Military Review

In one fell swoop, the Wehrmacht was beaten, or the Red Army in 1938

312
I would like to say at once: starting this article, the author in no case set himself the task of somehow denigrating the Red Army and the Soviet armed forces. But the remark attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte and Montecuccoli is absolutely true (although most likely, it was said by Marshal Gian-Jacopo Trivoulzio):


"For war, we need three things: money, money, and more money."


So, it is no less true that in the 1938, the USSR did not have enough money for the armed forces, and this, strictly speaking, is the reason for the extremely regrettable state in which the Army of the Soviets was.

Но обо всем по порядку.

Recently, Oleg Kaptsov introduced an article to the community of BO "Strike at fascist Germany ... in 1938 g"in which he claimed the following:

“In total for 18 months before the beginning of World War II, the main enemy was a militarily insignificant state. Based on the 100-multiple ratio of forces, our invincible and legendary could break the Wehrmacht, like a crystal vase. There was no reason to fear Hitler, to pursue a “policy of appeasement” and conclude any covenants with him. ”


We will not wonder how the Red Army could defeat the Wehrmacht at a time when the USSR had no land borders with Germany. We will not specify that in 1938 of the USSR no policy of appeasing Hitler led, but on the contrary, he tried his best to knock together the anti-Hitler coalition following the pattern of the Entente, and did it right up to the Munich betrayal, when England and France condemned the Czechoslovak state to death . We will not recall also that in 1938 the USSR did not conclude any pacts - the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was nevertheless signed on 23 in August 1939.

We will only try to recall the state of our “Invincible and Legendary” in 1938.

So, at the beginning of the year, our ground forces included:

1. Tank troops - 37 brigades, including 32 tank, 2 armored and 3 motorized rifle brigades. The number of peacetime - 90 880 people. or about 2,5 thousand people per brigade;

2. Cavalry - 32 divisions, including 5 mountain and 3 territorial, to this 8 spare cavalry regiments and a small, but unknown number of cavalry brigades. The number of peacetime - 95 690 people. or less 3 000 people in the division;

3. Rifle troops - 96 divisions, including 52 personnel and mixed, 10 mountain and 34 territorial. Peacetime strength - 616 000 people, (6 416 people per division), but other than that, rifle troops also included fortified garrisons with peacetime numbers 20 940 people, respectively, the total number was 636 940 people;

4. Artillery RGC - 23 regiment, peacetime strength 34 160 people;

5. Air defense - 20 artillery regiments and 22 division, in peacetime - 45 280 people;

6. The RGK Chemical Forces - 2 motorized chemical divisions, one armored chemical brigade, separate battalions and companies. Peacetime abundance - 9 370 people .;

7. Automobile parts - 32 battalion and 10 mouth total number - 11 120 people;

8. Communications units, engineering, railway, topographic troops - the number of connections is unknown to the author, but their peacetime numbers were 50 420 people;



In general, at first glance - a terrible force. Even without air defense forces, which the Germans were listed in the Luftwaffe, that is, they did not belong to ground forces, we had about 165 division-type formations (counting as brigade 2 divisions or 3 regiment), not counting communications, engineers, and so on.

And what was the Germans? Oh, their Wehrmacht in 1938 was much more modest and included only:

Panzer divisions - 3;

Motorized Divisions - 4;

Infantry Divisions - 32;

Reserve divisions - 8;

Landwehr divisions - 21;

Mountain rifle, cavalry and light motorized brigades - 3.

In other words, the Germans had 69,5 division-type compounds. Here, however, an attentive reader can ask a malicious question - and why are we to land forces for cadre troops? But we must remember that the 34 domestic rifle and 3 cavalry divisions were territorial, and what is it? Recall the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov:

“One of the most important measures of the reform was the introduction of the territorial principle of recruiting the Red Army in conjunction with personnel. The territorial principle extended to rifle and cavalry divisions. The essence of this principle was to give the necessary military training to the maximum number of workers with the minimum of their abstraction from productive labor. In the divisions of approximately 16-20, the percent of the states were cadre commanders, political workers and Red Army men, and the rest of the staff was temporary, annually called up (for five years) for training, first for three months and then for one month. The rest of the time the men worked in industry and agriculture. Such a system made it possible to quickly deploy, if necessary, sufficiently trained combat personnel around the personnel core of the divisions. And the cost of training one fighter in the territorial part for five years was much lower than in the personnel section for two years. Of course, it would have been better to have only a cadre army, but in those conditions it was almost impossible ... "


We draw attention to the fact that "for three months and five years," not only the rank and file, but also junior commanders were called. With such a level of "training", they could not be considered trained reserve rank and file, and they commanded! In general, the combat effectiveness of our territorial divisions was at about zero, and certainly was not higher than that of the German Landwehr. Even worse, from the 52 personnel division of the Soviet rifle divisions, some (alas, unknown to the author) were staffed on a mixed basis, that is, partly on a territorial basis, and, accordingly, also had limited combat capability.

And yet we can diagnose more than double the superiority of the Red Army by the number of connections. But if we look at the number of wartime armies, here the picture becomes much less optimistic.

In 1938, there was a transition to a new structure of ground forces and a new mobplan, in accordance with which the number of armed forces of the USSR, after mobilization, was to be 6 503 500 people. Prior to this, in 1937 g and at the beginning of 1938 g, another mobilization plan was in effect for 5 300 000 people. Strictly speaking, if suddenly the USSR in 1938 r decided to go to war with someone, then he would have the opportunity to do it according to the old mobilization plan, but after the beginning of the reorganization of the parts, it would be strictly contraindicated to go into a fight with someone - Anyone who knows a little about the army will tell you how much the combat capability of the reformed units that have not passed combat coordination falls.

But we still assume that the USSR, wanting to fight, has deployed the Red Army already under a new mobilization plan. In this case, the ground forces, including air defense troops, would be 5 137 200 people, and excluding air defense - 4 859 800 people.

At the same time, Germany, according to its plan of mobilization, was to deploy ground forces of 3 343 476 people. Again, it seems that the USSR has an advantage. True, no longer at times, but on 45,3%, but still. But even here, if you think about it, the picture is not at all as rosy as it may seem at first glance.

Suppose a geopolitical miracle happened in 1938. Poland magically moved to a parallel space, where it occupied the territory that befits its ambitions (“from mozhno mozha”) and, despite the tearful pleas of the League of Nations, absolutely does not want to come back. The world has changed, Germany and the USSR gained a common border in 1938, and the Dark Lord Sauron ... I mean, Stalin decided to collapse all his accumulated power over the centuries on the Light Elves of the West ... uh ... white and fluffy Hitler Germany. What will be the alignment of the political forces of the East and the West in this case?

The first thing that can be said right away is that no Anglo-American-Soviet Union, by analogy with the Second World War, can arise under such conditions. In our stories Britain and France arrogantly rejected the hand extended to them by the USSR, until the British themselves were one step away from a catastrophe from which only a strong continental ally could pull them out. That's when they, of course, remembered about the USSR. In our case, when many in the West still had illusions about Hitler, the USSR’s attack on Germany would be perceived as unprovoked aggression and in the best (for the USSR) case would be angrily branded from the high tribunes of the League of Nations. Of course, it is extremely doubtful if England or France moved their troops to help Gondor ... Ahhhh ... Hitler (to fight for the Huns? Fi, this is a move!), most likely it would be all-round approval, help with supplies weapons and so on, possibly by volunteers. In other words, Germany, most likely, could count on the support of the world community, no less than the one that Finland received during the “winter war” with the USSR. Least.

But the most important thing that follows from this support is that in this case the Germans did not have to worry about protecting their borders with other Western countries, Germany could concentrate the bulk of its ground forces in the east against the invading USSR armies. But in the USSR, the geopolitical alignment is completely different.

The USSR becomes a rogue state, it, in fact, was outlawed - not that we could not rely on someone else’s help, but even on maintaining the existing foreign trade relations with the United States. Americans will tear them apart. And in the east, we have an extremely exalted neighbor in Japan, who has been sharpening their katanas for a year, not knowing who to aim at - either the United States or the USSR. In our reality, the sons of Yamato grappled with the Americans, but in the event of a Soviet attack on Germany in 1938, the political alignment completely changes - Japan has the opportunity, attacking a rogue state that no one supports (USSR), get a lot of buns from Germany, which By itself, such support will be extremely important. And this is not just with non-interference, but with the approval of English-speaking countries!

What could keep Japan from attacking the USSR? Only one thing - a powerful Soviet army in the Far East. And, I must say, we had one, because of the total number of 5 137 200 people. ground forces of the Red Army in the Far East we had to be deployed 1 014 900 people. And we will not be able to transfer this army, as in 1941, to the western front - all this power, to the last man, will have to guarantee the security of the eastern flank of the USSR against the invasion of Japan.

The author does not know exactly how many air defense troops should have been deployed in the Far, but if we assume that they were distributed in proportion to the total number of ground forces, it turns out that for an attack on Germany, exposing all borders except the eastern one, the USSR could deploy 3 899 at best 703 people This still exceeds the capabilities of the Wehrmacht, but no more than 17%.

Strictly speaking, this is where any argument about the superiority of the USSR over Germany could be completed, but we will also recall such factors as the timing of the mobilization and deployment of armies. After the First World War, absolutely all countries knew that war does not begin when the first shot blasts, but when the country announces mobilization. But Germany won in terms of deploying armies for at least three weeks - the reason for this is easily recognized by anyone who looks at the map of Germany and the USSR and makes it difficult to estimate the area and carrying capacity of the transport communications of both countries. In other words, in the case of mobilization, Germany will be the first to deploy an army, and therefore it turns out that less than 20 percent Soviet numerical advantage is a purely imaginary thing, and in fact in the case of a real war, it may well turn out that we have to fight not even with equal , and with a superior enemy.

But what about technology? Guns, tanks, planes? “We will answer all your questions like this:“ We have a lot of “maxims” - do you have no “maxims”?

In one fell swoop, the Wehrmacht was beaten, or the Red Army in 1938


And indeed, an army with a sufficient number of heavy weapons has a significant, downright overwhelming advantage over an army of the same number, which does not have such weapons in general, or is much inferior to them in the enemy.

So, our armed forces really had a lot of weapons. But heavy weapons provide enormous advantages only under one condition - if the army knows how to use it. Alas, the Red Army model 1938, say this was not. We will not specifically quote S.K. Tymoshenko, who replaced the National Defense Commissioner K.E. Voroshilov 7 May 1940 Mr. - in the end, his crushing "comments" can always be attributed to "a new broom sweeps in a new way." But let us recall the orders of Clement Yefremovich Voroshilov himself, issued by him in 1938. The order of the USSR NKO N 113 from December 11 1938 g read:

"... 1) A completely unacceptable position with fire preparation was created. In the past year, the troops not only failed to fulfill the requirements of order N 110 to increase the individual rifle training of fighters and commanders from all models of small arms by at least 15-20% against 1937 g ., but reduced the results on the fire, and especially in the shooting of light and heavy machine guns.

This most important matter, just like the possession of “pocket artillery” - grenade launcher, was not given proper and daily attention from the military councils of districts, armies, groups and command of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments.

At the same time, the highest, senior and middle commanders, commissars and staffs themselves are not yet an example for the troops in the ability to wield weapons. Younger commanders are also not taught this case and therefore cannot properly train the fighters.

The troops still have, however, individual fighters who have served for a year, but have never fired a combat cartridge. It is necessary to firmly grasp that, not learning to really shoot, you can not expect success in close combat with the enemy. Therefore, anyone who counteracts or tries to “ignore” this yawning breakthrough in the combat readiness of the troops cannot claim to be the real commanders of the Red Army capable of teaching and training troops. Breakthroughs in fire training are considered as the main flaw in the work of all command units.

The ability of the commander, commissioner of the unit and subunit to direct the fire preparation and teach the unit (unit), shoot accurately and have a good command of personal weapons when inspecting units, as well as especially noted in the appraisals ... "


In other words, the qualification of the commanders of the Red Army was such that the ability to fire a pistol, rifle, machine gun, etc. among them were so infrequent that they should be particularly noted in the certification! But how could such a situation? The fact is that after the civil war the army of the USSR was reduced below any reasonable minimum - so, in 1925, the total number of our armed forces was 562 thousand people, and in 1932 g - 604 300 people, including all branches of the military there is not only a land army, but also air forces and the navy! No doubt, for the defense of a giant country, such as the USSR, such forces were completely inadequate, but the problem was that the young country of the Soviets simply could not afford anything more. Again, after the civil war, the Red Army did not have a shortage of officers — there were also old cadres who served the sovereign emperor, and “the practices of the civil war — the communists”. Accordingly, for some time the armed forces did not feel the need for an influx of graduate officers of military schools, and this, naturally, had a strong impact on their work.

However, later officers were needed, and urgently. In addition to the natural, and not quite natural, loss (it’s no secret that, in addition to the usual service, they tried to get rid of the tsarist officers from a certain moment), the USSR grew economically so that it could contain a much more numerous army - in 1938 r (peacetime) has already exceeded half a million. Accordingly, the need for officers increased dramatically, but where were they to be taken? The military schools that were reduced during the period of the “500-thousand army”, of course, could not provide the necessary quantity of “supply” of officers to the troops.

The exit was found in the accelerated courses of junior commanders (platoon-company level), and it looked like this - the most educated commanders (sergeants) were taken and sent to courses that lasted several months, and then returned to the troops as lieutenants. But such a system could only work effectively with a highly skilled non-commissioned officer staff. We did it the same way - the squad leader, whom no one taught the basics of military science (remember the ability to shoot!), Got into courses where nobody taught him that either (as it was assumed that he already knows all this) but they gave the basics of tactics, topography, etc. and released into the troops. In general, the problem was that refresher courses with proper organization can work very well, but under one very important condition - if the trainees have something to improve. In our case, these people should have been taught from scratch, which, naturally, the accelerated courses could not cope. As a result, a significant part of their graduates remained untenable both in the role of the detachment commander and in the role of a platoon commander. And therefore, it is not surprising that such devices as a revolver, rifle, grenade, machine gun, turned out to be too complicated for a significant part of the Red Army commanders, and they simply did not know how to effectively use the weapons entrusted to them.

I ask dear readers to understand the author correctly. The USSR was not at all a “land of fools” unable to understand the truism. The Red Army had a lot of experienced, intelligent commanders, but they were simply not enough. The key problem of the Red Army was not at all in some innate stupidity or inability of our ancestors, but in the fact that the army of the country for nearly a decade was reduced to a meager number, for the full maintenance and training of which there were no funds. And then, when funds were found, the international situation demanded an explosive increase in the size of the Red Army, which would be a huge problem even if our 500-thousand-strong armed forces were composed entirely of super-trained professionals, which, of course, was not.

And besides, there was a huge disproportion between the capabilities of the industry to produce military equipment and the ability of the armed forces to effectively exploit it. The USSR invested in the military industry and this gave the country a lot - a huge number of jobs appeared that required skilled labor, military enterprises demanded high-quality raw materials for weapons, armor, etc., and all this had a very positive effect on the development of Soviet industry, but Moreover, it laid the foundation that allowed us to subsequently break the back of fascist Germany. But with all this, thousands of tanks, aircraft and cannons going to the troops simply could not be properly mastered by them.



Formally, the Red Army tank forces in 1938 r possessed a truly all-crushing power - in the 1938 r the mobilized Red Army should have had 15 613 tanks. But of them in tank brigades as of 01.01.1938, there were 4 950 vehicles, while the rest were “ripped off” by rifle divisions. What does this mean in practice?

The Soviet planned economy in those years was still only making its first steps. The USSR established the production of tanks, but with the maintenance of technical combat readiness things were much worse - the plans for the production of spare parts and components did not correspond to the actual need, and besides, these plans, as a rule, were regularly disrupted by industry. It is not easy to blame production for this - in those years it also experienced diseases of explosive growth, including, of course, personnel hunger. Of course, it was only possible to dream of recruiting an army with a sufficient number of technicians trained in the maintenance of military equipment. Of course, in tank brigades, which were specialized tank divisions, it was easier with this, yet the graduates of tank schools in the USSR trained well enough, but in infantry divisions, as a rule, there was no repair base or people capable of servicing tracked military technique, why the latter quickly fell into disrepair. From this, again, there was a desire to use the technique to the very minimum, and it is not surprising that even by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, having a tank fleet exceeding all the other armies of the world combined, a fair amount of driver mechanics 5-8 hours. And one of the reasons for the formation of the Red Army's monstrous tank corps, each of which was supposed to include more than 1000 tanks in the state, was the desire to assemble equipment in one place, in which at least it could be provided with proper maintenance.

In addition, it should be borne in mind and not the best structure of our armored forces. The experience of World War II irrefutably showed that the greatest success was achieved by the formation of a division level, in which, besides the tanks themselves, there were motorized infantry and artillery capable of operating together with tanks. At the same time, the Soviet brigades were, in essence, purely tank units, and the Red Army did not have either artillery or motorized infantry capable of supporting tanks. Perhaps the only more or less reasonable way to form mobile units would be to give tank brigades to cavalry divisions, but even in this case, of course, tanks would operate at the speed of a horse.

In other words, there were a lot of tanks, but, alas, there were no combat-capable tank forces capable of waging a maneuverable war in the Red Army in 1938.

In addition, I would like to note that measuring the power of armies in proportion to the number of military equipment in its composition, which sins a lot of publicists and even authors claiming the title of academic historians, has absolutely no right to life. Let us take a simple example - artillery, which, as we know, is the god of war. The Red Army at the start of the 1938 of the year was armed with the 35 530 of various artillery systems.



It seems to be a very significant value, but ... is it necessary to explain that a gun has combat significance only when it is provided with a sufficient number of shells? At the same time, on 01.01.1938, the standards for the stock of shells for medium-caliber guns were provided by 56%, large-caliber - by 28%, and small-caliber - by only 10%! On average, the artillery was provided with 28% shells, and how would you order to fight this?

But maybe we just had too high standards? Let's try to count differently: on the 01.01.1938, the Red Army had reserves in the amount of 29 799 thousand shells of all calibres. As we have said, the artillery system in the Red Army was 35 530, that is, one gun had, on average, 839 shells. Is it a lot or a little? Before the First World War, the Russian Imperial Army had an average stock of almost 1000 shells per gun. The author believes that all readers of this article perfectly remember the consequences of the “shell hunger” faced by the Russian armed forces in that war?

But maybe in 1938 we already had such a powerful industry that we could easily meet the needs of the army by working “from the wheels”? Without a doubt, the USSR made great efforts to provide artillery with shells, and here we had some success - for all the 1938 of the Red Army received from the industry 12 434 thousand artillery shots, which made up almost 42% of all stocks accumulated on 01.01.1938. but alas, this was still not enough.

In 1938, the USSR gained the opportunity to test its armed forces in a small conflict with Japan at Lake Hassan.



There, the Japanese concentrated somewhat superior numbers of troops (about 20 thousand soldiers, against about 15 thousand Red Army men), while the artillery forces were approximately comparable (200 cannons from the Japanese, 237 from the Red Army). But Soviet troops were supported aviation and tanks, and the Japanese did not use either one or the other. The result of the clashes was excellently set forth in the order of the Non-Profit Organization “On the Results of the Main Military Council Considering the Events on Lake Hassan and the Measures for the Defense Preparation of the Far Eastern Theater of War” No. 0040 of September 4, 1938. Here are some of its sections:

“The events of these few days have revealed huge shortcomings in the state of QDfront. The combat training of the troops, headquarters and the commanding staff of the front was at an unacceptably low level. Troops were razdergany and inefficient; the supply of military units is not organized. The Far Eastern theater was found to be poorly prepared for war (roads, bridges, communications).

Storage, saving and accounting of mobilization and emergency supplies, both front-line warehouses and military units, turned out to be in a chaotic state.

To all this, it was found that the most important directives of the Chief Military Council and the people's commissar of defense by the command of the front were not criminally carried out for a long time. As a result of this unacceptable state of the troops of the front, we in this relatively small collision suffered significant losses - 408 people killed and 2807 people wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extreme difficulty of the terrain on which our troops had to operate, nor by three times the great losses of the Japanese.

The number of our troops, participation in the operations of our aircraft and tanks gave us such advantages, in which our losses in battle could be much smaller ...

... a) the troops marched to the border in combat alarm completely unprepared. The inviolable stock of weapons and other combat equipment was not pre-signed and prepared for handing out to the units, which caused a number of glaring disgraces during the entire period of hostilities. The head of the front and the commanders of the units did not know what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other military supplies are available. In many cases, whole art batteries were at the front without projectiles, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unattended, and many soldiers and even one of the 32 division rifle units arrived at the front without rifles and gas masks at all. Despite the enormous stocks of clothing and equipment, many soldiers were sent into battle in completely worn out shoes, semi-slips, a large number of Red Army soldiers were without their coats. The commanders and staffs did not have enough maps of the combat area;

c) all types of troops, especially infantry, found an inability to act on the battlefield, maneuver, combine movement and fire, apply to the terrain, which in a given situation, as in the conditions of the Far East, full of mountains and hills, is the alphabet of combat and tactical training of troops.

Tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in the material part. ”


In the second half of the 30, the Red Army experienced numerous growing pains, and, alas, was not yet a truly formidable fighting force. People's Commissar of Defense KM Voroshilov had to solve many of the most complicated tasks of transforming and expanding the Soviet armed forces, but, honestly, it must be admitted that he was not the person to whom such tasks were possible. The biggest shortcomings of our combat training came to light at Lake Hassan, at Khalkhin-Gol, and later, during the “Winter War” with Finland. And therefore it is impossible to express in words the merits of Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko, who replaced the post of NKO K.M. At the beginning of 1940, Voroshilov was just over a year before the war, but 22 June 1941 was met by a completely different army of the fascist invaders. The one about which the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of Germany, F. Halder, who led the invasion, already wrote 29 June in his diary (reaction to the battles of Grodno):

“The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West, we could afford certain liberties and deviations from statutory principles; now it is unacceptable. "


And what about Germany and its Wehrmacht? Without a doubt, in 1938 r he was not nearly an invincible army capable of breaking the resistance of the French armed forces in a month. Let us recall the Austrian Anschluss, which took place just in 1938. The German divisions could not reach Vienna in time, literally “scattering” along the road - all the roadsides were filled up with faulty military equipment. At the same time, the Wehrmacht also experienced a severe shortage of trained recruits: we already said that the mobilization plan provided for the deployment of more than 3,3 million people, but the Germans only had 1 million trained soldiers and draftees.

Nevertheless, the million German soldiers prepared according to all the rules of the Wehrmacht were there, but the Red Army could hardly boast of such.

What is the conclusion? It is very simple: it is difficult to say whether the ratio of the military potentials of Germany and the USSR in 1938 was better for us than it actually happened in 1941, but we could not quite break the Wehrmacht "like a crystal vase" in the thirty-eighth.

Thank you for attention!
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  1. Cat
    Cat 4 May 2018 06: 23
    +16
    I read it with pleasure.
    I will supplement the author. The USSR, beginning with the Munich agreement, tried at all costs to increase the combat effectiveness of its armed forces, but alas, by June 22, 1941, it had not been trite. Sometimes it looked like fuss in a heap of mala.
    Staff errors were corrected until May 1945.
    Sincerely, Kitty!
    1. 210ox
      210ox 4 May 2018 06: 33
      +8
      I completely agree with the author ... Kaptsov (with respect) simply put forward an alternative story .. But we do not live in a parallel world.
    2. Reptiloid
      Reptiloid 4 May 2018 06: 39
      +8
      Greetings, Vlad! Cat! I want to add that before the year 1938 the USSR tried to give skill to its armed forces ---- Spain, China. And if this had not happened?
      The article is very correct, necessary, timely. As everyone knows, most of your recent articles, Andrei, had a different theme ---- marine. Thank you.
      1. parma
        parma 4 May 2018 07: 48
        +2
        Quote: Reptiloid
        Greetings, Vlad! Cat! I want to add that before the year 1938 the USSR tried to give skill to its armed forces ---- Spain, China. And if this had not happened?
        The article is very correct, necessary, timely. As everyone knows, most of your recent articles, Andrei, had a different theme ---- marine. Thank you.

        And how was the experience of war veterans in Spain used? Many veterans of that war received awards upon their return and were arrested almost immediately ... Conclusions were drawn and taken into account, but for the most part not from the experience of the participants ....
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 19
          +7
          Quote: parma
          And how was the experience of war veterans in Spain used?

          Both tactically and strategically. Tactically - see Khalkhin-Gol. But strategically ... for example, work on the future T-34 began just with the demand of Pavlov, who had returned from Spain and France, to give the army an anti-ballistic reservation tank, armed with a gun with division ballistics.
      2. Proxima
        Proxima 4 May 2018 14: 54
        +17
        Articles of this quality rarely go to VO. What is most encouraging is that the author did not load heavily with statistical material, but expressed his thoughts, his position on this issue. As the saying goes, the perfect combination between "statistics and fiction" (in the good sense of the word). Andrey, thanks for the article. Such material always adorns the site. hi
    3. Mordvin 3
      Mordvin 3 4 May 2018 06: 41
      +2
      Quote: Kotischa
      but alas, by the 22 of June the 1941 of the year had not been trite.

      There it reached insanity. They studied on light tanks, and modern T-34 and KV put under protection. There were cases when they were stupidly filled with gasoline.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 4 May 2018 08: 59
        +4
        On May 23, 1941, in the 6th mechanized corps of the Western Special Military District, five T-34 tanks were put out of action and needed serious repairs. Reason: because of negligence (or because of basic ignorance) they were filled with gasoline.

        Before the appearance of the T-34 and KV-1 in the Red Army, all armored vehicles used gasoline engines. Or didn’t read those. documentation for tanks or "due to negligence and ignorance" did not see the difference between gasoline and diesel engines.
        In one of Kolomiyets’s books, an example was given - the BT-5 or 7 tank defrosted near Leningrad in the winter of 1941. The driver said that in the summer I watched the antifreeze flow from the cooling system, but he was advised to add WATER! So on top-ups of water, he drove the tank until the frosts of 1941. Until the frosts have done their "dirty deed."
        A simple lack of knowledge in people and the lack of an adequate number of spare parts and “consumables” (oils, filters (especially for KV-1), antifreeze).
        1. Vladimir 5
          Vladimir 5 6 May 2018 23: 44
          0
          Under such "lack of knowledge" and damage to technology, even too "literate" from a considerable number of people wishing to evade military operations and the front were hidden. The equipment broke under a different look. The fleet even ignited ships and boats, and recently it was described how one torpedo bomb blew up his own submarine. so as not to go on military campaigns ... This side also needs to be taken into account, this is from the reasons for 3 million prisoners in the first half of the Second World War ...
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 7 May 2018 08: 06
            +2
            And such facts of deliberate sabotage cannot be denied! But the mechanical drive described by me on my BT from the western border got to Leningrad - if there was a desire, I would DESERVE for a long time! So he just lacked knowledge!
            In a drunken affair and in Leningrad, we drove tanks in tanks - only such "races" ended in a tribunal!
            During the summer raids on Leningrad, the commander of one of the anti-aircraft batteries ordered not to open fire on German planes so that they would not bomb the battery!
            He was shot ...
            But no one can give me an answer to the question - why did the European military literate and not subjected to "repression" lose so easily to the Germans at the initial stage of the war?
            And their soldiers were educated, and the technique was not worse than German, and the generals "are all like that" ... However, they lost! And not only to the Germans! In the Far East, the British fled from the Japanese ...
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 27
        +7
        Quote: Mordvin 3
        There it reached insanity. They studied on light tanks, and modern T-34s and KVs were placed under protection.

        Correctly. Because the engine resource is less than 100 hours. At least 50 hours are required for driving training alone - for interchangeability in combat required each crew member to be trained. Plus shooting. Plus tactical training. And here in a couple of months we get tanks with dead engines. And new ones are not expected - the production of V-2 exceeds the production of tanks by only 10% (with the norm of 2 engines per tank).
        The number of new tanks of training battle parks, which was real in 1941 (about 100 vehicles), is the real maximum that could be provided with spare parts and engines.
        1. Mordvin 3
          Mordvin 3 4 May 2018 13: 36
          +1
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Right.

          I read the memories of a tanker. Kurochkin. "Iron rain." So there 13 drove new tanks into the barn and sent the sentry out. As a result, all the equipment burned down on June 22. Only three HFs were saved.
    4. igordok
      igordok 4 May 2018 06: 57
      +9
      I agree with the author.
      But the author forgot to mention the problems with vehicles, both in artillery and for infantry (armored personnel carriers). The lack of vehicles pursued the Red Army throughout the Second World War.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 4 May 2018 09: 09
        +7
        ..In 1931-1933 the AMO enterprise was reconstructed and renamed ZIS.
        ... In 1930-1932 the enterprise NAZ (GAZ) was built.
        ... YaAZ - former Lebedev (Yaroslavl)
        ... KIM (Moscow).
        That's the whole automotive industry of the USSR. Hence the lack of technology for the army and for the national economy. The transfer in 1941 of factories to the production of tanks only increased the shortage of vehicles in the Red Army. Saved only Lend-Lease ...
    5. hdgs
      hdgs 4 May 2018 08: 54
      +3
      Quote: Kotischa
      The USSR, beginning with the Munich agreement, tried at all costs to increase the combat effectiveness of its armed forces, but alas, by June 22, 1941, it had not been trite.

      From its birth until its death, the USSR "increased the combat effectiveness of its army." And never never had time. Because those who have served in the SA for at least a day understand very well that she was always unfit for work. That June 22, 1941, which is conditionally January 01, 1980. In addition to a very short period of time somewhere from the end of 1943 and after 2MB, when the Red Army was conditionally combat ready.
      1. Vasilenko Vladimir
        Vasilenko Vladimir 4 May 2018 22: 18
        +1
        Quote: hdgs
        Because those who have served in the SA for at least a day understand that she was always unfit for work

        the question arises why the war then ended not in Moscow but in Berlin
    6. Bar1
      Bar1 4 May 2018 14: 31
      +2
      it is not entirely clear in the USSR that there were no command schools, that commanders and military specialists were not graduated? How so that untrained commanders went to the troops?
  2. Andrey Sukharev
    Andrey Sukharev 4 May 2018 06: 25
    +7
    An excellent analysis of the pre-military state of our country! Thank!
  3. sleeve
    sleeve 4 May 2018 06: 33
    +4
    Moreover, the command of the Red Army was not unreasonably afraid of losing in a defensive war in the event of aggression against the USSR in this period. This was not alarmism against the background of all the overwhelming propaganda of work in the country and the army, but at the level of headquarters and senior management there were no illusions. Hence the vigorous political actions regarding treaties on mutual defense and the admission of units with both Poland and Czechoslovakia. To turn hostilities into offensive at any cost, to give them character in which the Red Army still had a chance due to technical saturation to inflict unacceptable damage. But within the framework of world isolation and confrontation, despite the clear threat of Czechoslovakia itself, the conjuncture turned out to be stronger. In principle, realizing the possibility of falling under the influence of the USSR with all the consequences, these countries justified it. Given the raging terror in the USSR in those years, everything is completely clear. But the chance was missed ... From the height of the years passed, these “maneuvers” on the diplomatic and political fronts can be called a pan-European loss.
  4. Olgovich
    Olgovich 4 May 2018 06: 43
    +9
    it is difficult to say whether the ratio of the military potentials of Germany and the USSR in 1938 was better for us than it actually happened in 1941, but we could not be sure for sure to break the Wehrmacht “like a crystal vase” in the thirty-eighth.

    Theoretically, based on military capabilities, Germany could have been defeated for sure (the Wehrmacht was created in ... 1935!), Taking into account geopolitical realities, the USSR would have had to fight Poland with the support of its West. What was fraught with defeat.
    But Comrade Kaptsov’s main idea was completely different: he quite rightly remarked that while the USSR strengthened its defenses by a percentage, Germany became more powerful factor of.
    And this could not be allowed.
    Hitler had to be hit in May 1940, when the fighting was in France and she, along with England, was firmly bogged down in WWII. Those. to repeat the situation of August 1914: Hitler would have ended and the USSR would have been the victor and savior of Europe.
    BUT, they preferred an alternative move: waiting for the imperialists to kill each other.
    But in the end, Germany simultaneously became stronger MULTIPLE due to the seized economies and resources of Europe, and we got a disaster in June 1941, because we also didn’t have time to intensify completely
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 4 May 2018 08: 02
      +10
      Quote: Olgovich
      ... Hitler had to be hit in May 1940, when the fighting went on in France and she, along with England, was firmly bogged down in WWII. Those. to repeat the situation of August 1914: Hitler would have ended and the USSR would have been the victor and savior of Europe.
      BUT, they preferred an alternative move: waiting for the imperialists to kill each other ...

      The delights of afterglow?
      Then no one in our military-political leadership could even conceive that the strongest European army would merge in 40 days.
      Second.
      The Polish campaign, and especially the results of the Finnish company, showed the depressing state of the Red Army.
      The restructuring of the army was supposed to be completed by 1943. We perceived the conflict in Europe as a reserve of time for ourselves.
      If we got into the 40th, there would be the same problems as in the 41st. Incompetence of the command staff, limited (or selective) combat effectiveness of the formations, underdevelopment, lack of logistics, lack of orderly logistics .., and again, motor vehicles, tractors, artillery, shell shortages, communications, etc., etc.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 4 May 2018 08: 15
        +3
        Quote: BigRiver
        The delights of afterglow?

        No, the delights of KNOWLEDGE are already held last-August 1914
        Quote: BigRiver
        Then no one in our military-political leadership even could not thinkthat the strongest army in Europe will merge in 40 days.

        Yes? So it was only necessary to open a school TEXTBOOK in the WWI section, where they would see that without a first front in Russia, a second front in France flew to defeat as swiftly as it happened in 1940
        Quote: BigRiver
        The Polish campaign, and especially the results of the Finnish company, showed the deplorable state of the Red Army

        And the Anschluss showed an even more depressing state of the Wehrmacht (see article)
        Quote: BigRiver
        If we climbed into the 40th, we would the same problemsas in the 41st.

        We would have the same ones, and the Germans would have much more than those that we had in 1941: no European resources, no victories, no well-functioning military industry, but they would have to the front in the East strongest front in the West and the resources of Europe against them
        . Germany and its economy did not have ANY chance.
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 4 May 2018 08: 24
          +2
          Quote: Olgovich
          ... And the Anschluss showed an even more depressing state of the Wehrmacht (see article)
          We would have the same ones, and the Germans would have much more than those that we had in 1941: neither European resources, nor victories, but, to the front in the East, we would have a strong front in the West and Europe’s resources against it. Germany and its economy have NO chance.

          Their command staff had basic knowledge and taught to operate large masses of troops in large theaters, applying "know-how". We are looking at the Weiss results. And we had neither basic knowledge nor panadol against this know-how, even in theory.
          Having stretched out flimsy communications, we could not simply hold on to a couple of three deep “punctures” of the Wehrmacht. Unfortunately, they knew how to quickly find weaknesses and pierce deeply. And again the boilers and the run to the border. And a disaster.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 4 May 2018 08: 43
            +3
            Quote: BigRiver
            Their command staff had basic knowledge and taught to operate large masses of troops in large theaters, applying "know-how". We are looking at the Weiss results. And we had neither basic knowledge nor panadol against this know-how, even in theory.

            You talk about the details, but I’m talking about the main thing: about the ECONOMY.
            There was NOT a single chance for a reviving German economy against
            powerful economies of the West and the USSR. As against their combined armies. This is obvious and public.
            1. Bigriver
              Bigriver 4 May 2018 09: 57
              +1
              Quote: Olgovich
              Quote: BigRiver
              Their command staff had basic knowledge and taught to operate large masses of troops in large theaters, applying "know-how". We are looking at the Weiss results. And we had neither basic knowledge nor panadol against this know-how, even in theory.

              You talk about the details, but I’m talking about the main thing: about the ECONOMY.
              There was NOT a single chance for a reviving German economy against
              powerful economies of the West and the USSR. As against their combined armies. This is obvious and public.

              The factor of the united economies plays when you exchange space for time, retreating in its territory.
              What do you think, how many months did the Red Army (counting from May) need for strategic planning, mobilization and installation of strike groups? Would you be in time by October?
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 4 May 2018 10: 06
                +2
                Quote: BigRiver
                What do you think, how many months did the Red Army (counting from May) need for strategic planning, mobilization and installation of strike groups? Would you be in time by October?

                In 1938, Czechoslovakia were ready toto dunk. This means that both planning and strike groups were completed.
                Also, in advance, planning had to be carried out in case Germany invaded France.
                What does May have to do with it? France was at war almost a year now. Bulk time. For this there is a General Staff. I think that something was. Moreover, groups in the West Ukraine and Belarus, have already stood since 1939.
                1. Bigriver
                  Bigriver 4 May 2018 10: 25
                  +2
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  Quote: BigRiver
                  What do you think, how many months did the Red Army (counting from May) need for strategic planning, mobilization and installation of strike groups? Would you be in time by October?

                  In 1938, Czechoslovakia were ready toto dunk. This means that both planning and strike groups were completed.

                  We and Finnish were planning for two months and almost half as much power as it turned out. And, I repeat, the Polish campaign + the Finnish one perfectly cleared the brains of our military and political leadership. By showing roughly visibly the real capabilities of the army.
                  Where did you see the presence of shock groups in the Red Army in 1940? Can you name their composition? They were not on the 41st. What the same Manstein writes about.
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  What does May have to do with it? France was at war almost a year now. Bulk time. For this there is a General Staff. Moreover, groups in the West Ukraine and Belarus, have already stood since 1939.

                  Yeah, two groups of troops stationed "just in case", not capable of conducting either offensive or defensive actions.
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  I think that something was.

                  To think so, and not otherwise, you need a factual. Is he there?
                  1. Olgovich
                    Olgovich 4 May 2018 11: 29
                    +1
                    Quote: BigRiver
                    We and Finnish were planning for two months and almost half as much power what happened in the end

                    Relative to what smaller?
                    Quote: BigRiver
                    , Polish campaign + Finnish cool brainwashed our and military and political leadership. By showing roughly visibly the real capabilities of the army.

                    An army that has existed and has been developing for TWENTY years. Unlike the German Wehrmacht, which existed only ....Three yearsstarting from scratch.
                    Quote: BigRiver
                    Where did you see the presence of shock groups in the Red Army in 1940?

                    I didn’t have the words “Percussion”.
                    1. Bigriver
                      Bigriver 4 May 2018 11: 43
                      +1
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      Quote: BigRiver
                      We and Finnish were planning for two months and almost half as much power what happened in the end

                      Relative to what smaller?
                      Quote: BigRiver
                      , Polish campaign + Finnish cool brainwashed our and military and political leadership. By showing roughly visibly the real capabilities of the army.

                      An army that has existed and has been developing for TWENTY years. Unlike the German Wehrmacht, which existed only ....Three yearsstarting from scratch.
                      Quote: BigRiver
                      Where did you see the presence of shock groups in the Red Army in 1940?

                      I didn’t have the words “Percussion”.

                      1. The outfit of allocated forces in Finnish was almost doubled, after the failures of December. It also took twice as much time as planned. In general, it turned out according to Shaposhnikov, and not according to Voroshilov. You should at least read something on the subject.
                      2. The army began to develop in 1938, when the transition to a regular army was made. Before that, there was a territorial concept. Also, I advise you to read about "development" though.
                      3. The Wehrmacht, in contrast to the Red Army, had a preserved officer and non-commissioned core capable of acting on solid fronts of great length. Our commanding staff is the partisan heroes of raid actions, whose success did not depend heavily on interaction with neighbors.
                      And the most important thing.
                      You did not see and did not understand what the "know-how" of the Wehrmacht consists of, which he honed in Poland and France.
                      1. Olgovich
                        Olgovich 4 May 2018 12: 05
                        +1
                        Quote: BigRiver
                        The outfit of allocated forces in Finnish was almost doubled after the failures of December. It also took twice as much time as planned. In general, it turned out according to Shaposhnikov, and not according to Voroshilov. You should at least read something on the subject.

                        How does this refute the thesis of the insolvency of the German economy against the economists of the USSR and the West in May 1940? Let me remind you that the economy determines victory in world wars
                        Quote: BigRiver
                        2. The army began to develop in 1938, when the transition to a regular army was made. Before that, there was a territorial concept. Also, I advise about the "development" although something to read

                        See above.
                        Quote: BigRiver
                        The Wehrmacht, in contrast to the Red Army, had a preserved officer and non-commissioned officer nucleus, able to operate on continuous fronts of great length. Our commanding staff is the partisan heroes of raid actions, whose success did not depend heavily on interaction with neighbors.
                        And the most important

                        This is only one of the conditions. Without an army of privates and sergeants, industry is nothing.
                        And one more thing: the USSR had the SAME time that Germany had, and to him the army and the defense industry in Versailles -not banned.
                  2. Gopnik
                    Gopnik 4 May 2018 14: 16
                    +1
                    Quote: BigRiver
                    Polish campaign + Finnish cool brainwashed our and military and political leadership.


                    This is called "burnt in milk, steel began to blow into the water." As a result, they sat and looked like a rabbit on a boa constrictor, as the Germans calmly, without hurrying, ruined their car together with the Allies in order to beat us lonely.
          2. Gopnik
            Gopnik 4 May 2018 14: 13
            +1
            Quote: BigRiver
            And we had neither basic knowledge nor panadol against this know-how, even in theory.


            So we did not have them in 1941.
            1. Bigriver
              Bigriver 4 May 2018 14: 28
              0
              Quote: Gopnik
              Quote: BigRiver
              And we had neither basic knowledge nor panadol against this know-how, even in theory.

              So we did not have them in 1941.

              Yes.
      2. The comment was deleted.
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 4 May 2018 09: 27
          +3
          What Soviet weapons of the times of the Red Army were worse than the weapons of the French or British of the same period of time?
          1. hdgs
            hdgs 4 May 2018 12: 54
            0
            Quote: hohol95
            What Soviet weapons of the times of the Red Army were worse than the weapons of the French or British of the same period of time?

            In short, then everyone. That's all for everyone. Heaven and earth.
            I can "expand", but it will turn out not even an article, but a story. Big and sad.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              4 May 2018 13: 13
              +5
              Quote: hdgs
              I can "expand", but it will turn out not even an article, but a story.

              And the armored destroyers-coastal ocean raiders of 3,58 rank will be?
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 4 May 2018 14: 13
                +2
                good drinks good Well, for him, everything that is Soviet is ... "a submarine in the Belarusian Sea."
              2. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 4 May 2018 20: 46
                +1
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And the armored destroyers-coastal ocean raiders of 3,58 rank will be?

                good laughing laughing laughing
            2. hohol95
              hohol95 4 May 2018 14: 09
              +2
              Again the fable about .30 Carbine (7,62 × 33 mm) ... Not tired yet?
            3. hohol95
              hohol95 4 May 2018 14: 59
              +1
              For example, do you justify how the Mate1924 / 29 Chatellerault machine gun was better than our DP-27?
        2. Bigriver
          Bigriver 4 May 2018 10: 02
          +3
          Quote: hdgs
          Quote: BigRiver
          The restructuring of the army was supposed to be completed by 1943.

          With zero effect.
          It was not a bad structure of the Red Army. It was in the Red Army itself, and later, the SA. These armies were almost never combat-ready (SA never at all).
          And the Red Army simply never had Its the rear. There is no army without a rear.
          In addition, if we recall the "Soviet weapon", especially since the Red Army ....

          What kind of rear did the Red Army have? Strategic, front-line, army, corps, division? Or all at once?
          And what is wrong with the "Soviet weapon"?
          If you are familiar with the negative experience of the Red Army database in the Second World War (for example, certain operations, for example), then you should seem to know that it was in all. And in the competence of the command staff, and in the organizational staff, and in the combat effectiveness of units, formations and associations, and in the interaction of the combat arms, and in logistics, and in the rear, and in the maintenance of equipment, and in the speed of assessing the situation and reaction speed (staff work), etc. etc.
          1. The comment was deleted.
            1. hohol95
              hohol95 4 May 2018 14: 18
              +3
              Article about 1938! Lend-Lease has not yet been born ...
              And you forgot - the first to eat the American stew, the British military began to use American weapons and explosives so that “dear comrade ZHORA 4” would sit on the throne.
            2. Bigriver
              Bigriver 4 May 2018 14: 40
              +4
              Quote: hdgs
              Quote: BigRiver
              What kind of rear did the Red Army have? Strategic, front-line, army, corps, division? Or all at once?

              But no.

              It is a masterpiece! Without any doubts!
              Quote: hdgs
              High-octane gasoline and thermal power plants were almost all Lend-Lease.
              Explosives were a big part of Lend-Lease ...

              Great!
              In the absence (of your affirming and absent) rear, is all the wealth from outer space falling on the front line?
              And how have we realized fire superiority since 1943?
              We loaded in the ML-20, M-30, ZIS-3, etc., skinny collective farmers who got to the guns on their own?
              Do you know how much traffic Bagration provided?
              They would be ashamed, and at least read something on the subject. It’s impossible to scream such a “zero” at a military forum.
              1. Vasilenko Vladimir
                Vasilenko Vladimir 4 May 2018 22: 26
                +1
                it seems that people generally from the moon (liberal) fell
              2. Golovan Jack
                Golovan Jack 4 May 2018 22: 29
                +3
                Quote: BigRiver
                It’s impossible to scream such a “zero” at a military forum

                For Carbinemaybe all.
                Didn’t you recognize the old acquaintance? wink
          2. strannik1985
            strannik1985 4 May 2018 14: 57
            +1
            If we return to the topic of the article, the front rear for the mobile group was not in the Polish campaign. 25 TC was able to refuel only once at the supply station, in the future, due to separation from s / s 150-200 km, sending cars with containers was not possible. The work of the rear was greatly hindered by the lack of tankers, workshops and tractors for towing faulty cars.
        3. Vasilenko Vladimir
          Vasilenko Vladimir 4 May 2018 22: 24
          +1
          Quote: hdgs
          In addition, if we recall the "Soviet weapon", especially since the Red Army ...

          let's remember
          I-16, La-5, Yak-9, IL-2, T-34, IS-2, BM-13
      3. BAI
        BAI 4 May 2018 09: 50
        +2
        The delights of afterglow?

        There is no aftertaste. It was in May 1940 that France and England in April 1940 planned the military operation "Spear" against the USSR.
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 4 May 2018 10: 07
          0
          Quote: BAI
          The delights of afterglow?

          There is no aftertaste. It was in May 1940 that France and England in April 1940 planned the military operation "Spear" against the USSR.

          And what, what my statement do you contradict?
          1. BAI
            BAI 4 May 2018 11: 16
            0
            That this is not aftertaste, but ignorance.
            1. Bigriver
              Bigriver 4 May 2018 11: 45
              0
              Quote: BAI
              That this is not aftertaste, but ignorance.

              All right.
              Ignorance of what? And what do you contradict? Which statement?
        2. Olgovich
          Olgovich 4 May 2018 10: 18
          +2
          Quote: BAI
          It was in May 1940

          К 1 May 1940 the French had in the Middle East only one a group of Glen Martin 167 bombers (GB I / 39 in Lebanon), and the British only one squadron
          Wow, how scary! belay
          And when you know
          that at a meeting of the Supreme Allied Military Council on April 22-23, 1940, British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain indicated that the USSR was changing its political course and was increasingly strictly neutral, so no need to strike
          then it becomes simple funny from experts "Spears" lolsinging in tune with Goebbels propaganda about the same operation.
          1. BAI
            BAI 4 May 2018 11: 26
            +2
            Wow, how scary!

            Start with this
            Here is one of the archival documents of the time. The Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry Leger wrote to the American Ambassador Bullitt on January 11, 1940:

            "France will not break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or declare war on it, it will simply destroy the USSR."


            Below I gave information that in the Caucasus, planes were transferred from the Western direction. In April 1940.
            Even on June 23, 1941, on the second day of the war between Germany and the USSR, the chief of staff of the British Air Force Charles Portal suggested ... send a telegram to the commander of the troops in India and the Middle East asking when preparations for the bombing of the oil fields of Grozny and Baku would be completed. And his offer was accepted!

            This meant bombing the pain points of a future ally. At that time, British military experts believed that the Soviet Union in the battle with Hitler would last no more than 6 months. And in this regard, they proposed to bomb the Caucasian oil fields so that they would not fall into the hands of the Germans.

            After the fall of Paris in June 1940, the departments of Ribbentrop and Goebbels published the Franco-British documents on their plans for the Caucasian oil fields that fell into their hands. Separate diplomacy received from Berlin copies of documents and Stalin. In the victorious 45th, the originals of these materials as Soviet trophies were exported from Germany to the USSR. True, for decades they have been kept secret with us.

            Marshal Zhukov, analyzing in his Memoirs and Reflections why Stalin mistrustfully warned Winston Churchill at the end of April 1941 about imminent Hitler aggression, wrote: “In 1940, rumors began circulating in the world press that the English and French military forces themselves are preparing to launch an attack on the North Caucasus, to bomb Baku, Grozny, Maykop. Then documents appeared confirming this. ”

            Since you are reluctant to search for yourself - here is the link
            https://aloban75.livejournal.com/4042245.html
            Here is the author, Gennady Evgenievich Sokolov, 67 years old.
            Graduated from MGIMO of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He worked in the UK, Denmark, Switzerland. He was sent to more than 30 countries of the world. He is the author of books on the history of the confrontation between Russian and British special services published in Russia and abroad: “The Naked Spy”, “Bomb” for the Prime Minister. Russian spy in London ”,“ Death Line. Failure of Operation Claret, Shah House of Windsor. The Royal Hunt (text is invalid) ”,“ Spy Number One. ” Co-author of Russian and foreign documentaries on the history of intelligence.
            just funny from the spear experts

            You can laugh at him, and at the same time - at Zhukov. (How is Zhukov
            in unison with Goebbels propaganda
            ?)
            1. Olgovich
              Olgovich 4 May 2018 11: 53
              +1
              Quote: BAI
              Below I gave information that in the Caucasus, planes were transferred from the Western direction. In April 1940.

              Above, I provided information on 2 (TWO!) Squadrons on May 1, 1940 in the Middle East.
              "Strength" for the destruction of Transcaucasia, yes. lol
              Quote: BAI
              Even June 23, 1941, on the second day of the war between Germany and the USSR, the chief of staff of the British Air Force Charles Portal suggested ... send a telegram to the commander of troops in India and the Middle East asking when preparations for the bombing of the oil fields of Grozny and Baku will be completed. And his proposal was taken!

              Was taken proposal send ....telegram with the request. And the telegram "with the request" meant
              Quote: BAI
              It meant - bomb the pain points of the future ally.

              ?! lol belay
              Do you or in Russian teach your authority to write, or don’t mention nonsense at all: WHERE are the “bombings”? lol
              Quote: BAI
              After the fall of Paris in June 1940, the departments of Ribbentrop and Goebbels published the Franco-British documents on their plans for the Caucasian oil fields that fell into their hands.

              You and Goebbels say the same thing, in the same vein. On what your attention is focused.
              Quote: BAI
              You can laugh at him, and at the same time - at Zhukov.

              What a fright? There were plans, but they were CANCELED,
              By the way, remember why you wanted to bomb something, and not only to bomb, but also to detain Soviet tankers? To stop the supply of Hitler with oil, on which he then attacked Paris.
              1. BAI
                BAI 4 May 2018 13: 47
                +1
                Above, I provided information on 2 (TWO!) Squadrons on May 1, 1940 in the Middle East.

                And against 2 squadrons (I repeat again):
                But already in April-May 1940 in the okrug (Transcaucasian) with Northwest Front(!! - the war with Finland was just over) the directorates of the 3rd, 17th and 64th air brigades and 9 air regiments, the 18th and 41st medium-bombing, 6th and 42nd long-range bombing brigades were transferred.

                The 35th Fighter Regiment was transferred here from the Belarusian Military District, the 133rd Fighter Regiment was transferred from the Moscow Military District, and the 12th Long-Range Bomber Aviation Regiment from the North Caucasus Military District.

                Not too much?
                By the way, remember why you wanted to bomb something, and not only to bomb, but also to detain Soviet tankers? To stop the supply of Hitler with oil, on which he then attacked Paris.

                They wanted to bomb because
                On January 11, 1940, the British embassy in Moscow reported with a secret connection to London that "an action in the Caucasus could" bring Russia to its knees as soon as possible, and a bombing of the Caucasian oil fields could deliver a knockout blow to the USSR. "
                - No Hitler, all against the USSR.

                As you know, by the beginning of the Second World War, the Baku fields produced 80% of high-grade aviation gasoline, 90% kerosene and 96% of motor oils from their total production in the USSR.
                This meant bombing the pain points of a future ally.

                ?! lol belay
                Do you or in Russian teach your authority to write, or don’t mention nonsense at all: WHERE are the “bombings”? lol

                Do you learn to read Russian? What is wrong here?

                There were plans, but they were CANCELED,
                - to be replaced by the "Unthinkable" plan.
                By the way, "CANCELED" - what of free will? Had to cancel, because Hitler managed to arrange a rout in Europe. And then, until the end was not canceled, on June 23 this topic was discussed. On June 23, did oil deliveries to Hitler from the USSR also go?
                To keep you informed - the reason for planning the attack on the USSR in 1940
                according to Western historians, the introduction of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in the autumn of 1939 was followed by the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.
                The main military council of France and England in January 1940 decided to send an expeditionary force of 150 thousand people to Finland in February-March.
                - here depriving the USSR of oil would be very welcome.
                1. Olgovich
                  Olgovich 5 May 2018 06: 37
                  0
                  Quote: BAI
                  And against 2 squadrons (I repeat again):

                  Do you even remember yourself? Just above, you argued that Stalin and Zhukov -did not know about Operation Spear. And the aircraft against her were rebooted! fool
                  Turkey was also in Transcaucasia, and Iran!
                  Quote: BAI
                  no Hitler all against the USSR

                  belay lol Oil, during the World War II, who did the USSR supply, dear man?
                  Quote: BAI
                  Do you learn to read Russian? What is wrong here?

                  Request for readiness is not a decision about the bombing: WHAT is not clear?
                  Quote: BAI
                  to be replaced by the Unthinkable

                  In 1940? lol
                  Quote: BAI
                  By the way, "CANCELED" - what of free will? Had to cancel, because Hitler managed to arrange rout in Europe.

                  Well, what a WRONG: the decision on the operation is canceled in APRIL, i.e. BEFORE the defeat in MAY.
                  1. BAI
                    BAI 5 May 2018 09: 12
                    +1
                    Just above, you claimed that Stalin and Zhukov did not know about the Spear operation.

                    And where did I write this? Do not wishful thinking.
                    I can even repeat it again:
                    «In 1940 g. in the world press rumors began to circulate that the British and French military forces themselves are preparing to launch an attack on the North Caucasus, to bomb Baku, Grozny, Maykop. Then documents appeared confirming this. "
                    1. Olgovich
                      Olgovich 5 May 2018 14: 31
                      +1
                      Quote: BAI
                      where did i write this? Do not wishful thinking.
                      I can even repeat it again:

                      And I will quote you:
                      After the fall of Paris in june xnumx Office of Ribbentrop and Goebbels unveiled Franco-British documents on plans for the Caucasian oil fields that fell into their hands. Separate dipocasia received from Berlin copies of documents and Stalin. In the victorious 45th, the originals of these materials as Soviet trophies were exported from Germany to the USSR. True, for decades they have been kept secret with us.
                      Marshal Zhukov, analyzing in his Memoirs and Reflections why Stalin mistrustfully warned Winston Churchill at the end of April 1941 about imminent Hitler aggression, wrote: “In 1940, rumors began circulating in the world press that the English and French military forces themselves are preparing to launch an attack on the North Caucasus, to bomb Baku, Grozny, Maykop. Then documents appeared confirming this "

                      Those. in June found out, and transferred, in April belay
                      1. BAI
                        BAI 5 May 2018 16: 11
                        +1
                        Thank God that you are not referring to 1945.
                        1. Where do you see specific date of receipt of documents (from Zhukov)?
                        2. What do you think, on what basis was the unprecedented transfer of aircraft (against TWO of your squadrons — which you so stubbornly recall) —number of aircraft were transferred from north to south even during the war (at least in such numbers)?
                    2. Olgovich
                      Olgovich 6 May 2018 07: 08
                      +1
                      Quote: BAI
                      Thank God that you are not referring to 1945.

                      belay
                      Quote: BAI
                      1. Where do you see a specific date of receipt of documents (from Zhukov)?

                      In JUNE, the Germans replicated and transferred documents to Stalin (Zhukov). Read yourself!
                      Quote: BAI
                      What do you think, on what basis was the unprecedented transfer of aviation (against TWO of your squadrons - which you so stubbornly recall) - did not transfer aircraft from north to south even during the war (at least in such numbers)?

                      Turkey and Iran, there was NO ONE else.
                      Or do you have a management decision with the justification for the transfer, where it says: in connection with the threat of an attack from the Anglo-French authorities, to throw, etc.?
                      No? Why then empty talk?
            2. parma
              parma 4 May 2018 11: 56
              +2
              Quote: BAI
              Even on June 23, 1941, on the second day of the war between Germany and the USSR, the chief of staff of the British Air Force Charles Portal suggested ... send a telegram to the commander of the troops in India and the Middle East asking when preparations for the bombing of the oil fields of Grozny and Baku would be completed. And his offer was accepted!

              Of course they planned ... According to their calculations, Germany was supposed to defeat the USSR in six months (by the way the post office turned out) and, as a result, get deposits ... In the late 30s and early 40s, oil production in the Caucasus was carried out in an open way-oil it was just gushing and stored in about the same way .... The beginning of field development using modern methods would lead to a complete solution of problems with oil products ... So it would be quite logical to decide to bomb and set fire to fields in Kuwait in the future ...
        3. hdgs
          hdgs 4 May 2018 13: 01
          0
          Quote: BAI
          It was in May 1940 that France and England in April 1940 planned the military operation "Spear" against the USSR.

          Not "Spear", but "Kladinets Sword".
          And not against the USSR, but against Zimbabwe.
          What is April-May 1940, if at that time they fought with the Axis?
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 4 May 2018 14: 22
            0
            In a report dated April 17, 1940, the commander of the French forces in Syria and Lebanon, General Maxim Weigan, proposed that the deadline for preparing the operation be set for the end of June - early July, but he noted that not a single air group allocated for the operation had arrived in the Levant, but aircraft for their armament have just begun to arrive at ports. The situation was similar with the preparations for the British part of the operation. By May 1, 1940, the French had in the Middle East only one group of Glen Martin 167 bombers (GB I / 39 in Lebanon), and the British only one squadron of "long-nosed" Blenheim'ov (No. 113 in Egypt). The fact is that on April 9, 1940, Operation Weserubung began — the landing of German troops in Norway. This event pushed the operation against the Caucasian oil fields into the backyard of planning.
            At a meeting of the Supreme Allied Military Council on April 22-23, 1940, British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain indicated that the USSR is changing its political course and is increasingly adhering to neutrality, so that there is no need for a strike.

            If it weren’t for the Germans - the first to hit them - everything could have been completely different!
          2. Vasilenko Vladimir
            Vasilenko Vladimir 4 May 2018 22: 30
            0
            Quote: hdgs
            Not "Spear", but "Kladinets Sword".
            And not against the USSR, but against Zimbabwe.
            What is April-May 1940, if at that time they fought with the Axis?

            tell me honestly, you were banned in both Google and Yandex, you carry such a heresy, and with all the topics that you don’t even know what to answer
            January 19, 1940 - exactly 77 years ago! - French Prime Minister Eduard Daladier set the concrete task of bombing the Caucasian oil fields before the military. His note on the alleged operation to invade the USSR was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Ground Forces in France and to the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Military Council, General Gamelin, as well as to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, Admiral Darlan.

            The idea of ​​Daladier was supported by then British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. On its basis, plans were prepared for a surprise attack on the USSR - the English "MA-6" and the French "RIP" ("Russia. Industry. Fuel.")

            Later, the Allies combined them into one covert operation "Spear".

            They planned to start the attack on the USSR by bombing the cities of Baku, Grozny, Batumi, Maykop and Poti. 9 groups of bombers from the airfields of Syria (then mandated territory of France) and Turkey, with which the British expected to negotiate, were supposed to strike at targets in the Caucasus and the Black Sea coast.

            The beginning of the operation was planned for May 15, 1940. Then moved to June.

            On March 20, 1940, a meeting of representatives of the French and English generals took place in the well-known Syrian city of Aleppo. It stated that by June 1940 the construction of 20 airfields of the first category for basing bombers aimed at hitting the Caucasian oil would be completed.

            On March 30, 1940, the British Lockheed-12A reconnaissance aircraft, taking off from the Habbaniya airbase in Iraq, took photographs of Baku and adjacent oil fields from a height of 7 km. After 4 days, this aircraft explored the refineries in Batumi and Poti. Soviet anti-aircraft guns opened fire, but to no avail.

            The minutes of the meetings of the coordination groups of the headquarters of the French and British air forces on April 4-5, 1940 stated: “From 90 to 100 aircraft consisting of 6 French groups and 3 British squadrons will be used for the operation. For each departure, they will be able to drop a maximum of 70 tons of bombs per hundred oil refineries. ”

            Long-range bombers occupied a special role in the British Air Force. As early as November 1938, the British set the Vickers Wellesley bomber an absolute world record for flight range, which lasted until 1945 - 3600 km with a full bomb load. For Operation Spear, they fit well enough. The only weak point was speed - only 380 km / h.

            As for the bombing itself, it had to be carried out both day and night from various heights. As a result of the raids, they planned to destroy Baku in 15 days, Grozny in 12, and Batumi in one and a half days.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      4 May 2018 11: 19
      +4
      Quote: Olgovich
      But Comrade Kaptsov’s main idea was completely different: he quite rightly remarked that while the USSR strengthened its defenses by a percentage, Germany had become more powerful at times.

      Kaptsov just did not notice that we, too, became stronger at times
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 4 May 2018 11: 39
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Kaptsov just didn’t notice that we also became stronger at times

        In no way:
        From May 40 to 1941, Germany became stronger on: France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Hungary, Finland, Romania, Norway, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, with ALL of their resources, reserves and economies (the Czech Republic was already).
        What became stronger than the USSR? Has its economy at least been comparable with Hitler’s by the aforementioned values ​​for the same period?
        Of course not.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          4 May 2018 12: 00
          +4
          Quote: Olgovich
          In no way:

          How else :)))
          Quote: Olgovich
          From May 40 to 1941, Germany became stronger on: France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Hungary, Finland, Romania, Norway, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, with ALL of their resources, reserves and economies (the Czech Republic was already).

          None of the economies of the conquered countries transferred to war footing. the Germans altered their economy in 1943. Of course, Germany received certain buns, (especially from Czechoslovakia) but ...
          In addition, we talked about the sun, not about the economy
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 4 May 2018 12: 20
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            None of the economies of the conquered countries transferred to war footing.

            The French did not work for the Wehrmacht? Belgians, Hungarians, Italians? I note that the economy of the occupied countries is not only the release of military equipment for Germany, but also an ALL national product. they developed and worked already for the needs of Germany. This includes s / economy and finance, and any industry, etc. Yes, and just the reserves of their armies: it’s enough to recall how many motor vehicles of the same France were from Yermacht
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            In addition, we talked about the sun, not about the economy

            This Kaptsov spoke purely about the sun, but you touched whole a complex of problems (geopolitical), which implies, in my opinion, the economy.
            And who has more resources and the economy wins: see WWII and WWII. hi
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              4 May 2018 13: 16
              +1
              Quote: Olgovich
              The French did not work for the Wehrmacht? Belgians, Hungarians, Italians?

              Yes, in general, not really. Here are the Czechs - yes, the Skoda was loaded. As for France itself, its GDP was consumed for the most part, which led to very comfortable conditions for its occupation.
              Quote: Olgovich
              Yes, and just the reserves of their armies: it’s enough to recall how many motor vehicles of the same France were from Yermacht

              Yes, but basically this is what was requisitioned in France after its defeat, and it’s impossible to say that the French factories worked on the Wehrmacht
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 4 May 2018 14: 24
                +1
                Who worked then? Only the Germans and Czechs themselves? The rest did partisanship and sabotage?
              2. Olgovich
                Olgovich 5 May 2018 08: 10
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Yes, in general, not really.

                30 trucks and PV 000 for the Wehrmacht from France is a trifle? 189 billion marks of orders for the army in France in the first half of 4, is also a trifle?
                By the way, you can go further: say that the Wehrmacht was OSLAB, occupying France, because part of the army was forced to leave in France. Some liberalists already say so.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                this is what was requisitioned in France after her defeat

                And the reserves of the armies of other occupied states?
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                and so, to say that the French factories worked on the Wehrmacht is still impossible

                Yes, they worked AGAINST him! yes
            2. Bigriver
              Bigriver 4 May 2018 13: 17
              +3
              Quote: Olgovich
              ... who has more resources and the economy wins: see WWII and WWII. hi

              Below answered. But, still a replica., "In the wrath of the day."
              60 powerful countries of the “most powerful coalition” merged one, not the most powerful, Russia, Iran and Syria.
              The most powerful US army, backed by the corresponding economy, leaked Vietnam.
              The most powerful BV army of Saudi Arabia is merging to some Husite partisans.
              Examples can be continued.
              We have a liberal sect, it exclusively preaches economic determinism. Not a member? :)))
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 5 May 2018 08: 27
                0
                Quote: BigRiver
                60 powerful countries of the “most powerful coalition” merged one, not the most powerful, Russia, Iran and Syria.

                belay fool lol
                Quote: BigRiver
                The most powerful US army, backed by the corresponding economy, leaked Vietnam.

                And what was the American-Vietnamese war? belay lolTell me!
                Three atomic bombs - and no Vietnam. The United States did it-could easy, northern Vietnam-never .: the level of the economy is different.
                Quote: BigRiver
                The most powerful BV army of Saudi Arabia is merging to some Husite partisans.

                What "merges"? And what does this word mean to you? request
                Quote: BigRiver
                Examples can be continued.

                So go on: as long as you have NO one. By the way, I can help: the USA lost (leaked) to Sudan! Forgot? laughing
                Quote: BigRiver
                We have a liberal sect, it exclusively preaches economic determinism. Not a member?

                In addition to the Hussites, open a textbook of grade 4 on the chapters of WWII and WWII.
                Axis countries and central powers were much weaker than the Entente economy and the Anti-Hitler coalition. And by the way,
                Quote: BigRiver
                Examples can be continued
            3. Gopnik
              Gopnik 4 May 2018 14: 54
              +1
              Quote: Olgovich
              The French did not work for the Wehrmacht? Belgians, Hungarians, Italians?


              It depends on what we are discussing. If the way the USSR entered the battle with the whole of Europe in 1941, then it certainly worked. And if something that did not have to wait for 1941, and to enter the war in 1938-40, then - no, they did not work.
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 5 May 2018 08: 33
                0
                Quote: Gopnik
                It depends on what we are discussing. If the way the USSR entered the battle with the whole of Europe in 1941, then it certainly worked. And if something that did not have to wait for 1941, and to enter the war in 1938-40, then - no, they didn’t work

                A great summary of the discussion. hi
        2. strannik1985
          strannik1985 4 May 2018 15: 14
          +1
          In the USSR, by 1938 they were more or less densely engaged in the army. In 1935, 45% of rifle divisions were territorial-militia (61% of regiments and brigades). By January 1938, 34% of the SD (37% of the regiments). But in the event of the deployment of the army, the territorial SD formed 54 SD and 1 SBR of the second stage and 9 SD of the third. When the triple deployment system was adopted, 37 diabetes formed an additional 74 compounds. For example, in 1941 up to 04 days were allocated for the deployment of SD 120/30 (the state is similar to the personnel SD of the 20th), so there are about 6000 people in them, and 1862-2853 people in the territorial one, and they must also allocate a frame for the formation of another SD .
          1. Gopnik
            Gopnik 4 May 2018 15: 22
            +1
            No one argues that the Red Army in 1941 is stronger than in 1938, this is obvious. Like the fact that the Wehrmacht in 1941 is much stronger than in 1938
      2. Gopnik
        Gopnik 4 May 2018 14: 23
        +1
        Well, yes, the Red Army in 1938 was 1,5 million people, and by June 22, 1941 5 million. The Wehrmacht in 1938 was several hundred thousand, by June 22.06.41, 7,2 - XNUMX million. Somehow the German "times" were thicker.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          4 May 2018 16: 55
          0
          Quote: Gopnik
          Well, yes, the Red Army in 1938 was 1,5 million people, and by June 22, 1941 5 million. The Wehrmacht in 1938 was several hundred thousand, by June 22.06.41, 7,2 - XNUMX million.

          Sorry, but the numbers are incorrect.
        2. strannik1985
          strannik1985 4 May 2018 18: 13
          0
          The number of peacetime troops in the Wehrmacht is 500-600 thousand people, partial mobilization of 2,2 million people, full 3,3 million 59 divisions, 2 608 tanks, 2 677 aircraft (against Czechoslovakia).
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 34
      +1
      Quote: Olgovich
      Hitler had to be hit in May 1940, when the fighting was in France and she, along with England, was firmly bogged down in WWII. Those. to repeat the situation of August 1914: Hitler would have ended and the USSR would have been the victor and savior of Europe.

      But there’s nothing to beat. Here is the situation in KOVO for April 1940:
      Today, in the Kiev Military District, there are 14 tanks in four tank brigades. The war sold them apart, tank brigades scattered. I must bluntly say that if mobilization is going on, our KOVO brigades are not ready. The tanks of these brigades are now returning from the Leningrad Military District.
      © Pavlov
      By the way, the situation is indicative: the Red Army of 1939, in order to cope with Finland alone, had to plunder the strike forces of the western districts. And it does not seem possible to quickly restore them - the rear and the industry do not have time to repair the equipment.
      1. Gopnik
        Gopnik 4 May 2018 15: 03
        +2
        So then in April, and not in May. By the way, in April 1940, the Red Army was larger in number than at the beginning of 1941. This is a mobilized army that has just victoriously completed the war, which includes divisions deployed to the military staff, with experienced personnel.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 4 May 2018 18: 35
          +1
          Quote: Gopnik
          So then in April, and not in May.

          In May, the situation has changed little. TBRs became at least somewhat combat-ready only in the late summer of 1940.
          In addition, during the same period, heavy tank brigades of the Western districts sent equipment to LKZ for modernization.
          Quote: Gopnik
          This is a mobilized army, just victoriously ending the war, having in its composition divisions deployed to the military staff, with experienced personnel.

          And those who know only one thing - to break through the defense in a wooded and swampy area with absolute qualitative and quantitative superiority in artillery and aviation and the complete absence of enemy active operations. And even in such conditions, our divisions managed to get into the Finnish boilers.
          Issues of entering into battle and combat operations of tank formations larger than the brigade were not worked out. Moreover, in full force it was decided not to use the mechanized corps at all - since they were more dangerous for their own troops, completely paralyzing their rear areas.
          1. Gopnik
            Gopnik 4 May 2018 20: 26
            +1
            You might think that by June 22, 1941 the Red Army became more efficient
      2. Olgovich
        Olgovich 5 May 2018 08: 53
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        But there’s nothing to beat. Here is the situation in KOVO for April 1940

        Yes, yes, only in just a MONTH, participated in the liberation of Bessarabia 3000 tanks of the same Cova and OdVO.
        From the air, go. request
    4. ventel
      ventel 4 May 2018 18: 55
      +2
      You forget that the Wehrmacht was not created from scratch before that was the Reichswehr. And the author correctly outlined the situation with the commanders of the Red Army. Here the Germans approached this issue more meticulously. After Versailles, Germany was allowed to have 100 thousand army, but it was a professional army, where the main emphasis was on non-commissioned officers and soldiers in case of mobilization to replace the junior officers.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 5 May 2018 09: 02
        0
        Quote: ventel
        You forget that the Wehrmacht was not created from scratch before it was reichswehr

        as much ..100 thousand people. " Horrible power"!
        Quote: ventel
        it was a professional army,

        Yeah, "professional" without tank troops, without aviation, navy, practically without artillery (heavy is generally prohibited and limited ... also the number of allowed shells per barrel). But the cavalry was!
        Yes, such an army had to be afraid! yes
        1. strannik1985
          strannik1985 5 May 2018 13: 13
          +1
          In the autumn of 1934, 240 thousand people, in 1937/38 about a million trained soldiers (with the army of 3,3 million). On October 1, 1936 1160 Pz.l Ausf A, the Germans form the first three TDs in 1935.
          And most importantly, the surrounding countries believe that the creation of full-fledged aircraft in Germany is beneficial for them, including France and the UK (in 1935 half of the Luftwaffe planes fly with English engines). Therefore, the young dragon stuffed cones in Spain, he fed turns to the Rhine region, Austria, Czechoslovakia.
        2. BAI
          BAI 5 May 2018 16: 20
          +3
          as much ..100 thousand people. " Horrible power"!

          The full-time officer staff was retained, including the General Staff.
          In 1941, all Wehrmacht officers in the ranks from regiment commander and above had WWI experience - which is not any, but still EXPERIENCE, which was not in the Red Army (you can argue as much as how much WWI experience is useful in WWII, but at least some experience is better than none).
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 6 May 2018 07: 15
            +1
            Quote: BAI
            Has been saved fully staff officers including the General Staff.

            False
            Quote: BAI
            In 1941, all Wehrmacht officers in the ranks from regiment commander and above had WWI experience - which is not any, but still EXPERIENCE, which was not in the Red Army (you can argue as much as how much WWI experience is useful in WWII, but at least some experience is better than none).

            From the battalion commander and above. Experience is priceless, yes.
            Russian officers were cut out, rotted in the camps: by the Second World War only a few HUNDREDs of PMV officers remained in the army. And this is a crime.
        3. ventel
          ventel 5 May 2018 20: 37
          +1
          Quote: Olgovich
          Quote: ventel
          You forget that the Wehrmacht was not created from scratch before it was reichswehr

          as much ..100 thousand people. " Horrible power"!
          Quote: ventel
          it was a professional army,

          Yeah, "professional" without tank troops, without aviation, navy, practically without artillery (heavy is generally prohibited and limited ... also the number of allowed shells per barrel). But the cavalry was!
          Yes, such an army had to be afraid! yes

          You compare how you received the rank of officer in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army is surprised. Yes, the Reichswehr did not have tanks, there was little artillery, but the Germans found a way out. Yes, foreign observers laughed at the sight of cars lined with cardboard depicting tanks, with one gun and an artillery banner, a soldier carrying also a banner that it was a battalion, but a couple of years later all of Western Europe heard the tread of forged German boots.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 6 May 2018 07: 20
            +1
            Quote: ventel
            You compare how you received the rank of officer in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army is surprised.

            Who prevented the Red Army from doing the same?
            Quote: ventel
            Yes, the Reichswehr did not have tanks, there was little artillery, but the Germans found a way out.

            The Red Army did not need to search and run with cardboard tanks, but the Wehrmacht, in just SIX years, prepared for some reason much better.
            1. strannik1985
              strannik1985 6 May 2018 08: 35
              +1
              Because the economic base of the Wehrmacht was better developed than that of the Red Army. Germany was the first in Europe in terms of industrial production already in 1928 (the second in the world, after the United States), the average level of education of the population cannot be compared; since 1935, several industrially developed regions and countries were fed the rising Reich. The Germans were well prepared (this is their plus, the availability of experienced officers and a developed industry does not guarantee anything — France, England), but their successes in 1939-1941 were due to an active, offensive strategy — they were the first to beat, knocking out opponents individually.
              1. Gopnik
                Gopnik 7 May 2018 12: 12
                0
                Quote: strannik1985
                Because the economic base of the Wehrmacht was better developed than that of the Red Army. Germany was the first in Europe in terms of industrial production in 1928 (the second in the world, after the United States), the average level of education of the population can not be compared


                So by 1941 the ratio of all these indicators for the USSR did not improve.
                1. strannik1985
                  strannik1985 8 May 2018 14: 33
                  0
                  But the combat effectiveness of the Red Army has grown significantly, the events of 1939-1940 on time revealed problems in the organization and combat training.
                  1. Gopnik
                    Gopnik 8 May 2018 15: 42
                    0
                    And the fighting ability of the Wehrmacht over the years has grown significantly.
    5. ecologer
      ecologer 7 May 2018 09: 23
      +1
      Unfortunately, in May 1940, teleportation was not yet invented and there was no Harry Potter with a magic wand, otherwise our troops would have slipped through the territory of Poland and hit the German invaders. True, Poland would then attack the USSR, which could become an ally of Germany. Oh dreams, dreams ...
      1. Gopnik
        Gopnik 7 May 2018 12: 13
        0
        You look at the map of Europe in May 1940, or something ...
  5. moskowit
    moskowit 4 May 2018 06: 48
    +6
    Extremely interesting and very professionally objective analysis ... Thank you
  6. kvs207
    kvs207 4 May 2018 07: 15
    +6
    Quote: Reptiloid
    The article is very correct, necessary, timely. As everyone knows, most of your recent articles, Andrei, had a different theme ---- marine. Thank you

    Very unexpectedly, but at the same time, a very robust article.
    Recently I read a book by Yu. Veremeyev about the state of our and German troops before the start of World War II and it was written there, roughly, the same thing - with a large number of armed forces, we did not have an army (exaggerated).
    1. hdgs
      hdgs 4 May 2018 09: 05
      +3
      Quote: kvs207
      With a large number of armed forces, we did not have an army (exaggerated).

      Why exaggerated? All right.
    2. Reptiloid
      Reptiloid 4 May 2018 23: 45
      0
      Quote: kvs207
      Recently I read a book by Yu. Veremeyev about the state of our and German troops before the start of World War II and it was written there, roughly, the same thing - with a large number of armed forces, we did not have an army (exaggerated).
      Familiarized with these books research online.
      This informative article and comments turned out to be informative and interesting.
      Thanks again to the author.
  7. Ber
    Ber 4 May 2018 07: 24
    +3
    So, it is no less true that in the 1938, the USSR did not have enough money for the armed forces, and this, strictly speaking, is the reason for the extremely regrettable state in which the Army of the Soviets was.


    What is the conclusion? It is very simple: it is difficult to say whether the ratio of the military potentials of Germany and the USSR in 1938 was better for us than it actually happened in 1941, but we could not quite break the Wehrmacht "like a crystal vase" in the thirty-eighth.
    Thank you for attention!


    Но обо всем по порядку.


    The author does not write nonsense ...

    1. In the USSR, all agriculture worked for workdays collective farmers did not see either money or passports, there was a specific state distribution of production, bypassing the intermediary scheme Commodity - Money - Commodity, replacing it with an exchange scheme, if necessary Agricultural products - Commodity.

    2. The USSR under Stalin could print any number of government loan bonds, both with the population and within government structures, that is, even more efficiently than the states are now printing dollars.
    The minus was only one for a full-fledged self-sufficient market, it is necessary for the population as economists have calculated over 300 million, others put a figure of about 500 million.

    3. And the most important if they had struck Germany in 1939, then Soviet aviation would not have been destroyed on the first day at airfields as in 1941.

    The defeat of the Anglo-French group in 1940 is the defeat of aviation, the defeat of the USSR in 1941 is the destruction of aviation at airfields in the early days of the war.
    The defeat of the United States in 1941 is also a victory for the Japanese aviation.

    In 1941, the Germans destroyed more than half of the Soviet armored vehicles from the air.

    For this reason, the respected author, only this one fact is sufficient, in addition to the second most important one, this is the blitz krieg tactics that the Americans successfully applied in Iraq in 1991-1993.
    At VO there is a detailed material about the tactics of bitskriga printed about a month ago.
    The Germans in 1938-1939 were not ready for a big war tactically, plus in 1939 they could receive attacks by Anglo-French aviation from beyond the Maginot Line.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 4 May 2018 08: 14
      +2
      Quote: Ber
      ... The defeat of the Anglo-French group in 1940 is a defeat for aviation ...
      The defeat of the United States in 1941 is also a victory for the Japanese aviation.

      Why do you think so? Do you like aviation?
      Quote: Ber
      In 1941, the Germans destroyed more than half of the Soviet armored vehicles from the air.

      If we take the Border Battle and the summer of the 41st, about half of the BT was not destroyed at all.
      It was left on roads, swamps, fields and meadows, due to lack of spare parts, fuel and oil.
      And then follow, as the main destroyers of Pak 35/36.
      1. Ber
        Ber 4 May 2018 13: 35
        +1
        Why do you think so? Do you like aviation?


        Dear facts, facts and again facts,
        The junkers Junkers Yu-87 carousels in a dive were ironed not only by hospitals but also by clones with cars and armored vehicles, I don’t have time to give numbers.

        The main goal of the Red Army gaining air superiority was achieved only in 1943 in the sky of the Kuban.

        And on the undergrowth The German offensive near the Ardennes was choked not only because of our offensive, but also due to the good weather that began when all the Royal Tigers, Panthers, and Tiger-1 were shot from the air by the Allied attack aircraft.

        At the beginning of the war, the Germans had an indisputable advantage in the air, plus the latest tactics, which neither our allies had.
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 4 May 2018 14: 52
          +1
          Quote: Ber
          Why do you think so? Do you like aviation?

          Dear facts, facts and again facts,
          The junkers Junkers Yu-87 carousels in a dive were ironed not only by hospitals but also by clones with cars and armored vehicles, I don’t have time to give numbers.

          I have numbers. :) But, about them later.
          There is a leading question.
          Was German front-line aviation equally active in Belarus and Ukraine?
          Quote: Ber
          The main goal of the Red Army gaining air superiority was achieved only in 1943 in the sky of the Kuban.

          You're wrong.
          The main goal of the Red Army was the conquest of the STRATEGIC initiative on the FRONT.
          Do you mind? :))
          Quote: Ber
          The German offensive near the Ardennes was drowned not only due to our advance but also due to the good weather that began when all the Royal Tigers, Panthers, and Tiger-1 were shot from the air by the Allied attack aircraft.

          The failure of the offensive near the Ardennes was provided, first of all, by the insufficient fuel supply of motorized formations and associations.
          Will you argue? For money? :))
    2. EvilLion
      EvilLion 4 May 2018 08: 34
      +5
      You yourself wouldn’t write nonsense, then the collective farmers had already forgotten about the famine and ate a belly, so you were ready to break the throat of anyone who was for the Soviet regime, which pulled them out of the terror of the tsarist village. But there were no passports in the Russian Empire either, since there was no way to produce them, and with the literacy of the population it was not very, more precisely, from a word to produce a lot of papers.

      By reference, they left the village council from the village council, 1930 million people left for the order of 30, and then the authorities were unhappy that there were few people to work in cities. The local chairman, who needs an intelligent tractor driver himself, would not be allowed to go.

      This is only later, the police gave those. the opportunity for every citizen to hang a label with a photo.

      The reasoning is the level of the dog that the collar rejoices.

      In 1941, the Germans destroyed more than half of the Soviet armored vehicles from the air.


      You are sick. To get into a tank from an airplane is at the level of circus tricks, tank losses from aircraft never exceeded the first percent.

      I wouldn’t be destroyed on the first day at the airdromes as in the 1941 year.


      She was not destroyed anyway.

      Where do you come from, Rezun re-read something ??
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. Vasilenko Vladimir
          Vasilenko Vladimir 4 May 2018 22: 37
          +2
          Quote: hdgs
          Ordinary farmers wanted to sneeze on this power and did not want to fight for it at all.

          fool

          do you forgive the crap ?!
          so as not to strain your ISK give a link
          https://yandex.ru/search/?text=%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BB
          %D1%8C%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%B6%D0%B8%D1%
          82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B8%20%D0%B3%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BE%D
          0%B8%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%81%D0%BA
          %D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%8E%D0%B7%D0%
          B0 & lr = 22 & clid = 2270455 & win = 331
        3. Vasilenko Vladimir
          Vasilenko Vladimir 4 May 2018 22: 38
          +1
          Quote: hdgs
          Read what the Balts wrote about the Soviet village after the annexation of the Baltic states of the USSR.

          forgive not the Baltic states about poverty to write
      2. Ber
        Ber 4 May 2018 13: 43
        +2
        First of all, for rudeness you can get a ban ...

        You are sick. To get into a tank from an airplane is at the level of circus tricks, tank losses from aircraft never exceeded the first percent.


        Secondly, that would not slam the ban, you fool . homoidioto .....

        Now exactly.



        Enlighten the Troll.
      3. Ber
        Ber 4 May 2018 14: 11
        +1
        Where do you come from, Rezun re-read something ??




        The reasoning is the level of the dog that the collar rejoices.


        I'm scared already, DO YOU EVEN WITH DOGS ABLE TO COMMUNICATE? laughing

        GAV ........ laughing laughing


      4. Monarchist
        Monarchist 4 May 2018 18: 10
        0
        EviLeon,: "the local chairman, who needs some tractor driver himself," could not let go, rave: what tractor drivers are on the collective farm? Then there were district with Machine-Tractor Stations, which served all the collective farm of the district. At that time, collective farmers could not even dream of their tractors! "Bucked ate" is also nonsense, in villages and cities you can still meet old people who remember how collective farms lived before the war, and people lived Khrenovo, I come from the village and all my relatives are collective farmers and I heard a lot of stories of old people. In the thirties there were collective farms where people themselves wove clothes!
      5. Olgovich
        Olgovich 6 May 2018 07: 26
        +1
        Quote: EvilLion
        You wouldn’t write rubbish yourself, the collective farmers had already forgotten about hunger and ate a belly,

        By the consumption of food and clothing, the Soviet Socialist Republic caught up with RI only to 1950 g. (Report of the Central Statistical Bureau of the USSR, 1955)
        In 33 and 47 g, 8,5 million people "who forgot about hunger" died of hunger.
    3. hohol95
      hohol95 4 May 2018 09: 30
      +1
      For the supply of equipment from abroad, the USSR also paid in bonds? Or workdays?
      1. hdgs
        hdgs 4 May 2018 13: 03
        +2
        Quote: hohol95
        For the supply of equipment from abroad, the USSR also paid in bonds? Or workdays?

        Workdays. Because grain (it was exchanged through currency for equipment), the Bolsheviks were selected from farmers (collective farmers). In exchange for workdays.
        1. Ber
          Ber 4 May 2018 13: 47
          +1
          Past, the Bolsheviks seized church utensils, including from gold with drag stones, on which they bought equipment for factories.

          The network has a lot of information, you just need not be lazy and take a couple of months to study the material.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 4 May 2018 14: 28
            +1
            Did they pay with crosses from churches? Or maybe gold from the "Black Prince", secretly raised in the Black Sea "?
    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      4 May 2018 11: 25
      +6
      Quote: Ber
      The author does not write nonsense ...

      Well, it’s necessary :)))
      Quote: Ber
      In the USSR, all agriculture worked for workdays.

      What does this have to do with the means at the disposal of the USSR for the army, let me ask?
      Quote: Ber
      The Soviet Union under Stalin could print any number of government loan bonds

      So that you still know - money is a product whose only value is the ability to exchange for another product. So, the money supply is directly linked to the amount of product produced by the economy. And if the product is not enough, then at least 100500 loans place, there will still be nothing to buy and nothing
      Quote: Ber
      The minus was only one for a full-fledged self-sufficient market, it is necessary for the population as economists have calculated over 300 million,

      In the 30s of the last century? :)))))
      Quote: Ber
      And most importantly, if they had struck Germany in 1939, then Soviet aviation would not have been destroyed on the first day at airfields as in 1941.

      And she was not destroyed, ashamed not to know.
      Quote: Ber
      In 1941, the Germans destroyed more than half of the Soviet armored vehicles from the air.

      Delirium
      Quote: Ber
      For this reason, the respected author, only this one fact is sufficient, in addition to the second most important one, this is the blitz krieg tactics that the Americans successfully applied in Iraq in 1991-1993.

      Hand face. What the MNA did in Iraq AND CLOSE was not a blitzkrieg. March to learn materiel, young man.
      1. Ber
        Ber 4 May 2018 13: 51
        +1
        So that you still know - money is a product whose only value is the ability to exchange for another product. So, the money supply is directly linked to the amount of product produced by the economy. And if the product is not enough, then at least 100500 loans place, there will still be nothing to buy and nothing


        I didn’t even read the rest, enlighten about the measured rails of the English kings, the Aztec coffee beans that appeared instead of money, and so on ...

        Money is a mathematical model, a figure and all, and the structure that has the most advanced model is more successful in relation to other currencies, at the moment it is $$$$$
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          4 May 2018 16: 57
          +1
          Quote: Ber
          I didn’t even read the rest, enlighten about the measured rails of the English kings, the Aztec coffee beans that appeared instead of money, and so on ...

          In my opinion, we say about money of the 20th century, no? :)))) So there is no need to cover up the inability to object essentially "did not read"
  8. EvilLion
    EvilLion 4 May 2018 08: 25
    +3
    On this issue, I recommend the last book of E. Prudnikova, about the 1941, how things were with the fighting efficiency in the Red Army there. And this is not only about money, when we started to rebuild the army in the 2000th army, it turned out that the money already seems to be there, but there is nothing to realize its availability. And this problem is still not everywhere eliminated. Sukhoi, yes, it fulfills all contracts on time and on time, and yesterday the loss of the Su-30СМ was the first loss of a production car manufactured for the Russian Ministry of Defense in the 2000s from more than 300 built. But what to do with ships of some classes, if there are still no engines for them? Strongly here the availability of money for the housing and other equipment for them will help?

    If we collide with the Wehrmacht in the 1938 (and the Red Army only after the start of WWII began to increase and increased times in 2), then yes, we would give the Germans. If they had caught up with us. And even the account of the tanks doesn’t help much here, there weren’t any T-34s with HF then, and the T-26, or BT-5 were atrociously beaten by the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol in the 1938, they won, but The losses in tanks from the fire of the anti-tank fire were monstrous.
    1. hdgs
      hdgs 4 May 2018 09: 18
      +2
      Quote: EvilLion
      there were no T-34s with HF then

      As of 01.06.41, only in the western districts were 892 T-34 and 504 KV. Plus delivery until 22.06. This is almost half of the German BTT, which mainly consisted of armored personnel.
      In addition, advancing tanks are customary to meet with anti-tank artillery, and not with their own tanks.
      1. EvilLion
        EvilLion 4 May 2018 09: 32
        +3
        You are sick, we are talking about the 1938 year. Learn to read.
        1. hdgs
          hdgs 4 May 2018 13: 07
          +2
          Quote: EvilLion
          You are sick

          Damn, what to do, what to do? He noticed that.
          Smile and wave ... fellow
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 40
        0
        Quote: hdgs
        As of 01.06.41, only in the western districts were 892 T-34 and 504 KV.

        Yeah ... and 300 trained crews on them. Because for training you need new engines, but they are not. sad
        So almost all KV and T-34 went into first category:
        new, not previously in use, meeting the requirements of technical conditions and quite suitable for use for its intended purpose.
        That is, the equipment is in storage, use is possible only at the final exercises, with the consumption of hours no more, EMNIP, 20.
      3. Ber
        Ber 4 May 2018 14: 03
        +1
        Do not pay attention to this mega-healer, this tipka is all sick around))) laughing

        EvilLion Today, 08:34 ↑ You are sick. To get into a tank from an airplane is at the level of circus tricks, tank losses from aircraft never exceeded the first percent.


        And you got smile

        EvilLion Today, 09:32 ↑
        You are sick, we are talking about the 1938 year. Learn to read.


        It is a pity there is no time, I’m leaving tomorrow, and I really appreciate such instances.

        With such a Homo-cynocephalus it is a pleasure to dive, the curvature of the flight of thought of such individuals sometimes leads to such topics that Elochka the Cannibal from 12 chairs, nervously smokes in the funnel.
    2. Gopnik
      Gopnik 4 May 2018 14: 29
      +1
      So the Germans in 1938 with tanks are very bad - several dozen early triples and fours. And we still have a bunch of quite adequate at that time t-28
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 May 2018 14: 58
        +2
        Quote: Gopnik
        And we still have a bunch of quite adequate at that time t-28

        For 1938, the T-28 is no longer adequate. Its armor protection is insufficient to protect even from the infantry 37-mm anti-tank vehicles - that is, it is no longer a medium tank.
        Plus, the tank had problems with armaments - the KT-28 was put as a temporary solution, and the new L-10s, even 2 years after being put into production, were dangerous for the crew.
        During the district exercises, the L-10 systems on T-28 vehicles often fail. Because of this, four cases of tank crew injuries were noted. From now on, it is forbidden to use L-10 systems in combat firing
        © report of the commander of the Western Special Military District D. Pavlov of August 19, 1940
        1. Gopnik
          Gopnik 4 May 2018 15: 13
          +1
          So the Germans tanks in 1938 did not have anti-shell armor.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 4 May 2018 19: 15
            0
            Quote: Gopnik
            So the Germans tanks in 1938 did not have anti-shell armor.

            And with us too. But we will have to attack the VET. But this attack will be organized as in Finnish: there is no intelligence, the fire system has not been opened, the artillery has been shot in squares, the infantry is not following the tanks.
            Oh yes, most infantry regiments do not have their own infantry and artillery. And this means that they will either climb into the VET with bare tanks, or they will be assigned to rifle divisions, where they will be safely killed. How they killed a full-blown 20 OTBR in the Finnish technical and vocational school - in just 3 unsuccessful attacks.
            After the battle on December 17, the 91st tank battalion was not combat-ready. 7 people were killed, 22 injured, including the commander of the battalion Major Drozdov, 16 were missing, including the commissar of the battalion Dubovsky. Of the 21 T-28 tanks sent to attack, 5 vehicles arrived at the assembly point, 2 were delivered to SPAM. The rest of the materiel needs repair, which is done. 4 cars burned down on the battlefield, 1 turned upside down with tracks in the anti-tank ditch, 1 - no one knows where. During an attack, VET up to 5 pcs., Bunkers up to 3 pcs. Due to the fact that the infantry did not go and stayed behind the gouges, which are north of the height of 65,5 to 500 m, this area is not occupied by our troops
            © Commander 20 OTBR
            Judging by the Special Forces, it took a month and a half to establish at least some kind of interaction between the infantry and tanks, one of which the army practically did not fight.
            1. Gopnik
              Gopnik 4 May 2018 20: 43
              +1
              So ours and in 1941 so tried to attack. I don’t really understand what are you trying to prove? What to meet so an attack of such an enemy as they met on 22.06.1941/1940/XNUMX is better than to strike by ourselves in May XNUMX?
              The fact that the Red Army is not ice - no one argues with this. For this special "thank you" to the Soviet party and military leadership
  9. hohol95
    hohol95 4 May 2018 08: 34
    0
    As military vehicles arrived from industry, the intensive development of motorized mechanized forces began (from 1934 - armored, from 1942 - armored and mechanized). In May 1930, the first permanent armored formation was formed - a mechanized brigade, the type of which began to create mechanized formations in military districts. In August 1938, mechanized regiments, brigades, and corps were converted into armored. By the end of the year, the Red Army had 4 tank corps, 24 separate light tank brigades, 4 heavy tank brigades and 3 chemical (flamethrower) brigades, as well as a significant number of tank battalions and regiments that were part of the infantry and cavalry divisions.
  10. Hole puncher
    Hole puncher 4 May 2018 09: 06
    +2
    the Soviet attack on Germany will be perceived as unprovoked aggression and in the best case (for the USSR) the case will be angrily branded from the high stands of the League of Nations.

    God, what a stupid thing from such an author ... Andrey, why would anyone in the world perceive the Soviet attack on Germany as aggression? Between Czechoslovakia and the USSR, that was the mutual assistance agreement of 1935. according to which the USSR undertook to provide military assistance in case of aggression against Czechoslovakia. Benesh tortured the Soviet ambassador at the end of September 1938 in an attempt to find out if the USSR was ready to fulfill the obligation and only the complete lack of reaction to this from Moscow prompted him to sign an agreement with the Germans. And if Comrade Stalin on September 29, 1938 would have declared that he would have helped Czechoslovakia to hear everything, there would have been no Munich conspiracy.
    The only variant of the 1938 war. The Germans without agreement enter the Wehrmacht in the Sudetenland, the Czechs announce mobilization, the USSR supplies arms, aviation and infantry via Romania through the air bridge, France and the WB support an alliance of Czechs and Russians, Hitler gets a whining whine under the bench cursing the world Zionism, the second world war does not come.
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 4 May 2018 09: 33
      +4
      Thank you, I neighing. Here the air bridge does not know how we will do in Transnistria if it breaks out. This is with the modern IL-76 with the Ruslans.
      1. Hole puncher
        Hole puncher 4 May 2018 09: 50
        +2
        Quote: EvilLion
        Here the air bridge does not know how we will do in Transnistria if it breaks out.

        So because with Ukraine there are contra, and Romania in 1938 was ready to provide an air corridor.
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 4 May 2018 10: 15
          +1
          This is where it is written about such a "nobility" of Romania?
          On February 10, 1938, a royal dictatorship was established in Romania: a state of siege was introduced on February 11, On February 24, in an open vote, a new constitution was adopted, in which article 91 appeared, prohibiting the passage of foreign troops through Romanian territoryOn March 31, all political parties were banned, instead of which the National Revival Front was created on December 16, and finally the government was able to get a fully controlled parliament.
          On March 30, in response to a request from France regarding the possibility of the passage of Soviet troops to help Czechoslovakia, the Romanian leadership said that “in the event of a conflict only between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Romania’s alliance treaties with Poland and the countries of the Balkan Entente oblige it to remain neutral. If France intervenes in the conflict, then Romania, although not obligated, would be disposed to intervene as well, but would subordinate its intervention to a preliminary agreement with Poland. Romania basically refuses to allow the passage of Russian troops. However, if Romania faces a Russian ultimatum, then it will never put itself in conditions that could lead to a conflict with France and Czechoslovakia. ”
          On April 6, Poland protested Romania because planes purchased by Prague in the USSR flew through Czechoslovakia through its airspace. For its part, Bucharest has protested Czechoslovakia. Referring to these statements, France on May 25 indicated to the USSR that Poland and Romania strongly opposed the admission of Soviet troops.
          On May 30, Romania notified Czechoslovakia that it would not make any statements prohibiting the passage of Soviet troops, but this did not mean that it would agree to this.
          On June 18, in a conversation between Litvinov and the Czechoslovak ambassador and the French ambassador in Moscow the latter said that the Romanian government is showing “extreme intransigence” on the issue of allowing the passage of Soviet troops, which is explained by Bucharest’s refusal of the USSR to recognize the Dniester border. If Moscow accepts this recognition, then the Romanian government will be able to allow the passage of the Red Army to help Czechoslovakia. It is clear that the Soviet leadership was not going to make such a concession, if only because there were no guarantees of a change in Romanian policy.
          1. Hole puncher
            Hole puncher 4 May 2018 11: 33
            +1
            Romanians and Poles were categorically against the presence of the Red Army on its territory, no one denies this, it is about an air corridor.
            What is nobility here?
            1. brn521
              brn521 4 May 2018 12: 08
              +3
              Quote: Puncher
              speech about the air corridor

              Which nafig did not give up to anyone, because could not provide transport volumes for conducting full-fledged military operations, even at the very minimum.
              1. Hole puncher
                Hole puncher 4 May 2018 13: 06
                +1
                Quote: brn521
                Which nafig did not give up to anyone, because could not provide transport volumes for conducting full-fledged military operations, even at the very minimum.

                The air corridor was and was used. It was possible to overtake military aircraft along it; the Czechs with aviation were depressed. The Czechs were fine with the infantry, they could have fought off the Germans on their own, but air cover would not hurt. You just think that there would be a large-scale war with the banner of victory in Prague or Berlin, but this is not so. There would be a cross-border conflict with post-shootings and no more. Hitler did not have the strength and resources for a full-fledged war as in Poland, he only in March 1939 was able to capture Bohemia and Moravia, and in October 1938 he barely had enough.
                1. hohol95
                  hohol95 4 May 2018 14: 31
                  +2
                  On April 6, Poland protested Romania because planes purchased by Prague in the USSR flew through Czechoslovakia through its airspace. For its part, Bucharest has protested Czechoslovakia.

                  So was there a corridor? Or there were only PROTESTS ...
    2. BAI
      BAI 4 May 2018 10: 11
      +5
      Soviet attack on Germany as aggression

      An attack by the USSR on Germany would give Germany, France and England an excellent occasion for concluding peace and a joint attack on the USSR.
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 4 May 2018 15: 04
          0
          Quote: hdgs
          Dear, in 1938 the USSR was fie, and grind. For its destruction, it was reasonably believed that the Polish Armed Forces would be enough.

          Well, don't play down. In the USSR of that time, it was believed that a coalition of such giants as Finland, Poland, Romania and Japan was extremely dangerous for us. smile
          1. Sergej1972
            Sergej1972 7 May 2018 23: 18
            0
            Japan is still a country of a different order compared to the three states mentioned. Even the population was at least two times more than in these three states combined.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      4 May 2018 11: 13
      +6
      Quote: Puncher
      God, what a nonsense from such an author ...

      Thank you!
      Quote: Puncher
      And if Comrade Stalin on September 29, 1938 would have declared that he would have helped Czechoslovakia to hear everything, there would have been no Munich conspiracy.

      You are mistaken, and very much. It is well known that on September 20-21, the English and French envoys to Czechoslovakia announced to the Czechoslovak government that if it did not accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government “would not fulfill the agreement” with Czechoslovakia. They also said the following: “If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war can take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stay away. ”
      That is, in fact, the Czechs were threatened with a military German-Anglo-French coalition!
      But even if you did not know this, it still does not justify you. There is a simple fact - both Chamberlain and Daladier presented the Munich agreement to their countries as a result of wise politics and the restoration of historical justice. Against this background, the Soviet invasion of Germany could not be politically accepted as a legitimate act, because in this case there was a global contradiction in the activities of governments - with one hand they allowed Hitler to destroy Czechoslovakia, and with the other they supported the USSR, which intervened on the Czech side?
      In general, the policies of France and England left them only a negative reaction to the entry into the war of the USSR, even if they wanted otherwise. And they didn’t want
      1. Hole puncher
        Hole puncher 4 May 2018 12: 16
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        It is well known that on September 20-21, the English and French envoys to Czechoslovakia announced to the Czechoslovak government that if it did not accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government “would not fulfill the agreement” with Czechoslovakia. They also said the following: “If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war can take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stay away. "

        This is an invention, a paraphrase of Ambassador Alexandrov, who reported gossip from Gusarek to Moscow, saying that Hitler convinced Daladier and Chamberlain that the union of Czechoslovakia and the USSR would lead to a war between the USSR and all of Europe.
        The French and British would be happy to calm down Hitler with the hands of the USSR, but the USSR was silent at the most crucial moment, thereby making it clear that it was not going to fight Hitler. If Benes had not signed the treaty with the USSR behind him, then there would have been no Munich. After all, Hitler did not plan a big war, in October 1938 he would not even have won the Czechs, he did not have the strength and resources to do that. And with the help of the USSR and even more so. If anything, the Germans were able to occupy only Bohemia with Moravia and then only after half a year.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          4 May 2018 13: 17
          +2
          Quote: Puncher
          This is an invention, a paraphrase of Ambassador Alexandrov, who reported gossip from Gusarek to Moscow

          I will not argue, just see point 2
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          There is a simple fact - both Chamberlain and Daladier presented the Munich agreement to their countries as a result of wise politics and the restoration of historical justice. Against this background, the Soviet invasion of Germany could not be politically accepted as a legitimate act, because in this case there was a global contradiction in the activities of governments - with one hand they allowed Hitler to destroy Czechoslovakia, and with the other they supported the USSR, which intervened on the Czech side?
          1. Hole puncher
            Hole puncher 4 May 2018 13: 42
            +1
            Andrey, how do you see this? Benes refuses to sign the treaty, Hitler sets an ultimatum, Stalin guarantees support, on October 1, 1938 the Germans send troops into the Sudetenland, the Czechs resist, the conflict erupts, the Czechs get help with weapons and soldiers internationalists from the USSR, just like in Spain. What is the reaction of the French, who are obligated under an agreement on mutual assistance to protect the Czechs? Help Hitler?
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 4 May 2018 15: 09
              +2
              Quote: Puncher
              What is the reaction of the French, who are obligated under an agreement on mutual assistance to protect the Czechs? Help Hitler?

              There is still a well-known option for us: to express indignation through diplomatic channels, to declare a moral embargo, to sell arms to the country subjected to aggression, and to make sinister plans for the bombing of something important for the Germans. It is true that Germany cannot be expelled from the League of Nations - it itself left there. smile
              Chamberlain best expressed the position of the Allies in Czechoslovakia:
              How terrible, fantastic, and implausible is the very idea that we should dig trenches and try on gas masks here, just because in a faraway country, people quarreled among themselves about whom we know nothing. It is even more impossible that an already fundamentally settled quarrel may become a subject of war.
              © Chamberlain
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              4 May 2018 17: 00
              0
              Quote: Puncher
              Andrey, how do you see this? Benes refuses to sign a contract

              Yes, Benes cannot refuse, for the simple reason that Stalin could not give him this support. The air corridor did not decide anything from the word at all, that is, without the permission of Poland, we could not provide military assistance. But moral was not enough.
              1. Hole puncher
                Hole puncher 4 May 2018 18: 35
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Yes, Benes cannot refuse, for the simple reason that Stalin could not give him this support.

                That's what you are guessing, I quoted NKID's correspondence at the crucial moment below, Benesh counted on the support of Moscow, but did not receive it and gave up.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                The air corridor did not solve anything from the word at all, that is, without the permission of the same Poland, we could not provide military assistance

                You clearly underestimate the Czechoslovak Supreme Soviet and its industry. Germany had an advantage only in the air, the Czechs lacked fighter aircraft, and the USSR had already prepared for the transfer of 246 bombers and 302 fighters. It didn’t particularly depend on Poland, the USSR was already throwing the Security Council through Romanian airspace.
                On September 8, Petrescu-Komnen told Bonnet that Soviet planes could fly from the USSR into the airspace of Romania, since it had very weak defense, not reaching a height of more than 3 thousand meters. But the Romanian government refused to give official permission to fly planes30. In this connection, one of the British diplomats in Geneva after a conversation with Petrescu-Roomn on September 14 came to the conclusion that "Romania would be satisfied with a note of protest in the event of a flight of Soviet squadrons through Romanian territory.

                Simply put, "guys, we will certainly protest, but we won’t bother you"
                Delivery by rail was not prohibited, except for military personnel.
                In fact, according to the recollections of German soldiers, entering the Sudetenland was a pure improvisation, they did not prepare for it, they quickly formed units that, having no idea about the enemy, carefully entered the settlements where they met with flowers. The Germans could only prepare for a real war by March 1939, and when the Czechoslovak Republic collapsed into three states, there was enough strength only for Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia remained free until 1944. Therefore, if Moscow had declared support for the Czechoslovakia on September 30, 1938, there would have been no Munich, and if Hitler had decided to go to war, then no earlier than March 1939, during this time it would have been possible to agree with the Romanians on the transit of troops.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  5 May 2018 15: 16
                  +1
                  Quote: Puncher
                  That's what you are guessing, I quoted NKID's correspondence at the crucial moment below, Benesh counted on the support of Moscow, but did not receive it and gave up.

                  No. Sorry, but this is not the case. Benesh was looking for some kind of solution, but everyone decided already for it, which clearly follows from the telegrams you quoted
                  You make a very broad assumption - from a telegram where Benesh is interested in the position of the USSR, you conclude that the position of the USSR would become a determining factor in the resistance of Czechoslovakia. While the surrender of the latter was actually predetermined by the resignation of the government (EMNIP September 22)
                  Quote: Puncher
                  You clearly underestimate the Czechoslovak Supreme Soviet and its industry. Germany had an advantage only in the air

                  I do not really understand how the 21st regular division of Czechoslovakia suddenly became equal to 39 German
      2. Olgovich
        Olgovich 6 May 2018 07: 46
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        They also said the following: “If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war can take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stay away. ”

        DOCUMENTALLY this phrase is NOT confirmed.
    4. Curious
      Curious 4 May 2018 13: 13
      +4
      Hole puncher, you only know how to build air bridges, or air castles too? What air bridges in 1938 in the absence of military transport aviation as such and transport aircraft? Here are the strategists of the sofa.
      1. Hole puncher
        Hole puncher 4 May 2018 13: 47
        +1
        And how did the US drive the land lease planes? They filled a full tank and forward, it was an air bridge. I’m talking about aviation, not tank transportation. So that distance was not great, and they flew to Prague from Moscow through Romania, and not through Poland.
        1. Curious
          Curious 4 May 2018 14: 14
          +3
          Puncher, do not be offended, but the jacket that you are without a doubt is very difficult to navigate in this matter. First you need to know how much cargo per day in the form of ammunition, food, fuel, spare parts, replenishment of personnel, transportation of the wounded, medicines and other ammunition is needed per day to provide the group that conducts combat operations in isolation from the supply bases. Then you calculate how much cargo per day your transport aircraft will carry (although you don’t have it in 1938, it’s not clear what you will take). How do you know? After that, you understand that you are a hole puncher, but not Schliffen.
          1. Monarchist
            Monarchist 4 May 2018 17: 34
            +1
            Sarcastically said
          2. Hole puncher
            Hole puncher 4 May 2018 17: 37
            +1
            Quote: Curious
            Puncher, do not be offended

            Why? The fact that you are trying to increase your self-esteem trying to humiliate the interlocutor? Come on, I’m sinning myself.
            Quote: Curious
            First you need to know how much cargo per day in the form of ammunition, food, fuel, spare parts, replenishment of personnel, transportation of the wounded, medicines and other ammunition is needed per day to provide the group that conducts combat operations in isolation from the supply bases.

            And the railway for what? Romanians objected to the transit of military personnel. And providing on-site headache is the receiving side. Would the Czechs squeeze food, fuel and medical care?
            1. Curious
              Curious 4 May 2018 19: 17
              0
              I had no intention of offending you somehow. "Pinjack" - a hyperbole - a stylistic figure of explicit and intentional exaggeration, with the goal of enhancing expressiveness and emphasizing the said thought. Those. I would like to emphasize that you are an exclusively civilian, far from strategy and tactics and, moreover, poorly aware of the historical realities of the issue under discussion. Therefore, I apologize if you are still offended.
              Now to the topic. You went from the air bridge to the railway. The task, in fact, is the same. You must transfer at least 50 divisions. For the transfer of one infantry division at that time, a throughput of 48-50 train pairs per day was required. It is up to the border with Romania. Then you need to overload, since the Romanians have a track of 1435 mm. But this is half the trouble. And what is the capacity of the Romanian railway network and its condition. Read a book on this subject
              Kovaleva I. V. "Transport in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)", where he describes the state of the railway network in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and Bessarabia, annexed to the USSR.
              In addition, their troops must be equipped, since the Czechoslovakians have no Soviet shells and ammunition, no spare parts for Soviet tanks and aircraft. And there is no fuel and lubricants for such a number of troops.
              Well and the most important thing. Romanians must agree to all this. But the position of Romania in 1938 is a separate big problem.
              It would not be bad to understand until the end, but did the Czechs want this in 1938?
              Try to study this issue yourself and you will understand that all these "liberation campaigns" through Poland and Romania in 1938 are from the "talk" area.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 4 May 2018 16: 13
          +1
          Quote: Puncher
          And how did the US drive the land lease planes? They filled a full tank and forward, it was an air bridge.

          Yeah ... and then for these aircraft, fuel, parts and ammunition were delivered by sea and by land.
          And by the way, which planes will we supply? Alone bombers, without fighter jets? So this is meat for enemy fighters. But the trouble with the USSR fighters ... from the experience of Spain it is already known that the I-16 is inferior to the Messer, and even has big problems with the engine.
          An extremely difficult situation was created with the M-25 engines for the I-16 and I-15, and this situation was aggravated after the August batch of I-16 with the M-25V motor, which turned out to be disadvantageous due to their design and production shortcomings not enough hardy to work in combat conditions, where for the most part they use the full power of the engine ... For a short time, 26 of these new engines failed, and the rest gradually go out ...
          © adviser brigade commander A.P. Andreev
          “In August - September 1938, there were many accidents of new engines. Pilots became afraid to fly on airplanes with these engines. Engines were handed over in each flight in battle, but there was nothing to replace bad motors with. The pilots were very worried about this, because they knew that some of their comrades died in the battles, on the assumption, only because of the surrender of the motor in battle "
          © "Combat use of the Air Force in the last period of the war in Spain", 1939,
          1. Hole puncher
            Hole puncher 4 May 2018 18: 00
            +1
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Yeah ... and then for these aircraft, fuel, parts and ammunition were delivered by sea and by land.

            And the railway for what? The Romanians did not prohibit the transportation of goods to the Czechoslovak Republic, they were against the transit of military personnel.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And by the way, which planes will we supply? Alone bombers, without fighter jets?

            found this
            were prepared for the transfer of 548 vehicles located in the Kiev and Belorussian districts (246 bombers and 302 fighters).

            Quote: Alexey RA
            here is trouble with the fighters of the USSR

            The Czechs generally had fighter aircraft rated. The Germans didn’t shine either at the end of 1938.
    5. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 46
      +4
      Quote: Puncher
      Benesh tortured the Soviet ambassador at the end of September 1938 in an attempt to find out if the USSR was ready to fulfill the obligation and only the complete lack of reaction to this from Moscow prompted him to sign an agreement with the Germans. And if Comrade Stalin on September 29, 1938 would have declared that he would have helped Czechoslovakia to hear everything, there would have been no Munich conspiracy.

      Seriously?
      On March 14, 1938, the USSR invited France to hold consultations on the situation that developed after the Anschluss of Austria, but was refused.
      On March 15-16, the Soviet side announced to the Czechoslovak envoy and representatives of the foreign press that she would "fulfill her allied obligations."
      On March 17, the USSR declared that it was ready to “participate in collective actions that would be resolved jointly with it and which would aim to halt the further development of aggression” and proposed holding a conference of interested countries. On March 24th, a response from London followed that such a conference was “currently impossible”.
      On April 23, the Czechoslovak envoy in Moscow reported to Prague about a meeting in the Kremlin at which it was decided that “the USSR, if asked to do so, was ready to help Czechoslovakia with France”. Recall that the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty entered into force only if France provided assistance to Czechoslovakia.
      April 26, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. Kalinin said that Moscow could help Prague without France.
      On May 13, Moscow invited Paris to begin military negotiations, but France evaded this.
      In mid-May, Stalin told the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, X. Gottwald, to convey to Benes that the USSR would provide assistance even without France if Czechoslovakia fought and asked for help.
      At the end of August, the USSR declared to England that in the event that Western countries act in defense of Czechoslovakia, Moscow will fulfill its allied obligations.
      On September 2, France first formally asked the USSR for its position in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia. Moscow replied that it would fulfill its allied commitments, and offered to start negotiations with the General Headquarters of France and Czechoslovakia, convene an Anglo-French-Soviet conference and discuss the Czechoslovak issue in the League of Nations.
      © Meltyuhov
      So there is no need to shift the blame from a sick head to a healthy one - Prague was repeatedly announced by Moscow that the USSR will fulfill its obligations.
      Prague was just as cautious about the Soviet Union, which only on September 19, after receiving the Anglo-French demands, first officially asked Moscow about its position in the event of an German attack. Already in the evening of September 20, a response was received from Moscow that the USSR would fulfill its obligations. On the morning of September 21, the USSR published its responses to a request from France on September 2 and Czechoslovakia on September 19. September 21 and 23, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov during the assembly of the League of Nations declared his readiness to help Czechoslovakia. When Prague turned to Moscow with a request to influence Poland, the USSR announced to Poland on September 23 that its actions against Czechoslovakia would lead to the denunciation of the Soviet-Polish non-aggression treaty. Nevertheless, even at the end of September, the Czechoslovak government did not want to ask the Soviet Union for help.
      © he
      1. Hole puncher
        Hole puncher 4 May 2018 14: 15
        +1
        Who is Meltiukhov? A participant in those events?
        Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Czechoslovak Republic to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR
        30 September 1938 of
        Benesh asked me to pose the following question to the government of the USSR. The great powers, without even asking Czechoslovakia, shamefully sacrificed it to Hitler for their own interests. The final decision on the formalities is provided to Czechoslovakia. This means that she is faced with the choice of either starting a war with Germany, ... or capitulating to the aggressor. ... Leaving this question open, Benesh wants to know the attitude of the USSR to these two possibilities, that is, to further struggle or surrender. He should know this as soon as possible and asks for an answer by 6–7 pm Prague time, that is, by 8–9 Moscow time.
        S. Alexandrovsky
        Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Czechoslovak Republic to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR
        30 September 1938 of
        Benes no longer insists on answering his last question because the government has already decided to accept all the conditions. The occupation of the Sudetenland by German troops will begin tomorrow morning.
        S. Alexandrovsky

        Alexandrovsky sent the first telegram at 11:45, and the second at 13:40, according to Alexandrovsky, Benesh called him at 9:30. Deputy NKID Potemkin in response telegram reported that he allegedly received the first telegram at 17:00, and the second at 17:45.
        1. Monarchist
          Monarchist 4 May 2018 17: 31
          0
          Something the telegrams were not in a hurry, or maybe the postman got lost?
          1. Hole puncher
            Hole puncher 4 May 2018 18: 05
            +1
            Quote: Monarchist
            Something the telegrams were not in a hurry, or maybe the postman got lost?

            The meaning of your comment? Type in NKID organization was at the level of a rural library?
    6. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 50
      +2
      Moreover, the USSR began to concentrate forces for possible assistance to Czechoslovakia.
      September 21, 1938 The Military Council of KOVO received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov on bringing to combat readiness and concentration of troops near the border with Poland with the aim of conducting "major exercises." In the Proskurov area, the Vinnitsa Army Group (commander - commander P.S. Ivanov) should be concentrated in the 17th Rifle Corps (72nd, 96th and 97th Rifle Divisions), as well as the 23rd and 26th separate tank brigades, 25th tank corps (4th and 5th tank and 1st motorized rifle brigades), 4th cavalry corps (9th, 32nd and 34th cavalry divisions), three regiments of fighter and four regiments of bomber aircraft. All preparations for action were ordered to be completed by September 23.
      Zhytomyr Army Group (Commander - Commander F.N. Remizov) - 8th and 15th Rifle (7th, 44th, 45th, 46th, 60th, 81st and 87th rifle divisions), 2nd cavalry (3rd, 5th and 14th cavalry divisions) corps - at that time conducted exercises according to the plan of the commander of the district, in the area adjacent to the places of its constant cantonment. By a directive of the people's commissar of defense, she was ordered to finish these exercises by concentrating all her forces in the area of ​​Novograd-Volynsky, Shepetovka by September 23-24. In order to replenish rifle divisions and two air bases, they were instructed to call the assigned command and rank personnel at the rate of 8 thousand people per division, and to airbases - until their full combat staffing.
      On September 21, the 2nd Special Purpose Aviation Army (GA) received an order from the General Staff to relocate its combat forces to the territory of the KOVO in the areas of the White Church and Uman to participate in the events.
      On September 23, the Military Council of the BOVO received a directive from the People’s Commissar of Defense to put the troops of the Vitebsk Army Group (commander - Commander F.I. Kuznetsov) in the 4th Rifle Corps (5th and 50th Rifle Divisions) and the 18th Tank Brigade), the Lepel Group of Forces (27th Rifle, 24th Cavalry Divisions and the 16th Tank Brigade) and the Bobruisk Army Group (commander - brigade commander V.I. Chuykov), which included the 16th Rifle ( 2nd, 13th, 100th rifle divisions, 21st tank brigade) and 3rd cavalry (4th, 7th and 36th cavalry divisions) corps.
      On September 23, the KalVO also received a directive from the people's commissar of defense to nominate the 67th Rifle Division to the state border.
      In addition, from September 21 in the western districts the rear units of the aircraft, the entire air defense system and the troops of the fortified areas were put on alert. By order of the General Staff, round-the-clock duty was established at headquarters and at communication centers of the KalVO, BOVO and KOVO in case of immediate receipt and report to the command of further orders and instructions. In total, the following were put on alert: 1 tank corps, 30 rifle and 10 cavalry divisions, 3 separate tank brigades, 7 fortified areas, 12 aviation brigades, as well as warehouses, bases and other parts of combat and rear support. In addition, the entire air defense system - 2 corps, 1 division, 2 brigades and 16 air defense regiments, 4 anti-aircraft artillery brigades and 15 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, was prepared for action in the air defense forces, KalVO, BOVO, KOVO, KhVO and MVO. also a number of separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions.
      On the morning of September 24, the formations of the border districts were raised by military alert for exercises.
      © Meltyuhov
    7. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 55
      +2
      And then the events began in the inner districts. Things even reached the call of the command staff and privates from the reserve.
      On September 27, the General Staff warned the military councils of all the districts, except the Far Eastern and Transbaikal, on the immediate preparation of documentation for the draft of the enlisted people, horses and vehicles from the national economy. On September 28, the LVO, BOVO, KOVO, HVO, ORVO, KalVO, MVO, PRVO, UrVO, SKVO and ZakVO received a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff with the order "of the Red Army and junior commanders who had served the established terms of service in the Red Army, henceforth, until the order from the army did not to dismiss. "
      On September 29, the KOVO, BOVO, LVO and KalVO Military Councils received a directive to put on alert another 17 additional rifle divisions, 2 tank corps and corps control units, 22 tank and 3 motorized rifle brigades, 34 air bases. To replenish them, the required number of assigned composition was mobilized for 20-day training camps.
      On the same day, the Military Councils of the KhVO, ORVO, SKVO, PriVO and UrVO received telegrams indicating within two days to call on 250-275 people of assigned command and political composition to all their divisions. These instructions then extended to the MBO. In addition to the troops of the western border military districts advanced to the state border, mobilization measures affected another 30 rifle and 6 cavalry divisions, 2 tank corps, 15 separate tank brigades, 34 air bases. 328,7 thousand people were drafted into the Red Army, and the dismissal of sergeants and privates from the army was delayed. It was especially strengthened by the personnel, transport and combat aircraft of the KOVO, in which 2 108 people had appeared at the training camp by October 528. In total, there were 18 tanks and 664 armored vehicles in the Red Army, of which 2 tanks and 741 armored vehicles were in the BOVO troops, and 3 tanks and 609 armored vehicles were in the KOVO troops.
      On September 28, the People’s Commissar of Defense reported to the Soviet government about their readiness to send the 16th (56th and 54th medium bomber regiments) and 58th (21st, 31st fighter regiments) aviation brigades to the Czechoslovakia, 10th (33 -th medium bomber regiment) and the 69th (17th, 43rd fighter regiment) aviation brigades KOVO and the 60th medium-bomber regiment HVO consisting of 548 combat aircraft {399}. In total, the KalVO, BOVO and KOVO aviation group, taking into account the 2nd GA, totaled 1 aircraft by October 1938, 2
      © Meltyuhov
    8. Hantengri
      Hantengri 4 May 2018 19: 17
      +2
      Quote: Puncher
      Between Czechoslovakia and the USSR, that was the mutual assistance agreement of 1935. according to which the USSR undertook to provide military assistance in case of aggression against Czechoslovakia.

      You, before brutally tormenting nonsense, at least have looked at Wikipedia, or what ?!
      The main provisions of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty are identical to the provisions of the Soviet-French treaty of 1935. The only exception was Article 2 of the protocol on signing the treaty, which stated that both governments recognize "... that the obligations of mutual assistance will be valid between them only because, subject to the conditions provided for in this agreement, assistance to the Party - the victim of the attack will be provided by France." As Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister K. Croft emphasized, insisting that the pact should be included in the treaty that the obligations of the pact apply to Czechoslovakia only if France acts, Foreign Minister E. Benes wanted to “prevent the pact from automatically acting”
  11. hohol95
    hohol95 4 May 2018 09: 15
    0
    The issue of "Front-line illustration" on the state of the ground forces of the USSR and Germany by June 1941. The main emphasis is on the state of the Red Army, especially on armored forces and fortified areas. The release is equipped with a large number of tables, many of which are published for the first time.

  12. EvilLion
    EvilLion 4 May 2018 09: 20
    0
    Before the First World War, the Russian imperial army had an average stock of almost 1000 shells per gun.


    Well, in general, this was enough for a month at 4, that is, the reserve is quite reasonable, provided that by this time the production of ammunition will increase by several times, or we will manage to end the war.

    not three times the great losses of the Japanese


    Which, unfortunately, is not confirmed. And the Japanese did not even win, they left.
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 4 May 2018 09: 40
      0
      They left and then left, but it’s not easy ... A week later the funeral teams dug up their own men and took them to the side of Manchuria for cremation ... The Japanese will never voice accurate data on Japanese losses at Khalkhin Gol! Or have long destroyed all the papers of those years! "No body - no business."
  13. BAI
    BAI 4 May 2018 09: 41
    +2
    . In our history, England and France arrogantly rejected the hand extended to them by the USSR, until the British themselves were on the verge of a catastrophe from which only a strong continental ally could pull them out. Then, of course, they remembered the USSR.

    The USSR is becoming a rogue country, it, in fact, was outlawed - not only for someone else's help, but even for the preservation of existing foreign trade relations with the United States, we could no longer count on.

    They remembered far from immediately. Moreover, all of the above is still mildly said:
    The beginning of the secret operation "Spear" was planned for May 15, 1940. Then moved to June. The war would start with massive bombing of oil facilities in Baku, Grozny, Batumi, Maykop and Poti. The minutes of the meetings of the coordination groups of the headquarters of the French and British air forces April 4-5, 1940 recorded: “From 90 to 100 aircraft will be used for the operation. For each departure, they will be able to drop a maximum of 70 tons of bombs per hundred oil refineries. ” Depriving the Red Army of fuel for tanks and planes, the Allies were about to take the Russians “warm”.

    As we see - plans for 1940 and planning in 1940 - the war has already begun!
    1. BAI
      BAI 4 May 2018 10: 06
      +2
      "A spear"

      Yes, I forgot to say.
      Stalin was aware of the operation:
      1.
      On January 11, 1940, the British embassy in Moscow reported with a secret connection to London that "an action in the Caucasus could" bring Russia to its knees as soon as possible, and a bombing of the Caucasian oil fields could deliver a knockout blow to the USSR. "

      2.
      On March 30, 1940, the British Lockheed-12A reconnaissance aircraft, taking off from the Habbaniya airbase in Iraq, took photographs of Baku and adjacent oil fields from a height of 7 km. After 4 days, this aircraft explored the refineries in Batumi and Poti. Soviet anti-aircraft guns opened fire, but to no avail.

      3.
      Urgent measures were taken to strengthen the defense capability of our southern borders. So, according to the General Staff of the USSR Air Force, until April 1940, the Air Force of the Transcaucasian Military District consisted of the 60th air brigade, 5th long-range reconnaissance squadron and 6th reconnaissance squadron.

      But already in April-May 1940, the directorates of the 3rd, 17th and 64th air brigades and 9 air regiments, the 18th and 41st medium-bombing, 6th and 42nd long-range bombardment brigades were transferred to the okrug from the North-Western Front.

      The 35th Fighter Regiment was transferred here from the Belarusian Military District, the 133rd Fighter Regiment was transferred from the Moscow Military District, and the 12th Long-Range Bomber Aviation Regiment from the North Caucasus Military District.

      Aviation was removed from the Western direction!
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 6 May 2018 09: 02
        +1
        Quote: BAI
        Stalin was aware of the operation:
        1.
        11th of January 1940 english embassy in Moscow reported a secret connection in London

        So where did he find out: in English. Embassy or London? lol
    2. brn521
      brn521 4 May 2018 12: 20
      +1
      Quote: BAI
      As we see - plans for 1940 and planning in 1940 - the war has already begun!

      In 1940, it was another matter. The USSR shared with Germany the spheres of influence at its borders, economic cooperation was carried out. There was a real danger that this will continue.
  14. Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 4 May 2018 10: 05
    +3
    Hmm ... if you consider the balance of power for 1938 year, then the Germans need to add the Poles. For the century-old dream of the Pan Yakubov, who is eating up on our TV, will come true: Poland and Germany in a single rush, against a common (and centuries-old) enemy ...
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 4 May 2018 11: 21
      +1
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      Hmm ... if we consider the ratio of forces for 1938, then the Germans need to add the Poles. For the century-old dream of the Pan Yakubov, who is eating up on our TV, will come true: Poland and Germany in a single impulse, against a common (and centuries-old) enemy ...

      General balance of power, or operational, tactical?
      I try to make you think? :)
      The super-duper Wehrmacht, therefore, was a “duper” until the 43rd year, because it could quickly concentrate deafening superiority in forces and means in the chosen and narrow (tactical or operational) direction. The result was often not obtained, but, again, due to the speed of mobile connections, connections and camp groups chose a different place and, as a rule, broke through.
      Resist speed, can only superfast. Which we have appeared only by the 44th year.
      A qualified answer depended on many components: balanced organizational staff, mobility of motorized infantry and artillery, the effectiveness of the repair base, clear logistics, communications, fast and efficient operation of reconnaissance and headquarters, operational air cover, interaction with artillery, infantry fighting efficiency, interacting with tanks, etc.
      PS: Unfortunately, many do not understand this and continue to consider tanks, planes, soldiers, and, in the best case, formations.
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 4 May 2018 14: 02
        +1
        General balance of power, or operational, tactical?

        General
        I try to make you think? :)

        I do so, and I advise you.
        As for the other stream of consciousness in your performance, what did you want to say?
        Say, the Wehrmacht of the 38 sample did not have all of this, but the Red Army simply had it in bulk ...
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 4 May 2018 15: 58
          0
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          General balance of power, or operational, tactical?

          ...what did you want to say?
          Say, the Wehrmacht of the 38 sample did not have all of this, but the Red Army simply had it in bulk ...

          I thought you were able to think about overall, operational and tactical superiority ...
          But, I was mistaken. You are not an officer.
          1. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 4 May 2018 17: 23
            0
            I thought you were able to think about overall, operational and tactical superiority ...

            Uh ... how would it be softer ... how does your writing relate to what I wrote?
            I quote:
            if we consider the balance of power for 1938 year, then the Germans need to add Poles

            We look at the political map of 1938 of the year and suddenly discover that between the USSR and Germany there is, who would have thought, Poland. And the chances that the Poles agree with Hitler are much greater than the other way around. And how the presence / absence of an officer rank can affect this fact ... there is a great mystery.
            But, I was mistaken. .

            You can’t even imagine how :)
            You are not an officer

            request
    2. alstr
      alstr 4 May 2018 12: 10
      +2
      And the Baltic states with the Finns. also not to forget.

      But in general, before you can measure your strength even in a quantitative version, you must first understand what benefit the USSR can get in the 38th year and whether there are any political conditions for any kind of war.

      But this all was NOT.
      Firstly, there is a difficult period of internal political struggle (expressed in the purges of 37-38 years - this is what is on the surface)
      Secondly, there is Spain whom we help
      Thirdly, in the east we have Japan sharpening its teeth on us and there are constant provocations.
      Fourth, there is a restructuring of industry.
      Fifth, do not forget about Poland, which was strong enough.

      And there are a bunch of other factors and considerations that we simply do not know and which are not reflected in the documents.
    3. The comment was deleted.
  15. DimanC
    DimanC 4 May 2018 11: 24
    +1
    I also note that not only the Germans on the road to Vienna, but also on our road to the western borders, the roadsides would be littered with abandoned tanks: at that time the industry still could not make hardy tracks - their resource sometimes even up to 1000 km reached out ...
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 4 May 2018 11: 30
      0
      Quote: DimanC
      I also note that not only the Germans on the road to Vienna, but also on our road to the western borders, the roadsides would be littered with abandoned tanks: at that time the industry still could not make hardy tracks - their resource sometimes even up to 1000 km reached out ...

      Manganese steel for trucks began to be universally used from the very end of the 30s. Therefore, in the USSR, too, they forgot about wheeled-tracked tanks.
      And the answer regarding abandoned tanks is a little higher in my post. "Operation Speed"! Tanks break down and on the march, and repair takes time.
    2. Bigriver
      Bigriver 4 May 2018 11: 58
      0
      Quote: DimanC
      ... at that time, industry still could not make hardy caterpillars - their resource sometimes did not even reach 1000 km ...

      Yes, I completely forgot. :))
      Erhard Raus of the 6TD Wehrmacht regiment wrote that by September 1941 the Czech tank unit had run about 10000 km. A commander’s tanks and up to 12000 km. Think you're lying:;)
      1. DimanC
        DimanC 4 May 2018 15: 48
        0
        Actually, we are about the same time, in the sense that 1938 is the end of the 30s. Were all Soviet tanks on the new tracks? ..
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 May 2018 19: 40
        0
        Quote: BigRiver
        Erhard Raus of the 6TD Wehrmacht regiment wrote that by September 1941 the Czech tank unit had run about 10000 km. A commander’s tanks and up to 12000 km. Think you're lying:;)

        SW D. Shein wrote that the German "rollers" of GA "Center" had enough resources somewhere before the Battle of Smolensk. After it went a shaft of requests for repairs for technical reasons.
        As for the caterpillars, there were even problems with them on the T-34:
        The quality of the tracks for mechanical strength has so far remained very low, and the sending of the second set of tracks, Plant No. XXUMX, has stopped production since January ...
        The experience of operating tanks in the army, according to the claims, also confirms the low quality of the tracks. There are breaks of tracks after 8-10 hours of operation of machines.
        © Shein / Ulanov
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 58
      +1
      Quote: DimanC
      I also note that not only the Germans on the road to Vienna, but also on our road to the western borders, the roadsides would be littered with abandoned tanks: at that time the industry still could not make hardy tracks - their resource sometimes even up to 1000 km reached out ...

      Hehehehe ... judging by the Polish campaign, the problems would begin long before the resource of caterpillars was exhausted:
      The 15th tank corps of the commander M.P. Petrov was not able to timely fulfill the order of the commander of the Dzerzhinsky horse-mechanized group of commander I.V. Boldin to speak on Grodno: due to lack of fuel, parts of the corps stopped west of Slonim. Only by the morning of September 20, the movement could resume as a result of replenishment due to the intervention of Marshal S.M. Budenny, who ordered the delivery of fuel to Slonim by transport aircraft. At a meeting of the senior management of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S.M. Budenny cited this example as an example: "I had to carry fuel in Belarus for 5 mechanized corps [Probably, I had in mind 15 -th tank corps of the Dzerzhinsky horse-mechanized group. There were no other corps, the designation of which included the number "5", except for the 5th rifle corps, in the Belorussian Front] by air. It’s good that there was no one to fight with. "On the roads from Novogrudok [from the Soviet border to Novogrudok it was about 100 km] to Volkovysk, 75 percent of the tanks were because of fuel." A.I. Eremenko, Lieutenant General, commander of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, Baltic Special Military District (in September 1939 he commanded the 6th Cavalry Corps, which was part of the horse-mechanized group) recalled: "When I arrived in Bialystok ( by September 23, 1939), aviation supplied me with gasoline, and they began to throw the tank corps near Grodno with a parachute. "
      © Shein / Ulanov
  16. Bigriver
    Bigriver 4 May 2018 13: 06
    0
    Quote: Olgovich
    How does this refute the thesis of the insolvency of the German economy against the economists of the USSR and the West in May 1940

    The thesis is not the case.
    The size of the economies of warring entities is not critical if one entity can smash another in one short-term campaign. In general, there are two concepts: crush strategy and depletion strategy. Germany could defeat its opponents (including the USSR), only if .., well, very quickly. :)
    In a protracted war - under no circumstances.
    Quote: Olgovich
    Let me remind you that the economy determines victory in world wars.

    No, it doesn’t.
    See above.
    1. Olgovich
      Olgovich 6 May 2018 09: 07
      +1
      Quote: BigRiver
      The thesis is not the case.

      On business. Who are you to determine what is “in the case and what is not?” belay
      Quote: BigRiver
      The size of the economies of warring entities is not critical if one entity can smash another in one short-term campaign. In general, there are two concepts: a crush strategy and a depletion strategy. Germany could defeat its opponents (including the USSR), only if .., well, very quickly. :)
      В protracted war - in no case.

      World wars not protracted could not be a priori.
      Quote: BigRiver
      Let me remind you that the economy determines victory in world wars.
      No, does not define.
      See above.

      Determines, see above, as well as the FACTS ALREADY past world wars, and ANY large wars.
  17. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 4 May 2018 13: 15
    +1
    Formally, the Red Army tank forces in 1938 r possessed a truly all-crushing power - in the 1938 r the mobilized Red Army should have had 15 613 tanks. But of them in tank brigades as of 01.01.1938, there were 4 950 vehicles, while the rest were “ripped off” by rifle divisions. What does this mean in practice?

    But in practice, this meant the following:
    Unfortunate fate befell us in the Red Army - and during any war befall - our division tanks. You will excuse me for harshness, but I must say bluntly: all that was claimed to be tanks in order to teach interaction, today it turned out to be a bluff, no interaction was taught. More than 7 thousand tanks are scattered across divisions and they did not play any role. They were helpless. Battalions of the rifle division, twin T-37 tanks with T-26 - Kutzai organization, low-power T-37 tanks are not able to walk on Malomalsky mud. These battalions, part of the infantry divisions, had no effect. And let them say, let me correct, if I incorrectly say that they were most often turned to the guard of the headquarters of regiments and divisions.
    VOTE. Correctly.
    PAULOV. But this amounts to about 7 thousand tanks.
    © Meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) of the commanding staff on the collection of experience in hostilities against Finland.
    After all, it came to insanity - it was necessary to form separate tank battalions on the basis of tank brigades, to give them to rifle divisions, which had their own tank battalions - and it was these otbns who supported the infantry.
  18. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 4 May 2018 13: 48
    0
    Yes, the story is misinterpreted by some comrades, it has become so simple ... profanity.
    We will fight back to frantic alternativeists! Right Andrey! :)) - I support.
  19. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 4 May 2018 14: 12
    0
    It is also worth mentioning that the artillery of the Soviet infantry division was not so numerous
    122-mm howitzer M-30 began to produce only in 1940
    1. Gopnik
      Gopnik 4 May 2018 14: 49
      +1
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      that the artillery of the Soviet infantry division was not so numerous


      Compared to what?
    2. Bigriver
      Bigriver 4 May 2018 16: 02
      0
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      It is also worth mentioning that the artillery of the Soviet infantry division was not so numerous
      122-mm howitzer M-30 began to produce only in 1940

      Let's talk about the states.
      On April 41st, November 41st, 42nd, etc.
      Is there anything to say about the organizational staff of the September 41 SD?
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 7 May 2018 10: 14
        0
        Quote: BigRiver
        Is there anything to say about the organizational staff of the September 41 SD?


        The 122 mm howitzer was a divisional weapon.
        According to the state of 1939, there were two artillery regiments in the rifle division - light (76 mm cannon division and three mixed divisions, two 76 mm cannon batteries and one 122 mm howitzer battery in 1 and 2 divisions, in 3 divisions 2 76 mm batteries guns and 2 batteries of 122 mm howitzers) and howitzers (a division of 122 mm howitzers and a division of 152 mm howitzers), a total of 28 pieces of 122 mm howitzers.

        In June 1940, another 122 mm howitzer division was added to the howitzer regiment, and the third mixed division was removed from the light artillery regiment. After these changes in the division there were 32
        By September 1941, the situation worsened - due to the loss of artillery in the boilers and during the retreat, the Red Army SD: only 8 (!) 122 mm howitzers were equipped in the division.



        For comparison, in the British-style infantry division, a 25-pound gun was the basis and main force of the field artillery of the British Commonwealth infantry divisions during World War II. Throughout the war, each infantry division, according to the British model of the organizational structure, had 72-e 25 pound howitzer guns. Each of the three regiments of the division had 24 guns consisting of three eight-gun batteries).
        That is, each British battalion in defense and attack was supported by at least two howitzer batteries.

        In our country, not every battalion could be supported by 122 mm howitzers - therefore, the need for 76 mm divisional guns was urgent throughout the war (although they are practically useless in the offensive, they are not able to destroy the enemy field fortifications :(
        From this we can draw a disappointing conclusion about the insufficient amount of 122 mm artillery throughout the first half of the war.

        In July 1941, after the losses incurred and the need to bring the states to the real presence of artillery systems, the howitzer regiment was excluded, the number of howitzers was reduced to 8 (!).
        In March 1942, the third mixed division (of two batteries) was added to the artillery regiment of rifle divisions, and the number of 122 mm howitzers increased to 12, and the number of 76 mm divisional cannons to 20. In this state, Soviet rifle divisions went through the rest of the war.
        Since December 1942, there have been 3 divisions in the Guards Rifle Divisions, 2 batteries of 76 mm cannons and one battery of 122 mm howitzers in each, a total of 12 howitzers and 24 cannons. Since December 1944, guards rifle divisions had a howitzer artillery regiment (two divisions, 5 batteries, 20 122 mm howitzers) and a light artillery regiment (two divisions, 5 batteries, 20 divisional 76 mm guns). Since June 1945, the remaining infantry divisions were transferred to this state.

        That is, even towards the end of the war, the full-time infantry division of the Soviet army was inferior to the British infantry division in full-time artillery support.
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 7 May 2018 11: 39
          +1
          Britain could afford to replace the 18-pound (84-mm) QF 18 field gun and the 4.5-inch (114-mm) howitzer, which were an important weapon in World War I with a single howitzer gun.
          The USSR did not go for it - the lines for the production of 76mm and 122mm shells did not "destroy" and there was still a certain supply of shells with PMV and Civilian.
          In addition, you forget about the means of transportation for heavier howitzers.
          On March 27, 1939, the Deputy Commissar of Defense S. Budyonny and the Deputy Commissar of Agriculture I. Vasin signed an instruction on the organization and maintenance of the “Horse of the Red Army” fund.
          It, in particular, said:
          “Artillery horse. The exterior should be bony, wide and deep in a cinch, with a massive body; well placed and proportionate to the head and neck; with normal vision; right withers; developed shoulder; well developed breasts and muscles; full, wide and not sunken loin; wide muscular and strong croup; strong, correctly set limbs, good hooves and free movements.
          A light artillery harness requires a horse from 151 cm and above, massive enough, with free movements on all gait, metacarpal circumference of at least 19 cm; in a harness of heavy artillery - from 154 cm and above, massive and tall, capable of moving at a free trot; metacarpal circumference of at least 21 cm. "

          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 7 May 2018 15: 23
            0
            Quote: hohol95
            Britain could afford to replace the 18-pound (84-mm) QF 18 field gun and the 4.5-inch (114-mm) howitzer, which were an important weapon in World War I with a single howitzer gun.
            The USSR did not go for it - the lines for the production of 76mm and 122mm shells did not "destroy" and there was still a certain supply of shells with PMV and Civilian.
            In addition, you forget about the means of transportation for heavier howitzers.


            England could afford 72 guns (relatively inexpensive, but damn quick-fire) for one infantry division - a rich country, a mass of colonies.
            Unfortunately, in the USSR, the formation of modern artillery was only taking place and the 122 M-30 was adopted - very heavy and expensive. Saturation of the units with them was slow - even before the end of the war they could not reach full-time support - only the guard units.

            When people are surprised at our 76 mm battalion - which was not left in the arsenal of other countries - this is from poverty. Relatively cheap 76 mm dvizionki, at least in defense could support their infantry. All this from poverty, cost a lot of blood, sad ...

            Or our battalion in the offensive, which could be supported by a single 122 mm battery, or 76 mm battery or not supported at all - because the state did not have artillery support for every battalion.
            But the British infantry battalion - had, of course, one or two batteries, which could fire 26-32 shells per minute and disrupt the enemy attack or support the battalion attack.

            I shot this in a museum near Rimini - a very compact, light, maneuverable howitzer gun, and very quick-fire.
            Although its power is inferior to 122 mm shell, but there were 72 of them in the division!
            1. hohol95
              hohol95 7 May 2018 15: 38
              +1
              The tsarist troops did not leave as many 122-mm howitzers so that they could only arm artillery regiments of rifle and not only divisions and brigades!
              The Germans in the anti-tank artillery of the motorized infantry division: 102 37-mm and nine 50-mm guns!
              And we have 18 45 mm per division! We could not produce guns and their vehicles at that time, like baking pies ...
              And the British QF 25 pounder should not be compared with 122-mm howitzers, but with the F-22USV!

              And about the maneuverability of the "British" - on an unprepared site and without a base plate, this gun is not very maneuverable!
              Just 4 degrees to the left and right the turn of the gun due to the single-beam carriage of the PMV!
              1. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 8 May 2018 10: 25
                +1
                Quote: hohol95
                And about the maneuverability of the "British" - on an unprepared site and without a base plate, this gun is not very maneuverable!


                Given the fact that the British QF-25 were exclusively on mechanized traction - a controversial statement.
                In British artillery since the 1930s. exclusively mechanical traction was used. For the 25-pound Mk.I guns, the Light Dragon Mk.IID crawler tractor of the Vickers company was considered standard, and the tri-axle (6x4) Morris CDSW wheeled tractor was less commonly used. Since 1937, the development of a family of new artillery two-axle all-wheel drive tractors, known as the FWD FAT, or the “Quad” began. The most common was the Canadian version of the “Quad” - FG-T.


                On the one hand, the introduction of an additional device increased the time the system was put into a combat position, on the other hand, thanks to the turntable, it was possible to maintain a simple single-beam carriage. But this rotary device gave:
                maneuver by fire - fast transfer of fire in a wide sector - a full-rotary platform allowed to quickly transfer fire in a sector of 360 degrees.
                For example, deploying an M-30 howitzer more than 90 degrees at a position is another task (I tried with my comrades in China in an art museum - even on asphalt, this is not fast), especially if the position is not prepared for circular shelling.
                So the turntable is rather a plus.

                Quote: hohol95
                And the British QF 25 pounder should not be compared with 122-mm howitzers, but with the F-22USV!


                Why?
                Or 76 mm OFS with a charge of 653-815 g BB (high-explosive steel old Russian grenade had the largest charge of 815 g) weight of about 6,1 kg.
                or a high-explosive fragmentation shell Mk.ID HE weighing 25 lbs (11,34 kg), usually equipped with amatol, less often a mixture of TNT and RDX had 1,8 lbs (about 820 g explosives).

                The projectile had an internal notch and, with an almost twice as large mass, gave an incomparably greater fragmentation effect.
                25-pound is considered as one of the best guns of that era, in particular due to the high striking effect of its high-explosive fragmentation shells and rate of fire.

                According to the British military, the somewhat less destructive ability of an 87,6 mm projectile than the 105 mm was more than offset by a higher rate of fire - during interrogations, German prisoners of war called 25-pounds “automatic”


                By the way, in the USSR in 1942-43m they tested 30 pounds in comparison with the M-25 and praised the fragmentation effect of shells and the high rate of fire.

                Of the main shortcomings of the QF-25 - weak high-explosive impact, compared with 105 mm howitzers - they are not able to destroy field fortifications, not to mention long-term, weak armor penetration.

                Here you probably won’t immediately say that it is better than the F-22USV / ZiS-3 or QF-25 divisions - the latter are more versatile with the incomparably higher fragmentation of a standard shell (Standard HE Shell Mk 1D).
                Grabinsky divisions are 2-3 times faster, slightly better in armor penetration, and higher the initial velocity of the projectile (680 m / s versus 518 m / s enhanced).
                Of course, I am inclined to our dvizionkah - the German infantry quite suffered from them and even gave the nickname "doom-doom" (the sound of the explosion was ahead of the sound of a shot), although 76 mm is from the poverty of the USSR. But better than the 76 mm division than none at all
                If our regiments were armed with 72 122 mm M-30 howitzers, that would be great.
                1. hohol95
                  hohol95 8 May 2018 15: 33
                  0
                  When comparing the F-22USV comparison, I meant the weight of the system and the angle of the vertical pointing of the barrel (for the USV and the British on an unprepared site (without a base plate) they are the same - 45 degrees, for the ZiS-3 - 37 degrees).
                  USV and ZiS-3 - Soviet guns created by our industry! By the way, the British 2-pound was no better, and in some ways worse than the Soviet 45-heel - mobility on the battlefield, complexity of the design, lack of a fragmentation shell in the ammunition, albeit weak!
                  From poverty there were also “colonels” ... 1927 and 1943! But they are better than nothing at all!
            2. hohol95
              hohol95 7 May 2018 16: 03
              +1
              On June 15, 1941 at 5 a.m., the Matild crews, ready to attack, held their breath, waiting for the first salvos of 40-pound howitzers. But ... artillery preparation for some reason did not start at the appointed time. However, at 25 o’clock, Major Miles, the commander of the C squadron of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment, ordered his subordinates to launch an attack. After a few minutes of movement, the tankers discovered the lack of infantry support, but this was quite familiar and not as discouraging as the silence of artillery. Alone, the tanks moved to the aisle and then came under the dagger fire of an 4-mm anti-aircraft gun.
              Squadron "C" was destroyed in a matter of minutes, one of the first killed its commander Major Miles. Of the 12 vehicles that went on the attack, only one survived, but her tower jammed and the transmission failed. The Indian infantry arrived in time, with the support of six “Matild” squadron “A”, attacked the German positions. Having quickly turned four tanks into soft bonfires, the Germans took up infantry, who considered it best to leave quickly. Halfway control remained with the Wehrmacht.

              "Not everything was good in the British Kingdom ..."
              1. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 8 May 2018 11: 24
                0
                Quote: hohol95
                "Not everything was good in the British Kingdom ..."


                The order is the order - to advance at 06:00. Could and bring to justice

                We have a fine battalion or execution for not fulfilling a combat mission - nothing good either.
                1. hohol95
                  hohol95 8 May 2018 15: 49
                  0
                  It is not a matter of abandoning the offensive - it is a matter of establishing interaction between different branches of the armed forces (the absence of which in the Red Army of 1941-1942 is constantly mentioned)!
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 May 2018 17: 06
      +1
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      It is also worth mentioning that the artillery of the Soviet infantry division was not so numerous
      122-mm howitzer M-30 began to produce only in 1940

      On 122-mm howitzers was a good start on old systems. If we take 1941, then the 122-mm howitzers of the 1909/37 model. there were 881 units, and 122 mm howitzers of the sample 1910/30. - 5680 pcs.
      Subtracting the production of new howitzers for the period “the second half of 1938-1941”, as of September 1938 in the Red Army there were about 2800-2900 122-mm howitzers of the 1910/30 model. and sample 1910
      On 122-mm howitzers of the sample 1909/37 years. the figure will not change - only instead of part 1909/37 will there be "clean" systems of 1909
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 7 May 2018 10: 31
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Subtracting the production of new howitzers for the period “the second half of 1938-1941”, as of September 1938 in the Red Army there were about 2800-2900 122-mm howitzers of the 1910/30 model. and sample 1910


        There were many "on paper", but they forgot about the ravines.

        Wrote above: In July 1941, after losses and the need to bring the states to the real presence of artillery systems, the howitzer regiment was expelled, the number of howitzers was reduced to 8 in the division !!!
        Those. most of the battalions on the defensive or offensive were supported by 76 mm double-division cannons (about 16-20 pieces in the division, but in fact there wasn’t any), which are generally useless when suppressing even field fortification - that is, if the knocked out battalions were not brought together into one combined battalion - in fact, there would be nothing to support ... Mikhin writes very well about this (Mikhin Pyotr Alekseevich “Gunners, Stalin gave the order!”.
        We were dying in order to win.) Without embellishment both about the shell hunger and about the practical actions of the Second World War artillery - he just commanded a 122 mm M-30 battery. By the way, he found about the use of captured German 10,5 cm leFH 18 - they crushed and captured the German battery.
  20. Snakebyte
    Snakebyte 4 May 2018 15: 13
    0
    Good analysis. True, it does not mention one very important factor. However, in other analyzes, even prominent historians, he practically does not occur.
    In the USSR, an educated population was sorely lacking. And the illiterate is much more difficult to prepare even as an infantryman, not to mention technical specialties.
    The universal education programs begun by the Bolsheviks after graduating from the Civil School began to produce significant results only in 1940, when recruits who had completed the full course of high school joined the army.
    Famous M.E. Katukov, who was appointed commander of the 1040th TD of the 20th MK in 9, reported that from the personnel of the division 30% are generally illiterate, a significant part has several education classes. And the replenishment received in 1940 exceeds the level of education of old-timers so much that it is easier to appoint them junior commanders than those who served 1-2 years.
    And this is in the tank troops - the elite of the land army, in which the best were selected. What was the situation in the infantry divisions, we can assume.
    In Germany, universal education has existed since the end of the 19th century. In addition, personnel in the Reichswehr were trained with the expectation of expansion. Privates prepared for the level of sergeants, lieutenants - for captains, etc. Thus, if necessary, the Wehrmacht could dramatically increase its number at times, relying on trained personnel. Which is what happened.
    1. strannik1985
      strannik1985 4 May 2018 15: 40
      0
      The remark is a little incorrect.
      It all depends on the scale of the increase in numbers, in 1938 the number of armored personnel carriers of the Red Army was a little more than 90 thousand people, and as of June 22 there were only 81 280 officers (65 012 according to the list).
      That is, there were 18 TD (1940), it became 61 (1941).
      The Germans had 1939 TBs in 33, of which 20 were 5 TDs, in May 1940 35 TBs were 10 TDs, in June 1941 57 TBs, 43 of which were 17 TDs. The scale of the increase in the number of BTVs is not comparable.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 May 2018 19: 37
        0
        Quote: strannik1985
        The remark is a little incorrect.
        It all depends on the scale of the increase in numbers, in 1938 the number of armored personnel carriers of the Red Army was a little more than 90 thousand people, and as of June 22 there were only 81 280 officers (65 012 according to the list).

        Both opinions are correct. smile
        Comment SW. Snakebyte on the low literacy of the population refers to draftees - the rank and file. And your remark refers to the command staff, where the problem was not so much with low literacy as with the mismatch between the level of education of the "wild" and drafted commanders from their reserve new positions that they had to be nominated to fill rapidly expanding states. And it’s even better if these commanders were ... in the call center in one of the TD, the operations department of the division headquarters consisted of one person.
        1. strannik1985
          strannik1985 4 May 2018 21: 04
          0
          Unfortunately, no, a multiple increase in numbers and tight formation deadlines have spoken with regard to the junior command and rank personnel. By June 1941, in the BTV sergeants in the state 116 334 (according to the list 94 396), privates 461 474 (338 858), respectively. I recall in BTV as of 01.01.1938 a total of 90 880 people, according to the plan as of 01.01.1943 an increase of 4 986 people.
          Where did they get them from? From the March call and from all parts of the Western Military District. The same Katukov was sent unsuitable for military service, illiterate, not fluent in Russian, i.e. the commanders took the opportunity to throw off the ballast and sent anyone worse, the same thing about the officers. From the new draft, in 17 MK some units were completely recruits. Naturally, they could not get at least 200 conscripts and Red Army men with a 000-year-old in the KA; if the Germans had formed 7-1940 TDs instead of 1941 in 30-40, they would have dipped.
      2. YELLOWSTONE
        YELLOWSTONE 9 May 2018 03: 01
        0
        only in tsarist Russia universal education existed earlier than in Germany (the most educated country in Europe where unsanitary conditions and rickets were ubiquitous) yes and the quality was better
        analysis is the same laughing
        1. YELLOWSTONE
          YELLOWSTONE 9 May 2018 03: 17
          0
          in Germany then there was no such revolution, red terror and civil war, during which it was possible, for example, for a teacher to easily lose his life if there were no corns on his hands.
          1. Alexander Greene
            Alexander Greene 9 May 2018 13: 43
            +1
            Quote: YELLOWSTONE
            in Germany then there was no such revolution, red terror and civil war, during which it was possible, for example, for a teacher to easily lose his life if there were no corns on his hands.

            Do you all think so in Canada or are you alone? It is interesting to look at your history textbook. Or do you have a Goebbels training manual?
            1. YELLOWSTONE
              YELLOWSTONE 9 May 2018 13: 47
              0
              Quote: Alexander Green
              Goebbels training manual?

              you, one field was with Trotsky berry yes
              1. YELLOWSTONE
                YELLOWSTONE 9 May 2018 14: 18
                0
                Quote: YELLOWSTONE
                easily lose your life if there were no corns on your hands

                have the audacity to deny it? as the words of another leader about the fact that the brains and what ...?
                Well, who would then begin to learn to read and write, for example, rural children who are lucky to survive and go to school or school?
                1. Alexander Greene
                  Alexander Greene 10 May 2018 01: 01
                  +1
                  Quote: YELLOWSTONE
                  Quote: YELLOWSTONE
                  easily lose your life if there were no corns on your hands
                  have the audacity to deny it?

                  Do you have the boldness to whistle like that? Nobody has long believed in this primitive.
                  1. YELLOWSTONE
                    YELLOWSTONE 10 May 2018 02: 53
                    0
                    whoever doubts that you have, the topic of words about the brains of your other leader is not disclosed, you decided to whistle according to the Trotskyist training manual on the Stalin holiday laughing
                    1. Alexander Greene
                      Alexander Greene 10 May 2018 19: 26
                      +1
                      Quote: YELLOWSTONE
                      who would doubt that you have the topic of words about the brains of your other leader is not disclosed, whistle on the Trotskyist training manual you decided on a Stalin holiday

                      You take care of your own first. Your primitive is visible for thousands of miles.
                      1. YELLOWSTONE
                        YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 03: 19
                        0
                        not disclosed again, apparently they never cared about their own, everyone repeated about them for the "classics" repeat
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 May 2018 19: 38
      +1
      Quote: Snakebyte
      Famous M.E. Katukov, who was appointed commander of the 1040th TD of the 20th MK in 9, reported that 30% of the division’s personnel were generally illiterate, a significant part had several education classes. And the replenishment received in 1940 exceeds the level of education of old-timers so much that it is easier to appoint them junior commanders than those who served 1-2 years.

      This is Katukov’s. But in general, according to the BTV KOVO for 1941, 60% of ordinary soldiers had 1-3 grades of education or did not have it at all. And the worst thing is that the junior command staff, which was supposed to train these privates, 30% of the commanders had the same 1-3 grades of education or did not have it at all.
      1. Snakebyte
        Snakebyte 7 May 2018 08: 08
        0
        By the way, many "historians" taunt the thesis that "history has given the USSR little time."
        In terms of literacy, the population really did not have enough time.
        If the war started a year later, the troops would have massively called on personnel who had completed a full-time secondary school course. This would be more significant than staffing the mechanized corps of the second or third stage.
        The Wehrmacht, in this regard, had nowhere to grow. In addition, in the absence of war on the land front, Hitler would have to demobilize a lot of personnel with combat experience.
      2. YELLOWSTONE
        YELLOWSTONE 9 May 2018 14: 52
        0
        start 1937 five years later and no war would be required, because there would be no Russians left anyway yes
        and Hitler would have to demobilize someday
  21. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 4 May 2018 15: 19
    +4
    Quote: Olgovich
    Theoretically, based on military capabilities, Germany could have been defeated for sure (the Wehrmacht was created in ... 1935!), Taking into account geopolitical realities, the USSR would have had to fight Poland with the support of its West. What was fraught with defeat. But Comrade Kaptsov’s main idea was quite different: he quite rightly remarked that while the USSR strengthened its defense capability by a percentage, Germany had become more powerful at times. And this could not be allowed.

    1. Theoretically, the USSR could defeat Germany one on one only when the Wehrmacht was not beaten, but another 100 thousandth Reichswehr beat. But only theoretically because even then Germany could very quickly deploy Reichswehr into a million-strong army with only stockpiles of weapons from the First World War. In 1938, the USSR probably could not defeat the Wehrmacht, even theoretically based on the military potentials of the two countries.
    2. The USSR created its military-economic potential in the 30th year, and Germany already had this potential in the First World War. Compared to World War I, the Soviet Union became several times more powerful and Germany only a percent. Therefore, Russia lost and the USSR lost the war with Germany.
    1. tasha
      tasha 4 May 2018 16: 11
      +1
      Yes, and there’s nothing more to add.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 6 May 2018 09: 20
        +1
        Quote: tasha
        Yes, and there’s nothing more to add.

        The SURE argument is particularly convincing. lol
        And you need to add KNOWLEDGE. Then Comrade Kostadinov’s nonsense will not be.
        1. tasha
          tasha 6 May 2018 11: 02
          +1
          We are talking about the capabilities of the military industry and scientific potential. The USSR had to create everything from scratch. And no secret KNOWLEDGE to understand this is not necessary ..

          Your day started badly? You are some kind of aggressive ..
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 7 May 2018 08: 40
            +1
            Quote: tasha
            The USSR had to create everything from scratch.

            From what "zero", what is the matter with you? belay
            ALL, I emphasize, ALL scientists, designers are a genus and a study from the IMPERIAL UNIVERSITIES of the Republic of Ingushetia and have been trained and educated by the IMPERIAL teachers. And many managed to make a career before the Thief.
            I built RI battleships, but the USSR couldn’t, although I tried. Even ditched from RI ditched. There was no “Baltzavod” in Russia, nor Sormov with Izhevsk and Tula with Obukhov and Nikolaev and Kherson. Everything is “from scratch”, from 17 started fool lol
            Quote: tasha
            Your day started badly? Some of you are aggressive.

            belay recourse
            1. tasha
              tasha 7 May 2018 09: 05
              +1
              It’s just not necessary ... A civil war swept through the not very developed industry of the Russian Empire (and this is to say the least) ... Many designers, engineers, technologists, workers of skilled professions died or left ...
              Battleships - yes. The Germans built the Nassau-type battleship in 26 months, and Russia in 4-5 years. Why do you think so?
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 7 May 2018 09: 17
                +1
                Quote: tasha
                Just do not.

                Need, Need!
                Quote: tasha
                A civil war swept through the not very developed industry of the Russian Empire (and this is to say the least) ... Many designers, engineers, technologists, workers of skilled specialties died or left ...

                Yes. And how does this cancel the fact that
                ALL, I emphasize, ALL scientists, designers are a genus and a study from the IMPERIAL UNIVERSITIES of the Republic of Ingushetia and have been trained and educated by the IMPERIAL teachers. And many managed to make a career before the Thief.

                Or did foreign tourists degenerate them and learn their Swiss?
                Those. The potential created by the Republic of Ingushetia was so great that, even with the losses caused by the BOP, it ensured the country's growth.
                Quote: tasha
                Battleships - yes. The Germans built the Nassau-type battleship in 26 months, and Russia in 4-5 years.

                And the USSR is NEVER.
                By the way, in terms of construction, there were nuances at the beginning of its calculation with the same Germans and the British.
                Remember, also, that the USSR was NOT able to build a bridge longer than the imperial Alekseevsky bridge.
                Like structures similar to the Trans-Siberian Railway.
                1. tasha
                  tasha 7 May 2018 09: 34
                  +1
                  I don’t even know what to write to you. List of literature, which would not hurt to pay attention?
                  What are you trying to convince me of now?
                  Again. The industry of the Russian Empire lagged behind the development of industry in Germany, England, France and the United States ... Very seriously .... What is not clear?
                  1. Olgovich
                    Olgovich 7 May 2018 11: 05
                    +1
                    Quote: tasha
                    I don’t even know what to write to you. List of literature, which would not hurt to pay attention?
                    What are you trying to convince me of now?

                    So I don’t know.
                    You already don’t remember yourself? Who wrote a nonsense a minute ago about the USSR "starting from scratch"? "
                    And from all the literature on this subject I recommend you only one book: "A textbook on the history of Russia" for grade 4.
                    Quote: tasha
                    Again. The industry of the Russian Empire lagged behind the development of industry in Germany, England, France and the United States ... Very seriously .... What is not clear?

                    And what should I understand? belay
                    Lagging behind. But it grew faster than them (except for the USA), France was ahead in some ways. 4-5 place in the world economy - a good result and hurt for the future with the most valuable fast-growing resource, the Russian people, promising first places.
                    And they ate, dressed and lived in Russia in 1913 BETTER than in .... the USSR already until the 50s. And millions of starvation deaths and cannibalism with corpse eating was NEVER in Russia, like the Russian Cross, as in the Communist Party.
                    What is incomprehensible? request
                    1. tasha
                      tasha 7 May 2018 14: 17
                      +1
                      You write a lot .... But you think a little, unfortunately ...
                      Read, read and think ...
                      1. Gopnik
                        Gopnik 7 May 2018 14: 57
                        +1
                        You yourself at least something answered the facts. And do not worry about Olgovich - reading his comments is very informative, because they are ALWAYS backed up by facts.
                      2. Olgovich
                        Olgovich 8 May 2018 05: 26
                        +1
                        Quote: tasha
                        You write a lot .... But you think a little, Unfortunately...

                        You think, apparently, a lot lol but the result ... request
                        You have NO objection to facts other than idle chatter
                        Quote: tasha
                        Read, read and think ...

                        Alas, I do not advise you of the same: useless, apparently. hi
    2. Olgovich
      Olgovich 6 May 2018 09: 19
      +1
      Quote: Kostadinov
      . Theoretically, the USSR could defeat Germany one on one only when the Wehrmacht was not beaten, but another 100 thousandth Reichswehr beat. But only theoretically because even then Germany could very quickly deploy Reichswehr in millionth army only weapons stocks from the First World War. In 1938 USSR probably could not defeat the Wehrmacht even theoretically based on the military capabilities of the two countries.

      What are your “for sure” statements worth? Nothing. USSR could break 5-year-old the Wehrmacht, which only 5 years ago STARTED only to create tank and aviation units, unlike the USSR
      Quote: Kostadinov
      . The USSR created its military-economic potential in the 30th year, and Germany already had this potential in the First World War.

      And they had and they had by 1940. And what? Who cares, WHEN he was reached by someone, yesterday or the day before?
      Quote: Kostadinov
      In comparison with World War I, it became more powerful several timesGermany percent only.

      About Germany, nonsense. Learn, and don’t forget, HOW MUCH Germany has become less after the WWII
      Quote: Kostadinov
      Therefore, Russia lost and the USSR lost the war with Germany

      Why "sing"? request
  22. hohol95
    hohol95 4 May 2018 15: 47
    +1
    A bit about artillery.
    How many systems were there by 1938 in the Red Army that were developed and adopted after the Civil War. Units.
    The basis of the park of howitzers and heavy guns of the Red Army was left, although modernized, but the models created before the First World War! Three-inch models of 1902/30 predominated in divisional artillery.
    How many modern guns were there in Germany - almost all of the artillery was updated with a slight fraud -
    Light Field Howitzer 10,5 cm leFH 18
    The task of designing a new howitzer was accomplished in the year 10,5, and the gun was tested. Development and testing took place in an atmosphere of complete secrecy. To mask the fact of the development of a new gun, he was given the name 18 cm leichte Feldhaubitze 28.07.1935 i.e. a light field howitzer of the eighteenth year. Although adopted on July XNUMX, XNUMX
    15cm lg. sFH13. Heavy Field Howitzer -
    In the post-war period, one of the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forbidden to have artillery of caliber 150 mm and higher. With a few exceptions, Koenigsberg's artillery retained only a dozen 15cm lg.sFH13.
    But the German military did not suit this state of affairs in any way, and they hid about seven hundred such howitzers from the Allied commission. In 1940, their number increased even more due to howitzers captured in Belgium and the Netherlands, which at one time received them by reparation.
    So hiding the old guns or attributing the newly created indices of the year 18, the Germans by 1938 had quite modern models of artillery!
  23. NF68
    NF68 4 May 2018 15: 50
    +1
    Interesting stuff.
  24. Alexander Greene
    Alexander Greene 4 May 2018 17: 00
    +1
    Article plus, thanks to the author for an objective analysis of the ratio of military potentials and economic capabilities of the USSR and Europe of the late 30s. All estimates are given objectively, taking into account the historical realities and knowledge of that time.
  25. Monarchist
    Monarchist 4 May 2018 17: 01
    +1
    Quote: 210ox
    I completely agree with the author ... Kaptsov (with respect) simply put forward an alternative story .. But we do not live in a parallel world.

    I would say that Kaptsov was infected by Suvorov, but I do not want to insult Oleg.
    I have long been an opponent of alternative history, and Kaptsov probably wants to try himself in science fiction
  26. Monarchist
    Monarchist 4 May 2018 17: 08
    +1
    Quote: BigRiver
    Quote: DimanC
    ... at that time, industry still could not make hardy caterpillars - their resource sometimes did not even reach 1000 km ...

    Yes, I completely forgot. :))
    Erhard Raus of the 6TD Wehrmacht regiment wrote that by September 1941 the Czech tank unit had run about 10000 km. A commander’s tanks and up to 12000 km. Think you're lying:;)

    What is the reason for lying to him? It probably is
  27. Monarchist
    Monarchist 4 May 2018 17: 17
    +1
    Quote: alstr
    And the Baltic states with the Finns. also not to forget.

    But in general, before you can measure your strength even in a quantitative version, you must first understand what benefit the USSR can get in the 38th year and whether there are any political conditions for any kind of war.

    But this all was NOT.
    Firstly, there is a difficult period of internal political struggle (expressed in the purges of 37-38 years - this is what is on the surface)
    Secondly, there is Spain whom we help
    Thirdly, in the east we have Japan sharpening its teeth on us and there are constant provocations.
    Fourth, there is a restructuring of industry.
    Fifth, do not forget about Poland, which was strong enough.

    And there are a bunch of other factors and considerations that we simply do not know and which are not reflected in the documents.

    In the 30s we still helped China, Okorokov in the book "In the battles of the Middle Kingdom .. The Russian footprint in China" gives figures: how much and what the USSR delivered to China, and all this was taken from the Red Army depots
    1. Reptiloid
      Reptiloid 4 May 2018 23: 34
      0
      Glory, but how not to help? Secured an ally. The USSR created aviation in China. The Chinese paid for this help.
  28. ALEA IACTA EST
    ALEA IACTA EST 4 May 2018 17: 30
    +1
    The German state was building up economic and military power much faster than the USSR. The delay of the war until 1943-44 would lead to complete defeat.
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 5 May 2018 01: 09
      +1
      Is not a fact. The United States entered World War II in December 2. And they began a sharp transition of the economy to war. Begin the Second World War a year later and Lendliz would have arrived in time for its very beginning.
  29. intuzazist
    intuzazist 4 May 2018 20: 09
    +1
    good competently .............
  30. Imobile
    Imobile 4 May 2018 20: 28
    0
    I propose to discuss 2 more related issues: 1 What would happen if Hitler started the war later? The consequences, I think, would be even more catastrophic. I came across documents on which Stalin should be destroyed the last sensible commanders. The best were destroyed by the start of the war. 2. Preparation of the modern army of Russia. The same problems as 38-41, the same conscripts who can only paint grass, got stuck in Syria, all countries are against us ...
  31. Aviator_
    Aviator_ 4 May 2018 20: 29
    +3
    Good article, thorough and reasoned. Respect to the author.
  32. ventel
    ventel 4 May 2018 20: 31
    0
    Quote: Ber
    Past, the Bolsheviks seized church utensils, including from gold with drag stones, on which they bought equipment for factories.

    The network has a lot of information, you just need not be lazy and take a couple of months to study the material.

    You haven’t confused 20te with 30th years. In the 20s, church utensils were seized for the restoration of industry after the civil war, but industrialization was already carried out by selling bread, wood, furs, flax, oil, manganese abroad.
  33. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 4 May 2018 23: 19
    +4
    I remember the stories of my father - a Leningrader. He said that the newspaper Pravda in the late 30s constantly appeared peppy programs about the Red Army, about tank exercises, about pilots.
    Before the Finnish winter war. After - it washed away with water. Daddy's uncle worked in the hospital: he quietly told in the kitchen: "the wounded say this - complete defeat, the commanders do not understand anything ..., there is no supply ..."
    So, the pursuit of the vastness of the army and the amount of equipment without real, and not ostentatious mega-exercises, gave warning calls even before the Second World War.
    1. Crane operator Nahamkinson
      Crane operator Nahamkinson 4 May 2018 23: 22
      +2
      About cakes, why don’t you remember?
  34. ser56
    ser56 5 May 2018 15: 41
    +2
    I read the author - quite interesting facts, however, in terms of military construction in the USSR, a golemous repetition of ordinary Soviet propaganda ...
    Firstly, a red army of 600 tons is a little for a country like the USSR, however, it’s not comparable to a spherical horse in a vacuum, but to the number of Reichswehrs and we’ll be surprised - it’s just about all types of aircraft 115t and this is in 1919-35 ... and without call at this time, i.e. without preparing the composition of the word from the word ...
    Secondly, the Red Army was in continuous battles during these years - first the Civil War until 1922, then its continuation in the Caucasus and Central Asia / Afghanistan, then the battles on the CER, the participation of "volunteers" in several wars in China ... and what is the German Reichswehr? Who did you fight with?
    Thirdly, why the leadership of the Red Army and the country did not provide the correct combat training of troops, maintenance of military equipment and training of competent command personnel? Only 4,5 years were enough for the Germans to deploy a mass army (March 1935 - September 39), and the Red Army had noticeably more years, if you take it from 1925, then it’s 15 years ... Did you have enough money? So they had enough to create many meaningless experiments, from Kucherevsky guns to 1000 TB-1/3 aircraft, but there was a catastrophic lack of spare parts for equipment ... Maybe the Red Army leadership cadres were not ready for their posts in terms of education and business skills?
    Fourth, it was amusing to compare the author of the 36TBR RKKA who really existed, well armed with modern equipment at that time (BT-5/7, T-26, T-28) with Wehrmacht tank troops in 1938, which had a ridiculous number of T-1 machine guns and T-2 light tanks with a 20mm cannon ... Their combat readiness was well shown during the Anschluss in the same 38g ... :)
    If we return to the topic of the article, then the Red Army could not advance in 38g, but for purely political reasons, which was well voiced in the article, but the author of the criticized article is right in the main - the Wehrmacht was gaining strength at a significantly higher speed, and at a higher technical level! I draw your attention to the fact that jet aviation, rocketry, guided weapons at a level that the Red Army never dreamed of were already being created there ...
    So to avoid the losses of the Second World War it was possible only with a preemptive strike, the window of opportunity for the USSR was from November 39 (complete mobilization of troops for the campaign in Poland) until May 40 - the defeat of France ...
    1. Olgovich
      Olgovich 6 May 2018 09: 25
      +1
      Quote: ser56
      So to avoid the losses of the Second World War it was possible only with a preemptive strike, the window of opportunity for the USSR was from November 39 (complete mobilization of troops for the campaign in Poland) until May 40 - the defeat of France ...

      Everything is logical, everything is consistent with the FACTS.
      I came to the same, OBVIOUS conclusion.
      1. Alexander Greene
        Alexander Greene 7 May 2018 17: 54
        +1
        Quote: Olgovich
        Quote: ser56
        So to avoid the losses of the Second World War it was possible only with a preemptive strike, the window of opportunity for the USSR was from November 39 (complete mobilization of troops for the campaign in Poland) until May 40 - the defeat of France ...
        Everything is logical, everything is consistent with the FACTS.
        I came to the same, OBVIOUS conclusion.

        Absolutely not a fact. Since August 1939, the USSR and Germany were bound by the Nonaggression Treaty. And if the USSR suddenly attacked Germany, then it would be declared an aggressor to the whole world, then Germany with the same France, the same England would fall upon the USSR. The anti-Hitler coalition in 1939 could not have formed yet. Her birth required German aggression not only against France, but also against England and against the USSR.
        1. ser56
          ser56 14 May 2018 13: 41
          0
          I remind you that in November 1939 Germany fought with both France and England ... while Germany was already an aggressor ... so your thesis is somewhat strange ... bully
          1. Alexander Greene
            Alexander Greene 14 May 2018 18: 19
            0
            Quote: ser56
            your thesis is somewhat strange ..

            Nothing strange, France, England and Germany would immediately reconcile.
            1. ser56
              ser56 18 May 2018 16: 44
              0
              The reality was different ... France was defeated in 1940, and then completely occupied ... and England was at war in the air and at sea, without any compromise ..
    2. Gopnik
      Gopnik 7 May 2018 12: 21
      0
      It's like that. Good and well written
    3. strannik1985
      strannik1985 7 May 2018 20: 47
      0
      When raising the issue of lack of spare parts, consider that this problem arose during the transition of the industry to the production of a tank with anti-ballistic armor. One of the two-spare parts for old tanks or T-34 and KV in the series. I think the answer is obvious.

      Crowds of tanks are not fighting in the open field, structures, units, units, formations are fighting. These Pz.I and Pz.ll were supported by an artillery regiment on mechanic traction, several infantry battalions, and an anti-tank division. Comparison of structures, in particular, TC 1935 will not be in favor of the Red Army.
  35. ser56
    ser56 5 May 2018 16: 05
    +1
    and in addition - curious numbers ... https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1002621/90
    /Martirosyan_Arsen_-_Na_puti_k_Mirovoy_voyne.html

    Comparative table of the growth rate of the Red Army and the Reichswehr, and then the Wehrmacht for the period from 1923 to June 22, 1941. (person)

    Red Army

    1923-550 000

    1927-586 000

    1928-617 000

    1932-562 000

    1933-880 000

    1935-930 000

    1937 - 1 200 000

    1938 - 1 513 400

    19.08.39 - 2 000 000

    09.05.40 - 3 200 000

    01.01.41 - 4 207 000

    21.06.41 - 5 500 000

    Until 16.03.35 - Reichswehr, after - the Wehrmacht

    until 30.01.33 - 100 000

    31.12.33 - 300 000

    1935-500 000

    1936-600 000

    01.10.38 - 2 200 000

    19.08.39 - 4 233 000

    23.11.39 - 5 000 000

    21.06.41 - 7 240 000
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      6 May 2018 16: 24
      0
      Quote: ser56
      however, it’s not comparable to a spherical horse in vacuum, but to the number of Reichswehrs and we’ll be surprised - it’s just about all types of aircraft 115t and this is in 1919-35 ... and without conscription at that time, i.e. without preparing the composition of the word from the word ...

      Well, firstly, despite the lack of conscription, it still existed - the Germans were quietly preparing reservists, and I don’t think you know about it. Also, in theory, you should have known that the appeal in the Red Army was not universal
      Quote: ser56
      Secondly, the Red Army was in continuous battle during these years - first the Civil War until 1922, then its continuation in the Caucasus and Central Asia / Afghanistan

      Very interesting. And what kind of large-scale hostilities were in the Caucasus / Central Asia? :))))) Let's not confuse the war with the police, in fact, operations.
      Quote: ser56
      But what about the German Reichswehr?

      The Reichswehr is probably nothing, but the Wehrmacht was most actively involved in the Spanish Civil War.
      Quote: ser56
      Not enough money? So they were enough to create many meaningless experiments.

      And that was, of course, too, but by and large the question was not in Kurchevsky’s matter - not the scale of the funds so that their transfer could seriously fix something
      Quote: ser56
      Fourth, it was amusing to compare the author of the 36TBR RKKA, really existing, well armed with modern equipment at that time (BT-5/7, T-26, T-28) with Wehrmacht tank troops in 1938,

      Which the author did not do :)))) The author indicated only that the USSR did not have tank troops as such. But the tanks were, yes
      Quote: ser56
      I draw your attention to the fact that jet aviation, rocketry, guided weapons at a level that the Red Army never dreamed of were already being created there ...

      And, with the exception of a very limited number of jet aircraft and completely useless FAA, the Germans could not give birth to any of this even by the end of the war.
      Quote: ser56
      Comparative table of the growth rate of the Red Army and the Reichswehr

      It’s hard to understand what you wanted to say with these numbers
      1. ser56
        ser56 8 May 2018 11: 14
        +1
        1) Of course, universal conscription appeared in 1939, previously it was simply not needed - there were enough workers and peasants ... I note that it is difficult to compare semi-underground activities with official conscription - then will we also take into account Osoviahim? wink
        2) There are different wars, in Wed Asian Basmachi were thousands of sabers - is it not enough? For the training of junior, middle and senior commanders of the Red Army, it is more than enough, as well as for testing and combat use of military equipment. By the way - do you also consider the fights on the CER to be insignificant? bully
        3) In other words, do you acknowledge that until 36g the Germans had no experience in maintaining a database? By the way - didn’t the commanders of the Red Army and the Red Army take part in the database in Spain? so in this case the equality-disagree? But with the advantage of the Red Army in preparing for the database in difficult desert conditions, etc ....
        4) According to Shirokorad, one Kucherevsky is 5000 guns - not enough? And the epic with polygonal shells, a universal divisional cannon, BT Turtle tanks and other technical nonsense in the form of 500 planing TCs? And 1000 TB1 / 3 aircraft? and more than 100 submarines like a baby?
        like a lot of typing ...
        5) i.e. There were no tank troops in the Red Army in 1938? Seriously? those. tank formations were formed up to the corps, which were run-in during exercises, a theory of their use was developed, as were horse-mechanized groups, but there were no troops? laughing If it’s not a secret, but who had these troops besides the Red Army? Are these amusing wedges from Hitler? What could not get to Vienna during the parade march on European roads? recall how a year later the concentration of TBR occurred on Khalkhin Gol? how far was the march there? crying
        5) I hope you remember how the battleship Roma was blacked out? hi I note that the Germans created and massively used the fauspatron, sub-caliber shells - to continue with you the list of "useless nothing"? bully
        6) Banal - your message is that the rapid growth of the Red Army in the 30s did not allow creating a good army, the Germans grew noticeably faster! And the conclusion is simple - you repeat the conclusion of Agitprop about the "ingenious leader who delayed the start of the war, which allowed to strengthen the Red Army." In fact, it was exactly the opposite - a pause of 39-41g allowed the Germans to train and equip a large army, get industry and resources from almost all of Europe (primarily Romania’s oil and food from France, Holland, Belgium, Bulgaria), form a coalition that yielded about 40 more divisions (Romania, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia). At the same time, the USSR was left alone, took upon itself the brunt of the war on the land front ... For example, in WW1 the Germans lost their losses (so we get the whole middle coalition, they also fought against us in the Second World War) on the Western and Eastern fronts are comparable, like losses of the Entente countries ... and in WW2 we lost more than 12 million at the front, and the British less than 400 tons in total ... here is the price of the “smart” IVS policy that you are de facto defending ... Now, is it clear? hi
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          8 May 2018 17: 54
          0
          Quote: ser56
          Of course, universal conscription appeared in 1939, previously it was simply not needed - there were enough workers and peasants ... I note that it is difficult to compare semi-underground activities with official conscription - then will we also take into account Osoviahim?

          It’s just not difficult, but very possible. The whole question is what were taught in the army of conscripts, and so in the Red Army, alas, for objective reasons, they taught poorly and little. As a result, our official appeal in our skills was quite comparable with the German underground.
          Quote: ser56
          There are different wars, in Wed. Asian Basmachi were thousands of sabers - is it not enough?

          Not just a few, but very few. The Basmachi movement was valid during the years of the Great Patriotic War, but then very quickly “blown away”. Basmachi themselves were, by and large, robbers from the high road, gang groups, not so much attacking the authorities, as punishing the local population for cooperating with the "Soviets". Unless 1927 stands out, and even that is not much. In general, this “war” could not give any experience; one can hardly speak of counter-guerrilla operations there. What experience can be gained by fighting against bandits who have no idea about the proper fighting?
          Quote: ser56
          By the way - do you also consider the fights on the CER to be insignificant?

          And what are significant? How many of us participated there? Thousands of 15-20? Will we compare with the second Chechen? :)
          Quote: ser56
          In other words, do you acknowledge that until 36g the Germans had no experience in maintaining a database?

          Конечно.
          Quote: ser56
          By the way - didn’t the commanders of the Red Army and the Red Army take part in the database in Spain? so in this case the equality-disagree?

          In general, yes, equality. Because the conflict in Spain really gave military experience and made us think about something, as, in fact, Lake Hassan. One problem is to think, it’s good, but after all this we were completely unprepared for the winter war.
          Quote: ser56
          According to Shirokorad, one Kucherevsky is 5000 guns - not enough?

          In service with the Red Army in 1938 there were more than 35 guns, and by the war their number doubled. What against this background is 000 unpretentious and much cheaper than conventional artillery of Kurchevsky guns? Minuscule.
          Quote: ser56
          And the epic with polygonal shells, a universal divisional cannon, BT Turtle tanks and other technical nonsense in the form of 500 planing TCs? And 1000 TB1 / 3 aircraft? and more than 100 submarines like a baby?

          Why didn’t the F-22 please you? :))) The Germans used it with pleasure. There were 300 boats, not 500, I won’t say anything about TB, although as far as I remember, it’s a good plane for its time. Baby ... yes, instead of them it was possible to build better submarines, but unsuccessful weapons systems existed in absolutely any country, we are no exception. That is, a situation in which we suddenly begin to create exclusively the most advanced weapon systems is unrealistic.
          Quote: ser56
          Those. There were no tank troops in the Red Army in 1938? Seriously?

          Absolutely.
          Quote: ser56
          those. tank formations were formed up to the corps, which were run-in during exercises, a theory of their use was developed, as were horse-mechanized groups, but there were no troops?

          We had no "buildings". In fact, in 1938 the brigade was the strongest tank formation, and it remained, and the fact that several corps riveted several corps from paper on several paper did not solve absolutely anything.
          No “break-in during exercises” occurred due to the lack of major exercises. The developed theory of their application (the theory of deep operation) showed its full incapacity in battle. I have not forgotten anything? laughing
          Quote: ser56
          If it’s not a secret, but who had these troops besides the Red Army?

          No one. But from this we did not get any more. In other words, tanks are good only when the troops know how to use them, and the Red Army did not know how, so this would not give us much benefit in a collision with the Wehrmacht.
          Quote: ser56
          recall how a year later the concentration of TBR occurred on Khalkhin Gol?

          Remind :)
          Quote: ser56
          Banal - your message is that the rapid growth of the Red Army in the 30s did not allow creating a good army, the Germans grew much faster!

          The Germans had a well-trained 100th corps of officers and junior commanders since Versailles, but we haven’t. From the very beginning of the deployment, the Germans had enough funds to train the army as expected, but we did not. In other words, the Germans "grew up" in much better conditions than we do.
          Quote: ser56
          And the conclusion is simple - you repeat the conclusion of Agitprop about the "ingenious leader who delayed the start of the war, which allowed to strengthen the Red Army"

          Yeah, I repeat. But for the time being I have not heard any refutation from you, therefore I will continue to repeat
          Quote: ser56
          At the same time, the USSR was left alone, took upon itself the brunt of the war on the land front ...

          Well, if in 1938 the USSR would move to conquer Poland in order to come into contact with Germany, then of course, the result would be completely different laughing
          1. ser56
            ser56 10 May 2018 10: 54
            +1
            1) In any case, the call to the Red Army was and at times more. As for poor preparation in the Red Army, this is not objectivity, but the result of the creation of the Red Army in the Civil War - the preparation of the RIA was not very bad! Well, the Red Army, many red commanders leaned more on political training, but not all and the databases on the CER showed it.
            2) Any war dramatically improves the individual training of soldiers, junior and middle commanders. The war with the Basmachians was maneuverable, so you are mistaken - this is a good school.
            3) Fights on the CER are a wonderful blitzkrieg experience, while different types of aircraft interacted - fleet, aviation, cavalry, etc. And what was the Reichswehr doing at that moment?
            4) Fine - you recognized Spain as an experience for the Red Army :) But the Germans have nothing more, and we have a whole list ... As for the Winter War, the fault is not the Red Army as such, but the mediocre top leadership, led by the IVS, who to frighten the Finns. After the blood, everything was fixed quite quickly and the line was broken, in winter, in cold weather! The databases in other places depended on the abilities of the commanders - everything went smoothly in the Arctic, in different directions - in different ways, in some places there were terrible failures.
            5) 5000 is a lot, it was possible to spend money / resources on spare parts, repairs, etc.
            6) Actually, F22 is semi-universal ... Ready to challenge? By the way, its creator himself perfectly described how the Germans, and not ours, used the potential inherent in it. I note that it is normal to create bad samples of weapons, but for this there are tests to weed out the garbage. However, in the USSR there was a vicious practice of launching a series of crude weapons, I note not during the war. In my opinion, this was due to the technical illiteracy of the leadership. I remind you that in the RIA weapons samples were meticulously tested and bad samples were extremely rarely put into service. As for the TK and submarines of type M, this is a classic example when the decision was made by amateurs who absolutized 1 factor - speed or the possibility of transportation by rail without disassembly.
            7) No, you simply showed that you did not have any knowledge in the field of the development of tank troops in the USSR. hi I recommend reading profile sites or just Wikis.
            "By decision of the PBC of the USSR from 11 March 1932 yearThe 11th and 45th mechanized corps, each, consisted of:
            Management
            reconnaissance battalion
            combat engineer battalion
            flamethrower battalion
            anti-aircraft artillery division
            traffic control companies
            technical base
            air squad
            two mechanized brigades (T-26 and BT tanks), each of which includes:
            control
            three tank battalions
            machine gun battalion
            Artillery battalion
            combat battalion
            anti-aircraft machine-gun company
            machine gun brigade "
            They were formed at the beginning of 4, then another. The structure of the MK improved, they conducted combat training, for example, about 45 MK:
            "By February 15, 1932, management, formations, units and divisions were formed. In September 1935, the mechanized corps participated in district exercises - Kiev maneuvers. On March 30, 1938, the mechanized corps was relocated to the city of Berdichev, Zhytomyr Region, Ukrainian SSR. On April 5, 1938, the Red Army General Staff issued a directive No. М1 / 00666 on renaming the 45th mechanized corps to the 25th tank corps (25 tk). "
            As for the deep operation, it was a completely advanced theory.
            8) The 11th tank brigade under the command of Yakovlev.
            9) I recall that as part of the Spring operation in 1930, 3000 Red Army commanders, RIA natives were repressed ... Who is to blame for the lack of competent commanders in the Red Army?
            10) I do not refute or try to convince you - I give arguments. In addition, he showed that you know the subject quite poorly.
            11) Why attribute to me nonsense? see above - I supported your own point of view that for political reasons the USSR could not fight with Germany in 1938. He further indicated a window of opportunity for defeating Germany with reasonable losses - November 39 - May 1940. You kept silent and attributed stupidity to me - did the arguments end? bully
            1. ser56
              ser56 10 May 2018 12: 09
              0
              according to claim 8. "Then he massively participated in battles on Khalkhin Gol as part of the 6th and 11th tank brigades, the last for 55 running hours made a march from art. Borzya to the border of the MPR and further through Bain-Tumen and Tamtsak-Bulak to the western bank of the river. Khalkhin Gol, having passed all for 6 days on a caterpillar track about 800 km (the average daily passage of tank battalions of the brigade was up to 150 km). "Compare with the German march to Vienna ... hi
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 10 May 2018 15: 39
                0
                In October 1939, the 6th Tank Brigade marched from Khalkhin Gol to Undurkhan with a length of 670 km. The movement was carried out on wheels. The team covered the route in 39 running hours, passing an average of 150 km per day.

                In a campaign in Western Ukraine and Belarus in September 1939, 3542 tanks were deployed. Since the Polish troops showed virtually no resistance, combat losses amounted to only 42 vehicles. 429 tanks failed for technical reasons. The situation for the Soviet tank forces in the Soviet-Finnish war was much more dramatic.
                1. YELLOWSTONE
                  YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 03: 12
                  0
                  Khalkhin-Gol topic not disclosed ...
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 11 May 2018 08: 04
                    0
                    The fighting at Khalkhin Gol was in 1939! The article is about 1938.
                    Or are you interested in my comment?
                    1. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 08: 22
                      0
                      and such an army came from somewhere in just a year?
                      in the article, the author immediately made one big assumption and let's fantasize yes and the conclusion at the end is clearly not correct.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 11 May 2018 12: 30
                        0
                        But didn’t the problems with the training of fighter pilots appear in the battles on Khalkhin Gol? The problem of the lack of communication on all types of military equipment from aircraft to tanks and armored vehicles? So during these battles it turned out that the army should also have a field uniform with insignia of camouflage color (many officers were killed by Japanese snipers thanks to the bright and shiny elements of the uniform)! Are the big losses of the 11th tank brigade during the assault on Mount Bain-Tsagan not related to the absence of their own infantry, artillery and engineering units in the brigades of that time ???
                        The brigade was thrown into the defense prepared by the enemy - out of 132 tanks, 46 were burned and 36 were destroyed!
                        Hag forced ... But meaning that the intelligence "overslept" the Japanese throw to this mountain, and the infantry and artillery units could not be thrown to strengthen the tank! They were embroiled in fights, there was no transport, or for some other reason ... In addition, the Japanese took a numerical superiority in technology and people!
                        But the fighter aircraft was the first to feel the Japanese pressure and in the first month of fighting suffered heavy losses!
                        And the battles themselves did not turn into a full-scale war!
                        That army was enough for Khalkhin Gol! For LOCAL conflict!
                    2. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 17: 01
                      0
                      the main problem there appeared among the Japanese
                      Quote: hohol95
                      In addition, the Japanese took a numerical superiority in technology and people!

                      about this is not necessary negative , the Japanese group was close, as such, there was no such superiority even in 1945 (1 to 1,3)
                      the battles themselves were large-scale lasted six months and this was a real war, such a concentration of aircraft was not even in the Kuban air battle
                      initially, ordinary pilots fought against Japanese aces, then Japanese success almost immediately came to an end.
                      Quote: hohol95
                      And the battles themselves did not turn into a full-scale war!
                      That army was enough for Khalkhin Gol! For LOCAL conflict!

                      all this sobered them up very well, for example, all the major naval forces of which including Kure were within the radius of TB-3 and DB-3 with a 1-ton bomb, you are not far behind fantasies from him, and this is a reality, Japan-Japan needed the Berlin-Tokyo pact 1936 otherwise he would not be imprisoned
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 11 May 2018 17: 41
                        0
                        initially, ordinary pilots fought against Japanese aces, then Japanese success almost immediately came to an end.

                        Your words confirm the state of affairs at that time ...
                        Were these bases within reach of the TB-3 escort fighters?
                        The USSR did not have fighters to escort distant bombers! And the TB-3 raids could turn into a disaster.
                        No one doubts the sobering of the Japanese "hawks", but the price for this sobering for the Red Army was "decent" ...
                        At the same time, you forgot that for our happiness in Mongolia there is no access to the ocean and the Japanese could not use their fleet against which the Pacific Fleet would be powerless ...
                    3. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 19: 30
                      0
                      confirm that the aces against aces became honest and the Japanese almost immediately came to an end?
                      and did British escort fighters have a lot of night bombers? TB-3 a year earlier over Japan flew even during the day.
                      it’s good that it doesn’t, because the Japanese fleet since 1934 was powerless against the Soviet aviation that could destroy it right in the bases, aviation from Primorye reached all Japanese possessions except Taiwan and Okinawa, the first flew to bomb from Chinese airfields.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 11 May 2018 20: 33
                        0
                        They confirm that the training of ordinary Soviet pilots (especially in such a "backwater" as the MPR) left much to be desired !!!
                        Was there a lot of aviation in the Far East and in Primorye?
                        For the transfer from the European part of the country it would take time and space to base all those machines, but which you trust.
                        The bombardment of ships from horizontal flight during World War II did not give the desired results, and there were no diving vehicles yet! And I think the number of torpedo bombers in the Pacific Fleet was not great! And the Japanese would not be sitting arms crossed ...
                        They flew to Taiwan with refueling at the jump airfield ...
                    4. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 20: 44
                      0
                      training ordinary Soviet pilots against Japanese aces?
                      then the airfields were unpaved, time as long as there summer.
                      very much given, especially for large ones, like torpedo bombers and mines
                      The Japanese hoped that this would not happen, and showing the teeth themselves they climbed into the pact with the Germans, despite the fact that they were all backed up by the very same England, the USA and France who had helped Japan against Russia all the time with the REV
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 11 May 2018 20: 51
                        0
                        You claim that the Japanese command threw special ASOV teams into the battles in the MPR?
                        How did the command of the Red Army Air Force!
                        Even a dirt airfield requires preparation! And depending on the weather!
                    5. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 21: 13
                      0
                      and you say no? they died there in large numbers
                      the training was short-lived and they were in general, in the Second World War, aviation fought somehow, and then they flew lol
                      German aces then fled from the Soviet, calling themselves the opposite, "fire brigade", and one "fireman" with the highest score, so generally, caught exclusively single recruits and did not even engage in a deliberate battle with them. yes
                      and when he saw immediately 20 American newcomers parachuted without a fight lol
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 11 May 2018 21: 59
                        0
                        The Imperial Air Force had combat experience at the start of the battles at Khalkhin Gol. But I have never read about the creation of special squadrons or regiments in them consisting solely of pilots with great combat experience and impressive personal lists of downed enemy aircraft!
                        The 57th Special Corps stationed in Mongolia included the 100th mixed air brigade, which consisted of the 70th fighter (70 IAP) and the 150th mixed bomber (150 sbp) regiments. The 70th IAP was led by Major Zabaluev, and the 150th SBP was led by Major Burmistrov. By the middle of May 1939, in the 70th IAP there were 14 I-15bis fighters and 24 I-16 fighters — a total of 38 aircraft. In the 150th squadron there were two squadrons (17 pieces) of light LSH-5 attack aircraft (aka R-5Sh - an assault version of the R-5 reconnaissance aircraft, additionally armed with four ShKAS machine guns on the lower wing), as well as three squadrons of recently received high-speed SB bombers (29 copies), not yet mastered by flight personnel. In early 1939, the brigade was commanded by Major Valeganzhanin, a former staff employee who did not have direct leadership experience. In mid-April, he was replaced by Colonel Kalinychev, and Valegzhanin remained in the post of chief of staff ‹4›.
                        Bombers were based at aerodromes in the Bain-Tumen area, more than 300 km from the conflict zone, and fighter planes were based at the Tamsag-Bulak air hub (the documents also contain the names Tamsag-Bulak and Tamsak-Bulak), which consists of five runways and is located at 100 km from Khalkhin Gol.

                        The condition of the materiel of the 100th Air Brigade, as they say, left much to be desired. All "donkeys" belonged to the outdated 5th type and had two-machine guns. All aircraft lacked armored seats. In addition, all the cars, with the exception of the SB, were very worn out, many were faulty, and from prolonged storage in the open air the percale lining on them began to rot (as they used to say, it was "framed"). As a result, by May 20, out of 38 fighters of the 70th regiment, only 21 (13 I-16 and 9 I-15bis) could fly into the air.
                        The situation was no better with the personnel. Only 40% of pilots were engaged in combat and flight training in the regiments. The rest were either sick or completely absent. Due to the lack of normal housing and poor living conditions, many pilots wrote reports asking for transfer to the Union. Leadership of the brigade was assessed as “ugly,” and discipline in parts — as “the lowest.” Fighter pilots were trained only in the technique of piloting single aircraft and did not possess the tactics of group combat. Most of them did not have aerial shooting skills.
                        The Japanese air force in Manchuria was represented by the 2nd Aviation Division (2nd Hikoshidan) under the command of Lieutenant General Tetsuji Giga. The division consisted of four air brigades (Hikodan), the composition of which is presented in the table:
                        PARTS AND UNITS OF THE JAPANESE AIR FORCES IN MANCHURIA ON 1.05.1939/XNUMX/XNUMX.
                        7th Hikodan
                        Sentai 12th (air regiment) 3 sensitive (squadron) Fiat bombers BR.20
                        15th Sentai 1 Chutai Ki-4, Ki-30 and Ki-32 light bombers
                        8th Hikodan
                        16th sentai 3 ki-30 light sensitive bombers
                        33rd sentai 3 ki-10 frantic fighter
                        58th sentai 3 ki-2 keen bomber
                        9th Hikodan
                        10th sentai 2 ki-30 light sensitive bombers
                        1 spy Ki-15 scouts
                        59rd sentai 2 ki-27 frantic fighter
                        61th sentai 3 ki-21 keen bomber
                        12th Hikodan
                        11rd sentai 4 ki-27 frantic fighter
                        24rd sentai 2 ki-27 frantic fighter
                        Due to the growing tension on the border with Mongolia, General Giga formed a temporary operational air group Rinji Hikotai on May 12. It included the 24th fighter sentai (two squadrons of 10 vehicles each), as well as one reconnaissance (six Ki-15) and one bomber (six Ki-30) squadrons of 10th Sentai. On May 32, an air group of 13 aircraft flew to the Hailar Manchurian airfield closest to Khalkhin Gol, located about 160 km northeast of the river. Unlike the Soviet 100th brigade, Rinji Hikotai mainly consisted of well-trained pilots with 3-5 years of experience and experience in fighting in China. The air group was led by the commander of the 24th sentai lieutenant colonel Koziro Matsumura.
                        Another short skirmish was observed on May 22.
                        According to our data, three I-16s and two I-15bis flew along the river when five I-96 appeared due to the clouds (as we used to call the Japanese A5M carrier-based fighter or “Claude” according to the allied code). In fact, there were no naval aircraft on Khalkhin Gol, and at first the pilots took for them the Ki-27 army fighters (Soviet designation I-97). The mistake was explained by the external similarity and the fact that the Soviet pilots met the Claudes many times in the sky of China, and the Ki-27 was a novelty for them. Around the beginning of July, when our aviators studied the enemy equipment well enough, references to the I-96 gradually disappear from their reports.
                        Seeing the enemy, the pilot of one of the I-16 I.T. Lysenko broke off, rushed to the attack and was shot down. A burning fighter crashed to the ground, the pilot died. The remaining planes did not enter the battle.

                        Vyacheslav Kondratiev
                        Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air
                    6. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 22: 04
                      0
                      the imperial air force at halhingol raked
                      if you didn’t read it doesn’t mean that it wasn’t, even the very one was about the fact that some Japanese units had better preparation, some worse
                      Soviet pilots also fought not only in Spain but also in the same China
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 11 May 2018 22: 12
                        0
                        LOSSES AMONG THE PERSONNEL OF THE RKKA Air Force:
                        killed in air battles - 88 people
                        died from anti-aircraft artillery fire - 11
                        missing - 65
                        died during air raids - 6
                        Died of wounds - 4
                        TOTAL - 174
                        Injured - 113
                        The figures for Japanese casualties are from Eichiro Sekigawa's article The Undeclared Air War.
                        The casualties of Japanese aviation, according to the same author, amounted to 152 dead and 66 "seriously injured." Among them 163 people from flight personnel: 95 fighter pilots, 28 members of reconnaissance crews and 40 members of bomber crews. The calculation method adopted by the Japanese historian does not allow us to determine how many pilots died and how many were injured. In addition, it is unclear whether Sekigawa considers the wounds to be missing, and which wounds are considered serious, and which are “not so.”

                        Vyacheslav Kondratiev
                        Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air
                        Expensively this "hump" was given to the Red Army Air Force ...
                    7. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 22: 42
                      0
                      the Japanese are much more expensive, despite the fact that they prepared their pilots in "peace" time from childhood (probably they ate little rice at the same time)
                      after which it was decided, despite the best performance characteristics and the presence of Pervitin, to substitute Soviet aviation at airfields in 1941, after which the pilots went into the infantry and lay down soldiers without planes, and then “train” until the spring of 1943 only on beginners when the planes appeared again in the USSR
                      and in 1938 the Germans didn’t have anything good at all that they were trying to “refute” in this article, so see the big quote below about the position of England and France in the Munich agreement, it was not just an agreement, these two countries plus Poland violated Czechoslovakia by violating their agreement when trying an anti-German defensive alliance with the USSR by the war.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 12 May 2018 09: 47
                        0
                        after which it was decided, despite the best performance characteristics and the presence of Pervitin, to substitute Soviet aviation at airfields in 1941, after which the pilots went into the infantry and lay down soldiers without planes, and then “train” until the spring of 1943 only on beginners when the planes appeared again in the USSR

                        Did you happen to write this without drinking "mushroom tea"? What is this nonsense ...
                    8. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 12 May 2018 13: 14
                      0
                      a lot of pre-war pilots left without aircraft really died in the infantry
                      sake should be drunk less and do not snack with pansher chocolate.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 12 May 2018 13: 34
                        0
                        sake should be drunk less and do not snack with pansher chocolate.

                        Do not drink ... hi
                    9. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 12 May 2018 23: 48
                      0
                      and without such an appetizer anyway? bully
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 13 May 2018 14: 08
                        0
                        What a mysterious you are - STONE YELLOW ... what
                    10. YELLOWSTONE
                      YELLOWSTONE 13 May 2018 16: 04
                      0
                      and you are not so
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                10 May 2018 19: 50
                0
                Quote: ser56
                In any case, the call to the Red Army was many times more.

                I can repeat again - in 1938 the Germans had a million trained soldiers. Trained by the standards of the Wehrmacht. We had more people who served in the army, but we did not have such a million.
                Quote: ser56
                Any war dramatically improves the individual training of soldiers, junior and middle commanders. The war with the Basmachi was maneuverable,

                There was no "war with the Basmachi," unless you count it as a rout in 1927, but I will not say at random the number of Basmachi detachments. The rest - the troops performed primarily security functions.
                Quote: ser56
                Combat on the CER is a wonderful blitzkrieg experience, while different types of aircraft interacted - the fleet, aviation, cavalry, etc.

                From what you wrote, I conclude that you do not know what blitzkrieg is. In general, the similarity of a blitzkrieg under the CER was only during the Mishanfus operation - and that’s all.
                Quote: ser56
                But the Germans have nothing more, and we have a whole list ...

                And where is the result? :)))
                Quote: ser56
                As for the Winter War, the fault was not of the Red Army as such, but of the mediocre senior leadership led by the IVS

                Well what can I say? Will you give a link to Tymoshenko’s order based on the results of the Finnish war, or will you find it yourself?
                "... The experience of the war at the Karelian-Finnish Theater revealed the biggest shortcomings in combat training and education of the army ... ... The interaction of the combat arms in battle, especially in the company link — battery, battalion division — was the bottleneck ... ... The main reason for the poor interaction between the military branches was a poor knowledge of the commanding personnel of the combat properties and capabilities of other military branches ... ... The infantry entered the war the least prepared of all the military branches: it did not know how to engage in close combat, in trenches, did not know how use the results of artillery fire and provide their offensive with fire with machine guns, mortars, battalion and regimental artillery ... .. The training of command personnel did not meet modern combat requirements. The authority of the command staff in the middle and junior level is low. The demands of the command staff are low. The commanders are sometimes criminally tolerant of violations discipline, to the bickering of subordinates, and sometimes to direct non-execution of orders. The weakest link was the company, platoon, and squad commanders, who, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, command skills, and service experience ... The senior and senior command staff poorly organized interaction, poorly used staffs, and mismanaged the tasks of artillery, tanks, and especially aviation. The command staff of the reserve was extremely poorly trained and often completely unable to fulfill its duties ...

                This is from N 120 of May 16, 1940. But from the act of receiving the People’s Commissar of Defense
                “... OPERATIONAL PREPARATION

                1. By the time of the acceptance and surrender of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, there was no operational plan of war, operational plans, both general and private, were not developed and lack The General Staff has no data on the state of covering the borders. The decisions of the military councils of the districts, armies and the front on this issue are unknown to the General Staff.

                more...
                1. The People’s Commissariat does not have an accurately established actual strength of the Red Army at the time of admission. Accounting personnel due to the fault of the Main Directorate of the Red Army is in an extremely neglected state ...

                more...
                "... MILITARY TRAINING OF TROOPS
                1) Low training of the middle command staff in the company link - a platoon and especially weak training of the junior command staff.
                4) The extremely weak training of the combat arms on the battlefield: the infantry cannot cling to and break away from the fire shaft, the artillery can not support the tanks, the aviation can not interact with the ground troops.
                5) The troops are not trained in skiing.
                7) The troops have not worked out fire control.
                8) The troops are not trained in attacking fortified areas, building and overcoming barriers and forcing rivers ”

                Continue?:))))
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  10 May 2018 20: 04
                  +1
                  Quote: ser56
                  5000 is a lot

                  Against the background of 35 thousand - this is Mizer. That is, the complete abandonment of the Kurchevsky guns did not even solve the problems of artillery, even if only in terms of a sufficient number of shells
                  Quote: ser56
                  I note that it is normal to create bad samples of weapons, but for this there are tests to weed out the garbage.

                  German T-1s, anti-aircraft "guns" for the fleet, English sten, missile anti-aircraft installations, American "Chicago pianos" - I can tell you for hours about unsuccessful weapons systems, which, however, were adopted
                  Quote: ser56
                  No, you simply showed that you had absolutely no knowledge in the field of the development of tank troops in the USSR. hi I recommend reading profile sites or just Wikis.

                  I can only recommend reading the documents of those years - they are a little more accurate wiki
                  Quote: ser56
                  By a decision of the PBC of the USSR of March 11, 1932, the 11th and 45th mechanized corps

                  which had nothing to do with tank forces and as of 01.0138 they were not included. Will we argue? :))))
                  Quote: ser56
                  In September 1935, the mechanized corps took part in district exercises - Kiev maneuvers.

                  Do you even imagine what these “maneuvers” were like?
                  Quote: ser56
                  As for the deep operation, it was a completely advanced theory.

                  Which means that you do not know anything about the theory of the deep operation of the USSR. I strongly recommend reading not "profile sites and Wikipedia", but the works of the developer of this theory, Triandafillov. Such enchanting nonsense ...
                  In general, Triandafillov's ideas completely contradict the theory of maneuver warfare, the theory of blitzkrieg and did not materialize during the years of the Second World War.
                  Quote: ser56
                  I recall that in the framework of the Spring operation in 1930, 3000 Red Army commanders, immigrants from the RIA, were repressed ...

                  read at least wikipedia. Even from it you will learn that of the 3000 arrested in the spring case, not all were commanders of the Red Army, and that some of the repressed were restored to their ranks in 1932
                  Quote: ser56
                  You kept silent and attributed stupidity to me - are the arguments over?

                  I do not ascribe to you stupidity, you deal with it much better than me :)))
                  Quote: ser56
                  the last in 55 running hours made a march from Art. Borzya to the border of the MPR and further through Bain-Tumen and Tamtsak-Bulak to the western bank of the river. Khalkhin-Gol, having covered about 6 km in just 800 days on a caterpillar track

                  You were answered for me :)))
                  1. YELLOWSTONE
                    YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 03: 14
                    0
                    Did they answer? What was the war with the Japanese Basmachi in the summer of 1939? or did they prepare such an army in just a year?
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      11 May 2018 09: 34
                      0
                      Quote: YELLOWSTONE
                      Did they answer? What was the war with the Japanese Basmachi in the summer of 1939?

                      The fact that 1939 is irrelevant - my opponent writes about conflicts before 1938.
                      Quote: YELLOWSTONE
                      or did they prepare such an army in just a year?

                      Generally yes
                      1. ser56
                        ser56 11 May 2018 13: 40
                        0
                        funny with you - does one year difference mean something for BP?
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Generally yes

                        hmm ... and then you quote documents from 1940 about the shortcomings ... bully
                      2. YELLOWSTONE
                        YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 17: 02
                        0
                        In general, no, the Germans asked for an anti-Soviet military alliance with Japan back in 1936.
                  2. ser56
                    ser56 11 May 2018 13: 36
                    0
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Against the background of 35 thousand - this is MIZER

                    this is 1/7, repeat the arithmetic ... and this is only one entertainer ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    I can tell you for hours about unsuccessful weapons systems, which, however, were adopted
                    you have a strange message that the weapon must be perfect, and it must fulfill the function ... by the way, the T-1 is a training tank and as such - quite ...

                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    I can only recommend reading the documents of those years - they are a little more accurate wiki

                    but less accessible, the essence of this is changing? bully

                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    which had nothing to do with tank forces and as of 01.0138 they were not included.

                    decided to play titles? bully You denied the presence of cases, I brought you the data ... and so run if you want ... lol
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Do you even imagine what these “maneuvers” were like?

                    but noticeably better than when the Germans decorated cars in a tank ... I note that you admitted your lie about the lack of participation in the fur. maneuver buildings ... love


                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    In general, Triandafillov's ideas completely contradict the theory of maneuver warfare, the theory of blitzkrieg and did not materialize during the years of the Second World War.

                    If it’s no secret, you graduated from the General Staff Academy, have a military degree in profile? I suppose the answer is, you have the sincere belief of the amateur that you can come up with everything at once, and ideally ... bully I note that Triandafilov died long before the outbreak of war ..
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    and that some of the repressed were restored to their ranks in 1932

                    and then repressed again ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    I do not ascribe to you stupidity, you deal with it much better than me :)

                    fi, you don’t know how to hold a blow, a wounded pride crawled ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    You were answered for me :)))

                    my answer was supplemented by other facts of the Red Army Red Army march at that time - which show the superiority of both materiel and the organization of the tank forces of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht ... It is a pity that you did not see this platitude behind these numbers ...
                    read
                    “In general, the trip to Vienna went without any particular complications. The failure of vehicles was insignificant, the output of tanks was somewhat large. I don’t remember the exact numbers anyway, in any case, not more than 30% of the vehicles were out of order. By March 15, the parade was scheduled, almost all the tanks arrived at their destination, but these numbers, which are not very large given the considerable distance and high speed of the march, seemed, however, frightening for those who did not understand anything in the armored forces, and above all for Colonel-General von Bock, so after going to Vienna these people attacked the young armored forces with fierce criticism, claiming that they were not able to make long marches.

                    However, business criticism came to completely different conclusions. When evaluating the combat capabilities [71] of the armored forces, based on the experience of the campaign on Vienna, it was necessary to take into account the following circumstances.

                    a) The armored forces were not yet ready to carry out their tasks in full. In early March, they only underwent combat training on a company scale. The theoretical training of staff officers, which was carried out very intensively in the 2nd Panzer Division throughout the winter, was supposed to end with field exercises in the area of ​​the Moselle River, which were mentioned above. Nobody even thought about organizing winter exercises on the scale of a division.

                    b) The high command was also not adequately prepared for this campaign. The decision about him came from Hitler alone. The whole campaign was a complete improvisation, which was a risky event for the tank divisions, created only in the autumn of 1935.

                    c) The 2nd Panzer Division was to be completed in 48 hours. during the execution of this makeshift march 700 km, and the regiment of the life-standard SS “Adolf Hitler” - about 1000 km. Nevertheless, this task was mainly accomplished.

                    d) The most important drawback revealed during the march was the unsatisfactory performance of equipment repair, especially tanks. This flaw was noted during the autumn maneuvers of 1937, but the measures proposed in March 1938 to eliminate it were not taken into account. Subsequently, such shortcomings were no longer repeated.

                    e) There were serious difficulties in providing fuel, but they were quickly overcome. Due to the fact that no ammunition was consumed during the campaign, only relative conclusions could be made in this regard. Ammunition will be enough if you take care of them in advance. "
                    I hope they found out where? bully Compare with the Red Army Red Army march in Mongolia WITHOUT roads! And also with the orders of Tymoshenko ... hi Maybe draw some conclusions .... soldier
                2. ser56
                  ser56 11 May 2018 13: 12
                  +1
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Trained by the standards of the Wehrmacht. We had more people who served in the army, but we did not have such a million.

                  and this is a claim to the commanders of the Red Army that the soldiers were trained like this .. I note that the battle in 1939 did not show the superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army.

                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  There was no "war with the Basmachi,"

                  "In October 1920, gathering new forces, Dzhunaid Khan captured Kungrad and surrounded Nukus. In November, the communist government of Khorezm tried to enter into peace negotiations with Dzhunaid Khan, but he wrote in writing that he would not stop the struggle with the Soviet government and the Bolsheviks. In the spring In 1921, the Junaid Khan detachments were again forced to withdraw to the desert regions.

                  Over time, Junaid Khan was able to enlist the support of the Islamic clergy and bring the number of their troops to 9 thousand people. At the end of 1923, an uprising broke out in Khorezm, at the head of which stood Junaid Khan. In January 1924, his troops occupied Pitnyak and Khazarasp, besieged Khiva and Novo-Urgench. In March, the Red Army managed to push the rebels out of the Khiva oasis, but the Basmachis managed to inflict decisive defeats only at the end of 1924, after which Dzhunaid Khan retreated to the depths of the Turkmen region.

                  In 1927, Junaid Khan sent his representatives to the 1st All-Turkmen Congress of Soviets, with the consent to establish peaceful relations. The congress accepted the offer of Dzhunaid Khan, after which he and his detachment returned to Khorezm and settled in Karakum. Taking advantage of the freedom provided, Junaid Khan began preparations for further struggle. On September 19, 1927, Dzhunaid Khan announced the third military campaign against the Soviet regime, but by December his units had been defeated and he fled to Iran.

                  In 1931, Dzhunaid Khan crossed the Soviet border at the head of a detachment of 2000 Basmachis and made the last attempt to overthrow the Soviet power in Turkmenistan, but the detachment was defeated. Junaid Khan emigrated to Iran, from where he later moved to Afghanistan. "can you read Vicki yourself? bully
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  From what you wrote, I conclude that you do not know what blitzkrieg is.

                  your conclusion is not correct, you further refute it yourself hi
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  And where is the result? :)))

                  What do you mean by the result? I took Berlin in 1945, and you deny it? crying
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  You link to the order of Tymoshenko according to the results

                  and what is the banal work on mistakes ... The CA, following the results of entering Afghanistan, was also not ready, and much has changed ...

                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Continue?:))))
                  Of course, one question - the Wehrmacht how was the ski training set? bully
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    11 May 2018 17: 41
                    0
                    Quote: ser56
                    funny with you

                    Yeah. Now it will be even funnier :)))
                    Quote: ser56
                    hmm ... and then you quote documents from 1940 about the shortcomings ... bully

                    That is, you are even unable to understand that we are talking about the eradication of deficiencies in the period 1940-1941? When did an NPO become Tymoshenko? And why am I not surprised?
                    Quote: ser56
                    this is 1/7, repeat the arithmetic ... and this is only one entertainer ...

                    In terms of numbers, but not in price, if you understood the structural difference between a DRP and an ordinary gun, you would also understand that their costs are correlated at best as 1/2. And this is really a miser, which is not enough even to solve the local problems of artillery
                    Quote: ser56
                    you have a strange message that the weapon must be perfect, and it must fulfill the function ... by the way, the T-1 is a training tank and as such - quite ...

                    No need to transfer from a sick head to a healthy one. You here told me with a blue eye that the F-22 is no good and that money was wasted on it in vain. I told you that no army fought the perfect weapon, and that it is very easy to find a bunch of low-performing weapons in the armed forces of any country. Now you are clumsy “changing shoes” - it turns out that the weapon should fulfill its function, it must be, what a revelation :)))) And what function, let me ask, did F-22 not fulfill, that even the Germans did not disdain to fight it? Do you even understand that your own remarks put a mate on yourself?
                    Quote: ser56
                    decided to play titles? bully You denied the presence of cases, I gave you the data ... and so run if you want ...

                    My friend, here is one of two things - either you are simply brazenly lying in my eyes, or you have an unusually short, "girlish" memory. Because I did not deny the presence of corps in the Red Army (we had rifle corps, for example). I denied the presence of the tank corps in the tank troops. On your
                    Quote: ser56
                    Those. There were no tank troops in the Red Army in 1938? Seriously? those. tank units formed up to the hulls

                    I replied
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    We had no "buildings". In fact, in 1938 the brigade was the strongest tank formation, and it remained, and the fact that several corps riveted several corps from paper on several paper did not solve absolutely anything.

                    You, jumping up from happiness, rushed to bring me the staff of the mechanized corps - to which I, quite logically, informed you that at the beginning in 1938 the mechanized corps did NOT enter the tank troops :))) I understand that this is all for you equally, and you are sure that since there were tanks in them, it means tank troops. I hasten to disappoint - in 1938, we also had tanks in rifle divisions, which, despite this, did not belong to tank armies.
                    Quote: ser56
                    but much better than when the Germans decorated cars in a tank ...

                    Noticeably worse. Because the Germans used the car in order to conduct the TEACHING of personnel, but the Kiev maneuvers were not at all teachings.
                    Quote: ser56
                    I note that you admitted your lie about the lack of participation of the fur. maneuver buildings ...

                    Liar, quote where I said this :)))
                    Quote: ser56
                    If it’s no secret, you graduated from the General Staff Academy, have a military degree in profile? I suppose the answer is your sincere amateur’s conviction that you can come up with everything at once, and ideally ... bully I note that Triandafilov died long before the start of the war ..

                    Sergey, I’ve been engaged in military history for about 30 years :)))) And my advice to you is - do not be clever, this is very bad for you. I perfectly understand that you are the next victim of the myth that the blitzkrieg strategy was invented in the USSR and that half of the specialized sites and publications refer precisely to Triandafillov. And, of course, those who refer to it themselves did not read it ...
                    But I’m not too lazy. And he was horrified by the nonsense that he had written. Because in his "writings" there IS IN general no understanding of how the modern war will be waged, all his statements turned out to be "true exactly the opposite." Triandafillov was mistaken at every step, and literally in everything.
                    You, now, having read "profile sites" but not having read a single line at Triandafillov, puff out a connoisseur from yourself, reproaching me for amateurism laughing
                    Sergey, seriously, you should read Triandafillov :)))) And let you be ashamed :)))
                    Quote: ser56
                    and then repressed again ...

                    Lists in the studio, please. how many active commanders of the Red Army were repressed in 1932, how many of them returned, how many were repressed again. Without this, your claims are not worth a damn.
                    Quote: ser56
                    fi, you don’t know how to hold a punch

                    said the kitten to the tiger. Sergey, we are in so many different weight categories that your efforts do not cause anything but a smile.
                    Quote: ser56
                    my answer was complemented by other facts of the Red Army Red Army march at this time - which show the superiority of both materiel and the organization of the tank forces of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht ..

                    Wow! :)))) That is, what
                    Quote: ser56
                    the average daily crossing of tank brigade battalions was up to 150 km). "Compare with the German march to Vienna ...

                    but at the same time
                    Quote: ser56
                    The 2nd Panzer Division was to be completed in 48 hours. during the execution of this makeshift march 700 km, and the regiment of the life standard SS Adolf Hitler - about 1000 km

                    that is, to make 350-500 km per day - is that nothing? :)))
                    Quote: ser56
                    Can you read Vicki yourself? bully

                    That is, even when they give you read the text, you are not able to overpower the read. Sadly
                    Quote: ser56
                    The Basmachi succeeded in inflicting decisive defeats only at the end of 1924, after which Dzhunaid Khan retreated to the deep regions of the Turkmen region.

                    24 year old, Karl! And then what?
                    Quote: ser56
                    On September 19, 1927, Dzhunaid Khan announced the third military campaign against the Soviet regime, but by December his units had been defeated and he fled to Iran.

                    In 1931, Dzhunaid Khan crossed the Soviet border at the head of a detachment of 2000 basmache

                    As I said - a short relapse in 1927, and ... that's it. Already 2 sabers in 000 do you consider a serious adversary capable of teaching the Red Army to fight? laughing
                    Quote: ser56
                    your conclusion is not correct, you further refute it yourself

                    This is where, let me ask?
                    Quote: ser56
                    What do you mean by the result? I took Berlin in 1945, and you deny it?

                    That is, in your opinion, the capture of Berlin in 1945 is a consequence of the military experience that the Red Army received before the Second World War? laughing Sergey, are you out of your mind?
                    Quote: ser56
                    and what - banal work on the bugs ...

                    Well, what can I say ... That's right. Only now if you had given yourself the trouble to study the history of the winter war - at that time the Red Army was one continuous mistake, which, however, could be divided into many small ones :))))
                    Quote: ser56
                    Of course, one question - the Wehrmacht how was the ski training set?

                    Excellent.
                    1. ser56
                      ser56 12 May 2018 13: 13
                      0
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      if you understood the structural difference between the DRP and a conventional gun, you would also understand that their costs are correlated at best as 1/2. And this is really a miser, which is not enough even to solve the local problems of artillery

                      1) you probably don’t understand the principle of the DRP, I’ll remind you that they altered the usual guns up to 12 dm .. lol
                      2) if you don’t want to hear — I don’t see any reason to repeat — I gave 1 (one) example of the incompetent spending of public money by illiterate bosses ... hi
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      You here told me with a blue eye that the F-22 is no good and that money was wasted on it in vain.

                      yes, while I rely on the opinion of Grabin himself! Ready to challenge? The question is not that Grabin created something acceptable in F22USV practically contrary to TK from Tukhachevsky who dreamed of universality, but that several design bureaus were engaged in stupidity and wasting money ... I recommend Shirokorad - he described everything quite easily. wink

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And what function, let me ask, did F-22 not perform, that even the Germans did not disdain to fight it? Do you even understand that your own remarks put a mate on yourself?

                      1) shoot at planes, as was customary from TK
                      2) the Germans converted the F22 into a VET gun if you are not in the know.
                      3) In your fantasies. I note that you have a classic chatter themes and withdrawal to details ...
                      4) Weapon weapons are what industry can do or maybe buy. However, the stupidity of the authorities set forth in the TK, such as, for example, a large-caliber self-propelled gun from Tukhachevsky, does not relate to the capabilities of industry ...
                    2. ser56
                      ser56 12 May 2018 13: 34
                      0
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And my advice to you - do not be clever, this is very bad for you.

                      I will refrain from writing what I do so that you do not have a complex ... I note that such advice gives out your lack of ability to discuss ...
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      I understand perfectly well that you are another victim of the myth that the blitzkrieg strategy was invented in the USSR

                      1) another transition to personality bully without an answer to the innocent question about the level of your military education.
                      2) Blitzkrieg is a German term; the USSR had its own understanding of operational and strategic art.


                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Because in his "writings" there IS IN general no understanding of how the modern war will be waged, all his statements turned out to be "true exactly the opposite." Triandafillov was mistaken at every step, and literally in everything.

                      this is because you look at his thoughts on the impending war in the late 20s through the experience of 2MB ... and therefore you do not see the essence of his innovations! But they are serious - deep separation of the formation of battle formations of the attacking army, and he draws this conclusion on the basis of analysis ... etc. so you are to yourself, not to Triandafilov ... bully
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Lists in the studio, please. how many active commanders of the Red Army were repressed in 1932, how many of them returned, how many were repressed again. Without this, your claims are not worth a damn.

                      you are funny! write yourself that some part wasand rehabilitated ... wassat
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      that is, to make 350-500 km per day - is that nothing? :)))

                      however, you forgot to indicate that the Germans lost at least 30% (how much the memoirist does not remember exactly bully ) tanks and they moved along the highway ... can you understand the difference with the 11TBr march across the steppe and desert? By the way - the marching speed of the tank column and now 25km / h, and with interruptions for maintenance of equipment.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Already 2 sabers in 000 you consider a serious opponent, able to teach the Red Army to fight

                      1) of course - this is a full-fledged team!
                      2) as I understand it, you have an extremely theoretical understanding of war ... even a small battle teaches soldiers and commanders better than lengthy exercises ...
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      This is where, let me ask?

                      You don’t remember what you write yourself? do you blame others for not understanding what you read? fancy ... bully Read yourself

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      In general, pblitzkrieg approval under the CER was only during the Mishanfus operation
                      crying


                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      about, in your opinion, the capture of Berlin in 1945 is a consequence of the military experience that the Red Army received before the Second World War? laughing Sergey, are you out of your mind?

                      1) yes, first of all, the CER, Mongolia and Finnish can be noted.
                      2) I already announced earlier that you do not know how to behave - rudeness in the discussion does not decorate ...
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      at that time the Red Army was one continuous mistake, which, however, could be divided into many small ones :))))

                      if not a secret - who took Vyborg? bully
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Excellent.

                      you probably think that you wrote something smart, you are mistaken ...
                      in short, despite a 30-year study of military history, you did not understand anything and remained an amateur who knew little about the development of tank (mechanized hi ) troops of the Red Army ... your statement that until the 30s the brigade was super!
                      soldier
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        13 May 2018 17: 31
                        +1
                        Quote: ser56
                        probably you don’t understand the principle of the DRP, I’ll remind you that they altered the usual guns up to 12 dm ..

                        The first prototypes :)))
                        Quote: ser56
                        if you don’t want to hear — I don’t see any reason to repeat — I gave 1 (one) example of the incompetent spending of public money by illiterate bosses ...

                        to which I replied to you that the example is incorrect due to the insignificance of the funds spent on it
                        Quote: ser56
                        yes, while I rely on the opinion of Grabin himself! Ready to challenge?

                        Naturally. Because Grabin did not say that the gun could not perform any functions, he wrote that other artillery systems could do the same much better.
                        Quote: ser56
                        I recommend Shirokorada - he described everything quite accessible. wink

                        I DO NOT recommend Shirokorad, because the only useful thing in his works is cataloging and systematization, i.e. as an encyclopedist he is not bad, but when he tries to pose as a historian ... he makes three mistakes in one paragraph. In fact, Shirokorad is not at all valued among historians.
                        Quote: ser56
                        shoot at planes, as was customary from TK

                        I could not, I agree. This makes her useless like an anti-aircraft gun, but not like a field gun
                        Quote: ser56
                        the Germans converted the F22 into a VET gun if you aren’t in the know.

                        That is, how the PT-F-22 gun at least corresponded to German requirements, right? And from this it automatically follows that and how the F-22 field gun took place, since the external and internal ballistics of the gun suitable for anti-theft defense, in terms of firing accuracy, fully meets the requirements for destroying enemy manpower and other tasks of field guns. 76 mm ammunition had a certain power. That is, it was clearly not the best, but still a tolerable artillery system. You’re trying to turn it in for scrap :)))) But, for example, 28-mm American anti-aircraft guns that were completely unsuitable for repelling artillery strikes or German 37-mm “auto” anti-aircraft guns - for some reason, no. What am I talking to you about? F-22 was not the best, but was not worthless :)))
                        Quote: ser56
                        another transition to a bully personality, and without answering an innocent question about the level of your military education.

                        The question is not innocent, the question is ridiculous - as if in order to be able to judge the operational-strategic doctrines of the Second World War era, you need to have a military education. And with this question you are trying to get away from a topic that has become uncomfortable for you, to shut up my mouth "say - not a general, so be quiet."
                        Quote: ser56
                        Blitzkrieg is a German term; the USSR had its own understanding of operational and strategic art.

                        It was. But this understanding in the part of the “theory of deep operation” was not progressive, no matter how much. In general, I can only advise reading Isaev first (he explains the essence of the Blitzkrieg in a very simple and understandable language "for dummies"), and then - Triandafillov.
                        Quote: ser56
                        I will refrain from writing what I do

                        Better to refrain from writing at all, and start reading something.
                        Quote: ser56
                        this is because you look at his thoughts on the impending war in the late 20s through the experience of 2MB ... and therefore you do not see the essence of his innovations! But they are serious - deep separation of the formation of battle formations of the attacking army

                        You know, I won’t argue with you. Since you have not found the strength to familiarize yourself with the work of Triandafillov, then read my old article on this topic. If, after reading it, you will have something to object to on the merits, I beg you. Essentially, please.
                        http://alternathistory.com/nekotorie-razmyshleniy
                        ao-blitskrige-i-taktike-tankovikh-voysk
                        Quote: ser56
                        you are funny! write yourself that some part has been rehabilitated ... wassat

                        Clear. You declare to me that the Red Army received a terrible blow by repressions. When I ask - how much - you give me the figure of 3 people. When I remind you that not all of the recommended 000 were commanders, and a significant part was then returned to the ranks of the Red Army, then this, then you begin to get out, "and they say they planted them again", and when I ask to clarify who and how much, then this turns out to be funny :))))
                        Nude nude
                        Quote: ser56
                        however, you forgot to indicate that the Germans lost at least 30% (how many bully memoirists do not remember) of the tanks and they moved along the highway ... can you understand the difference with the 11TBr march across the steppe and desert?

                        Are you sure that the highway? :))) Or is the highway for you - a priori any road in the West? :)))) By the way, have you ever seen the steppe in the areas where our team was walking? :)))) )
                        And most importantly - a difference of 3-4 times in the average daily distance of the transition.
                        Quote: ser56
                        Of course - this is a full-fledged team!

                        Is a gang of Basmachi, not knowing the system, not having heavy weapons - is this a full-fledged brigade? Well, what can I say - yes, you are just a full-fledged historian! laughing
                        Quote: ser56
                        You don’t remember what you write yourself?

                        I remember. And I know that I did not write anything like that. For I wrote
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Quote: ser56
                        Combat on the CER is a wonderful blitzkrieg experience, while different types of aircraft interacted - the fleet, aviation, cavalry, etc.

                        From what you wrote, I conclude that you do not know what blitzkrieg is. In general, the similarity of a blitzkrieg under the CER was only during the Mishanfus operation - and that’s all.

                        Where was the "refutation of oneself" here? The spirit of the restless Winston Churchill has infused you and you accept the “polite refusal for warm approval”?
                        Quote: ser56
                        Yes, first of all, CER, Mongolia and Finnish can be noted.

                        Tryndets. But I'm glad you said it yourself. Because if I blamed you for this, the readers of our correspondence would not have believed me :))))

                        Thanks for the discussion, I have no more questions for you.
                        Z.Y.
                        Quote: ser56
                        your statement that until the 30s the brigade was super the highest unit in the Red Army mechanized troops!

                        TANK Troops, Serge. TANK :))))))
  36. ventel
    ventel 6 May 2018 08: 39
    +1
    Quote: Olgovich
    Quote: ventel
    You compare how you received the rank of officer in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army is surprised.

    Who prevented the Red Army from doing the same?
    Quote: ventel
    Yes, the Reichswehr did not have tanks, there was little artillery, but the Germans found a way out.

    The Red Army did not need to search and run with cardboard tanks, but the Wehrmacht, in just SIX years, prepared for some reason much better.

    The eternal Russian question of finding the one to blame for their troubles. Although this question was already answered "Fools and roads will destroy Russia" if Stalin and his tough approach to building the state would lose the war.
  37. tasha
    tasha 7 May 2018 18: 32
    +1
    Gopnik,
    You freak man ...
    How can I argue with Olgovich if you tell him nothing, he’s all about one thing: “The USSR couldn’t, the USSR couldn’t” ... And he does not understand in his fanaticism that he bites his tail ..
    The USSR could not create normal aircraft engines, could not weld glass for sights, could not make the gearbox for the tank .. Yes, a lot of things could not. And even the great reserve from the king-father did not help him, and even the cadres of the imperial academies on a silver platter did not bring ready-made projects. Everything had to be created by trial and error, at the cost of incredible efforts and the experience of a bloody ...
    And you're still trying to protect the unreasonable .. From what?
    1. Gopnik
      Gopnik 7 May 2018 19: 42
      0
      Quote: tasha
      And you're still trying to protect the unreasonable .. From what?


      I did not think to protect you, it is pointless.
      1. tasha
        tasha 8 May 2018 04: 08
        +1
        I did not think to protect you, it is pointless.

        Looks like it ... Yes, but at first it seemed that ... Your comments addressed to me will be read, but I do not consider it possible and necessary to respond to them.
    2. ser56
      ser56 8 May 2018 11: 20
      +1
      Just as an example - in 1914, the RI industry built Izmail-type LCs ... yes, with technical assistance from the West, but according to its own design ... and in 1934 the USSR was unable to create a project even EM, I had to buy in Italy ... argue, of course that ri was backward difficult bully
      1. tasha
        tasha 8 May 2018 13: 45
        0
        Another ... Where do you come from?!?!
        Do you understand what this is about?

        Yes, the USSR was such a backward country that even EM projects could not create their own. We couldn’t create our tanks, we had to take foreign models as a basis, there was nowhere to take our own anti-tank gun, I had to make “forty-five” from the German 37-mm ... I couldn’t create my own aircraft engines ... I’m writing everything correctly, still add that you in paroxysm of happiness clogged up? wink
        1. ser56
          ser56 8 May 2018 14: 25
          0
          Do you have problems realizing your emotions in other places? sorry... bully however, I didn’t see the arguments, be simpler - write them instead of lyrics ... hi
          1. tasha
            tasha 8 May 2018 14: 30
            0
            What are the arguments? What should I convince you of? What gates are painted?

            Do you understand what this is about?

            Am I writing everything right?
  38. tasha
    tasha 8 May 2018 06: 07
    0
    Olgovich,
    Eh, Olgovich, Olgovich .. Can you explain the essence of our dispute? Short..
  39. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 8 May 2018 11: 12
    +2
    What are your “for sure” statements worth? Nothing. The USSR could defeat the 5-year-old Wehrmacht, which only 5 years ago STARTED only to create tank and aviation units, unlike the USSR

    My statements are worthless, but the real course of the Soviet-Finnish war is a historical fact. Based on this historical fact and the difference in the power of the Finnish and German army, I made my vivod that "for sure" the Red Army could not defeat the Wehrmacht in 1938.
    Quote: Kostadinov

    “. The USSR created its military-economic potential in the 30th year, and Germany already had this potential in the First World War.

    And they had and they had by 1940. And what? Who cares, WHEN he was reached by someone, yesterday or the day before?

    It should be understood that it does not matter to you if an industrial enterprise was created 50 years ago and its workers and engineers were already the second or third generation, or an enterprise was created 5 years ago and its workers and engineers were beaten by peasants five years ago.
    It does not matter that only the Messerschmit design bureau beat more engineers than all the USSR aviation design bureaus. It doesn’t matter that Germany produced the best fighters in the world as early as 1918, and Russia didn’t even produce bad fighters, and the USSR was forced to start beating with a copy of the failed American Boeing fighters. And so on in all areas of the military industry
    Quote: Kostadinov

    “In comparison with the First World War, the USSR became more powerful several times and Germany only by a percent.
    About Germany, nonsense. Learn, and don’t forget, HOW MUCH Germany has become less after the WWII

    The USSR also became smaller in comparison with tsarist Russia. All the same, Germany managed to increase its industry by about 30% compared with the WWI, and the USSR 5-6 times, but it didn’t beat enough to overcome the whole huge lag behind Germany in the WWI, even in quantitative terms, and even more so it couldn’t beat so fast Overcome a quality lag.
    Quote: Kostadinov
    “Therefore, Russia lost and the USSR lost the war with Germany
    Why "sing"? request

    Because the USSR was reducing every year and managed to reduce its lag behind Germany by 1941, he still lost the war, but only with great stress and casualties, and to a large extent thanks to the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition. In 1938, the lag of the USSR from Germany in the military industry beat much more than in 1941 and could not beat any anti-German coalition. Therefore, the preventive war of the USSR against Germany in 1938 could end only in defeat.
    1. ser56
      ser56 8 May 2018 14: 29
      0
      you have logical mistakes - the Finnish war showed that the Red Army is capable of fighting in the winter, especially after abandoning the tactics of throwing hats, but the Wehrmacht was not ready to fight in the winter ... bully
      1. YELLOWSTONE
        YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 21: 04
        0
        Quote: Munich agreement
        September 20-21, English and French envoys Czechoslovakia told the Czechoslovak government that if it does not accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government "will not fulfill the contract" with Czechoslovakia. They also said the following: “If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war can take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stay away. ”
        ...
        On September 28, Chamberlain assured Hitler that he could get everything “without war and without delay” [6].

        On September 29, in Munich, at the initiative of Hitler, he meets with the heads of government of Great Britain, France and Italy. However, contrary to the promise in a letter to Chamberlain, Czechoslovak representatives were not allowed to discuss the agreement. The USSR was refused participation in the meeting. Soviet troops were on the western state border until October 25, and then were returned to areas of permanent deployment.

        that's where their legs grow
    2. YELLOWSTONE
      YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 03: 18
      0
      could anyone give her? for this, it would have been nice to fight with Poland, which Germany, which had not yet gained strength against the USSR, was covered by England, which then bombarded the grateful Germans
      1. YELLOWSTONE
        YELLOWSTONE 11 May 2018 17: 11
        0
        By the way, the Poles at that time had an agreement with the Germans on mutual defense against the USSR yes
        and here it was about the passage of Soviet troops to defend Czechoslovakia against which there were not only Poles but also their commanders in the Munich conspiracy, a deed with a chamberlain in London and Paris
  40. ser56
    ser56 14 May 2018 14: 56
    0
    Andrey from Chelyabinsk,
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    The first prototypes :)))

    you confuse the work of the DRP with the classic recoilless guns, but this is not entirely true ... there is a Laval nozzle ...
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    to which I replied to you that the example is incorrect due to the insignificance of the funds spent on it

    tens of millions of rubles trifles? bully recalling the T-34 was worth 300-400t

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Because Grabin did not say that the gun could not perform any functions, he wrote that other artillery systems could do the same much better.

    that’s why he designed the SPM, and then the ZIS-3 ... well - you don’t want to take the blinkers off - your right ...
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    DO NOT recommend Shirokorada,
    talking about artillery? You are funny, as is the opinion of some "historians" about him crying

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    about there as a weapon of the PT-22 at least met the German requirements, right? And from this it automatically follows that and how the F-22 field gun took place, since the external and internal ballistics of the gun suitable for the VET are accurate

    German requirements, it began to comply after alterations ... by the way - why do you have such cringing? bully
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    b operational-strategic doctrines of the era of the Second World War need to have a military education. And with this question you are trying to get away from a topic that has become uncomfortable for you, to shut up my mouth "say - not a general, so be quiet."
    you should not transfer your approaches to me in vain ... just to understand the place and significance of any thinker you need to have systemic knowledge ... usually those who have specialized education have it. I am returning you to my father for Shirokorada ... bully

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    this, then you start to get out, "and they say they later planted them again," and when I ask to clarify who and how much, it turns out to be ridiculous :))))

    I am waiting for an answer to the question - how many of these 3000 were rehabilitated ... bully
    "He was arrested in 1930 in the case of the National Center, but was released. Re-arrested in February 1931 in the case of Vesna and sentenced to 5 years in prison in July. However, he was released in February 1932 and returned to service in the Red Army : first at the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, then at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army newly formed in 1936. The last military rank in the Red Army is the division commander.
    The last arrest followed on December 30, 1937. During the investigation, Svechin did not confess to anything and did not stipulate anyone [2]. He was signed for repression in the first category (shooting) on ​​the list of Moscow Center on July 26, 1938 for 139 people, No. 107, on the recommendation of I. I. Shapiro. Signatures: "For the execution of all 138 people." Stalin, Molotov. Sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on July 29, 1938 on charges of participating in a counter-revolutionary organization and training terrorists.
    He was shot and buried at Kommunarka (Moscow Region) on July 29, 1938. "
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    You about the fact that at the beginning in 1938 the mechanized corps did not enter the tank troops :)))

    while tank troops, strictly speaking, weren’t in 1938 ... hi Okay - you want to play verbiage - your problem ...
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    read Isaev first (he explains the essence of the Blitzkrieg in a very simple and understandable language "for dummies"), and then - Triandafillov.

    I have a different opinion about Isaev’s "creativity", but this is off topic and I will refrain from littering the branch ....
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Better to refrain from writing at all, and start reading something.

    rudeness is a common trait of those who have no arguments ...

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Are you sure that the highway? :))) Or is the highway for you - a priori any road in the West? :)))) By the way, have you ever seen the steppe in the areas where our team was walking? :)))) )
    And most importantly - a difference of 3-4 times in the average daily distance of the transition.

    1) sure
    2) I have been not only in Munich, but also in Berlin, Cologne, Düssel and others ... I understand that Chelyabinsk is a strange revenge, but why consider everyone from the Urals as homebody ... bully Your opinion about the Transbaikal steppe is amusing ....
    3) My data shows exactly the running hours of BT tanks, Guderian just shows the time - how many running are not indicated. If you think that tanks can move non-stop - you're funny ... bully so your arithmetic is funny ...


    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Well, what can I say - yes, you are just a full-fledged historian!

    it seems like a tantrum ... laughing For me, the word historian is an insult ... in the USSR / RF, with the rarest exception, these are propagandists ....
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    what is blitzkrieg. AND In general, the semblance of a blitzkrieg under the CER was only during the Mishanfus operationand - and that’s it.

    Where was the "refutation of oneself" here?

    it’s a pity that you don’t know how to read yourself ...
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    TANK Troops, Serge. TANK :))))))

    1) Do you and I know each other - where does familiarity come from?
    2) There were then no tank troops in the Red Army, there were Mechanized Forces (1929-1936) and Armored Forces (1936-1942)

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Thanks for the discussion, I have no more questions for you.

    mutually - you are not able to lead a discussion on this topic - The balance of forces of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in 1938 and the military-economic capabilities to wage war between the USSR and Germany at this time. They reduced it to trifling issues of technical equipment, but at the same time they refused to consider the Red Army and the Wehrmacht according to uniform requirements. In general, the banal theses of the Soviet Agitprop were projected, despite the removal of the veil of secrecy from the data.
    In general, the usual level of Soviet historians who do not know how to think for themselves ... Good luck .. bully
  41. ser56
    ser56 14 May 2018 14: 57
    0
    Andrey from Chelyabinsk,

    Now about your article
    “Blitzkrieg is a broader term, implying a quick defeat of the enemy’s armies even before the enemy can deploy and throw into the battle all the power available to him and forcing him to peace as a result of such a defeat”
    here and consider the fights on the CER in the context of this definition ... Classic blitzkrieg ..
    "Therefore, for the tactics described above, I will allow myself to use a new term - the tactics of deep operations"
    egregious military illiteracy - tactics describe the battle of units, you write about the operational level of formations and associations .. in doing so, further “during the deep operation of the tank forces a strategic result is achieved” write correctly, but forget about the interaction of the military branches ... you are alone tanks should fight? without aviation and artillery attached?
    "As A. Patients wrote maliciously," he made out in his book what you are trying to write in an article ... and more convincingly
    "which implies the complete mechanization of troops" controversially - horse - mechanized groups showed themselves perfectly in the Second World War ... you confuse mobility and mechanization ...
    "Only on June 17, 1929, at the suggestion of V.K. Triandafilov, the Revolutionary Military Council accepts" you are funny when you read carefully - write the correct data, but draw strange conclusions ... Triandafilov theoretically came to the thought of MK, broke through their formation, but for you " They are credited with the creation of the theory of deep operations, or at least the authorship of the main postulates of this theory (and especially to V.K. Triandafilov). " laughing
    "Hence the question - what kind of such deep tank raids could Triandafilov write if the materiel at his disposal worked" a day in two? "
    even at a speed of 5 km / ch 6 hours it’s 30 km - and this is an operational breakthrough ... bully yes, and the troops can not immediately put everything into action, but with trains, as the theoretician wrote about ...
    “an offensive - according to Triandafilov, not for the purpose of encircling the enemy, but for the purpose of“ drawing on himself ”most of his forces and defeating them in the oncoming battle.”
    you have an absolute environment! I don’t know why - but probably from a poor understanding of the banal that with the growth of the Red Army command of the Red Army in the Second World War, they switched to this type of action - see the Wisla-Oder operation ...
    Yes, and in the Belarusian boilers were defeated in the oncoming battle ...
    "Triandafilov is a priori sure that the advancing groups will move SLOWER than the defending groups!" because the enemy will destroy bridges, roads!
    "Triandafilov says nothing about the actions of mechanized troops after breaking through the enemy’s defense."
    therefore, he does not say that he does not have experience in their application, but he came to the thought of the need for their creation ...
    "DOES NOT SEE fully motorized compounds" - see the beginning - he encouraged their creation ... bully
    further "A normally advancing one must maintain the possibility of an offensive with its main forces at an average speed equal to the average speed of movement of large military masses, that is, less than 20-25 km per day; in this case, individual army units (cavalry and motorized units) must do up to 35 —50 km, in order to maintain a position covering or threatening the enemy’s deep rear lines, to ensure the possibility of reaching its rear and obstructing its planned retreat. quite a lot of motorized units. The motorization of the strategic cavalry must also be attached to these events. "the full essence of the tactics of the mobile troops .... but you don’t have enough ... bully
    but you don't like it
    "the role of motorized units is not the main, but purely auxiliary - the pursuit of the enemy after his defeat. Light cavalry of antiquity." and there is! Very accurate remark!

    “The thing is that Triandafilov considers tanks as some kind of additional means that can be given to infantry, cavalry units to strengthen them. In other words (and this is most important) Triandafilov DOES NOT SEE a tank formation as an alloy of dissimilar forces. He sees separate purely tank compounds that are attached to advancing units to enhance their power. "
    exactly - that was how tank regiments were led in cavalry division!
    “Yes, and these very“ independent mechanized and tank units with non-independent tasks were planned ”a little - by January 1, 1934 in the Red Army there were 2 mechanized corps, 6 mechanized brigades, 6 tank regiments, 23 tank battalions and 37 separate tank companies of rifle divisions, 14 mechanized regiments and 5 mechanized divisions in the cavalry. In pursuance of the plan, two more mechanized corps were formed in 1934. "
    I read you and do not really understand your message that MK was not in the 30s ... crying
    "with a total number of slightly less than 9 thousand people, the mechanized corps was armed with 463 tanks, but only 20 guns. This tank cross" remember the change in the structure of German tank divisions? I note - according to the results of the database ... bully

    I don’t see any point in reading - I previously made a complete conclusion — you demand the impossible from Triandafilov — to create a complete theory of the use of mobile (for you tank) troops! I would call it politely speaking - funny ... He was a military theorist, not a prophet. hi His analysis is quite accurate and in the right direction - he first formulated the requirements and achieved the formation of the MK, and that fate didn’t give him more time is not his fault ... and your jumps on his bones and fussing with after knowing just characterize you, and not Triandafilov ... wassat