By the early days of May 2018, expert opinion began to come to the full realization that hastily modeled precedents from deceiving the world public about the poisoning in Salisbury and the absolutely groundless accusation of using sarin and chlorine against the militants in Eastern Ghouta against the militants in the background those methods that begin to turn on Washington and Tel Aviv immediately after approval of the odious "Russophobe virtuoso" and ex-director of the CIA M Ayka Pompeo. Immediately after his appointment by the US Senate to a new position, the more or less verified and neat rhetoric of the US foreign ministry, observed while at the helm of Rex Tillerson (naturally, not counting the support of Theresa May in the Skripal case) instantly changed to sharp and absolutely destructive statements regarding the impossibility of returning Russia-NATO relations to the same course while maintaining the Republic of Crimea as part of Russia, as well as continuing support for the unrecognized republics of Donbass. One of his main tasks, Pompeo, called the return of the US State Department "the same assertiveness."
Considering the fact that the dismissal of Tillerson and the further support of M. Pompeo’s candidacy were held simultaneously with the filing of the head of the White House Donald Trump and the senators lobbying Israeli interests (there were more than 57), the administration of the President of the United States already definitively “ Crouched "under those very lobbyists. And this means only one thing: the further diplomatic vector of the States finally turns to the “rails of war”; This refers to both the European and the Persian theaters of military operations.
All the above points can be attributed only to a kind of indicative "surface layer" of geopolitical denouement, which allows only vaguely predict the degree of growth of military-political tensions or escalation in one or another section of the theater, while the main information array for military forecasting is often needed bit by bit collect on the basis of numerous reports posted on Twitter-eyewitness pages and local correspondents, according to data from tactical online maps and online mo of air traffic, as well as on the basis of the integration of these reports with loud statements, visits and negotiations of major military officials and representatives of the foreign affairs agencies of the Big Game member states.
In our previous work, we focused on Pompeo's first overseas tour, during which a number of talks were held at the level of Foreign Ministries of the countries participating in the North Atlantic Alliance, NATO headquarters in Brussels, and meetings and consultations were held with the leaderships of Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Such a Pompeo route can be explained only by launching the process of translating into reality the US strategy of ousting Iran and Russia from the Middle Eastern agenda using the large-scale offensive operation of the Free Syrian Army opposition and terrorist forces and SDF Kurdish detachments to the southern and central regions of Homs and Damascus with simultaneous seizure of the city of Damascus. At the same time, direct air and artillery support to the advancing Kurdish detachments of the "Syrian Democratic Forces" should continue to be provided by units of the USF and the USMC, as well as French marines, the bases of which are deployed on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. On the contrary, the ground forces and the Royal Air Forces of Saudi Arabia are planned to be involved in supporting the less professional and small formations of the Free Syrian Army operating from the “de-escalation triangle” around the city of Dar'a and from the 55-kilometer “security zone” around At-Tanfa.
Why do the states see only Saudi Arabia as the main offensive “fist” in the upcoming military action against the UAR government forces? First, its close proximity to the Syrian theater of military operations (the distance from the Arabian city of Qurayat to the southern border of the province of Essaweida does not exceed 90 km in a straight line across Jordan) causes tens of times higher efficiency of transferring hundreds of armored vehicles of Saudi mechanized units to the Syrian-Jordanian border area.
It is quite logical to assume that even the most powerful armored vehicles with the corresponding amount of light and heavy armored vehicles cannot boast with such high operational efficiency of the expeditionary battalions of the US Marine Corps. stories fleets of American amphibious assault naval attack groups, which have universal amphibious ships of the class "Wosp", amphibious and helicopter ships-docks of the class "San Atonio", as well as amphibious ships of the class "Harpers Ferry". At the same time, it will take about three months for several American ship formations to load the same amount of equipment and personnel of the ILC, as well as sending them to the theater of operations on several flights, Riyad can drive more than a hundred "Abrams" M2A2 "Bradley" infantry vehicles, as well as dozens of barreled artillery units and MLRS to the southern provinces of Syria in just 2 — 4 hours.
What is even more important for Washington is the fact that the Saudis have powerful and high-tech Air Force, whose combat potential is comparable to the capabilities of the Israeli Air Force (Hel Haavir), and ahead of some technical points. In particular, today the fleet of Saudi tactical fighter F-70S from 15 is gradually being upgraded to the level of F-15SA, in addition to purchasing the latest version of 84 fresh cars. These fighters are equipped with an advanced export version of the on-board radar with active phased array AN / APG-63 (V) 3, capable of detecting an air object with an 2 ESR square. m at a distance of 160 km, JHMCS (we can use melee air combat using the ultra-maneuverable short-range AIM-9X Block II), an ALQ-239 DEWS multi-range radiation warning / radio intelligence system (allows a maneuvering warning system / radio intelligence ALQ-XNUMX DEWS) objects, and then classify and identify them), an infrared station for detecting attacking missiles with a distributed CMWS aperture (is analogous to the lightning DAS and the Russian SOAR; capable of a distance from several dozen to waged on hundreds of kilometers pelengovat and accompany guided missiles many classes torch burnable fuel charge, as well as fighters on the afterburner mode of operation).
All of the above sensors are integrated into a single combat information and control system that displays generalized tactical information about surface, ground and air situations on a huge panoramic LCD display type PCD, and, partly, on the indicator of a helmet-mounted targeting system such as JHMCS. Thanks to the use of a “digital glass cockpit”, the pilots of these machines have the same high level of information awareness as the pilots of the unobtrusive X-Numx generation F-5I “Adir” fighters acquired by Israel with a similar smart touch terminal.
Saudi F-15SA Pilot's Cabin Information Field
Consequently, Saudi F-15SA can completely replace the F-15E "Strike Eagle" used by the US Air Force in the tasks of air support of offensive actions by FSA groups and SDF units on the territories controlled by the Syrian army in the southern part of the republic. As for the sources of providing tactical information for the Arabian F-15SA, here such aircraft as the Israeli G550 "Eitam" CAEW, RC-135W "Rivet Joint" of the US Air Force, and, of course, will become the irreplaceable means of radar, radio and electronic intelligence. Saudi E-3A "Sentry". All of these machines will transmit a possible range of data over the Link-16 tactical network protected radio channel (the contract for upgrading the Arabian E-3A with the Link-16 / TADIL-J terminals was signed between the CA and the USA as early as 2006, its cost was about 10 million dollars).
Such a well-thought-out strategy will enable the Pentagon to remove the bulk of the load from the Strike Eagles and Raptor units and squadrons patrolling the air and ground approaches to the 55-kilometer security zone and Khusham’s pocket and involve them in the air cover of their own air bases US Air Force in the Persian Gulf (Al-Dafra, Al-Udeid, etc.). Aviation It is no coincidence that the US Defense Department is ranked as a priority task for immediate implementation of the air defense and anti-ship defense component of air bases in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, because against the background of Mike Pompeo's frankly defiant and deliberately aggressive anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian statements, during his Middle East tour, There were several more serious events that were hardly exaggerated by our media.
In particular, on April 24, a few days before Pompeo's publicized tour to the Middle East, an unannounced visit of the commander-in-chief of the US Special Forces and the "four-star general" of the US Army Joseph Voutel to Israel took place for a closed meeting with the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (Rabbi Aluf / General Colonel) Gadi Eysenkot, as well as other high-ranking military officials of the department. The results of the talks remained unreported, while the purpose of Voutel's visit was to discuss a plan to intensify and strengthen strategic military partnerships between states, as well as security issues in the region. As you can see, everything is very veiled and streamlined. The results were not long in coming: during the night, another strike by the Israeli F-15I "Ra'am" flight on the arsenals of the 47th brigade of the Syrian Arab Army, located north of the "Rastan cauldron" in the province of Hama, followed. Killed at least 26 people of the SAA LS, as well as the Iranian military. Moreover, in the course of this strike, judging by the photographs of the wreckage of the air attack, the bet was made on the so-called "narrow bombs" in the early GBU-39 / B modification, capable of gliding at a distance of more than 110 km after leaving the hardpoints. What do we see here?
The distance from the mountain areas of Lebanon (the F-15I crews worked from these lines) to the military base / arsenals of the 47 brigade of the Syrian army is approximately 90 km. Consequently, the Israeli pilots had to go unnoticed by the ground-based DRLO weapons of Syria and the Russian Aerospace Forces to get to the northern outskirts of the mountain folds of Antilivan in the rounding mode of the terrain. The task was successfully completed. But then, in order to drop the bombs and give the necessary range of flight (85 — 90 km), they needed to sharply gain altitude over 5-7 km and transonic speed. The vehicles clearly hit the air indicators of the operators of the radar systems of the 96Л6Е type (the all-altitude detector) attached to our Triumph C-400. Consequently, the command of the Syrian Air Defense Forces was notified in advance of a suspicious maneuver.
But to intercept the bombs from the EPR around 0,015 square. m, unfortunately, failed. The answer suggests itself: the object was not covered by the Pantsir-S1 air defense system, or they were not in combat duty due to the carelessness of the Syrians, which can be explained by the remoteness from the most dangerous lines of operation of the Israeli Air Force. In the same turn, such air defense systems as “Buk-М1 / 2” and С-125М “Pechora-2М” are not able to work on such small-sized targets due to the hardware limitations of the illumination radar and 9С36 and guidance of СНР-125. Optic-electronic TV / IR sights failed to perform their function, since the blow was struck at night, and GBU-39 / B are “cold targets” due to the absence of a solid rocket or turbojet engine.
Tel Aviv and Washington have achieved with this blow some slowdown in the assault operation of the “Rana Boiler”, as well as even more aggressive statements from Tehran, which will eventually lead to tougher actions by the CAA and Iranian troops in the Deir ez-Zor area against the “Syrian Democratic forces. " That is what the IDF General Staff is waiting for to launch a major regional Iranian-Israeli conflict to the accompaniment of Netanyahu and Pompeo screaming about the unacceptability of the “nuclear deal” and continuing the secret development of nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles by Iranian specialists. This is where the real reasons for placing the hopes of the United States on the combat power of the Arabian army begin, without which all the daring ambitions of Israel and the United States would be very quickly put on the blades by joint efforts of the renewed Syrian air defense and Iranian missile units.