? some direct dependence, if a power is hammered with guns, then it’s somehow easier for it in a war
  13. barbiturate
    barbiturate April 27 2013 20: 23 New
    Throughout the war of 1914 - 1917 Russian artillery spent a total of no more than 50 rounds of all calibers, including chemical shells.

    the result was deplorable
  14. barbiturate
    barbiturate April 27 2013 20: 25 New
    EVEN Austria-Hungary (which everyone rightly considered to be weaker than Russia, militarily) was able to fire 20 MILLION (!!!) gun shots at the enemy more than Tsarist Russia. About the rest of the country and say nothing.
    Germany ONLY LARGE CALIBER shells fired 116 million (and Russia - ALL shells of all types - about 50 million), England - also fired only large-caliber shells - 47 million pieces, France - fired FOUR more shells than Russia on all fronts.
    These statistics vividly characterize AT what level REALLY was the industrial development of Russia and the power of its artillery.
  15. barbiturate
    barbiturate April 27 2013 20: 28 New
    the Bolsheviks knew this data very well, no one kept it secret and made conclusions, after that, my Motherland was hollowing so that, according to the recollections of German soldiers, it was terrible, and this is a victory, an army multiplied by the power of the rear
  16. barbiturate
    barbiturate April 27 2013 20: 42 New
    leads in his book General E.I. Barsukov:
    “... both at the beginning and at the end of the war, Germany was significantly stronger both in Russia and France in the number (and power) of artillery. By the end of the war, the German artillery was armed with a total of 19810 guns, including 7 heavy, while the Russian artillery had only 862 guns, including 10 heavy, and the French artillery had 178 guns, including 1 heavy. "Special-purpose guns - anti-aircraft, assault, mortars, etc., as well as guns that were in the stocks of the front, are not taken into account."
    Germany remained the strongest country in terms of providing the army with artillery even towards the end of the war.
    “At the end of the war, according to Schwart, there were a total of 21 guns of various types and calibers on the front of the German army, and during the war the total number of guns increased almost 650 times; at the front of the French army - about 3 guns (an increase of almost 13 times); at the front of the Russian army about 000 guns (an increase of only 3 times). [14]
    The density of artillery saturation of the Russian "front was the smallest. At the end of 1916, there were on average 1 guns per 2 km of the Russian front, while the French front had an average of 12 guns, and the Italian front 5,2 guns. This is explained , however, not only by the poverty of the Russian army in artillery, but also by the enormous length of the Russian European front (not counting the Caucasian one) - about 1 km, while the length of the French front is 800, and the Italian front is about 650 km. Finally, the essence of the matter is not in the number of guns per kilometer of the total length of the front, and in the art of concentrating the greatest number of guns (and massive, most powerful destructive artillery fire in the most important battle and in the decisive direction of the strike inflicted on the enemy. This skill was not distinguished by the Russian command. "

    for some reason, in that war, no one came even close to Berlin
    It’s a mistake to think what will happen to a girlfriend in the 21st century, when a high-precision weapon ends in a week, normal kneading begins and where the soldier didn’t pass, the territory was not taken
  17. Tamagon
    Tamagon April 28 2013 20: 35 New
    Grandfather served in the RVGK Artillery (29th Guards Art. Cannon). Since July 42, he graduated in the Far East with Japan. Order of Kr. Sound., For Courage, For military merits. Two injured.
  18. Krios
    Krios 1 May 2013 10: 52 New
    The author strongly goes over the facts. It’s one thing to step into prepared positions in the winter, another thing to be broken up in the summer.
    Those pillboxes that stopped our troops at 39 cost the Finns very expensive; besides, a lot of human resources were lost, and considering Finland is a small country, it was likely that the war would put an end to the Finnish nation. Therefore, they missed our troops with minimal fights. As for heavy artillery, during the Second World War, diving bombers were a significant competitor for us; it was Pe 2 among the Stuk Germans.
    1. Denis
      Denis 1 May 2013 20: 49 New
      Quote: Krios
      As for heavy artillery, during the Second World War, diving bombers were a significant competitor for us; it was Pe 2 among the Stuk Germans.
      What about the weather and the run-down runway? She's moody in those parts