Six Day War. Part of 1. Prelude
Usually, everything that is written about this war fits into one phrase: “In the morning of 5 on June 1967, the Israeli Air Force operation began, which destroyed the Arab coalition Air Force in a few hours, after which Israel defeated the Arab armies left without air support ". However, only in fairy tales, having looked at the window and scratched his beard, you can call your governor and go to war with some Burlandia or Philippponia. Well, and then the thing is known: either the chest in the crosses, or the head in the bushes. It's simple. In life, it does not happen. Wars are the result of accumulating contradictions, wars ripen like fruits on a tree and do not start by themselves, and their causes are thoroughly researched, studied and analyzed by military historians for years after completion.
A year ago, Israel celebrated the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Six Day War, which occupies a special place in stories of the state. The triumph of 1967 of the year, with all the pathos of the word, radically changed the situation in the Middle East, affecting both the attitude towards Israel in the World and the Israeli society and the Jewish people in general. It can be said without exaggeration that the geopolitical map of the modern Middle East is a direct consequence of these six days that shook the world.
The beginning of this war was the result of a number of factors, and none of the political and military leaders, either in the Middle East or outside of it, controlled the situation completely. At the same time, this war cannot be called an accident either. Paradoxically, the most important of the Arab-Israeli wars was the result of fatal discrepancies between the true interests of the Israeli and Arab leaders and the policies that they voluntarily or unwittingly enforced. Consider how the distribution of political and military forces in the Middle East and beyond in the 1967 year looked like in a historical retrospect.
For the first time, the world saw Egyptian ballistic missiles, openly and proudly presented on display at a parade in July 1962 on the occasion of Revolution Day.
These missiles could hit "any target south of Beirut," as the Egyptians stated. There was no boast in these words, the German scientists designed the missiles. (Read more on the HE in article by Kirill Ryabov "Egyptian projects of ballistic missiles".) Israel as a whole was aware of the Egyptian successes, but annoying rattling was serious weapons. The fact is that Israel had nothing of the kind at this time, except for experimental meteorological rockets. So, in July 1962, the Israelis "discovered" that they did not have missiles, and their enemies had them.
At that time there were two schools of military thinking in Israel. One school assumed the further development of the army in the direction of introducing new technologies and developing nuclear weapons. These were the ideas of Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan.
They believed that instead of a conventional arms race, they should try to outrun enemies as weapons. Another school was pushing for a further build-up of conventional weapons. So thought Yigal Allon and Israel Galili.
In fact, in these disputes, the question was decided where to send the fixed assets from the military budget.
Ahmad Abdel Nasser was silent about the Israeli nuclear program. First, the Egyptians knew that they had overtaken Israel in the field of missiles. Secondly, since 1961, Egypt has quietly tried to engage in its atomic bomb. Therefore, Nasser did not stutter on the Dimona reactor, and the Israelis "did not notice" Egyptian research.
By the middle of 1966, the Israeli Kutuzov - Moshe Dayan did not know what to do. He left the army for years of service, he left the government out of devotion to Ben-Gurion, and sat his pants in the chair of the Knesset deputy from the opposition faction. Continuing to live in the art of war, the retired general decided to keep up with life and went to Vietnam as a simple correspondent to learn the latest methods of warfare.
Yes, the Vietnam War was in full swing, and the Americans cordially showed the famous commander everything they could. Several times Dayan landed from a helicopter in the jungle and fell into serious alterations, but when you lose an eye in battle, you gain valuable combat experience in vain not to hang out. From Vietnam, Dayan returned without a scratch.
He could see a lot and realized that the Americans could not win the Indochina war. Dayan wrote with envy in his memoirs about the army of American helicopters; some of them cost 3 million dollars, unimaginable money for the Israeli army. He saw that the most effective method of war was the raiding of heavy high-flying bombers, and that soldiers should be deployed by helicopters. Neither helicopters, nor heavy bombers to Israel were suitable, too expensive. Israelis are used to fighting as economically as possible. Dayan wrote that he had to watch the battle, during which the Americans fired more shells on the enemy than all of Israel’s artillery for the entire War of Independence and the Sinai campaign combined. Having been in the best military laboratory of 60's, Dayan returned to Israel full of impressions and interesting ideas. The near future showed that this trip was made oh so not for nothing.
In the meantime, Yitzhak Rabin worked as chief of the operations department of the general staff and by the year of 1964 he had served as chief of the general staff.
Ariel Sharon was out of work after the 1956 war, was appointed head of the infantry school and pulled this strap for four years. Only shortly before 1967 was he transferred as reserve commander tank brigades.
David Elazar, another future chief of staff, met the new 1967 year as commander of the Northern Military District. Prior to this appointment, he commanded the armored forces of the Israel Defense Forces.
On the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula, UN soldiers were sunbathing and it was relatively quiet, while on the Syrian border, a rare day went by without an artillery duel. The Syrians turned the Golan Heights overhanging Lake Kinneret into a powerful fortress with many kilometers of long-term firing points. Hundreds of Soviet cannons, anti-aircraft guns and Katyusha rocket launchers were installed on the line. For many years, the Syrians fired from above from above the Israeli agricultural settlements clearly visible below, obstructed fishing on Lake Kinneret (Tiberias), etc.
They could shell a significant part of the north of the country, from Metulla and Kiryat Shmona to the shores of Lake Galilee and to the south. Especially it went to Israeli farmers. Syrian artillerymen hit their tractors like moving targets. The tractor had to be sheathed with armor. Israel was the only country in the world where the land was plowed on armored cars. In early 1967, the Syrians began to send saboteurs to Israel through the territory of Jordan. They mined Israeli roads adjacent to the Israeli-Syrian border. Israel responded with military operations against sabotage bases. The situation escalated, and in April episodic clashes between Israeli and Syrian aviation.
Israeli response to the shelling and air raids followed with enviable regularity, but both governments felt the edge of what was permitted and these constant border incidents did not escalate into a full-scale war, although the Syrian leadership was asleep and saw the Syrian flag over Haifa.
For a full-fledged war with Israel, Syria needed dope outside. By the year 1967, she received this dope, or rather two at once, from Nasser and from the Soviet Union.
In 1967, the Soviet people, under the wise leadership of the Communist Party, which is getting stronger from day to day, is preparing to worthily and solemnly celebrate the 50 anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The leader of the party and the people, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who celebrated his 60 anniversary six months ago and was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union for this occasion, replaced the modest Khrushchev's “first secretary” with a more appropriate hero — the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Voluntarism in economics and politics, thank God, is finished, the Leninist Politburo is staffed with loyal leaders, suitable for party leadership cadres. The loud slogans of the previous leader, such as “Catch up and overtake America” or “The current generation of Soviet people will live under communism!”, Delicately, quietly removed - the country is already at the top of its power. Why catch up with America if we have long overtaken it, and the whole world is watching how Soviet rockets iron the space.
Quote from the essay by Yuri Okunev "A six-day chord of the history of the biblical scale", written eleven years ago to the 40 anniversary of the Six-Day War:
Nasser was ready to meet the Soviets. In 1966, he signed an agreement with Moscow, according to which the Russians got access to ports on the Mediterranean and Red Seas and three Egyptian airfields. On the Mediterranean Sea, Soviet ships stood in Port Said, Alexandria, and Mersa Matruh, and in the Red Sea, the USSR had a base at Ras Banas. In exchange, Moscow pledged to increase the supply of weapons and provide military specialists. This did not solve, however, the financial problems of Egypt. By 1967, the country has slipped to bankruptcy. The balance of payments deficit reached 0,5 billion dollars, and foreign debt - 1,3 billion dollars. For those times, the money is quite considerable, and for Egypt it is very heavy. Before the war, the Egyptians had to sell a third of their gold reserves, but nevertheless they could not make all their payments to the International Monetary Fund.
In the Israeli-Syrian confrontation of the USSR, the UN supported all resolutions condemning the use of force by Israel, and vetoed all similar resolutions against Syria. Since the United States took a neutral position, the anti-Israel resolutions in the UN passed, but there was no anti-Syrian one. However, the Syrians were their worst enemies, for 17 years in this country occurred 13 military coups. 23 February 1966, the government, dreaming of the complete destruction of Israel, burst into power. The power in Damascus was seized by an extremist Baath party faction. Back in the 1920s, the Syrian Michel Aflak went to Paris, he read Kant, Hegel and Marx and began to create the intellectual foundation of the Arab Renaissance Party - Baath. By the 1960 years, the Baath bizarrely mixed in itself socialism, nationalism and pan-Arabism, mixed up with irreconcilable hostility towards Israel. To the war with Israel, Syria was led:
The activities of the Soviet Union in the Arab countries especially sharply intensified in the first year after the Baath Party came to power in Syria. As Kosygin said in a speech to Moscow on 8 on June 1966, this activity was aimed at enhancing Syrian-Egyptian cooperation and preparing the basis for other Arab countries to join the bloc, “having thrown off colonial oppression and in new conditions continue to oppose imperialism and reaction ". Reaction meant all those countries (Saudi Arabia, Jordan) and organizations in Arab countries that refused to pursue pro-Soviet policies.
The flow of messages about the "growing Soviet-Arab friendship" made Israeli analysts worry. Every month brought new news. The opening of direct air communication between Moscow and Beirut was held on 14 on June 1966. A Soviet government delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik visited Algeria to participate in the Algerian national holiday 3 of July of that year. At the same time, the delegation of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa and Asia arrived in Beirut. (It was indicated that the delegation would discuss issues related to the “strengthening of the solidarity of peoples in the struggle for peace against imperialism and colonialism”, TASS, July 5). Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Piki visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on July 13. The Moroccan Foreign Minister arrived on a visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of Foreign Minister Gromyko on July 17. Almost immediately after him, on July 27, the Prime Minister of Iraq arrived at the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin. This Arab summer ended with the fact that on August 21 a delegation of the Arab Socialist Unity Party arrived in Egypt from Egypt. The purpose of the visit is “familiarization with the practical work of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union”.
In September, a delegation of the Egyptian Friendship Society with the Soviet Union visited Moscow for the first time, and after that a congress of friendship societies and cultural ties with Arab countries opened. At the same time, September 20-22, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Semenov visited Egypt (Pravda, September 26). October 9 ended the visit to the Soviet Union, the Minister of Labor of Kuwait. Leaving Moscow, he, in particular, said: “The purpose of my visit is to establish economic ties with Soviet specialists” (Izvestia, October 10). Even with the Moroccan monarchy, "the unification of the Arab peoples on an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist basis" was discussed. At the end of October 1966, the Komsomol delegation visited Tunisia, and the Soviet delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Malik visited Algeria again.
The Arab-Soviet friendship grew stronger throughout the fall. Finally, on November 22, in connection with the signing of the treaty on defense between Egypt and Syria with the support of the USSR, Pravda said that this treaty plays not only a deterrent role, but also represents a cohesive factor, laying a solid foundation for a block of progressive, read pro-Soviet countries. At the same time, on November 22, the Egyptian Prime Minister Amer arrived on an official visit to the Soviet Union. November 30 was followed by an agreement between the Soviet Union and Jordan on the construction of a hydropower station on the Yarmuk River. The same day, the Soviet delegation arrived in Algeria to open a direct air link between Moscow and Algeria.
Observing the broad maneuvers of the Soviet Union, but being very politically cautious, America nevertheless began to sell weapons to Israel after President Eisenhower left the White House. The new president, John F. Kennedy, was located pro-Israel.
In 1962, Israel finally received Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, and from 1965, the United States began supplying tanks to Israel. By this time, the Arab countries were already crammed with Soviet weapons. The American jet fighters A-4 "Skyhawk" Israel received only in 1966 year.
Nasser, the charismatic leader of the 31 million Egyptian people, with all his pan-Arabic ambitions, was a cautious man. He was about 50, and for a politician it is youth. At the same time, he was the oldest among all Arab leaders! In Israel, it was time for the reign of older politicians. Nasser wanted war with Israel, but cautiously believed that only by 1969, Soviet instructors and Soviet weapons would make his army able to fight the IDF on an equal footing (as experience has shown, this turned out to be possible only in 1973). Covered after the UN 1956 war at Sinai, Nasser was more involved in global projects in the Arab world. So, 1 February 1958, Egypt united with Syria in the United Arab Republic, the UAR, which lasted until 28 September 1961, and fell apart because the Egyptians regarded Syria as a minor northern province of Egypt. In 1962, Nasser intervened in the civil war in Yemen and even sent Egyptian troops to the Arabian Peninsula. As for Israel itself, by 1966, the Syrian government was more aggressive than the Egyptian one. The Syrian radical anti-Israeli regime rebuked Egypt for an inadequately hostile (!) Stance against the common enemy. These reproaches took effect and finally led to the conclusion of the 4 in November of 1966, a defensive treaty between the two countries, hotly approved by the USSR.
As for Jordan, the socialist Nasser did not cherish love for the monarchical regime of this country. Indeed, 31-year-old King Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussein al Hashimi, a friend of the West, did not fit into the Naser pro-Soviet Middle East.
Hussein, the grandson of King Abdullah, ascended the throne to the young. After Abdullah was killed by a Palestinian fanatic in Jerusalem, the throne passed to 17-year-old Hussein, who was then studying in England, in Harrow. He did not have a love for the Palestinians, although they became citizens of his country. He was with his grandfather at the 20 Al-Aqsa Mosque in July 1951, and his grandfather was killed before his eyes. One of the bullets hit the medal on the chest of the young prince, and the only way he was not injured.
After cooling relations with England in 1956, King Hussein found himself in difficult circumstances, which the Americans took advantage of. They unobtrusively put a financial leash on the monarch in order to have a friendly regime in the middle of a troubled region. From 1957 to 1977, Hussein secretly received money from the funds of the CIA, some of which was spent on his security service, and some on maintaining the royal standard of living. Now, in 1966, the king was quite tolerant of Israel and would have been even more tolerant if not for Nasser and the Palestinian national liberation movement. Nasser harassed Hussein for a pro-Western orientation, calling him an "Amman courtesan" and a "TsRUshny dwarf". The short and frail Jordanian king, next to the broad, broad Nasser, looked really small.
The Jordanian radio snapped that Nasser, having covered himself with a UN pillow from Israel, is easy to argue. Jordan, at least, gave the Palestinians full citizenship, while the Egyptians in Gaza kept Palestinians in second grade. The Syrians also whispered to Nasser that only after the peace-loving king would be replaced on the throne of Jordan by a more aggressive person, a war with Israel would become possible.
Even before American shipments, Israeli pilots flying French-made Mirage fought successfully in the north with brand new Syrian MiG-21. Israeli pilots inflicted the most severe defeat on the Syrians on 7 on April 1967. As usual, Israeli aircraft flew in order to destroy the positions of heavy artillery in the Golan Heights. The Syrian pilots rushed to the aid of the artillerymen. The air battle was on the space between Damascus and the Golan Heights. Residents of the Syrian capital could see the Israelis shoot down their planes. In total, 6 Syrian MiGs were shot down in this battle without loss by the Israeli Air Force. It was a shame. The next day, the Syrian regime declared: “Our well-known goal is the liberation of Palestine and the elimination of Zionist existence there.” At a meeting with a high-ranking Egyptian delegation, Prime Minister Mohammed Sidqi Suleiman and commander of the air force, General Mohammed Sidqi Mahmoud, Syria invited Egypt to consider a joint attack plan codenamed Rashid, in which Syrian forces would strike northern Israel with the ultimate goal of seizure all of Galilee and Haifa, and the Egyptian troops - in southern and central Israel.
In an effort to maintain their Syrian bridgehead at all costs, the Russians several times hinted to Israel in a rather sharp way the possibility of "grave consequences" in the event of its "provocations" against Syria. And on April 21, 1967, two weeks after the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian fighters, Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Yakov Malik quite roughly warned the Israelis that they put at risk the very existence of their state.
Already in January, 1967, the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was forced to openly warn the Syrians: "I cannot exclude the possibility that we will have no other way but preventive actions."
The 7 air battle of April could be seen as a foreshadowing of even more severe punitive actions. Panicked, the Syrians moved their heavy artillery directly into the demilitarized zone. The Israelis responded by bringing their border garrison to combat readiness. Finally, on May 11, Jerusalem informed the UN Security Council that if Syrian provocations continued, Israel "would consider it right to resort to self-defense." And at that moment, the Russians, deeply concerned about the safety of their favorite Arab protégé, committed the most pernicious mistake since their intervention in Middle Eastern affairs ...
13 On May 1967, the Egyptian government received official notification from the USSR government that Israeli troops were preparing an attack on Syria, and that for this purpose, the Israeli border is concentrated from 11 to 13 Israeli brigades. This message was made in Moscow, in a personal conversation between the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.V. Podgorny and the head of the Egyptian parliamentary delegation to the USSR, Anwar Sadat.
The same message was previously brought to the attention of the Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, the USSR Ambassador Dmitry Chuvakhin, and also in a personal conversation. Eshkol replied to the ambassador that his sources of information are most likely not entirely correct. He offered him a joint trip to the north, so that the ambassador could personally verify that there was no concentration of Israeli troops there. Since the trip could have been done in just a couple of hours, it would have been impossible to hide 30-40 thousands of people and 3-4 thousands of cars in 20 km wide spaces, the offer looked convincing. However, Chuvakhin knowingly served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR since 1938, almost 30 years. Absolutely calmly, he replied that his business was not to check the messages of his government, but to bring them to the attention of the Israeli prime minister - after which he interrupted the conversation and bowed.
Israel has not started mobilization of troops yet, and 12 may not have “concentration of troops” yet. By transmitting this kind of "intelligence information" to Egypt, the Soviet Union pursued a definite goal: to achieve the deployment of Egyptian forces in Sinai, thus creating a threat to Israel from the south. Nasser was in a difficult position of a strong partner who does not intercede for a weak partner who is beaten. He decided to send several military missions to Syria. On the same day, the chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian army flew to Damascus to establish proper coordination between the armies of Egypt and Syria.
This did not cause much alarm in Israel. The head of Israel’s military intelligence, General Yariv, notified the Prime Minister that it was most likely a demonstration - like the one the Egyptian army was already conducting in 1960, and also in support of Syria.
He considered the probability of a war to be low. According to the forecast of intelligence, the readiness of the Egyptian army was supposed to be at the end of 1970, after the completion of the program of military supplies from the USSR.
Moreover, it was difficult to imagine that Egypt would start something serious before reaching an acceptable settlement in Yemen. There was a war in which Egypt was involved in the most tactile manner, not only politically. 8 Egyptian brigades were fighting in Yemen, Egyptian aviation bombed the positions of Yemeni royalists, even using chemical weapons.
The Egyptian guests did not find, however, anything alarming in the so-called "concentration of Israeli troops." Nevertheless, Nasser decided to go on a certain escalation of the crisis. Oddly enough, one of the reasons for this was the deteriorating financial position of Egypt. The Egyptian ruler hoped that Moscow’s economic and military assistance would help him out of the situation, and this dependence on the Soviets did not allow him to ignore their request to make a gesture towards the new Syrian leadership. Sending the Egyptian troops to Syria would have required too much time, and therefore Nasser decided instead to concentrate most of his army in Sinai. He hoped that this step would weaken any possible Israeli threat to Syria, satisfy the Russians, lead the Americans into confusion and, perhaps once and for all, silence the critics of his “passivity” from the Arab camp. Therefore, 15 May in Egypt was declared a state of emergency. The first vice-president of the United Arab Republic (as Egypt was then called), the commander of the armed forces of Egypt, the Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, in violation of international armistice agreements, moved an army of seven infantry and armored divisions to Sinai, a thousand T tanks -54 and T-55 and five hundred heavy guns.
The personal envoy of President Nasser immediately left for Damascus in order to reassure the Syrian brothers: Egypt is ready to throw all its military resources into battle, “in order to destroy the Israeli air force and occupy the territory of Israel”. Marshal Amer at this time personally received in Cairo a parade of valiant Egyptian troops, defiantly passing along Cairo boulevards, right under the windows of the American embassy, heading straight from the parade to the Sinai desert for the last and decisive battle with the Zionist enemy.
The conversation with the Soviet ambassador was unpleasant. The situation on the Syrian-Israeli border was really bad. Therefore, Eshkol proposed to the Chief of the General Staff of Israel - Yitzhak Rabin, at that time, to reduce the military parade, which was to be held on Independence Day, 15 on May, to the absolute minimum.
On May 15, an unusually modest military parade took place in Israel, in which, against custom, no tanks or airplanes participated, but simply passed several infantry units. The situation somehow did not have to festive celebrations. The absence of military equipment at the parade, however, was very much noticed by the Arab press - although this observation was interpreted not at all as Eshkol hoped. Arab newspapers have come to the unanimous opinion - everything that can shoot is already on the Syrian border.
Already during the parade ceremony, Eshkol received a note from the military department: the number of Egyptian troops at Sinai increased from 30, and thousands to 60, and continued to increase.
After a meeting at the Ministry of Defense, it was decided to start a partial mobilization.
On the morning of May 16, the Indian general, the commander of the UN forces in Sinai - Major General Indian Indar Jeet Richai, received a notification from General Fawzi with a request to remove his units from the Egyptian-Israeli gate to "... not interfere with the actions of the Egyptian army In the event that Israel undertakes aggression against any Arab country ... "
In Sinai, 978 Indians, 795 Canadians, 579 Yugoslavs, and also Swedes, Brazilians and Norwegians quietly carried the Sinekura. Altogether, UN troops on the peninsula had 3373 military personnel.
The commander was greatly puzzled as he read the message. The brigadier General Mukhtar who brought the letter on his own added that the Brazilians and the Swedes would roll off this night. Upon learning of this, the UN Secretary-General, 48, a quiet old former teacher U Thant, urgently invited his deputy, Ralph Bunch, and Egyptian representative Muhammad Al-Kony.
First, U Thant delivered a lecture to the Egyptian on the diplomatic protocol: the state cannot turn to the military in the field, but must send its demands directly to the general secretary. Later, at the suggestion of Bunche, the Secretary General informed Al-Kony that the UN could not agree to "half measures": either its forces would continue their mission without any obstacles, or they would leave Egyptian territory altogether. Both UN officials were confident that Nasser would not want a complete evacuation of international forces and therefore would go backwards. Unknowingly, the gullible Burmese U Thant played on Nasser. His desire was immediately granted. At noon 17 on May, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad notified him in a kind letter to the Secretary General that the Egyptian government had decided to "terminate the activities of UN troops both in Egypt and in the Gaza Strip ..."
Then something happened that had not and still has no analogues in the history of international organizations. Without any consultation with anyone, U Thant agreed to fulfill the request of the Egyptian government. This highly dramatic decision was made with unheard of, truly cosmic speed - the answer was delivered to the Egyptian government in 75 minutes after receiving its request. Abba Even, Israeli Foreign Minister at that time, in his memoirs, expresses complete amazement at the fact that the UN, known for its bureaucracy and slowness, was capable of such swift actions. One gets, however, the impression that he was surprised in vain - this impromptu looked very well prepared.
In fact, try to imagine that an important, even extremely important document should be read, should be comprehended, the answer should be formulated, should it finally be printed (immediately, without a draft?), And even should be delivered to the addressee - and all this in 75 minutes!
Even noted that neither with Israel, nor with the states that supplied their troops to the UN troops in Sinai, did not consult in any way. However, meetings with some countries have undoubtedly taken place. India, for example, as well as Yugoslavia, not only immediately expressed their full consent to the withdrawal of their parts, but even began to carry out this withdrawal without any delay, without even receiving any, at least official, instructions from the UN Secretariat. So the fact that they did not consult with Israel is understandable. What is absolutely incomprehensible is that U Thant did not gather the Security Council, did not immediately notify the General Assembly, did not speak with any of the ambassadors of countries with a permanent representation on the Security Council and, by the way, having a veto right there.
What is even more interesting is that none of these powers wished to come forward with the initiative of convening a session of the Security Council, to which they had an inalienable right.
The actions of the Secretary General were criticized only by the USA and Canada, and then privately.
This was later explained by the fact that Western countries sympathized with Israel, but believed that in the General Assembly Asian and African countries would automatically support Egypt as a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement. I wanted to avoid confrontation.
And the Security Council was blocked by the Soviet Union, which already expressed the opinion that “there is no crisis, and Israeli provocations are to blame for the exacerbation of the situation ...”
On the same day, May 17, two Egyptian MiG-21 flew at high altitude above the reactor in Dimona. They stayed in the Israeli sky for only five minutes and left in the direction of Jordan. Intercept them did not have time. (There are conspiracy studies that are trying to prove that reconnaissance flights over the Israeli nuclear center were made at that time by an experimental and top-secret MIG-25, which officially went into serial production only in 1972 year. At that time, in the West there was no analogue to this car, which received the designation Foxbat (“The Bat”) in the NATO classification. Israeli pilots who knew MIG-21 like their five fingers immediately understood that they were dealing with a completely different machine: the planes flying over Dimona went on at such a height and with such a speed that the fighters who had risen to intercept would have no chance to catch up with him.) Around the Dimona quickly put additional missiles "Hawk".
In the evening of May 18, the blue and white helmets left their barracks in Al Quuntilla and El Hamra. Egyptian troops immediately took their place. Then, which was even more disturbing, the Egyptians demanded the evacuation of a small garrison of UN soldiers located in Sharm el-Sheikh and guarding the Straits of Tirana. As a result, the entire structure of international observation collapsed exactly a house of cards.
U Thant expressed a desire to visit Cairo, in order to “get acquainted with the situation on the spot.”
Why he decided to go there after his so famous, and so inexplicable decision, and not before, for example, it also remained unexplained.
On May 10, Egyptian diplomats advised him, apparently, as a token of gratitude, to postpone the visit until he received an official invitation.
On May 19, the Soviet Ambassador to Israel visited the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Even, at his request. He explained to the minister that the matter was not at all in the movement of the Egyptian troops to Sinai, but "... in Israeli politics, continuously and without any need exacerbating the already difficult situation ...", and made a bold assumption that "... mines on Israeli roads, adjacent to the Israeli-Syrian border, in fact, put the CIA agents ... "
After the publication of Nasser’s decision on the withdrawal of UN troops and the immediate response of the UN Secretary General, who agreed to the complete withdrawal of all UN troops, two stages can be distinguished, characterized by different Soviet positions. At the first stage, the Soviet Union took this message with a certain anxiety, refraining from any assessments of the decision of Egypt. At the second stage, the Soviet Union at the official and diplomatic level spoke in support of the Egyptian decision. The newspaper Pravda published a statement by the Soviet government on the situation in the Middle East, which, inter alia, stated:
Late in the evening on May 21, yielding to the insistence of his cabinet and other Arab governments, Nasser made a fateful decision. At dawn, two Egyptian submarines, a destroyer and four missile boats proceeded through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea. The following day, Nasser made a statement:
For Israel, this meant a deadly threat. The port of Eilat after the 1956 war of the year served as an Israeli outlet to Asia and Africa. In the 1966 year, about a million tons of cargo passed through it, almost 30% of all Israeli raw material exports. It became the main oil port of Israel, and an oil pipeline was built from it to Ashkelon. Nasser was fully aware that his step could not be interpreted in any other way than casus belli - a declaration of war, since the maritime powers had already confirmed the principle of the freedom of international navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba as early as 1957. Even the Russians were amazed at the fact that Nasser was at risk of war: by publicly supporting his actions, behind the scenes they expressed their irritation at the fact that this step was taken without consulting them.
Accordingly, 22 May Eshkol turned to the Knesset for advice on what to do. The general tone of the speeches of members of parliament was this: we do not want war, but if we have to fight, let no one be offended. Jaber Muaddi, a member of the Druze faction, said that the Druze of Israel is ready to join the army and defend the country. He was not afraid to say from the tribune of the Knesset that the closure of the Straits of Tirana is tantamount to declaring war on Israel. And in Cairo on this day announced a military alliance with Iraq.
All eyes turned to the United States. The Americans skillfully pulled time. Perhaps they sincerely believed that there was still time for diplomacy, but the Israelis thought that there was no time. From 1961, the US ambassador to Israel was Walworth Barbour, who by 1967 had managed to recognize everyone and everything. When he finally became convinced that Israel would fight, he telephoned Washington State Department and reported. Barbour was instructed to ask the Israelis to postpone the start of the war for 48 hours, while the Americans will try to settle the straits issue by peaceful means. Friends, said Even, let's not repeat the mistakes of 1956 of the year and quarrel with the Americans. Uncle Sam requests 48 hours, let's give him 48 hours.
23 May, King of Saudi Arabia Faisal said in London that the forces of his kingdom would help repel Israeli aggression. The pendulum of war has already swung.
By noon, 23 in May, mobilization in Israel was already in full swing. The bus service was discontinued because all vehicles were put at the disposal of the army. The streets are empty, cafes and theaters, too; school hours were reduced; across the country citizens were digging trenches in a hurry; Civil Defense Headquarters delivered fire extinguishers and first aid kits to the bomb shelters. The children helped sand the bags. The question of the possibility of street fighting was seriously discussed.
Thousands of Israelis rushed to pay taxes in advance, knowing that the government would need money; at the same time, various donations from the public, including jewelry and wedding rings, poured into the Ministry of Defense. On the eve of the war, the Israelis believed that the very existence of the state was under threat. In public parks, sites for 10 thousands of graves were prepared and this was considered insufficient.
On the same day, May 23, at 13: 33, US President Lyndon Johnson summoned Walter Rostow, state security adviser, and directly asked him what were the real chances that Egypt would clash with Israel; and how can this all turn out for the USA?
Rostow sighed heavily and began to bend his fingers. First, he bent over Israel:
* Israel sincerely believes that its existence is under threat and that war is the last historical chance.
* Israel sincerely believes that terrorism can be stopped only by force.
* Israel sincerely believes that its geography gives it only one chance to win the war - to deliver a preemptive strike.
* Israel is well aware that the alignment in the UN is against it and that the Arabs have now consolidated both their military forces and their diplomatic efforts.
* Israel believes that America has nothing to offer Israel right now instead of the idea of a preemptive strike.
* And finally, how can America give Israel ferroconcrete guarantees to ensure its security in case the Jews do not start a war, and their diplomatic capabilities are completely exhausted?
Johnson frowned, but Rostow continued to bend his fingers about Egypt:
* Egypt yearns to pay for defeat in the 1956 war of the year.
* The political and economic situation in the country is not brilliant.
* Nasser is forced to maintain his prestige and position of the leader of the Arab world.
* Egypt would be glad to economically milk the USSR and the USA at the same time and at the same time play on the contradictions of the great powers.
In general, summed up Rostow, the war will be.
To be continued ...
Sources:
Shterenshis M. Israel. The history of the state. 2009.
Tenenbaum B. The Unsuspected Arab-Israeli War of 1956. 2011.
Okunev Yu. A six-day chord of biblical history.
Arab-Israeli wars. Arab look. 2008.
“Israel after 40 years”, Aaron S. Klieman, 1990, Pergamon, New York.
“Arabs in War”, Kenneth M. Pollack, 2002, Nebraska University.
“Israel's Wars”, Ahron Bregman, 2003, Ruthledge, New York.
Wikipedia articles, Cyclopaedia, etc.
A year ago, Israel celebrated the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Six Day War, which occupies a special place in stories of the state. The triumph of 1967 of the year, with all the pathos of the word, radically changed the situation in the Middle East, affecting both the attitude towards Israel in the World and the Israeli society and the Jewish people in general. It can be said without exaggeration that the geopolitical map of the modern Middle East is a direct consequence of these six days that shook the world.
The beginning of this war was the result of a number of factors, and none of the political and military leaders, either in the Middle East or outside of it, controlled the situation completely. At the same time, this war cannot be called an accident either. Paradoxically, the most important of the Arab-Israeli wars was the result of fatal discrepancies between the true interests of the Israeli and Arab leaders and the policies that they voluntarily or unwittingly enforced. Consider how the distribution of political and military forces in the Middle East and beyond in the 1967 year looked like in a historical retrospect.
For the first time, the world saw Egyptian ballistic missiles, openly and proudly presented on display at a parade in July 1962 on the occasion of Revolution Day.
These missiles could hit "any target south of Beirut," as the Egyptians stated. There was no boast in these words, the German scientists designed the missiles. (Read more on the HE in article by Kirill Ryabov "Egyptian projects of ballistic missiles".) Israel as a whole was aware of the Egyptian successes, but annoying rattling was serious weapons. The fact is that Israel had nothing of the kind at this time, except for experimental meteorological rockets. So, in July 1962, the Israelis "discovered" that they did not have missiles, and their enemies had them.
At that time there were two schools of military thinking in Israel. One school assumed the further development of the army in the direction of introducing new technologies and developing nuclear weapons. These were the ideas of Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan.
Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan
They believed that instead of a conventional arms race, they should try to outrun enemies as weapons. Another school was pushing for a further build-up of conventional weapons. So thought Yigal Allon and Israel Galili.
Igal allon
Israel Galili
In fact, in these disputes, the question was decided where to send the fixed assets from the military budget.
Ahmad Abdel Nasser was silent about the Israeli nuclear program. First, the Egyptians knew that they had overtaken Israel in the field of missiles. Secondly, since 1961, Egypt has quietly tried to engage in its atomic bomb. Therefore, Nasser did not stutter on the Dimona reactor, and the Israelis "did not notice" Egyptian research.
By the middle of 1966, the Israeli Kutuzov - Moshe Dayan did not know what to do. He left the army for years of service, he left the government out of devotion to Ben-Gurion, and sat his pants in the chair of the Knesset deputy from the opposition faction. Continuing to live in the art of war, the retired general decided to keep up with life and went to Vietnam as a simple correspondent to learn the latest methods of warfare.
Moshe Dayan in Vietnam
Yes, the Vietnam War was in full swing, and the Americans cordially showed the famous commander everything they could. Several times Dayan landed from a helicopter in the jungle and fell into serious alterations, but when you lose an eye in battle, you gain valuable combat experience in vain not to hang out. From Vietnam, Dayan returned without a scratch.
He could see a lot and realized that the Americans could not win the Indochina war. Dayan wrote with envy in his memoirs about the army of American helicopters; some of them cost 3 million dollars, unimaginable money for the Israeli army. He saw that the most effective method of war was the raiding of heavy high-flying bombers, and that soldiers should be deployed by helicopters. Neither helicopters, nor heavy bombers to Israel were suitable, too expensive. Israelis are used to fighting as economically as possible. Dayan wrote that he had to watch the battle, during which the Americans fired more shells on the enemy than all of Israel’s artillery for the entire War of Independence and the Sinai campaign combined. Having been in the best military laboratory of 60's, Dayan returned to Israel full of impressions and interesting ideas. The near future showed that this trip was made oh so not for nothing.
In the meantime, Yitzhak Rabin worked as chief of the operations department of the general staff and by the year of 1964 he had served as chief of the general staff.
Ariel Sharon was out of work after the 1956 war, was appointed head of the infantry school and pulled this strap for four years. Only shortly before 1967 was he transferred as reserve commander tank brigades.
David Elazar, another future chief of staff, met the new 1967 year as commander of the Northern Military District. Prior to this appointment, he commanded the armored forces of the Israel Defense Forces.
On the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula, UN soldiers were sunbathing and it was relatively quiet, while on the Syrian border, a rare day went by without an artillery duel. The Syrians turned the Golan Heights overhanging Lake Kinneret into a powerful fortress with many kilometers of long-term firing points. Hundreds of Soviet cannons, anti-aircraft guns and Katyusha rocket launchers were installed on the line. For many years, the Syrians fired from above from above the Israeli agricultural settlements clearly visible below, obstructed fishing on Lake Kinneret (Tiberias), etc.
Panorama. Left and right - Israel. More to the right - the demilitarized zone and Syria
They could shell a significant part of the north of the country, from Metulla and Kiryat Shmona to the shores of Lake Galilee and to the south. Especially it went to Israeli farmers. Syrian artillerymen hit their tractors like moving targets. The tractor had to be sheathed with armor. Israel was the only country in the world where the land was plowed on armored cars. In early 1967, the Syrians began to send saboteurs to Israel through the territory of Jordan. They mined Israeli roads adjacent to the Israeli-Syrian border. Israel responded with military operations against sabotage bases. The situation escalated, and in April episodic clashes between Israeli and Syrian aviation.
Israeli response to the shelling and air raids followed with enviable regularity, but both governments felt the edge of what was permitted and these constant border incidents did not escalate into a full-scale war, although the Syrian leadership was asleep and saw the Syrian flag over Haifa.
For a full-fledged war with Israel, Syria needed dope outside. By the year 1967, she received this dope, or rather two at once, from Nasser and from the Soviet Union.
In 1967, the Soviet people, under the wise leadership of the Communist Party, which is getting stronger from day to day, is preparing to worthily and solemnly celebrate the 50 anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The leader of the party and the people, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who celebrated his 60 anniversary six months ago and was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union for this occasion, replaced the modest Khrushchev's “first secretary” with a more appropriate hero — the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Voluntarism in economics and politics, thank God, is finished, the Leninist Politburo is staffed with loyal leaders, suitable for party leadership cadres. The loud slogans of the previous leader, such as “Catch up and overtake America” or “The current generation of Soviet people will live under communism!”, Delicately, quietly removed - the country is already at the top of its power. Why catch up with America if we have long overtaken it, and the whole world is watching how Soviet rockets iron the space.
Quote from the essay by Yuri Okunev "A six-day chord of the history of the biblical scale", written eleven years ago to the 40 anniversary of the Six-Day War:
“The main thing is a centralized, comprehensive party leadership. And, of course, it is necessary to strengthen party work abroad. Expensive, however, it is worth - currency funds. To maintain the apparatus of one French Communist Party, 2 has to transfer a million dollars a year, and even so much to publish and buy up this newspaper, L'Humanite. But it’s not for nothing that this is what wave the comrades in Europe raised against American aggression in Vietnam. Comrades Andropov and Grechko report: Americans are getting bogged down in Vietnam. It is necessary to increase the help to comrade Ho Chi Minh so that he would refuse any peace talks with the imperialists. Expensive it all costs in currency. What is there "Jumanite" - a trifle. The content of the Cuban comrades costs 1 a million dollars daily, but here, of course, loyalty to the Leninist cause is a real and enormous return in Latin America and Africa.
And also - the content of the Hero of the Soviet Union Nasser, as his there, Gamal Abdel, flies in a pretty penny. Both the planes were delivered to him, the ships, the cannons, and the newest tanks, and the army of advisers — all at our expense, and everything is small. Comrades from the Central Committee report: over the past 10 years, we have supplied the Arabs with weapons for 2 billion dollars - 1700 tanks, 2400 guns, 500 jets and 1400 advisors. And more than half of all this - Nasser. Clearly, Nasser wants to be the leader of all the Arabs, and this will not work without a victory over Israel. It is impossible not to support the Egyptian and Syrian comrades - in any way they adhere to the socialist orientation, although they do not want to be real communists, like Fidel Castro. But - our people, and the Americans showed the ass with the British. We must help them and indicate the right way - let Israel be punished. Then all over the world it will be clear to all who is more profitable to stick with - us or the Americans. The Zionists are holding on to America, they are crawling ahead of all world imperialism - it's time to give them a shot. Americans chatter about democratic freedoms, and we, without much chatter, give weapons to those who are against imperialism and Zionism. And our Jews will have a good lesson. Comrade Andropov reports: nationalistic sentiments among the Jews have increased, already, like that, talking about emigration to Israel. This is an undermining of the foundations, and even such secret thoughts should not be allowed to dare to leave the USSR, countries of developed socialism. So they decided with comrades Suslov and Andropov to ensure the decisive actions of Egypt and Syria against Zionist Israel. Then even in a nightmare, gentlemen, the Zionists, your Israel will not dream of you ... ”
And also - the content of the Hero of the Soviet Union Nasser, as his there, Gamal Abdel, flies in a pretty penny. Both the planes were delivered to him, the ships, the cannons, and the newest tanks, and the army of advisers — all at our expense, and everything is small. Comrades from the Central Committee report: over the past 10 years, we have supplied the Arabs with weapons for 2 billion dollars - 1700 tanks, 2400 guns, 500 jets and 1400 advisors. And more than half of all this - Nasser. Clearly, Nasser wants to be the leader of all the Arabs, and this will not work without a victory over Israel. It is impossible not to support the Egyptian and Syrian comrades - in any way they adhere to the socialist orientation, although they do not want to be real communists, like Fidel Castro. But - our people, and the Americans showed the ass with the British. We must help them and indicate the right way - let Israel be punished. Then all over the world it will be clear to all who is more profitable to stick with - us or the Americans. The Zionists are holding on to America, they are crawling ahead of all world imperialism - it's time to give them a shot. Americans chatter about democratic freedoms, and we, without much chatter, give weapons to those who are against imperialism and Zionism. And our Jews will have a good lesson. Comrade Andropov reports: nationalistic sentiments among the Jews have increased, already, like that, talking about emigration to Israel. This is an undermining of the foundations, and even such secret thoughts should not be allowed to dare to leave the USSR, countries of developed socialism. So they decided with comrades Suslov and Andropov to ensure the decisive actions of Egypt and Syria against Zionist Israel. Then even in a nightmare, gentlemen, the Zionists, your Israel will not dream of you ... ”
Nasser was ready to meet the Soviets. In 1966, he signed an agreement with Moscow, according to which the Russians got access to ports on the Mediterranean and Red Seas and three Egyptian airfields. On the Mediterranean Sea, Soviet ships stood in Port Said, Alexandria, and Mersa Matruh, and in the Red Sea, the USSR had a base at Ras Banas. In exchange, Moscow pledged to increase the supply of weapons and provide military specialists. This did not solve, however, the financial problems of Egypt. By 1967, the country has slipped to bankruptcy. The balance of payments deficit reached 0,5 billion dollars, and foreign debt - 1,3 billion dollars. For those times, the money is quite considerable, and for Egypt it is very heavy. Before the war, the Egyptians had to sell a third of their gold reserves, but nevertheless they could not make all their payments to the International Monetary Fund.
In the Israeli-Syrian confrontation of the USSR, the UN supported all resolutions condemning the use of force by Israel, and vetoed all similar resolutions against Syria. Since the United States took a neutral position, the anti-Israel resolutions in the UN passed, but there was no anti-Syrian one. However, the Syrians were their worst enemies, for 17 years in this country occurred 13 military coups. 23 February 1966, the government, dreaming of the complete destruction of Israel, burst into power. The power in Damascus was seized by an extremist Baath party faction. Back in the 1920s, the Syrian Michel Aflak went to Paris, he read Kant, Hegel and Marx and began to create the intellectual foundation of the Arab Renaissance Party - Baath. By the 1960 years, the Baath bizarrely mixed in itself socialism, nationalism and pan-Arabism, mixed up with irreconcilable hostility towards Israel. To the war with Israel, Syria was led:
President Nureddin Al-Atassi
Prime Minister Yusuf Zuejin
Defense Minister Hafez Asad (Papa Bashar Assad)
The activities of the Soviet Union in the Arab countries especially sharply intensified in the first year after the Baath Party came to power in Syria. As Kosygin said in a speech to Moscow on 8 on June 1966, this activity was aimed at enhancing Syrian-Egyptian cooperation and preparing the basis for other Arab countries to join the bloc, “having thrown off colonial oppression and in new conditions continue to oppose imperialism and reaction ". Reaction meant all those countries (Saudi Arabia, Jordan) and organizations in Arab countries that refused to pursue pro-Soviet policies.
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin
The flow of messages about the "growing Soviet-Arab friendship" made Israeli analysts worry. Every month brought new news. The opening of direct air communication between Moscow and Beirut was held on 14 on June 1966. A Soviet government delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik visited Algeria to participate in the Algerian national holiday 3 of July of that year. At the same time, the delegation of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa and Asia arrived in Beirut. (It was indicated that the delegation would discuss issues related to the “strengthening of the solidarity of peoples in the struggle for peace against imperialism and colonialism”, TASS, July 5). Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Piki visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on July 13. The Moroccan Foreign Minister arrived on a visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of Foreign Minister Gromyko on July 17. Almost immediately after him, on July 27, the Prime Minister of Iraq arrived at the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin. This Arab summer ended with the fact that on August 21 a delegation of the Arab Socialist Unity Party arrived in Egypt from Egypt. The purpose of the visit is “familiarization with the practical work of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union”.
In September, a delegation of the Egyptian Friendship Society with the Soviet Union visited Moscow for the first time, and after that a congress of friendship societies and cultural ties with Arab countries opened. At the same time, September 20-22, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Semenov visited Egypt (Pravda, September 26). October 9 ended the visit to the Soviet Union, the Minister of Labor of Kuwait. Leaving Moscow, he, in particular, said: “The purpose of my visit is to establish economic ties with Soviet specialists” (Izvestia, October 10). Even with the Moroccan monarchy, "the unification of the Arab peoples on an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist basis" was discussed. At the end of October 1966, the Komsomol delegation visited Tunisia, and the Soviet delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Malik visited Algeria again.
The Arab-Soviet friendship grew stronger throughout the fall. Finally, on November 22, in connection with the signing of the treaty on defense between Egypt and Syria with the support of the USSR, Pravda said that this treaty plays not only a deterrent role, but also represents a cohesive factor, laying a solid foundation for a block of progressive, read pro-Soviet countries. At the same time, on November 22, the Egyptian Prime Minister Amer arrived on an official visit to the Soviet Union. November 30 was followed by an agreement between the Soviet Union and Jordan on the construction of a hydropower station on the Yarmuk River. The same day, the Soviet delegation arrived in Algeria to open a direct air link between Moscow and Algeria.
Observing the broad maneuvers of the Soviet Union, but being very politically cautious, America nevertheless began to sell weapons to Israel after President Eisenhower left the White House. The new president, John F. Kennedy, was located pro-Israel.
In 1962, Israel finally received Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, and from 1965, the United States began supplying tanks to Israel. By this time, the Arab countries were already crammed with Soviet weapons. The American jet fighters A-4 "Skyhawk" Israel received only in 1966 year.
Nasser, the charismatic leader of the 31 million Egyptian people, with all his pan-Arabic ambitions, was a cautious man. He was about 50, and for a politician it is youth. At the same time, he was the oldest among all Arab leaders! In Israel, it was time for the reign of older politicians. Nasser wanted war with Israel, but cautiously believed that only by 1969, Soviet instructors and Soviet weapons would make his army able to fight the IDF on an equal footing (as experience has shown, this turned out to be possible only in 1973). Covered after the UN 1956 war at Sinai, Nasser was more involved in global projects in the Arab world. So, 1 February 1958, Egypt united with Syria in the United Arab Republic, the UAR, which lasted until 28 September 1961, and fell apart because the Egyptians regarded Syria as a minor northern province of Egypt. In 1962, Nasser intervened in the civil war in Yemen and even sent Egyptian troops to the Arabian Peninsula. As for Israel itself, by 1966, the Syrian government was more aggressive than the Egyptian one. The Syrian radical anti-Israeli regime rebuked Egypt for an inadequately hostile (!) Stance against the common enemy. These reproaches took effect and finally led to the conclusion of the 4 in November of 1966, a defensive treaty between the two countries, hotly approved by the USSR.
As for Jordan, the socialist Nasser did not cherish love for the monarchical regime of this country. Indeed, 31-year-old King Hussein ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussein al Hashimi, a friend of the West, did not fit into the Naser pro-Soviet Middle East.
Hussein, the grandson of King Abdullah, ascended the throne to the young. After Abdullah was killed by a Palestinian fanatic in Jerusalem, the throne passed to 17-year-old Hussein, who was then studying in England, in Harrow. He did not have a love for the Palestinians, although they became citizens of his country. He was with his grandfather at the 20 Al-Aqsa Mosque in July 1951, and his grandfather was killed before his eyes. One of the bullets hit the medal on the chest of the young prince, and the only way he was not injured.
King Abdullah I ibn Hussein
After cooling relations with England in 1956, King Hussein found himself in difficult circumstances, which the Americans took advantage of. They unobtrusively put a financial leash on the monarch in order to have a friendly regime in the middle of a troubled region. From 1957 to 1977, Hussein secretly received money from the funds of the CIA, some of which was spent on his security service, and some on maintaining the royal standard of living. Now, in 1966, the king was quite tolerant of Israel and would have been even more tolerant if not for Nasser and the Palestinian national liberation movement. Nasser harassed Hussein for a pro-Western orientation, calling him an "Amman courtesan" and a "TsRUshny dwarf". The short and frail Jordanian king, next to the broad, broad Nasser, looked really small.
The Jordanian radio snapped that Nasser, having covered himself with a UN pillow from Israel, is easy to argue. Jordan, at least, gave the Palestinians full citizenship, while the Egyptians in Gaza kept Palestinians in second grade. The Syrians also whispered to Nasser that only after the peace-loving king would be replaced on the throne of Jordan by a more aggressive person, a war with Israel would become possible.
Even before American shipments, Israeli pilots flying French-made Mirage fought successfully in the north with brand new Syrian MiG-21. Israeli pilots inflicted the most severe defeat on the Syrians on 7 on April 1967. As usual, Israeli aircraft flew in order to destroy the positions of heavy artillery in the Golan Heights. The Syrian pilots rushed to the aid of the artillerymen. The air battle was on the space between Damascus and the Golan Heights. Residents of the Syrian capital could see the Israelis shoot down their planes. In total, 6 Syrian MiGs were shot down in this battle without loss by the Israeli Air Force. It was a shame. The next day, the Syrian regime declared: “Our well-known goal is the liberation of Palestine and the elimination of Zionist existence there.” At a meeting with a high-ranking Egyptian delegation, Prime Minister Mohammed Sidqi Suleiman and commander of the air force, General Mohammed Sidqi Mahmoud, Syria invited Egypt to consider a joint attack plan codenamed Rashid, in which Syrian forces would strike northern Israel with the ultimate goal of seizure all of Galilee and Haifa, and the Egyptian troops - in southern and central Israel.
In an effort to maintain their Syrian bridgehead at all costs, the Russians several times hinted to Israel in a rather sharp way the possibility of "grave consequences" in the event of its "provocations" against Syria. And on April 21, 1967, two weeks after the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian fighters, Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Yakov Malik quite roughly warned the Israelis that they put at risk the very existence of their state.
Jacob Malik
Already in January, 1967, the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was forced to openly warn the Syrians: "I cannot exclude the possibility that we will have no other way but preventive actions."
The 7 air battle of April could be seen as a foreshadowing of even more severe punitive actions. Panicked, the Syrians moved their heavy artillery directly into the demilitarized zone. The Israelis responded by bringing their border garrison to combat readiness. Finally, on May 11, Jerusalem informed the UN Security Council that if Syrian provocations continued, Israel "would consider it right to resort to self-defense." And at that moment, the Russians, deeply concerned about the safety of their favorite Arab protégé, committed the most pernicious mistake since their intervention in Middle Eastern affairs ...
13 On May 1967, the Egyptian government received official notification from the USSR government that Israeli troops were preparing an attack on Syria, and that for this purpose, the Israeli border is concentrated from 11 to 13 Israeli brigades. This message was made in Moscow, in a personal conversation between the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.V. Podgorny and the head of the Egyptian parliamentary delegation to the USSR, Anwar Sadat.
Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny
Anwar Sadat
The same message was previously brought to the attention of the Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, the USSR Ambassador Dmitry Chuvakhin, and also in a personal conversation. Eshkol replied to the ambassador that his sources of information are most likely not entirely correct. He offered him a joint trip to the north, so that the ambassador could personally verify that there was no concentration of Israeli troops there. Since the trip could have been done in just a couple of hours, it would have been impossible to hide 30-40 thousands of people and 3-4 thousands of cars in 20 km wide spaces, the offer looked convincing. However, Chuvakhin knowingly served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR since 1938, almost 30 years. Absolutely calmly, he replied that his business was not to check the messages of his government, but to bring them to the attention of the Israeli prime minister - after which he interrupted the conversation and bowed.
Israel has not started mobilization of troops yet, and 12 may not have “concentration of troops” yet. By transmitting this kind of "intelligence information" to Egypt, the Soviet Union pursued a definite goal: to achieve the deployment of Egyptian forces in Sinai, thus creating a threat to Israel from the south. Nasser was in a difficult position of a strong partner who does not intercede for a weak partner who is beaten. He decided to send several military missions to Syria. On the same day, the chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian army flew to Damascus to establish proper coordination between the armies of Egypt and Syria.
This did not cause much alarm in Israel. The head of Israel’s military intelligence, General Yariv, notified the Prime Minister that it was most likely a demonstration - like the one the Egyptian army was already conducting in 1960, and also in support of Syria.
He considered the probability of a war to be low. According to the forecast of intelligence, the readiness of the Egyptian army was supposed to be at the end of 1970, after the completion of the program of military supplies from the USSR.
Moreover, it was difficult to imagine that Egypt would start something serious before reaching an acceptable settlement in Yemen. There was a war in which Egypt was involved in the most tactile manner, not only politically. 8 Egyptian brigades were fighting in Yemen, Egyptian aviation bombed the positions of Yemeni royalists, even using chemical weapons.
The Egyptian guests did not find, however, anything alarming in the so-called "concentration of Israeli troops." Nevertheless, Nasser decided to go on a certain escalation of the crisis. Oddly enough, one of the reasons for this was the deteriorating financial position of Egypt. The Egyptian ruler hoped that Moscow’s economic and military assistance would help him out of the situation, and this dependence on the Soviets did not allow him to ignore their request to make a gesture towards the new Syrian leadership. Sending the Egyptian troops to Syria would have required too much time, and therefore Nasser decided instead to concentrate most of his army in Sinai. He hoped that this step would weaken any possible Israeli threat to Syria, satisfy the Russians, lead the Americans into confusion and, perhaps once and for all, silence the critics of his “passivity” from the Arab camp. Therefore, 15 May in Egypt was declared a state of emergency. The first vice-president of the United Arab Republic (as Egypt was then called), the commander of the armed forces of Egypt, the Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, in violation of international armistice agreements, moved an army of seven infantry and armored divisions to Sinai, a thousand T tanks -54 and T-55 and five hundred heavy guns.
Abdel Hakim Amer
The personal envoy of President Nasser immediately left for Damascus in order to reassure the Syrian brothers: Egypt is ready to throw all its military resources into battle, “in order to destroy the Israeli air force and occupy the territory of Israel”. Marshal Amer at this time personally received in Cairo a parade of valiant Egyptian troops, defiantly passing along Cairo boulevards, right under the windows of the American embassy, heading straight from the parade to the Sinai desert for the last and decisive battle with the Zionist enemy.
The conversation with the Soviet ambassador was unpleasant. The situation on the Syrian-Israeli border was really bad. Therefore, Eshkol proposed to the Chief of the General Staff of Israel - Yitzhak Rabin, at that time, to reduce the military parade, which was to be held on Independence Day, 15 on May, to the absolute minimum.
On May 15, an unusually modest military parade took place in Israel, in which, against custom, no tanks or airplanes participated, but simply passed several infantry units. The situation somehow did not have to festive celebrations. The absence of military equipment at the parade, however, was very much noticed by the Arab press - although this observation was interpreted not at all as Eshkol hoped. Arab newspapers have come to the unanimous opinion - everything that can shoot is already on the Syrian border.
Already during the parade ceremony, Eshkol received a note from the military department: the number of Egyptian troops at Sinai increased from 30, and thousands to 60, and continued to increase.
After a meeting at the Ministry of Defense, it was decided to start a partial mobilization.
On the morning of May 16, the Indian general, the commander of the UN forces in Sinai - Major General Indian Indar Jeet Richai, received a notification from General Fawzi with a request to remove his units from the Egyptian-Israeli gate to "... not interfere with the actions of the Egyptian army In the event that Israel undertakes aggression against any Arab country ... "
General Mohammed Fawzi
In Sinai, 978 Indians, 795 Canadians, 579 Yugoslavs, and also Swedes, Brazilians and Norwegians quietly carried the Sinekura. Altogether, UN troops on the peninsula had 3373 military personnel.
The commander was greatly puzzled as he read the message. The brigadier General Mukhtar who brought the letter on his own added that the Brazilians and the Swedes would roll off this night. Upon learning of this, the UN Secretary-General, 48, a quiet old former teacher U Thant, urgently invited his deputy, Ralph Bunch, and Egyptian representative Muhammad Al-Kony.
U Tan
Ralph Bunch
First, U Thant delivered a lecture to the Egyptian on the diplomatic protocol: the state cannot turn to the military in the field, but must send its demands directly to the general secretary. Later, at the suggestion of Bunche, the Secretary General informed Al-Kony that the UN could not agree to "half measures": either its forces would continue their mission without any obstacles, or they would leave Egyptian territory altogether. Both UN officials were confident that Nasser would not want a complete evacuation of international forces and therefore would go backwards. Unknowingly, the gullible Burmese U Thant played on Nasser. His desire was immediately granted. At noon 17 on May, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad notified him in a kind letter to the Secretary General that the Egyptian government had decided to "terminate the activities of UN troops both in Egypt and in the Gaza Strip ..."
Then something happened that had not and still has no analogues in the history of international organizations. Without any consultation with anyone, U Thant agreed to fulfill the request of the Egyptian government. This highly dramatic decision was made with unheard of, truly cosmic speed - the answer was delivered to the Egyptian government in 75 minutes after receiving its request. Abba Even, Israeli Foreign Minister at that time, in his memoirs, expresses complete amazement at the fact that the UN, known for its bureaucracy and slowness, was capable of such swift actions. One gets, however, the impression that he was surprised in vain - this impromptu looked very well prepared.
In fact, try to imagine that an important, even extremely important document should be read, should be comprehended, the answer should be formulated, should it finally be printed (immediately, without a draft?), And even should be delivered to the addressee - and all this in 75 minutes!
Even noted that neither with Israel, nor with the states that supplied their troops to the UN troops in Sinai, did not consult in any way. However, meetings with some countries have undoubtedly taken place. India, for example, as well as Yugoslavia, not only immediately expressed their full consent to the withdrawal of their parts, but even began to carry out this withdrawal without any delay, without even receiving any, at least official, instructions from the UN Secretariat. So the fact that they did not consult with Israel is understandable. What is absolutely incomprehensible is that U Thant did not gather the Security Council, did not immediately notify the General Assembly, did not speak with any of the ambassadors of countries with a permanent representation on the Security Council and, by the way, having a veto right there.
What is even more interesting is that none of these powers wished to come forward with the initiative of convening a session of the Security Council, to which they had an inalienable right.
The actions of the Secretary General were criticized only by the USA and Canada, and then privately.
This was later explained by the fact that Western countries sympathized with Israel, but believed that in the General Assembly Asian and African countries would automatically support Egypt as a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement. I wanted to avoid confrontation.
And the Security Council was blocked by the Soviet Union, which already expressed the opinion that “there is no crisis, and Israeli provocations are to blame for the exacerbation of the situation ...”
On the same day, May 17, two Egyptian MiG-21 flew at high altitude above the reactor in Dimona. They stayed in the Israeli sky for only five minutes and left in the direction of Jordan. Intercept them did not have time. (There are conspiracy studies that are trying to prove that reconnaissance flights over the Israeli nuclear center were made at that time by an experimental and top-secret MIG-25, which officially went into serial production only in 1972 year. At that time, in the West there was no analogue to this car, which received the designation Foxbat (“The Bat”) in the NATO classification. Israeli pilots who knew MIG-21 like their five fingers immediately understood that they were dealing with a completely different machine: the planes flying over Dimona went on at such a height and with such a speed that the fighters who had risen to intercept would have no chance to catch up with him.) Around the Dimona quickly put additional missiles "Hawk".
In the evening of May 18, the blue and white helmets left their barracks in Al Quuntilla and El Hamra. Egyptian troops immediately took their place. Then, which was even more disturbing, the Egyptians demanded the evacuation of a small garrison of UN soldiers located in Sharm el-Sheikh and guarding the Straits of Tirana. As a result, the entire structure of international observation collapsed exactly a house of cards.
U Thant expressed a desire to visit Cairo, in order to “get acquainted with the situation on the spot.”
Why he decided to go there after his so famous, and so inexplicable decision, and not before, for example, it also remained unexplained.
On May 10, Egyptian diplomats advised him, apparently, as a token of gratitude, to postpone the visit until he received an official invitation.
On May 19, the Soviet Ambassador to Israel visited the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Even, at his request. He explained to the minister that the matter was not at all in the movement of the Egyptian troops to Sinai, but "... in Israeli politics, continuously and without any need exacerbating the already difficult situation ...", and made a bold assumption that "... mines on Israeli roads, adjacent to the Israeli-Syrian border, in fact, put the CIA agents ... "
After the publication of Nasser’s decision on the withdrawal of UN troops and the immediate response of the UN Secretary General, who agreed to the complete withdrawal of all UN troops, two stages can be distinguished, characterized by different Soviet positions. At the first stage, the Soviet Union took this message with a certain anxiety, refraining from any assessments of the decision of Egypt. At the second stage, the Soviet Union at the official and diplomatic level spoke in support of the Egyptian decision. The newspaper Pravda published a statement by the Soviet government on the situation in the Middle East, which, inter alia, stated:
“The United Arab Republic, fulfilling its allied obligations on joint defense with Syria, has taken steps to curb aggression. Considering that the presence of UN troops in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula in this situation would give Israel advantages for conducting military provocations against Arab countries, the UAR government appealed to the United Nations with a proposal to withdraw these troops from this area. ”
The fact that the presence of UN troops in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula was the guarantor of the prevention of aggression against any of the parties, no one even bothered.Late in the evening on May 21, yielding to the insistence of his cabinet and other Arab governments, Nasser made a fateful decision. At dawn, two Egyptian submarines, a destroyer and four missile boats proceeded through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea. The following day, Nasser made a statement:
“The Strait of Tiran is part of our territorial waters. No Israeli ship will continue to pass through it. At the same time, we prohibit the delivery of strategic goods to other countries through this strait to Israel. ”
For Israel, this meant a deadly threat. The port of Eilat after the 1956 war of the year served as an Israeli outlet to Asia and Africa. In the 1966 year, about a million tons of cargo passed through it, almost 30% of all Israeli raw material exports. It became the main oil port of Israel, and an oil pipeline was built from it to Ashkelon. Nasser was fully aware that his step could not be interpreted in any other way than casus belli - a declaration of war, since the maritime powers had already confirmed the principle of the freedom of international navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba as early as 1957. Even the Russians were amazed at the fact that Nasser was at risk of war: by publicly supporting his actions, behind the scenes they expressed their irritation at the fact that this step was taken without consulting them.
Accordingly, 22 May Eshkol turned to the Knesset for advice on what to do. The general tone of the speeches of members of parliament was this: we do not want war, but if we have to fight, let no one be offended. Jaber Muaddi, a member of the Druze faction, said that the Druze of Israel is ready to join the army and defend the country. He was not afraid to say from the tribune of the Knesset that the closure of the Straits of Tirana is tantamount to declaring war on Israel. And in Cairo on this day announced a military alliance with Iraq.
All eyes turned to the United States. The Americans skillfully pulled time. Perhaps they sincerely believed that there was still time for diplomacy, but the Israelis thought that there was no time. From 1961, the US ambassador to Israel was Walworth Barbour, who by 1967 had managed to recognize everyone and everything. When he finally became convinced that Israel would fight, he telephoned Washington State Department and reported. Barbour was instructed to ask the Israelis to postpone the start of the war for 48 hours, while the Americans will try to settle the straits issue by peaceful means. Friends, said Even, let's not repeat the mistakes of 1956 of the year and quarrel with the Americans. Uncle Sam requests 48 hours, let's give him 48 hours.
23 May, King of Saudi Arabia Faisal said in London that the forces of his kingdom would help repel Israeli aggression. The pendulum of war has already swung.
By noon, 23 in May, mobilization in Israel was already in full swing. The bus service was discontinued because all vehicles were put at the disposal of the army. The streets are empty, cafes and theaters, too; school hours were reduced; across the country citizens were digging trenches in a hurry; Civil Defense Headquarters delivered fire extinguishers and first aid kits to the bomb shelters. The children helped sand the bags. The question of the possibility of street fighting was seriously discussed.
Thousands of Israelis rushed to pay taxes in advance, knowing that the government would need money; at the same time, various donations from the public, including jewelry and wedding rings, poured into the Ministry of Defense. On the eve of the war, the Israelis believed that the very existence of the state was under threat. In public parks, sites for 10 thousands of graves were prepared and this was considered insufficient.
On the same day, May 23, at 13: 33, US President Lyndon Johnson summoned Walter Rostow, state security adviser, and directly asked him what were the real chances that Egypt would clash with Israel; and how can this all turn out for the USA?
Johnson and Rostow
Rostow sighed heavily and began to bend his fingers. First, he bent over Israel:
* Israel sincerely believes that its existence is under threat and that war is the last historical chance.
* Israel sincerely believes that terrorism can be stopped only by force.
* Israel sincerely believes that its geography gives it only one chance to win the war - to deliver a preemptive strike.
* Israel is well aware that the alignment in the UN is against it and that the Arabs have now consolidated both their military forces and their diplomatic efforts.
* Israel believes that America has nothing to offer Israel right now instead of the idea of a preemptive strike.
* And finally, how can America give Israel ferroconcrete guarantees to ensure its security in case the Jews do not start a war, and their diplomatic capabilities are completely exhausted?
Johnson frowned, but Rostow continued to bend his fingers about Egypt:
* Egypt yearns to pay for defeat in the 1956 war of the year.
* The political and economic situation in the country is not brilliant.
* Nasser is forced to maintain his prestige and position of the leader of the Arab world.
* Egypt would be glad to economically milk the USSR and the USA at the same time and at the same time play on the contradictions of the great powers.
In general, summed up Rostow, the war will be.
To be continued ...
Sources:
Shterenshis M. Israel. The history of the state. 2009.
Tenenbaum B. The Unsuspected Arab-Israeli War of 1956. 2011.
Okunev Yu. A six-day chord of biblical history.
Arab-Israeli wars. Arab look. 2008.
“Israel after 40 years”, Aaron S. Klieman, 1990, Pergamon, New York.
“Arabs in War”, Kenneth M. Pollack, 2002, Nebraska University.
“Israel's Wars”, Ahron Bregman, 2003, Ruthledge, New York.
Wikipedia articles, Cyclopaedia, etc.
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