In the evening of June 18, when the detachment, being in a band of strong fog, tried to reach Memel, the Novik went into the wake of the Rurik and in 23.00 lost sight of the cruiser ahead. According to G.K. Earl, Rurik was to blame for this:
“It was extremely difficult for Novik to hold on to Rurik, since he completely disregarded him and, changing his courses and courses, did not even warn about it; so we risked all the time. On the bridge, everyone was in a tense state and made incredible efforts to notice the change in the course of their matelot in time. ”
Within an hour, the commander of the destroyer MA. Behrens tried to find the ships of the special purpose detachment, but he failed. Then he decided to return, and in 09.30 19 June anchored at Tserel. In 10.10, Novik received a radiogram given by M.K. Bakhirev for “Rurik” with an indication of the course of the 1 th cruiser brigade (during an exchange of fire with the “Roon”) and “Novik” went to meet, but then, around 12.00, received an order to return and turned to Kuivast. On this, the participation of "Novik" in the operation ended.
As for the "Rurik", then it turned out more interesting. He was "lost" even earlier than the Novik and could not find the 1 cruiser brigade, but did not go to the "winter quarters", remaining in the area of operation. It was, no doubt, the right decision.
As we said earlier, MK Bakhirev, having lost Rurik and Novik in the fog, searched for them for a while and then turned to Gotland in order to at least determine his place (for a long time the detachment went imputation). Most likely, “Rurik” did not do this, with the result that by the beginning of the battle with “Augsbug” and “Albatross” it turned out to be southeast of the 1 cruisers brigade. In 08.48, i.e. approximately 13 minutes after the Admiral Makarov fired the first shot at Augsburg, received a radiogram of M.K. on Rurik. Bakhireva: "Fight the enemy, square 400".
Commander "Rurik" A.M. Pyshnov immediately ordered to increase the speed to 20 nodes, and led the cruiser to the area indicated to him, where he arrived at 09.45, but, of course, he did not find anyone in the “400 square”, and by that time the first episode of the battle was over. Nevertheless, A.M. Pyshnov was able to make the right conclusions about the location of the main forces of the special purpose detachment, suggesting that "the brigade is driving the enemy to the north" and went after the ships of M.K. Bakhireva.
In 10.10, Rurik receives a new radiogram showing the course of the 1 th cruiser brigade (40 degrees). It did not contain any instructions for “Rurik”, therefore A.M. Pyshnov suggested that the enemy is located east of the cruisers M.K. Bakhirev (which was perfectly correct - the “Roon” was catching up on Russian cruisers from the southeast) and took the course of 20 degrees in order to be between the enemy ships and the coast of Kurland, that is, to take the enemy in two fires, cutting off his escape route. Then, on 10.20, there is a radiogram order: "Engage in battle with the Roon cruiser in the 408 square." A.M. Pyshnov, ordering to give a radiogram to the "Admiral Makarov" ("I go to you") ordered to turn on the 8 points to the left and led "Rurik" directly to the center of the square 408.
As we said earlier, approximately in 10.22-10.25 (the time in Russian and German sources is different) “Roon” left the battlefield with “Admiral Makarov”, turning south. But already in 10.30, following with Roon, “Lübeck” saw smoke in the east and turned “for clarification”. At that very moment, Roon and Augsburg finally found each other. The fact is that Commodore I. Karf, having heard the shooting at 10.00, went north, and now he met up with the detachment “Roona”. And the "Roon" and "Augsburg" turned to "Rurik", while the destroyers went with the "Augsburg", lined up at the side of a light cruiser, opposite the enemy.
At the same time, literally a few minutes after its turn, “Lübeck” considered a single silhouette, but it was impossible to understand what the ship was in front of him. "Lübeck" gave the searchlight an identification signal - "Rurik" answered him (naturally - incorrectly). And here “Lübeck” would be worth retreating, but he, deceived by the thin masts of the ship, believed that he saw the Novik in front of him, and the German light cruiser could easily cope with it, so Lübeck continued to advance. And only in 10.45 on the German cruiser, finally, they made out with whom they were dealing, and laid down the opposite course.
As for the "Rurik", then the situation looked like this. Around 10.28, on the cruiser, smoke was found to the right of its course, and after a short time, they saw three silhouettes heading towards the ship, one of which showed something with a searchlight. Apparently, A.M. Pyshnov immediately ordered to answer abracadabra. In 10.35, the Rurik was struck with a combat alarm, in 10.44 the ship’s control was transferred to the conning tower, and in 10.45, Rurik launched a sighting barrage for Lübeck from the forward 254-mm turret, to which the 203-front turrets soon joined, after a few minutes, the 120-mm guns entered the scene. The distance at the time of the opening of fire, according to domestic data, was 66 cables, at Lübeck it was considered that the distance at the time of opening fire was 60,2-65,6 cables. The German cruiser immediately went zigzagging, knocking down the sight to the gunners of Rurik and opened intensive fire from its guns. The Lübeck gunners demonstrated excellent training - one of the first volleys lay right under the Rurik’s nose, flooding the water and temporarily disabling its open-range range finders, and almost immediately the 105-mm projectile landed on the forecastle deck, pierced it and exploded into laundry room. In fact, “Lübeck” was able to shoot at literally some minutes after the opening of the fire, because Rurik received the first hit even before it transferred the fire to the “Roon”.
One type "Lübeck" light cruiser "Bremen"
At the same time, the Rurik's salvos were not accurate, giving only short shots, and there were only a few of them - the nasal 254-mm tower managed to fire two volleys, after which the second silhouette of the three could be identified in 10.50 - it turned out to be Roon . A.M. Pyshnov immediately ordered to turn, leading the enemy to the course angle 60 hail, in order to fight all overboard, and concentrated the fire on Roon. The German armored cruiser responded. At this time, Augsburg and Roon were still moving closer to Rurik, and this continued until 11.00, the distance between them was reduced from 82 to 76 KBT. By this time, "Lubeck" retreated from the Russian cruiser far enough so that it was transmitted by a searchlight (obviously, from the "Augsburg", although direct sources do not contain this) the order to go to Estergarnu, so that "Lubeck" went to the coast of Gotland and further, along it, to the base. Further rapprochement with the powerful Russian ship was clearly not in the interests of the Germans, so the "Augsburg" and the "Roon" lay down on a course parallel to "Rurik". From 11.00 until about 11.17, the skirmish continued without any maneuvers, but then Roon and Augsburg abruptly turned away from Rurik and headed south. Because of the large distances, this maneuver was not immediately noticed on the Rurik, but as soon as it became clear that the Germans were retreating, A.M. Pyshnov immediately ordered to turn directly on the enemy and in 11.20 "Rurik" went for "Roon".
However, it was at this moment that the report of the senior officer of the cruiser about the periscope periscope submarine entered the conning tower. In accordance with current regulations, A.M. Pyshnov immediately ordered to turn away to the left in order to turn around to the submarine astern. On board the "Rurik" they even observed the trail of a torpedo passing through the stern of the cruiser - in fact, the Germans did not have any submarine in that area. However, as a result of the reversal, the courses of the Russian and the German ships dispersed under 90 hail: "Rurik" went almost to the east, while the "Roon" and "Augsburg" with the destroyers - to the south. The Germans claim that the fire stopped even before the “Rurik” reversal, while according to their data, at the time of the “Rurik” ceasefire, 87,5 cables separated the Roon.
But then came, probably the most interesting moment of this episode. A.M. Petrov in the book “Two fights” writes:
"Dodging Ost from the attack of the boat, the cruiser lost sight of the enemy, and then lay down on N to go to the Gulf of Finland."
That is, it turns out that the cruiser, turning away from the submarine, in the future did not make any maneuver to get closer to the enemy and left the battlefield without brains. Without a doubt, such an act characterizes the commander of the "Rurik" is far from the best way. But if we open the work of S.E. Vinogradov and A. D. Fedechkin "" Rurik - the flagship of the Baltic fleet", Then we read a different description of this episode:
“Evading a possible attack, Rurik stopped firing for a while, and the enemy immediately took advantage of it, hiding in a shroud of fog. The unsuccessful pursuit followed him until almost noon, when the radio received an order from Rear Admiral MK Bakhirev to return to the base and join the squad, after which Rurik turned to the North.
In other words, it turns out that A.M. Pyshnov, having made a maneuver of evasion, then turned and rushed in pursuit, and left the battle later, having received the direct order of M.K. Bakhireva. Who is right after all?
To do this, let's try to decide when "Rurik" turned north. V.Yu. Gribovsky writes about it this way:
“Shy, Rurik abruptly turned left and stopped firing. The anxiety was false, but allowed the enemy to withdraw from the battlefield. In 10 h 40 mines on a hazy horizon could only see clouds of smoke from the German cruisers. The commander of "Rurik" turned north. "
Other researchers, for example, D.Yu. Kozlov. And this is how the German historian G. Rollman describes this episode:
"Rurik seemed to turn, then walked for some time beyond the range of fire, and finally disappeared completely from 10.45."
In other words, according to the Germans, the chase was all the same, since “Rurik” was “following”, but the Russian cruiser did not get close to the distance of fire and eventually turned away and left the battlefield.
We make a simple calculation. We know that after the “Rurik” cuff of a non-existent submarine (11.20) and before its turn to the north (11.40), 20 minutes passed. At the time of the lapel, the ships went south (Germans) and east (Russians) at an angle of almost 90 degrees. It is also known that “Rurik”, having entered the battle on 20 nodes during the chase, did not reduce speed. The Germans have developed no less speed, because after approaching the 76 KBT. they managed to break the distance to kbt 87,5.
So, let us imagine a giant triangle in which the Russian and German cruisers move along its legs, and the distance between them is a hypotenuse. If we assume that from 11.20 to 11.40 the Rurik did not catch up with the German squadron, but left it to the east, then both legs during this time “lengthened” by 6 miles each (this is how many 20 ships will pass through. 20 minutes in progress) . And this means that the distance between Rurik and Roon to 11.40 should have been no less than 171 cable. Of course, visibility to 11.40 improved a lot, but not as much. And given the fact that the Germans had lost their “Rurik” sight in 11.45, the distance between the opponents at the time of the loss of visibility should have made absolutely unbelievable 204 cable!
These are, of course, impossible figures, and therefore we state: having executed the evasion maneuver from submarines, A.M. Pyshnov turned his ship back on track and went to catch up with the Roon and its squad. Why not caught up? Say hard enough. Theoretically, Rurik should have had such an opportunity, because the ship had to develop its 21 hubs from с boilers, respectively, when all boilers were put into operation, the cruiser’s speed should have been even higher. But on the other hand, it is a theory, and the real maximum speed of “Rurik” in 1915, unfortunately, is unknown to the author. At the same time, the most slow-moving ship of the German detachment was the Roon, but even in tests it showed the 21,143 node. That is, we absolutely cannot rule out that the speed of Roon and Rurik in 1915 was comparable. Perhaps, "Rurik" and was a little faster, but he strongly broke the distance, performing a maneuver of evading from a submarine. When the German ships left for the south, and the Rurik - to the east, the distance between them increased by about 4,7 cables per minute. That is, even if we assume that “Rurik” went to the east for the entire 3-4 minute, and then turned back, then the distance between the enemies should have been 101-106 cables. That is, even if Rurik had a slight superiority in speed, it took time (and significant!) To get closer to the Germans at a distance sufficient to resume the fight. Recall that the "Rurik" ceased firing at the "Roon" immediately after its turnout from the submarine. Yes, "Rurik", of course, lay down a divergent course, but this could not prevent him from continuing to shoot at the "Roon"! However, he stopped, and this means that the distance was too great for aimed fire. Recall that in 11.50 on Rurik, Roon could only be identified when it was in 82 KB. from the Russian cruiser.
Therefore, assuming that the marginal visibility for actual artillery fire at that moment was about 90 cabels, and at the end of the submarine evasion maneuver, the distance between Roon and Rurik was 101-106 kbt., We come to the conclusion that if "Rurik" would have surpassed the German detachment in speed by a whole knot, then even then he needed from an hour to one and a half hours only to resume the fight! But not the fact that "Rurik" had a similar superiority.
It is not entirely clear what kind of radiogram M.K. Bakhirev on "Rurik." Some sources claim that this was a direct order from A.M. Pyshnov to get out of the battle and join the 1 th brigade, but the text of the radiogram itself is not given. Other sources mention the radiogram "Fear the approach of the enemy from the south", which was given by "Admiral Makarov" as soon as he heard the sounds of battle. As a matter of fact, the presence of this radio telegram does not refute and does not confirm the existence of an order to leave the battlefield. But even if there was no direct order - with what we can reproach the commander of "Rurik" A.M. Pyshnova?
As soon as he discovered the enemy (moreover, he was outnumbered) and even before he was able to determine the composition of the opposing detachment A.M. Pyshnov, however, goes to a rapprochement. As soon as the main opponent, “Roon” - “Rurik”, was identified, he leads him to the 60 course angle in order to be able to fight the whole board, while the Germans themselves were going to meet him. When "Lubeck" retired sufficiently from "Rurik", the Germans lay down on a parallel course, and A.M. Pyshnov did not interfere with this, but as soon as he noticed that the Germans were trying to get out of the battle, he immediately turned and went straight at them. Having found the periscope, he executed an evasion maneuver, and then continued the pursuit of the retreating enemy. None of these actions of the commander of the Russian ship deserves the slightest reproach - he fought, and in a very aggressive manner.
However, shortly after the resumption of persecution, it became clear that:
1. To resume artillery combat in the shortest possible time will not succeed;
2. German ships flee south;
3. M.K. At the very beginning of the battle, Bakhirev warned that the approach of enemy forces from the south should be feared.
So, for about an hour, the 11.40 "Rurik" was going exactly where from (according to MK Bakhirev) the enemy forces could approach. The further pursuit of “Roona” in such conditions simply lost its meaning - we said that for the renewal of the battle, and provided that “Rurik” was faster than one Roon node (which is far from a fact) A.M. It took Pyshnov an hour or one and a half only to resume the fight, but in order to get close to a distance, which allowed him to inflict decisive damage on Roon, in this case it was not the hour that was needed, but the watch. Given the threat of the appearance of enemy forces, this chase completely lost its meaning, and "Rurik" turned north.
I must say that M.K. Bakhirev, acted in a similar way. When shots were heard on “Admiral Makarov” and they understood that “Rurik” had joined the battle, Mikhail Koronatovich deployed his brigade and led it to the south. However, soon his cruisers lay back. Why?
On the one hand, having no advantage in speed over “Roon” to catch up with him, after the latter had disappeared from view, it was completely pointless. But the Russian commander could not know the circumstances of the beginning of the “Roon” battle with “Rurik”. It was possible that the “Roon” retreating to the south would be between the “Rurik” (if he were moving from the south) and the 1 th brigade of cruisers M.K. Bakhireva. Having an enemy in the north and in the south, the Roon squad only had to retreat to the coast of Gotland, that is, to the west, or to Kurland, that is, to the east. And in this case, a quick turnaround of the brigade of cruisers to the south, gave some hope to put the “Roon” in two flames and quickly destroy it.
The game was obviously worth the candle, and Mikhail Koronatovich turned his cruisers to the south. But time passed, but the German ships were not there, and this meant that the “Roon” still broke through the “Rurik” to the south (which actually happened in reality), and the “ticks” did not work. In this case, the prosecution of the Germans for the cruisers of the 1 th brigade lost its meaning, and M.K. Bakhirev turns his cruisers north. He is still threatened by an unknown squadron near Göstka-Sanden (which actually did not exist, but the Russian commander, of course, could not know this) and did not have time to waste him looking for a needle in a haystack - you need to connect with the “Tsarevich” and "Glory" and be ready for a big battle with armored German ships. That is why M.K. Bakhirev didn’t want the Rurik too shy towards the south - in this case it would be difficult to assist him with the combined forces of cruisers and battleships of cover.
Thus, the maneuvering of the Russian ships in the third (and last) episode of the battle in Gotland should be considered reasonable and sufficiently aggressive. And what about shooting accuracy? Unlike other episodes, we definitely know the consumption of Rurik projectiles: 46 254-mm, 102 203-mm and 163 120 mm high-explosive projectile. The first five minutes of the battle (10.45-10.50) “Rurik” fired at “Lübeck”, the next half hour - at “Roon”, in 11.20 the battle stopped and was no longer resumed. The Russian sailors believed that they had hit the Roon, but in fact not a single Rurik projectile hit the German ships.
Why did this happen?
Sources, alas, do not give an answer to this question - usually only a statement of fact follows, without explaining the reasons. In some cases, a description is given of the reasons that made shooting “Rurik” difficult, such as the water from the Lübeck salvo, which filled the rangefinders, which caused them to break down for some time, as well as the temporary ceasefire of the nasal 254-mm tower, due to the fact that the right gun failed the system of blowing the barrel. The tower was filled with gases at each attempt to blow the barrel, several people were poisoned. Generally speaking, these reasons are quite weighty and could explain the low percentage of hits - but not their complete absence.
As a result, the only reason for the disgusting shooting of "Rurik" has to be considered as poor training of its gunners. Since (again, according to most sources), the 1 th brigade of cruisers didn’t play off the Albatross (we already know that this is not the case), the opinion of the bad training of naval gunners of the Baltic Fleet in general took root. Meanwhile, there is a reason that explains very well the failure of Rurik in the battle of Gotland and it is extremely strange that she is not mentioned in any of the studies and monographs known to the author on this issue.
As we have said many times in the articles devoted to the actions of the Russian fleet in the Russian-Japanese war, artillery skills must be maintained with regular training sessions - if there are none, then the accuracy of ship-gun fire “slides” down. Examples include history with the reserve, in which in the 1911 g on 3 weeks the ships of the Black Sea fleet were withdrawn due to lack of funds for their combat training. After that, the accuracy of the shooting of the armored cruiser Memory of Mercury fell almost 1,6 times, and on the other ships of the squadron "almost doubled." The example of the Port-Arthur squadron, which, having just left the 2,5 monthly reserve in the 27 battle of January 1904 in January, showed far from the best result is indicative in this respect - the accuracy of firing large caliber guns was 1,1 times lower than that of the Japanese, medium caliber (152-203-mm) - respectively 1,5 times. However, at that time it was still possible to talk about some kind of comparability of the training of the Russian and Japanese commanders. However, the subsequent six-month stay on the roads of Port Arthur (only when S. Makarov fleet went to sea for training) led to the fact that in a battle in the Yellow Sea there were four Japanese in one Russian hit.
So, for some reason, domestic sources in the description of the results of the shooting of “Rurik” in Gotland miss the following fact. As you know, 1 February 1915, the strongest armored cruiser of the Baltic Fleet, was put forward to cover the mine, which the command was going to carry out in order to:
“To create difficulties for him in bringing up troops and equipment through the ports of Danzig Bay”.
Moving in conditions of near-zero visibility (fog and a strong snowstorm) due to the northern tip of the island of Gotland, the cruiser "rammed" the bottom of a stone jar, not marked on the maps. Other cruisers of the 1 Brigade, which also participated in that march, had a smaller draft and passed over it. As a result, “Rurik” was heavily damaged, taking 2 700 tons of water. The ship managed to drag Revel with great difficulty, but its draft was too large to enter the raid, so the cruiser was again aground (this time sandy). Subsequently, it had to be unloaded on 1 108 t, and the roofs of the towers and trunks were removed. 254-mm and 203-mm guns, in this form the cruiser was taken to Kronstadt.
"Rurik" was docked, but repair work on it was completed only by the end of April 1915 g. Then the ship was taken out of the dock, but work continued on it, and only 10 on May cruiser left Kronstadt to Revel "for additional equipment and equipment" (not for the installation of the guns removed from it?). As a result, "Rurik" was commissioned ... in the middle of June 1915, that is, just a few days before the raid on Memel.
Thus, the armored cruiser "Rurik" before the battle of Gotland did not have artillery practice for at least six months. While the remaining ships of the Baltic Fleet were actively recovering their skills after the winter, the Rurik was repaired in Kronstadt and "re-armed" in Reval. That, in the opinion of the author of this article, in combination with the above-mentioned factors (temporary failure of rangefinders, the nose tower of the main caliber) and predetermined the failure of his gunners. By the way, remembering that the Rurik was under repair for half a year before the operation, we can completely differently assess the position of the commander of the Baltic Fleet V.А. Canina, who did not want to send this cruiser to raid on Memel. It’s one thing to use a ship ready for “marching and fighting” in an operation, and quite another to send a cruiser there after a six-month gap in combat training.
And finally, the last aspect. S.E. Vinogradov and A. D. Fedechkin ““ Rurik - the flagship of the Baltic Fleet ”on the pages dedicated to the repair of the cruiser in 1915, write:
“Along with the repair of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided to simultaneously carry out work on the repair and modernization of cruiser artillery, including the replacement of all 10" and 8 "guns that had reached the full degree of wear, rebuilding Jenny’s speed regulators, rebuilding and cleaning the turning parts and lifting mechanisms of towers "
That is, to cover the mining operation in February 1915, the “Rurik” was going with completely executed guns, and of course, since the cruiser was under repair, it was necessary to correct this deficiency. But there is an interesting nuance: in the source we read about the “made decision”, but alas, there is no information about whether this decision was executed, but it could not be, especially given the fact that the Rurik towers were partially dismantled before his arrival in Kronstadt. Thus, there is a non-zero probability that the 19 June 1915, the cruiser was engaged in the battle of the guns that reached its limit on wear. However, the author of this article does not have sufficient data, and can only state the need for additional study of this issue.
I would like to note one more nuance. Usually, the unsuccessful shooting of “Rurik” is compared with the brilliant result of “Lübeck”, who achieved 10 or 11 (data differs from different sources) of hits. However, it should be noted that the "Lübeck" approached the "Rurik" closer to other German ships, at the time of opening the fire the distance between them was no more than 60-66 KBT. Then the "Lübeck" turned and retreated, continuing to shoot at the Rurik until the latter was within the reach of the X-gun of the German cruiser. At the same time, “Rurik” already after 105 minutes of the battle moved the fire to “Roon”, which was much further than “Lübeck” (the distance 5 kbt is indicated.). At the same time, Roon and Rurik did not converge more than 82 kb, and then the distance between them began to grow again, until it reached 76 kb.
So, the sources usually mention the squall fire of "Lübeck" ("the fourth salvo was fired when the other three were in the air"), but nowhere is it really described the time of hitting the Russian cruiser. It should be noted that "Lübeck", armed with 105-mm / 40 SK L / 40 arr 1898, with very modest characteristics - even at the limiting elevation angle (30 hail) the range of "Lübeck" guns did not exceed 12 200 m or approximately 66 KBT! Accordingly, it can be assumed that this was the case - the senior gunner of Lübeck, having correctly determined the distance, covered the Russian cruiser with the first volleys. Then he brought down a hail of shells on Rurik, having achieved 10 or 11 hits at the very beginning of the battle, while the distance did not exceed those limit 66 KBT., On which his guns could shoot. Then "Lubeck" distanced itself from "Rurik" and did not take any further part in the battle. At the same time, "Roon", leading the battle for at least half an hour at a distance of 76-87,5 KB. hits not achieved. We know that the gunners of the German armored cruiser were not stupid at all, so we can assume that the shooting conditions (first of all - visibility) hampered the German gunners, and therefore their colleagues on the Rurik.
In general, according to the third episode of the Gotland battle, we can state the following - Russian commanders, including the commander of “Rurik” A.M. Pyshnova acted very professionally and aggressively during the battle, and did not deserve any reproach. But ... If we consider the actions of A.M. Pyshnova, then we will see a very clear, but not mindless execution of the received orders. Having received the order of M.K. Bakhirev to join the battle, he arrived at the designated square, but found no one there. Nevertheless, he quite correctly decided that the enemy should be searched north of the square indicated to him - having gone there, he was able to enter the battle literally through some 20 minutes after Roon interrupted the battle with the 1 cruisers of the brigade .
However, the following question arises: the fact is that telegrams of the Baltic Fleet communications service, informing M.K. Bakhirev about the discovery of the group I. Karfa could not be given "targeted", on the flagship of the Russian commander of the special purpose detachment. In other words, all the telegrams that were sent from the coast of M.K. Bakhirev should have been accepted both on Novik and Rurik. In this case, it is rather strange that they were ignored on both Russian ships - the Rurik remained “in the mist” southeast of the interception site, and the Novik went to winter apartments in general. You can, of course, assume that neither Rurik nor Novik received these telegrams - radio communication in those days left much to be desired, and even in the same Jutland battle we see a lot of sent but not received radiograms. It is also possible that radiograms sent to M.K. Bakhirev was coded in a special way, which could not be disassembled on other cruisers of the detachment, but the author does not know anything about it. However, we see that A.M. Pyshnov and M.A. Berens received the radiograms of his immediate commander, M.K. Bakhirev, and immediately proceeded to their implementation, but the radiograms sent to Mikhail Koronatovich passed by them - and this is a mystery of the battle of Gotland 19 June 1915 g. At least for the author of this article.
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