After the day before yesterday's appearance in the world media news on holding a sudden closed meeting between the West European permanent representatives to the UN in Sweden on the issue of launching the “putting into active action” bypassing the Unity for Peace 377 resolution “Unity for Peace” finally clarified the upcoming strategic line of the West to eliminate Moscow from all without exception political issues in various regions of the world. In accordance with the experience of the mid-20th century, when our so-called "partners" were able to easily unleash the bloodiest Korean War of 1950 — 1953. Bypassing the Soviet veto in the Security Council, we can talk about the success of this resolution in relation to respect for interests.
If at present the pro-American permanent members of the UN Security Council are only planning to agree on the statutory details of applying the above resolution during several more meetings in the last week of April, then the final implementation of this venture will allow them to immediately implement the most unpredictable ideas about how to unleash the Syrian campaign and in relation to the situation with the unilateral introduction of the pseudo-peacekeeping contingent on the territories of Donetsk and Lugans seized by the Ukrainian military formations which national republics. We will consider the prerequisites for the May escalation of hostilities in the Donbass theater of operations in our next works, and in today's review we will return to reviewing the situation with the supply of advanced air defense and missile defense systems to Syria, as well as details of their use in the event of further coalition rocket attacks .
About a week ago, the first data on the possible transfer to the Syrian Arab Republic of an undetermined number of S-300 unknown modifications to the Syrian Arab Republic appeared on the western Internet and on the Internet with reference to informed sources in the Tartus province. It was reported that the complexes were delivered to the republic in the compartment for armored vehicles of the large landing ship (BDK), pr. 1171, Nikolay Filchenkov, attributed to the Black Sea the fleet The Russian Navy and unloaded under an aerosol curtain to hide the vigilant optical-electronic complex SYERS-2B / C, installed in the rotary turret of the RQ-4B Global Hawk drone. The information from online air traffic monitors about the arrival of the An-124 Ruslan heavy transport plane, which delivered the first S-2015 Triumph to Syria in 400, and the statement of the Syrian ambassador to Russia Riyad Haddad about oil also added fuel to the fire. the fact that the “three hundred” have been in the arsenal of the SAR air defense forces for a month already. Despite all this contradictory information movement, our military-diplomatic sources and other structures close to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia are in no hurry to talk about the transfer of the “XNUMXth” to the Syrian army as a fait accompli. What is the reason here?
This may be an attempt by our defense structures to completely misinform the enemy about any delivery dates, and even more so about the presence of C-300 complexes at Damascus, which in practice will create such an operational surprise effect that could force the coalition to completely change the tactics of future missile strikes in the moment when the crews of “Rivet Joint” or “Raptor” for the first time will find on the indicators of the 55000 and AN / ALR-94 radio intelligence systems “markers” indicating the operation of the 76H6 low-altitude detector, divisional 64Н6 radar detector and 30Н6Е radar for illumination and targeting. And this, in turn, will delay the date of the next powerful strike, allowing even more solidly to strengthen the Syrian air defense.
An important detail is the fact that it will not be possible to detect the divisions of the “300ths” in the USA and Israel air forces until the above-mentioned radar facilities start work on radiation. For example, launchers 5P85SD (CE) with 30H6E, 76H6, and 5X63C (54XXUMXX) radars can be expected to be ordered to be in a combat position while on the eastern slopes of the Lubnan-a-off-off-a-off-a-off-a-off-a-off line-a-off-a-off line. - UMV-6 / 1 complexes or frameless masks of the “Tent” type, which reduce radar and infrared signatures many times, as well as optical conspicuity for radar and optical radar and optical reconnaissance systems.
In this case, the mountain ranges act as a natural “screen” of the area hiding the presence of S-300 from AFAR radars with the synthesized aperture AN / ZPY-2 installed on the Global Hawks, which barrage west of the Lubnan al-Sharqiya mountains . When the disguised command post 54K6E receives information about the launch of enemy cruise missiles from sea and air carriers of enemy cruise missiles from an A-50U Aircraft and A-20U, literally in 5 minutes all elements of the complex can advance to previously known positions, deploy in XNUMX minutes and wait for the moment when the "Tomahawk", other means of air attack, including low-flying tactical Aviationwill be within the radio horizon and range of the complex.
It is logical to assume that the Syrian C-300 calculations will be prepared on the principle of "turned - worked - left positions", with an emphasis on minimizing the time of combat work of the division in the enemy's radar and electronic intelligence reconnaissance area, as it would be an extremely stupid decision to transfer expensive anti-aircraft guided missiles to intercept conventional anti-radar missiles AGM-88E AARGM, which in service with only one carrier-wing wing of tactical fighter F / A-18E / F can be around 200! Yes, and the relative safety of the C-300 anti-aircraft missile group in Syria can be guaranteed solely thanks to the above tactics of “quick massive interceptions and withdrawal from positions”, because literally in each of several divisions of the Israeli air force and deck aircraft of the US Navy, with full numerical superiority, apply literally to hundreds of different elements of high precision weapons (from the super-small-size Spice-250 and GBU-53 / B SDB planning bombs to the AGM-84H tactical missiles SLAM-ER and Popeye-II).
A separate conversation about the inflatable models of elements of "three hundred", which can be transferred to the engineering and camouflage units of the Syrian Arab Army. These models, deployed in the shortest possible time, have similar optical parameters and an effective scattering surface with real launchers, radars and PBU complex, which can confuse almost any aerial reconnaissance device, from Global Hawk to strategic radar reconnaissance aircraft and ground-based targeting E-8C "J-STARS", equipped with the most advanced airborne radar systems based on active phased AN / ZPY-2 MP-RTIP and AN / APY-3. Thanks to the high-frequency centimeter X-band operation, these complexes are capable of obtaining a radar image of super-high resolution in the mode of the synthesized aperture, according to which classification and, in some cases, identification of surface and ground equipment units is possible. But inflatable dummies are able to circle these radars around their fingers, but only until the radar lights up this complex.
And now about the most "piquant" technological details that instill real fear and insecurity in the flight personnel of the deck aviation of the US Navy and the pilots of the Israeli Air Force. The trick here is that neither Tel Aviv nor Washington, given the degree of "closeness" of the process of delivering the "300th" to the Syrian Arab Republic, is unlikely to be able to determine in advance the modification of the arrived complexes. And there may be as many as three. The most likely modification of anti-aircraft missile systems considered for delivery is the C-300PMU-2 Favorit, consisting of several divisions. This is the most advanced option, presented by the advanced command and control unit (PBU) 54K6Е2 with more high-performance controls 35Р6-2 on the new computing base. Unlike the early PBU 54K6, the new product allows C-300PMU-2 to be integrated into almost any network-centric anti-missile defense system, where the main component remains the Baikal-1МE and Polyana-D4X1 ACS. In terms of hardware, the combat information and control system of this complex is as close as possible to the 30K6E system of the C-400 Triumph complex, thanks to which Syrian calculations can receive radar information both via Baikaly and directly from the 96Л6 radar located in Tartus and Khmeimime.
The main advantage of the C-300PMU-2 is the long-range anti-aircraft guided missile interceptor 48Н6Х2, which has a range of 200 km. It is from this moment that all the problems of lovers of unpunished rocket bombing of strategic facilities of the Syrian government forces will begin. The point is that the 30H6Х2 radar complex of illumination and guidance, located on the hardware container Ф1М of С-300ПМУ-2 complex or by the operating frequency range (X-band), does not differ by its energy potential from the similar multi-functional radar 30Н6 З zenernite zentoneffly zither. 300PMU-1, which can also be supplied to Damascus.
Consequently, even during the combat work of the “300th” AN / ALR-67 (V) 3 Super Hornets warning station, the Israeli F-3000I Sufa Israeli S-16 FPS, as well as specialized X-Rum 55000 complexes of RC-planes 135W cannot reliably distinguish the PMU-1 from the PMU-2, and the anti-aircraft missiles are different. For example, the pilot of the deck F / A-18E / F, approaching the distance of the “three hundredth” at a distance of 170 km, will walk along the blade of the knife, because it will not have information about whether 48H6Е is used against him with a radius of 150 km or The 200-kilometer 48H6-2, which will be much harder to escape from in the event of shelling, since the maximum height of its flight trajectory is noticeably higher than that of the earlier version, and hence the negative retardant effect of aerodynamic drag is observed at a longer distance.
This fact causes extremely serious concerns to the Israeli Air Force commanders, since C-XNUMPPMU-300 make it possible to retain fire control over all the medium-altitude and high-altitude sections of Israel’s aerospace space up to Tel Aviv. Deploying the same complex in the mountainous regions west of Damascus will allow the expansion of the radio horizon for intercepting Hel Haavir aviation and the US Air Force operating from the southern and southeast air routes. The 2H48Е and 6Н48Х6 anti-aircraft missiles have unique speed characteristics today, accelerating to 2 — 6900 km / h at the upper stage, which leaves the enemy pilots a minimum amount of time to perform an anti-missile maneuver. Consequently, the F-7100C / D / I Israeli Air Force, stationed on the Ramat-David Avb, will automatically be within the radius of destruction of the Syrian C-16PMU-300 / 1 immediately after takeoff and rise to a height of several kilometers.
There is also an "economy version" of the "three hundred" for the improvement of the Syrian air defense system - 75Р6 С-300ПС, which entered service with the USSR air defense forces in the distant 1982 year. The complex is equipped with an early modification of the radar illumination and targeting 30H6-1, which has a range of capture of an air target with EPR around 2-3 square. m of order 75 — 90 km. Despite the fact that the 5B55Р anti-aircraft missiles used, due to the low radar power qualities, have a similar range, their speed is almost at the level of the above-described samples (hypersonic), and is about 6500 km / h.
Meanwhile, the outdated computational “stuffing” of the command post 5H63С (in particular, the hardware container ФХNUMXК) does not allow intercepting aerospace attack weapons moving at speeds over 2 km / h, while PMU-4700 / 1 destroy hypersonic CR and ballistic targets with speeds in 2 km / h. But, fortunately, such WTO weapons are unlikely to be used by the American and Israeli air forces in the Syrian theater of operations, and therefore the C-10500PS may be quite enough. The radar 300H30-6 has six target channels, as well as modern PMU-1, and is also able to accompany airborne objects to 2 in the “trail / SNP” mode.
Combat command point 5Н63С with hardware container Ф2К and antenna post 30Н6-1 in the center (С-300ПС complex)
As a result, a system of six complexes can simultaneously intercept 36 targets. The hardware possibility of linking with various modifications of the automated control systems "Baikal" and "Polyana" is also present here, as evidenced by the officially provided information from the air defense concern "Almaz-Antey". The only thing that could cause some concerns before 14 in April was the minimum ESR of the target being processed in 0,05 sq.m. (against 0,02 sq. m for Favorit), since the reflecting surface of the missiles used by our opponents in Syria could be less. But practice has shown the opposite, and therefore even the good old C-300PS is able to set the heat on any Trump “smart and beautiful” missiles.Read more...