The question of the "three hundredths" for Syria has become even more acute. Sunday's battle near Deir ez-Zor will bring a new strike date closer
As we recall, at the last emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, convened on the Russian 14 initiative on April 2018, immediately after the limited point strike of the United Navy and Air Force coalition, our draft resolution condemning the actions of Washington, London and Paris regarding the Syrian Arab Republic. This may not seem surprising against the background of the fundamental statement of the French leader Emmanuel Macron, made during his visit to Washington on April 25, where he announced the beginning of the confrontation of the Western world with the emerging concept of world order; Washington’s and Paris should become the “backbone” of this action, he said.
It is not known what methods of zombies were used against Mr. Macron during his overseas tour to the States, but one thing is clear: the “new world order” means exactly that multipolar world, the emergence of which can be clearly seen through the cooling of relations between Turkey and the United States, as well as the likely The withdrawal of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the nuclear deal, which Donald Trump insists on "modernization" and the addition of which to 12 May. Such points as strengthening the position of Moscow in the Syrian company, as well as turning the People’s Republic of China into a powerful military-political "player" in the Asia-Pacific region, who retains full-fledged operational and strategic control over the 2000-kilometer segment, can be added to the same list. Southern Sea Route and has almost full technological superiority over the AUG of the US Navy up to the second island chain of the Philippines - Palau - Guam - Ogasawara.
More than a decade ago, Russian analysts repeatedly pointed out the complete futility and unviable nature of a unipolar ideology imposed by Western states on the Eurasian continent, but the latter decided to drop all constructive integration schemes into the new structure and are already openly entering the war path. So, approved by a majority of the US Senate for the post of US Secretary of State, an ardent Russophobe and former CIA head Mike Pompeo first thing went not somewhere, but on an Asian tour, in particular, to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Jordan. Before that, he will pay a visit to Brussels. Everything is clear here as a white day: the new US foreign minister, after agreeing on further joint destructive steps towards Damascus with NATO headquarters, will go on negotiations with the leaders of key front-Asian states participating in the coming hybrid war against the Syrian Arab Army. After all, it is not by chance that Donald Trump hopes to use the large and technologically trained Royal Saudi Arabian Armed Forces in a large-scale operation in southwestern Syria (including the 55-kilometer safety zone around At-Tanfa).
In this case, Jordan turns into a powerful transshipment base, the transport branches of which will be provided for the transfer of heavy armored vehicles of Saudi Arabia towards the southern bases of Free Syrian Army in Dar'a and At-Tanfa areas, and the airspace is used by the Arabian Air Force to support the above ground forces . Naturally, the logistics facilities, as well as the repair units of the Arabian army will need to be moved to the territory of Jordan (closer to the Syrian theater of operations): what is the cost of servicing the "capricious" Abrams in combat conditions ... It is no wonder that numerous areas of this the countries will, on quite fair grounds, turn into targets for barreled and rocket artillery, as well as operational tactical missile systems "Tochka" and "Elbrus" at the disposal of the Syrian Arab Army. Here Pompeo headed to Amman for very difficult negotiations with King Abdullah II Ibn Hussein of Jordan regarding the highly probable engagement of the kingdom’s territory in the most extensive round of military confrontation with the CAA.
In addition to M. Pompeo’s rather interesting trip to the Middle East, Washington’s further plans for the Syrian Arab Republic clearly illustrate Trump’s statement that “the United States weapon charged and cocked. " At least, that was how the US envoy to the UN, Nikki Haley, presented it at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, referring to the morning telephone conversation with the head of the White House. And as we learned long before that, they will not limit themselves to only militant rhetoric. About two weeks ago, a powerful carrier-based strike force of the US Navy headed by the nuclear aircraft carrier CVN-75 USS "Harry S. Truman", and also with the support of the missile cruiser URO USS "Normandy", the missile destroyers USS "Arleigh Burke" went to the Mediterranean (lead class ship in the Flight I modification), USS "Forrest Sherman", USS "Bulkeley", USS "Farragut", USS "Jason Dunham", USS "The Sullivans" and the frigate F221 FGS "Hessen" (class "Saxony") German Navy. Her arrival in the Western Mediterranean was marked on the afternoon of April 27. It is quite logical to assume that this very compound will become the main component for delivering the next, much more massive rocket attack on Syria.
Carefully assessing the impact potential of this carrier group, it becomes clear that only Aegis-destroyers Arley Burke in the number of 6 ships, as well as the Normandy missile cruiser (Ticonderoga class) can place in their universal TLU Mk 41 VLS from 170 (in the case of regular ammunition from the 24 and 26 "Axes" on each ship) to 392 strategic cruise missiles of the RGM-109E / TLAM-C type (in the case of attaching these ships with 56 "Axes" on each unit). To this number, we add at least 154 "Tomahawk", which are placed in 22x7 stationary turret launchers of percussion modifications (SSGN) of Ohio-class atomic submarines, as well as around 50 missiles on torpedo racks of modern British AIPL "Estyut" type gives a total of over 600 cruise missiles. If we add to this huge arsenal also high-precision weapons (planning UAB AGM-154 JSOW, anti-radar missiles AARGM and HARM), which is in service with 48 deck F-A-18C / D Hornet, F / A-18E / F “Super Hornet” and the “Growlers” link, then it will be possible to count more than 800 means of air attack. Asymmetrical response to this "Mediterranean Gift" from Washington is the transfer of Damascus additional anti-aircraft missile and gun complexes 96K6 "Carapace-S1" mysterious "new air defense systems", as well as long-range anti-aircraft missile systems S-300PMU-2 (or earlier versions ).
The possibilities of the “300s” in reflecting many times more large-scale strikes by “Tomahawks” were discussed in our previous work. Thanks to the ability of network-centric hardware aggregation of the command and control points of these 5H63С and / or XNHOVscamsarates operating systems with the help of the automated systems "Baikal-54ME", we can use the operating systems to deploy only a few 6P2SHD / E systems radars that allow R & D to deploy only a few 1P5-SD / E systems and radars, which allow you to quickly deploy other operating systems to a few Radar detection 85D30 and low-altitude detector 6Н1) for only a few minutes, so that it can be attacked simultaneously from 2 to 36, 6, 76 and more depending on the number of receiving and transmitting booths ФХNUMXС with radars 6Н6. As a result, thanks to receiving targeting from A-12U planes, the above-mentioned illumination radars can turn in the required azimuth direction even before the radiation is turned on, which means that the complexes are capable of very effectively firing off in a short period of time without substituting additional radar for the HARMs and other high-precision weapons. facilities. Here you have a network-centric link.
Now consider the moment that was not considered in our previous works. We are talking about the number of "three hundredths" needed to minimize the future missile attack on the SAR. Opinions on this matter among the Russian military experts are noticeably divided. In particular, Russian military specialist, a reserve colonel and a member of the Expert Council of the Board of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation, Viktor Murakhovsky, argues that the optimal configuration for the delivery of three-hundred-meter 3 — 4 anti-aircraft missile battalion to the Syrian three-radar defense and 30 radar -6 / Е1 and 2 / 36 of the 48ПХNUMXСД / Е quadruplet launchers with 5 -85 ТПК with anti-aircraft missiles of the 144ВХNUMXР / 192Н5Х55 types. According to him, this should be enough to protect strategic facilities in Syria.
Indeed, this amount will be quite enough to partially cover important administrative and military facilities in the western provinces of the republic, in the segment from Damascus to Homs. An important role here will be played by the possibility of deploying divisions (or directly 30Н6Х2 radars) on the eastern elevations of the Antilivan mountain ranges, which determines 2-s or even 3 -fold increase in the radio horizon of the backlight radar from the usual 35 to 80 or more kilometers But after all, the areas of location of the most important strategic facilities of the Syrian Arab Army are far from being confined to the environs of Damascus, Sadad, Homs, Hama and Masy'af, over which Antilivan occupies a dominant position. There are also such sites as the highway "Es-Sukhne - Deir-ez-Zor", and also "Palmyra - Haraij". On them are located the strongholds of the government forces of Syria, which provide safe traffic for military goods and mechanized units between the western regions of the republic and the cities along the Euphrates.
These items include the T2 and T3 pumping stations, as well as the cities of Ash-Shula and Palmyra. They also need echeloned missile defense in the event of a massive coalition attack in order to maintain the operational flexibility of the CAA in the south of the country, but the proximity of the enemy’s territory (the SDF and the US Armed Forces on the west bank of the Euphrates, as well as the FSA and the US-British contingent in At-Tanf) does not allow calmly place the “300th” divisions near the above points, as they fall within the range of the US 155-mm long-range howitzers M777 (use the M982 “Excalibur” guided missile) and the HIMARS MLRS. It is also unlikely to succeed in safely and quickly leaving the positions at the C-300PMU-2 battalion after the operation, given the size of the column and the time required to collapse all PUs and the backlight radar. It is not difficult to conclude that the deployment of the C-XNUMPPMU-300 should be carried out only in relative operational depth from the lines of contact with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" and the "Syrian Free Army".
In relation to the Syrian theater of operations, we can talk about the northern approaches to Palmyra, located almost 100 km from the 55-kilometer "security zone" around the "at-Tanfa". Here, the C-300PMU-2 division will be outside the scope of the fire fighting program for the CENTURIES cp. shells XM1 GUMLRS. But here there is a geographic snag. In the desert regions east of Palmyra (Homs province) there is a huge number of hills and elevations of approximately equal height. Unlike the dominant heights of Lubnan el-Sharqiya, these hills will constantly impede the steady seizure of American cruise missiles for precise tracking of the 57H6Е complex, and therefore the range for repelling an impact here will be limited to 30 - 2 km.
To work effectively on difficult terrain with a "floating" the radio horizon of the Syrian army needs such anti-aircraft missile systems, the C-300V4 or C-350 "Vityaz", equipped with surface-to-air missile with active radar homing types 9M82MV or 96M6DM. Only in this case will it be possible to reliably cover up the advanced units of the Syrian army near the Euphrates without a significant threat to the complexes from the enemy’s artillery. But the Russian side has no plans to provide Damascus such “exotic” and advanced systems. Consequently, to protect the central and eastern regions of the right bank of the Euphrates, the more mobile self-propelled short-range anti-aircraft missile artillery systems Pantsir-С1 and other unnamed types of air defense missile systems, which were announced to Syria by April of the Chief Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian General, will be used. - Colonel Sergey Rudskiy. What means of air defense can we talk about?
First of all, these are self-propelled anti-aircraft missile systems of the Tor-M2U and Tor-M2KM type. They are ideally suited to repel massive attacks with enemy’s high-precision weapons in an unpredictable and rapidly changing tactical environment that might develop in the above-mentioned central, southern and eastern regions of the right bank of the Euphrates, where the Western coalition plans to support the “rebels” ground attack Riyadh) and VTS. One of the most important advantages of the Tor-M2 complex is the possibility of detecting, tracking, and intercepting air objects in motion, in some cases, with a short stop. There is also a rather important network-centric “link” mode, which provides for synchronization of the weapons control systems of the 9A331МA combat vehicles with simultaneous compilation of information on the air situation at the operator terminals of the two complexes. So, in case of failure of the radar detector of one of the complexes, it can receive target designation via telecode radio from the second complex.
At the same time, the noise immunity and efficiency of the link will not suffer at all, since the backup optical-electronic aiming complex is integrated into the WOS, which accompanies the target in angular coordinates regardless of the jamming environment. As for the work of “Thorov-M2”, united in an anti-aircraft missile battery of 4 complexes, here the unified battery command post of the UBCF 9C737М “Ranzhir-M” makes the whole weather. This self-propelled gearbox, the information field of which is based on the Baguette-21 / 41 computer, has an instrumental range for displaying the tactical situation on the indicators of the battery commander, radar information processing operator and radiotelephone operator in 100 km, which is more than enough to control the battery of the complexes " Tor-M2U ”with a range of interception of targets to 16 km.
“Ranzhir-M” is capable of synchronizing with an encrypted telecode radio channel to synchronize with a superior command and control center or surveillance radar complex (96L6Е, Opponent-G or BBO 96L6), and then receive and select up to 40 the closest (priority) air targets, which are the closest (priority) air targets, aerial targets, and then receive and select up to 4 the closest (priority) aerial targets. their distribution between 2 ZRSK "Tor-M1" in the battery. An automated control system for the Baikal-50МЭ mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade can serve as a higher command post for Ranzhira, the source of the radar information for which are the A-2U radar patrol aircraft. Thus, the Tor-MXNUMU battery can receive a much more complete range of information about the air situation than when paired with ground-based radars that have restrictions on radio horizon.
The next important advantages of the Tor-MXNUMU complexes are the rapid time of conversion from the marching to the combat position (lifting of the SOZ antenna post and guidance radar, as well as activating the launch automation) and using new high-speed, maneuverable and compact 29K-type missiles (PXNXXV) ). The translation of the new “Thors” into the combat position is about 338 minutes, while the “Pantsiri” spend about 3 minutes on this procedure. With the arrival of an unexpected command for immediate deployment, this feature will give the Torah a noticeable advantage over other air defense systems. It would seem that all 3 minutes of difference, but during this time, the same strategic "Tomahawks" overcome 5 - 2 km of the way.
Now about the new missiles. 9M3338K missile interceptors, designed by Vympel GosMKB and mass-produced by Vyatkinsk Avitek VMP OJSC, have a 20% higher flight speed of 3,3M versus 2,65M for the early version 9M331, which allows Tor-M2U / KM systems »Intercept a much larger number of air targets in a certain period of time. Its range increased from 12-15 to 16 km, which in relation to the Syrian theater of operations allows the AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter to be fired just at the moment it reaches a distance that allows it to launch a promising multi-purpose JAGM rocket (analogue of AGM-114L, but with a tri-band AR / IR / TV homing head). For the flight crew of the army aviation The US Armed Forces, the appearance of this complex in the Syrian army will turn into a real test. But this is not the most interesting.
In conjunction with the upgraded PFAR-radar targeting the new "Torah", capable of capturing targets with extremely small EPR, the promising SAM RZV-MD had the opportunity to more effectively defeat not only standard Tomahawk and ALCM strategic cruise missiles, but also such tactical missiles, like the above JAGM or anti-radar HARM. During the field tests conducted back in 2013, the rocket seamlessly intercepted such targets with a small radar signature, such as Saman, some of which were destroyed by the direct hit-to-kill method, despite the radio command guidance method, which does not provide for such unique qualities. It is possible that the radar targeting the updated "Torah" switched to a higher-frequency Ku-band, allowing with a much smaller error to accompany the target and the interceptor missile before their meeting. One thing is known for sure: Tor-MXNUMU will be able to cope with almost any state element of high-precision weapons. The maximum overload for RZV-MD increased to 2-35G, which allows to hit objects that maneuver with overloads to 40-16 units.
Launch of the new 9M338K
Conclusion: the delivery of these complexes by the Syrian Arab Army, together with the additional “Armor”, is quite sufficient for the formation of a reliable medium-height “air defense umbrella” over the unpredictable regions of Syria in the central part of the Deir ez-Zor province. Moreover, the States do not have serial hypersonic air attacks that they could use against the CAA (with all objects flying at speeds up to 2600 and 3600 km / h, the Torah and Pantsiri are coping with excellent).
Nevertheless, despite the substantial optimism about the excellent anti-missile qualities of our short-range air defense weapons, it would not hurt to listen to the opinion of the military specialist, Lieutenant-General Aytech Bijev, who believes that the Syrian air defense does not require 3-4, but 10- 12 divisions with 480-576 anti-aircraft missiles 5ВХNUMXР / 55Н48Х6 in total ammunition. As you already understood, they are required to repel attacks in the western provinces. Why so much?
At the time of work on the final part of our review, in the northern suburbs of Deir-ez-Zor (north of Husham’s pocket), the attack began on the part of the Syrian Arab army and the Syrian-Iranian militia on the positions of the Kurdish SDF supported by the Americans, who were preparing a breakthrough to the western shore. Government forces began to act ahead of the curve, forcing the Euphrates near the village of Janina and taking control over the 4 settlement (Huweijat, al-Maishiya, Shamra al-Hisan and al-Jiy).
Around 16: 30 began serious clashes between Syrian militias and the SDF, supported by American tactical aircraft and artillery. Later, syria.liveuamap.com, citing Twitter, the eyewitness channels reported that the Kurdish militants from the SDF (not related to Afrin kurds) pushed back pro-government forces, but the positions vacated under Salkhia remained under the control of the CAA. By evening, the Syrian army used artillery shells, and aviation operated on the eastern environs of Deir ez-Zor, and the fighting continued.
It is becoming more and more obvious that the region is at the gates of the most serious military conflict over the past few decades, and a couple of the "300th" will not get off.
Information sources:
https://syria.liveuamap.com/
https://riafan.ru/1052291-siriya-novosti-29-aprelya-22-30-vvs-mezhdunarodnoi-koalicii-atakovali-soyuznikov-saa-v-deir-ez-zore-v-idlibe-poyavilsya-novyi-vooruzhennyi-alyans
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/tor-m2/tor-m2.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
https://ria.ru/world/20180426/1519502700.html
Information