Six Day War. Part of 2. Diplomatic intrigue and military preparations
In general, the diplomatic efforts of the Israelis these days were unsuccessful, and since the war is a continuation of the policy by military means, the Israelis turned their gaze to the army. At the same time, they swept from the shelves of canned goods, and the dollar jumped by 20% on the black market.
The president of Egypt was a brilliant orator. 23 May on Cairo radio, he delivered an extremely impressive speech, which, in particular, stated the following:
At about the same time, an extended meeting was held at the Israeli Ministry of Defense. It was attended by all ministers, representatives of all parties that were part of the government coalition, high-ranking officials of the army and military intelligence, as well as representatives of the opposition. Not a trace remains from recent optimism. Foreign Minister Abba Even, in particular, reminded the government of the American call received on the eve of not responding to the Egyptian blockade and not sending Israeli ships over the next 48 hours through the Strait of Tiran, in order to give the United States the opportunity to find a solution.
It was felt that Even was encouraged by signs of growing American hardness. He just received information about an urgent message sent from Washington to Moscow. "The United States," it said, "will consider any violation of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran as an act of aggression, against which Israel, in American opinion, has the right to take appropriate protective measures." In reality, however, the harshness of this message reflected not so much the position of the State Department as the personal conviction of President Johnson, who then, on May 23, sent a similar “uncompromising” warning to Naser in Cairo. Something in the American position continued to alarm Israel. President Kennedy at the 8 press conference on May 1963 of the year said: "We support the security of both Israel and its neighbors." Vaguely somehow. And this Johnson 2 August 1966 of the year repeated the exact same phrase. And this is all that the United States actually promised to Israel.
On May 25, Even flew away. His path lay first to Paris, then to London, and finally to the most important of the western capitals - to Washington. On the way, he learned that Jordan had announced that it had completed full mobilization of troops and allowed the troops of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to cross its border. In 1957, France promised to support Israel in the event of a re-blockade of Eilat, and Britain and the United States in the same year made declarations that “... the Strait of Aqaba is international waters ...”, which meant that this region was not the territorial waters of Egypt . Therefore, they cannot be blocked by Egypt without violating international law. Even very much hoped that Britain and the United States would see in such actions infringement of their own interests - both powers were strongly interested in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation.
He didn’t have much hope for the support of France - relations with her were very cool. The war in Algeria is over, France’s need for Israeli friendship has greatly diminished, and now de Gaulle was seeking rapprochement with the Arab world. Recently, the French Foreign Ministry simply did not respond to urgent telegrams from Israel. By the time of arrival of Ebana, de Gaulle had already decided that the blockade by Egypt of the Strait of Tiran did not give grounds for military action.
More importantly, he saw in this crisis a favorable reason for convening a conference of the four great powers (and not just the USSR and the United States), which would force the parties to resolve the conflict. In modern terms, de Gaulle wanted to become a "co-sponsor of the peace process." When the Israeli guest began to state the causes of the crisis, de Gaulle impatiently interrupted him: “Just do not rush. The Quartet must act together, and I will take care of this. ” Instead of warning about possible Israeli countermeasures, Even considered it best to scatter in thanks "for all the political and military assistance that France provides to Israel." The mention of military aid made de Gaulle frown, and nine days later he ordered the closure of French military supplies to Israel. It was difficult to imagine a more unsuccessful visit on the eve of a possible war.
Even met a somewhat greater understanding in London, where he was received by Premier Wilson.
The British leader assured the guest that he would fully support all international measures to ensure freedom of navigation on the Strait of Tirana. Moreover, he has already sent representatives to Washington to discuss the details of such international actions. The next few days have shown that all the applications and all the sent representatives cannot do anything about the situation.
On May 26, the Egyptian President delivered a regular speech to the Pan-Arab Federation of Trade Unions. He promised the Arabs defeat Israel and throw the Jews into the sea.
The political prestige of the Egyptian dictator in the Arab world was growing rapidly - finally a leader appeared, similar to the ancient Arab warriors from the dynasty of the Prophet Mohammed, who would defend the defaulted honor of the Arab nation with his sword and recreate the great Arab caliphate. He repeated his previous words that "... now is not 1956-th year, when we fought not with Israel, but with England and France ...". And he added something new: "... if war breaks out, it will be total and its goal will be the destruction of Israel." He also called the United States "the main enemy", and England the "American footman."
On the same days, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Asad said enthusiastically: “Our troops are now fully ready not only to repel aggression, but also to initiate liberation, and to destroy the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland” .
26 May Even was already in Washington, his meeting with President Johnson was scheduled for 7 at pm local time. To avoid journalists, it was decided that Even will enter the White House through the side gate, but Even did not have time to pass. US Secretary of Defense McNamara himself was waiting for him at the side gate, and Even at that moment was bursting into the White House through the central ones.
He had a passport with him, but they don’t write in the passport that the man works as Israeli Foreign Minister. The President’s security stood up for 15 minutes, but then the marine called the presidential aide and reported: “Then a guy named Even says he has an appointment with the president.” Even's nerves were wound up to the limit and not with him alone. When Even finally met with Johnson in the White House, he asked the president to announce that the attack on Israel would be regarded by the United States as an attack on America itself. Johnson replied then that such a statement does not allow him to make the US Constitution. Then Johnson vaguely and meaningfully remarked: "Israel will not be left alone if he does not decide to go alone." Not for such words flew to America Abba Even. In any case, he refused in any concrete steps aimed at helping Israel - for example, in accelerating the supply of previously promised, but delayed Skyhawk aircraft. True, the Americans promised "to consider the question of organizing an international armada that, under the protection of American military courts, would pass through the Strait of Aqaba." This enterprise was to be called Regatta, and it was this promise that was the basis for Even's optimistic report to his government.
Practically at the same time, on the night of May 27, the USSR Ambassador to Egypt Dmitry Pozhidaev received an urgent order from Moscow to persuade Nasser not to start the war first. Without a preliminary call Pozhidaev rushed to the residence of the Egyptian president. He, too, for a long time was explaining to the guards that he needed to talk with the president right now, at three in the morning. Nasser woke up. The Soviet Union, as a friend of Egypt, advises not to start the war first, because this is what the United States is waiting for from Egypt, the ambassador began to tell Nasser, who wiped his eyes. Having penetrated, Nasser replied that he had not given any orders about the war and had not appointed any dates for the commencement of hostilities.
On the same night on May 27, the Soviet ambassador to Israel, Dmitry Chuvakhin, went to wake Eshkol for the same purpose — to dissuade from military action. Eshkol also raised from the bed. After listening to the ambassador’s notation on the need to “try to resolve the conflict by non-military means,” sleepy Eshkol explained that Israel had announced mobilization because of the actions of Egypt and Syria. Let the USSR makes its claims to the Arabs. The Arabs are not in my competence, Chuvakhin parried, but now I would like to hear a direct answer, is the Jewish state not going to attack first? Eshkol just did not want to give a direct answer. Chuvakhin began to insist. Eshkol, a suit over his pajamas, lost his temper. Do not attack first, do not attack first! Egypt closed the straits, sent troops to Sinai, its planes make reconnaissance flights over the territory of Israel - isn't this all called “attack first”? Chuvakhin got up and wanted to leave at night, but now it was difficult to stop the premiere. “The function of the ambassador,” he said to the retreating Chuvakhin, “is to establish friendly relations with the country where he is accredited [, and you ...]”.
On May 27, Even returned home. The results of his trip were disappointing. All his arguments that "... in 1957, you promised us ..." in all three capitals he was answered "... yes, but now 1967 is oh ...". The difference was in shades.
Nasser gave a May 28 press conference. He criticized Britain, the United States and Canada for pro-Israel sentiment. But Israel is now not threatening Egypt with aggression, as in 1956, they tried to reason the Egyptian leader. “The existence of Israel is in itself an aggression,” Nasser proclaimed. The war will be understood by journalists.
U Thant, returning from Egypt, presented a report to the UN Security Council on the situation in the Middle East. He said that "... both Egyptian President Nasser and Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmoud Riad assured him that Egypt would not take offensive actions against Israel, and the main goal is to restore the situation that existed before 1956 year ...". The speech “... about a total war, the purpose of which would be the destruction of Israel ...” made by the same Nasser, was not noticed by the UN Secretary General - perhaps because of the absentmindedness of such a busy person.
However, this speech made a completely different impression both in Israel and in the Arab countries - and there and there it was taken quite seriously.
Cheering demonstrations marched through Cairo and Damascus — huge crowds of people carried placards expressing the enthusiastic support of their governments. Newspapers came out with huge headlines "The End of Israel!", And with drawings that depicted burning Tel Aviv with blood-drenched streets and piles of skulls as a foreground.
The situation was intensified. Nasser daily threatened to launch military action against Israel. “Our main goal will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab peoples want to fight, ”he said, and the next day he added:“ We will not agree to any coexistence with Israel. Today the subject of the dispute is not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel. In fact, the war with Israel has been going on for a long time, starting with the 1948 year. ”
In Israel, as you can guess, the mood was reversed. Israel was created by people who survived the crematoria and the shooting moats. So the non-interference of the world observing the development of the conflict touched the sickest memories - there was nothing to rely on the “just of this world”.
The actions of their own government did not inspire confidence in the public.
The last straw in this sense was the performance of Eshkol 28 on May 9th. He arrived on the radio immediately after a sleepless night, held at a meeting at the Ministry of Defense, read the text directly from the draft, and as a result spoke crumpled and unintelligible. To top it all, he lost his way, could not find the lost line and in the open air asked his assistant to show him the right place ...
Egyptian Defense Minister Shams Badran returned from Moscow in triumph. The Soviet government fully supported the actions of Egypt and confirmed its readiness to help, if necessary, with its armed forces. Moreover, the USSR insured the Egyptians against the interference of the Americans. At the Moscow airport, the USSR Minister of Defense, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal Andrei Grechko, told his Egyptian counterpart: “If America enters the war, we will be on your side. We have already sent destroyers and submarines equipped with missiles and other secret ships to the shores of Egypt. weapons... I want to confirm to you that if something happens and you need our help, just give us a sign. We will come to your aid immediately. ” The next day, the Cairo radio, choking with delight, presented the direct speech of the Soviet Minister with the following stilted phrases:
Speaking 29 in May 1967 of the year before the National Assembly of Egypt, Nasser said that the day before Minister Shams al-Din Badran (after defeat in the Six Day War, he will be convicted of conspiracy to seize power, put on trial and sentenced to life imprisonment) delivered him a letter from Kosygin, in which it is said that the Soviet Union supports us in this conflict, he will not allow any country to intervene in it until the situation becomes as it was before 1956.
This was supposed to mean that the Soviet Union supported the complete withdrawal of UN troops and the closure of the Strait of Tiran for the passage of Israeli ships. In fact, Moscow was in a slippery situation: the Israelis would win the war - badly, the Arabs won - too bad, because then the United States would have to intervene, and if so, then the USSR would have to make movements. And why is this necessary? At the propaganda level, Egypt’s decision was presented as a defensive measure against Israel’s intention to attack Syria and overthrow the Syrian government, as well as an action aimed at returning the situation that existed before the Sinai campaign. Various commentators, as is usually the case, began to argue that the Strait of Tiran is the territory of Egypt, and therefore he has the right to control the passage of ships through this strait.
May 30th it became known that the American project to create an international flotilla, which, under the protection of the American fleet, will pass through the Strait of Aqaba, cannot be realized. None of the 80 states to which participation in this enterprise was offered joined it. Egypt has brought to the attention of the United States that ships attempting to violate the territorial waters of Egypt will be shot. Consequently, an attempt to lead the ships through the blockade would lead to a possible war, the conduct of which had neither ready resources nor political will.
On the same day, an unexpected guest arrived in Cairo - King Hussein of Jordan. They accepted him fraternally, with open arms, although literally a couple of days before the visit of Radio Cairo, the King called him nothing less than a “Hashemite whore.”
King Hussein came to the conclusion that war is inevitable, that his political position, formulated as “sitting on the fence and waiting for the outcome of events”, no longer ensures the security of either his country or him personally, and that we must hurry to join the winner.
A treaty of friendship and mutual assistance was immediately concluded, the Jordanian army was placed under the command of the Egyptian general, and Ahmed Shukeyri the head of a Palestinian political organization under the control of the Egyptian government, the sworn enemy of King Hussein flew to Amman with the king as a messenger of goodwill. Needless to say, he changed his radical anti-Jordanian views with lightning speed.
Parts of the Iraqi army entered Jordan for the holy Arab war with Israel. After that, Nasser said: “The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are at the borders of Israel to take up the challenge, and the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the entire Arab nation stand behind our armies. Our actions will amaze the whole world. Today, everyone will know that the Arabs are ready for military action, that the critical hour has come. We have entered the stage of serious actions, not declarations. ”
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, Lebanon, Yemen and Algeria expressed their full support for the actions of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq and their readiness to contribute to the “crushing of Zionism.”
Algerian Prime Minister Houari Boumediene: "Freedom of the fatherland will be achieved through the destruction of the Zionist entity." The Minister of Foreign Affairs of pathetic Yemen Salam: “We want war. War is the only way to solve the problem of Israel. Arabs are ready! ”King Hussein of Jordan:“ Arab armies surround Israel. ” The chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmed al-Shukeyri, who was brought to Jordan from Egypt, said more definitely: "We will destroy Israel and its people, and for those who will be saved, if they will, the boats are ready to send them to sea."
31 May Iraqi President Abdel Rahman Muhammad Aref, explained the essence of Arab intentions for those who have not understood everything: "The existence of Israel is a mistake that needs to be corrected ... Our goal is clear - to erase Israel from the world map."
For Israel, the war on three fronts became a completely tangible reality. Public opinion concluded that "... something must be done, and immediately ..."
By the beginning of June, Israel was in complete political, economic and military isolation, it was alone with the superior armies of the Arab states, who did not hide their intentions. It was clear that with the slightest success of the Egyptian army in Sinai, all Israel’s neighbors without exception would immediately rush to kill the Jews. The Arab countries, and with them the entire Muslim world, carnivorously rubbed their hands in anticipation of the new Jewish pogrom. Arab propaganda promised a quick victory. Not a single country in the world supported Israel even in words. It was obvious to everyone that this time the victory of the superior Arab forces is inevitable, and nothing can save Israel, and therefore it would not be better to take the side of the future winner in advance, especially since the victim is quite familiar and not so great - “just” two and a half million Jews ...
The Soviet Union, at the head of the gigantic socialist camp and in all the splendor of its monolithic unity, tried not to lose its own and for this purpose showed its heartfelt readiness to help its Arab friends in their intended business with all available political, economic and military means. People’s Republic of China, North Vietnam and North Korea expressed full support for the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggle of the Arab peoples.
Western Europe, without much emotion, looked at what was happening, believing that the Jews, as always, were to blame for themselves, and wondering in their minds what this whole mess would pour out in terms of the price of oil. The cynical position of the European intellectual torch, philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell ("... if Israel should disappear for the welfare of the rest of the world, I will not protest against the destruction of the Jewish state") quite suitably cowardly and mean-minded Europe.
US President Lyndon Johnson wrote in those days in his diary: "Canadians and Europeans do not want to take responsibility ... They believe that this is not their concern, and they should not get involved in the Middle East conflict."
The United States, stuck in a bloody Vietnam war and internal racial problems, stung by the tremendous successes of the Russians in space, was losing their prestige and influence in the world before their eyes. The Soviet Union and the Arab countries openly made fun of American diplomatic initiatives.
Even before the start of the general mobilization, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who was part-time Minister of Defense, was a solid man, a good business executive, who began to count the soldiers. Israel could put 250 — 264 thousand soldiers, 800 tanks and 300 (according to other data, 286) combat aircraft “into the field”. At the same time 50-60 thousand were already under the gun at an urgent, and the rest still had to be mobilized.
Arab forces were assessed as follows:
Egypt: 210-240 thousand soldiers, 1200 tanks, 500 combat aircraft, including 30 Russian Tu-16 bombers capable of bombarding Israeli cities, will definitely fight.
Syria: 50 — 63 Thousands of Soldiers, 400 Tanks, 120 Planes — Exactly will fight.
Jordan: 50-55 Thousands of Soldiers, 200 Tanks, 40 Airplanes - Unclear for sure, but there is a great suspicion that they will fight.
Lebanon: 12 Thousands of Soldiers, 80 Tanks, 18 Airplanes - is unlikely to be actively fighting, but who knows.
Iraq: 70 Thousands of Soldiers, 400 Tanks, 200 Aircraft - wants to fight and will fight if Jordan misses Iraqi troops through its territory.
Algeria: 60 Thousands of Soldiers, 400 Tanks, 100 Airplanes — Something was in favor of the war, sending "limited contingent" to the front is possible.
Kuwait: 5 Thousands of Soldiers, 24 Tank, 9 Aircraft - verbally ready to powder Israel, but its 9 airplanes do not.
Saudi Arabia: 50 Thousands of Soldiers, 100 Tanks, 20 Aircraft — Of course, they can fight, but they are unlikely to want to help anti-monarchist Egypt and Syria.
Eshkol counted that Israel would have to deal with 547 thousand soldiers, 2504 tanks and 957 aircraft of Arab countries, and these figures made him think deeply. But Aaron Yariv, head of military intelligence, told the prime minister that “the issue is no longer about the freedom of navigation in the straits,” and much more. If Israel does not respond to the closure of the straits, its influence will fall and the IDF will lose its image. The Arabs will consider us weak, and then we can really expect big trouble.
The last days of May 1967 were filled with feverish diplomatic activity on both sides trying to secure the support of the great powers, but apparently, diplomacy was over, the army had to speak further.
The foundations of the structures of the Israeli army were laid under the leadership of General Igael Yadin. At the age of 32, he left his career as an archaeologist and led the General Staff of the Israeli army in the War of Independence.
He received the appointment for good reason - there were a lot of brave young commanders in the newborn Israeli army, but Yadin was distinguished by brilliant intellect and enormous abilities of the organizer. After the end of the war, the General Staff engaged in the development of the structure of the future regular army. Forms of its construction was developed by Yadin himself, taking the British model as a basis. In the system of preparation and mobilization of reserves, much was taken from the experience of the Swiss.
The development of the method of using the army - the doctrine of action, was entrusted to a committee chaired by Colonel Haim Laskov.
The doctrine proceeded from gloomy geopolitical realities:
1. Israel is inferior to its neighbors in the population and in the foreseeable future will always be forced to wage war against a numerically superior enemy.
2. The dispute with neighbors is not in disagreement over borders, but in rejection of the very fact of the existence of Israel. Israel’s opponents will wage war against it for destruction.
3. Given the geographical realities, as well as the enemy’s superiority in the number and in the material, Israel in the event of war cannot count on victory through the destruction of the enemy. The real goal should be to cause such damage to its armed forces, which would disable them for as long as possible.
4. The small territory, the very rugged borders and the proximity of the inhabited centers to the front line deprives Israel of any strategic depth. In the narrowest zone, the distance from the border to the sea is only 14 km. There are no natural barriers to defense.
5. Israel cannot wage a long war. War makes it necessary to mobilize such a huge percentage of the population that the economy will simply cease to function in a few weeks.
The only plus in this grim picture was the "presence of internal operating lines."
Translated from professional military jargon into universal language, this meant that the central position of the country made it possible to strike at enemies one by one if they acted quickly.
A direct consequence of the 5 basic provisions was the need to build such an army that could switch from one front to another at the highest possible speed and cause the enemy maximum damage in the shortest possible time. After the War of Independence and in the next few years, she didn’t know how to even remotely resemble the Israeli army.
After the demobilization of 1949, nine of the twelve existing brigades were transferred to the reserve, and only three were left in the ranks - two infantry, Golani and Givat, and one so-called “armored” 7, consisting of one tank battalion and two motorized infantry, planted on an old half-track lorry. There was also intelligence on jeeps with machine guns. The first company of the tank battalion consisted of "Shermans", of which she was very proud, because they were at least old, but the same engines. And the guns were the same too. True, they were completely unsuitable for fighting with other tanks. These were the 75-mm Krupp howitzers of the First World War, written off as scrap in Switzerland, and found by some Israeli gunner with an eagle eye. The fact is that there were shells for the guns. The second company could not boast of such efficiency. Its armament was also made up of the Shermans, but they could have made a museum - the company had 5 of different types of tank, which differed in the transmission, engines and guns. The only thing that was common was that there were very few spare parts for the engines, and very few shells for the guns.
To one of the tanks - the English modification called "Firefly" shells did not exist. The third and fourth company had only personnel. There were no tanks in them. The companies were created, so to speak, in advance, with the expectation of the future.
When the opportunity arose to receive tanks in France, they did not begin to buy them in finished form, but began to remake in their own way. In particular, the Shermans were not thrown away, but retooled, armed with a new French cannon. What was far from simple, because the tower "Sherman" was not designed for such alterations.
But the real revolution in the army began with 1953, when the new, fourth in a row, Chief of General Staff Moshe Dayan took over the reins.
She wore not so much technical as organizational nature. In 1953, General Dayan understood little in tanks, but he understood the war well. The focus of his attention was on people. Based on the principle that the main thing is to ensure the promotion of the correct commanders, and they will ensure everything else, he cut off the “tail” of his new army and sharply strengthened its “teeth”. Rear services, such as bakeries and laundries, were withdrawn from military structures. Their functions are assigned to the civil sector contract. The brigades were reduced (at the expense of the rear) from 6 000 thousand people to 3 500 thousand, while maintaining the number of combat battalions. There was a dramatic change in the method of planning operations - now the responsibility for planning passed to the executor, the center simply set a directive and demanded a report on either the progress achieved or problems encountered. Independence and initiative in all subordinate instances were strongly encouraged. The methods of warfare developed for the special forces were transferred from small elite units (in the division of Major Ariel Sharon, at first there was only 45 people) to a battalion of paratroopers, which, in turn, was deployed to the brigade with maximum speed. The impatient Dayan tried to transfer the whole army to a similar basis - which, of course, was not always possible.
But new methods were still being introduced, which was facilitated by the systematic promotion of intelligent initiative officers.
Dayan established the rules that remained in the Israeli army for many years after he himself resigned. All commanders, from sergeant to general, moved up the service ladder, starting from the lowest rung, they were accepted into military schools only from the ranks of the army. Education and social origin were not taken into account - only the qualities of a leader. This rule was valid to a certain limit. Beginning with the commanders of the battalions, the officers were obliged to study, and they were given for this paid vacation. Education was not necessarily purely military. For example, it was possible to take a course in philosophy, or systems management — the choice was broad. Finally, after 40 years, officers, as a rule, resigned, received their military pension, and transferred to the reserve.
Dayan believed that the army needed young officers who were more susceptible to fresh ideas, so there was simply no generals older than 45 in the regular army. He himself went to the "citizen" in 43 year.
This system was tested by the war of 1956, and showed excellent results. Despite many shortages, for example, army boots were found only for 30 thousand people, and there were three times as many mobilization conscripts, there were so few outerwear that the soldiers went to the front in their own coats, but the operational plan worked without interruption. The surprises were also pleasant. Tanks, which had modest hopes before the war, unexpectedly showed themselves very well, practically deciding the outcome of the campaign. Dayan drew immediate conclusions from this. Aviation still received about half of all appropriations for new equipment, but what went into the ground forces now had a distinct "tank" priority. He began the rapid expansion of the area of responsibility for a new, promising type of weapon. Infantry brigades began to be transferred to armored vehicles as new equipment arrived, and he appointed Colonel Israel Tal to manage their technical equipment.
This appointment turned out to be extremely successful. The colonel was a solid man. He began a new service by following the “candidate commander tank” course for lieutenants. Then he took up the development of the doctrine of the use of tanks in the specific conditions of the Arab-Israeli conflict - the war of 1956 gave him a wealth of material for study.
The conclusions he arrived at were somewhat unexpected. Instead of fast, fast-moving AMX-30 French tanks capable of making 80 km / h, he preferred to buy heavy, unwieldy “Centurions” in England, whose maximum speed was somewhere in the 30 km / h area, and then on the road, not on rough terrain. They had a not too strong gun, a weak and easily ignitable gasoline engine, and a capricious temper - they demanded serious and continuous care. Nevertheless, Tal chose the “Centurions” - the main advantage in his eyes was their thorough armor.
Everything else he considered reparable. The gun was replaced by the excellent English 105 mm gun, with long range. Gasoline engine replaced by an American diesel. Finally, the capricious temper of the machine was overcome by skill and discipline, which he managed to root in his tank crews.
After some time, it became possible to get the American Pattons through Germany, where they were removed from the Bundeswehr. They were included in the same modernization program as Centurions. Even the old "Shermans" - and those were updated, some even managed to put a shortened version of the 105 mm gun. By the end of May 1967, Israel had in service 8 tank and 5 mechanized brigades. Total 1 000 more or less modern tanks.
The army did not have many things that would like to have. There were no armored personnel carriers for the infantry - they did not have enough money, all purchases were only for one thing - for tanks. Lacked artillery. Not enough transport. According to the mobilization plan, almost all civilian cargo transport in the country had to be requisitioned; even trucks for the delivery of fruit, with bald tires and without spare wheels, were used. The small arms in the reserve infantry units included not only the Belgian 20-charging rifles FN, or the Uzi submachine guns, but also the 98 rifles, where "98" meant "Mauser 1898" of the year before the First World War.
However, about 220 thousands of people were mobilized. Approximately 130 thousands of them were brought together in the 25 brigades of the army and this army was really ready to act.
In Egypt, the tasks of the armed forces were by no means reduced, as was the case in Israel, to the simple and obvious task of defending the homeland. The army was considered the “Avant-garde of the Revolution”, which was quite natural, because Nasser and his associates came to power precisely as a result of a military coup, as the leaders of the Free Officers group. Therefore, the army defended not only and even not so much the country as the regime. And attention was paid to her appropriate. Of course, to the soldiers, not ordinary soldiers, but the officers were well paid, those who reached the senior ranks, say, lieutenant colonel or older, almost automatically received communications and facilities that were not available to the common man. The officer club in Cairo was the most aristocratic place in the capital.
Unlike the Israeli army, where there was a single lieutenant general who held the post of Chief of the General Staff, and a dozen of the major generals who made this headquarters, there were many generals in the Egyptian army.
He was headed by the army minister of war, Abdel Hakim Amer, a loyal associate of the leader of the revolution, in the utterly exceptional rank of field marshal.
Everything that happened in the armed forces of the country, especially with personnel, happened only with his knowledge.
It must be said that President Nasser had repeatedly offered his friend Amer not to focus so exclusively on the concerns of officers, but to take up broader political tasks that would more closely correspond to his outstanding talents. In the end, everyday concerns could be entrusted to a less distinguished person like Field Marshal, for example, General Fawzi. This general was not only the chief of the General Staff, but was personally known to President Nasser as his former teacher in a military school.
The general was divided, humble and, most importantly, was extremely loyal to the president. It is the president. However, Amer always replied that he was only a modest soldier, completely satisfied with his shares, and that he was not attracted to posts, if he had to, to achieve them, he, as the President had certainly wished, would move away from his favorite occupation, namely, direct and direct leadership of the armed forces. However, for 1967, the list of his posts included the posts of First Vice-President, Minister of Science, Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Commission, Chairman of the Commission on the Elimination of Feudalism (with wide confiscation rights), and even for some reason the Chairman of the Football Federation. Field Marshal, known by this title, regardless of the set of his other official posts, occupied a completely exceptional place in Egypt.
When Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev awarded Naser the Golden Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union in 1964, then, being well informed about the internal affairs of the United Arab Republic, he assigned this title not only to the President of Egypt, but also to his minister of war.
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 13 in May 1964, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
However, field marshal did not have the opportunity to shift General Fawzi. President Nasser was very careful to have his own people, namely his own, in the armed forces. Therefore, Amer tried to put the matter in such a way that the General Headquarters did not enter into questions that the Minister of War himself was keenly interested in. Since we had to deal with the army through an intermediary, and even so influential, Nasser, for his part, did everything possible so that the military would not overlap in affairs or leisure with security officers, for example, with his personal security. (Shortly after the military failure, the field marshal will be accused of attempting a coup d'état and put under house arrest, and on September 14 of 1967, according to the official version, he will commit suicide by taking poison.)
In Egypt, the end of the 50s — the beginning of the 60s were many German advisers. For example, headquarters in the field of war planning was led by a group of former Wehrmacht officers led by General Wilhelm Farmbacher, who not only gained a wealth of combat experience fighting in the Rommel tank army Africa, but also commanded a corps in Brittany in 1944. defending Saint Malo and Brest from the Anglo-American invasion.
Joachim Daimling, the former head of the Gestapo in Düsseldorf, reorganized the Egyptian secret police, greatly improving its professional standards.
German advisers found use in Egypt in sometimes very unexpected areas. Heinrich "Hassan Suleiman" Selmann, a former Gestapo chief in Ulm, went to work at the Ministry of Information in Cairo to head the propaganda department.
All secret work in the field of the development of chemical weapons and missiles was also conducted with the extensive use of German specialists, but, for understandable reasons, this work was not particularly advertised.
The Suez War of 1956 raised the prestige of Nasser in the world, and in Arab countries it soared to the skies.
Success followed success - in 1958, Syria agreed to a formal alliance with Egypt, a new state was formed - the United Arab Republic.
With the help of the USSR, the Aswan Dam was built in 1960. This project was supposed to make Egypt an industrial power. Further, however, things did not go so smoothly. In September, 1961, in Syria, there was another coup, and the Egyptian administration had to urgently leave the Syrian part of the United Arab Republic. This name now refers only to Egypt. Relations with Russia were also strained - to the taste of N.S. Khrushchev, the Nasser revolution "lost its dynamism." In return for the enormous funds invested by the USSR in the construction of the dam and in the armament of the Egyptian army, he wanted a more active alliance directed against the United States, to which Nasser did not agree. On the contrary, his policies at that time gave a noticeable bias towards rapprochement with the Americans. The administration of President Kennedy believed that Nasser’s revolutionary fervor could be cooled, and offered him extensive food aid if he “changes the microphone to the bulldozer”, i.e. will move from violent subversive propaganda in the Arab world to peaceful internal development.
In the 1962 year, 40% of Egypt’s population was fed by American food aid.
This idyll came to an end after the coup in Yemen. The "Free Officers" group, modeled on the Egyptian one, produced a small palace revolution, expelling the country's ruler, Imam Badr. He, however, did not accept defeat, and with the help of Saudi Arabia began a war against the revolutionaries, who, in turn, turned to Naser for help. Over time, the Yemen war has become a heavy burden for Egypt, financial, military and political. In November 1964, disputes with the United States reached a boiling point. In a conversation with the American ambassador, Battle, Nasser said that "those who dislike our politics can go away and drink the sea. We will cut off the language to anyone who speaks badly about us."
This kind of speech led to some consequences. The American grain, from which 60 was baked, in% of bread baked in Egypt, ceased to flow into the country. Cairo’s attempts to refinance its foreign debt failed - international banks suddenly found that loans to Egypt were somehow too risky. The colossal losses were partially counterbalanced by the promise of the Soviet Union to help with money, but no solution was visible. The economy did not work. Socialism and in his homeland, he worked with big problems, and even in the conditions of Egypt he broke down completely. 5 000 workers and employees of the El Nasr automobile plant, built with the help of the USSR, produced 2 machines per week.
So the 1967 crisis that happened in May came in very handy. It was a great opportunity to increase the weight of Egypt in international affairs. Indeed, the diplomatic and military offensive launched against Israel brought remarkable results.
In fact, the entire defense of Israel held on to the thin line of UN troops stationed in Sinai, in alliance with France, on somewhat controversial (but still considered as real) membership in the "Western Club" and on its own armed forces. Israel was surrounded by Arab armies. The overall advantage in the army was almost two to one in people, two to one in tanks, three to one in aircraft, and at least five to one in artillery.
However, Nasser did not want to act recklessly. His foreign minister, Dr. Mahmoud Riad, explained to American diplomat Charles Yost that Nasser wants peace, but he simply cannot agree to lifting the blockade.
He does not want to fight anyone, and least of all with the United States. And he does not want to attack Israel at all, although his generals insist on an attack.
The president of Egypt himself prefers the Israelis to strike the first blow, then his army will crush them in the desert, and “this short war will immediately heal the situation”. We should not attach too much importance to all this talk about a total war of annihilation, Nasser does not mean anything like that, this is all the rhetoric, necessary in practical politics, as a distinguished ambassador, undoubtedly understands, simply because of his deep and enlightened mind. We are talking about the “amputation of the Israeli south” and the establishment of a land direct border between Egypt and Jordan. Then, in the absence of Eilat, the blockade issue will disappear by itself, Israel will learn to live without this port, and the parties “... will begin preparations for a realistic solution of the issue - for example, through the extensive repatriation of Palestinian refugees back to Israel ...”. The conversation took place on June 1.
On the same day, the Government of National Unity was formed in Israel. Moshe Dayan entered him as Minister of Defense. Before the war there were only a few days left. Americans all asked about 48 rest hours. Dayan, on the other hand, felt it was just a drag on the time. Well, he said, the 48 watch we give them, but it is 48, not 49.
And the Americans, knowing full well what was about to begin, moved the aircraft carriers America and Saratoga, and with them the entire Sixth Fleet, closer to the shores of Israel and Egypt.
The specific date of the attack was set in a very confidential conversation between Dayan and Rabin, the Chief of the General Staff, and is scheduled for Monday morning, 5 on June 1967 of the year.
In the context of this narrative, I can only note that the Six-Day War, which actually lasted for 132 hours and 30 minutes, is described in detail in many historical and military studies, it has been the subject of careful study in military academies and general staffs around the world. This war is regarded as the most important event in the history of Israel. It was not just a war, but a clash between two opposing civilizations that happened in the 60s of the last century. The six-day war is much more than an episode in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In June 1967, in the desert of Sinai, where the prophet Moses adopted the moral code of mankind from the hands of the Lord himself, and on the hills of Jerusalem, where the founder of monotheism, the prophet Abraham received the Lord’s recognition and blessing, determined the future of our civilization as a whole. And if European intellectuals did not understand this, then it only means that, as Albert Einstein used to say, the mind is unintelligible in choosing a master, that reason is blind when it comes to priorities and ultimate goals.
Sources:
Shterenshis M. Israel. The history of the state. 2009.
Tenenbaum B. The Unsuspected Arab-Israeli War of 1956. 2011.
Okunev Yu. A six-day chord of biblical history.
Arab-Israeli wars. Arab look. 2008.
Wikipedia articles, etc.
The president of Egypt was a brilliant orator. 23 May on Cairo radio, he delivered an extremely impressive speech, which, in particular, stated the following:
“... We are in confrontation with Israel. However, this is not the 1956 year, when France and the United Kingdom were on his side. Now Israel is not supported by any European country. This time we will meet with Israel face to face. The Jews threaten us with war. I answer them "Ahlan wa-Sahlan" ("Welcome"). "
At about the same time, an extended meeting was held at the Israeli Ministry of Defense. It was attended by all ministers, representatives of all parties that were part of the government coalition, high-ranking officials of the army and military intelligence, as well as representatives of the opposition. Not a trace remains from recent optimism. Foreign Minister Abba Even, in particular, reminded the government of the American call received on the eve of not responding to the Egyptian blockade and not sending Israeli ships over the next 48 hours through the Strait of Tiran, in order to give the United States the opportunity to find a solution.
Abba Even
It was felt that Even was encouraged by signs of growing American hardness. He just received information about an urgent message sent from Washington to Moscow. "The United States," it said, "will consider any violation of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran as an act of aggression, against which Israel, in American opinion, has the right to take appropriate protective measures." In reality, however, the harshness of this message reflected not so much the position of the State Department as the personal conviction of President Johnson, who then, on May 23, sent a similar “uncompromising” warning to Naser in Cairo. Something in the American position continued to alarm Israel. President Kennedy at the 8 press conference on May 1963 of the year said: "We support the security of both Israel and its neighbors." Vaguely somehow. And this Johnson 2 August 1966 of the year repeated the exact same phrase. And this is all that the United States actually promised to Israel.
On May 25, Even flew away. His path lay first to Paris, then to London, and finally to the most important of the western capitals - to Washington. On the way, he learned that Jordan had announced that it had completed full mobilization of troops and allowed the troops of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to cross its border. In 1957, France promised to support Israel in the event of a re-blockade of Eilat, and Britain and the United States in the same year made declarations that “... the Strait of Aqaba is international waters ...”, which meant that this region was not the territorial waters of Egypt . Therefore, they cannot be blocked by Egypt without violating international law. Even very much hoped that Britain and the United States would see in such actions infringement of their own interests - both powers were strongly interested in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation.
He didn’t have much hope for the support of France - relations with her were very cool. The war in Algeria is over, France’s need for Israeli friendship has greatly diminished, and now de Gaulle was seeking rapprochement with the Arab world. Recently, the French Foreign Ministry simply did not respond to urgent telegrams from Israel. By the time of arrival of Ebana, de Gaulle had already decided that the blockade by Egypt of the Strait of Tiran did not give grounds for military action.
Sharl De Goll
More importantly, he saw in this crisis a favorable reason for convening a conference of the four great powers (and not just the USSR and the United States), which would force the parties to resolve the conflict. In modern terms, de Gaulle wanted to become a "co-sponsor of the peace process." When the Israeli guest began to state the causes of the crisis, de Gaulle impatiently interrupted him: “Just do not rush. The Quartet must act together, and I will take care of this. ” Instead of warning about possible Israeli countermeasures, Even considered it best to scatter in thanks "for all the political and military assistance that France provides to Israel." The mention of military aid made de Gaulle frown, and nine days later he ordered the closure of French military supplies to Israel. It was difficult to imagine a more unsuccessful visit on the eve of a possible war.
Even met a somewhat greater understanding in London, where he was received by Premier Wilson.
Harold Wilson
The British leader assured the guest that he would fully support all international measures to ensure freedom of navigation on the Strait of Tirana. Moreover, he has already sent representatives to Washington to discuss the details of such international actions. The next few days have shown that all the applications and all the sent representatives cannot do anything about the situation.
On May 26, the Egyptian President delivered a regular speech to the Pan-Arab Federation of Trade Unions. He promised the Arabs defeat Israel and throw the Jews into the sea.
The political prestige of the Egyptian dictator in the Arab world was growing rapidly - finally a leader appeared, similar to the ancient Arab warriors from the dynasty of the Prophet Mohammed, who would defend the defaulted honor of the Arab nation with his sword and recreate the great Arab caliphate. He repeated his previous words that "... now is not 1956-th year, when we fought not with Israel, but with England and France ...". And he added something new: "... if war breaks out, it will be total and its goal will be the destruction of Israel." He also called the United States "the main enemy", and England the "American footman."
On the same days, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Asad said enthusiastically: “Our troops are now fully ready not only to repel aggression, but also to initiate liberation, and to destroy the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland” .
26 May Even was already in Washington, his meeting with President Johnson was scheduled for 7 at pm local time. To avoid journalists, it was decided that Even will enter the White House through the side gate, but Even did not have time to pass. US Secretary of Defense McNamara himself was waiting for him at the side gate, and Even at that moment was bursting into the White House through the central ones.
Robert McNamara
He had a passport with him, but they don’t write in the passport that the man works as Israeli Foreign Minister. The President’s security stood up for 15 minutes, but then the marine called the presidential aide and reported: “Then a guy named Even says he has an appointment with the president.” Even's nerves were wound up to the limit and not with him alone. When Even finally met with Johnson in the White House, he asked the president to announce that the attack on Israel would be regarded by the United States as an attack on America itself. Johnson replied then that such a statement does not allow him to make the US Constitution. Then Johnson vaguely and meaningfully remarked: "Israel will not be left alone if he does not decide to go alone." Not for such words flew to America Abba Even. In any case, he refused in any concrete steps aimed at helping Israel - for example, in accelerating the supply of previously promised, but delayed Skyhawk aircraft. True, the Americans promised "to consider the question of organizing an international armada that, under the protection of American military courts, would pass through the Strait of Aqaba." This enterprise was to be called Regatta, and it was this promise that was the basis for Even's optimistic report to his government.
Practically at the same time, on the night of May 27, the USSR Ambassador to Egypt Dmitry Pozhidaev received an urgent order from Moscow to persuade Nasser not to start the war first. Without a preliminary call Pozhidaev rushed to the residence of the Egyptian president. He, too, for a long time was explaining to the guards that he needed to talk with the president right now, at three in the morning. Nasser woke up. The Soviet Union, as a friend of Egypt, advises not to start the war first, because this is what the United States is waiting for from Egypt, the ambassador began to tell Nasser, who wiped his eyes. Having penetrated, Nasser replied that he had not given any orders about the war and had not appointed any dates for the commencement of hostilities.
On the same night on May 27, the Soviet ambassador to Israel, Dmitry Chuvakhin, went to wake Eshkol for the same purpose — to dissuade from military action. Eshkol also raised from the bed. After listening to the ambassador’s notation on the need to “try to resolve the conflict by non-military means,” sleepy Eshkol explained that Israel had announced mobilization because of the actions of Egypt and Syria. Let the USSR makes its claims to the Arabs. The Arabs are not in my competence, Chuvakhin parried, but now I would like to hear a direct answer, is the Jewish state not going to attack first? Eshkol just did not want to give a direct answer. Chuvakhin began to insist. Eshkol, a suit over his pajamas, lost his temper. Do not attack first, do not attack first! Egypt closed the straits, sent troops to Sinai, its planes make reconnaissance flights over the territory of Israel - isn't this all called “attack first”? Chuvakhin got up and wanted to leave at night, but now it was difficult to stop the premiere. “The function of the ambassador,” he said to the retreating Chuvakhin, “is to establish friendly relations with the country where he is accredited [, and you ...]”.
On May 27, Even returned home. The results of his trip were disappointing. All his arguments that "... in 1957, you promised us ..." in all three capitals he was answered "... yes, but now 1967 is oh ...". The difference was in shades.
Nasser gave a May 28 press conference. He criticized Britain, the United States and Canada for pro-Israel sentiment. But Israel is now not threatening Egypt with aggression, as in 1956, they tried to reason the Egyptian leader. “The existence of Israel is in itself an aggression,” Nasser proclaimed. The war will be understood by journalists.
U Thant, returning from Egypt, presented a report to the UN Security Council on the situation in the Middle East. He said that "... both Egyptian President Nasser and Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmoud Riad assured him that Egypt would not take offensive actions against Israel, and the main goal is to restore the situation that existed before 1956 year ...". The speech “... about a total war, the purpose of which would be the destruction of Israel ...” made by the same Nasser, was not noticed by the UN Secretary General - perhaps because of the absentmindedness of such a busy person.
However, this speech made a completely different impression both in Israel and in the Arab countries - and there and there it was taken quite seriously.
Cheering demonstrations marched through Cairo and Damascus — huge crowds of people carried placards expressing the enthusiastic support of their governments. Newspapers came out with huge headlines "The End of Israel!", And with drawings that depicted burning Tel Aviv with blood-drenched streets and piles of skulls as a foreground.
The situation was intensified. Nasser daily threatened to launch military action against Israel. “Our main goal will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab peoples want to fight, ”he said, and the next day he added:“ We will not agree to any coexistence with Israel. Today the subject of the dispute is not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel. In fact, the war with Israel has been going on for a long time, starting with the 1948 year. ”
Caricature of an Arab newspaper of those days. "Nasser dumps the Jews into the Mediterranean." In the background are the armies of Syria, Egypt, Jordan.
In Israel, as you can guess, the mood was reversed. Israel was created by people who survived the crematoria and the shooting moats. So the non-interference of the world observing the development of the conflict touched the sickest memories - there was nothing to rely on the “just of this world”.
The actions of their own government did not inspire confidence in the public.
The last straw in this sense was the performance of Eshkol 28 on May 9th. He arrived on the radio immediately after a sleepless night, held at a meeting at the Ministry of Defense, read the text directly from the draft, and as a result spoke crumpled and unintelligible. To top it all, he lost his way, could not find the lost line and in the open air asked his assistant to show him the right place ...
Egyptian Defense Minister Shams Badran returned from Moscow in triumph. The Soviet government fully supported the actions of Egypt and confirmed its readiness to help, if necessary, with its armed forces. Moreover, the USSR insured the Egyptians against the interference of the Americans. At the Moscow airport, the USSR Minister of Defense, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal Andrei Grechko, told his Egyptian counterpart: “If America enters the war, we will be on your side. We have already sent destroyers and submarines equipped with missiles and other secret ships to the shores of Egypt. weapons... I want to confirm to you that if something happens and you need our help, just give us a sign. We will come to your aid immediately. ” The next day, the Cairo radio, choking with delight, presented the direct speech of the Soviet Minister with the following stilted phrases:
“The USSR, its government and army will, together with the Arabs, support and inspire them. We are your loyal friends and we will remain them. The armed forces of the Soviet Union will continue to support you, because such is the policy of the Soviet people and our party. On behalf of the Minister of Defense and on behalf of the entire Soviet people, we wish you victory in the war against imperialism and Zionism. We are with you and ready to help you at any time. "
Speaking 29 in May 1967 of the year before the National Assembly of Egypt, Nasser said that the day before Minister Shams al-Din Badran (after defeat in the Six Day War, he will be convicted of conspiracy to seize power, put on trial and sentenced to life imprisonment) delivered him a letter from Kosygin, in which it is said that the Soviet Union supports us in this conflict, he will not allow any country to intervene in it until the situation becomes as it was before 1956.
Shams al-Din Badran and Gamal Abdel Nasser
This was supposed to mean that the Soviet Union supported the complete withdrawal of UN troops and the closure of the Strait of Tiran for the passage of Israeli ships. In fact, Moscow was in a slippery situation: the Israelis would win the war - badly, the Arabs won - too bad, because then the United States would have to intervene, and if so, then the USSR would have to make movements. And why is this necessary? At the propaganda level, Egypt’s decision was presented as a defensive measure against Israel’s intention to attack Syria and overthrow the Syrian government, as well as an action aimed at returning the situation that existed before the Sinai campaign. Various commentators, as is usually the case, began to argue that the Strait of Tiran is the territory of Egypt, and therefore he has the right to control the passage of ships through this strait.
May 30th it became known that the American project to create an international flotilla, which, under the protection of the American fleet, will pass through the Strait of Aqaba, cannot be realized. None of the 80 states to which participation in this enterprise was offered joined it. Egypt has brought to the attention of the United States that ships attempting to violate the territorial waters of Egypt will be shot. Consequently, an attempt to lead the ships through the blockade would lead to a possible war, the conduct of which had neither ready resources nor political will.
On the same day, an unexpected guest arrived in Cairo - King Hussein of Jordan. They accepted him fraternally, with open arms, although literally a couple of days before the visit of Radio Cairo, the King called him nothing less than a “Hashemite whore.”
King Hussein came to the conclusion that war is inevitable, that his political position, formulated as “sitting on the fence and waiting for the outcome of events”, no longer ensures the security of either his country or him personally, and that we must hurry to join the winner.
A treaty of friendship and mutual assistance was immediately concluded, the Jordanian army was placed under the command of the Egyptian general, and Ahmed Shukeyri the head of a Palestinian political organization under the control of the Egyptian government, the sworn enemy of King Hussein flew to Amman with the king as a messenger of goodwill. Needless to say, he changed his radical anti-Jordanian views with lightning speed.
Parts of the Iraqi army entered Jordan for the holy Arab war with Israel. After that, Nasser said: “The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are at the borders of Israel to take up the challenge, and the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the entire Arab nation stand behind our armies. Our actions will amaze the whole world. Today, everyone will know that the Arabs are ready for military action, that the critical hour has come. We have entered the stage of serious actions, not declarations. ”
Caricature of the Lebanese newspaper Al-Jarida, May 31 1967: The guns of eight Arab states - Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, Lebanon, Yemen and Algeria expressed their full support for the actions of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq and their readiness to contribute to the “crushing of Zionism.”
Algerian Prime Minister Houari Boumediene: "Freedom of the fatherland will be achieved through the destruction of the Zionist entity." The Minister of Foreign Affairs of pathetic Yemen Salam: “We want war. War is the only way to solve the problem of Israel. Arabs are ready! ”King Hussein of Jordan:“ Arab armies surround Israel. ” The chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmed al-Shukeyri, who was brought to Jordan from Egypt, said more definitely: "We will destroy Israel and its people, and for those who will be saved, if they will, the boats are ready to send them to sea."
31 May Iraqi President Abdel Rahman Muhammad Aref, explained the essence of Arab intentions for those who have not understood everything: "The existence of Israel is a mistake that needs to be corrected ... Our goal is clear - to erase Israel from the world map."
Caricature in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Hayat, May 31, 1967. Tanks UAR, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon
For Israel, the war on three fronts became a completely tangible reality. Public opinion concluded that "... something must be done, and immediately ..."
By the beginning of June, Israel was in complete political, economic and military isolation, it was alone with the superior armies of the Arab states, who did not hide their intentions. It was clear that with the slightest success of the Egyptian army in Sinai, all Israel’s neighbors without exception would immediately rush to kill the Jews. The Arab countries, and with them the entire Muslim world, carnivorously rubbed their hands in anticipation of the new Jewish pogrom. Arab propaganda promised a quick victory. Not a single country in the world supported Israel even in words. It was obvious to everyone that this time the victory of the superior Arab forces is inevitable, and nothing can save Israel, and therefore it would not be better to take the side of the future winner in advance, especially since the victim is quite familiar and not so great - “just” two and a half million Jews ...
The Soviet Union, at the head of the gigantic socialist camp and in all the splendor of its monolithic unity, tried not to lose its own and for this purpose showed its heartfelt readiness to help its Arab friends in their intended business with all available political, economic and military means. People’s Republic of China, North Vietnam and North Korea expressed full support for the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggle of the Arab peoples.
Western Europe, without much emotion, looked at what was happening, believing that the Jews, as always, were to blame for themselves, and wondering in their minds what this whole mess would pour out in terms of the price of oil. The cynical position of the European intellectual torch, philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell ("... if Israel should disappear for the welfare of the rest of the world, I will not protest against the destruction of the Jewish state") quite suitably cowardly and mean-minded Europe.
Bertrand Russell
US President Lyndon Johnson wrote in those days in his diary: "Canadians and Europeans do not want to take responsibility ... They believe that this is not their concern, and they should not get involved in the Middle East conflict."
The United States, stuck in a bloody Vietnam war and internal racial problems, stung by the tremendous successes of the Russians in space, was losing their prestige and influence in the world before their eyes. The Soviet Union and the Arab countries openly made fun of American diplomatic initiatives.
"At this critical moment, when story presented a new and unprecedented test to the Jews, who still remembered well their relatives killed in Babiy Yar and strangled in the gas chambers of Auschwitz, the small people had shrunk into a fearless lump of will. Attempts of blatant Arab propaganda to intimidate Jews, as well as the hopes of Soviet strategists that the "cowardly Jews" would not withstand the terrible tension and run, turned into their opposite: the Jews did not run away, but, on the contrary, took the Uzi machine gun in their hands. In the valleys of Galilee, near Tel Aviv and Beersheba, reservists underwent accelerated military training. In the Negev desert, the pilots trained in bombing. Priceless Dead Sea Bible Scrolls hid in a secret vault. Thousands of people were digging trenches and preparing bomb shelters. Taxis and buses were mobilized to transport troops. People donated blood and taught children to hide in shelters. The little people turned into a single, spring-loaded steel spring ... "
In the cities and kibbutzim they dug trenches, hastily built shelters. Citizens were preparing for the worst.Even before the start of the general mobilization, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who was part-time Minister of Defense, was a solid man, a good business executive, who began to count the soldiers. Israel could put 250 — 264 thousand soldiers, 800 tanks and 300 (according to other data, 286) combat aircraft “into the field”. At the same time 50-60 thousand were already under the gun at an urgent, and the rest still had to be mobilized.
Arab forces were assessed as follows:
Egypt: 210-240 thousand soldiers, 1200 tanks, 500 combat aircraft, including 30 Russian Tu-16 bombers capable of bombarding Israeli cities, will definitely fight.
Syria: 50 — 63 Thousands of Soldiers, 400 Tanks, 120 Planes — Exactly will fight.
Jordan: 50-55 Thousands of Soldiers, 200 Tanks, 40 Airplanes - Unclear for sure, but there is a great suspicion that they will fight.
Lebanon: 12 Thousands of Soldiers, 80 Tanks, 18 Airplanes - is unlikely to be actively fighting, but who knows.
Iraq: 70 Thousands of Soldiers, 400 Tanks, 200 Aircraft - wants to fight and will fight if Jordan misses Iraqi troops through its territory.
Algeria: 60 Thousands of Soldiers, 400 Tanks, 100 Airplanes — Something was in favor of the war, sending "limited contingent" to the front is possible.
Kuwait: 5 Thousands of Soldiers, 24 Tank, 9 Aircraft - verbally ready to powder Israel, but its 9 airplanes do not.
Saudi Arabia: 50 Thousands of Soldiers, 100 Tanks, 20 Aircraft — Of course, they can fight, but they are unlikely to want to help anti-monarchist Egypt and Syria.
Eshkol counted that Israel would have to deal with 547 thousand soldiers, 2504 tanks and 957 aircraft of Arab countries, and these figures made him think deeply. But Aaron Yariv, head of military intelligence, told the prime minister that “the issue is no longer about the freedom of navigation in the straits,” and much more. If Israel does not respond to the closure of the straits, its influence will fall and the IDF will lose its image. The Arabs will consider us weak, and then we can really expect big trouble.
The last days of May 1967 were filled with feverish diplomatic activity on both sides trying to secure the support of the great powers, but apparently, diplomacy was over, the army had to speak further.
The foundations of the structures of the Israeli army were laid under the leadership of General Igael Yadin. At the age of 32, he left his career as an archaeologist and led the General Staff of the Israeli army in the War of Independence.
Igael Yadin
He received the appointment for good reason - there were a lot of brave young commanders in the newborn Israeli army, but Yadin was distinguished by brilliant intellect and enormous abilities of the organizer. After the end of the war, the General Staff engaged in the development of the structure of the future regular army. Forms of its construction was developed by Yadin himself, taking the British model as a basis. In the system of preparation and mobilization of reserves, much was taken from the experience of the Swiss.
The development of the method of using the army - the doctrine of action, was entrusted to a committee chaired by Colonel Haim Laskov.
Chaim Laskov
The doctrine proceeded from gloomy geopolitical realities:
1. Israel is inferior to its neighbors in the population and in the foreseeable future will always be forced to wage war against a numerically superior enemy.
2. The dispute with neighbors is not in disagreement over borders, but in rejection of the very fact of the existence of Israel. Israel’s opponents will wage war against it for destruction.
3. Given the geographical realities, as well as the enemy’s superiority in the number and in the material, Israel in the event of war cannot count on victory through the destruction of the enemy. The real goal should be to cause such damage to its armed forces, which would disable them for as long as possible.
4. The small territory, the very rugged borders and the proximity of the inhabited centers to the front line deprives Israel of any strategic depth. In the narrowest zone, the distance from the border to the sea is only 14 km. There are no natural barriers to defense.
5. Israel cannot wage a long war. War makes it necessary to mobilize such a huge percentage of the population that the economy will simply cease to function in a few weeks.
The only plus in this grim picture was the "presence of internal operating lines."
Translated from professional military jargon into universal language, this meant that the central position of the country made it possible to strike at enemies one by one if they acted quickly.
A direct consequence of the 5 basic provisions was the need to build such an army that could switch from one front to another at the highest possible speed and cause the enemy maximum damage in the shortest possible time. After the War of Independence and in the next few years, she didn’t know how to even remotely resemble the Israeli army.
After the demobilization of 1949, nine of the twelve existing brigades were transferred to the reserve, and only three were left in the ranks - two infantry, Golani and Givat, and one so-called “armored” 7, consisting of one tank battalion and two motorized infantry, planted on an old half-track lorry. There was also intelligence on jeeps with machine guns. The first company of the tank battalion consisted of "Shermans", of which she was very proud, because they were at least old, but the same engines. And the guns were the same too. True, they were completely unsuitable for fighting with other tanks. These were the 75-mm Krupp howitzers of the First World War, written off as scrap in Switzerland, and found by some Israeli gunner with an eagle eye. The fact is that there were shells for the guns. The second company could not boast of such efficiency. Its armament was also made up of the Shermans, but they could have made a museum - the company had 5 of different types of tank, which differed in the transmission, engines and guns. The only thing that was common was that there were very few spare parts for the engines, and very few shells for the guns.
To one of the tanks - the English modification called "Firefly" shells did not exist. The third and fourth company had only personnel. There were no tanks in them. The companies were created, so to speak, in advance, with the expectation of the future.
When the opportunity arose to receive tanks in France, they did not begin to buy them in finished form, but began to remake in their own way. In particular, the Shermans were not thrown away, but retooled, armed with a new French cannon. What was far from simple, because the tower "Sherman" was not designed for such alterations.
But the real revolution in the army began with 1953, when the new, fourth in a row, Chief of General Staff Moshe Dayan took over the reins.
She wore not so much technical as organizational nature. In 1953, General Dayan understood little in tanks, but he understood the war well. The focus of his attention was on people. Based on the principle that the main thing is to ensure the promotion of the correct commanders, and they will ensure everything else, he cut off the “tail” of his new army and sharply strengthened its “teeth”. Rear services, such as bakeries and laundries, were withdrawn from military structures. Their functions are assigned to the civil sector contract. The brigades were reduced (at the expense of the rear) from 6 000 thousand people to 3 500 thousand, while maintaining the number of combat battalions. There was a dramatic change in the method of planning operations - now the responsibility for planning passed to the executor, the center simply set a directive and demanded a report on either the progress achieved or problems encountered. Independence and initiative in all subordinate instances were strongly encouraged. The methods of warfare developed for the special forces were transferred from small elite units (in the division of Major Ariel Sharon, at first there was only 45 people) to a battalion of paratroopers, which, in turn, was deployed to the brigade with maximum speed. The impatient Dayan tried to transfer the whole army to a similar basis - which, of course, was not always possible.
But new methods were still being introduced, which was facilitated by the systematic promotion of intelligent initiative officers.
Dayan established the rules that remained in the Israeli army for many years after he himself resigned. All commanders, from sergeant to general, moved up the service ladder, starting from the lowest rung, they were accepted into military schools only from the ranks of the army. Education and social origin were not taken into account - only the qualities of a leader. This rule was valid to a certain limit. Beginning with the commanders of the battalions, the officers were obliged to study, and they were given for this paid vacation. Education was not necessarily purely military. For example, it was possible to take a course in philosophy, or systems management — the choice was broad. Finally, after 40 years, officers, as a rule, resigned, received their military pension, and transferred to the reserve.
Dayan believed that the army needed young officers who were more susceptible to fresh ideas, so there was simply no generals older than 45 in the regular army. He himself went to the "citizen" in 43 year.
This system was tested by the war of 1956, and showed excellent results. Despite many shortages, for example, army boots were found only for 30 thousand people, and there were three times as many mobilization conscripts, there were so few outerwear that the soldiers went to the front in their own coats, but the operational plan worked without interruption. The surprises were also pleasant. Tanks, which had modest hopes before the war, unexpectedly showed themselves very well, practically deciding the outcome of the campaign. Dayan drew immediate conclusions from this. Aviation still received about half of all appropriations for new equipment, but what went into the ground forces now had a distinct "tank" priority. He began the rapid expansion of the area of responsibility for a new, promising type of weapon. Infantry brigades began to be transferred to armored vehicles as new equipment arrived, and he appointed Colonel Israel Tal to manage their technical equipment.
This appointment turned out to be extremely successful. The colonel was a solid man. He began a new service by following the “candidate commander tank” course for lieutenants. Then he took up the development of the doctrine of the use of tanks in the specific conditions of the Arab-Israeli conflict - the war of 1956 gave him a wealth of material for study.
Israel Tal
The conclusions he arrived at were somewhat unexpected. Instead of fast, fast-moving AMX-30 French tanks capable of making 80 km / h, he preferred to buy heavy, unwieldy “Centurions” in England, whose maximum speed was somewhere in the 30 km / h area, and then on the road, not on rough terrain. They had a not too strong gun, a weak and easily ignitable gasoline engine, and a capricious temper - they demanded serious and continuous care. Nevertheless, Tal chose the “Centurions” - the main advantage in his eyes was their thorough armor.
Everything else he considered reparable. The gun was replaced by the excellent English 105 mm gun, with long range. Gasoline engine replaced by an American diesel. Finally, the capricious temper of the machine was overcome by skill and discipline, which he managed to root in his tank crews.
After some time, it became possible to get the American Pattons through Germany, where they were removed from the Bundeswehr. They were included in the same modernization program as Centurions. Even the old "Shermans" - and those were updated, some even managed to put a shortened version of the 105 mm gun. By the end of May 1967, Israel had in service 8 tank and 5 mechanized brigades. Total 1 000 more or less modern tanks.
The army did not have many things that would like to have. There were no armored personnel carriers for the infantry - they did not have enough money, all purchases were only for one thing - for tanks. Lacked artillery. Not enough transport. According to the mobilization plan, almost all civilian cargo transport in the country had to be requisitioned; even trucks for the delivery of fruit, with bald tires and without spare wheels, were used. The small arms in the reserve infantry units included not only the Belgian 20-charging rifles FN, or the Uzi submachine guns, but also the 98 rifles, where "98" meant "Mauser 1898" of the year before the First World War.
However, about 220 thousands of people were mobilized. Approximately 130 thousands of them were brought together in the 25 brigades of the army and this army was really ready to act.
In Egypt, the tasks of the armed forces were by no means reduced, as was the case in Israel, to the simple and obvious task of defending the homeland. The army was considered the “Avant-garde of the Revolution”, which was quite natural, because Nasser and his associates came to power precisely as a result of a military coup, as the leaders of the Free Officers group. Therefore, the army defended not only and even not so much the country as the regime. And attention was paid to her appropriate. Of course, to the soldiers, not ordinary soldiers, but the officers were well paid, those who reached the senior ranks, say, lieutenant colonel or older, almost automatically received communications and facilities that were not available to the common man. The officer club in Cairo was the most aristocratic place in the capital.
Unlike the Israeli army, where there was a single lieutenant general who held the post of Chief of the General Staff, and a dozen of the major generals who made this headquarters, there were many generals in the Egyptian army.
He was headed by the army minister of war, Abdel Hakim Amer, a loyal associate of the leader of the revolution, in the utterly exceptional rank of field marshal.
Everything that happened in the armed forces of the country, especially with personnel, happened only with his knowledge.
It must be said that President Nasser had repeatedly offered his friend Amer not to focus so exclusively on the concerns of officers, but to take up broader political tasks that would more closely correspond to his outstanding talents. In the end, everyday concerns could be entrusted to a less distinguished person like Field Marshal, for example, General Fawzi. This general was not only the chief of the General Staff, but was personally known to President Nasser as his former teacher in a military school.
Mohammed Fawzi
The general was divided, humble and, most importantly, was extremely loyal to the president. It is the president. However, Amer always replied that he was only a modest soldier, completely satisfied with his shares, and that he was not attracted to posts, if he had to, to achieve them, he, as the President had certainly wished, would move away from his favorite occupation, namely, direct and direct leadership of the armed forces. However, for 1967, the list of his posts included the posts of First Vice-President, Minister of Science, Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Commission, Chairman of the Commission on the Elimination of Feudalism (with wide confiscation rights), and even for some reason the Chairman of the Football Federation. Field Marshal, known by this title, regardless of the set of his other official posts, occupied a completely exceptional place in Egypt.
When Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev awarded Naser the Golden Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union in 1964, then, being well informed about the internal affairs of the United Arab Republic, he assigned this title not only to the President of Egypt, but also to his minister of war.
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 13 in May 1964, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
However, field marshal did not have the opportunity to shift General Fawzi. President Nasser was very careful to have his own people, namely his own, in the armed forces. Therefore, Amer tried to put the matter in such a way that the General Headquarters did not enter into questions that the Minister of War himself was keenly interested in. Since we had to deal with the army through an intermediary, and even so influential, Nasser, for his part, did everything possible so that the military would not overlap in affairs or leisure with security officers, for example, with his personal security. (Shortly after the military failure, the field marshal will be accused of attempting a coup d'état and put under house arrest, and on September 14 of 1967, according to the official version, he will commit suicide by taking poison.)
In Egypt, the end of the 50s — the beginning of the 60s were many German advisers. For example, headquarters in the field of war planning was led by a group of former Wehrmacht officers led by General Wilhelm Farmbacher, who not only gained a wealth of combat experience fighting in the Rommel tank army Africa, but also commanded a corps in Brittany in 1944. defending Saint Malo and Brest from the Anglo-American invasion.
Joachim Daimling, the former head of the Gestapo in Düsseldorf, reorganized the Egyptian secret police, greatly improving its professional standards.
German advisers found use in Egypt in sometimes very unexpected areas. Heinrich "Hassan Suleiman" Selmann, a former Gestapo chief in Ulm, went to work at the Ministry of Information in Cairo to head the propaganda department.
All secret work in the field of the development of chemical weapons and missiles was also conducted with the extensive use of German specialists, but, for understandable reasons, this work was not particularly advertised.
The Suez War of 1956 raised the prestige of Nasser in the world, and in Arab countries it soared to the skies.
Success followed success - in 1958, Syria agreed to a formal alliance with Egypt, a new state was formed - the United Arab Republic.
With the help of the USSR, the Aswan Dam was built in 1960. This project was supposed to make Egypt an industrial power. Further, however, things did not go so smoothly. In September, 1961, in Syria, there was another coup, and the Egyptian administration had to urgently leave the Syrian part of the United Arab Republic. This name now refers only to Egypt. Relations with Russia were also strained - to the taste of N.S. Khrushchev, the Nasser revolution "lost its dynamism." In return for the enormous funds invested by the USSR in the construction of the dam and in the armament of the Egyptian army, he wanted a more active alliance directed against the United States, to which Nasser did not agree. On the contrary, his policies at that time gave a noticeable bias towards rapprochement with the Americans. The administration of President Kennedy believed that Nasser’s revolutionary fervor could be cooled, and offered him extensive food aid if he “changes the microphone to the bulldozer”, i.e. will move from violent subversive propaganda in the Arab world to peaceful internal development.
In the 1962 year, 40% of Egypt’s population was fed by American food aid.
This idyll came to an end after the coup in Yemen. The "Free Officers" group, modeled on the Egyptian one, produced a small palace revolution, expelling the country's ruler, Imam Badr. He, however, did not accept defeat, and with the help of Saudi Arabia began a war against the revolutionaries, who, in turn, turned to Naser for help. Over time, the Yemen war has become a heavy burden for Egypt, financial, military and political. In November 1964, disputes with the United States reached a boiling point. In a conversation with the American ambassador, Battle, Nasser said that "those who dislike our politics can go away and drink the sea. We will cut off the language to anyone who speaks badly about us."
This kind of speech led to some consequences. The American grain, from which 60 was baked, in% of bread baked in Egypt, ceased to flow into the country. Cairo’s attempts to refinance its foreign debt failed - international banks suddenly found that loans to Egypt were somehow too risky. The colossal losses were partially counterbalanced by the promise of the Soviet Union to help with money, but no solution was visible. The economy did not work. Socialism and in his homeland, he worked with big problems, and even in the conditions of Egypt he broke down completely. 5 000 workers and employees of the El Nasr automobile plant, built with the help of the USSR, produced 2 machines per week.
So the 1967 crisis that happened in May came in very handy. It was a great opportunity to increase the weight of Egypt in international affairs. Indeed, the diplomatic and military offensive launched against Israel brought remarkable results.
In fact, the entire defense of Israel held on to the thin line of UN troops stationed in Sinai, in alliance with France, on somewhat controversial (but still considered as real) membership in the "Western Club" and on its own armed forces. Israel was surrounded by Arab armies. The overall advantage in the army was almost two to one in people, two to one in tanks, three to one in aircraft, and at least five to one in artillery.
However, Nasser did not want to act recklessly. His foreign minister, Dr. Mahmoud Riad, explained to American diplomat Charles Yost that Nasser wants peace, but he simply cannot agree to lifting the blockade.
Mahmud Riad
He does not want to fight anyone, and least of all with the United States. And he does not want to attack Israel at all, although his generals insist on an attack.
The president of Egypt himself prefers the Israelis to strike the first blow, then his army will crush them in the desert, and “this short war will immediately heal the situation”. We should not attach too much importance to all this talk about a total war of annihilation, Nasser does not mean anything like that, this is all the rhetoric, necessary in practical politics, as a distinguished ambassador, undoubtedly understands, simply because of his deep and enlightened mind. We are talking about the “amputation of the Israeli south” and the establishment of a land direct border between Egypt and Jordan. Then, in the absence of Eilat, the blockade issue will disappear by itself, Israel will learn to live without this port, and the parties “... will begin preparations for a realistic solution of the issue - for example, through the extensive repatriation of Palestinian refugees back to Israel ...”. The conversation took place on June 1.
On the same day, the Government of National Unity was formed in Israel. Moshe Dayan entered him as Minister of Defense. Before the war there were only a few days left. Americans all asked about 48 rest hours. Dayan, on the other hand, felt it was just a drag on the time. Well, he said, the 48 watch we give them, but it is 48, not 49.
And the Americans, knowing full well what was about to begin, moved the aircraft carriers America and Saratoga, and with them the entire Sixth Fleet, closer to the shores of Israel and Egypt.
The specific date of the attack was set in a very confidential conversation between Dayan and Rabin, the Chief of the General Staff, and is scheduled for Monday morning, 5 on June 1967 of the year.
In the context of this narrative, I can only note that the Six-Day War, which actually lasted for 132 hours and 30 minutes, is described in detail in many historical and military studies, it has been the subject of careful study in military academies and general staffs around the world. This war is regarded as the most important event in the history of Israel. It was not just a war, but a clash between two opposing civilizations that happened in the 60s of the last century. The six-day war is much more than an episode in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In June 1967, in the desert of Sinai, where the prophet Moses adopted the moral code of mankind from the hands of the Lord himself, and on the hills of Jerusalem, where the founder of monotheism, the prophet Abraham received the Lord’s recognition and blessing, determined the future of our civilization as a whole. And if European intellectuals did not understand this, then it only means that, as Albert Einstein used to say, the mind is unintelligible in choosing a master, that reason is blind when it comes to priorities and ultimate goals.
Sources:
Shterenshis M. Israel. The history of the state. 2009.
Tenenbaum B. The Unsuspected Arab-Israeli War of 1956. 2011.
Okunev Yu. A six-day chord of biblical history.
Arab-Israeli wars. Arab look. 2008.
Wikipedia articles, etc.
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