In one fell swoop, the Wehrmacht was beaten, or the Red Army in 1938
So, it is no less true that in the 1938, the USSR did not have enough money for the armed forces, and this, strictly speaking, is the reason for the extremely regrettable state in which the Army of the Soviets was.
Но обо всем по порядку.
Recently, Oleg Kaptsov introduced an article to the community of BO "Strike at fascist Germany ... in 1938 g"in which he claimed the following:
We will not wonder how the Red Army could defeat the Wehrmacht at a time when the USSR had no land borders with Germany. We will not specify that in 1938 of the USSR no policy of appeasing Hitler led, but on the contrary, he tried his best to knock together the anti-Hitler coalition following the pattern of the Entente, and did it right up to the Munich betrayal, when England and France condemned the Czechoslovak state to death . We will not recall also that in 1938 the USSR did not conclude any pacts - the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was nevertheless signed on 23 in August 1939.
We will only try to recall the state of our “Invincible and Legendary” in 1938.
So, at the beginning of the year, our ground forces included:
1. Tank troops - 37 brigades, including 32 tank, 2 armored and 3 motorized rifle brigades. The number of peacetime - 90 880 people. or about 2,5 thousand people per brigade;
2. Cavalry - 32 divisions, including 5 mountain and 3 territorial, to this 8 spare cavalry regiments and a small, but unknown number of cavalry brigades. The number of peacetime - 95 690 people. or less 3 000 people in the division;
3. Rifle troops - 96 divisions, including 52 personnel and mixed, 10 mountain and 34 territorial. Peacetime strength - 616 000 people, (6 416 people per division), but other than that, rifle troops also included fortified garrisons with peacetime numbers 20 940 people, respectively, the total number was 636 940 people;
4. Artillery RGC - 23 regiment, peacetime strength 34 160 people;
5. Air defense - 20 artillery regiments and 22 division, in peacetime - 45 280 people;
6. The RGK Chemical Forces - 2 motorized chemical divisions, one armored chemical brigade, separate battalions and companies. Peacetime abundance - 9 370 people .;
7. Automobile parts - 32 battalion and 10 mouth total number - 11 120 people;
8. Communications units, engineering, railway, topographic troops - the number of connections is unknown to the author, but their peacetime numbers were 50 420 people;
In general, at first glance - a terrible force. Even without air defense forces, which the Germans were listed in the Luftwaffe, that is, they did not belong to ground forces, we had about 165 division-type formations (counting as brigade 2 divisions or 3 regiment), not counting communications, engineers, and so on.
And what was the Germans? Oh, their Wehrmacht in 1938 was much more modest and included only:
Panzer divisions - 3;
Motorized Divisions - 4;
Infantry Divisions - 32;
Reserve divisions - 8;
Landwehr divisions - 21;
Mountain rifle, cavalry and light motorized brigades - 3.
In other words, the Germans had 69,5 division-type compounds. Here, however, an attentive reader can ask a malicious question - and why are we to land forces for cadre troops? But we must remember that the 34 domestic rifle and 3 cavalry divisions were territorial, and what is it? Recall the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov:
We draw attention to the fact that "for three months and five years," not only the rank and file, but also junior commanders were called. With such a level of "training", they could not be considered trained reserve rank and file, and they commanded! In general, the combat effectiveness of our territorial divisions was at about zero, and certainly was not higher than that of the German Landwehr. Even worse, from the 52 personnel division of the Soviet rifle divisions, some (alas, unknown to the author) were staffed on a mixed basis, that is, partly on a territorial basis, and, accordingly, also had limited combat capability.
And yet we can diagnose more than double the superiority of the Red Army by the number of connections. But if we look at the number of wartime armies, here the picture becomes much less optimistic.
In 1938, there was a transition to a new structure of ground forces and a new mobplan, in accordance with which the number of armed forces of the USSR, after mobilization, was to be 6 503 500 people. Prior to this, in 1937 g and at the beginning of 1938 g, another mobilization plan was in effect for 5 300 000 people. Strictly speaking, if suddenly the USSR in 1938 r decided to go to war with someone, then he would have the opportunity to do it according to the old mobilization plan, but after the beginning of the reorganization of the parts, it would be strictly contraindicated to go into a fight with someone - Anyone who knows a little about the army will tell you how much the combat capability of the reformed units that have not passed combat coordination falls.
But we still assume that the USSR, wanting to fight, has deployed the Red Army already under a new mobilization plan. In this case, the ground forces, including air defense troops, would be 5 137 200 people, and excluding air defense - 4 859 800 people.
At the same time, Germany, according to its plan of mobilization, was to deploy ground forces of 3 343 476 people. Again, it seems that the USSR has an advantage. True, no longer at times, but on 45,3%, but still. But even here, if you think about it, the picture is not at all as rosy as it may seem at first glance.
Suppose a geopolitical miracle happened in 1938. Poland magically moved to a parallel space, where it occupied the territory that befits its ambitions (“from mozhno mozha”) and, despite the tearful pleas of the League of Nations, absolutely does not want to come back. The world has changed, Germany and the USSR gained a common border in 1938, and the Dark Lord Sauron ... I mean, Stalin decided to collapse all his accumulated power over the centuries on the Light Elves of the West ... uh ... white and fluffy Hitler Germany. What will be the alignment of the political forces of the East and the West in this case?
The first thing that can be said right away is that no Anglo-American-Soviet Union, by analogy with the Second World War, can arise under such conditions. In our stories Britain and France arrogantly rejected the hand extended to them by the USSR, until the British themselves were one step away from a catastrophe from which only a strong continental ally could pull them out. That's when they, of course, remembered about the USSR. In our case, when many in the West still had illusions about Hitler, the USSR’s attack on Germany would be perceived as unprovoked aggression and in the best (for the USSR) case would be angrily branded from the high tribunes of the League of Nations. Of course, it is extremely doubtful if England or France moved their troops to help Gondor ... Ahhhh ... Hitler (to fight for the Huns? Fi, this is a move!), most likely it would be all-round approval, help with supplies weapons and so on, possibly by volunteers. In other words, Germany, most likely, could count on the support of the world community, no less than the one that Finland received during the “winter war” with the USSR. Least.
But the most important thing that follows from this support is that in this case the Germans did not have to worry about protecting their borders with other Western countries, Germany could concentrate the bulk of its ground forces in the east against the invading USSR armies. But in the USSR, the geopolitical alignment is completely different.
The USSR becomes a rogue state, it, in fact, was outlawed - not that we could not rely on someone else’s help, but even on maintaining the existing foreign trade relations with the United States. Americans will tear them apart. And in the east, we have an extremely exalted neighbor in Japan, who has been sharpening their katanas for a year, not knowing who to aim at - either the United States or the USSR. In our reality, the sons of Yamato grappled with the Americans, but in the event of a Soviet attack on Germany in 1938, the political alignment completely changes - Japan has the opportunity, attacking a rogue state that no one supports (USSR), get a lot of buns from Germany, which By itself, such support will be extremely important. And this is not just with non-interference, but with the approval of English-speaking countries!
What could keep Japan from attacking the USSR? Only one thing - a powerful Soviet army in the Far East. And, I must say, we had one, because of the total number of 5 137 200 people. ground forces of the Red Army in the Far East we had to be deployed 1 014 900 people. And we will not be able to transfer this army, as in 1941, to the western front - all this power, to the last man, will have to guarantee the security of the eastern flank of the USSR against the invasion of Japan.
The author does not know exactly how many air defense troops should have been deployed in the Far, but if we assume that they were distributed in proportion to the total number of ground forces, it turns out that for an attack on Germany, exposing all borders except the eastern one, the USSR could deploy 3 899 at best 703 people This still exceeds the capabilities of the Wehrmacht, but no more than 17%.
Strictly speaking, this is where any argument about the superiority of the USSR over Germany could be completed, but we will also recall such factors as the timing of the mobilization and deployment of armies. After the First World War, absolutely all countries knew that war does not begin when the first shot blasts, but when the country announces mobilization. But Germany won in terms of deploying armies for at least three weeks - the reason for this is easily recognized by anyone who looks at the map of Germany and the USSR and makes it difficult to estimate the area and carrying capacity of the transport communications of both countries. In other words, in the case of mobilization, Germany will be the first to deploy an army, and therefore it turns out that less than 20 percent Soviet numerical advantage is a purely imaginary thing, and in fact in the case of a real war, it may well turn out that we have to fight not even with equal , and with a superior enemy.
But what about technology? Guns, tanks, planes? “We will answer all your questions like this:“ We have a lot of “maxims” - do you have no “maxims”?
And indeed, an army with a sufficient number of heavy weapons has a significant, downright overwhelming advantage over an army of the same number, which does not have such weapons in general, or is much inferior to them in the enemy.
So, our armed forces really had a lot of weapons. But heavy weapons provide enormous advantages only under one condition - if the army knows how to use it. Alas, the Red Army model 1938, say this was not. We will not specifically quote S.K. Tymoshenko, who replaced the National Defense Commissioner K.E. Voroshilov 7 May 1940 Mr. - in the end, his crushing "comments" can always be attributed to "a new broom sweeps in a new way." But let us recall the orders of Clement Yefremovich Voroshilov himself, issued by him in 1938. The order of the USSR NKO N 113 from December 11 1938 g read:
This most important matter, just like the possession of “pocket artillery” - grenade launcher, was not given proper and daily attention from the military councils of districts, armies, groups and command of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments.
At the same time, the highest, senior and middle commanders, commissars and staffs themselves are not yet an example for the troops in the ability to wield weapons. Younger commanders are also not taught this case and therefore cannot properly train the fighters.
The troops still have, however, individual fighters who have served for a year, but have never fired a combat cartridge. It is necessary to firmly grasp that, not learning to really shoot, you can not expect success in close combat with the enemy. Therefore, anyone who counteracts or tries to “ignore” this yawning breakthrough in the combat readiness of the troops cannot claim to be the real commanders of the Red Army capable of teaching and training troops. Breakthroughs in fire training are considered as the main flaw in the work of all command units.
The ability of the commander, commissioner of the unit and subunit to direct the fire preparation and teach the unit (unit), shoot accurately and have a good command of personal weapons when inspecting units, as well as especially noted in the appraisals ... "
In other words, the qualification of the commanders of the Red Army was such that the ability to fire a pistol, rifle, machine gun, etc. among them were so infrequent that they should be particularly noted in the certification! But how could such a situation? The fact is that after the civil war the army of the USSR was reduced below any reasonable minimum - so, in 1925, the total number of our armed forces was 562 thousand people, and in 1932 g - 604 300 people, including all branches of the military there is not only a land army, but also air forces and the navy! No doubt, for the defense of a giant country, such as the USSR, such forces were completely inadequate, but the problem was that the young country of the Soviets simply could not afford anything more. Again, after the civil war, the Red Army did not have a shortage of officers — there were also old cadres who served the sovereign emperor, and “the practices of the civil war — the communists”. Accordingly, for some time the armed forces did not feel the need for an influx of graduate officers of military schools, and this, naturally, had a strong impact on their work.
However, later officers were needed, and urgently. In addition to the natural, and not quite natural, loss (it’s no secret that, in addition to the usual service, they tried to get rid of the tsarist officers from a certain moment), the USSR grew economically so that it could contain a much more numerous army - in 1938 r (peacetime) has already exceeded half a million. Accordingly, the need for officers increased dramatically, but where were they to be taken? The military schools that were reduced during the period of the “500-thousand army”, of course, could not provide the necessary quantity of “supply” of officers to the troops.
The exit was found in the accelerated courses of junior commanders (platoon-company level), and it looked like this - the most educated commanders (sergeants) were taken and sent to courses that lasted several months, and then returned to the troops as lieutenants. But such a system could only work effectively with a highly skilled non-commissioned officer staff. We did it the same way - the squad leader, whom no one taught the basics of military science (remember the ability to shoot!), Got into courses where nobody taught him that either (as it was assumed that he already knows all this) but they gave the basics of tactics, topography, etc. and released into the troops. In general, the problem was that refresher courses with proper organization can work very well, but under one very important condition - if the trainees have something to improve. In our case, these people should have been taught from scratch, which, naturally, the accelerated courses could not cope. As a result, a significant part of their graduates remained untenable both in the role of the detachment commander and in the role of a platoon commander. And therefore, it is not surprising that such devices as a revolver, rifle, grenade, machine gun, turned out to be too complicated for a significant part of the Red Army commanders, and they simply did not know how to effectively use the weapons entrusted to them.
I ask dear readers to understand the author correctly. The USSR was not at all a “land of fools” unable to understand the truism. The Red Army had a lot of experienced, intelligent commanders, but they were simply not enough. The key problem of the Red Army was not at all in some innate stupidity or inability of our ancestors, but in the fact that the army of the country for nearly a decade was reduced to a meager number, for the full maintenance and training of which there were no funds. And then, when funds were found, the international situation demanded an explosive increase in the size of the Red Army, which would be a huge problem even if our 500-thousand-strong armed forces were composed entirely of super-trained professionals, which, of course, was not.
And besides, there was a huge disproportion between the capabilities of the industry to produce military equipment and the ability of the armed forces to effectively exploit it. The USSR invested in the military industry and this gave the country a lot - a huge number of jobs appeared that required skilled labor, military enterprises demanded high-quality raw materials for weapons, armor, etc., and all this had a very positive effect on the development of Soviet industry, but Moreover, it laid the foundation that allowed us to subsequently break the back of fascist Germany. But with all this, thousands of tanks, aircraft and cannons going to the troops simply could not be properly mastered by them.
Formally, the Red Army tank forces in 1938 r possessed a truly all-crushing power - in the 1938 r the mobilized Red Army should have had 15 613 tanks. But of them in tank brigades as of 01.01.1938, there were 4 950 vehicles, while the rest were “ripped off” by rifle divisions. What does this mean in practice?
The Soviet planned economy in those years was still only making its first steps. The USSR established the production of tanks, but with the maintenance of technical combat readiness things were much worse - the plans for the production of spare parts and components did not correspond to the actual need, and besides, these plans, as a rule, were regularly disrupted by industry. It is not easy to blame production for this - in those years it also experienced diseases of explosive growth, including, of course, personnel hunger. Of course, it was only possible to dream of recruiting an army with a sufficient number of technicians trained in the maintenance of military equipment. Of course, in tank brigades, which were specialized tank divisions, it was easier with this, yet the graduates of tank schools in the USSR trained well enough, but in infantry divisions, as a rule, there was no repair base or people capable of servicing tracked military technique, why the latter quickly fell into disrepair. From this, again, there was a desire to use the technique to the very minimum, and it is not surprising that even by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, having a tank fleet exceeding all the other armies of the world combined, a fair amount of driver mechanics 5-8 hours. And one of the reasons for the formation of the Red Army's monstrous tank corps, each of which was supposed to include more than 1000 tanks in the state, was the desire to assemble equipment in one place, in which at least it could be provided with proper maintenance.
In addition, it should be borne in mind and not the best structure of our armored forces. The experience of World War II irrefutably showed that the greatest success was achieved by the formation of a division level, in which, besides the tanks themselves, there were motorized infantry and artillery capable of operating together with tanks. At the same time, the Soviet brigades were, in essence, purely tank units, and the Red Army did not have either artillery or motorized infantry capable of supporting tanks. Perhaps the only more or less reasonable way to form mobile units would be to give tank brigades to cavalry divisions, but even in this case, of course, tanks would operate at the speed of a horse.
In other words, there were a lot of tanks, but, alas, there were no combat-capable tank forces capable of waging a maneuverable war in the Red Army in 1938.
In addition, I would like to note that measuring the power of armies in proportion to the number of military equipment in its composition, which sins a lot of publicists and even authors claiming the title of academic historians, has absolutely no right to life. Let us take a simple example - artillery, which, as we know, is the god of war. The Red Army at the start of the 1938 of the year was armed with the 35 530 of various artillery systems.
It seems to be a very significant value, but ... is it necessary to explain that a gun has combat significance only when it is provided with a sufficient number of shells? At the same time, on 01.01.1938, the standards for the stock of shells for medium-caliber guns were provided by 56%, large-caliber - by 28%, and small-caliber - by only 10%! On average, the artillery was provided with 28% shells, and how would you order to fight this?
But maybe we just had too high standards? Let's try to count differently: on the 01.01.1938, the Red Army had reserves in the amount of 29 799 thousand shells of all calibres. As we have said, the artillery system in the Red Army was 35 530, that is, one gun had, on average, 839 shells. Is it a lot or a little? Before the First World War, the Russian Imperial Army had an average stock of almost 1000 shells per gun. The author believes that all readers of this article perfectly remember the consequences of the “shell hunger” faced by the Russian armed forces in that war?
But maybe in 1938 we already had such a powerful industry that we could easily meet the needs of the army by working “from the wheels”? Without a doubt, the USSR made great efforts to provide artillery with shells, and here we had some success - for all the 1938 of the Red Army received from the industry 12 434 thousand artillery shots, which made up almost 42% of all stocks accumulated on 01.01.1938. but alas, this was still not enough.
In 1938, the USSR gained the opportunity to test its armed forces in a small conflict with Japan at Lake Hassan.
There, the Japanese concentrated somewhat superior numbers of troops (about 20 thousand soldiers, against about 15 thousand Red Army men), while the artillery forces were approximately comparable (200 cannons from the Japanese, 237 from the Red Army). But Soviet troops were supported aviation and tanks, and the Japanese did not use either one or the other. The result of the clashes was excellently set forth in the order of the Non-Profit Organization “On the Results of the Main Military Council Considering the Events on Lake Hassan and the Measures for the Defense Preparation of the Far Eastern Theater of War” No. 0040 of September 4, 1938. Here are some of its sections:
Storage, saving and accounting of mobilization and emergency supplies, both front-line warehouses and military units, turned out to be in a chaotic state.
To all this, it was found that the most important directives of the Chief Military Council and the people's commissar of defense by the command of the front were not criminally carried out for a long time. As a result of this unacceptable state of the troops of the front, we in this relatively small collision suffered significant losses - 408 people killed and 2807 people wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extreme difficulty of the terrain on which our troops had to operate, nor by three times the great losses of the Japanese.
The number of our troops, participation in the operations of our aircraft and tanks gave us such advantages, in which our losses in battle could be much smaller ...
... a) the troops marched to the border in combat alarm completely unprepared. The inviolable stock of weapons and other combat equipment was not pre-signed and prepared for handing out to the units, which caused a number of glaring disgraces during the entire period of hostilities. The head of the front and the commanders of the units did not know what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other military supplies are available. In many cases, whole art batteries were at the front without projectiles, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unattended, and many soldiers and even one of the 32 division rifle units arrived at the front without rifles and gas masks at all. Despite the enormous stocks of clothing and equipment, many soldiers were sent into battle in completely worn out shoes, semi-slips, a large number of Red Army soldiers were without their coats. The commanders and staffs did not have enough maps of the combat area;
c) all types of troops, especially infantry, found an inability to act on the battlefield, maneuver, combine movement and fire, apply to the terrain, which in a given situation, as in the conditions of the Far East, full of mountains and hills, is the alphabet of combat and tactical training of troops.
Tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in the material part. ”
In the second half of the 30, the Red Army experienced numerous growing pains, and, alas, was not yet a truly formidable fighting force. People's Commissar of Defense KM Voroshilov had to solve many of the most complicated tasks of transforming and expanding the Soviet armed forces, but, honestly, it must be admitted that he was not the person to whom such tasks were possible. The biggest shortcomings of our combat training came to light at Lake Hassan, at Khalkhin-Gol, and later, during the “Winter War” with Finland. And therefore it is impossible to express in words the merits of Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko, who replaced the post of NKO K.M. At the beginning of 1940, Voroshilov was just over a year before the war, but 22 June 1941 was met by a completely different army of the fascist invaders. The one about which the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of Germany, F. Halder, who led the invasion, already wrote 29 June in his diary (reaction to the battles of Grodno):
And what about Germany and its Wehrmacht? Without a doubt, in 1938 r he was not nearly an invincible army capable of breaking the resistance of the French armed forces in a month. Let us recall the Austrian Anschluss, which took place just in 1938. The German divisions could not reach Vienna in time, literally “scattering” along the road - all the roadsides were filled up with faulty military equipment. At the same time, the Wehrmacht also experienced a severe shortage of trained recruits: we already said that the mobilization plan provided for the deployment of more than 3,3 million people, but the Germans only had 1 million trained soldiers and draftees.
Nevertheless, the million German soldiers prepared according to all the rules of the Wehrmacht were there, but the Red Army could hardly boast of such.
What is the conclusion? It is very simple: it is difficult to say whether the ratio of the military potentials of Germany and the USSR in 1938 was better for us than it actually happened in 1941, but we could not quite break the Wehrmacht "like a crystal vase" in the thirty-eighth.
Thank you for attention!
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