Fiasco "beautiful and smart." Technical points failing Syria
Obviously, dashing times of simple and quick-prepared massed missile strikes by the combined naval and air forces of the Western coalition in terms of geopolitical disagreeable states of the world are coming to their logical conclusion, since most of the “bad guys” regimes (the NATO military men like to say supported by Moscow and Tehran) today are often worthy of military-technical means that pose a serious threat to both the means of air attack and their carriers. This opinion was confirmed by the extremely dubious rocket attack on various strategic military facilities of the SAR.
The most striking example of the dramatically changed military-technical relationship of forces between the Western coalition led by the United States and Moscow-supported players is the Syrian theater of operations, where the start of an escalation junction with the use of "smart and beautiful rockets", announced publicly by the head of the White House Donald Trump and the Minister of Defense James Mattis, noticeably delayed. For example, despite the operational redeployment of strategic bomber-missile carriers (each equipped with 24 TKRVB AGM-158B), as well as being within the 2500 radius of the Syrian undersea territory (impact modification of SSBNSGNBX), the SSNNX missile line (attack modification of SSBNSGNBX) ") And surface (USS" Donald Cook "and" Porter "destroyers) carriers of UGM / RGM-109E" Block IV "strategic cruise missiles, to issue an order to start an MRAU in Syria Trump did not rush. The announced 2 days were not enough to weigh the pros and cons in making a final decision on this difficult issue. And the destroyer control rocket weapons DDG-75 USS "Donald Cook" quite unexpectedly retreated from the closest approaches to Tartus to the area between the islands of Crete and Cyprus.
The culminating and illustrative moments include D. Trump’s tweet statement that the launch of the missile strike will take place either “very soon or not at all” and the subsequent statement by the head of the US defense department, James Mattis, to continue considering several options for a joint coalition against government forces. Syria, as he put it, "for tactical reasons: to save the lives of civilians." All of us are well aware that in all military conflicts with the participation of the Western powers, without exception, the issue of preserving the lives of civilians was not on the agenda.
In view of this, a quite logical question arises: what was the main reason for the “slipping” of the implementation of the power scenario in Syria and such inadequate jumps in the rhetoric of Donald Trump in his Twitter account? After all, the crews of the B-1B “Lancer” with more than a hundred “beautiful and smart” JASSM-ER have been waiting for orders for the MRAU for several days, as well as the allied British “Tornado GR.4” at Akrotiri airbase, ready to send by targets in the SAR, there are dozens of precision Storm Shadow long-range tactical missiles plus the British MAPL Trafalgar and Esteut, capable of receiving UGM-25E strategic cruise missiles on the torpedo compartments 38 and 109, respectively. We can also add the destroyers of the Donald Cook and Porter URO destroyers carrying more than a hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles to the universal TLU Mk 41.
The total number of high-precision weapons, with the participation of the Israeli Air Force and without the participation of the AUG, led by the aircraft carrier "Harry Truman", has passed for 500 — 550 units. a few days ago, which prompted many of our observers to think about the complete incapacity of the Syrian air defense systems, as well as the missile defense system of the Russian Aerospace Forces before such a swarm of rockets. But the Pentagon continued to delay the operation, considering options for strikes, including air "loopholes" for breaking through the Syrian air defense, the distribution of WTO assets ("Storm Shadov", "Tomahawki" and JASSM-ER) in one or another airway, and the most important facilities on which the Russian contingent may be located.
The first part of the answer cleared up on Friday afternoon, April 13, when The New York Times, citing sources in Washington, reported that during a closed meeting at the White House, the head of the US defense department D. Mattis explained the delay of the military operation by searching options that exclude a direct clash of the forces of the western coalition with the armed forces of Russia and Iran, which can develop into a regional and then global conflict.
After bringing all the units of the Russian air forces and naval forces into full combat readiness in the western strategic direction, as well as warning the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Valery Gerasimov, about the interception of air force and destruction of carriers (in the case of the death of our military personnel), this fear of strategists in the Pentagon is fully understandable and lies on the surface . The most piquant moment here was that the Central Command of the US Armed Forces until the last day did not have reliable information about exactly what strategically important facilities of the Syrian Arab Army are units of the Russian military contingent, including advisers, specialists in the field of air defense, radio intelligence and etc. And so any hastily planned massive missileaviation a strike could lead to the death of our military, which would eventually turn out to be a real disaster for the United States and NATO, at least in the scale of delivering massive strikes against the Air Force of the United Kingdom Air Force Akrotiri and all NATO naval strike groups operating in the eastern Mediterranean and Red sea.
A significant proportion of the difficulty in calculating the exact coordinates of the deployment of Russian military units in Syria was caused by several significant factors. First of all, this is a line of conduct that is absolutely unusual for the leader of a superpower and the psychological state of US President Donald Trump. The plans for the operation to be announced on Twitter in advance resulted in the relocation of the headquarters of the Syrian Arab Army to an unknown area in the first hours of growing tensions, as reported by the French edition of Le Figaro. Secondly, it is the presence in the western provinces of the Syrian Arab Republic (mainly in Hama, Tatrthus and Latakia) of an impressive amount of advanced electronic countermeasures that produce noise barrage and response impulse noise for airborne radar, radio electronic and radio intelligence reconnaissance units of the OVAS of the Western coalition. For example, at the disposal of the Russian contingent there are such powerful noise (barrier, quasi-continuous and impact) interference systems like 1Л248-4 SPN-4 and 1Л248-2 SPN-2. Both complexes are the offspring of a high-tech developer, the All-Russian Research Institute Gradient, and differ in the frequency ranges of radiation.
In particular, the interference emitted by the 1L248-4 SPN-4 complex covers most of the centimeter X-band (8-10,17 GHz), falling short of only 12 GHz. This is quite enough to reduce the quality of the "radar image" of ground objects by several times, obtained by means of the AN / ZPY-2 side-scan AFAR radar installed in the ventral radio-transparent fairing of the strategic drone RQ-4B "Global Hawk". In order to clearly identify a ground object in the synthetic aperture mode, the Global Hawk needs to approach a distance of approximately 120-150 km from the reconnaissance territory, which is confirmed by the example of regular reconnaissance flights of the vehicle near the line of contact in the Donbass. At the same time, SPN-4 provides effective countermeasures simultaneously to 2 X-band aerial radar reconnaissance systems at a distance of more than 130-140 km.
Also SPN-4 is able to ensure the safety of operating tactical, strategic, military transport and army aviation in the area of air bases located near the theaters of military operations. Thus, during take-off or landing, when friendly combat aircraft do not have the ability to fully utilize an armament control complex (KUV), powerful response impulse interference from the 1L248-2 complex deployed near the runway web prevents the stable "capture" of our planes and helicopters using onboard Radar of the enemy (AN / APG-82V1, AN / APG-83, AN / APG-77, etc.) EW 1LXXUMUM-248 SPN-2 complex operates in higher frequency J- and Ku-centimeter waves (from 2 to 13,333 GHz) and is designed primarily to suppress active radar seeker heads medium-range missiles air combat MICA-EM, MBDA «Meteor» etc. And this is far from a complete list of the REP funds that created and are creating significant problems for the US airborne X-ray radar reconnaissance systems; there is also “Krasuha-17,544” and many other complexes that perform jamming in the meter, decimeter and centimeter wavelengths.
Antenna post station powerful noise interference SPN-4
It is noteworthy that even two days before the missile attack by the Air Force and the US Navy repeatedly tried to calculate the location and movement of military equipment of the Russian contingent using RQ-4B strategic aerial reconnaissance drones, RC-135V / W “Rivet Joint” aircraft and anti-submarine aircraft P -8A "Poseidon" operating in the airspace of Israel (south of the Golan Heights) and over the water area of the eastern Mediterranean Sea (south-west of the maritime borders of the province of Tartus). All this could be seen on the syria.liveuamap.com tactical online map. But, as we see, such unprecedented measures did not allow the joint command of the coalition forces to get a full-fledged strategic picture with the coordinates of the Russian contingent, including military advisers, which once again confirms the high efficiency of our EW complexes and means of encrypting radio communication channels and tactical data exchange.
It is for this reason that during the entire period of preparation for the strike, the Pentagon contacted the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces via military communication channels, trying to coordinate the maximum possible number of "points of contact" in order to avoid a direct collision with the Russian contingent, and for this very reason the strike turned out to be so limited, and also absolutely inconsistent with the number of used media, which at the current moment, according to summary information from several sources, there are approximately 18 units. Thus, the mixed strike group of the OVS coalition was represented by:
- an underwater component, which was made by the ultra low noise multipurpose nuclear submarine of the 4 generation SSN-785 "John Warner" of an improved version of the Virginia Block III, nicknamed "Sledgehammer of Freefom" and "shoot out" one of the 2's vertical revolver PU, launching 6 SCS UGM-109E "Tomahawk Block IV" on targets in the SAR (British MAPL classes "Trafalgar" and "Estujt" did not participate in striking; the total number of missiles launched from the "John Warner" and a pair of British submarines could exceed 30 - 40 units, in total - only 6);
- a surface component that was presented by the Aegis-CG-61 USS "Monterey" class Ticonderoga cruiser (launched the 30 tactical UGM-109C / D TLAM-C / D tactical with a reduced range of 50-60 or more missiles), Aegis "DDG-76 USS" Higgins "and DDG-58" Laboon "rocket weapon controlmen (with a total number of missiles launched - only 30 units) and the French frigate D653" Languedoc ", which launched only 3 missiles SCALP Naval; the number of missiles launched from the USS Porter and Donald Cook destroyers is unknown (obviously, they were used only as an anti-missile umbrella over the Eastern Mediterranean);
- the air component presented by 2 by strategic rocket-carrying bombers B-1B "Lancer", which used only 19 low-profile tactical long-range cruise missiles AGM-158B JASSM-ER in the presence of 48 suspension units on internal revolver PU; as well as the Tornado GR.4 strike force of the British Air Force (Storm Shadow 8 tactical missiles), the French Rafale link and one Mirage-2000 (the air-launched SCALP-EG launched 9 tactical missiles).
As a result, there is a “strike swarm” of only 105 missiles of two classes, where Tomahawks account for approximately 63%, on JASSM-ER - 18,1%, on SCALP in sea and air basing - 11,4% and “Storm Shadow” - 7,5% while more than 350 missiles could be used, not including the Israeli Delilah and Popeye II. As we can see, the C-400 “Triumph” (the first deployed near Hmeimim and the second near Masyaf) and the powerful C-300B4 division in the Tartus region, are quite meager by the standards of a pair of divisions (anti-aircraft missile regiment). This mixed anti-missile group is represented by roughly 192 anti-aircraft guided missiles 48H6XXUMUM, 3М9МВ and 82М9М. But after all, our air defense weapons once again, due to geopolitical agreements with the West, did not participate in repelling the blow that took place in early morning on April 83, and therefore even such a “restrained” and “limited” strike could become critical for the far from advanced Syrian air defense system .
But the opposite happened: 71 from 105 (103, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense) cruise missiles were intercepted by anti-aircraft missiles that are in service with the Syrian Arab army. In addition, all the CDs launched at Duvaly airbases (4 missiles), Dumeyr (12 units), Bley (18 units) and Shyrat (12 units) were destroyed in the flying area of the trajectory, thanks to which the runway lanes , hangars and auxiliary facilities remained intact.
How could such a high interception ratio (0,68) be achieved, given that the Russian media spread the data that only outdated Soviet air defense systems of the C-75, C-125, C-200, and Cube types took part in repelling the blow and "Beech"? Moreover, 17 tactical missiles “Storm Shadow”, “SCALP-EG”, “Scalp Naval” and 6 “Tomahawks” launched from Tornado, Rafaley and Mirage suspensions, as well as from the John Paulner MAPL ”(From the Mediterranean direction) approached targets through the ridges of Anti-Lebanon, which means they were not available for detection by the Syrian and Russian ground radio-electronic reconnaissance complexes until the very last moment. Here it is worthwhile to move our brains, consider modifications of these supposedly “ancient” complexes, as well as the network-centric linking systems and additional ABM systems assigned to them to cover the “dead zones” in close proximity to military airfields and other strategic facilities.
To begin with, some of our media not only seriously mistaken about the "oak" and outdated elemental base of the current anti-aircraft missile systems of Syrian air defense, but also do not have the slightest basic knowledge about the nomenclature of these means, which we observed in the recent erroneous comment of one of correspondents who issued the Buk medium range air defense system for the C-200 long-range complex. But this is not so important detail. The fact is that since 2012, many stationary anti-aircraft missile systems C-125 Pechora are undergoing a program of deep modernization of both the element base of onboard radioelectronic equipment and the missile component with a launcher prior to the Pechora-2M modification. One of the revolutionary stages of the renovation of the complex, carried out by the Defense Industrial Systems financial and industrial group, consisting of the ICB Fakel, the Kuntsevo Design Bureau, the Almaz Central Design Bureau and other enterprises, became the development of the improved 5B27DE anti-aircraft missile, as well as integration into the combat point control UNK-2M terminal receiving information about the tactical air situation over a secure radio channel.
The new 5B27DE anti-aircraft guided missile, characterized by the possibility of increasing the solid propellant charge of the launch stage, is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 32 km, as well as at 15 - 20 m heights due to the modernization of the radio fuse. The latter option makes it possible to destroy the advertised ultra-low-altitude tactical missiles "JASSM-ER" and "Storm Shadow", not to mention the "Tomahawks", the effective scattering surface of which approaches 0,1 square. The important point here is that the Pechora 125М C-2 is capable of striking cruise missiles not only in the active mode of the CHP-125-2М radar, but also in the passive mode using the Carat TV / IR scanner. -2 ”or more modern. Such a regime can become indispensable if a tactical / strategic cruise missile with an ESR of less than 0,07 - 0,05 square is used against the object being covered. m, which only radar type 92H6Е or 9С32М are capable of consistently detecting. Equipping the tactical environment with a telecode communications channel through a secure channel allows the integration of Pechora-2M into a single network-centric air defense network with Triumph C-400, C-300B4, C-200, Buk-M2E, Panim complexes -С1 »,« Tor-М1 / М2Е / М2МКМ », etc. The link of the system linking in this case is the high-performance automated control systems (ACS) of the Baikal-1МE and Poliana-D4М1 anti-aircraft brigades, as well as the Unified Battery Command Center (UCMM) 9-X737М Ranzhir-M.
In such an integrated air defense system, the Syrian Pechora-2M, although they did not receive direct fire support from the Russian C-300B4 and C-400 air defense systems, repelled by the attack of the 14 enemy missiles of April, definitely received a full-fledged picture of the air situation over most of the western The provinces of the Syrian Arab Republic also received “data packets” with target allocation, which could be implemented exclusively through the Baikal-1МЭ and Poliana-D4М1 automated control systems. Sources of radar information in this case could be either the 96L6 high-altitude detectors attached to the Triumph C-400 complexes, as well as the A-50U long-range radar patrol and guidance aircraft, which were probably lifted from the Hmeymim airbase for familiarization with the effective reflecting surface of the Sculpus to be seen from the effective reflecting surface of the Sculpus to be seen from the Scalpus. and "Storm Shadow."
It is worth noting that the joint work of the A-50U bundle - Baikal-1МE, issuing target designation to Pechory-2М, Bukam-М2Э, Pantsirymi and Osam-AKM in the region of Damascus, Homs and Hama provinces would be enough not only to successfully repel the last strike of 103 or 105 cruise missiles, but also to repel a three times more powerful strike using 300 air attack weapons, because the throughput of the Bumblebee-2 radar complex (installed on A-50) 300 simultaneously accompanied air routes, while The time as the “Baikal-1МЭ” ACS can work with 500 targets, rationally distributing them between the 24 divisions of the mixed anti-aircraft missile group. Moreover, “Baikal-1МЭ” is capable of issuing target designation to three modern electronic warfare complexes at once (from Krasukha to SPN-4 / 2).
The A-50U long-range radar detection and control aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces, which was on combat duty, was spotted over the province of Ham on April 13 (a few hours before the strike); it is for this reason that the reflection of the coalition’s missile strike by the Syrian air defense forces was so “honed” and brilliant. The main work was entrusted to the shoulders of the operators of the multi-channel Buk-М2E air defense system and the Pantsir-С1 air defense system, which CAA already has more than 40 units.
Information sources:
https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/4119740.html
https://bmpd.livejournal.com/261092.html
https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2018/04/14/rudskoy-iz-103-raket-ssha-71-byla-perehvachena-siriyskimi-pvo
Information